

Looking Doppelganger: An Analysis of Evolving State-Sponsored Disinformation Tactics

by

Marcus Müller

2024

Supervisors:

René Torenlid, first supervisor

Shawn Donnelly, second supervisor

Acknowledgements: data is provided by the Bot blocker project @antibot4navalny

This work was produced with the help of Claude 3 Opus, an AI model by Anthropic. Detailed usage explained in Appendix section 10.6.

Listen, actually, I shouldn't really talk about it, but I will roughly outline it. We create many sources of information that are not tied to us. While the CIA tries to figure out that they're tied to us, they already have an enormous audience. Sometimes they find them and close them down. Some mornings, you wake up, 600 channels are gone, all at once. While they're shutting them down, we've already created the new ones. This is how we chase each other, it's actually fun. - Margarita Simonyan, head of Russia Today (RT).¹

¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBx7ogBHyBc>, translated by Julia Davis, show "The Fate of a Man" on Russia 1

Executive Summary:

This master's thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the "Doppelganger" disinformation campaign, a sophisticated Russian-linked operation targeting multiple countries through social media platforms. The research, based on data from the @antibot4navalny group, examines the campaign's infrastructure, tactics, narratives, and impact from November 2023 to May 2024, while situating the findings within the broader context of existing literature on Russian disinformation campaigns.

The study builds upon existing research on Russian disinformation tactics, drawing on works such as Yablokov (2015), Mejias and Vokuev (2017), and Linvill and Warren (2020). It incorporates concepts like "conspiratorial discourse," the exploitation of social divisions, and concepts such as the "firehose of falsehood" model (Paul & Matthews, 2016).

Key Findings:

1. Infrastructure and Tactics:
 - The campaign uses a network of Twitter bots, including content bots and distribution bots.
 - It employs a multi-stage redirection process (FIKED) to obscure the origins of disinformation.
 - The operation creates and promotes content through RRN (Recent Reliable News) affiliated sites, cloned news websites, and selective use of mainstream media articles.
2. Narratives:
 - Content is tailored to specific target audiences in Germany, France, Italy, Poland, the United States, Ukraine, and Israel.
 - Common themes include criticism of Western governments, skepticism towards Ukraine, and promotion of pro-Russian viewpoints.
3. Attribution and Enforcement:
 - The campaign is linked to Russian companies Social Design Agency (SDA) and Structura, both sanctioned by the EU and US.
 - Despite sanctions, many campaign-affiliated websites continue to operate on US and EU-based servers.
 - Twitter's response to the campaign has been inconsistent and often ineffective, raising questions about compliance with the EU's Digital Services Act.
4. Impact and Reach:
 - While overall reach is often limited, the campaign has demonstrated the ability to significantly amplify certain narratives during key events.

Recommendations:

1. Enhance coordination among stakeholders for improved detection, takedowns, and sanctions enforcement
2. Improve social media platforms' detection and response to coordinated inauthentic behavior.
3. Improve Twitter's response to coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB).
4. Address domain registrars' and web hosts' role in combating disinformation campaigns.

This study underscores the complex and evolving nature of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns and highlights the need for a multi-stakeholder approach to effectively counter these threats to democratic processes and ensure information integrity.

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Glossary of Terms:

- Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior: The use of multiple social media accounts working together to mislead people or manipulate public debate for a strategic goal, while concealing the identity of the actors behind the operation.
- Disinformation: False, inaccurate, or misleading information that is spread deliberately with the intent to deceive or mislead.
- Doppelgänger/Doppelgänger/RRN: A disinformation operation that disseminates false articles using websites designed to resemble real news outlets. It uses a multi-stage redirection technique to drive traffic to the fake content.
- Network Obfuscation: Techniques used to hide or obscure the details of network communication to avoid detection, attribution, or blocking.
- OSINT: Open-Source Intelligence, which refers to the collection and analysis of data gathered from publicly available sources to produce actionable intelligence.
- Information Warfare: The tactical and strategic use of information to gain an advantage over an opponent, often by spreading propaganda or disinformation to influence public opinion.
- FIKED model: Refers to the four major components of the Doppelgänger link promotion:
 - Front domains (F): Expendable domains advertised on Twitter to initiate the redirection chain
 - Intermediary domains (I): Responsible for redirecting
 - Keitaro domains (KE): Host an ad tracker from Estonian based company Keitaro that geofences content and performs the final redirection
 - Doppelgänger domains (D): The final destination article
- Geofencing: The practice of determining from where an internet user is using the internet from and prevent or allowing a user to access a service depending on the location of the user. Used by Doppelgänger to restrict content visibility.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Disinformation campaigns are a form of information warfare designed to manipulate perceptions and influence behavior change through distributing propaganda, fabricated evidence, manipulated media, and more (Jack, 2017; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). This is accomplished by networks of automated bots, fake accounts, websites, articles, images, videos, advertisements, social media posts, discussion forum comments, reviews, petitions, data visualization, and edited video/audio clips engineered to deceive target audiences at mass scale. Goals include pushing narratives, smearing opponents, depressing voter turnout, increasing distrust in institutions, exacerbating tensions around divisive issues, and broadly impacting the information ecosystem and policy decisions. State actors pioneer such influence operations to gain geopolitical leverage cheaply with minimal attribution.

The pioneer of modern computational disinformation is Russia, which views information warfare as crucial for achieving strategic objectives (Giles, 2016; Paul & Matthews, 2016). Tactics were used first domestically to consolidate Putin's power through imprisoning critics and harassing journalists before expanding internationally (Sanovich, 2017). While the 2016 US election brought mainstream spotlight, Russian operations have global scope and history. After the annexation of Ukraine in 2014, similar propaganda flooded nearby Baltic states stirring ethnic tensions. The Internet Research Agency, Russia's infamous disinformation factory, also targeted the 2016 Brexit vote while amplifying Catalan separatism to weaken Europe, and sought to interfere in European elections with pro-Russian far right support (DiResta et al., 2018; Bastos & Farkas, 2019).

Most recently, since invading Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin has dramatically escalated disinformation tactics as wartime censorship laws threaten domestic journalists (Bergengruen, 2023). Termed the "firehose of falsehood," the Russian model pursues confusion and uncertainty through a deluge of contradictory coverage rather than coherence (Paul & Matthews, 2016). Narratives shift fluidly week-to-week between denying bombing civilians, praising occupying forces, blaming false flags, claiming comparison to Nazi Germany, and more. Target countries face information paralysis from the overwhelming flood.

One notable organization monitoring disinformation is @antibot4navalny, a group of anonymous volunteers dedicated to identifying and tracking Russian disinformation campaigns. They operate primarily on Twitter, where they track and report on the activities of pro-Russian disinformation networks. For instance, they have extensively documented the "Doppelgänger" campaign, whose data will be used to analyze the campaign for this paper. The data collected by @antibot4navalny is used for this research and has also been regularly shared with media and journalists to inform the public and enhance transparency about ongoing Russian disinformation.

Doppelgänger, first extensively analyzed by EU DisinfoLab in September 2022, the campaign originally impersonated legitimate Western news outlets websites through copy-cat domain names, fabricated articles/videos, and sophisticated targeting across languages aligned with Kremlin interests (DisinfoLab, 2022). Meta then analyzed the campaign further by identifying a network of over 60 fake cloned websites targeting primarily Germany and France with anti-Ukraine narratives (Meta, 2022). These reports revealed key early tactics and infrastructure,

but as an adaptive operation, Doppelgänger as a disinformation campaign continued shifting shape.

Disinformation poses one of the foremost threats to contemporary open democratic societies. Disinformation aims to exacerbate social divides, undermine trust in media and institutions, and broadly influence public discourse, political decision-making and even elections (Bennett & Livingston, 2018).

Many disinformation campaigns are state-sponsored, deliberately designed to destabilize societies and discredit political opponents. Autocratic states such as Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran have well-documented histories of engaging in such activities. Even democratic nations, like the United States, have occasionally deployed disinformation tactics, such as through Operation Earnest Voice, which aimed to spread pro-American sentiments internationally (Cobain, 2017).

Most of these campaigns leverage social media, employing bots, fake websites, and fake accounts to disseminate manipulated or entirely fabricated information widely. In combating these disinformation efforts, governments have adopted various strategies. Legislation such as Germany's Network Enforcement Act compels platforms to remove illegal content under threat of fines. Enhancing media literacy has been prioritized in countries like Finland and Sweden, equipping citizens to critically assess information sources.

Public awareness campaigns help educate citizens on recognizing disinformation. There is significant collaboration with technology companies to share intelligence and mitigate fake news, and international cooperation is evident in initiatives like the European Union's Code of Practice on Disinformation. Governments also impose sanctions targeting entities associated with disinformation campaigns, attempting to curb the influence of foreign powers.

These measures highlight the challenge of addressing disinformation without infringing on free speech, maintaining a crucial balance in democratic societies. This balance is particularly vital as governments strive to prevent the erosion of public trust and the potential destabilization of democratic institutions.

Russia, in particular, has emerged as a sophisticated leader in global disinformation, exploiting gaps in policy, enforcement, and public preparedness. This research focuses specifically on how European governments are responding to the Russian disinformation campaigns Doppelgänger on social media, analyzing the effectiveness of different countermeasures against increasingly complex and adaptive threats.

The Doppelgänger campaign

The Doppelgänger campaign, first analyzed in 2022, originally involved a network of fake websites impersonating legitimate news outlets to spread fabricated pro-Kremlin content across platforms like Twitter and Facebook (DisinfoLab, 2022; Meta, 2022). This study examines two key dimensions of the campaign: infrastructure, meaning the technical backbone of websites, domains, and accounts enabling content dissemination; and narratives, referring to the strategic messaging and framing aimed at shaping perceptions and behaviors around issues like the Ukraine war, energy policies, and social divisions.

While Doppelgänger operates across many social media platforms, this research focuses primarily on Twitter due its ease of access in tracking the on-going disinformation. Future studies could expand to other platforms like Facebook to assess the generalizability of findings.

EU DisinfoLab (2022) in collaboration with Qurium originally analyzed the Doppelgänger campaign. According to DisinfoLab, the campaign originally just involved impersonating news outlets by cloning their websites and domains to spread fake news articles, videos, and polls that align with Russian propaganda narratives about the war in Ukraine.

Specifically, the fake content aimed to undermine Ukraine by portraying it as a failed, Nazi state while also fear mongering that European sanctions against Russia will devastate economies and cause shortages. The campaign runners originally purchased dozens of lookalike domain names of real outlets like Bild, The Guardian, and Le Monde and copied their visual designs to disguise the disinformation. And the campaign runners used technical features that enabled tactics like geo-blocking content and smart link redirects.

When the DisInfoLab made their analysis, they argued that definitive attribution was not possible, but that multiple signals in the campaign pointed to Russian involvement, including Russian-language metadata in videos and registrations of fake domains with a Russian company. Recommendations were made to better regulate domain name registrations, prevent abuse of EU-based digital infrastructure, improve enforcement of laws against such covert operations, and increase data access for researchers. Nevertheless, despite the campaign's sophistication, engagement appears low according to them, leading them to characterize it as a failed attempt to intimidate Europe more than genuinely influence opinions. The report concludes by calling for European actions to close loopholes that allow malicious actors to evade accountability.

In their Recap of 2022, Meta (formerly Facebook) provided an update on their ongoing efforts to combat influence operations originating from Russia (Meta, 2022). The report highlighted the diversity of tactics, targets, and actors involved in these operations, emphasizing that there is no single "Russian influence operations playbook."

Notably, Meta attributed the Doppelgänger campaign to two companies based in Russia: Structura National Technology and Social Design Agency (Агентство Социального Проектирования)

VIGINUM's report on the Doppelgänger disinformation campaign provides valuable insights that complement and bridge the gap between the DisinfoLab and Meta reports and the more recent analysis by Recorded Future. The French government agency's findings shed light on the evolving tactics and infrastructure of the campaign, helping to paint a more comprehensive picture of the threat landscape.

In July 2023, VIGINUM, the French government's agency tasked with combating foreign digital interference, released a detailed report on the Doppelgänger campaign. The report confirmed the findings of the DisinfoLab and Meta analyses, while also providing new insights into the campaign's operations and connections to Russian state actors.

VIGINUM's analysis revealed that the campaign had expanded its efforts to create WordPress websites mimicking legitimate European news outlets, with a particular focus on French media. These news sites were used to disseminate fabricated articles and disinformation aligned with pro-Kremlin narratives. The report also identified the central role of the website RRN.world (later renamed RRN.media) in coordinating and amplifying the campaign's content across multiple platforms and languages.

Moreover, VIGINUM's investigation uncovered evidence linking the Doppelgänger campaign to Russian state-sponsored actors. The VIGINUM report also highlighted the campaign's use of sophisticated techniques to evade detection and maintain its infrastructure, such as the employment of a multi-stage redirection process involving multiple domains and the use of Keitaro TDS (Traffic Direction System) for geotargeting and content delivery. These findings demonstrate the adaptability and resilience of the Doppelgänger operation, foreshadowing the ongoing evolution of its tactics as documented in Recorded Future's later analysis.

Recorded Future's analysis uncovered several concurrent Doppelgänger campaigns targeting audiences in Ukraine, the United States, and Germany. These campaigns using network obfuscation techniques and first-/second-stage website redirects to disguise the ultimate destination of links. Social media accounts, many likely automated, promote this content through coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB). Recorded Future's analysis also found likely generative AI was used to produce scalable disinformation content for the campaigns (Recorded Future, 2023). With one of the promoted sites via the Doppelgänger campaign, ElectionWatch, appearing to leverage AI-generated articles focused on election issues, while another, MyPride, spread anti-LGBTQ rhetoric (Recorded Future, 2023).

Infrastructure analysis revealed links between the campaigns' first- and second-stage websites and domains previously identified as part of the Doppelgänger network. Additional evidence, such as reused assets and the Keitaro analytics platform, provided further analysis to the evolving nature of Doppelgänger. The report discusses Doppelgänger's flexibility and innovation in avoidance tactics as an "enduring, scalable, and adaptable" Russian information warfare apparatus.

Recorded Future's analysis concluded with recommendations for continued research cooperation and public education to counter the threat of the disinformation campaign. The analysis provides extensive indicators to aid technology firms and social media platforms in detection and takedown efforts against the sophisticated malign influence operation.

While a significant body of work is currently being produced on the Doppelgänger campaign, this literature review has aimed to provide a comprehensive overview of the most relevant and up-to-date resources available. The reports and analyses from DisinfoLab, Meta, VIGINUM, and Recorded Future have been instrumental in understanding the campaign's origins, tactics, infrastructure, and evolution over time.

It is important to acknowledge that due to the ongoing nature of the Doppelgänger operation and the rapid pace at which disinformation campaigns adapt and evolve, there may be additional research and findings that have not been included in this review. However, the selected sources represent what I believe to be the most significant and informative contributions to the understanding of this specific disinformation campaign up to the data cut-off of May 1st.

For readers interested in further exploring the Doppelganger campaign and staying ahead of the latest developments, I recommend regularly consulting the EU DisinfoLab's website², which maintains a collection of the most current resources and analyses related to this and other disinformation campaigns.

This study aims to contribute to the understanding of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns targeting democratic societies by providing an in-depth analysis of one of the longest and most detailed trackings of the Doppelganger campaign with data given by the group @antibo4navalny group. By focusing on this specific case, it seeks to enhance public awareness about sophisticated disinformation tactics, inform policymakers and stakeholders about gaps in current responses, and highlight the importance of international cooperation in countering information manipulation.

Research question

The main research question guiding this paper is the following: How does the Doppelganger disinformation campaign operate, and how effective are the current policy measures in countering its influence?

To address this main research question, the sub-questions are:

1. What is the state-of-the-art literature on the operation of Russian disinformation campaigns?
2. What is the structure and ecosystem of the Doppelganger disinformation campaign, and how does it function?
3. How does the Doppelganger campaign tailor its narratives for different countries, and what insights can be drawn from existing literature on public opinion, political parties, and advocacy coalitions?
4. How suitable are the current public responses to the Doppelganger campaign, and what improvements can be suggested based on the analysis of its operations and the relevant literature?

² <https://www.disinfo.eu/doppelganger-operation/>

Chapter 2: Russian disinformation campaigns: Literature Review

Russian disinformation campaigns have become increasingly sophisticated and adaptive, employing a wide range of tactics and technologies to manipulate public opinion and undermine democratic institutions. These campaigns exploit the infrastructure of social media platforms and the internet to maximize their reach and impact while minimizing costs and attribution. By examining the existing literature on Russian disinformation, this review aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how these campaigns operate, the tactics they employ, and the types of content they promote. This knowledge will serve as a foundation for analyzing the specific case of the Doppelgänger campaign and identifying potential countermeasures to mitigate the impact of these threats.

In this chapter, the first sub-question will be addressed: What is the state-of-the-art literature on the operation of Russian disinformation campaigns? To provide context for understanding the Doppelgänger campaign, this section will review existing research on Russian disinformation tactics, focusing on their evolution, common narratives, and the role of social media platforms in their dissemination. By synthesizing the current knowledge on this topic, this chapter will lay the groundwork for a more in-depth analysis of the Doppelgänger operation.

Disinformation, or the deliberate spread of false or misleading information, has become an increasingly pressing issue in today's digital age. Among the most notorious perpetrators of disinformation campaigns are state actors, particularly Russia, which has a long history of employing these tactics to influence public opinion and undermine democratic institutions both domestically and abroad.

In recent years, there has been a growing body of academic literature examining the nature, scope, and impact of Russian disinformation campaigns. This research highlights the ongoing evolution of Russia's disinformation tactics and the need for policy innovation to keep pace with these ever-changing threats.

A major focus of this literature is the destabilizing impact of disinformation on democratic societies. By exploiting existing social, cultural, and political divisions, Russian disinformation campaigns aim to increase polarization, sow distrust in media and government institutions, and interfere in domestic political processes, such as elections.

Moreover, researchers have noted the adaptive persistence of these campaigns, which makes them particularly challenging to counter. As disinformation actors' domains and accounts are discovered and disabled, they quickly create new ones to continue pushing their narratives, engaging in a seemingly endless game of whack-a-mole with those trying to combat their influence.

By examining both the broader context of Russian disinformation and the specific case of the Doppelgänger campaign, this review aims to provide valuable insights into the complex nature of these threats and the challenges faced by policymakers, tech platforms, and civil society in countering them.

2.1 Russian disinformation

A 2019 comparative study of seven European countries targeted by Kremlin propaganda argued computational disinformation has been strategically effective for four key reasons: exploiting democratic values of free speech against itself limits regulation; disguising government attribution maintains deniability; utilizing essential digital infrastructure maximizes reach while minimizing costs; and masking coordination behind third parties complicates unified response (DiResta et al., 2018). Adaptability also aids effectiveness: as old domains/accounts get discovered and disabled, new ones emerge continuing narratives (Nimmo et al., 2020). Whack-a-mole disruptions overlook root problems.

Examining the 2016 US election interference specifically, Persily (2017) details how computational propaganda, microtargeting, illegal hacking/leaking, and sensationalist commercial clickbait combined as force multipliers interdependently amplifying effects beyond individual components. He argues the campaign exploited structural weaknesses at societal and architectural levels - algorithmic ranking rewarding emotionally charged content keeps users addicted and divided, declining local journalism leaves vacuum for disinformation, while lack of disclosure enables foreign dark money influence.

Others analyze how Russian information operations stir ethnic tensions both internationally and domestically to maintain control, tracing activities since annexation of Crimea (Giles, 2016; Koltsova & Nagorny, 2019). They detail ongoing targeting of Russian minorities in Baltic states with fabricated mistreatment claims spreading back to their homeland to legitimize aggressive intervention. These manufactured pretexts for invasion - evoking need to protect endangered diaspora populations - parallel similar false narratives in eastern Ukraine after pro-democracy protests threatened its sphere of influence.

Ultimately, current literature argues increased polarization, declining institutional trust, and information paralysis from overload of contradictory coverage all signal Russian disinformation achieving intended goals of sowing confusion to indirectly favor pro-Kremlin policies (Linvill & Warren, 2020; Paul & Matthews, 2016). The Finnish government's lessons from facing Russian interference since 2014 emphasize building societal resilience through media literacy and policy deterrence rather than platitudes of critical thinking or fact-checking which overlook the operational tactics and infrastructure enabling adversarial computational propaganda rather than just content (Salonius-Pasternak, 2017).

However, research also recognizes responding to disinformation without infringing democratic principles presents difficulties. Critics argue attempts to define "truth" overly politicizes the process, while the metaphor of fighting "firehoses of falsehood" with waterhoses of facts risks watering down quality information with oversimplified binaries failing to address root complexities (Freelon et al., 2020). Removing content also triggers accusations of censorship and disproportionately restricts marginalized groups (Gillespie, 2018). Still, policy guidance is necessary when inauthentic coordinated campaigns funded by adversarial governments seek geopolitical outcomes overshadowing individual expression. The emerging consensus calls for context-specific evaluations accounting for impacted communities paired with multistakeholder coordination balancing complex tradeoffs case-by-case (Bontcheva et al., 2020).

The literature on Russian disinformation also highlights its strategic use of narratives to undermine trust in democratic institutions and sow discord within targeted societies. Yablokov (2015) argues that Russian propaganda often employs a tactic of "conspiratorial discourse," spreading theories about hidden forces manipulating events to erode faith in official accounts and create a sense of uncertainty. This approach is exemplified by the Kremlin's promotion of multiple, contradictory narratives about the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine in 2014, which aimed to deflect blame and confuse the public (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016).

Similarly, Mejias and Vokuev (2017) analyze how Russian disinformation campaigns exploit existing social divisions and hot-button issues to polarize public opinion and undermine social cohesion. By amplifying extreme voices on both sides of contentious debates, such as the Black Lives Matter movement or gun rights in the United States, these campaigns aim to exacerbate tensions and create the impression of an irreconcilably divided society. This strategy aligns with the Kremlin's geopolitical goal of weakening Western democracies and discrediting the liberal international order.

Furthermore, Bayer et al. (2019) highlight how Russian disinformation often blurs the line between authentic domestic dissent and foreign interference, coopting genuine grassroots movements to advance pro-Kremlin narratives. By infiltrating and amplifying groups like the "Yellow Vests" in France or Catalan separatists in Spain, Russian actors can exploit legitimate grievances to undermine faith in democratic governments and the European Union. This "astroturfing" tactic, also observed in the US context (Badawy et al., 2019), complicates efforts to distinguish between organic political expression and coordinated manipulation. Bennett and Livingston (2018) further emphasize how these campaigns target and destabilize democratic institutions by exploiting existing social and political divisions.

The existing literature on Russian disinformation campaigns reveals the sophisticated and multifaceted nature of these operations, which exploit the infrastructure and vulnerabilities of digital platforms to manipulate public opinion, sow discord, and advance geopolitical objectives. By employing tactics such as conspiratorial discourse, amplifying extreme voices, and coopting authentic grassroots movements, Russian actors seek to undermine trust in democratic institutions, exacerbate social tensions, and create an atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion. As the Doppelgänger campaign illustrates, these efforts are highly adaptive and persistent, constantly evolving to evade detection and maintain their influence. Countering these complex threats requires a comprehensive, proactive, and collaborative approach that prioritizes societal resilience, media literacy, and effective policy responses while safeguarding democratic principles. The insights provided by the existing literature offer a valuable foundation for understanding the challenges posed by Russian disinformation and informing the development of strategies to combat its impact.

Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter will outline the research design and methods employed in this study, detailing the data collection process, the sample used, and the analytical techniques applied. By providing a clear and transparent account of the methodological approach, this section aims to ensure the reliability and replicability of the findings presented in subsequent chapters.

The research employs an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach, first applying quantitative social network analysis to map the infrastructure and evolution of the Doppelgänger disinformation campaign, followed by qualitative analysis to identify narrative themes and policy gaps. Finally, formulating findings to provide recommendations for curbing this and similar campaigns.

3.1 Research design

This study employs a mixed-methods approach to thoroughly investigate the Doppelgänger disinformation campaign and provide actionable recommendations for countering similar threats. The quantitative analysis focuses on examining the behavior of the campaign's content bots and distribution bots, utilizing data provided by @antibot4navalny. This dataset includes archived tweets, articles, videos, and pictures, as well as saved copies of entire accounts with their reply spam. By manually reviewing this data, it was possible to understand how the bots interact with users on Twitter and identify patterns in their behavior.

Complementing the quantitative analysis, the qualitative component delves into the narrative themes and policy gaps within the campaign. Using Claude 3 Opus, an AI-powered text analysis tool with a 200k context window, the study processes 30-word summaries of each article/link, categorized by language.

Two specific prompts were provided to Claude and combined with the data provided by @antibot4navalny, enabled Claude to generate the main narrative themes for each targeted language, which will be presented as blocks of text in the findings section.

The study also incorporates visuals such as graphics and other representations to support the analysis and effectively communicate the findings to the audience. These visualizations, which will be presented in the subsequent chapters, help to make the results more accessible and understandable to a non-technical audience.

The data provided by @antibot4navalny was already separated and categorized, allowing for a streamlined analysis process. The different data types, including articles, videos, and pictures, were examined using content analysis techniques to identify key themes, patterns, and trends.

Building upon the insights gained from the analysis, the study aims to formulate policy advice and suggestions to strengthen the efforts of the European Union (EU) and its respective countries against disinformation campaigns. This process involves closely examining the infrastructure behind the Doppelgänger campaign, including its location and the resources it leverages. By assessing the current state of enforcement and identifying gaps in existing policies, the research provides actionable recommendations for policymakers. These

recommendations are designed to contribute to a more robust and effective response to the Doppelganger campaign and similar threats.

3.2 Sample

The dataset used for this study, provided by the @antibot4navalny group, consists of Twitter data collected from November 20, 2023, to May 1, 2024. The antibot4navalny group, also known as Bot Blocker, is a project dedicated to monitoring and tracking Russian bot operations on social media platforms, particularly on Twitter.

The data is organized by the targeted country and includes archived tweets and associated campaign assets such as websites, domains, social media accounts, articles, images, and videos. The @antibot4navalny group employs tools like archive.today and urlscan to capture and preserve the data, ensuring its reliability and enabling validation by other researchers. In addition to the archived tweets and articles, the dataset also contains videos and pictures promoted by the campaign. These multimedia assets have been archived and stored on a secure cloud storage platform, allowing for their retrieval and analysis. The inclusion of these elements provides a more comprehensive understanding of the campaign's narratives and tactics.

The dataset contains samples of promoted content for each targeted country, including at least one archived example of a content bot and a distribution bot. These archived samples allow for the examination of the specific content shared by the bots and their role in the dissemination process. Additionally, the dataset includes urlscan records that provide a detailed look at the redirection chain, enabling researchers to trace the user's path from the initial tweet to the final promoted article. This level of detail enhances the transparency and reproducibility of the study's findings. Furthermore, the presence of active bots that have not been banned by Twitter allows for real-time verification of the campaign's ongoing activities. These active bots serve as a testament to the persistence of the Doppelganger campaign and provide an opportunity for researchers to validate the findings of this study against the current state of the campaign.

Bot Blocker has uncovered several significant campaigns carried out by the Doppelganger network. The data gathered by the antibot4navalny group has been partially shared before with news media outlets for reporting purposes, providing valuable insights into the tactics and content promoted via the disinformation campaign. One notable event monitored by the antibot4navalny group and reported on by news media was the Latvian hockey ban campaign in February 2024. This campaign, which criticized Latvia's decision to ban its hockey players from participating in a tournament in Russia, was the first massive operation conducted by the Doppelganger network in the Latvian language. Bot Blocker estimated that the campaign generated nearly 200,000 bot retweets and 800,000 impressions over just two days, demonstrating the network's ability to quickly mobilize and potentially influence public opinion³.

Another significant event tracked by Bot Blocker and covered by news outlets was the Doppelganger network's response to the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow in March 2024. The network spread articles claiming that ISIS was not responsible for the attack and

³ <https://vsquare.org/games-of-the-future-kremlin-bots-latvia-rusia-hockey-putin/>

instead pointed fingers at Ukraine, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the "collective West." This campaign marked the first time the network was observed using multiple languages, indicating an effort to expand its reach across a wider range of Western audiences⁴.

As part of the Doppelganger network's efforts, Bot Blocker uncovered a campaign that involved the use of fake quotes attributed to celebrities like Taylor Swift, Beyoncé, and Cristiano Ronaldo to spread anti-Ukraine propaganda. The campaign on Twitter was using images of celebrities alongside fabricated quotes suggesting they supported Russia and detested Ukraine.

In addition to the Doppelganger network, the antibot4navalny group has also identified the "Matryoskha" campaign, which directly targets Western media outlets to encourage them to fact check disinformation. This campaign aims to occupy fact-checkers with fake news, trying to give visibility to false information through "fact checks"⁵.

The dataset collected by the @antibot4navalny group for the Doppelganger campaigns behaviour appears to be of high quality, as it is gathered by closely following the bots on Twitter and capturing the links to the articles from the Keitaro tracking instance. The accuracy of the data can be verified by matching the images of the tweets to the images of the articles, which adds to the dataset's reliability.

The data collection process is transparent and well-documented, with tweets archived on a third-party archival site, ensuring that the data is held independently. However, there may be some biases in the summaries and citations attached to the data from the articles, as they are generated by an (Large Language Model) LLM/AI such as GPT-4(o) and Claude 3 Opus. These biases could lead to issues such as incomplete summarization or incorrect categorization of the people mentioned in the articles.

The dataset is highly representative of the entire Doppelganger disinformation campaign's targeting on Twitter due to its daily tracking done by the antibot4navalny group, covering all the languages in which the campaign operates, with the dataset aligns with previous analyses and public information published by third parties such as Meta⁶ and Recorded Future, further validating the dataset's completeness. While there may be some gaps in the data, particularly in the media content promoted by the campaign, the risk of missing data is low due to the collection method employed.

The dataset has been partially shared before with other media outlets and third parties for analysis, and validation can be performed using third-party archiving tools such as archive.today and urlscan. Ethical considerations and privacy concerns have been addressed by obscuring the names of the accounts tweeted by the bots in the paper's pictures. However, links are provided for users to check the full interactions, maintaining transparency while protecting individual privacy.

⁴ <https://theins.ru/en/news/270225>

⁵ <https://factuel.afp.com/doc.afp.com.34H32VP>

⁶ https://github.com/facebook/threat-research/blob/main/indicators/csv/Q2_2023%20Q2_2023_Doppelganger_Russia_based_CIB_network_updated.csv

The 5-month timeframe of the dataset is significantly larger than the period analyzed by other organizations, such as Alethea, which only examined February and March 2024. This extended time frame enhances the validity of the findings, as it allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the Doppelganger campaign's evolution and scope.

While the @antibot4navalny group made extensive efforts to collect all content promoted through the Doppelganger campaign during the specified timeframe, due to the high volume of content, there is a possibility that some elements may have been missed. However, the archived nature of the data, the inclusion of representative samples for each targeted country, and the presence of now unused non banned bots allow for a comprehensive analysis of the campaign's tactics and narratives, as well as the ability to verify the study's findings.

The data provided by the antibot4navalny group, some of which has been previously shared with news media and is being used for this paper, offers a foundation for further analysis and methodology development in the study of Russian disinformation campaigns. By examining the data recollected by the group, researchers can gain a deeper understanding of the tactics employed by pro-Kremlin actors to manipulate public opinion and spread disinformation on social media platforms and help create policy advice to mitigate and combat these disinformation campaigns.




Figure 1 - Total links encountered, including duplicates, on Twitter

The dataset provided by the antibot4navalny group includes at least 3,930 unique instances of promoted link content captured through Twitter. Here's a breakdown of the targeted audiences:

- 837 targeted an English-speaking audience, coded as US by the disinformation campaign
- 1,090 targeted German speakers in Germany.
- 1192 targeted to a French audience
- 521 targeted Ukrainian speakers.

- 204 targeted Hebrew speakers or Israelites, coded as US by the disinformation campaign.
- Italian and Polish content is significantly less, with 42 and 46 instances respectively, as bots have only recently begun using these languages starting as of 4th of April 2024.




Figure 2 – Language link content analysis

There are “special events” such as the Crocus massacre narrative laundering event which use the Doppelgänger infrastructure but for the link count analysis are counted separately by the @antibot4navalny group.

Regarding the video and pictures promoted, based on the data, they have encountered a total of 2121 Twitter content accounts promoting content in German, French, English and Ukrainian languages. This includes the Latvian anti-hockey ban, Tambov election promotion, Games of Future promotion.

The data provided by the antibot4navalny group also shows that the disinformation campaign also is being run on Russian holidays such as February 23rd 2024 (Defender of the Fatherland Day) and May 1st 2024 (Spring and Labor Day).




Figure 3 – Media content analysis

Chapter 4: Operation, infrastructure, and tactics of the ‘Doppelganger’ campaign

In this chapter, the following subquestion will be addressed: What is the structure and ecosystem of the Doppelganger disinformation campaign, and how does it function?

This chapter aims to shed light on the complex inner workings of the Doppelganger disinformation campaign. By examining data provided by the @antibot4navalny group, it is possible to gain insights into the campaign's infrastructure, tactics, and the types of content being promoted.

The analysis begins by examining the targeted reply spam tactics employed by the campaign's Twitter bots, which can be categorized into two main types in section 4.1. Each type of bot plays a specific role in spreading the disinformation content to a wider audience.

Next, section 4.2 goes into detail of the multi-stage process used by the campaign to distribute false and misleading information. This process involves a series of website redirects designed to obscure the true origins of the disinformation content and make it more difficult for users to identify the source.

In section 4.3 the diverse range of content promoted by the Doppelganger campaign is analyzed, including articles from seemingly legitimate news sources, content from questionable websites, and carefully selected mainstream news articles. Special attention is given to the campaign's tactics in targeting Ukrainian audiences, which differ from those used in other countries.

By the end of this chapter, readers should have a comprehensive understanding of the Doppelganger campaign's modus operandi, providing a foundation for the subsequent analysis of narratives, attribution, and policy recommendations.

4.1 Targeted reply spam

The behavior of the Twitter bots in the disinformation campaign is characterized by targeted reply spam, which can be classified into 2 types, distribution and content bots. The content bots host the content promoted, the distribution bots use the quote tweet functionality of Twitter to reply the content bot to unsuspecting users. These distribution bots identify users to engage with based on trending topics in the country they are targeting. Once a user is identified that matches the criteria, the distribution bot responds to their tweet with a quote tweet containing a URL, video, or picture of content bots that the campaign aims to promote.

The content and distribution bots operate in six languages: German (DE), French (FR) American English (US/IL), Ukrainian (UA), Polish (PL), and Italian (IT). It is to be said that content in Hebrew which appears to target an audience in Israel, is promoted through bots that tweet in American English, and with US trends.




Figure 4 - Types of Twitter bots in the Doppelganger campaign

When targeting the user to reply to, the operators of the campaign do not take extra care to exclude name-based matches when searching for users to target. As a result, their search query also targets users whose names or handles share the same word as the trending topic, even if the content of their tweets is unrelated. This lack of precision in targeting can lead to the distribution bots consistently re-engaging with users who share the same name as the keyword chosen.

Furthermore, the campaign runners often encounter localization issues due to the global nature of trends. Since trends can transcend geographical boundaries, such as football events, the bot's language may not always match the language of the users targeted by the reply spam. This issue is particularly prevalent in the Ukrainian side of the disinformation campaign, as trends within Ukraine often are also present in other countries. Ukrainian trends are generally characterized by events that happen within the country, such as a city name or a location that has been targeted by the Russian military. Consequently, Ukrainian bots may inadvertently respond to non-Ukrainian users, leading to confusion and undermining the effectiveness of the campaign.

Based on mobile API from the Twitter app version 9.7.1 data collected up until December 26th through a third party tool "Burp Suite"⁷, it was possible to see that the content bots post from a desktop device, as indicated by the "Twitter Web App" user-agent. Previously, it was possible to determine the distribution of Twitter usage by examining the Quote Tweet viewing functionality, which was used by distribution bots to amplify content. However, this method is no longer available due to recent API changes.

⁷ Burp Suite: A comprehensive web application security testing platform that intercepts, inspects, and modifies HTTP/S traffic—used by security professionals to analyze API calls, test for vulnerabilities, and perform automated scanning of web applications.

The content promoted can be classified into 3 different categories: URLs, videos or pictures. While this was not the case at the beginning of the tracking of the campaign, the bots were decoupled into two; link and media (video and image) at the end of November 2023, and into content bots and distribution bots, starting on 21st of December of 2023 for URL/link bots.





Figure 5 – Bots and types of the Doppelganger bots, with localization

The content bots on Twitter publish their text in first person as creating the appearance of being a local citizen and not necessarily a bot (see Figure 5).

The texts attached to the tweets appear to have been originally written in Russian and then translated into the target language using an AI language model, most likely ChatGPT. The antibot4navalny group has noticed consistent issues such as campaign runners sometimes forgetting to translate the texts, mistranslating the text attached to tweets to the wrong language, or omitting text altogether. It was also possible to see from the data a case where the default "Hello! How can I assist you today?" text, which is a standard response provided by an AI language model has been left.



<https://archive.ph/H0Ynf>

Figure 6 – Content bot with AI welcome text

The videos promoted are generally interviews which appear on RRR sites and are generally co-promoted with the link content bots. There are also cases of interview clips or AI generated content dubbing which appear to be generated using an AI by ElevenLabs. By sending samples from the data to ElevenLabs' AI speech classifier tool, the consistent detection results suggest that these videos were most likely generated with ElevenLabs' voices (see appendix 10.3)

The videos for the Ukrainian side of the campaign differ from the rest of the countries and are generally vertical TikTok formatted videos related to the Ukrainian military and corruption within the country.

The images which are promoted are either statistics, celebrities with pro-Russian text superposed, or cartoons, which some are from the Telegram channel @VoxCartoons, which has been previously correctly identified by VIGINUM, French government's national service for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference, as being one of the main sources of content used in the RRN campaign.



Figure 7 – Example of celebrity video with >90% ElevenLabs AI detection

4.2 Redirecting to the promotional spam

Most of the time, the campaign employs a multi-step process involving several types of domains to redirect users to the final promoted link content. This process can be broken down into the following functional blocks:

- **Front domains (F):** These domains are the one the user sees first on Twitter, have the structure `subdomain.expendable_root_domain/some_string` and are designed to redirect visitors to an intermediary domain. The root of the domain is internally categorized through the openresty server under a specific article that the campaign wants to promote.
- **Intermediary domains (I):** These domains are responsible for redirecting the visitor to a set of domains running Keitaro, an advertisement tracker. They follow the structure




Figure 8 – User redirection process clicking the link after encountering a content bot

rootdomain/firstlettersnumbers (example: roundlovestickers.com/spie0672771). They include a Keitaro TDS tracker in its JavaScript (JS) format.

- **Keitaro domains (KE):** This is a tracker from tracker Keitaro TDS (Traffic Distribution System). Keitaro is a Traffic Direction System (TDS) designed to optimize web traffic through precise targeting using various filters, including geolocation and browser information. The tracker ensures that the content is only accessible from certain locations and the Keitaro instance being ultimately responsible for the final step in the chain, redirecting the viewer to the promoted content pushed by the disinformation campaign.
- **Doppelganger domains (D):** These are the final destinations for the traffic, consisting of the content that the disinformation campaigns aims to promote.

The multi-step redirection process employed by the Doppelganger campaign adds certain complexity to the campaign with the Front domains (I) and the Intermediary domains (I) becoming inaccessible after some un-determined time after posting.

The Keitaro instance allows for the actors behind the bots to track the click-through-rate and the evolution of the campaign and is most likely used for further reporting to superiors. With a researcher from the *antibot4navalny*, getting manually IP banned from the actors Keitaro instance, shows that the actors actively use the Keitaro not as a redirection tool but as a tracking tool.




Figure 9 – Keitaro tracking tool used by Doppelganger, 302 for allowed users/countries 200 for non-allowed users/countries

The Keitaro (KE) also allows the campaign runners to block or allow access to the final content based on the IP location from where they are accessing from. It appears as if the Keitaro has a country wide whitelist on what countries are allowed to see the final content, some of those being Poland, Germany, France and the Netherlands. Other countries such as Spain which are not whitelisted would not be able to see the final content and would get stuck in the intermediary redirect. Nevertheless, all content promoted by the disinformation campaign can be viewed from a country that is permitted. Therefore, Ukrainian content can be viewed by a German with a German IP address and vice versa.

It is to be said that there are cases in which the FIKED redirection system does not occur and the articles and/or links are directly promoted by the distribution bots, but this is generally not

the case. This occurs extensively in narrative laundering events, which will be developed later on in the paper.

It is important to note that the Keitaro TDS domain used in the redirection chain has changed over time, likely in response to increased scrutiny and exposure. After the report from RecordedFuture was published on December 5th, 2023, which detailed the use of the ggspace(.)space domain as part of the Doppelgänger infrastructure, the campaign runners appear to have taken notice and have changed the domain to sdgqaef(.)site, most likely to avoid detection and maintain the effectiveness of the redirection process.



Figure 10 – Doppelgänger run process

The campaign is generally run during the week, with it being perceivable for the Twitter user after 5-6pm CEST. The bots have been seen responding in different time intervals, with each response by each bot generally running every 30 minutes to 4hrs, before being stopped manually by the actor, account getting limited by Twitter or banned. The reply quote tweeting spamming distribution bots generally get re-used in campaign runs if they are not shadow banned, the content bots tend to not get re-used, but there are recorded cases in which they have been re-used.

4.3 Types of content of the spam

To better understand the tactics and objectives of the Doppelgänger disinformation campaign, it is essential to examine the various types of content promoted through its network of Twitter bots. By analyzing the data provided by the @antibot4navalny group, it is possible to identify five distinct categories of content based on their source, characteristics, and the role they play in the overall disinformation effort.

The classification of the promoted content is based on the following criteria:

1. The source of the content: Whether it originates from RRN (Recent Reliable News), InfoRos-affiliated sites, fringe news outlets, or mainstream news sources.
2. The presence or absence of certain features: Such as funding sources, advertisements, clear authorship, and the use of specific platforms like WordPress.
3. The frequency and timing of promotion: Some content, such as narrative laundering episodes, is promoted less frequently and without the use of Keitaro tracking.
4. The targeting and objectives of the content: Different types of content are tailored to specific audiences and aim to achieve various goals, such as promoting pro-Kremlin narratives or just general news covering.
5. The connection to the broader Doppelgänger infrastructure: Some content is directly linked to RRN-based sites or cloned legitimate news outlets, while others are sourced from third-party sites or social media accounts.

Each category represents a distinct aspect of the campaign's content strategy, from the use of purpose-built disinformation websites to the selective promotion of legitimate news articles that support the campaign's objectives. By examining these categories in detail, it is possible to better appreciate the complexity and adaptability of the Doppelgänger campaign and its ability to influence public discourse across a wide range of topics and platforms.

In the following sections, we will go into the specific characteristics and objectives of each content category, providing examples and insights into their role within the broader Doppelgänger disinformation ecosystem. Through this analysis, the aim is to make a more detailed understanding on what the disinformation campaign promotes.




Figure 11 – Content promoted the link bots from the Doppelgänger campaign

4.3.1. RRN and RRN-based news sources.

RRN, which stands for Recent Reliable News, is the central component of the Doppelgänger disinformation campaign as analyzed by VIGINUM. As the main news site connected to a network of seemingly unrelated WordPress-based news sites, RRN plays a crucial role in spreading disinformation and promoting pro-Russian narratives across multiple languages and countries.

RRN(.)media is the most frequently promoted "news" site in the Doppelgänger campaign, with a total of 165 times appearing in all targeted languages except Ukrainian, which primarily relies on cloned news sites. The prominence of RRN(.)media suggests that it serves as a hub for the campaign's disinformation efforts, providing a platform for disseminating false or misleading content to a wide audience.

In addition to RRN(.)media, the RRN (Reliable Recent News) operates a vast network of WordPress-based news sites tailored to specific countries and topics. These sites, while not explicitly linked to RRN, cover a diverse range of subjects that align with overall Russian disinformation themes. For example, [acrosstheline\(.\)press](#) focuses on migration topics in the US, [cropmarketchronicles.us](#) targets grain and farmer issues, and [Derleitstern.com](#) provides astrological analysis of news events. By creating niche sites that cater to specific interests and concerns, the campaign can effectively reach and influence diverse target audiences.

The connection between RRN and Russian disinformation efforts is supported by several technical indicators. VIGINUM's analysis, which can be backed up with [antibot4navalny's](#) data of RRN-linked sites, reveals the presence of Cyrillic letters and Russian error codes⁸ through these seemingly unrelated news sites. These findings strongly suggest the involvement of Russian actors in the creation and management of these sites. Furthermore, the discovery of a Russian WordPress README.html file on the site [electionwatch\(.\)live](#) provides additional evidence of the campaign's ties to Russia⁹.

4.3.1.1 RRN viewership strategies

For the news sites to gain viewership outside of the promotion through the Doppelgänger campaign, these sites engage in interviews with individuals who generally have had a presence on Russian state television such as RT or Sputnik. Similarly to Voice of Europe, which was also recently exposed by the Czech government as a Russian influence operation¹⁰, RRN employs a comparable tactic of featuring interviews with different individuals, with some of them promoting the content on their social media accounts.

Nevertheless, not all individuals involved in interviews with the network are aware that they are being used in a Russian disinformation campaign, as per research done by the [antibot4navalny](#) group in collaboration with t-online.

According to the investigation done with German news outlet t-online, the ones responsible for conducting interviews for the



Figure 12 – User promoting their interview done on RRN site Wanderfalke on Twitter

⁸ <https://archive.ph/FKVYL> - Mias Tagebuch error code

⁹ <https://archive.ph/ZKZMt>

¹⁰ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68685604>

RRN news media outlets involve two Russian journalists, Vadim C. and Alexandre J¹¹.

Vadim C., who operates from Moscow, often uses aliases such as "Valeriy Stepanov" during interviews. He has a background working for RT and other Russian media outlets. Vadim's role involves gathering statements from Western experts and politicians, which are later included in the RRN news sites. Alexandre J., another key figure in the campaign, operates under different aliases to arrange interviews. He has a similar background, having studied at the Lomonossow University in Moscow and worked for major Russian media outlets, including "Iswestija" and REN TV. Alexandre's role often involves the initial contact and coordination of the interviews, ensuring that the interviewees are unaware of the true intent behind their participation.

One notable individual who was misled by the team is Simon Schnetzer, a leading youth researcher in Europe. Schnetzer was initially contacted by Alexandre J. for an interview, believing it to be for a legitimate media outlet. However, his statements were taken out of context and used to support the RRN-based site Wanderfalke(.)net. Despite his efforts to clarify the purpose of the interviews in subsequent interactions, Schnetzer's content was repeatedly misused.

Nevertheless, similarly to "Voice of Europe", it was possible to identify several politicians from the German political party "Alternative für Deutschland" (AfD), and French National Rally / Rassemblement National which appear to have done interviews with RRN, which were then posted to the RRN WordPress websites. Some of those are the following.

Individual	Party	Link
Hansjörg Müller	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	meisterurian(.)io/was-werden-die-usa-als-nachstes-mit-deutschland-tun/
Olga Petersen	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	brennendefrage(.)com/deutschland/video-in-deutschland-ist-es-nicht-mehr-sicher
Steffen Kotré	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	RRN(.)media/de/video-scholz-hat-seine-eigenen-feinde-erfunden RRN(.)media/de/video-scholz-arbeitet-gegen-deutschland/

¹¹ https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/id_100366874/fake-seiten-und-bots-diese-russen-arbeiten-fuer-kampagne-gegen-den-westen-.html (article in German)

Gunnar Beck	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	brennendefrage(.)com/deutschland/interview-deutsche-wollen-nicht-fur-die-ukraine-zahlen
Peter Marček	REPUBLIKA (HLAS L'UDU)	RRN(.)media/de/video-warum-sich-die-eu-weigert-der-ukraine-zu-helfen/
Hervé Juvin	National Rally (RN)	RRN(.)media/fr/video-lue-sort-du-jeu/
Konrad Stanisław Rękas	Przywrócić Prawo (PP)	besuchszweck(.)org/wann-konnen-wir-stolz-auf-die-eu-sein
Emmanuel Leroy	National Rally (RN)	franceeteu(.)today/opinions/le-president-francais-sest-encore-complique-les-choses
Alex Tyrrell	Greens Canada	wanderfalke(.)net/video-westliche-lander-unterstutzen-die-ukraine-wahrend-kiew-den-nazismus-pflegt

RRN's Interviewees' Presence on Russian State Media




Figure 13 – RRN's personalities presence on Russian state media, analysis done to the data provided by *antibot4navalny*.

Analysis done to the data provided by the antibot4navalny group shows that a majority of the people interviewed by RRN news sites have previously appeared on Russian state media outlets. With more than 60% of the identified RRN interviewees having had a presence on channels like RT or Sputnik before being featured in RRN articles.

This pattern of featuring individuals with established ties to Russian state media helps RRN to subtly shape public perceptions in a pro-Kremlin direction. By carefully curating its roster of interviewees, RRN seeks to create an echo chamber effect, reinforcing the same narratives and talking points promoted by official Russian channels. The prevalence of Russian state media-affiliated interviewees highlights RRN's role as an extension of Russia's broader information influence apparatus. While RRN presents itself as an independent news network with no apparent ties to Russia, its reliance on figures associated with outlets like RT and Sputnik betrays its true function as a proxy for Russian state interests.

4.3.1.2 RRN's localization efforts




Figure 14 – Example of localization efforts of RRN WordPress news sites and clones

When writing the WordPress-based news sites, RRN employs various localization strategies to increase the relevance and credibility of its content for different target audiences. By tailoring its content to specific countries and languages, RRN can more effectively spread disinformation and try to influence public opinion.

One notable aspect of RRN's localization efforts is the use of country-specific news sources when crafting articles. As illustrated in the image above, RRN-linked sites cite different news outlets depending on the targeted language and region. For example, German-language sites like Deutschlandfunk, Der Spiegel and Berliner Zeitung are referenced in articles aimed at German audiences, while French-language sites such as Le Figaro, Le Parisien, and BFMTV are cited in content targeting French readers. This strategic use of local news sources demonstrates a deep understanding of the media landscape in each targeted country and helps to lend an air of authenticity to the disinformation content.

Similarly, RRN adapts its content to other languages and regions, citing sources like Radio Zet, Rzeczpospolita, and Fakt for Polish-language articles for example; Il Fatto Quotidiano, Affaritaliani, and Il Messaggero for Italian-language content; and Fox News, New York Times, and Washington Post for English-language pieces targeting US/IL audiences. By carefully selecting and referencing well-known, region-specific news outlets, RRN can make its disinformation content appear more credible and convince readers that the information is coming from trusted, familiar sources.


In terms of content creation, RRN employs a mix of methods, including the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and manual writing, aligning with the observations made by Recorded Future's Insikt Group in their analysis of the Doppelgänger campaign (Recorded Future, 2023)¹². Some articles are entirely made with generative AI, which can quickly produce large volumes of text on a given topic while maintaining a consistent style and tone. This approach allows RRN to rapidly create and disseminate disinformation content across multiple sites and languages with minimal human intervention.

Other articles are partially written with the assistance of AI, with human writers providing additional context, editing, or localization to ensure the content is tailored to the intended audience. This hybrid approach combines the speed and efficiency of AI-generated text with the nuance and cultural understanding of human writers, resulting in more convincing and effective disinformation content.

Finally, some articles are written entirely by hand, allowing for a higher degree of customization and adaptation to specific narratives or target audiences. While this method is more time-consuming and resource-intensive, it enables RRN to create more specific content which might not be allowed through a Large Language Model such as ChatGPT which would result in refusals.

4.3.1.3 RRN based clones

RRN (Recent Reliable News), as part of its disinformation efforts, creates clones of legitimate news websites to deceive readers and lend credibility to its fabricated content. These cloned websites mimic the design, layout, and domain names of reputable news outlets through typosquatting - the act of registering domain names that are misspellings or variations of well-known domain names, making it difficult for readers to distinguish between genuine and false information.



Removal of Putin text yields 100% AI GPTZero detection

Figure 15 – Example of AI + Human written article on RRN WordPress site WarfareInsider

¹² Behavior could only conclusively be determined for English and French written content, due to limitations on AI detection in languages such as Hebrew, Ukrainian, Polish, Italian and German.

Prior to VIGINUM's analysis of the clones in 2023, these sites often included links to RRN.world, the central website for the now defunct RRN(.)world news domain (example: <https://archive.ph/lliKw>). and the articles were both published via the clones and main RRN news sites. However, following the initial exposure of the campaign by Meta and the EU Disinfo Lab in 2022, many of the analyzed clones, such as the fake clones of The Guardian, Le Monde or Bild, have been taken down and have not appeared during the tracking period by the antibot4navalny group, and the clones appear to be unique with distinct texts written exclusively for the news site clones.

The use of cloned websites is a key tactic employed by the Doppelgänger campaign to spread disinformation and mislead readers. By mimicking trusted news sources, the campaign aims to exploit the credibility of these outlets to amplify its false narratives and influence public opinion. Therefore, Doppelgänger, the disinformation campaign, gets its name from the German word “double”, as the news sites mimic the real ones.

The Doppelgänger campaign, which has been named by this feature, has created numerous clones of well-known news websites across multiple countries and languages. These clones mimic the domain names of legitimate news outlets, using similar but slightly altered top-level domains (TLDs) to deceive readers.

Based on the tracking period by the antibot4navalny group, in Germany, the campaign has targeted popular news sites such as Spiegel (spiegel.ltd), Welt (welt.pm and welt.ltd), Süddeutsche Zeitung (sueddeutsche.ltd), and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (faz.ltd). The German clones account for a significant portion of the identified fake websites, with 96 instances of spiegel.ltd alone counted until May 1st.

For English-language audiences, the campaign has created clones of 2 prominent U.S. news outlets, Fox News (fox-news.in) and The Washington Post (washingtonpost.pm/ltd).

In France, the cloned websites imitate well-known publications such as Le Point (lepoint.foo) and Le Parisien (leparisien.re, leparisien.top and leparisien.pm). These French-language clones demonstrate the campaign's efforts to manipulate public opinion in Francophone countries.

The campaign has also targeted Israeli audiences by creating clones of Walla! News (walla.re) and The Liberal (theliberal.in), an Israeli political magazine. The inclusion of these Israeli news site clones indicates that the Doppelgänger campaign seeks to influence public discourse and opinion in Israel.

In Poland, the campaign has cloned the websites of Polityka (polityka.link) and Polskie Radio (polskieradio.icu), both prominent Polish news outlets. This signifies an attempt to spread disinformation among Polish-speaking readers and manipulate public opinion in Poland.

For Ukrainian audiences, the campaign has created clones of popular news websites such as UNIAN (unian.pm), Obozrevatel (obozrevatel.ltd), and RBC Ukraine (rbk.media). The high number of cloned Ukrainian news sites, with 166 instances of UNIAN clones and 145 and 143 each of Obozrevatel and RBC clones respectively, underscores the campaign's intense focus on influencing Ukrainian public opinion.

Lastly, in Italy, the campaign has targeted well-known newspapers La Stampa (lastampa.in) and La Repubblica (repubblica.in).




Figure 16 – Modified timestamps (in GMT) for uploaded images on clone sites. Server response with GMT value, matching up with UTC 0 even with summertime clock change.

The clones are uploaded on a schedule that appears to be centered around European Union working hours, operating from 7am to 8pm GMT, Monday through Saturday, with a few outliers. The data also matches up with RRN’s Twitter activities, with general pauses on both Telegram and on Twitter on Sundays. The timing of the working hours has been determined by analyzing the "Last Modified" value on the images, which are uploaded sequentially (n = 293), the value provided by the server is in GMT but matches with UTC +0.

As Moscow Standard Time (MSK) is GMT+3, the "Last Modified" value suggests that the campaign operators either work from an EU location or have intentionally adjusted their workday to match EU hours.

4.3.1.4 RRN Writers

While most of the authors behind the RRN WordPress-based websites remain anonymous or use fake aliases as in RRN.media, one writer stands out for his public presence: Амедео Андреевич Авондет (Amedeo Avondet). Amedeo is one of the writers for the Italian RRN-based website named Il Corrispondente, which shares similar characteristics with other WordPress-based websites in the network, such as the absence of advertisements, apparent funding sources, and public information about who runs the website.




Figure 17 – Source: Amedeo’s VK profile

Before writing for RRN and Il Corrispondente, Amedeo wrote for Readovka, a Russian-based news site, specifically for their English version. The English version of Readovka, Readovka.world, was launched at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in March 2022 but was discontinued by the end of September-August of the same year. After the discontinuation of Readovka.world, Amedeo appears to have moved on to the now-defunct RRN.world.

Information from Amedeo's VK profile confirms that he previously wrote for Readovka's international version, which used the domain extension .world. Although the site is still accessible at the time of writing, it is no longer in use. This url is similar to the previous domain used by RRN, rrn.world, which also ended in .world, which was changed to rrn.media on July 26, 2023, likely in response to the VIGINUM report released on July 19, 2023.

Amedeo Avondet's connections to Russia extend beyond his writing for Russian-affiliated news sites. He has been invited to Russia and has established connections with Russian state affiliated individuals such as Irina Elifiorova (Ирина Елифёрова), a worker for the United Russia political party, and other well-connected individuals to the Russian state apparatus. These connections raise questions about the nature of Avondet's involvement with Russian political interests and the extent to which his work for Il Corrispondente may be influenced by these relationships

For example, Il Corrispondente not only publishes articles aligned with Russia's goals but also engages in advertising in Italy to promote pro-Russian viewpoints. The aim of these advertisements appears to be to influence viewers to vote for political parties that prioritize domestic issues, a recurring topic throughout the different countries targeted by the campaign, except for Ukraine.



Figure 18 – Source: [il-corrispondente\(.\)com](https://www.il-corrispondente.com)

Despite his public presence as a writer for Il Corrispondente, the source of Amedeo's funding remains unclear. Given his ties to Russian-affiliated news sites and his connections to individuals associated with the United Russia political party, it is plausible that his funding originates from Russian sources. This lack of transparency regarding financial support is concerning, as it may indicate an attempt to obscure foreign influence on the content and messaging of Il Corrispondente.

The only other public author for an RRN WordPress news site appears to be the writer for the RRN site [notrepays\(.\)today](https://notrepays.today). Cyrille de Lattre, a French citizen who is now based in Russia. His appearance was added during the end of March¹³, while speculative, it was most likely done as a response due to increased viewership of the news site and to give the news site an air of legitimacy, but this is not measurable due to not having access to the data.




Figure 19 – Source: Amedeo's VK profile, translated to English

¹³ <https://archive.ph/FOMFb> <https://archive.ph/B5JKb>



German sites	French sites	US-centric sites	Israel-centric sites
derrattenfanger.net	lexomnium.com	electionwatch.live	holylandherald.com
besuchszweck.org	notrepays.today	interventionist.us	omnam.life
deintelligenz.com	lesfrontieres.media	warfareinsider.us	
miastagebuch.com	candidat.news	honeymoney.info	Italian sites
arbeitspause.org	lavirgule.news	mypride.press	il-corrispondente.com
derglaube.com	franceeteu.today	truthgate.us	
grunehummel.com	le-continent.com	acrossthepress.com	Polish sites
meisterurian.io	laterrasse.online	liesofwallstreet.com	polskikompass.com
hauynescherben.net	allons-y.social	50statesoflie.com	
wanderfalke.net	la-sante.info	uschina.press	Arabic sites
grenzezank.com	levinaigre.net	cropmarketchronicles.us	alhiwar.me*
kaputteampel.com	lesifflet.net	spicyconspiracy.info	
derleitstern.com	lebelligerant.com	ukrlm.info	Spanish sites
derbayerischelowe.info		shadowwatch.us	noticiasbravas.com*
brennendefrage.com			

*only seen once during the Crocus campaign run

Figure 20 - RRN news media universe as detected; links provided in Appendix (see 10.4.1)

4.3.2. InfoRos sites:

InfoRos, a Russian news agency, has been identified as a key player in the broader Russian disinformation ecosystem. The organization has been linked to sophisticated disinformation tactics and has been previously analyzed by the EUDisinfoLab in a report published in 2020. The presence of InfoRos-related content in the Doppelganger campaign, particularly in the French-language portion, suggests a connection between the two and highlights the campaign's ties to the larger Russian disinformation apparatus.

According to the EUDisinfoLab report, InfoRos employs a range of tactics to spread disinformation and pro-Russian narratives while obscuring its true origins. For example, the agency has been found to have hidden connections to French website Observateur Continental, which presents itself as an independent French portal but has been shown to have strong technical and human links to InfoRos. This tactic of creating seemingly unrelated websites to disseminate content is a hallmark of Russian disinformation efforts.

Although these sites have relatively small direct audiences, their content is widely amplified through a network of conspiracy and "alternative media" websites, ensuring broader reach and impact.

Notably, Western intelligence sources have tied InfoRos to the Russian military intelligence agency GRU and its psychological warfare operations. The agency's role in conducting information operations to support pro-Russian narratives has been well-documented.¹⁴¹⁵

Rather than focusing on building large social media followings directly, according to EUDisinfoLab's analysis¹⁶, InfoRos appears to prioritize feeding disinformation narratives into a wider ecosystem of proxy websites and partners. This approach makes it difficult to trace the original source of the content and allows for greater plausible deniability. The amplification of these narratives is then achieved through this network of sites, rather than through direct engagement.

The presence of InfoRos-linked content in the Doppelganger campaign, such as articles from Observateur Continental and AgoraVox re-postings, suggests that InfoRos and its associated sites might be secondary actors in the Doppelganger disinformation campaign. The inclusion of this content indicates that the campaign is not only leveraging the same tactics and networks employed by Russian disinformation actors but also potentially relying on InfoRos as a source for some of its narratives.

¹⁴ <https://openfacto.fr/2023/01/16/inforos-historical-networks-of-influence/>

¹⁵ <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0126>

¹⁶ https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/20200615_How-two-information-portals-hide-their-ties-to-the-Russian-Press-Agency-Inforos.pdf




Figure 21 – InfoRos content layering, from Le Point clone to AgoraVox to ObservateurContinental

The connection between InfoRos and the Doppelganger campaign is further evidenced by the narrative layering observed in the news site clones, where content can be traced back to InfoRos-linked sites like Observateur Continental. This finding might suggest that RRN is not operating in isolation but rather is part of a larger, interconnected network of disinformation actors.


4.3.3. Narrative laundering episodes:

Narrative laundering episodes are a distinct type of content promotion within the Doppelganger disinformation campaign. Narrative laundering is a process of concealing the origins of false or misleading information and making it appear credible. It involves three stages: placement (initial posting), layering (spreading to more credible sources), and integration (endorsement by genuine sources and wide dissemination by real users). The goal is to obscure the source and increase perceived legitimacy. In the case of the Doppelganger campaign, the narrative laundering episodes involve a consistent push of content across all targeted languages, focusing on one or two specific topics with a shared narrative. Unlike other content promotion tactics, such as RRN content, which typically promotes a single news topic and narrative at a time for each individual promoted article, narrative laundering episodes aim to reinforce a common theme through various links and sources.



Figure 22 – Example content promoted through the Narrative Laundering events

These episodes usually occur once or twice per month and do not involve the use of Keitaro tracking. Instead, bots directly share a wide range of links from various sources, such as Telegram channel posts from Kremlin-aligned individuals like Alina Lipp (@neuesausrussland) and Adrien Bocquet (@adrienbocquet), as well as Twitter posts from pro-Russian accounts like "Brainless Partisans" (@BPartisans), the Russian Embassy in South Africa (@EmbassyofRussia), and content from the "Foundation to Battle Injustice," a non-profit founded by the now suspected deceased founder of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), Yevgeny Prigozhin.



archive.is/kHQwL

Figure 13 – Example content promoted through the Narrative Laundering events, “news site” attributed to John Mark Dougan

In addition to these sources, narrative laundering episodes also promote content from the Pravda news sites ecosystem, named "Portal Kombat," which was previously analyzed by VIGINUM. Named “Portal Kombat” by VIGINUM, “Portal Kombat” is a Russian-based network of websites that serve as a news-aggregator of different sources. These sites do not produce any original content, but massively aggregate different sources such as social network accounts of Russian or pro-Russian accounts, Russian press agencies or news outlets, and official websites of the Russian government. For more information regarding “Portal Kombat”, I recommend reading VIGINUM's detailed analysis on the sites¹⁷.

These narrative laundering episodes also include content previously analyzed by Linvill and Warren from Clemson University. With sites run by John Mark Dougan, such as clearstory(.)news being promoted simultaneously with the rest of the content exclusively during these episodes¹⁸.

Narrative laundering episodes are particularly challenging to track due to the high volume of links promoted through Twitter bots. Unlike standard runs, which involve a smaller number of links, narrative laundering episodes make it easier for content to be missed during monitoring by the antibot4navalny group. Additionally, during these episodes, the distinction between content bots and distribution bots becomes blurred, as bots directly sometimes tweet out links without quote tweeting another tweet, a tactic used in standard runs.

4.3.4. Third-party fringe news sites: Third-party fringe news sites are websites that are not directly associated with the RRN network but are occasionally promoted by the Doppelganger campaign. In this context, "fringe" refers to news sources that operate outside the mainstream media, often promoting extreme political views, conspiracy theories, or alternative narratives.

¹⁷ https://www.sgdsn.gov.fr/files/files/20240212_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_PORTAL-KOMBAT-NETWORK_ENG_VF.pdf

¹⁸ https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/mfh_reports/3/

These sites frequently align with the campaign's objectives, providing an additional layer of content that supports the disinformation campaign runners' interests.

For the German audience, the campaign has promoted content from sites such as Junge Freiheit, NachDenkSeiten, and Die Freie Welt. Junge Freiheit is a German right-wing newspaper that has been criticized for its nationalist and conservative views. NachDenkSeiten is a left-wing political blog that often expresses anti-American and pro-Russian sentiments¹⁹. Die Freie Welt is a right-wing populist news site that frequently publishes articles critical of immigration and the European Union²⁰.


In the French segment of the campaign, Boulevard Voltaire (BVoltaire.fr) is the most prominently promoted fringe news site. BV (Boulevard Voltaire) is a far-right news site²¹ known for its nationalist, anti-immigration, and Eurosceptic views. The site has been accused of spreading conspiracy theories and disinformation in the past.

4.3.5. Mainstream News Sites: In addition to the RRN-based content and third-party fringe news sites, the Doppelgänger campaign occasionally promotes articles from mainstream news outlets. These articles are carefully selected to reinforce the campaign's narratives and objectives, exploiting the credibility and reach of established media brands to lend legitimacy to the disinformation effort.

Some of the mainstream news sites whose content has been directly promoted or run through the Keitaro TDS (Traffic Direction System) include Axios, Bild, CNN, Fox News, and France Info

4.3.6 Ukrainian content

The Ukrainian component of the disinformation campaign is distinct from others, as it mostly solely relies on cloned news sites from the Doppelgänger campaign rather than WordPress-based websites. Unlike the campaigns such as in France, Germany, and the US, which use third party news sites and RRN based WordPress news sites, the Ukrainian side of the disinformation campaign mostly exclusively relies on the clones of RBC, UNIAN and Obozrevatel.



archive.is/ar82r

Figure 24 – Example Telegram channel promoted via Doppelgänger bots for the Ukrainian audience

¹⁹ <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/revealing-russian-propaganda-3%5B71%5D.pdf>

²⁰ <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugee-crisis-drives-rise-of-new-right-wing-in-germany-a-1067384.html>

²¹ <https://apcoworldwide.com/blog/follow-not-fear-frances-far-right-is-here-to-stay/>

There have been some cases in which the rest of the narrative laundering events in which the Doppelganger campaign has also co-promoted Telegram channels next to the clone sites, but as mentioned before, this is rare and occurs at most once or twice per month.

Another unique aspect of the Ukrainian part of the campaign is the promotion of demonstrations within Ukraine. This tactic has not been observed in other countries targeted by the Doppelganger campaign.

These promoted demonstrations often focus on issues such as corruption, calling for the demobilization of troops, directing funds to the armed forces. By highlighting and potentially exaggerating these protests, the campaign appears to create an image of widespread discontent and instability within Ukraine.

4.4 Dual Purpose of the Doppelganger Campaign

While in this paper the content analyzed is the one promoted through the Twitter bots, it is to be said that the Doppelganger campaign appears to serve two purposes: promoting pro-Russian content on Twitter and driving traffic to RRN (Recent Reliable News) WordPress based news sites. While a significant portion of the content disseminated through the campaign is clearly aligned with Russian narratives and interests, not all content published on RRN-affiliated WordPress sites is actively promoted via the Doppelganger infrastructure.

On one hand, the campaign consistently pushes articles, videos, and images that advance pro-Kremlin talking points and is tailored to specific target audiences in different languages, is strategically amplified through the campaign's network of content bots and distribution bots on social media platforms like Twitter.

However, the RRN-affiliated sites produce a broader range of content that extends beyond the overtly pro-Russian materials promoted by the Doppelganger campaign. While some of this content may align with Russian interests or echo Kremlin narratives, not all of it is actively disseminated through the Doppelganger network.

This dual purpose suggests that the RRN-WordPress news sites serve not only as a source of content for the Doppelganger campaign but also as standalone entities designed to attract organic traffic and build an audience independently of the bot-driven amplification efforts. By establishing a diverse portfolio of seemingly unrelated news sites catering to different niches and interests, the operators behind RRN can potentially reach a wider range of users and exert influence beyond the reach of the Doppelganger campaign.



Figure 25 – Example of demonstration tweet for UA audience

Chapter 5: Narratives and reach

Narratives, in the context of disinformation campaigns, refer to the overarching themes, stories, and messages that are strategically crafted and disseminated to influence public opinion, shape perceptions, and achieve specific goals (Starbird et al., 2019). These narratives often exploit existing social, political, or cultural divisions, playing on fears, prejudices, and uncertainties to manipulate the target audience's beliefs and actions (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). They are designed to be emotionally compelling, memorable, and shareable, making them effective tools for spreading disinformation and propaganda (Bakir & McStay, 2018).

Narratives in disinformation campaigns are carefully constructed to fit within the pre-existing worldviews and biases of the target audience, making them more likely to be accepted and internalized (Freelon & Wells, 2020). They often involve a combination of factual elements, half-truths, and outright fabrications, woven together to create a seemingly coherent and persuasive story. By repeating and reinforcing these narratives across multiple channels and platforms, disinformation actors aim to create an echo chamber effect, where the target audience is consistently exposed to the same messages, gradually shaping their perceptions of reality (Bennett & Livingston, 2018).

In this chapter, the following subquestion will be addressed: How does the Doppelganger campaign tailor its narratives for different countries, and what insights can be drawn from existing literature on public opinion, political parties, and advocacy coalitions? By analyzing the content promoted by the campaign and assessing its potential reach, this section will identify the key themes and messages disseminated by the Doppelganger operation and evaluate its effectiveness in shaping public discourse. In the context of the Doppelganger campaign, analyzing the topics and narratives pushed by the disinformation actors helps understand their objectives, tactics, and the potential impact on the targeted populations. This chapter will provide valuable insights into the potential impact of the campaign on the targeted populations and inform the development of counter-strategies.

By identifying and deconstructing these narratives, researchers and policymakers can develop more effective counter-strategies, build resilience against disinformation, and protect democratic processes from malign influence operations (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017).

5.1 Narratives

To understand these topics, the promoted articles through the disinformation campaign were summarized into approximately 30 words using large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 and Claude 3 Opus. These summaries were then analyzed to identify the cited sources and assess the portrayal of various entities, including people, governments, political parties, and news sites. The analysis evaluated whether these entities were depicted positively, neutrally, or negatively, and also considered indirect mentions, political affiliations, and contexts involving religion and elections.

Next, the summaries were grouped by language and sent back to Claude 3 Opus with a temperature setting of 0 to identify the most common themes.

While the amount of articles for Polish and Italian is not as sizable as the rest, in general, the promoted articles, regardless of the targeted language or country, are highly critical of the government in power, wary of the EU, opposed to NATO, and portray the Ukrainian government as rife with corruption.

Sample articles that the LLM used for topic for each country are provided in the Appendix, see 10.5 to 10.5.7.

5.1.1 Narratives used for the German audience

The most common topics covered by the campaign in German revolve around Germany's economic challenges, the Ukraine conflict and its impact, domestic political tensions, shifting geopolitical dynamics, and social issues and public discontent.

Regarding Germany's economic challenges, the campaign highlights high energy costs and inflation harming businesses and citizens, deindustrialization and companies relocating production abroad, criticism of the Ampel government's policies for prioritizing foreign issues over the domestic economy, and calls for normalizing relations with Russia to access cheaper energy.

On the Ukraine conflict and its impact, the campaign covers the ongoing military conflict with Russia and heavy Ukrainian losses, corruption allegations against the Ukrainian government and officials, Western military and financial aid to Ukraine with Germany as a major contributor, the refugee influx from Ukraine straining European countries, and sanctions against Russia harming European economies more than intended.

Domestically, the campaign focuses on the declining popularity of the ruling coalition (Ampel) due to economic issues and Ukraine policy. The campaign aims to promote opposition parties like AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) and BSW (Bündnis Sarah Wagenknecht) as alternatives to the current government. Calling for early elections and leadership changes.

Regarding shifting geopolitical dynamics, the campaign accuses the U.S. of profiting from the Ukraine conflict and manipulating European policies, challenges the EU's unity and strategic



x.com/AnupChessi66490/status/1783169517218136448

Figure 26 – Sample content tweet promoting German party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)

autonomy due to its dependence on the U.S., highlights European countries reassessing relations with Russia and China, and questions NATO's relevance and future role.

Finally, on social issues and public discontent, the campaign also covers migration and refugee influx causing societal tensions, rising poverty, inequality and declining living standards, protests by farmers, steel workers and other groups against government policies, concerns over rising crime rates and cultural clashes, and consistently calls for greater focus on social welfare and domestic issues over foreign aid to Ukraine.

5.1.2 Narratives used for the French audience

The campaign in France covers similar topics to the German campaign, with a stern focus on criticism of President Emmanuel Macron and his government, skepticism towards Ukraine and Western support for the ongoing conflict, economic challenges and social unrest in France and Europe, geopolitical shifts and the rise of alternative global powers, and domestic political tensions and the rise of populist movements.

Regarding Macron's government, the campaign promotes articles dealing with the mishandling of domestic issues like the economy, healthcare, education, and security, prioritizing foreign policy over national interests, aligning with U.S. and EU policies at the expense of French sovereignty, and failing to address citizens' concerns, leading to declining popularity.

On Ukraine, the campaign as in on the German side of the campaign, alleges corruption and misuse of funds by Ukrainian officials, doubts Ukraine's military capabilities and chances of victory against Russia, raises concerns about the economic and social costs of prolonged support for Ukraine, and calls for a diplomatic solution and peace negotiations with Russia.

Economically, the campaign criticizes rising inflation, cost of living, and declining purchasing power, protests and strikes by various sectors like farmers, healthcare workers, and teachers, EU policies and sanctions against Russia, and fears of recession and economic collapse due to the Ukraine conflict.

Geopolitically, the campaign highlights the declining U.S. influence and reliability as an ally, the growing economic and political strength of Russia, China, and BRICS nations, calls for a



x.com/tiosucterk29309/status/1750909603141857472

Figure 27 – Example of content tweet promoting Marión Maréchal

more independent and assertive European foreign policy, and debates about the future of NATO and the transatlantic alliance.

Domestically, the campaign focuses on increasing support for right-wing parties such as Reconquête and the National Rally (Rassemblement National) and figures like Marine Le Pen, criticism of immigration policies and concerns about national identity, accusations of media bias and manipulation of public opinion, and divisions within French society along ideological and cultural lines.

5.1.3 Narratives used for the Italian audience

There is significant criticism directed towards the European Union and its policies, which are portrayed as detrimental to Italy's economic interests, sovereignty, and industries. The EU is accused of imposing harmful green initiatives, contributing to economic crises, and subordinating member states to the interests of the United States.

Many articles express support for Russia's actions, portraying it as a victim of Western aggression and NATO expansion. There is skepticism towards Ukraine's role in the conflict, with some articles suggesting that Ukraine has already lost the war and should negotiate peace. Russia's economic resilience in the face of sanctions is also highlighted.

The Italian government, particularly under Giorgia Meloni, is heavily criticized for prioritizing foreign policy interests over the welfare of Italian citizens. There are concerns about rising poverty, economic stagnation, and the government's perceived subordination to the United States and NATO.

Several articles make references to fascist ideologies, with some suggesting that the current Italian government is embracing Mussolini's legacy. There are also mentions of far-right political parties and their growing influence in Europe.

Some articles focus on the issue of abortion rights in Italy, with concerns that the government is imposing restrictive measures and limiting access to safe abortion services. There are also discussions about the criminalization of women's bodies and the reinforcement of reproductive control ideologies.



Figure 28 – Example of content tweet targeted for an Italian audience

5.1.4 Narratives used for the Polish audience

Many articles discuss Poland's economic struggles, rising debts, job losses, and dissatisfaction with EU policies, particularly regarding trade and agricultural imports from Ukraine. There is a growing sentiment among some Polish officials and analysts that the EU's policies are harming Poland's interests, leading to calls for leaving the EU or renegotiating terms.

Several articles cover the consequences of the ongoing war for Poland, including the influx of Ukrainian refugees, the potential for escalation or involvement of NATO, and concerns about Poland's security and relations with Russia. There are also discussions about Poland's military preparedness, hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, and the potential for further tensions with Russia.



archive.is/bBdeF

Many articles focus on the disputes between Poland and Ukraine regarding agricultural imports, particularly grain and other products. Polish farmers are protesting and demanding an embargo on Ukrainian imports, citing concerns about the impact on the domestic agricultural sector and the broader economy.

Figure 29 – Example of content tweet targeted for a Polish audience

Some articles highlight issues of corruption and mismanagement in Ukraine, particularly in the context of the war effort and the construction of defensive fortifications. There are concerns about the misuse of funds and substandard construction, potentially undermining Ukraine's defense capabilities.

Several articles discuss social and political unrest in Poland, including protests by various groups (e.g., farmers, timber industry), dissatisfaction with the government's policies, and concerns about political repression and crackdowns. There are also mentions of growing nationalist sentiments and potential reforms to social benefits for Ukrainians in Poland.

5.1.5 Narratives used for the American audience

Most of the topics revolve around U.S. foreign policy and international relations, domestic U.S. politics and upcoming elections, immigration and border security, economic issues and military spending, and corruption and mismanagement allegations.

Firstly, U.S. foreign policy and international relations emerge as the most common theme, with a particular focus on the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and the substantial military aid

provided by the U.S. to Ukraine. Additionally, the U.S. involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict and its relations with Israel are extensively discussed, often in the context of debates over the allocation of foreign aid and the prioritization of strategic alliances. The U.S.-China relationship, marked by diplomatic efforts and tensions over issues such as Taiwan and trade, is also a recurring subject.

Secondly, domestic U.S. politics and the upcoming 2024 presidential elections are widely covered, with discussions centering on the approval ratings and public perception of President Joe Biden, potential candidates like Donald Trump, and divisions within the Democratic Party, particularly regarding foreign policy decisions. The Republican opposition to certain foreign aid packages and domestic policies is also a prominent topic, reflecting the ongoing debates over government spending priorities and budget allocations.

Thirdly, immigration and border security are significant areas of concern, with criticisms directed at Biden's border policies and their perceived impact on national security. Republican demands for stricter immigration enforcement and border control measures are frequently highlighted, alongside discussions on the strain placed on local resources and infrastructure due to the influx of migrants.

Fourthly, economic issues and military spending are extensively debated, with concerns raised over rising inflation and its impact on American households. The allocation of funds for foreign military aid versus domestic needs is a recurring topic, with calls for a reevaluation of economic priorities and a focus on domestic development instead of military aid to Ukraine. The influence of military-industrial interests on foreign policy decisions is also scrutinized.

Finally, corruption and mismanagement allegations are also prevalent here, with accusations leveled against the Ukrainian government for the misuse of foreign aid and concerns over the lack of oversight and accountability in the U.S. military aid distribution. Additionally, allegations of political bias and abuse of power within the U.S. government and calls for increased transparency and anti-corruption measures in both domestic and foreign contexts.



archive.ph/zeSCE

Figure 30 - Example content tweet targeted for an American audience

5.1.6 Narratives used for the Ukrainian audience

The campaign with its clones promotes narratives that seek to portray Ukraine as a lost cause, its leadership as corrupt and incompetent, and its allies as increasingly reluctant to provide support.

One consistent narrative revolves around the declining support for Ukraine from its allies. The campaign highlights delays and reductions in military aid and equipment deliveries, citing shifting priorities and domestic challenges in allied countries. It also amplifies growing skepticism about Ukraine's prospects for victory, with some voices calling for Ukraine to negotiate with Russia and accept territorial losses. This narrative appears to create a sense of inevitability about Ukraine's defeat and discourage continued assistance from its partners.

Another major theme is the internal political tensions and power struggles within Ukraine itself. The campaign has consistently painted a rift between President Zelensky and the military leadership, particularly General Zaluzhny, fueling speculation about potential military uprisings or coups against Zelensky. It also emphasizes corruption scandals and mismanagement of funds within the Ukrainian government and military, further eroding trust in the country's leadership.

The disinformation campaign has also targeted Ukraine's mobilization practices, depicting them as aggressive and detrimental to society. It highlights the possible conscription of women, students, and older citizens, as well as inadequate training, equipment, and support for mobilized soldiers. Draft evasion and resistance to mobilization among the population are portrayed as widespread, with concerns raised about the long-term demographic and social consequences of the war.

The campaign also paints a grim picture of Ukraine's deteriorating military situation and heavy losses on the front lines. It emphasizes the depletion of manpower and resources, strategic setbacks, ammunition shortages, and declining morale among soldiers, all contributing to a sense of impending defeat for Ukraine's forces.

Finally, the campaign seeks to promote strained relations between Ukraine and its neighbors, particularly Poland. It highlights economic blockades, trade restrictions, and historical grievances resurfacing amidst the ongoing conflict. The treatment of Ukrainian refugees and workers in neighboring countries is also portrayed negatively, potentially trying to undermine Ukraine's long-term integration with the European Union.



archive.ph/A6HGL

Figure 31 - Example content tweet targeted for a Ukrainian audience

5.1.7 Narratives used for the Hebrew/Israeli audience

The articles, written in English and Hebrew, promoted through Doppelgänger cover a wide range of topics related to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with a focus on the violence between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

One of the most prominent themes that emerges from the articles is the growing tension and disagreement between the United States and Israel over the latter's handling of the Gaza war. Many articles suggest that the US, under President Joe Biden's administration, is increasingly critical of Israel's military actions and alleged human rights violations in Gaza. Marking a significant shift from the previous US administration's unconditional support for Israel. The US is reportedly pressuring Israel to de-escalate the conflict, threatening to reduce or suspend military aid, and even considering sanctions against Israeli officials involved in the war. Some articles go as far as accusing the US of betraying Israel and comparing its treatment of the Jewish state to its stance on Ukraine.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself is another central topic, with articles focusing on the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Israel is facing widespread international criticism for its military actions, which are seen as disproportionate and indiscriminate, resulting in high civilian casualties and the destruction of infrastructure in Gaza. Many countries and international organizations are accusing Israel of committing war crimes and even genocide against the Palestinian people. There are growing calls for a ceasefire and the provision of humanitarian aid to the besieged Gaza Strip. At the same time, some articles defend Israel's right to self-defense against Hamas, which is recognized as a terrorist organization by many countries.

The international community's reaction to the Gaza conflict is another significant topic covered in the articles. Many countries, including traditional allies of Israel like Germany and France, are condemning Israel's actions and calling for investigations into alleged war crimes. Some are even threatening sanctions and arms embargoes against Israel. The conflict has also sparked a wave of antisemitic incidents and attacks on Jewish communities worldwide, with many articles highlighting the surge of anti-Jewish sentiment in Europe and other regions.

Israel's domestic politics is another important theme, with articles revealing deep divisions and disagreements within the Israeli government over the handling of the Gaza war. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing growing criticism from both the opposition and members of his own coalition for his leadership during the conflict. Some are calling for his resignation and



archive.ph/I50aV

Figure 32 - Example content tweet targeted for an Israeli American audience

new elections, accusing him of delaying the war's end for political reasons. The cost of the war is also putting a strain on Israel's economy, with articles mentioning budget issues and the need for revisions.

Finally, the articles highlight the regional and global geopolitical dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Iran's role in supporting Hamas and other anti-Israel groups is mentioned in several articles, with some suggesting that the Gaza war is part of a broader proxy conflict between Israel and Iran. Russia's efforts to mediate and expand its influence in the Middle East are also noted, with articles pointing to the alignment of Russia and Iran in advocating for a ceasefire and aid to Gaza. Some articles compare Israel's situation to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, drawing parallels between the two crises. The impact of the Gaza war on global issues like energy prices and shipping routes is also discussed, underscoring the far-reaching consequences of the conflict.

5.2 Observing Theory in Practice

The data collected on the Doppelgänger campaign offers a valuable opportunity to observe the real-world application of the tactics and narratives identified in the literature on Russian disinformation. By analyzing the content, strategies, and impact of the campaign, it is possible to validate and expand upon existing theoretical frameworks, demonstrating how these disinformation techniques manifest in practice and influence public discourse, political processes, and societal dynamics.

The use of "conspiratorial discourse" (Yablokov, 2015) is evident in the content promoted by RRN-affiliated sites such as spicyconspiracy.info in the US and derleitstern.com in Germany. These sites propagate various conspiracy theories and suggest the influence of hidden forces on world events, aligning with the tactic of eroding faith in official accounts and creating a sense of uncertainty.

Similarly, the campaign's exploitation of social divisions and hot-button issues, as described by Mejias and Vokuev (2017), can be seen in the targeting of sensitive topics by sites like mypride.press, which focuses on LGBTQ issues, and acrosstheline.press, which deals with migration. By framing these issues in a way that exacerbates tensions and fuels fears, the campaign seeks to polarize public opinion and undermine social cohesion.

Furthermore, the Doppelgänger campaign's support for opposition parties in Germany, such as the BSW (Bündnis Sarah Wagenknecht) and AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), shows the blurring of lines between authentic domestic dissent and foreign interference, as highlighted by Bayer et al. (2019). By amplifying these parties' grievances and anti-establishment rhetoric, the campaign coopts genuine political movements to advance pro-Kremlin narratives and undermine the German government's foreign policy.

As Linvill and Warren (2020) and Paul and Matthews (2016) argue, Russian disinformation aims to increase polarization, erode trust in institutions, and create a state of information paralysis through an overload of contradictory coverage. The Doppelgänger campaign's response to the Crocus terrorist attack in Moscow exemplifies this approach. In the aftermath of the attack, the campaign's bots propagated a flood of conflicting narratives but localized for each language, pointing the finger at Ukraine, the U.S., the UK's Secret Intelligence Service

(MI-6), and the so-called "collective West" while denouncing official U.S. government statements attributing the attack to ISIS. This combination of contradictory claims tries to sow confusion, undermine trust in official accounts, and ultimately serves to deflect blame from Russia and advance pro-Kremlin narratives.

Arabic	Spanish	English (US)	French	Italian
<p>Direct accusations of Ukraine, UK, and US involvement</p> <p>Claims that ISIS is a cover story used by the West</p> <p>Limited focus on condolences and solidarity</p>	<p>Ukraine portrayed as a US puppet sponsoring terrorism</p> <p>Accusations of Ukraine supporting ISIS to target Russia</p> <p>Emphasis on Ukraine doing the "dirty work" for the US</p>	<p>Overwhelming focus on condolences and support for victims</p> <p>Minimal mentions of suspicions about Ukraine or the West</p> <p>Primary emphasis on condemning terrorism itself</p>	<p>Mix of suspicions about UK and Ukraine involvement</p> <p>Expressions of condolences and solidarity with Russia</p> <p>Comparisons to previous attacks in Paris and fears of recurrence</p>	<p>Ukraine portrayed as a terrorist regime directly responsible</p> <p>Accusations of Ukraine becoming a global terrorist training center</p> <p>Unequivocal framing of Ukraine as a terrorist state</p>

Figure 33 - Crocus Doppelgänger tweet text analysis, analyzed with Claude 3 Opus

The concept of "firehoses of falsehood" (Paul & Matthews, 2016) is also relevant to the Doppelgänger campaign's narrative laundering events, during which a high volume of links and content from various sources is rapidly disseminated across multiple platforms and languages. Aiming to overwhelm audiences with a flood of information, making it difficult to discern truth from fiction and creating a sense of uncertainty and disorientation.

The figure displays four examples of cloned news articles, each presented in a screenshot format. From left to right:

- Le Parisien:** Article titled "America has brought the French economy to its knees". The text discusses the impact of international sanctions on the Russian economy, quoting a European radio journalist. It mentions that the Russian economy is expected to grow by more than 2% next year, which is paradoxical given the situation.
- SPIEGEL:** Article titled "Unemployment rises in June". The text discusses the impact of sanctions on the German economy, mentioning that a third of manufacturers are considering such a possibility. It lists corporations like Volkswagen, BMW, and Bosch, and notes that the loss of jobs in Germany is already at 5.9 percent.
- FOX NEWS:** Article titled "U.S. and EU Lost in Confrontation They Imposed on Russia". The text discusses the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy, stating that leading media in the United States and Europe are increasingly saying that subjugating Russia and inflicting unacceptable damage on it has failed.
- Le Point:** Article titled "The 'war of attrition' prepared by the United States in Ukraine will eventually destroy Europe". The text discusses the impact of sanctions on Europe, stating that congressional negotiations on aid to Kyiv are increasingly deadlocked.

Figure 34 – Examples of cloned articles dealing on sanctions, translated to English

This can be seen in the Doppelgänger campaign's content, with it often presenting contradictory views on the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia. Some articles argue that sanctions are not working and are harming European economies more than Russia and how they should be removed, while others write how sanctions have made Russia stronger. This seemingly inconsistent messaging aligns with the "firehose of falsehood" model described by Paul and Matthews (2016), which involves the rapid, continuous, and repetitive dissemination of multiple, often contradictory narratives. By promoting these conflicting viewpoints, the campaign aims to create confusion, sow doubt about the efficacy of international sanctions, and ultimately undermine support for measures against Russia.

However, as revealed in an internal proposal by the disinformation campaign runners obtained by The Washington Post, the operators of the campaign recognize the need to balance the use of outright fabrications with more realistic information for maximum effectiveness²².

The Doppelgänger campaign's sophisticated and adaptive nature also highlights the challenges of combating disinformation without infringing on democratic principles, as noted by Gillespie (2018). While the campaign's content and tactics clearly aim to manipulate public opinion and advance geopolitical objectives, efforts to remove or censor this content can be seen as an attack on free speech. RRN (Recent Reliable News) for itself, did play into this mantra, playing itself as a victim of censorship and "cancelation" by the French government after the original reporting by VIGINUM.²³

As the Finnish government's experience with Russian interference since 2014 suggests (Salonius-Pasternak, 2017), building societal resilience through media literacy and policy deterrence could be an effective way of dealing with the issue on hand rather than simply fact-checking or removing content. This approach recognizes the need to address the underlying infrastructure and tactics that enable disinformation campaigns, rather than just focusing on the content itself.

Ultimately, to effectively counter sophisticated disinformation campaigns like Doppelgänger, a coordinated and collaborative approach involving multiple countries and organizations is key. Given the nature of these campaigns and their ability to adapt quickly, isolated efforts by individual countries or organizations are unlikely to have a lasting impact. Governments, social media platforms, civil society organizations, and media outlets must work together, sharing intelligence, best practices, and resources to identify, monitor, and take action against disinformation networks.

²² <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/08/russia-propaganda-us-ukraine/>

²³ [https://rrn\(.\)media/france-wants-to-cancel-rrn/](https://rrn(.)media/france-wants-to-cancel-rrn/)

5.3 Reach and impact

While previous analyses of the Doppelganger campaign have suggested that its reach and impact are limited²⁴, this assessment may not capture the full extent of the campaign's potential influence. While it is true that in many cases, the campaign's content receives minimal views, there are notable exceptions where the disinformation achieves significantly greater reach when the campaign operators dedicate additional resources and efforts to promoting specific narratives or events.

Two examples of the campaign's potential for broader impact are the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow and the Games of Future event in Kazan. In the aftermath of the Crocus City Hall incident, the Doppelganger network heavily promoted content across multiple languages, claiming that Ukraine and Western countries were responsible for the attack rather than the officially reported perpetrator, ISIS²⁵. This concentrated effort to push a false narrative in the wake of a high-profile event demonstrates the campaign's ability to capitalize on major news stories to sow confusion and division on an international scale.

Similarly, during the Game of Future competition in Kazan in 2024, the campaign devoted significant resources to promoting videos and pictures surrounding the event, seeking to promote the event internationally using the same style of bots.



Figure 35 - User on Twitter complaining about Games of (the) Future bots




Figure 36 - View count data provided by @antibot4navalny, ZXX indicates content without text to determine language from

²⁴ <https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/29/NEAR-FINAL-DRAFT-Meta-Quarterly-Adversarial-Threat-Report-Q2-2023.pdf> (page 21)

²⁵ <https://theins.ru/en/news/270225>

It is important to note that while the campaign's reach can be measured to some extent by the number of views on promoted content, it is not possible to know precisely how many people click through the links to read the full articles. However, there is evidence that users do engage with the cloned websites, as some individuals have not only successfully navigated the redirection process but have also shared the content on Twitter. For example, by searching for the share link "<https://w.lpnt.fr/2519191t> via @LePoint," which is consistent across the Le Point clones, it becomes clear that users are actively republishing the disinformation. Searching for "url:lepoint.foo" or "leparisien.re" on Twitter yields similar results.

Such cases underscore the fact that the reach and effectiveness of the Doppelganger campaign are not static or uniform, but rather depend on the strategic allocation of resources by its operators. One way the campaign expands its reach is by deploying a larger number of content bots and distribution bots. Content bots are responsible for posting the disinformation content, while distribution bots amplify the content through targeted reply spam on Twitter. By increasing the number of these bots, the campaign can significantly scale up its operations and reach a wider audience. This tactic allows the Doppelganger network to rapidly disseminate its narratives and flood online discussions with its signature reply spam.

Therefore, while it is accurate to state that the campaign's overall reach is probably often limited, this should not lead to the conclusion that it is incapable of having a significant impact. The Crocus City Hall massacre and the Games of Future promotion serve as a reminder that the Doppelganger campaign's potential for influence should not be underestimated, as its operators can selectively deploy resources to amplify certain narratives and interfere in specific events when needed. This adaptability and strategic targeting complicate efforts to assess the full scope of the campaign's reach and underscores the need for continued vigilance and analysis of its activities.

Chapter 6 Attribution

Meta and The Washington Post have attributed the Doppelganger disinformation campaign to two Russia-based companies: Social Design Agency (SDA) and Company Group Structura LLC (Structura). These two companies were sanctioned by the European Union on July 28th²⁶, 2023, and by the United States on March 20th, 2024²⁷. While these entities have been publicly linked to the campaign, the report by Meta²⁸ did not provide detailed evidence supporting this attribution.

However, it is possible to corroborate independently SDA's involvement in the Doppelganger operation, despite the company's registered address being in Moscow.

Firstly, a logo visible in one of the videos promoted by the campaign, which focused on the Tambov election and was promoted through the Doppelganger campaign, matches the logo of Social Design Agency. This direct visual link ties content disseminated by Doppelganger to SDA.



Figure 37 - Voting in Tambov election video promoted through Doppelganger bots, matching logo with SDA

Secondly, prior reporting by the research group Qurium in the original reporting with the EU DisinfoLab revealed that metadata on images used by the campaign frequently indicated they were uploaded from the Irkutsk region of Russia²⁹. This geolocation data suggests a significant portion of the company's infrastructure originated from Irkutsk, rather than the company's official location in Moscow.

²⁶ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A190I%3ATOC&uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2023.190.01.0021.01.ENG>

²⁷ <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2195>

²⁸ <https://about.fb.com/news/2022/12/metasp-2022-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-enforcements/>

²⁹ <https://www.qurium.org/alerts/under-the-hood-of-a-doppelganger/>

Analysis of the mutual Twitter following of accounts associated with SDA’s Twitter account shows a significant concentration of followers based in Irkutsk. The geographic alignment between the image metadata and SDA's online social network presence further strengthens the connection to Irkutsk, despite the company's registered Moscow address.

Mutual following




Figure 38 – social media mutual follower analysis on Social Design Agency’s Twitter profile

The discrepancy between SDA's official Moscow location and the repeated appearance of Irkutsk in the campaign's online footprint raises even more intriguing questions related to the working hours at the company as previously analyzed in 4.3.1.3. It suggests that key elements of the Doppelganger operation were managed from Irkutsk, possibly to obscure the campaign's true origins or to leverage local resources and personnel. This finding underscores the complexity of attribution in the context of disinformation campaigns, where the stated location of an organization may not align with the actual geographical distribution of its activities.

Taken together, these pieces of evidence - the matching logo, the Irkutsk metadata, and the Irkutsk-based Twitter following - build a helping case in identifying Social Design Agency (SDA) as one of the entities behind the Doppelganger campaign, despite the company's registered address in Moscow. While not definitively conclusive, this helps support the attribution claims made by Meta and The Washington Post

Chapter 7 Law and sanction enforcement role

This chapter addresses the question: How suitable are the current public responses to the Doppelganger campaign, and what improvements can be suggested based on the analysis of its operations and the relevant literature?

It examines the responses of key players to the campaign's activities, assesses the effectiveness of current laws and sanctions in combating state-sponsored disinformation, and highlights gaps, inconsistencies, and challenges in applying these measures. The chapter also investigates the consequences of actions taken by Twitter and hosting providers and considers how these might shape future strategies.

By analyzing the current infrastructure, the chapter aims to identify areas for improvement in taking down the Doppelganger campaign and similar disinformation campaigns in the context of the European Union.

The recent approval of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) is a step in the EU's efforts to safeguard media pluralism and independence. This chapter will discuss the EMFA's potential impact on countering disinformation campaigns like Doppelganger and the challenges in its implementation.

7.1 The Digital Services Act (DSA) and European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)

The European Union has established a comprehensive legal framework to address the challenges posed by disinformation, protect media freedom, and ensure the proper functioning of the internal market for media services. Two key components of this framework are the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).

The DSA, which came into force on November 16, 2022, aimed to create a safer and more transparent online environment by imposing new obligations on digital platforms to counter the spread of illegal content, disinformation, and other harmful materials. It requires very large online platforms (VLOPs) like Twitter to assess and mitigate systemic risks associated with disinformation and manipulative behavior, adjust their recommendation systems to limit the spread of such content, and provide clear information about their content moderation policies and outcomes.

The EMFA³⁰, approved by the European Parliament on 13 March 2024 and adopted by the Council on 26 March 2024, complements the DSA by safeguarding media pluralism and independence across the EU. It addresses sector-specific problems not fully covered by the DSA and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), such as national restrictions on journalistic sources and communications, interference in the operation of media service providers, risks of state interference in public service media, and the impact of media market concentrations on pluralism and editorial independence.

The EMFA introduces measures to enhance transparency in media ownership and funding, protect journalists from various forms of pressure and interference (including the use of spyware), ensure the independent functioning of public service media, and establish the European Board for Media Services to address cross-border issues related to media freedom

³⁰ <https://www.media-freedom-act.com/>

and pluralism. The Act also provides additional protection against unjustified removal of media content by VLOPs, building on the provisions of the DSA.

The EMFA entered into force on 7 May 2024, and the new rules will fully apply as of 8 August 2025. As the EMFA enters into force, member states will need to transpose its provisions into national law and ensure that the necessary institutional arrangements are in place for its effective implementation.

7.2 Institutional Framework and Key Public Institutions

The enforcement of the DSA and EMFA involves a multi-layered institutional framework, with shared responsibilities among EU institutions, national regulatory authorities, and the European Board for Media Services.

At the EU level, the European Commission is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the DSA and EMFA, issuing guidance, and coordinating with national authorities. The Commission can also initiate infringement proceedings against member states for non-compliance with the regulations.

National regulatory authorities play a role in monitoring and enforcing compliance with the DSA and EMFA within their respective jurisdictions. Tasked with investigating potential violations, imposing penalties on non-compliant platforms, and cooperating with their counterparts in other member states to address cross-border issues. These authorities are expected to be independent bodies set up under national laws.

The European Board for Media Services, established under the EMFA, will serve as an independent advisory body, providing opinions and recommendations on matters related to media freedom and pluralism. It will facilitate information sharing and best practices among member states and stakeholders, contributing to a more coordinated and effective response to disinformation. The Board will be composed of representatives from the national media authorities or bodies.

In France, VIGINUM, the national service for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference, has analyzed the Doppelganger campaign and its connection to the sanctioned Russian entities Social Design Agency and Structura. Similarly, the German Foreign Ministry has also examined the campaign. However, despite their awareness of the issue, neither institution appears to have taken significant enforcement actions against the campaign's infrastructure or the entities involved.

7.3 Business compliance and enforcement gaps

The Doppelganger disinformation campaign's ability to operate and spread misleading content across various online platforms and websites highlights significant gaps in business compliance and enforcement of relevant laws and regulations. Despite the existence of legal frameworks such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), as well as targeted sanctions against Russian entities involved in disinformation activities, the campaign has managed to exploit loopholes and inconsistencies in the application of these measures.

The following sections will examine the roles and responsibilities of key actors, including social media platforms, domain registrars, and web hosting providers, in countering the Doppelganger campaign. By analyzing their responses to the campaign's activities and identifying areas where enforcement has fallen short, it is possible to gain insights into the

challenges faced by businesses in complying with anti-disinformation regulations and the need for more effective coordination between the private sector and public authorities.

The gaps in business compliance and enforcement not only undermine the effectiveness of existing legal and regulatory frameworks but also create an environment in which state-sponsored disinformation campaigns can thrive. Addressing these gaps require a concerted effort by businesses, governments, and civil society to establish clear standards, strengthen accountability mechanisms to take down this type of content.

7.3.1 Twitter's role

While not the only method of propagation, Twitter has been one of the primary platforms for the dissemination of disinformation by the Doppelganger campaign, and while the platform has taken some actions to curb the spread of disinformation, its efforts have been inconsistent and often insufficient. The takedown of RRN's original domain and Twitter account following the VIGINUM report in 2023 showed some initial enforcement, but the subsequent decline in enforcement suggests that Twitter's commitment to combating this campaign has waned over time.

After the release of the VIGINUM report in 2023, which analyzed RRN's (Recent Reliable News) central role in the Doppelganger campaign, Twitter took action by banning the @RRNworld account associated with the RRN.world domain. This initial enforcement action demonstrated Twitter's willingness to respond to evidence of coordinated disinformation efforts. However, the campaign quickly adapted, with RRN changing its domain to RRN.media and repurposing what appears to be an aged Twitter account, @RRNmedia, July 5th 2023.



archive.ph/MdQju

Figure 39 - Twitter Blue for RRN (sanctioned entity - SDA)

Despite the clear connection between the new RRN domain and Twitter account and the previously sanctioned entities Social Design Agency and Structura, Twitter has allowed the sanctioned companies to operate @RRNmedia and even pay for Twitter Blue/X Premium, a subscription service that provides exclusive features and benefits. This lack of consistent enforcement against the Doppelganger campaign raises serious questions about Twitter's ability to effectively identify sanctioned companies and their infrastructure.

Moreover, Twitter's apparent inability to detect the coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) employed by the Doppelganger campaign, wherein thousands of accounts consistently quote tweet a single tweet without triggering any appreciable limitations or red flags, suggests that the platform's algorithms and monitoring systems are not adequately equipped to identify and respond to such coordinated activities, even when they occur at a significant scale.

Another aspect that highlights Twitter's inadequate response is its failure to recognize the consistent structure and placement of the content bots' links, which follow a specific pattern: subdomain.expendable_root_domain/some_string. Despite this pattern having been previously analyzed and identified as a key indicator of the Doppelganger campaign's activity, Twitter's systems seem unable to detect and flag it effectively, allowing the campaign to continue operating without interruption.

Even when enforcement actions are taken against the Doppelganger bots, Twitter's approach appears to be incomplete and ineffective. In most cases, only the quote tweeting reply spam bots are taken down, while the content bots, which play a crucial role in the campaign's effectiveness, are left untouched. This selective enforcement indicates a lack of understanding of the campaign's structure and the interdependence between the content and distribution bots.

The lack of consistent enforcement against disinformation campaigns is not limited to the Doppelganger operation. Twitter's handling of accounts related to the Russian state-backed media outlet RT raises serious questions about the platform's compliance with sanctions and its commitment to countering state-sponsored disinformation. Despite the EU's ban on RT and Sputnik following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as outlined in Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350, Twitter has failed to fully enforce this ban on its platform.

One such example is the account @ahilesvainfo, which is a RT (Russia Today) show account targeting Spanish audiences but remains active and viewable on Twitter in the European Union. This selective enforcement of sanctions not only undermines the effectiveness of international efforts to counter Russian disinformation but also highlights a broader problem with Twitter's inconsistent application of its own policies and compliance with legal obligations.

Despite the clear evidence of coordinated inauthentic behavior and the dissemination of disinformation by the Doppelganger campaign on its platform, Twitter has demonstrated an inconsistent and often insufficient response. The platform's failure to effectively detect and counter the campaign's tactics, as well as its selective enforcement of sanctions against Russia-linked entities, raising potential concerns about its compliance with the DSA's requirements for VLOPs to assess and mitigate systemic risks on its platform in order to limit the spread of disinformation.




Figure 40 - Twitter screenshot of RT show ¡Ahí les va!

7.3.1.1 Enforcement analysis on media content takedown on Twitter

Analysis of media content bots gathered by the @antibot4navalny group from February 2024 to May 2024 shows significant inconsistencies in Twitter's enforcement actions against the Doppelganger campaign's media content (images and videos). The takedown rates vary considerably over time, with nearly complete enforcement in early February followed by substantial dips in March.




Figure 41 – Takedown behavior of Doppelganger media content bots from February to May 2024. Value as in amount of media content bots. See Appendix, 10.7.1 for more details.

It is important to note that the actual removal of content was checked as of June 2024, and even if the content was eventually taken down, it may have already served its purpose if the takedown occurred after the disinformation campaign's intended run of one to two days. However, a limitation in this analysis is that the specific details of how and when the enforcement occurred have not been tracked.

This limitation is further compounded by the lack of access to Twitter's API data, which hinders the ability to track and analyze the Doppelganger campaign in greater detail. Without comprehensive data on the campaign's activities, it becomes challenging to assess the full extent of Twitter's enforcement efforts and identify potential gaps in its response.

Greater transparency from Twitter, including easier access to relevant API data for researchers, would enable a more thorough evaluation of the platform's enforcement actions and help identify areas for improvement. Increased cooperation between Twitter and the research community would allow the development of more effective strategies for detecting and mitigating disinformation on the platform.

7.3.1.2 Twitter's Potential Violations of the EU Digital Services Act

Twitter's inconsistent and often insufficient efforts to combat the Doppelganger disinformation campaign, as well as its failure to fully enforce the EU's ban on RT affiliated accounts, raise concerns about the platform's compliance with the Digital Services Act (DSA). The DSA, which came into force on November 16, 2022, aims to create a safer and more transparent online environment by imposing new obligations on digital platforms to counter the spread of illegal content, disinformation, and other harmful materials.

One of the key provisions of the DSA is Article 26, which requires very large online platforms (VLOPs) like Twitter to assess and mitigate systemic risks associated with the dissemination

of illegal content, manipulative behavior, and disinformation. Twitter's apparent inability to detect and effectively respond to the coordinated inauthentic behavior employed by the Doppelgänger campaign, as well as its failure to recognize and flag the consistent structure of the campaign's content bots' links, suggests that the platform may be failing to adequately assess and mitigate these risks, potentially violating Article 26.

Article 27 of the DSA also obligates VLOPs to take appropriate measures to adjust their recommendation systems to limit the spread of disinformation. Twitter's inconsistent enforcement actions against the Doppelgänger campaign, particularly the selective takedown of quote tweeting reply spam bots while leaving content bots mostly untouched, raise questions about the effectiveness of the platform's measures to limit the spread of disinformation, potentially breaching Article 27.

The DSA also emphasizes the importance of transparency and accountability in content moderation decisions. Article 23 requires platforms to provide clear and detailed information about their content moderation policies, the measures taken to enforce these policies, and the outcomes of their efforts. Twitter's lack of transparency regarding its actions against the Doppelgänger bots and its failure to consistently enforce existing sanctions may possibly constitute a violation of Article 23.

DSA's Article 35 establishes a co-regulatory approach, with the development of codes of conduct and industry standards to address specific challenges, such as disinformation. Twitter's difficulties in effectively combating the Doppelgänger campaign and its inconsistent enforcement of sanctions against RT-related accounts suggest that the platform may struggle to meet the standards set forth in these codes of conduct, potentially exposing itself to enforcement actions and penalties under the DSA.

7.3.2 The role of companies and authorities in domain typosquatting

The Doppelgänger disinformation campaign heavily relies on the use of cloned news websites created through typosquatting, a tactic that involves registering domain names that closely resemble legitimate news outlets. These cloned sites are designed to mislead readers by mimicking the appearance and content of the original sources while injecting false or manipulated information. The campaign operators exploit the trust and credibility associated with well-known news brands to amplify the reach and impact of their disinformation efforts.

Despite the central role of these cloned websites in the Doppelgänger campaign, efforts to remove them have been inconsistent and often inadequate. With the analysis of the squatted domains showing that they are registered through registrars based in the United States or European countries, suggesting that enforcement actions should be feasible. The EU DisinfoLab's analysis³¹ argues that granting news sites a privileged "trusted notifier" status could facilitate the takedown process for these fraudulent domains.

³¹ <https://www.disinfo.eu/of-domain-names-and-ducks/>




Figure 42 – Examples of five news sites clones’ take-down behaviour between November 2023 and May 1, 2024.

However, the responsibility for addressing this issue does not lie solely with the news organizations themselves. While some outlets, such as Le Parisien and Le Point, have actively pursued the removal of cloned domains, others, like Spiegel, appear to have taken little or no action. This inconsistency underscores the need for a more coordinated and proactive approach involving multiple stakeholders. ICANN, the global authority overseeing the domain name system, and the relevant authorities in the countries where the affected news sites are based should play a more active role in enforcing measures to combat typosquatting and the proliferation of cloned websites.

It is important to note that Spiegel is well aware of the Doppelgänger campaign's efforts to clone its website as per previous reporting on the Doppelgänger campaign by them³². During the tracking period, Spiegel's cloned domain (spiegel.ltd) was the most frequently promoted among the German-language clones, with 96 instances recorded. Despite this, Spiegel has not taken visible steps to address the issue, suggesting a lack of urgency or prioritization in combating the misuse of its brand and content.

The lack of effective enforcement is further exemplified by the case of the Welt domain takedown during the tracking period. The .ltd extension of the Welt clone was successfully removed, but it quickly resurfaced using the .pm extension. Notably, this takedown was not the result of efforts by the news organization or the authorities, but rather the initiative of an individual Twitter user who contacted the registrar after encountering one of the Doppelgänger campaign's bots³³. This incident highlights the glaring gaps in the current enforcement landscape, as it seemingly required the action of a single concerned user to temporarily disrupt a small part of the campaign's infrastructure.

³² <https://archive.ph/Lu8dk>

³³ <https://x.com/Doener/status/1744493311862112342>

In addition to the responsibilities of news organizations, domain registrars, and national authorities, ICANN, as the global authority overseeing the domain name system, should also play a more active role in combating domain squatting. ICANN could facilitate better coordination among stakeholders and develop policies and procedures to streamline the takedown of fraudulent domains. However, the effectiveness of such measures will depend on the willingness and ability of all parties involved to cooperate and enforce them consistently.

The Welt clone example demonstrates that the existing measures to combat squatted domains and cloned websites are very much inadequate, and while extensively analyzed by third parties, not enough enforcement is being taken. The fact that a user's email resulted in the temporary removal of a single clone while the affected news site and authorities appeared to remain passive highlights the need for more proactive and coordinated efforts by affected news organizations, domain registrars, and public authorities to combat news. The limited and inconsistent actions taken against these fraudulent domains suggest a lack of effective enforcement of the EMFA's provisions on transparency and media protection.

7.3.3 The role of registrars and web hosters in sanction enforcement

The Doppelganger campaign's infrastructure heavily relies on domain registrars and hosting providers based in the United States and the Netherlands, despite the campaign's clear ties to sanctioned Russian entities. This raises serious questions about the effectiveness of sanction enforcement and the role of these service providers in combating state-sponsored disinformation.

A closer examination of the French and German RRN WordPress websites reveals a pattern of using US-based registrars like Namecheap and hosting providers such as Hostinger³⁴, which has servers in both the US and the Netherlands. For example, German sites like derrattenfanger.net, besuchszweck.org, and meisterurian.io are hosted on US-based servers belonging to Hostinger or Namecheap. Similarly, French sites like lexomnium.com, notrepays.today, and candidat.news are registered with Namecheap and hosted on US-based servers.

Under the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations, US companies are prohibited from engaging in transactions with sanctioned entities. This includes providing domain registration and hosting services. Similarly, the European Union's sanctions regime obligates EU-based companies to freeze the assets of designated entities and prohibit making funds or economic resources available to them.

However, the fact that the Doppelganger campaign's websites remain active on US and Dutch servers suggests that the relevant service providers have not effectively enforced these sanctions. This lack of enforcement could be due to several factors:

- **Insufficient due diligence:** Registrars and hosting providers appear to not be conducting thorough checks on the beneficial ownership and affiliations of their clients, allowing sanctioned entities to maintain their online presence.

³⁴ See Appendix 10.4.2 for the data on the WordPress registrars and IP addresses.

- Lack of proactive monitoring: Service providers appear to not be proactively monitoring their client base for potential sanctions violations, instead relying merely on government notifications for enforcement.
- Inadequate coordination with authorities: There may be a lack of effective communication channels and information sharing between service providers and the relevant government agencies responsible for sanctions enforcement.

The continued operation of Doppelganger-linked websites on servers owned by US and EU-based companies, despite the campaign's ties to sanctioned Russian entities, reveals significant gaps in the enforcement of existing sanctions regimes. This lack of enforcement by registrars and web hosters undermines the effectiveness of international efforts to counter disinformation and points to the need for stronger cooperation between service providers and public authorities.

The failure to enforce sanctions against the Doppelganger campaign's infrastructure not only undermines the effectiveness of international efforts to counter state-sponsored disinformation but also highlights the need for stronger cooperation between service providers and government authorities. Registrars and hosting companies should be in theory required to implement more stringent due diligence processes, regularly screen their client base against sanctions lists, and promptly act upon any identified violations, but this does not appear to occur in practice, at least in this case.

7.3.4 The role of enforcement by Government Entities

The issue with taking down the RRN WordPress sites and other related disinformation infrastructure appears to be less about awareness among intelligence agencies and more about a general lack of enforcement.

As analyzed in 4.3.2 regarding the InfoRos ecosystem in the Doppelganger, the site `ObservateurContinental(.)fr`, which was previously identified by Alethea³⁵ as the reasoning for linking the Doppelganger campaign to the Russian intelligence service GRU, at the time of writing clearly shows in its WHOIS data that it is owned by the sanctioned entity InfoRos.

InfoRos has been sanctioned for over three years by the US and over 1 year by the French government, and at the time of this writing³⁶, and `ObservateurContinental` is registered with a French domain name (`.fr`). This suggests a broader problem of non-enforcement by government entities in taking down sites associated with sanctioned companies, despite their awareness of the issue.

nic-hdl:	ICL98-FRNIC
type:	ORGANIZATION
contact:	Inforos Co., Ltd
address:	Alex Kouchnir
address:	13-2 Krzhizhanovskogo st.
address:	117218 Moscow
country:	RU
phone:	+7.4957188411
e-mail:	nic@inforos.ru
registrar:	KEY-SYSTEMS GmbH
anonymous:	NO
obsoleted:	NO
eppstatus:	associated
eppstatus:	active
eligstatus:	not identified
reachstatus:	not identified
source:	FRNIC

Figure 43 – InfoRos information publicly listed via WHOIS check. <https://archive.ph/lbCxX>

³⁵ <https://alethea.com/insights/writing-with-invisible-ink>

³⁶ <https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-FQkaf2WXzfiA2g2QMnLZTd/>

In the RRN sites the ownership information is faked in the WHOIS data, like truthgate.us, where the name of the person who registered the site appears to be fake³⁷. In the case of ObservateurContinental, the WHOIS data explicitly states that the owner is InfoRos³⁸.

The EU DisinfoLab, in their report "How two information portals hide their ties to the Russian Press Agency Inforos" published in 2020, also provided a detailed analysis of the connections between InfoRos and several news sites, including ObservateurContinental. Despite this evidence, the French authorities, or any authorities for that matter, have not taken any visible action against ObservateurContinental or other InfoRos-linked sites.

In the case of the RRN sites, VIGINUM, the French agency responsible for countering foreign digital interference, has previously analyzed some of the RRN WordPress sites and their connection to the Doppelganger campaign. In their report, VIGINUM identified several RRN-linked sites, such as notrepays.today and candidat.news, as part of the disinformation network. However, despite this analysis and the clear evidence of their association with sanctioned entities, no visible enforcement action has been taken against these sites, allowing them to continue operating and spreading disinformation.

This lack of enforcement extends beyond France, as many of the RRN WordPress sites and clone news sites are hosted on servers located in the United States and the Netherlands, which is further analyzed in Section 7.3.

The failure of governments to enforce existing sanctions and take down sites linked to known disinformation actors undermines the effectiveness of international efforts to combat state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. Rather than just making people aware of it as is in the case of Germany³⁹ and France. Government entities across the EU need to adopt a more proactive and coordinated approach to enforcing sanctions and disrupting the infrastructure that enables the spread of false and misleading information. This requires better information sharing, joint investigations, and swift action against identified threats.

7.4 Coordination and Information Sharing Mechanisms

In addition to the legal and institutional framework established by the DSA and EMFA, the EU and its member states have developed several mechanisms for coordination and information sharing to address cross-border disinformation campaigns:

1. Rapid Alert System: This system enables EU institutions and member states to share information on ongoing disinformation campaigns and coordinate responses.⁴⁰
2. European External Action Service (EEAS) initiatives: The EEAS has set up tools like EUvsDisinfo to forecast, address, and respond to Russian disinformation campaigns affecting the EU and its neighbors.⁴¹

³⁷ <https://archive.ph/q957K>

³⁸ <https://archive.ph/lbCxX>

³⁹ <https://archive.ph/z6bfo>

⁴⁰ <https://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/audens/article/download/36331/35374/92407>

⁴¹ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3124

<https://rm.coe.int/iris-plus-2022en3-user-empowerment-against-disinformation/1680a963c4>

3. EU-US Coordination Mechanism: The United States and European Union have established a mechanism to empower partners in the Western Balkans to address foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threats.⁴²
4. European Democracy Action Plan⁴³: This plan proposes developing EU-specific terminology and a disinformation framework, delegating responsibilities to specific EU institutions, and formulating proactive methods for deterring adversaries from spreading disinformation.
5. Strengthened EU Code of Practice on Disinformation⁴⁴: This self-regulatory initiative involves online platforms, social networks, advertisers, and the advertising industry, aiming to set standards for addressing disinformation.

Despite these mechanisms, there still are persistent gaps in compliance and enforcement in taking down disinformation campaigns, as evident in the Doppelganger case, suggest that more needs to be done to translate these coordination efforts into effective action against foreign disinformation campaigns.

For example, while the Rapid Alert System theoretically facilitates information sharing about ongoing disinformation campaigns, it does not appear to have triggered a coordinated response to the Doppelganger operation by EU institutions or member states. Similarly, despite the EEAS's efforts to counter Russian disinformation through initiatives like EUvsDisinfo⁴⁵, the Doppelganger campaign has managed to continue its activities with no apparent disruption.

The EU-US Coordination Mechanisms could be widened to address cross-border infrastructure takedowns on the infrastructure of the Doppelganger campaign's entire FIKED infrastructure. The European Democracy Action Plan and the strengthened EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, while promising, are still in the early stages of implementation and have also yet to demonstrate their effectiveness in countering sophisticated disinformation operations like Doppelganger.

7.5 The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) and its potential impact on RRN

At the time of writing, the European Union has recently approved the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), a new legislation aimed at safeguarding media pluralism and independence across the EU⁴⁶. The EMFA introduces several measures that could potentially impact the operations of RRN (Recent Reliable News) and its wide scope of news sites.

One of the key provisions of the EMFA is the requirement for media service providers to disclose information about their ownership structures, sources of funding, and editorial policies. This transparency obligation could make it more difficult for RRN to operate its network of seemingly unrelated WordPress-based news sites without drawing scrutiny from

⁴² <https://www.state.gov/u-s-eu-coordination-mechanism-on-information-integrity-in-the-western-balkans/>

⁴³ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A790%3AFIN>

⁴⁴ <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation>
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=74738

⁴⁵ <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/doppelganger-strikes-back-unveiling-fimi-activities-targeting-european-parliament-elections/>

⁴⁶ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240308IPR19014/media-freedom-act-a-new-bill-to-protect-eu-journalists-and-press-freedom>

regulators and the public. If enforced effectively, this measure could expose the connections between these sites and their ties to Russian state-affiliated actors.

Another important aspect of the EMFA is its emphasis on protecting journalists and media workers from various forms of pressure, interference, and threats. This includes measures to prevent strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) and other legal harassment tactics. While this provision primarily targets the intimidation of legitimate journalists, it could also indirectly benefit efforts to combat disinformation by creating a more resilient media ecosystem less vulnerable to manipulation and interference.

The EMFA also calls for the establishment of a European Board for Media Services, an independent body tasked with providing opinions and recommendations on matters related to media freedom and pluralism. This board could potentially play a role in coordinating EU-wide efforts to counter disinformation campaigns like RRN/Doppelganger, facilitating information sharing and best practices among member states and stakeholders.

However, as with other legal instruments and sanctions discussed in this paper, the effectiveness of the EMFA in curtailing the activities of RRN and similar disinformation campaigns will largely depend on the consistency of its enforcement. The lack of enforcement of existing sanctions against the companies behind RRN, as well as the inconsistent actions taken by platforms like Twitter, highlights the challenges in translating legal provisions into tangible results.

While the EMFA represents a step towards creating a more transparent media environment in the EU, its impact on disinformation campaigns will be limited without a strong commitment to enforcement from member states, regulatory bodies, and online platforms. The case of RRN/Doppelganger shows the need for a more proactive and coordinated approach to identifying and disrupting these campaigns, involving close cooperation between governments, civil society, and the private sector.

The EMFA's success in countering this and other similar campaigns will depend on the willingness and ability of these stakeholders to enforce its provisions. National authorities must be prepared and willing to investigate and prosecute violations of the law rather than just being onlookers without proper enforcement being provided..

7.6 The Case for an EU-wide Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA)

The rise of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns targeting the European Union, such as the Russian-linked "Doppelganger" operation or the recently exposed "Voice of Europe" case, highlight the urgent need for stronger measures to ensure transparency and accountability in foreign influence activities. The EU should consider adopting a law similar to the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)⁴⁷ to address this growing threat to its democratic processes and institutions.

The activities of EU-based writers like Amedeo Avondet, who writes for *Il-Corrispondente*, a site connected to the Doppelganger disinformation campaign and EU-sanctioned companies like Social Design Agency and Structura, demonstrate how foreign actors can exploit domestic

⁴⁷ <https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/frequently-asked-questions>

individuals and organizations to spread disinformation and propaganda. Implementing a FARA-like law in the EU would help make visible these connections and inform the public about the sources of information they encounter.

Requiring individuals and organizations working on behalf of foreign governments, including sanctioned entities, to register and disclose their activities would provide much-needed transparency about the sources of information and influence in the EU public sphere. This would allow EU citizens to make more informed decisions about the credibility and intentions of the content they consume. Moreover, the prospect of mandatory registration and disclosure could deter some foreign actors from engaging in covert influence operations, as the risk of exposure would increase. This could help reduce the overall volume and impact of foreign-sponsored disinformation in the EU.

A FARA-like law would provide EU authorities with a clearer legal framework to investigate and prosecute individuals and organizations engaged in unregistered foreign influence activities. This would strengthen the EU's ability to hold foreign actors and their domestic proxies accountable for their actions. Furthermore, implementing a uniform Foreign Agent law across the EU would facilitate better coordination and information-sharing among member states in detecting and countering foreign influence operations. This would help address the cross-border nature of many disinformation campaigns and ensure a more consistent and effective response.

The registration and disclosure requirements under a Foreign Agent law would generate valuable data and insights about the scope and nature of foreign influence activities in the EU. This information could be used to raise public awareness about the threats posed by disinformation and support the development of more targeted and evidence-based countermeasures.

Critics may argue that a Foreign Agent law could chill free speech and legitimate cross-border collaborations. However, the law would not prohibit such activities but merely require transparency about foreign connections. Exemptions could be included for academic, artistic, and other types of exchanges. While the registration and reporting requirements may impose additional administrative burdens on individuals and organizations, this could be mitigated through clear guidance, streamlined processes, and appropriate thresholds for registration.

Some may worry that an EU Foreign Agent law could invite retaliation from other countries imposing similar measures on EU citizens and organizations. However, many countries, including the US, already have such laws in place, and the EU's commitment to transparency and the rule of law would provide a strong justification for its actions.

7.7 Reflection on enforcement

The Doppelganger campaign has shown significant gaps in the enforcement of existing laws, sanctions, and regulatory frameworks aimed at combating state-sponsored disinformation in the EU. The inconsistent and often insufficient responses by platforms like Twitter, the lack of action by government entities against known disinformation actors, and the challenges in coordinating cross-border efforts highlight the need for a more proactive and integrated approach between members and EU member states.

While the approval of the EMFA and the proposed EU-wide FARA shows important steps being taken towards creating a more resilient and transparent media environment their success in countering disinformation will depend on the consistent enforcement and the willingness of all stakeholders to cooperate and share information.

To effectively combat state-sponsored disinformation, the EU and its member states must significantly strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions and regulations, with a focus on disrupting the infrastructure and financial resources of disinformation actors, and improve coordination and information sharing among national authorities, EU institutions, and international partners to enable coordinated and decisive action against foreign interference.

Chapter 8: Discussion

While this paper aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the Doppelganger disinformation campaign and offers policy recommendations based on the observed infrastructure and tactics, it is important to acknowledge that the scope of the study is limited by the available data and the challenges of attributing certain elements to the campaign with absolute certainty.

One significant limitation is the inability to conclusively link certain aspects of the broader Russian disinformation ecosystem to the Doppelganger campaign. For instance, the internally called "hashtag bots," which exhibit behaviour similar to the campaign's bots, such as using media and text, but in this case also accompanied by hashtags, have not been included in this analysis due to the difficulty in conclusively attributing them to the Doppelganger infrastructure. While these bots appear to have connections to the campaign, the current level of evidence does not allow for their inclusion in the study.




Figure 44 - Picture of a German hashtag bot

It is important to recognize that the Doppelganger campaign likely extends beyond the elements analyzed in this paper and by third parties. The campaign's full scope remains unknown, and it is probable that a significant portion of its activities has not been identified or examined. This uncertainty highlights the need for continued research and collaboration among researchers, governments, and tech platforms to uncover and counter the evolving tactics of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns.

Furthermore, this paper focuses primarily on the Doppelganger campaign's activities on Twitter, as this platform has been a primary vehicle for the dissemination of the campaign's content. However, as the Washington Post and Meta's threat reporting has demonstrated, the Doppelganger campaign is not limited to Twitter and operates across multiple social media platforms and websites. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the campaign's reach and impact, future research should explore its presence and tactics on other platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube.

It is also important to note that this study primarily analyzed the content (articles) linked in the tweets promoted by the Doppelganger campaign, rather than the text of the tweets themselves. Another aspect that could be further analyzed with more data is the narratives promoted to an Italian and Polish audience, a bigger sample size of promoted articles could yield a more detailed analysis of the type of narratives pushed for those countries

On the topic of articles, the hosting of the FIKED redirection system used in the campaign to redirect users to the articles, was also not analyzed extensively, such as the source of the domains that appear on Twitter and the technical infrastructure behind it. Additionally, the images and videos promoted by the campaign were not extensively examined. These limitations suggest that there are still significant aspects of the campaign that warrant further investigation.

Moreover, during the research process, several news sites were identified as potentially linked to the Russian state apparatus. However, due to the challenges in conclusively establishing these connections, they were not included in the analysis. This finding underscores the complexity of the Russian disinformation ecosystem and the need for continued efforts to unravel the intricate web of actors and outlets involved.

Another aspect that has not been tackled is third party leaks from the Telegram channel “ВЧК-ОГПУ⁴⁸” which appear to have published internal papers from Social Design Agency on the innerworkings and goals of the company. Due not being able to conclusively confirm those leaks, these have not been mentioned here.

The findings of this study align with and expand upon the theoretical frameworks and concepts presented in the literature review. The use of "conspiratorial discourse" (Yablokov, 2015) is evident in the content promoted by RRN-affiliated sites, while the campaign's exploitation of social divisions and hot-button issues (Mejias & Vokuev, 2017) can be seen in the targeting of sensitive topics by sites focused on LGBTQ issues and migration. The study's in-depth analysis of the Doppelganger campaign provides a detailed case study that validates and extends the understanding of state-sponsored disinformation tactics.

The campaign's use of narrative laundering and the promotion of contradictory viewpoints on issues like sanctions against Russia exemplify the "firehose of falsehood" model (Paul & Matthews, 2016). By analyzing the narratives tailored to different countries, this study adds nuance to the understanding of how disinformation actors leverage local contexts and grievances to polarize public opinion and undermine trust in institutions.

The tactics, infrastructure, and narrative themes identified in the Doppelganger campaign align with patterns observed in other known Russian disinformation operations, such as the Internet Research Agency's activities (DiResta et al., 2018). The adaptability and persistence of these campaigns, as demonstrated by Doppelganger's ability to evolve in response to exposure and enforcement efforts, appear to be consistent characteristics of state-sponsored disinformation operations.

The reliability of the data provided by the @antibot4navalny group is supported by their transparent methodology and the ability to verify their findings through archived links and images. While the use of large language models like GPT-4 and Claude 3 for content analysis may introduce potential biases and limitations, these tools provide valuable assistance in processing and categorizing large volumes of data. The study's use of multiple sources, including previous research, media reports, and official statements, helps to corroborate findings and enhance the validity of the conclusions drawn.

Future research should investigate the Doppelganger campaign's activities on other platforms and its potential connections to a broader network of Russian disinformation actors and outlets. Additionally, studies should examine the effectiveness of countermeasures, such as

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/vchkogpu/44167?single>
<https://t.me/vchkogpu/44477> - Ukraine focused
<https://t.me/vchkogpu/44504> - Israel focused

platform enforcement actions, sanctions, and media literacy initiatives, in mitigating the impact of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. Ongoing monitoring and analysis of emerging disinformation tactics and narratives are crucial as campaigns like Doppelganger continue to evolve and adapt. Increased collaboration among researchers, platforms, and policymakers is necessary to develop more comprehensive and proactive strategies for countering state-sponsored disinformation and safeguarding democratic processes.

The limitations discussed in this paper serve as a reminder that the Doppelganger campaign is a complex and multifaceted operation, with many elements yet to be fully explored and understood. As researchers continue to investigate this and other state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, it is crucial to remain aware of the challenges in attribution and the potential for overlooked or undiscovered components. By addressing these limitations and building upon the findings presented in this study, future research can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the evolving landscape of state-sponsored disinformation and inform the development of effective countermeasures to protect the integrity of democratic discourse and decision-making.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This study aimed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Doppelganger disinformation campaign, addressing the main research question: How does the Doppelganger disinformation campaign operate, and how effective are the current policy measures in countering its influence? By examining data provided by the @antibot4navalny group and building upon existing research, this study has shed light on the complex and evolving nature of state-sponsored disinformation in the digital age.

The Doppelganger campaign, attributed to the Russia-based Social Design Agency and Structura, employs a sophisticated and adaptive infrastructure to disseminate false and misleading content across multiple languages and platforms, aligning with patterns observed in other known Russian disinformation operations (DiResta et al., 2018). At the core of its operations is a network of Twitter bots, consisting of content bots that post disinformation and distribution bots that amplify the content through targeted reply spam. These bots work in combination to maximize the reach and visibility of the campaign's narratives while evading detection and takedown efforts.

A key tactic employed by the Doppelganger campaign is the use of cloned news websites, created through typosquatting to mimic legitimate news outlets. These cloned sites, along with a network of RRN-based WordPress sites, serve as the primary vehicles for spreading disinformation, exploiting the trust and credibility associated with established media brands. The campaign's operators use multi-stage content promotion techniques, such as the FIKED redirection system, to obscure the true origins of the disinformation and make it more difficult for users and platforms to identify and remove the malicious content.

The study also revealed the campaign's use of narrative laundering, a tactic involving the coordinated promotion of content across multiple languages and sources to reinforce specific themes and messages. By analyzing the content pushed by the Doppelganger campaign, the research identified the key narratives tailored to different target audiences, consistently seeking to undermine trust in Western governments, institutions, and media while promoting pro-Kremlin talking points. These narratives exploit local contexts, grievances, and hot-button issues to polarize public opinion and sow discord.

While the overall reach of the Doppelganger campaign may be limited in many instances, the study highlighted the campaign's ability to significantly scale up its operations around specific events or narratives when dedicating additional resources. This adaptability and strategic targeting underscore the persistent threat posed by the campaign and the need for vigilant monitoring and response.

The attribution of the Doppelganger campaign to the Social Design Agency and Structura, as previously assessed by Meta and The Washington Post, was corroborated by evidence gathered in this study. However, the research also acknowledged the challenges in definitively linking all aspects of the campaign to these entities, given the complex and often opaque nature of the Russian disinformation ecosystem. This finding emphasizes the importance of ongoing investigation and collaboration among researchers, platforms, and authorities to unravel the full scope and reach of state-sponsored disinformation operations.

One of the most critical findings of this study is the exposure of significant gaps and inconsistencies in the enforcement of existing laws and sanctions against the Doppelganger operation. The Doppelganger disinformation campaign's ability to exploit gaps in the compliance and enforcement of the DSA, EMFA, and sanctions regimes highlights the need for a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to countering disinformation in the EU. While the legal and institutional framework established by these regulations provides a solid foundation, its effectiveness depends on the consistent and proactive efforts of both public institutions and private actors.

Public policy decision-makers must prioritize the strengthening of enforcement capabilities, both at the EU and national levels, to ensure that the DSA and EMFA's provisions are fully implemented and that sanctions against disinformation actors are rigorously applied. This requires adequate resources, technical expertise, and robust cooperation among regulatory authorities, as well as with international partners.

The existing coordination and information sharing mechanisms, such as the Rapid Alert System and the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, provide a foundation for a more integrated response to cross-border disinformation campaigns. However, the limited enforcement actions taken by national authorities like VIGINUM and the German Foreign Ministry in the Doppelganger case highlight the need for stronger coordination and more decisive action by public institutions.

The gaps revealed by the Doppelganger case also underscore the importance of complementary measures, such as the proposed EU-wide FARA, to enhance transparency and accountability in the fight against foreign influence operations. By adopting a combined approach that combines legal, institutional, and policy tools, the EU would be create a more resilient information ecosystem that protects democratic discourse from the threats posed by state-sponsored disinformation campaigns.

While this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the Doppelganger campaign's operations, tactics, and narratives promoted on Twitter, it also acknowledges its limitations and the need for further research. The full scope of the campaign's cross-platform activities, the specific mechanisms behind the creation and manipulation of cloned news websites, and the role of related tactics like the use of hashtag bots remain areas that warrant additional investigation. As state-sponsored disinformation campaigns continue to evolve and adapt, ongoing research and monitoring will be essential to keep pace with their changing tactics and develop effective countermeasures.

The Doppelganger disinformation campaign represents a complex and persistent threat to the integrity of democratic discourse and decision-making. By exposing its sophisticated infrastructure, adaptive tactics, and targeted narratives, this study aims to inform and mobilize the efforts of policymakers, platforms, researchers, and civil society to counter this and similar state-sponsored disinformation operations. Effectively addressing this challenge will require a sustained, collaborative, and multifaceted approach that combines robust enforcement of existing regulations, innovative policy solutions, and the active engagement of all stakeholders in the defense of our information ecosystems.

As the digital landscape continues to evolve, so too must our understanding of the threats posed by disinformation and our strategies for combating them. The insights and recommendations presented in this study serve as a foundation for further research, dialogue, and action to safeguard the health and resilience of our democracies in the face of state-sponsored disinformation. It is only through such concerted and collective efforts that we can hope to create a more transparent, trustworthy, and inclusive information environment that supports informed public debate and decision-making.

10. Appendix

10.1 References

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10.2 Example Twitter sample bots

Type	Account	Timeframe	Language
Video/picture	https://twitter.com/Digital6549812/with_replies	23/12 to 20/01	
Video/picture	https://twitter.com/kristi19890/with_replies	15/12 to 19/01	
Link	https://twitter.com/Coreesax69410/with_replies	18/01	
Link	https://twitter.com/JeanellSto13164/with_replies	18/01	
Link	https://twitter.com/Lloyd0171359280/with_replies	12/02 to 16/02	DE
Link	https://twitter.com/Maggie3729251/with_replies	12/02 to 16/03	DE
Link	https://twitter.com/Luis88554663297/with_replies	12/02 to 16/04	DE
Link	https://twitter.com/LeahClay36408/with_replies	26/03 to 29/03	DE
Link	https://x.com/ElyaJaeger70787/with_replies	09/02 to 15/02	US

10.3 ElevenLabs AI detection

ElevenLabs	Score	Context
https://x.com/JNazanin83777/status/1780289395301753179	58%	
https://twitter.com/KacieNail15716/status/1780288111714386419	85%	
https://x.com/JackelynJy4614/status/1780288667069677708	58%	
https://twitter.com/BrandyP35112/status/1777342554972815786	81%	
https://twitter.com/YWildes94084/status/1777342519723844029	84%	
https://x.com/AlbertsArt29316/status/1775515652297523530	91%	
https://twitter.com/ShereaB92506/status/177551515522349601083	24%	
https://x.com/TeresinaC41273/status/1775515242023309347	58%	
https://x.com/BellamyQui56232/status/1750555319560814823	2%	Background noise
https://x.com/Sturdivant34623/status/1750555477929341048	2%	Background noise
https://x.com/Jessicaann14387/status/1780293517706752091	61%	
https://x.com/SCynda47156/status/1780293045826486637	59%	Background noise

10.4 Interview data on RRN sites

Duplicates removed, many of the individuals have had more than 1 article in where they appear. Individuals found manually and therefore the list might have missed individuals which have not been detected.

Language targeted	Site	Individual	Presence	Evidence	Political ?	Party
IL	https://holylandherald.com/lobby-	Arnaud T. Mylle	no			

	behind-aid-package/					
US	https://rrn.media/video-who-s-next-after-palestine/	Danny Shaw	yes	"https://archive.ph/byddt https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FOluJ-qri3E&t=132s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdoeuK5OndQ"		
IT	https://rrn.media/it/video-il-termino-della-guerra-atte-so-post-elezioni-in-usa-e-ue/	Tiberio Graziani	unclear	https://sputnikglobe.com/20230703/french-riots-legacy-of-the-colonial-past-or-result-of-free-immigration-1111642710.html		
DE	https://meisterurien.io/was-werden-die-usa-als-nachstes-mit-deutschland-tun/	Hansjörg Müller	yes	https://rtde.website/international/162934-hansjoerg-mueller-zu-hershsh-nord/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ET-fvtJjvJw	yes	AfD
DE	https://besuchszweck.org/wann-konnen-wir-stolz-auf-die-eu-sein	Konrad Rękas Stanisław	yes	https://my.mail.ru/mail/anatolij.fuks/video/195/81263.html https://www.geopolitika.ru/pl/person/konrad-rekas-0 https://sputnikglobe.com/20170208/eu-sanctions-problems-1050469988.html - https://oko.press/siewcy-strachu-10-dni-z-rosyjska-propaganda-w-polsce-to-sa-zolnierze-w-walce-informacyjnej	yes	Przywórci Prawo (PP)

FR	https://lavirgule.news/darmanin-a-maroc-paris-demande-a-securiser-les-jo2024/	Milos Bandur	yes	https://rumble.com/v11gd8t-erasing-history-ukrainian-russophobia-is-state-ideology.html https://archive.ph/GdyL0 https://imgur.com/a/Hkkzy1h	yes	unclear
FR	https://candidat.news/chine-russie-et-europe-qui-profite-a-qui/	Adrian Zelaia	yes	https://vk.com/wall710830590_33 https://vk.com/video-61174019_456244042 https://rumble.com/v3uv0zn-reportan-muertos-y-heridos-en-un-ataque-israel-contra-el-hospital-al-shifa.html		
IL	https://holylanherald.com/can-american-army-save-israel/	Ethan Shelton	no			
EN	https://interventionist.us/intervention-conflicts/secret-technologies	Joe Montaldo	no			
DE	https://derrattenfaner.net/stanislav-novotny-die-usa-regieren-europa-zu-seinem-nachteil	Stanislav Novotný	yes	https://sputnik.by/20231218/novotny-rasskazal-ob-istinnom-otnoshenii-chekhov-k-belarusi-i-rossii-1082147007.html https://pravda-en.com/world/2023/10/18/142081.html		
DE	https://brennendefrage.com/europa/	Matthias Kohan	no	https://www.szenec.sk/hu/Cikkek/Erdekes-es-		

	die-traurige-zukunft-europas			hasznos/kohan-matyas-a-jelent-vegkepp-eltorolni.alej		
DE	https://meisterurian.io/warum-werden-die-menschen-rechtswahlen/	Frank Haussner	no			
IT	https://il-corrispondente.com/politica/l-italia-ha-bisogno-di-un-leader	Giacomo Gabellini	no	https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/person/giacomogabellini		
DE	https://derrattenfaner.net/isis-kann-die-usa-oder-europa-angreifen	Albert Cornelis Gietelink	yes	https://odysee.com/@Alternatief.tv:f/nederlandse-internetproviders-censureren:d https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nLrIZsae5hY https://sputniknewsbr.com.br/20230811/especialista-explica-por-que-pilotos-ucranianos-nos-cacas-f-16-nao-consequirao-dominar-os-russos-29880656.html - said in an interview with Spuntik - https://archive.ph/bqijV		
US	https://spicyconspiracy.info/conspiracy/extraterrestrial-intervention	Karen Hill	no			

DE	https://wanderfalk.e.net/fur-wen-istes-gut-in-europa-zu-leben	Andrzej Szczęśniak	yes	https://web.archive.org/web/20240111094650/https://sputnikglobe.com/20180301/gazprom-eu-gas-1062130203.html https://vsquare.org/viktor-orban-poland-propaganda-disinformation-andrzej-szczesniak/		
FR	https://notrepays.today/ukraine-le-consensus-occidental-mis-amal	Mirko Jović	no		yes	New Serbia
FR	https://rrn.media/fr/qui-fait-peur-a-macron/	Nicolas Fréal	unclear	https://alexandre.atsa.ru/2015/03/%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%88%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%B4%D0%B2%D1%83%D1%85-%D1%84%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%B2-%D0%B2-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B1%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%81/		
US	https://rrn.media/video-what-happens-if-biden-stays/	Emma Craig	no			
US	https://spicyconspiracy.info/conspiracy/aliens-are-running-the-u-s	J. Michael Long	no			

IL	https://holylandherald.com/stink-of-failure/	Mehmet Perincek	yes	https://rumble.com/v16phgd-we-saw-with-our-own-eyes-this-ordinary-fascism.html https://pravda-en.com/usa/2023/09/16/95833.html https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/haber/mehmet-perincek-rt-almancaya-konustu-astana-modeli-akdenize-tasinabilir-113557 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=djqX_9DJKK4		
US	https://50statesofie.com/why-will-migrants-vote-for-trump/	Carlos Alberto Pereya Mele	yes	https://vk.com/wall-61174019_411186 - https://archive.ph/kJ36c https://actualidad.rt.com/video/479620-paises-otan-enredarse-falsedades-justificar-ucrania		
DE	https://brennendefrage.com/deutschland/video-in-deutschland-ist-es-nicht-mehr-sicher	Video: Olga Petersen (AfD)	yes	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SxIOFIFqCA8	yes	AfD
US	https://rrn.media/video-who-controls-europe/	Video: John Varoli	yes	" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ay_aOFVYOOo&t=38s - soloviev live https://twitter.com/RT_com/status/1643010493626417152 - https://archive.ph/1BK6k "		

DE	https://meisterurian.io/ist-die-zeit-fur-kriegsvorbereitungen-gekommen/	Video: Ken Stone	yes	https://disk.yandex.ru/i/2G6Xv25MEhbrIA - https://archive.ph/3S5Rx https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FA-MeEwxqAI4DVUk7fB6Mymib6vw1B_m/view - 2:27 - https://archive.ph/73JUj		
DE	https://wanderfalken.net/was-soll-mit-der-ukraine-geschehen-will-deutschland-krieg-oder-frieden	Hans-Christoph Berndt	no		yes	AfD
FR	https://franceeteu.today/opinions/le-president-francais-est-encore-complique-les-choses	Video: Emmanuel Leroy	yes	https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=553284132372287 - RT https://twitter.com/SebastienParet/status/1496880342367621124 - https://archive.ph/gfvyF https://www.fakeobservers.org/bias-d-observation-database/details/leroy-emmanuel.html	yes	National Rally / Rassemblement National
FR	https://lavirgule.news/guerre-en-ukraine-personne-ne-veut-soutenir-macron/	Video: Peter Kuznick	yes	https://www.rt.com/shows/going-underground/527023-peter-kuznick-putin-biden/ - https://archive.ph/UViZI https://www.rt.com/news/443757-wwi-century-world-war/ - https://archive.ph/wDmFp		

DE	https://rrn.media/de/video-scholz-arbeitet-gegen-deutschland/	Video: Steffen Kotré	yes	https://www.tiktok.com/@steffenkotre/video/7204919638054997254 - https://archive.ph/dWpkm	yes	AfD
FR	https://lavirgule.news/macron-a-marseille-il-s-attend-a-un-triomphe-et-affronte-le-jugement/	Video: Pierre Plas	unclear	https://t.me/internationalreporters/37441 https://fr.newsfront.su/2023/08/22/lex-capitaine-des-services-de-renseignement-francais-plas-designe-la-veritable-cause-du-conflit-en-ukraine/ https://pravdafr.com/france/2024/01/18/55236.html https://www.geopolitika.ru/fr/article/la-russie-se-suiciderait-aussi-en-nous-abandonnant		
US	https://interventionist.us/economic-sanctions/james-jatras-usa-will-choose-israel-over-ukraine	Video: James Jatras	yes	https://twitter.com/areidross/status/966792177912131585/photo/1 - https://archive.ph/bUgHj https://archive.ph/biOyB https://rumble.com/v1vd974-crosstalk-zelenskys-war.html - https://archive.ph/uvVC4		

DE	https://derrattenfaner.net/eike-hammer-lobbyisten-regieren-nicht-im-interesse-des-volkes	Video: Eike Hammer (Hamer, wrong last name)	yes	https://rumble.com/v1v68z4-konom-eike-hamer-die-verstaatlichungspolitik-der-bundesregierung-fhrt-zu-we.html - https://archive.ph/MGnGQ https://rumble.com/v4imxar-the-modus-operandi-germanys-new-far-right.html - https://archive.ph/7F5II	unclear	unclear
IL	https://holylandherald.com/u-s-reeks-chaos-in-middle-east	Video: Tamara Lorincz	unclear	https://www.rt.com/news/583544-canada-nazi-ukraine-applause/ has made interview to RT worked on personal channel: https://ingaza.wordpress.com/the-donbass-my-articles-videos-interviews-from-on-the-donetsk-lugansk-peoples-republics-2019-present/ - https://archive.ph/u8vJr https://rumble.com/v2ag8jh-tamara-lorincz-canadas-support-for-ukraines-war-on-the-donbass-and-canadas-.html - https://archive.ph/0TCmU		

DE	https://wanderfalk.e.net/problem-der-migration	Video: Jürgen Elsässer	yes	https://www.rt.com/news/iran-nuclear-program-elzesser/ https://archive.ph/vz0y0		
DE	https://rrn.media/de/video-die-nato-hat-angst	Video: Radmila Tonković	unclear	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hytmg1DatT8 https://vk.com/wall498193080_29035		
US	https://50statesoflie.com/trump-or-biden-who-s-better-for-the-u-s-economy/	Video: Jean-François Garcia	no			
FR	https://notrepays.today/nouveau-camouflet-pour-macron	Video: Jean-Michel Vernochet	yes	https://www.fakeobservers.org/biased-observation-database/details/vernochet-jean-michel.html https://sputnikglobe.com/20141230/1016387461.html https://sputnikglobe.com/20160212/aleppo-liberation-media-silence-1034667291.html		
DE	https://derrattenfaner.net/giuliano-bifolchi-die-menschen-fuehlen-sich-nicht-mehr-sicher	Video: Bifolchi Giuliano	unclear	https://it.telegramstore.com/catalog/channels/sputnikitalia/7345 https://geopolitica.estului.ro/international-seminar-eu-russia-challenges-and-opportunities-for-mutually-beneficial-strategic-communication/ https://life.ru/p/1366629		

DE	https://brennendefrage.com/europa/video-wie-sich-der-illegale-waffenmarkt-in-der-ukraine-aufbaut	Video: Christoph Hörstel has cited Korrespondomi (RT German podcaster that follows Wanderfalke): https://t.me/chrisoerstel/8457 has cited Alina Lipp: https://t.me/chrisoerstel/8420, https://t.me/chrisoerstel/7440 (villa zelensky)	yes	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iySxFSqjXs		
DE	https://rrn.media/de/video-das-groeste-korruptionssystem-der-eu	Video: Thomas Fazi	unclear	https://sputnikglobe.com/20220723/europe-suffers-from-leadership-crisis-brought-to-light-by-ukrainian-conflict-experts-believe-1097724852.html https://pravda-en.com/world/2024/01/26/283473.html https://strategic-culture.su/news/2023/11/24/israels-ceasefire-conceals-a-bigger-threat/		
FR	https://franceeteu.today/nous-et-eux/les-dilemmes-de-macron-prioriser-la-nation-ou-lue	Video: Jean-Stéphane Betton	yes	https://odysee.com/@RTFRANCE:a/ECHIQUIER-MONDIAL-Routemaritime-Nord-quels-enjeux:3 https://archive.org/details/20240222_20240222_2237		

US	https://interventionist.us/public-opinion-resistance/former-gop-senator-penn-we-have-an-expensive-war-in-ukraine	Video: Bruce Marks	yes			Republican
DE	https://meisterurien.io/video-europamuss-unabhangig-von-den-usa-werden/	Video: Mátyás Kohán	no			
FR	https://rrn.media/fr/video-aidez-les-europeens-a-retrouver-la-democratie	Video: Cyrille de Lattre	yes		https://rumble.com/v410m33-rt-discusses-moscow-terror-attack-with-geopolitical-analyst-cyrille-de-latt.html	
FR	https://lavirgule.news/salon-de-l-agriculture-une-exposition-de-la-veritable-douleur-des-francais/	Video: Slobodan Boban	no			
DE	https://rrn.media/de/video-es-gibt-keine-wahrheit-mehr/	Video: Patrick Savalle	unclear			
US	https://50statesoflie.com/why-arent-the-u-s-and-israel-interested-in-ending-the-gaza-war/	Video: Lawrence Wilkerson	no			

DE	https://wanderfalken.net/wohin-sind-die-50-milliarden-euro-geflossen-die-europa-an-die-ukraine-geschickt-hat	Video: Jose Antonio Alcaide	yes	https://twitter.com/pueblopatriota/status/1759061716724338723 - https://archive.is/UMAHf https://vk.com/video-26493942_456343748 (REN TV) - https://m.ok.ru/rtrussian/topic/154289331277094 - https://archive.ph/pLHXH		
FR	https://notrepays.today/les-elites-achevent-la-destruction-nationale	Video: Philippe Murer	yes	https://rtenfrance.tv/magazines/la-grande-interview/108487-grande-interview-philippe-murer - https://archive.ph/RLjZH		
FR	https://lavirgule.news/presidentielle-2027-pourquoi-marine-le-pen-est-elle-en-tete/	Video: Thierry-Paul Valette	yes	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hn6Vg_Lfuo	yes	
DE	https://meisteruriain.io/video-wird-die-ukraine-abende-februar-einen-neuen-prasidenten-haben/	Video: Stefano Orsi	yes	https://pravda-en.com/world/2023/12/01/205189.html https://rutube.ru/channel/23366228/ https://vk.com/stefanoorsi https://www.youtube.com/@StefanoOrsi/videos		
FR	https://rrn.media/fr/video-leurope-se-revolte/	Video: José Antonio Egido	yes	https://vk.com/wall-61174019_443081 - https://archive.ph/ZkUFO https://esrt.online/actualidad/219022		

				-bombardeo-ejercito-sirio-provocacion-rusia - https://archive.ph/z8M8r		
DE	https://brennendefrage.com/europa/video-die-vereinigten-staaten-mussen-kriege-fuehren-um-zu-uberleben	Video: Tiberio Graziano (Think tank)	yes	https://en.interaffairs.ru/article/interview-with-an-italian-political-scientist-tiberio-graziani/		
US	https://interventionist.us/media-propaganda/garland-nixon-if-democrats-disqualify-trump-from-election-there-would-be-violent-event	Video: Garland Nixon	yes	https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/d-c-radio-station-russian-agent-federal-judge-rules-n1005236 https://www.rt.com/podcast/594837-garland-nixon-and-dr-wilmer-leon/ https://www.rt.com/shows/crosstalk/552171-ukraine-foreign-policy-escalation/		
DE	https://brennendefrage.com/deutschland/video-es-gibt-nur-noch-eine-chance-deutschland-zu-retten	Video: Tiberio Graziani	yes	https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=TVlkweiwSCI https://www.eurasia-rivista.com/us-uses-europe-as-a-bridge-head-to-attack-eurasia-interview-with-tiberio-graziani/		
FR	https://franceetoutoday/opinions/biden-autorise-des-sanctions-contre-les-colons-juifs-en-cisjordanie	Video: Sipiwe Nyanda	no			

IL	https://omnam.life/b-wlm/sknwt-llhymh-ngd-hwtym	Video: Francis Boyle	no	https://www.sott.net/article/274755-Ukraine-was-a-playbook-CIA-coup-d-etat-according-to-Prof-Francis-Boyle https://pravda-en.com/world/2024/01/11/255678.html	
DE	https://rrn.media/de/video-wie-man-die-ukraine-loswerden-kann/	Video: Isaac Bigio-Lerner	yes	https://esrt.press/actualidad/295672-reino-unido-brexit-theresa-may-apoyo-gobierno - https://archive.ph/KGvPH https://esrt.online/actualidad/266231-dimite-presidente-peruano-pedro-pablo - https://archive.ph/iE8kB	
DE	https://wanderfalken.net/wird-europa-weitere-50-milliarden-euro-fur-die-ukraine-zahlen	Video: Onur Sinan Güzaltan	yes	https://rumble.com/v4lg6xc-attackers-could-be-linked-to-terrorist-groups-us-is-using-onur-sinan-gzalta.html - https://archive.ph/b9X8h https://rumble.com/v1m545u-us-attacked-nord-stream-turkstream-likely-to-be-next-political-scientist.html - https://archive.ph/6DV0s etc...	

IL	https://omnam.life/b-wlm/hkwh-hmspy	Rick Sterling	yes	<p>https://x.com/ricksterling99/status/1500554605838487552</p> <p>https://www.rt.com/op-ed/391239-syria-us-deconfliction-zone/ - https://rumble.com/v2hpc6i-crosstalk-leaving-the-dollar.html</p>		
US	https://interventionist.us/public-opinion-resistance/u-s-weakened-on-global-stage-world-community-frustrated-with-american-international-policy	Dimitri Lascaris	yes	<p>https://x.com/dimitrilascaris/status/1652446820818092032</p> <p>https://rumble.com/v425ouh-canada-will-do-whatever-its-masters-in-washington-tell-it-to-do-dimitri-las.html</p> <p>https://rumble.com/v2llhta-worlds-apart-one-handshake-at-a-time-dimitri-lascaris.html</p>	yes	Green Party Canada
FR	https://rrn.media/fr/video-lue-sort-du-jeu/	Hervé Juvin	yes	<p>Voice of Europe: https://www.politico.eu/article/i-hope-ukraine-will-lose-meps-russian-propaganda-channel/</p> <p>https://rumble.com/v2zecli-for-russia-security-guarantees-will-be-at-heart-of-peace-agreement-herve-ju.html</p>	yes	National Rally (RN)

IL	https://omnam.life/bysr-l/lmh-sty-mdynwt-lsny-mym-hw-qrwn-l-r-ly-wmh-tpqyd-sl-rh-b-bkk	yves engler	yes	https://x.com/EnglerYves/status/1530695496909594624 https://archive.ph/3U5Ba https://rumble.com/v2fb0zm-trudeau-dodges-question-on-canada-involvement-in-ukraine-proxy-war.html https://rumble.com/v3htg20-crosstalk-stoltenbergs-confession.html		
US	https://50statesoflie.com/biden-controls-nothing/	Norio Hayakawa	no			
DE	https://derrattenfannger.net/selenskyj-ist-eine-marionette-der-dunklen-machte	Paul Shishis	no			
DE	https://wanderfalken.net/video-westliche-lander-unterstutzen-die-ukraine-wahrend-kiew-den-nazismus-pflegt	Alex Tyrrell	no	https://ru.reseauinternational.net/ukraine-alex-tyrell-chef-du-parti-vert-du-quebec-condamne-le-canada-et-lotan/	yes	Green s Cana da
FR	https://franceeteu.today/opinions/kul-eba-a-declare-que-lafu-devenait-de-facto-une-armee-de-lotan	Daniel Shaw	yes	https://www.jjay.cuny.edu/faculty/danny-shaw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FOluJ-qri3E https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3VpYha1Cg1A https://x.com/profdannyshaw/status/1594813332212547585		

				https://archive.ph/byddt		
DE	https://wanderfalk.e.net/wohin-steuert-die-eu-jetzt-weitere-unterstuetzung-fur-ukraine-oder-frieden-mit-russland	Richard Werner	yes	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwpjYyMHSJ0 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zQRCsiZ4dhs		
US	https://interventionist.us/media-propaganda/gary-heseltine-s-erie-insights-on-extraterrestrial-influence-exclusive-interview	Gary Heseltine	no			
US	https://50statesoflie.com/israel-and-the-u-s-knew-all-about-it/	Andrés Conteris	Thomas yes	https://latamnews.lat/20190808/posible-ataque-washington-injerencia-otros-estados-1088315205.html - https://archive.ph/YDoF4 https://twitter.com/ActualidadRT/status/1323935016875888640 - https://archive.ph/quwUr https://actualidad.rt.com/video/372195-periodista-afirma-victoria-trump-florida-confirma-papel-voto-latino - https://archive.ph/cktCI		

DE	https://brennendefrage.com/deutschland/interview-deutsche-wollen-nicht-fur-die-ukraine-zahlen	Video: Gunnar Beck	yes	https://rumble.com/v2c2ezk-worlds-apart-no-value-in-duty-gunnar-beck.html - https://archive.ph/jVzyd https://rumble.com/v3rndu4-eu-wiederaufbaufonds-hundertemilliarden-euro-ungenutzt-und-verschwendet.html - https://archive.ph/VL61x	yes	AfD
DE	https://rrn.media/de/video-warum-sich-die-eu-weigert-der-ukraine-zu-helfen/	Video: Peter Marček	yes	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SYJckUJzdNc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWPsWdBkSO4 - https://archive.ph/9PrYJ	yes	REPU BLIKA
FR	https://lavirgule.news/macron-a-explique-son-absence-a-la-marche-contre-l-antisemitisme/	Video: Claude Gaucherand	yes	https://francais.rt.com/opinions/27831-a-propos-guerre - https://archive.ph/ZK5SI https://archive.ph/8eRLw InfoRos world: https://www.mondialisation.ca/author/claude-gaucherand?doing_wp_cron=1712181780.7806870937347412109375 https://en.reseauinternational.net/un-monde-de-myopes/ https://www.globalresearch.ca/author/claude-gaucherand		

10.4.1 RRN Social Media presence

DE	Social media
derrattenfanger.net	https://x.com/Rattenfangernet/with_replies
besuchszweck.org	
deintelligenz.com	
miastagebuch.com	
arbeitspause.org	https://x.com/Arbeitspause_1/with_replies
derglaube.com	
grunehummel.com	https://www.facebook.com/GruneHummel
meisterurian.io	
hauynescherben.net	https://x.com/obutskuram76625/followers
wanderfalke.net	https://x.com/WanderfalkeInfo/
grenzezank.com	https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61559028067180
kaputteampel.com	https://x.com/KaputteAmpel/verified_followers
derleitstern.com	
derbayerischelowe.info	
brennendefrage.com	https://x.com/brennende_frage/following

FR	Social media
lexomnium.com	https://x.com/LexOmnium/
notrepays.today	
lesfrontieres.media	https://x.com/lesfrontieres
candidat.news	https://x.com/candidat_news
lavirgule.news	https://x.com/la_virgule
franceeteu.today	https://x.com/franceeteu
le-continent.com	
laterrasse.online	
allons-y.social	
la-sante.info	
levinaigre.net	https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61560782348625

lesifflet.net	
lebelligerant.com	https://x.com/lebelligerant

US	Social media
electionwatch.live	https://www.instagram.com/election_2024_usa/?img_index=5
interventionist.us	https://x.com/Intrvntnst
warfareinsider.us	
honeymoney.info	
mypride.press	https://www.instagram.com/_pride_wave/
truthgate.us	https://x.com/TruthGateOff
acrossthepress	
liesofwallstreet.com	
50statesoflie.com	https://x.com/50StatesOfLie
uschina.press	
cropmarketchronicles.us	
spicyconspiracy.info	https://x.com/SpConspiracy
ukrlm.info	https://x.com/ULM_Info
shadowwatch.us	

HE	
holylandherald.com	
omnam.life	
IT	
il-corrispondente.com	
PL	
polskikompass.com	https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61557332549983
AR	
alhiwar.me	

ES	
noticiasbravas.com	https://x.com/noticiasbravas https://www.facebook.com/noticiasbravas

10.4.2 RRN hosting infrastructure for DE - FR sites

German sites			
derrattenfanger.net	89.117.9.58	US	Hostinger
besuchszweck.org	63.250.43.4	US	Namecheap
deintelligenz.com	89.117.139.165	US	Hostinger
miastagebuch.com	91.108.98.195	NL	Hostinger
arbeitspause.org	63.250.43.131	US	Namecheap
derglaube.com	191.96.63.132	NL	Hostinger
grunehummel.com	77.37.53.45	NL	Hostinger
meisterurian.io	63.250.43.130	US	Namecheap
hauynescherben.net	89.117.139.218	US	Hostinger
wanderfalke.net	63.250.43.130	US	Namecheap
grenzezank.com	63.250.43.16	US	Namecheap
kaputteampel.com	191.96.63.132	NL	Hostinger
derleitstern.com	89.117.9.58	US	Hostinger
derbayerischelowe.info	154.62.105.208	NL	Hostinger
brennendefrage.com	89.117.9.58	US	Hostinger
lexomnium.com	63.250.43.131	US	Namecheap
notrepays.today	63.250.43.7	US	Namecheap
lesfrontieres.media	63.250.43.130	US	Namecheap

candidat.news	63.250.43.14	US	Namecheap
lavirgule.news	63.250.43.7	US	Namecheap
franceeteu.today	63.250.43.14	US	Namecheap
le-continent.com	89.116.53.78	NL	Hostinger
laterrasse.online	89.117.9.243	US	Hostinger
allons-y.social	63.250.43.8	US	Namecheap
la-sante.info	89.117.9.243	US	Hostinger
levinaigre.net	63.250.43.3	US	Namecheap
lesifflet.net	89.117.9.243	US	Hostinger
lebelligerant.com	89.117.139.165	US	Hostinger

10.5 Narrative analysis articles

Claude prompt:

I am sending you a list of summaries from articles, some of them with extra info such as what light people are being mentioned in. Structure is URL, summary, and citation and context

Make me a detailed long list of the top 5 most common topics and subtopics you can infer based on the data I am sending you.

10.5.1 German sample texts used in narrative analysis

Topic	Source URLs	Archived Version	Summary
Germany's Economic Challenges	https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/BASF-konnte-dem-Druck-der-Ampel-nicht-standhalten-a-3728e60c-36e2-48f5-9667-ddcaa628ee0f.html	https://archive.ph/HOEOan	BASF's financial results improved, but government actions, like sanctions and the Nord Stream pipeline, negatively impacted the company, risking the loss of German industry.

Germany's Economic Challenges	https://www.welt.p m/politik/deutschland/article240128277/Deutsche-Hersteller-fliehen-vor-der-Ampel.html	https://archive.ph/f85Gc	German manufacturers are relocating due to economic downturns, rising insolvencies, and production shifts abroad, exacerbated by government policies, energy crises, and sanctions impacting costs and demand.
Germany's Economic Challenges	https://www.sueddeutsche.ltd/politik/Ampel-hat-Angst-vor-Demokratie-1.5484184.html	https://archive.ph/yDNYZ	Facing declining voter support, Germany's Ampel coalition is criticized for economic downturns, high inflation, and prioritizing Ukraine support over domestic welfare, boosting opposition parties like AfD and BSW.
Germany's Economic Challenges	https://grenzezank.com/fur-habeck-ist-die-krise-vorbei-fur-deutschland-ist-sie-im-gange/	https://archive.ph/COD1s	Despite Germany's Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck's optimistic claims, the nation's energy crisis persists, with high electricity prices and dependency on Russian gas undermining his assertions.
Ukraine Conflict and Its Impact	https://www.spiegel.ltd/ausland/Die-Ukraine-muss-zwischen-Gespr%C3%A4chen-und-Kapitulation-w%C3%A4hlen-a-a7a5f24e-2056-49d3-9d26-daeb9d26d5fd.html	https://archive.ph/n9sNX	Ukraine faces a grim choice between negotiation and capitulation, with its failed counteroffensive and mounting losses suggesting an inevitable defeat against a superior Russian military advantage.

Ukraine Conflict and Its Impact	https://www.welt.p m/politik/deutschla nd/article24012827 7/Die-Ukraine-ist- entv%C3%B6lkert. html	https://arch ive.ph/xS4 hM	Ukraine's war losses, as reported by various sources including Pentagon experts and European Parliament members, far exceed official figures, with claims of up to 500,000 casualties. Despite substantial aid, Ukraine's military faces severe personnel and equipment shortages, raising doubts about its capacity to continue the conflict.
Ukraine Conflict and Its Impact	https://www.spiegel .ltd/ausland/Wer- w%C3%A4rmt- seine- H%C3%A4nde-an- den-Feuern-des- Krieges-a- 9ad92d0b-fc10- 4a14-9910- 46139035d7d6.htm l	https://arch ive.ph/RAIj 8	Global conflicts, especially in Ukraine and Gaza, have sparked a surge in arms demand, with sales exceeding half a trillion dollars, benefiting major arms manufacturers.
Ukraine Conflict and Its Impact	https://www.spiegel .ltd/ausland/Macht- sich-die-Ukraine- die-ISMethoden- zu-eigen-a- 7cfd56e7-702d- 4a59-8826- a503baeb01bb.htm l	https://arch ive.ph/1tqh W	Recent terror attack in Krasnogorsk, Russia, raises questions about Ukraine's possible connections to the incident and broader implications for international relations.
Ukraine Conflict and Its Impact	https://grenzezank. com/ukraine-als- nazi-anerkannt	https://arch ive.ph/FkH s5	This piece claims that Ukraine has embraced Nazism, highlighting discriminatory practices and nationalism, leading to violence and conflict, reflecting Putin's narrative of "denazification."

Domestic Political Tensions Germany	in	https://www.sueddeutsche.ltd/politik/Die-Gunst-Washingtons-ist-wichtiger-als-die-Zukunft-unserer-Kinder-1.1353867.html	https://archive.ph/NrCDZ	Chancellor Scholz, after talks with President Biden, plans to increase military aid to Ukraine, despite the risk of escalating conflict and the potential misuse of weapons. CDU leader Merz pushes for further support, aligning with U.S. interests, while domestic challenges and German voters' priorities are sidelined.
Domestic Political Tensions Germany	in	https://www.welt.p m/politik/deutschland/article240128277/Die-Ampel-ist-kurz-vor-Aufl%C3%B6sung.html	https://archive.ph/MDzIL	Germany's Ampel coalition faces dwindling popularity, potentially leading to alliances or early elections. Economic recession, inflation, and political decisions, particularly regarding the energy crisis and foreign policy, have sparked voter dissatisfaction.
Domestic Political Tensions Germany	in	https://www.spiegel .ltd/ausland/Deutschland-brennt-der-Ampel-unter-den-Sohlen-a-0ba997ee-531c-4531-93a3-873cd59b068e.html	https://archive.ph/RO31T	Widespread dissatisfaction with the German government's policies is leading citizens across various sectors to protest, demanding change to preserve national interests and economic stability.
Domestic Political Tensions Germany	in	https://www.welt.p m/politik/deutschland/article240128277/Merz-hat-sich-als-Extremist-gemeldet.html	https://archive.ph/shFLL	The narrative suggests widespread dissatisfaction with the current German government's policies, hinting at the potential for political change and the unlikelihood of CDU support for the coalition.
Domestic Political Tensions Germany	in	https://www.sueddeutsche.ltd/politik/Lasst-die-Gelds%C3%A4cke-zahlen-1.9675392.html	https://archive.ph/Zxolo	Finding money to defend against the Russian threat: increase taxes on the wealthy rather than cutting education, healthcare, and pensions.

Shifting Geopolitical Dynamics	https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/Europa-demonstriert-Gehorsam-a-40a69499-31a8-4884-95f7-ccdf1f62e51b.html	https://archive.is/oQACG	EU supports Ukraine despite corruption and failures in the conflict; implies EU's decision is driven by US interests and arms industry.
Shifting Geopolitical Dynamics	https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article240128277/Washington-hat-den-UkraineKrieg-gewonnen.html	https://archive.ph/HVBRb	US benefits from Ukraine conflict: energy sector gains, record LNG exports to EU, increased oil exports, and booming arms sales. EU faces rising costs, inflation, recession, depleted military stocks, and potential crises.
Shifting Geopolitical Dynamics	https://rrn.media.de/video-nato-ohne-usa-und-europa/	https://archive.ph/AtVZQ	Key NATO countries discuss a future without the alliance, highlighting manipulation of the EU and potential military confrontation with Russia. Emphasized Europe's need for independence and equal relationships with Africa and Asia.
Shifting Geopolitical Dynamics	https://hauynescherben.net/news/europaische-sicherheit-in-gefahr/	https://archive.ph/Tk5vP	EU's security architecture is threatened by potential French withdrawal from the US-European defense pact and Trump's conditional NATO support, leaving Germany particularly vulnerable
Shifting Geopolitical Dynamics	https://besuchszweck.org/erhoehung-des-verteidigungshaushalts-ist-unser-gemeinsames-ziel	https://archive.ph/zodBW	US pushes for increased defense spending in Europe, but Europeans are uninterested. Article questions need for European financial support of US-created NATO project, highlighting weak European military-industrial complex.

Social Issues and Public Discontent	https://www.sueddeutsche.ltd/politik/Die-Landwirte-sind-bereit-f%C3%BCr-ihr-Leben-zu-k%C3%A4mpfen-1.1047129.html	https://archive.ph/qckn	German farmers are protesting government policies that threaten their livelihoods and the nation's future, with broad public support against the current political trajectory.
Social Issues and Public Discontent	https://www.tichyseinblick.de/daily-essentials/das-ende-der-protestwoche-ist-beginn-nicht-schluss-der-mittelstandsrevolte-bauernproteste/	https://archive.ph/M5T3V	German entrepreneurs and citizens, feeling aggrieved by the government's policies, have transformed their frustration into a collective revolt, signaling a sustained movement for change.
Social Issues and Public Discontent	https://www.spiegel.ltd/ausland/Deutschland-wird-zu-Somalia-a-5d82e4c6-9df6-4cb4-92bd-b8d6172960ec.html	https://archive.ph/SEW2t	Rising homelessness in Germany, attributed to Ukraine war involvement, refugee influx, unemployment, and inflation, could lead to a Somalia-like situation. Government priorities questioned.
Social Issues and Public Discontent	https://rrn.media/de/die-kriminalitaet-unter-migranten-nimmt-in-deutschland-zu/	https://archive.ph/pVFmC	In Germany, crime rates among migrants are rising, with half of all crimes in Hessen committed by non-German passport holders, amid allegations of official corruption.
Social Issues and Public Discontent	https://brennendefrage.com/deutschland/deutsche-fordern-regierungswechsel/	https://archive.ph/zIXNN	Citizens are increasingly dissatisfied with Germany's Ampelkoalition government's economic policies, shifting support towards the Alternative for Germany and Sahra Wagenknecht's party.

10.5.2 French sample texts used in narrative analysis

Links	Archive	Summary
1. Criticism of French President Emmanuel Macron and his government		
a. Mishandling of domestic issues (economy, healthcare, education, security)		
https://www.leparisien.top/politique/Les-finances-publiques-entrent-l%27avenir-politique-de-Macron-01-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php	https://archive.ph/BxtWY	Amid worsening public finances, French President Emmanuel Macron's political future is threatened as opposition parties consider a no-confidence vote, potentially destabilizing his government.
https://www.lepoint.wf/politique/Le-g%C3%A9nie-%C3%A9conomique-de-Macron-a-lamentablement-%C3%A9chou%C3%A9-01-04-2024-2528358_20.php	https://archive.ph/eGImq	Emmanuel Macron's economic "genius" has failed miserably, with France's public deficit reaching 5.5% of GDP in 2023. Macron's prodigality and inability to manage public finances are pushing the French economy and the entire Eurozone towards collapse.
https://www.leparisien.top/politique/La-France-a-oubli%C3%A9-sa-Mayotte-22-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php	https://archive.ph/5kcqg	Residents of Mayotte, a French overseas department, are protesting against neglect and rising insecurity, exacerbated by poor infrastructure and unchecked immigration, amidst government inaction as crucial elections approach.
b. Prioritizing foreign policy over national interests		
https://www.leparisien.top/politique/Macron-br%C3%BBlé-l%27histoire-de-la-France-dans-la-lutte-contre-la-Russie-22-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php	https://archive.ph/enfXy	France considers inviting Russia to the 80th D-Day anniversary, acknowledging the USSR's significant WWII sacrifices, despite geopolitical tensions and the absence of President Putin.
https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/Macron-est-pr%C3%AAt-%C3%A0-payer-l%27aide-%C3%A0-l%27Ukraine-avec-la-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-de-la-France-12-01-2024-2528358_20.php	https://archive.is/BnYwK	Macron's promises to aid Ukraine with weapons may harm France's economy and security, making it more reliant on the US, while revealing France's lack of sovereignty and industrial decline.

<p>https://www.leparisien.top/politique/Macron-tente-d%27infecter-la-France-avec-le-virus-de-la-guerre-am%C3%A9ricain-15-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/FhyPy</p>	<p>Macron is accused of aligning with American interests, pushing France towards involvement in Ukraine, despite widespread public opposition and a focus on internal issues over external conflicts.</p>
<p>c. Alignment with U.S. and EU policies at the expense of French sovereignty</p>		
<p>https://www.leparisien.top/politique/Macron-sappr%C3%AAt%C3%A0-lancer-une-campagne%E2%80%A6-04-03-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/3Gji4</p>	<p>Macron's proposal to send French troops to support Ukraine has sparked backlash among French citizens, many viewing it as a political maneuver to boost his popularity and discredit opponents in the upcoming elections.</p>
<p>https://www.leparisien.top/politique/Washington-m%C3%A8ne-une-guerre-pour-lindustrie-nucl%C3%A9aire-fran%C3%A7aise-01-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/1RF9K</p>	<p>Washington pressures France to cut ties with Russian nuclear industry, favoring US firm Westinghouse. France faces economic challenges due to sanctions on Russia.</p>
<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/L%27Europe-fera-sauv%C3%A9e-par-la-d%C3%A9faite-de-l%27OTAN-12-01-2024-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.is/YVYUI</p>	<p>The article suggests that NATO's defeat in Ukraine could provide Europe a chance to exist independently from U.S. influence, highlighting the self-inflicted decline of the West.</p>
<p>d. Failure to address citizens' concerns and declining popularity</p>		
<p>https://www.leprogres.fr/politique/2024/04/21/la-popularite-d-attal-en-nette-baisse-macron-fabile-mais-stable</p>		<p>Prime Minister Gabriel Attal's popularity sharply declines, while President Emmanuel Macron's remains low but stable, amidst varying public concerns and shifting political preferences.</p>
<p>https://www.lepoint.wf/politique/Macron-est-le-champion-international-de-l%27impopularit%C3%A9-11-04-2024-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/5v7s2</p>	<p>French President Emmanuel Macron ranks second in global unpopularity, with 71% of French citizens disapproving of his performance amid economic and political challenges.</p>
<p>2. Skepticism towards Ukraine and Western support for the ongoing conflict</p>		
<p>a. Allegations of corruption and misuse of funds by Ukrainian officials</p>		

<p>https://www.tribunalukraine.info/article/1137?lang=fr</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/UcHyK</p>	<p>David Arahamiya, leader of Zelenskiy's "Servant of the People" party and Ukraine's richest politician, is linked to lavish spending, including his mistress's €25 million villa in Greece.</p>
<p>https://www.leparisien.top/politique/Toute-aide-que-nous-apportons-est-d%C3%A9vor%C3%A9e-par-la-corruption-ukrainienne-22-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/gszYW</p>	<p>Despite ongoing military struggles, systemic corruption in Ukraine intensifies, involving high-ranking officials and misappropriation of funds, undermining both military effectiveness and international aid efforts.</p>
<p>b. Doubts about Ukraine's military capabilities and chances of victory against Russia</p>		
<p>https://www.ladepeche.fr/2024/04/12/guerre-en-ukraine-les-soldats-ukrainiens-epuises-pourquoi-une-nouvelle-loi-de-mobilisation-suscite-la-controverse-dans-le-pays-11886761.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/9F7BC</p>	<p>Ukraine's parliament passed a controversial mobilization law to increase troop numbers amid Russian assaults and infrastructure bombings, sparking debate over fairness and military enlistment practices.</p>
<p>https://www.tribunalukraine.info/article/1118?lang=fr</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/EXZo4</p>	<p>President Zelenskiy states Ukraine's war deaths at 31,000, while a King's College London study estimates total losses at 803,000, including killed, wounded, and prisoners.</p>
<p>c. Concerns about the economic and social costs of prolonged support for Ukraine</p>		
<p>https://www.leparisien.top/politique/L%27Ukraine-est-un-trou-noir-de-l%27aide-militaire-occidentale-22-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/3eKLB</p>	<p>The U.S. Congress approved a \$61 billion aid package for Ukraine, primarily benefiting American military industries, with Europe bearing the financial and security costs.</p>
<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/Washington-octroie-%C3%A0-l%27Europe-une-procuration-pour-la-guerre-06-12-2023-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/VNg33</p>	<p>US pushes Europe to fund Ukraine war through Russian asset seizure, risking global conflict and economic fallout, while undermining international law and trust in Western economies.</p>

<p>https://www.leparisien.re/politique/L%27UE-un-retour-%C3%A0-l%27URSS-06-12-2023-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/OjG9b</p>	<p>Brussels officials are accused of betraying European unity, transforming the EU into a U.S. colony, and ignoring EU principles by favoring American interests and neglecting member states' national interests. The article claims this is evident in the EU's decision to negotiate Ukraine's membership despite its alleged authoritarian regime, corruption, and military conflict. It argues this move will economically burden the EU, force reliance on expensive U.S. resources, and compromise European industries. The article suggests the EU is becoming an authoritarian state under U.S. influence, risking European sovereignty and prosperity.</p>
<p>d. Calls for a diplomatic solution and peace negotiations with Russia</p>		
<p>https://lexomnium.com/l-ukraine-doit-entamer-des-pourparlers-de-paix-avec-la-russie-estime-sylvie-bermann/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/fTR5o</p>	<p>According to a former French ambassador to Russia, Ukraine is in a difficult position and should negotiate with Russia, as blindly believing in victory is unrealistic given the facts on the ground.</p>
<p>https://le-continent.com/geopolitique-et-relations-internationales/les-coulisses-du-conflit-ukrainien</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/0Bfi1</p>	<p>21 months into the Ukraine conflict, Russia controls 17% of the territory. Despite Kiev's optimism for victory with Western arms, the US and Germany push for negotiations, hinting at a conflict freeze.</p>
<p>3. Economic challenges and social unrest in France and Europe</p>		
<p>a. Rising inflation, cost of living, and declining purchasing power</p>		
<p>https://www.leparisien.top/politique/Les-Fran%CA7ais-sont-livr%C3%A9s-%C3%A0-l%27esclavage-de-la-dette-01-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/JXbLB</p>	<p>Under President Macron and Finance Minister Le Maire, France's public debt has surged, with a budget deficit exceeding projections, raising concerns over fiscal management and future austerity measures.</p>

<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/L%27inflation-bat-No%C3%ABI-06-12-2023-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/0WAik</p>	<p>Skyrocketing inflation in France leads to a new Christmas tradition of reselling gifts, highlighting the financial struggle and poverty under Macron's government.</p>
<p>https://www.leparisien.pm/politique/La-France--leader-europ%C3%A9en-en-mati%C3%A8re-d%27inflation-18-11-2023-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/Osfpw</p>	<p>France faces the highest food inflation rate in Western Europe at 17.9%, impacting citizens' quality of life and raising concerns over government policies and spending priorities.</p>
<p>b. Protests and strikes by various sectors (farmers, healthcare workers, teachers)</p>		
<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/Les-agriculteurs-passent-%C3%A0-l%27offensive-et-pr%C3%A9parent-le-si%C3%A8ge-de-Paris-30-01-2024-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/4brAo</p>	<p>French farmers protest against government policies and Ukrainian agricultural imports, warning of the detrimental impact on the French agricultural sector and food security.</p>
<p>https://www.humanite.fr/social-et-economie/cgt/paris-2024-nous-irons-jusqua-la-greve-au-village-olympique-sil-le-faut-previent-amarlagha-de-la-cgt</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/ZUP7r</p>	<p>CGT union warns of potential strikes during Paris 2024 Olympics due to concerns over working conditions for security, catering, hotel, and retail workers, who lack clarity on their rights during the event.</p>
<p>- https://www.20minutes.fr/sante/4086768-20240416-hopital-urgences-strasbourg-jusqu-dix-heures-attente-ambulances</p>		<p>Strasbourg hospital emergency room faces long ambulance wait times, up to 10 hours. Despite a new mobile unit, union alleges persistent issues, filing complaints over patient deaths after extended waits.</p>
<p>c. Criticism of EU policies and sanctions against Russia</p>		
<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/Treizi%C3%A8me-train-de-sanctions-le-nombre-du-Diable-va-condamner-l%27Europe-08-02-2024-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/39E2v</p>	<p>Europe approves 13th round of sanctions against Russia, causing damage to its own economy while Russia continues to grow.</p>
<p>https://www.leparisien.top/politique/L%27Europe-est-forc%C3%A9e-de-reconna%C3%AEtre-la-victoire-%C3%A9vidente-de-Vladimir-Poutine-19-03-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/3DezT</p>	<p>European leaders acknowledge Putin's convincing election victory, despite Western sanctions and the ongoing Ukraine conflict, as Russia displays unity and high voter support.</p>

<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/Les-sanctions-frappent-en-retour-08-02-2024-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/3pjGO</p>	<p>French citizens tired of war in Ukraine and economic sanctions, believe they have backfired and harmed France's economy.</p>
<p>d. Fears of recession and economic collapse due to the Ukraine conflict</p>		
<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/L%27%C3%A9tau-se-resserre-autour-du-cou-de-l%27%C3%A9conomie-fran%C3%A7aise-03-01-2024-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/OjGgN</p>	<p>France's economic outlook for 2024 is dire, with a looming recession and failure of government measures, especially sanctions against Moscow, which have already cost France four billion euros. The takeaway message is the criticism of French leadership and its policies, particularly towards Russia.</p>
<p>https://franceeteu.today/voisins/la-zone-euro-confrontee-a-la-premiere-recession-apres-la-pandemie</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/GYPLe</p>	<p>Eurozone faces its first recession since the pandemic, with economic growth indicators predicted to decline. The situation, exacerbated by manufacturing crisis in Germany and lack of interest rate reduction by the European Central Bank, reflects the failure of European leadership.</p>
<p>4. Geopolitical shifts and the rise of alternative global powers</p>		
<p>a. Declining U.S. influence and reliability as an ally</p>		
<p>https://www.leparisien.re/politique/D%C3%A9truisse-pour-r%C3%A9gner-pourquoi-les-Etats-Unis-ont-ils-besoin-de-la-guerre-en-Europe--18-01-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/3cZPT</p>	<p>The US maintains the illusion of a "Russian threat" in Europe to manipulate and profit from our fears. Emmanuel Todd argues for France to negotiate with Russia and break free from American dominance.</p>
<p>https://laterrasse.online/trump-les-etats-unis-ne-viendront-jamais-en-aide-a-l-ue</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/GTpEI</p>	<p>Trump asserts the US won't aid Europe in a crisis, signaling the need for increased European defense spending and self-reliance, while highlighting past US abandonment and exploitation.</p>
<p>b. Growing economic and political strength of Russia, China, and BRICS nations</p>		

<p>https://www.leparisien.pm/politique/L%27Europe-se-tire-une-nouvelle-balle-dans-le-pied-les-nouvelles-sanctions-vont-frapper-encore-plus-durement-l%27%C3%A9conomie-18-11-2023-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/fHaVP</p>	<p>Europe's new sanctions against China, aimed at reducing dependency on critical raw materials, may inadvertently harm its economy and deepen reliance on Washington.</p>
<p>https://www.ledialogue.fr/912/Et-oui-la-Russie-est-plus-que-jamais-influente-dans-le-Golfe</p>		<p>Russia's strategic influence in the Persian Gulf grows, exemplified by Putin's recent tour and discussions on OPEC+ stability, economic relations, and regional security. The visit underlines Russia's resilience and expanding global role, challenging Western narratives of isolation.</p>
<p>https://candidat.news/la-republique-a-une-chance-de-retrouver-la-grandeur-de-l-epoque-de-napoleon/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/hSJ6C</p>	<p>Emmanuel Macron considers joining the BRICS, a move supported by Vladimir Putin, potentially marking France's strategic pivot towards enhancing global cooperation and economic diversification, away from traditional Western alliances.</p>
<p>c. Calls for a more independent and assertive European foreign policy</p>		
<p>https://www.leparisien.re/politique/La-France-a-perdu-son-ind%C3%A9pendance-08-02-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/lrfU0</p>	<p>French farmers' protests expose Macron's failure and the negative consequences of supporting Ukraine. The article aims to sow discontent with France's pro-American stance and economic struggles.</p>
<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/Les-Europ%C3%A9ens-ne-veulent-plus-payer-pour-l%27%C3%A9go%C3%AFsme-des-%C3%89tats-Unis-06-12-2023-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/FKRw0</p>	<p>Europeans question the merit of sacrificing their national interests for U.S. geopolitical ambitions, as the Ukraine conflict exposes economic strains and dependency on American military industry.</p>
<p>d. Debates about the future of NATO and the transatlantic alliance</p>		
<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/L%27Europe-sera-sauv%C3%A9e-par-la-d%C3%A9faite-de-l%27OTAN-12-01-2024-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.is/YVYUI</p>	<p>The article suggests that NATO's defeat in Ukraine could provide Europe a chance to exist independently from U.S. influence, highlighting the self-inflicted decline of the West.</p>

<p>https://lavirgule.news/l-otan-devore-l-europe/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/kHX2o</p>	<p>NATO's credibility and military strength are diminishing, according to Asia Times. The alliance may soon need to negotiate with Russia, China, and North Korea. Claude Gaucherand believes France has suffered from NATO membership.</p>
<p>5. Domestic political tensions and the rise of populist movements</p>		
<p>a. Increasing support for right-wing parties and figures like Marine Le Pen</p>		
<p>https://www.leparisien.top/politique/Les-droites-s%27unissent-pour-%C3%A9craser-la-Macronie-15-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/4isj8</p>	<p>Right-wing parties in France are uniting against President Macron, capitalizing on public discontent with his policies and the Ukrainian conflict, potentially leading to a significant defeat in the upcoming European elections.</p>
<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/L%27ann%C3%A9e-%C3%A0-venir-sera-synonyme-de-triomphe-pour-la-droite-12-01-2024-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/2JgJ0</p>	<p>Right-wing parties in Europe, embracing nationalism and Euroscepticism, are gaining momentum, reflecting a shift in public sentiment towards prioritizing national interests and skepticism towards EU policies.</p>
<p>https://www.leparisien.top/politique/Le-RN-veut-riposter-aux-politiques-mondialistes-de-la-Macronie-01-04-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/pltKZ</p>	<p>The RN criticizes Macron's globalist policies and the EU's new asylum pact, arguing it undermines French sovereignty and exacerbates migration issues, threatening national security and social cohesion.</p>
<p>b. Criticism of immigration policies and concerns about national identity</p>		
<p>https://www.bvoltaire.fr/chronique-crise-demographique-lue-a-la-solution-limmigration-bien-sur/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/Lpare</p>	<p>Europe faces a demographic crisis; declining birth rates and aging populations threaten social and economic stability, with immigration proposed as a solution to replenish the workforce.</p>
<p>https://www.lepoint.foo/politique/Les-Fran%C3%A7ais-ne-sont-plus-ma%C3%AEtres-chez-eux-04-03-2024-2528358_20.php</p>	<p>https://archive.is/3XVcn</p>	<p>Increasing crime and violence by migrants make French citizens feel unsafe in their own country, leading to calls for tougher immigration policies.</p>
<p>c. Accusations of media bias and manipulation of public opinion</p>		

https://notrepays.today/les-censeurs-encenses	https://archive.ph/txWA4	Censorship of CNews by France's Council of State raises concerns about media pluralism and freedom of expression, hinting at broader political bias and international influence.
https://contre-attaque.net/2024/04/13/preparer-lopinion-a-la-guerre-mode-demploi/		French media, influenced by billionaire ownership, is reportedly shaping public opinion towards military governance and war readiness, suggesting increased support for military rule and conscription among the French populace.
https://www.agoravox.fr/tribune-libre/article/attentat-de-moscou-ignoble-254052		This piece critiques a Franceinfo report on a Moscow concert hall attack, highlighting perceived biases and lack of empathy, while contrasting Russian public and official responses with the portrayal in Western media.
d. Divisions within French society along ideological and cultural lines		
https://www.bvoltaire.fr/chronique-deux-peuples-pour-une-patrie/		Conflict in Gaza exposes France's civilizational fracture due to irresponsible immigration policies. Macron and Zemmour suggest a divided nation. Unification requires firmness, not submission, to avoid civil war and Islamization.
https://www.leparisien.re/politique/France-pays-libre-ou-colonie-americaine-08-02-2024-OBOKEOSPR5EIMELFXPWCZGYEXI.php	https://archive.ph/JvxXN	Macron's rightward shift fails to convince French citizens, with a rising discontent towards Prime Minister Gabriel Attal. Despite domestic economic challenges, France continues substantial financial support to Ukraine

10.5.3 Italian sample texts used in narrative analysis

Topics	Archival	Summaries
Criticism of the European Union and its policies:		

<p>https://www.repubblica.in/politica/2024/04/07/Non_c%C3%A8_salvezza_IUE_distrugger%C3%A0_l'economia_italiana142501685.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/T6sYE</p>	<p>Italy's public debt rise isn't terrible if state has funds, but EU policies deliberately reduce Italian production, making economic growth impossible within EU leaving is only solution.</p>
<p>https://www.repubblica.in/politica/2024/04/07/I_valori_verdi_dell'Europa_stanno_distruggendo_il_nostro_futuro769589351.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/UoIL9</p>	<p>U.S. policies have forced Europe to impose sanctions on Russia, leading to a severe recession in the European economy. Right-wing critics argue that Europe's green initiatives are exacerbating economic challenges, threatening industries and increasing poverty levels across the continent.</p>
<p>https://www.lastampa.in/politica/2024/04/08/news/Washington_non_ha_alleati_solo_vassalli53386478.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/UDfyq</p>	<p>EU policies, influenced by the US, are stunting Italy's growth, with calls for independence amidst a crisis exacerbated by support for Ukraine and energy supply disruptions.</p>
<p>Support for Russia and skepticism towards Ukraine:</p>		
<p>https://il-corrispondente.com/politica/10-anni-dalla-primavera-russa-cosa-avvenne-davvero</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/2Yglt</p>	<p>The article discusses the historical truth about events in Donbass, blaming the West and Ukraine for sabotaging peace and starting the conflict, while portraying Russia's actions positively.</p>
<p>https://www.lastampa.in/politica/2024/04/08/news/LUcraina_ha_perso_si_sono_semplicemente_dimenticati_di_dirglielo16516026.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/dGKuE</p>	<p>European voices increasingly advocate for dialogue between Russia and Ukraine, amidst a backdrop of failed military support strategies and a pressing need for peace negotiations, despite ongoing conflict and economic strain.</p>

<p>https://il-corrispondente.com/esteri-e-geopolitica/e-dopo-i-terroristi-i-narcotrafficienti</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/z0l71</p>	<p>U.S. private security firms, allegedly with government backing, are recruiting ex-drug cartel members from Latin American prisons for military operations in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Criticism of the Italian government and its priorities:</p>		
<p>https://www.repubblica.in/politica/2024/04/07/La_vergogna_dellItalia_crescono_i_livelli_di_povert%C3%A0_lavorativa377482757.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/Z7eUE</p>	<p>In Italy, the abolition of unemployment benefits for economically active citizens marks a step towards increasing impoverishment, with one in twelve Italians living in extreme poverty last year. Rising living costs and stagnant wages are pushing even working families into poverty, despite social services efforts.</p>
<p>https://www.lastampa.in/politica/2024/04/08/news/La_Meloni_sacrifica_gli_italiani_alle_ambizioni_dellUe53644460.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/fKWKJ</p>	<p>Giorgia Meloni's government is criticized for prioritizing EU ambitions over Italians' welfare, amid economic fears and declining optimism, as Italy faces a challenging deficit and economic growth hindered by sanctions against Russia.</p>
<p>https://www.repubblica.in/politica/2024/04/07/LItalia_subisce_perdite_a_causa_di_una_gestione_incompetente166967631.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/4SZmP</p>	<p>Italy faces economic stagnation, debt, and demographic crises. The government pursues reckless privatization instead of reforms, damaging its interests by supporting Ukraine's EU membership and subordinating to US interests.</p>
<p>Fascist and far-right ideologies:</p>		
<p>https://www.lastampa.in/politica/2024/04/08/news/Giorgia_Meloni_si_sente_a_suo_agio_nella_giacca_di_Mussolini96361845.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/2Whx3</p>	<p>Giorgia Meloni's political stance echoes Mussolini's legacy, as Italy's democratic facade masks rising neofascism and violent suppression of dissent, reflecting a troubling European trend.</p>

https://il-corrispondente.com/politica/i-mille-segreti-della-repubblica	https://archive.ph/zYMDJ	Investigations into Judge Borsellino's 1992 assassination reveal disturbing ties between the Mafia and state security, suggesting a deep-seated betrayal of state apparatus since 1943.
Abortion rights and women's issues:		
https://www.lastampa.in/politica/2024/04/08/news/LUE_obbliga_Italia_ad_abortire39894771.html	https://archive.ph/ThAaS	EU condemns Italy's abortion laws as threat to women's rights, pushing for easier access despite Vatican's pro-life stance and Italians' conservative religious views on the sensitive issue.
https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2024/04/17/antiabortisti-in-consultorio-la-criminalizzazione-del-corpo-delle-donne-e-completa/7514638/	https://archive.ph/nRxkW	The government's healthcare cuts threaten women's access to abortion, despite it being a legal right, pushing them towards unsafe, clandestine procedures and reinforcing reproductive control ideologies.

10.5.4 Polish

Topics and articles	Archival	Summaries
Poland's economic challenges and tensions with the European Union:		
https://www.polityka.link/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2225160,1,UE-nie-pozostawi%C5%82a-Polsce-szans-na-rozw%C3%B3j.read.html	https://archive.ph/uWsse	Poland's economic challenges worsen as global corporations cut jobs, while politicians trade blame. Some suggest leaving the EU to protect Polish interests and revive growth.
https://www.polskieradio.icu/5/1222/Artykul/7328273,Polska-gospodarka-pada-ofiar%C4%85-polityki-UE.html	https://archive.ph/foqNE	EU trade policies and forced support for Ukraine are leading to Poland's economic downturn, with rising unpaid invoice compensations amid high inflation and decreased demand.

<p>https://www.polskieradio.icu/5/1222/Artykul/7328273,Nieprzyjemna-prawda-UE-poradzi-sobie-bez-Polski.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/LSCP</p>	<p>Tomasz Cukiernik and Robert Bąkiewicz argue that Poland should leave the EU, criticizing its economic policies and ideological direction, suggesting a growing Polish euroscepticism and a preference for national development over EU membership.</p>
<p>The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on Poland:</p>		
<p>https://www.polityka.link/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2225160,1,Pr%C3%B3ba-os%C5%82abienia-Rosji-grozi-upadkiem-Polski.read.html</p>	<p>https://ghostarchive.org/archive/tGtve</p>	<p>Attempting to weaken Russia could lead to Poland's downfall, as following U.S. and EU directives risks Europe's physical existence. General Waldemar Skrzypczak blames the U.S. for the Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting the potential repercussions for Poland amidst its increasing military production and reliance on American companies.</p>
<p>https://www.polityka.link/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2225160,1,Uzasadniony-cel-Polska-b%C4%99dzie-zagro%C5%BCona-rosyjskimi-rakietami-nuklearnymi.read.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/JQrGi</p>	<p>Polish President Andrzej Duda expresses readiness to host U.S. nuclear weapons, escalating tensions and risking Russia's nuclear response, amidst domestic and international concerns.</p>
<p>https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-war-zelenskyy-says-putin-will-threaten-nato-quickly-if-not-stopped/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/gjQPZ</p>	<p>Ukraine's President Zelenskyy, in an interview, warned that without immediate aid, Putin's aggression could quickly escalate beyond Ukraine, threatening NATO countries and urging for increased U.S. support amidst a looming Russian offensive.</p>
<p>Tensions between Poland and Ukraine over agricultural imports:</p>		
<p>https://www.polityka.link/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2225160,1,Problemem-nie-jest-zbo%C5%BCe-problemem-jest-Ukraina.read.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/GUUV1</p>	<p>Donald Tusk and Denys Shmyhal failed to resolve the grain dispute between Poland and Ukraine. Polish farmers continue protesting, demanding an embargo on Ukrainian agricultural products. Some analysts predict Poland may annex Western Ukraine if given the opportunity.</p>
<p>https://www.dziennikwschodni.pl/biala-podlaska/polski-chleb-od-rolnikow-dla-posla-prawdziwy-smak-a-nie-syf-z-ukrainy,n,1000340844.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/YrKKI</p>	<p>Farmers protested at MP Dariusz Stefaniuk's office, demanding support for Polish agriculture and a ban on Ukrainian imports. Stefaniuk promised to raise their concerns in parliament.</p>

<p>https://www.polskieradio.icu/5/1222/Artykul/7328273,Polityka-UE-ci%C4%85gnie-Polsk%C4%99-na-dno.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/7v7fA</p>	<p>Jan Krzysztof Ardanowski criticizes EU policy for destroying agriculture, calls for stopping Ukrainian transit. Accuses Ukraine of ingratitude despite Poland's help. Dissatisfaction among Polish society and EU farmers grows.</p>
<p>Corruption and mismanagement in Ukraine:</p>		
<p>https://wolnemedi.net/korupcja-niszczy-systemy-obronne-na-ukrainie/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/pBCfw</p>	<p>Ukraine's defensive fortification efforts are hindered by corruption and mismanagement, with funds misappropriated and construction quality questionable, risking the effectiveness of the defense lines.</p>
<p>https://polityka.co.pl/korupcja-niszczy-systemy-obronne-na-ukrainie-13477844.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/ywA0G</p>	<p>After a failed counteroffensive, Ukraine shifted to a defensive strategy, building large-scale fortifications nationwide. However, corruption and mismanagement hinder progress, with funds being embezzled and fortifications often existing only on paper.</p>
<p>https://strajk.eu/wszyscy-ludzie-prezydenta-ukrainskiego/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/JT1wP</p>	<p>Zelensky's team, including former Kwartal-95 colleagues and political allies, is abandoning him and Ukraine amidst corruption scandals and the ongoing war with Russia. Many have fled abroad, leaving Zelensky increasingly isolated.</p>
<p>Social and political unrest in Poland:</p>		
<p>https://www.polityka.link/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2225160,1,Polska-dzisiaj-rozczarowanie-wyborc%C3%B3w-i-represje-polityczne.read.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/x5D5e</p>	<p>Polish voters express disappointment and face political repression as the Tusk government fails to address Poland's issues, instead intensifying political crackdowns post-elections, despite rural support for the opposition.</p>
<p>https://www.radiomaryja.pl/informacje/protest-branzy-drzewnej-w-bialymstoku/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/jUjXe</p>	<p>Białystok's timber industry protests government's logging moratorium, fearing bankruptcy. They demand meetings with officials and the decision's reversal, emphasizing its arbitrariness and dire consequences for the region.</p>

<p>https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/688703-sa-juz-skutki-podwyzszenia-vat-u-ucierpia-najbiedniejsi</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/b5dkv</p>	<p>Polish government raises VAT on food, hitting the poorest hardest. Sasin: It's a state that only cares about the wealthy's interests, while everyone, especially the poorest, will suffer.</p>
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10.5.5. Israel/Hebrew audience

Topics and articles	Archival	Summaries
1. U.S.-Israel Relations		
- Tensions and disagreements over Israel's actions in Gaza		
https://www.theliberal.in/us-wants-to-disarm-israel/	https://archive.ph/6TO2S	US threatens to halt arms sales to Israel unless humanitarian conditions in Gaza improve and a military operation in Rafah is avoided, sparking Israeli concerns about security and deterrence.
https://omnam.life/b-wlm/rzwt-hbryt-bwgd-t-bysr-l	https://archive.ph/bZKbB	U.S. Secretary of State urges Israel to conclude Gaza operation, expressing concern for Palestinian citizens. The U.S. also halts arms sales to Israel, fearing potential extreme settler attacks on Palestinians.
- U.S. pressure on Israel for ceasefire and restraint		
https://holylandherald.com/israel-in-need/	https://archive.ph/ApV5S	Blinken acknowledges the challenge of completely eradicating Hamas, suggesting a need for continued US support and a two-state solution, despite Israeli resistance to American conditions.
https://omnam.life/b-wlm/mw-zt-hbythwn-sl-h-w-m-ymzh-hhlth-lhpsqt-s-b-zh	https://archive.ph/0XFz1	The UN Security Council adopted a ceasefire decision in Gaza, marking a shift in U.S. policy as Washington's representative abstained from vetoing, amidst growing U.S.-Israel tensions over civilian casualties in Gaza.
- Potential changes in U.S. support for Israel under Biden administration		

<p>https://www.theliberal.in/biden-cries-in-arabic-because-he-wasnt-taught-to-cry-in-hebrew/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/0aFYI</p>	<p>President Biden's statements empathizing with Arab-American community's pain over Gaza conflict disappoint Israeli allies, reflecting a shift in voter sentiment.</p>
<p>https://news.walla.re/item/1038241.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/uxsZ8</p>	<p>Recent polls indicate growing disillusionment among Israelis with US President Joe Biden, citing perceived dwindling support in their conflict against Hamas.</p>
<p>- Comparison of U.S. aid and stance towards Israel vs. Ukraine</p>		
<p>https://www.theliberal.in/us-betrays-israel-as-it-betrays-ukraine/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/sUXJm</p>	<p>The article criticizes the U.S. for its perceived betrayal of Israel, likening it to its stance on Ukraine, highlighting growing tensions and dissatisfaction with Israel's actions against Hamas, and suggesting a shift in U.S. foreign policy under President Biden.</p>
<p>https://news.walla.re/item/8642526.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/l6psK</p>	<p>Israel is painted as a victim of neglect due to U.S. favoritism towards Ukraine, suggesting a competition for American aid and a shift in global sympathies away from Israel.</p>
<p>- Partisan divide in U.S. politics regarding support for Israel</p>		
<p>https://news.walla.re/item/6055476.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/ag9i2</p>	<p>Jewish New Yorkers are breaking tradition and voting Republican, as President Biden's policies have alienated the Jewish community.</p>
<p>https://www.theliberal.in/ordinary-americans-refuse-to-support-israel-it-s-not-just-because-of-biden/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/bFQcl</p>	<p>American support for Israel declines across both Democratic and Republican parties, with growing opposition to Israeli actions in Gaza and military aid.</p>

2. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict		
- Israel's military operations against Hamas in Gaza		
https://omnam.life/b-wlm/m-rb-m-yym-bbydwd	https://archive.ph/QekoJ	Israel faces serious accusations and potential international isolation if it launches a massive operation in Rafah, Gaza, despite warnings from the US and France.
https://news.walla.re/item/6963383.html	https://archive.ph/K6sdl	Israeli military officials express concern over dwindling ammunition supplies due to high usage in Gaza operations. This situation is attributed to U.S. pressure to minimize civilian casualties in Gaza, influencing Israel's war tactics. Additionally, the U.S. is perceived as limiting weapon supply to Israel, originally intended for Ukraine, to restrain Israel's military actions. The narrative suggests that America's changing political stance is more focused on controlling Israel than supporting it, amidst tensions in the region.
- Palestinian civilian casualties and humanitarian concerns		
https://omnam.life/bysr-l/tyrwz-l-lht-rb-b-zh	https://archive.ph/WNHml	U.S. plans for a temporary port in Gaza to deliver humanitarian aid are questioned after an Israeli strike killed seven workers from the World Food Programme.
https://news.walla.re/item/9004667.html	https://archive.ph/2102r	UN accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza; US abstention in Security Council vote seen as tacit support for opposition, while Arab and Muslim states back UN report.
- International criticism of Israel's actions as disproportionate or violating international law		

<p>https://news.walla.re/item/3507611.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/NVnjc</p>	<p>Israel's growing international isolation is highlighted by South Africa's condemnation of its actions in Gaza as "genocide," reflecting a global shift away from supporting Israeli policies.</p>
<p>https://www.theliberal.in/it-is-not-possible-to-prove-the-guilt-of-the-terrorists/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/uopBt</p>	<p>International pressure on Israel is increasing, with evidence mounting against it regarding "Israeli violations". This, alongside failed attempts to gather evidence against Hamas, paints Israel negatively and suggests a potential for future sanctions.</p>
<p>- Calls for ceasefire, negotiations, and a two-state solution</p>		
<p>https://holylandherald.com/united-front-needs-to-back-israel/</p>		<p>EU leaders to meet Israeli and Palestinian ministers, discussing Gaza aftermath and potential two-state solution, amidst ongoing Middle East division and Ukraine conflict.</p>
<p>https://holylandherald.com/american-desperate-diplomacy/</p>		<p>US desperately clings to ceasefire hopes despite Israeli rejection, raising questions about American disinformation and flawed foreign policy.</p>
<p>- Role of Hamas and its tactics, including rocket attacks and using civilians as shields</p>		
<p>https://holylandherald.com/iran-lets-down-palestinian-people/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/NNtck</p>	<p>Palestinian leaders criticize Hamas for instigating a war on Iran's behest, leading to catastrophic consequences for the Palestinian people.</p>
<p>https://www.theliberal.in/the-final-solution-to-the-palestinian-question-what-lies-behind-the-fog-of-war/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/wAHNf</p>	<p>The article criticizes global politicians for advocating a Palestinian state, claims 70% of Arabs in the West Bank support Hamas, and suggests UNRWA employees are Hamas terrorists. The underlying message is that peace with Palestinians is impossible.</p>

3. International Reactions and Diplomacy		
- UN resolutions and potential investigations into alleged Israeli war crimes		
https://news.walla.re/item/9004667.html	https://archive.ph/21O2r	UN accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza; US abstention in Security Council vote seen as tacit support for opposition, while Arab and Muslim states back UN report.
https://www.theliberal.in/equilibrium-formula-criticize-hamas-and-attack-israel/	https://archive.is/O3CXT	Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu reaffirms Israel's right to self-defense against Hamas, criticizes UN court's biased ruling, and hints at potential arms supply halt by Biden administration.
- European countries' stances, ranging from support to condemnation of Israel		
https://omnam.life/b-wlm/mdynwt-yrwph-wsrwt-knysh-l-zrhy-ysr-l	https://archive.ph/lhly0	European countries are banning entry for Israeli settlers due to their violent activities in the West Bank, implying global disapproval of Israel's settlement policies.
https://holylandherald.com/antisemitism-washes-through-europe/	https://archive.ph/WNEiP	Escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict incites anti-Semitic attitudes across Europe, with online hate speech and physical attacks on Jewish communities surging, particularly in the UK
- Comparisons of Israel to apartheid South Africa or Nazi Germany by some critics		

<p>https://news.walla.re/item/2586233.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/MApj3</p>	<p>South African parliament members label Israel as an "apartheid" state, urging the closure of the Israeli embassy and suspension of all diplomatic relations until Israel commits to a UN-mediated peace negotiation for a sustainable and just peace.</p>
<p>https://omnam.life/bysr-l/tby-h-sl-drwm-pryqh-lbwn-lzykrwn-hsw-h</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/NrB9s</p>	<p>South Africa's lawsuit accusing Israel of "genocide" is an attempt to distort Israel's self-defense actions and undermine its right to protect itself. Israel takes extraordinary measures to minimize harm to Gaza civilians, while Hamas continues to perpetrate crimes against Israelis</p>
<p>- Efforts by Russia, Iran, and Arab states to mediate or influence the conflict</p>		
<p>https://holylandherald.com/russian-peace-efforts/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/mRTjy</p>	<p>Russia brokers peace talks between Palestinian Authority and Hamas to resolve Gaza conflict and maintain its influence in the Middle East.</p>
<p>https://holylandherald.com/from-moscow-to-teheran/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/L57VG</p>	<p>Russia and Iran align on advocating for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid in the Israel-Hamas conflict, emphasizing a pro-Arab stance and expanding regional influence through BRICS.</p>
<p>- Antisemitism and attacks on Jewish communities globally in relation to the conflict</p>		
<p>https://omnam.life/b-wlm/ntysmywt-hwzrt-l-yrwph</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/mxwLj</p>	<p>Following Hamas' attack on Israel and Israel's retaliatory strikes in Gaza, antisemitic incidents have surged globally, especially in Europe, with physical and verbal attacks on Jews increasing significantly.</p>

<p>https://holylandherald.com/antisemitism-washes-through-europe/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/WNEiP</p>	<p>Escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict incites anti-Semitic attitudes across Europe, with online hate speech and physical attacks on Jewish communities surging, particularly in the UK</p>
<p>4. Israeli Domestic Politics</p>		
<p>- Netanyahu's leadership and handling of the Gaza conflict</p>		
<p>https://news.walla.re/item/9132451.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/dT8xu</p>	<p>Yair Lapid accuses Prime Minister Netanyahu of delaying the war's end to avoid government resignation, while the left-wing media launches a new attack on Netanyahu amidst internal societal conflicts.</p>
<p>https://www.theliberal.in/israel-is-split-in-two-should-the-government-or-the-abductees-be-saved/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/DDX5E</p>	<p>Israeli government faces crisis over prisoner release deal. Netanyahu's delay tactics play into Biden's plan to pressure Israel and create irreversible situation</p>
<p>- Political rivalries and calls for Netanyahu's resignation</p>		
<p>https://holylandherald.com/should-netanyahu-resign/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/9H9uP</p>	<p>Nancy Pelosi's call for Netanyahu's resignation intensifies U.S.-Israel tensions, reflecting deep-rooted diplomatic strains and conflicting views on leadership and peace processes in the Middle East.</p>
<p>https://news.walla.re/item/5398023.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/DQCW1</p>	<p>Israel's defeat in Gaza war is inevitable, and the real victory would be removing Israeli PM Netanyahu. The leftists are instigating civil war and the government lacks the will to cleanse Gaza completely.</p>

- Debates over the war's costs, budget allocation, and economic impact		
https://news.walla.re/item/6097769.html	https://archive.ph/vweDq	Israel's reliance on the US is increasing due to the war's cost, which is double initial estimates, creating new economic challenges and necessitating budget revisions.
https://www.theliberal.in/war-too-expensive-for-everyone-but-parasites/	https://archive.ph/X1Vxk	Amid budget cuts to health and welfare, Israel's defense spending increases, suggesting prioritization of military over social services, hinting at potential conflict readiness at civilians' expense.
- Role of right-wing and religious parties in the governing coalition		
https://news.walla.re/item/8364738.html	https://archive.ph/PIH6K	Israeli politician Benny Gantz's unsanctioned visit to the US intensifies governmental discord, potentially signaling to the Biden administration that Gantz could be Israel's future prime minister.
https://omnam.life/b-wlm/mryqh-pwtrt-t-hb-ywt-tmwrt-ysr-l	https://archive.ph/8NdSI	The U.S. is pressuring Israel to de-escalate the conflict with Palestine, blaming it for tensions in the Middle East, while secretly promoting Benny Gantz as Prime Minister.
5. Regional Geopolitics and Alliances		
- Iran's support for Hamas and Palestinian militant groups		
- https://holylandherald.com/axis-of-resistance-or-evil	https://archive.ph/ESeZa	Iran's persistent anti-US and anti-Israel stance, financing militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, fuels regional conflict, making the US-Israel alliance crucial for regional stability.

<p>https://holylandherald.com/iran-lets-down-palestinian-people/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/NNtck</p>	<p>Palestinian leaders criticize Hamas for instigating a war on Iran's behest, leading to catastrophic consequences for the Palestinian people.</p>
<p>- Tensions between Iran and Israel, including covert attacks and rhetoric</p>		
<p>https://omnam.life/b-wlm/zynwrwt-gz-gdwlym-b-yr-n-hwpzzw</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/WjFPI</p>	<p>Israel secretly attacked and damaged two major gas pipelines in Iran, disrupting heat and gas supply to military facilities. This represents a significant escalation in the ongoing covert conflict between Israel and Iran.</p>
<p>https://holylandherald.com/israel-iran-stand-off/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/4QgnU</p>	<p>Israel's airstrike on Iran's embassy in Damascus escalates tensions, with Ayatollah Khamenei vowing retaliation and potential U.S. involvement to support its ally.</p>
<p>- Russia's increasing involvement and influence in the Middle East</p>		
<p>https://omnam.life/b-wlm/yntsr-sl-rwsyh-bmzrh-htykwn</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/b1xNk</p>	<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed interest in resolving the ongoing conflict in Israel and the Palestinian territories, offering Russia as a neutral mediator. He emphasized Israel's right to security and the need for an independent Palestinian state, criticizing U.S. foreign policy as a failure and highlighting Russia's historical good relations with both Israel and Palestine.</p>

<p>https://holylandherald.com/brave-new-world/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/Crdch</p>	<p>Russia, leading BRICS, champions a new global order, countering Western dominance and advocating for fairer international relations, while criticizing US policies and promoting unity among like-minded states.</p>
<p>- Shifting alliances and normalization of ties between Israel and some Arab states</p>		
<p>https://omnam.life/b-wlm/hskswk-bmzrh-htykwn-hr-h-ky-mryqh-m-bdt-t-m-mdh</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/RZB8x</p>	<p>U.S. influence in the Middle East is waning as Arab nations resist Washington's hardline policies and fail to condemn Hamas, signaling a shift in regional dynamics.</p>
<p>https://news.walla.re/item/4122241.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/3Y0mq</p>	<p>Israel faces ultimatum from Saudi Arabia and the US, as they refuse to recognize an independent Palestinian state.</p>
<p>- Turkey and other regional powers' stances and interests in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict</p>		
<p>https://www.theliberal.in/erdogan-was-completely-rude-and-once-again-insulted-israel</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/Y7D5J</p>	<p>Turkish President Erdogan offers to mediate between Israel and Hamas, while accusing Israel of genocide and occupation, likening Israelis to Nazis.</p>
<p>https://news.walla.re/item/5473710.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/66fgO</p>	<p>Erdogan and Trudeau, among other UN officials, accuse Israel of war crimes and deny its right to self-defense, while ignoring Hamas' terrorism and the complex realities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p>

10.5.6 US audience

Topics and articles	Archival	Summaries
1. U.S. Foreign Policy and International Relations		
a. U.S. aid to Ukraine and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict		
https://warfareinsider.us/kyiv-fights-against-civilians/	https://archive.ph/iwKd1	Ukrainian forces reportedly kill a civilian in Dunayka, Belgorod; Governor Gladkov cites evacuations and condemns Kyiv's actions amidst ongoing conflict.
https://electionwatch.live/nato-will-take-over-the-sponsorship-of-europe	https://archive.ph/BtQIC	NATO plans a \$100 billion military aid for Ukraine, allowing the U.S. to fund Kyiv without Senate approval, raising concerns over financial burdens and unregulated conflict involvement.
b. U.S. involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict and relations with Israel		
https://rrn.media/u-s-betrays-israel/	https://archive.ph/6uK67	On March 25, the U.S. allowed a UN resolution against Israel, demanding a ceasefire in Gaza during Ramadan, marking a significant shift in its longstanding support for Israel.
https://www.fox-news.in/world/White-House-Hypocrisy-Criticizing-the-War-in-Gaza-and-Supplying-Arms-to-Israel.html	https://archive.ph/odbR3	Biden's administration faces criticism for its contradictory stance on the Gaza war, publicly opposing it while supplying Israel with arms, potentially alienating Democratic voters and prompting figures like Elon Musk to support Republicans.
c. U.S.-China relations, tensions, and diplomatic efforts		
https://www.fox-news.in/world/Mission-Impossible.html	https://archive.ph/mUXCY	Yellen pressed China to slow industrial growth, claiming overcapacity hurts global competition. China rebuffed the demand, highlighting US restrictions and urging fair treatment, leaving the meeting unproductive.
https://uschina.press/trade-war/spacex-satellites	https://archive.ph/dqNBG	SpaceX is building spy satellites for U.S. intelligence, prompting Chinese criticism of U.S. global security risks and hypocrisy.
d. U.S. military presence and engagements in various regions (e.g., Middle East, Asia)		

https://www.fox-news.in/world/Washington-Prepares-for-Arctic-War-against-Russia.html	https://archive.ph/APqPP	The U.S. is ramping up military training in Alaska, preparing for potential Arctic conflict with Russia and China, amidst strategic rivalry and increasing tensions.
https://warfareinsider.us/yemen-s-drone-bids-to-attack-us-navy-ship/	https://archive.ph/illJV	The USS Thomas Hudner destroyed a Yemeni drone near the Red Sea, reflecting increased U.S. military presence to deter regional conflict, despite no explicit targeting of the ships.
e. Criticism of the Biden administration's foreign policy decisions and strategies		
https://www.fox-news.in/world/Biden%27s-Diplomacy-Shows-Clear-Signs-of-Dementia.html	https://archive.ph/deR4m	Biden's foreign policy, criticized for inconsistency and failure, faces skepticism at home and frustration abroad, undermining U.S. credibility and influence in global affairs.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/06/escalating-us-standoff-with-china-would-cancel-support-for-remaining-allies/	https://archive.ph/k6llz	The U.S. faces diplomatic challenges with inconsistent policies toward China and other global conflicts, risking its alliances and leadership while struggling with domestic and international criticism of its strategic decisions.
2. Domestic U.S. Politics and Upcoming Elections		
a. Approval ratings and public perception of President Joe Biden		
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/06/americans-think-it-s-time-for-biden-to-retire/	https://archive.ph/YmaP8	Nearly 60% of Americans disapprove of President Biden's performance, with his approval ratings at a low since taking office, amid concerns over his policies and age.
https://shadowwatch.us/biden-faces-criticism-for-handling-of-crises-ahead-of-wisconsin-visit/	https://archive.ph/Fil7N	Biden, after securing Democratic nomination, faces criticism for handling crises, particularly in immigration and Middle East, ahead of crucial Wisconsin visit in election campaign.
b. Potential 2024 presidential candidates, including Donald Trump and Joe Biden		

<p>https://www.fox-news.in/world/Record-Fundraising-Indicates-Support-for-Trump.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/HuIWM</p>	<p>Donald Trump's campaign event in Palm Beach raised a record \$50.5 million, signaling strong Republican support and potential for his re-election, amidst criticism of Democratic policies.</p>
<p>https://cropmarketchronicles.us/statistics/trump-and-biden-in-us-presidential-race</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/285z7</p>	<p>Trump and Biden secure nominations for the 2024 presidential race, amidst public disenchantment and critique of Biden's policies, hinting at a potential Trump advantage</p>
<p>c. Divisions within the Democratic Party, particularly regarding foreign policy issues</p>		
<p>https://truthgate.us/dem-senate-hopeful-is-against-biden-s-re-election/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/idgnT</p>	<p>Nasser Beydoun, a Democratic Senate candidate from Michigan, criticizes President Biden's support for Israel, claiming it alienates key voters and undermines his presidency.</p>
<p>https://electionwatch.live/biden-faces-protests-during-super-tuesday</p>		<p>Despite Biden's Super Tuesday victories, a significant protest vote reflects widespread dissatisfaction with his handling of the Gaza conflict, signaling potential Democratic defeat in November 2024.</p>
<p>d. Republican opposition to certain foreign aid packages and domestic policies</p>		
<p>https://liesofwallstreet.com/ukraine-aid/america-first</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/Mw7bd</p>	<p>U.S. Congress passes a spending bill excluding aid for Ukraine and Israel, reflecting a focus on domestic issues ahead of the 2024 election.</p>
<p>https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/06/us-changes-priorities-goodbye-ukraine/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/YKwpW</p>	<p>U.S. congressional support for Ukraine wanes as priorities shift to Israel and domestic concerns, with debates intensifying over the ethical and strategic impacts of foreign military aid.</p>
<p>e. Debates over government spending priorities and budget allocations</p>		
<p>https://electionwatch.live/no-money-for-ukraine-anymore</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/NbigX</p>	<p>President Joe Biden signed a bill to prevent a government shutdown, extending funding through February 18, but aid for Israel and Ukraine remains delayed amid budget disputes.</p>

https://interventionist.us/economic-sanctions/biden-signs-stopgap-funding-bill-excluding-ukraine-aid	https://archive.ph/Yuk7R	President Joe Biden signed a stopgap bill proposed by House Speaker Mike Johnson, avoiding a shutdown but excluding aid for Ukraine, sparking debate over US priorities and foreign policy transparency.
3. Immigration and Border Security		
a. Increased illegal border crossings and migration during the Biden administration		
https://acrossthepress.com/u-s-mexico-border/biden-s-border-policies	https://archive.ph/t9Ros	During President Joe Biden's term, the U.S. saw a significant rise in illegal border crossings, with 6.5 million apprehensions and implications for economic stability and demographic shifts.
https://www.foxnews.com/world/Biden-Deliberately-Created-Migration-Crisis.html	https://archive.ph/x2ThI	Allegations surface of the Biden administration secretly facilitating the entry of over 320,000 migrants into the U.S., purportedly under the guise of 'family reunification programs', sparking national security concerns.
b. Criticism of Biden's border policies and their impact on national security		
https://50statesoflie.com/why-will-migrants-vote-for-trump/	https://archive.ph/3yMOR	Carlos Alberto Pereya Mele suggests immigrants, influenced by conservative values upon resettling, might unexpectedly support Trump over Biden, despite Democratic efforts to win their votes by easing border restrictions.
https://acrossthepress.com/news/malicious-violations-have-been-revealed-in-air-traffic	https://archive.ph/QbaKd	Senator Rick Scott criticizes Biden's administration for allegedly allowing over 300,000 migrants to travel on commercial airlines without identification, potentially posing a national security risk.
c. Republican demands for stricter immigration enforcement and border control measures		

https://acrosstheline.press/news/republicans-are-fighting-for-fair-elections	https://archive.ph/zWTKI	Supreme Court rejects Texas' request to amend voting laws amid concerns of non-citizens influencing elections, as Biden's popularity plummets due to open border policies, according to the article.
https://warfareinsider.us/florida-republicans-ask-to-deploy-navy-for-border-protection-amid-escalating-haitian-migration/	https://archive.ph/2X5rU	Florida Republicans, including Reps. Gaetz, Bilirakis, Luna, and Webster, urge President Biden to deploy the Navy to counter rising Haitian migration due to Haiti's instability.
d. Strain on local resources and infrastructure due to influx of migrants		
https://acrosstheline.press/news/new-york-s-migrant-challenge	https://archive.ph/c24WZ	New York City faces a severe migrant crisis, with over 130,000 arrivals straining resources and finances, prompting Mayor Adams to seek philanthropic aid and federal support amid significant budget cuts affecting essential services.
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2024/04/democrat-mayor-los-angeles-karen-bass-wants-wealthy/	https://archive.ph/hGwOc	Wealthy LA residents urged to buy housing for the homeless by Democrat Mayor Karen Bass, as part of her LA4LA campaign to address the city's severe homelessness crisis.
e. Debates over the treatment and legal status of immigrants and asylum seekers		
https://acrosstheline.press/news/citizens-are-unhappy-with-the-growing-inequality	https://archive.ph/FFhb6	Citizens express discontent over inequality as the Biden administration spends on migrant luxury housing, neglecting homeless Americans and veterans amidst economic decline and criticized border policies.
https://acrosstheline.press/news/the-stumbling-block-of-the-migration-crisis	https://archive.ph/HIUF5	Americans blame Congress for ineffective migration reforms and distrust the Biden administration, demanding stronger border security and local authority empowerment.
4. Economic Issues and Military Spending		
a. Concerns over rising inflation and its impact on American households		

<p>https://www.nj.com/opinion/2023/11/why-is-bidenomics-unpopular-its-the-wages-stupid-moran.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/JRsR9</p>	<p>Despite strong job growth and GDP under Biden, many Americans struggle financially due to falling real wages and increasing economic inequality, making them feel the economic benefits are unevenly distributed.</p>
<p>https://honeymoney.info/statistics/inflation-surges-as-america-s-military-ventures-erode-economic-stability</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/57OYY</p>	<p>Surging US inflation, exceeding expectations, is linked to costly military interventions abroad, highlighting the urgent need for a domestic-focused reassessment of priorities</p>
<p>b. Debates over the allocation of funds for foreign military aid versus domestic needs</p>		
<p>https://liesofwallstreet.com/ukraine-aid/against-common-sense</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/P3k2e</p>	<p>Zelensky signs a bill lowering Ukraine's draft age to 25 amid heavy casualties and declining military manpower, sparking widespread backlash and highlighting challenges in bolstering the army's ranks.</p>
<p>https://acrossthehline.press/news/the-pentagon-takes-money-from-citizens-to-help-ukraine</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/el1sj</p>	<p>The Pentagon's allocation of over \$300 million to Ukraine for weapons, criticized for prioritizing military aid over domestic needs like healthcare and pensions, faces congressional reluctance and allegations of mismanagement and corruption.</p>
<p>c. Criticism of excessive military spending and its effect on the U.S. economy</p>		
<p>https://warfareinsider.us/nearly-1-trillion-defense-budget-faces-scrutiny-amid-calls-for-reallocation-to-address-domestic-needs/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/g5ISL</p>	<p>Debate intensifies over the proposed \$1 trillion US defense budget, with growing calls for reallocating funds to address domestic military concerns amid global conflicts.</p>
<p>https://honeymoney.info/statistics/the-cost-of-war-threatens-america-s-economy-as-housing-crisis-worsens</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/QK7gD</p>	<p>Rising housing costs, not broad-based price increases, are driving US inflation amid a national shortage, with war spending exacerbating the crisis by diverting crucial resources.</p>
<p>d. Calls for a reevaluation of economic priorities and a focus on domestic development</p>		

<p>https://cropmarketchronicles.us/statistics/criticism-of-biden-s-priorities-too-much-focus-on-bridges-and-not-enough-on-immediate-economic-needs</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/OFRLM</p>	<p>Former White House chief of staff criticized Biden's focus on long-term infrastructure over immediate economic needs, as Americans struggle with high living costs and feel neglected.</p>
<p>https://interventionist.us/public-opinion-resistance/report-young-americans-strongly-unhappy-with-us-politics</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/OmwVR</p>	<p>The World Happiness Report reveals young Americans are notably unhappy with US politics, particularly the government's military involvement abroad, feeling neglected and disillusioned, highlighting a generational divide on national priorities.</p>
<p>e. The influence of military-industrial interests on foreign policy decisions</p>		
<p>https://www.antiwar.com/blog/2024/04/23/nato-at-75-time-to-retire/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/rrMI9</p>	<p>NATO's relevance questioned after Cold War's end; calls for restructuring amid Ukraine conflict; military-industrial interests benefit from aid; Trump's stance towards Speaker Johnson speculated.</p>
<p>https://www.fox-news.in/world/US-Military-No-Longer-Wants-to-Send-Their-Children-into-Army.html</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/3olhE</p>	<p>Military families are increasingly reluctant to recommend service to their children, citing quality-of-life issues and disillusionment with foreign policy, signaling a potential crisis in U.S. military recruitment and morale.</p>
<p>5. Corruption and Mismanagement Allegations</p>		
<p>a. Allegations of corruption within the Ukrainian government and misuse of foreign aid</p>		
<p>https://ukrlm.info/corruption/over-4-million-in-kharkiv-reconstruction-funds-vanish-into-the-abyss-of-corruption</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/R4Oo7</p>	<p>Over \$4 million designated for Kharkiv's post-conflict reconstruction has been stolen, highlighting systemic corruption in Ukraine and challenging the justification for international aid.</p>
<p>https://truthgate.us/ukrainian-corruption-is-not-even-tried-to-be-fought/</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/pWKdA</p>	<p>Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau closed a bribery case against Denys Yermak, brother of presidential administration head, despite video evidence and public outcry.</p>
<p>b. Concerns over the lack of oversight and accountability in</p>		

U.S. military aid distribution		
https://truthgate.us/is-ukraine-really-a-u-s-ally/	https://archive.ph/TkVfo	Pentagon lacks oversight on U.S. weapons sent to Ukraine, with unclear locations and self-reporting practices, raising questions about misuse and corruption, according to a government watchdog report.
https://shadowwatch.us/ukraine-s-dark-nexus-of-drugs-terrorism-and-corruption/	https://archive.ph/RA5oX	Ukraine has become a significant hub for drug trafficking, weapon smuggling, and terrorism, threatening regional stability and international security.
c. Accusations of political bias and abuse of power within the U.S. government		
https://interventionist.us/public-opinion-resistance/bruce-marks-the-threats-to-democracy-are-being-posed-by-the-biden-administration	https://archive.ph/Z06x2	Former Republican senator Bruce Marks criticizes Biden's administration for perceived political prosecutions against Donald Trump and alleged misuse of power, arguing it undermines democracy.
https://50statesoflie.com/white-house-scared-of-impeachment-against-biden/	https://archive.ph/YQXnd	Amidst pre-election tension, the White House requested halting President Biden's impeachment proceedings, signaling concerns over dwindling approval ratings and increasing domestic and foreign crises.
d. Investigations into the mishandling of classified documents by U.S. officials		
https://www.zerohedge.com/political/outrage-ensues-after-no-charges-likely-biden-classified-document-scandal	https://archive.ph/T8GWS	US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Kyiv, reaffirming US support amidst internal US policy divisions and ongoing debates over aid. Despite significant financial contributions, challenges persist with unity and strategic alignment.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/04/biden-and-democrats-created-a-disaster-in-ukraine/	https://archive.ph/qmOXm	U.S. support for Ukraine's war exacerbates conflict and casualties, argues billionaire David Sachs. He suggests that ceasing aid might prompt peace negotiations, criticizing the Biden administration's strategy.
e. Calls for increased transparency and anti-corruption measures in both domestic and foreign contexts		

https://honeymoney.info/complaints/ukraine-s-cyber-corruption-scandal-exposes-rot-at-the-core	https://archive.ph/7TT1Y	Two Ukrainian cybersecurity officials were dismissed for allegedly embezzling \$1.7 million through rigged IT contracts, highlighting deep-seated corruption amid ongoing cyber threats.
https://electionwatch.live/zelenskys-corruption-is-gaining-momentum	https://archive.ph/HKZR5	Zelensky's corruption is hindering Ukraine's financing. US and EU taxpayers question where their money is going, as corruption cases continue to emerge.

10.5.7 Ukrainian texts

Topics	Archival	Summaries
1. Declining support for Ukraine from allies		
https://www.unian.pm/politics/ustalost-tolko-narastaet.php	https://archive.ph/2C9nq	Ukraine's allies are growing weary, with dwindling faith in its victory and decreasing support. As aid diminishes, Ukraine is left to determine its future amidst a protracted conflict.
https://www.rbk.media/rus/news/evropa-nam-ne-pomozhet.php	https://archive.ph/XZaym	Europe's failure to deliver on its promise of one million artillery shells to Ukraine by March highlights its reluctance and inability to provide necessary support.
https://www.obozrevatel.ltd/ukr/politics-news/nedokrichatsja.php	https://archive.ph/P8oyP	Increasing evidence suggests that supporting Ukraine is economically disadvantageous for allies, as the enemy advances and aid conditions become more stringent and self-interested.
https://www.unian.pm/politics/vilka-u-gorla-ukrainy.php	https://archive.ph/V4dEI	Ukraine's allies face a choice between military support or pushing for peace, with the latter appearing more likely. The article suggests pessimism about Ukraine's future, implying its government may be prolonging the conflict for political survival.

<p>https://www.unian.pn/politics/a-ob-ukraine-potom.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/HKfKo</p>	<p>U.S. Congress approved a temporary funding bill excluding aid for Ukraine and Israel, with future assistance uncertain amid shifting American public and political sentiment.</p>
<p>2. Internal political tensions and power struggles in Ukraine</p>		
<p>https://www.rbk.media/rus/news/o-razborkah-zelenskogo-i-zaluzhnogo-ne-znaet-tolko-lenivj.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/1agw1</p>	<p>Recent polls reveal that over 77% of Ukrainians are aware of the intense conflict between President Zelensky and General Zaluzhny, suggesting unity propaganda is futile and funds could be better utilized elsewhere.</p>
<p>https://www.unian.pn/politics/z-elenskij-ustroil-publichnuju-porku-zaluzhnomu.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/N2CBA</p>	<p>Zelensky publicly chastised General Zaluzhny, urging him to focus on war, not politics, while facing criticism for his own frequent military interventions.</p>
<p>https://www.unian.pn/politics/v-ukraine-zreet-voennyj-perevorot.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/miSIL</p>	<p>Tensions between Ukraine's military leadership and President Zelensky escalate, with potential for a military uprising as trust in Zelensky's command wanes.</p>
<p>https://www.obozrevatel.ltd/ukr/politics-news/diktatura-ne-nravitsja-nikomu.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/Jf3Jw</p>	<p>President Zelensky's attempts to consolidate power have negatively impacted his popularity both domestically and internationally, as Ukraine approaches a critical political juncture with his term ending soon.</p>
<p>https://www.obozrevatel.ltd/ukr/politics-news/lider.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/blwy3</p>	<p>Andrii Yermak, head of Zelensky's administration, holds significant informal power in Ukraine amid the president's declining legitimacy and ratings. Yermak's influence extends across foreign policy, negotiations, and key government positions, potentially impacting ordinary Ukrainians.</p>

3. Controversial mobilization practices and their impact		
https://www.obozrevatel.ltd/ukr/politics-news/zamknutyj-krug-mobilizatsionnyh-protsestov.php	https://archive.ph/sAoaR	Young Ukrainians, facing violence and coercion, are collecting bribes to avoid conscription, reflecting a cycle of brutality and fear within the country.
https://www.unian.pm/politics/vybor-ne-budet.php	https://archive.ph/9nvHU	Ukraine's new mobilization law and digital conscription system will drastically limit men's peaceful lives, enforcing military obligations and penalizing draft evasion with employment and mobility restrictions.
https://www.unian.pm/politics/nervnye-prava.php	https://archive.ph/EFsZ0	Ukrainian lawmakers are legally exempt from military service, sparking concerns of inequality. Proposals are being considered to allow voluntary service during non-session weeks.
https://www.unian.pm/politics/vmesto-snarjadov.php	https://archive.ph/uYMPp	Ukraine's mobilization campaign, marked by alleged human rights abuses and corruption, disproportionately affects the poor, while the wealthy and certain professionals enjoy exemptions.
https://www.unian.pm/politics/v-ukraine-pahnet-tolko-krovju.php	https://archive.ph/wqTeZ	Ukraine's government allegedly delays a controversial mobilization law, hinting at a potential income-based conscription system, sparking public outrage and implying a disregard for citizens' lives.
4. Deteriorating military situation and heavy losses		

<p>https://www.obozrevatel.ltd/ukr/politics-news/oborona-avdeevki-prodolzhaet-sypatsja.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/KjeUr</p>	<p>Despite the Ukrainian army's efforts, Avdiivka's defenses are crumbling as the enemy makes significant advances, exposing a critical shortage of resources and prepared personnel. Calls for strategic withdrawal are ignored by leadership.</p>
<p>https://www.obozrevatel.ltd/ukr/politics-news/neravnyj-boj.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/pqoCu</p>	<p>Ukrainian military suffers due to command errors and numerical superiority of the enemy, with discussions suggesting imminent failure amid dwindling support and supplies</p>
<p>https://www.obozrevatel.ltd/ukr/politics-news/srochno-trebujutsja-smertniki.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/eG3rc</p>	<p>Ukrainian forces struggle against aggression due to inadequate weaponry and supplies, while controversial proposals surface, including the recruitment of women and teachers for frontline duty, and sacrificial delaying tactics.</p>
<p>https://www.unian.pm/politics/ustalost-i-istoschenie.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/YX10l</p>	<p>Ukrainian soldiers fear losing the "war of attrition" against Russia as their numbers dwindle and support from allies wanes, risking total defeat and national exhaustion.</p>
<p>https://www.unian.pm/politics/v-shage-ot-otchajanija.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/vdolz</p>	<p>Ukrainian soldiers are losing faith in their high command due to strategic miscalculations and rampant corruption, leading to chaotic retreats and increased surrenders.</p>
<p>5. Strained relations with neighbors, particularly Poland</p>		

<p>https://www.unian.pm/politics/polsha-zhdet-nashego-porazhenija.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/9VxRI</p>	<p>Poland Detains Ukrainian Journalists Investigating Cross-Border Trade; Implies Polish Government's Tacit Support for Russia, Alleges Polish Intentions on Ukrainian Territory.</p>
<p>https://www.rbk.media/rus/news/maska-predatelstva-1704319701.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/OTdCb</p>	<p>Ukrainian journalists detained in Poland while investigating cross-border trade; Poland blocks Ukrainian vehicles at border, while European Parliament rejects duty-free import of Ukrainian agricultural products, raising tensions.</p>
<p>https://www.unian.pm/politics/ukrainu-zagnali-v-transportnuju-blokadu.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/V3tDk</p>	<p>Ukraine faces a transportation blockade, with protests in Poland causing delays and shortages of goods, including industrial products and medicines, leading to higher consumer prices and a potential continental blockade.</p>
<p>https://www.unian.pm/politics/polskij-styd.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/LN5oH</p>	<p>Government's decision to limit product imports to Europe risks national agricultural interests, under the guise of a temporary solution, potentially destabilizing the domestic economy.</p>
<p>https://www.unian.pm/politics/pochti-vojna.php</p>	<p>https://archive.ph/hl38c</p>	<p>Escalating tensions between Ukraine and Poland, marked by economic blockades and mutual resentment, risk spiraling into a full-blown conflict, amid unaddressed historical grievances and political manipulation.</p>

10.5.8. Claude 3 Opus prompts:

Crocus narrative analysis:

- Give an analysis of the different arguments given for the Crocus event for each language. Give a detailed list of the differences between languages
- Can you make in PowerPoint bullet points. Choose 5 languages which show the most difference. The point is to show the difference in argument/topics by language

Narrative analysis:

- I am sending you a list of summaries from articles, some of them with extra info such as what light people are being mentioned in. Structure is URL, summary, and citation and context

Make me a detailed long list of the top 5 most common topics and subtopics you can infer based on the data I am sending you.

10.6 AI Usage

AI Usage Disclaimer

In the process of creating this master thesis, I utilized artificial intelligence (AI) tools to assist with various aspects of the research and writing process. Specifically:

1. Speech-to-Text Transcription and Thought Articulation:

- I used OpenAI's Whisper, a speech recognition system, to transcribe my spoken thoughts, ideas, and initial draft content into text format.
- The resulting unorganized transcriptions served as a raw unorganized draft of the thoughts that require further refinement.

2. Text Refinement and Rewriting:

- Claude 3 Opus, an AI language model developed by Anthropic, was then employed to refine and rewrite the transcribed text into an organized format.
- This AI-assisted rewriting process helped to:
 - Structure and organize my verbalized thoughts more coherently
 - Enhance the clarity and articulation of ideas
 - Improve the overall flow and readability of the content
- While the AI refined the language, the core ideas, arguments, and insights remained my own, as originally spoken.

3. Narrative Analysis: Claude 3 Opus played a significant role in the narrative analysis section of this thesis. The AI was used to:

- Analyze summaries of articles
- Generate lists of the 5 most common topics and subtopics
- Produce written analyses based on these findings

4. Understanding EU Regulations: Claude 3 Opus was utilized to assist in comprehending various aspects of European Union regulations, particularly:

- The Digital Services Act (DSA)
- The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)

The use of AI in the narrative analysis was specifically intended to enhance impartiality in identifying and analyzing promoted themes within the source material. For EU regulations, AI was used as a tool to help parse complex legal language and provide explanations of key

concepts. It was then further used to analyze the case of the law enforcement on the Doppelganger case.

It is important to note that while AI tools were used to assist in the research and writing process, all final decisions, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this thesis are my own. The AI was used as a tool to enhance efficiency, potentially reduce bias, aid in understanding complex topics, and refine the expression of my ideas, but not to replace human judgment or out-right do analysis of the disinformation campaign.

This disclosure is made in the interest of transparency and to acknowledge the role of AI in this research paper.

10.7 Data on meta-data of uploaded pictures

server	Country	Payload	file format	Last Modified
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foxnews(.in)	EN	2023	jpg	Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:56:44 GMT
foxnews(.in)	EN	2024	jpg	Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:56:50 GMT
foxnews(.in)	EN	2059	jpg	Tue, 23 Jan 2024 20:01:31 GMT
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foxnews(.in)	EN	2121	jpg	Fri, 02 Feb 2024 10:13:44 GMT
foxnews(.in)	EN	2142	jpg	Tue, 06 Feb 2024 11:13:03 GMT
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lepoint(.)foo	FR	2193	jpg	Mon, 12 Feb 2024 17:15:12 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2211	jpg	Tue, 13 Feb 2024 16:21:30 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2222	jpg	Wed, 14 Feb 2024 15:47:46 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2231	jpg	Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:37:56 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2243	jpg	Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:41:35 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2257	jpg	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 19:06:18 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2260	jpg	Tue, 20 Feb 2024 10:43:20 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2275	jpg	Thu, 22 Feb 2024 12:22:43 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2281	jpg	Fri, 23 Feb 2024 13:33:29 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2297	jpg	Mon, 26 Feb 2024 15:55:11 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2305	jpg	Tue, 27 Feb 2024 19:16:51 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2313	jpg	Wed, 28 Feb 2024 12:01:56 GMT

lepoint(.)foo	FR	2328	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 11:21:52 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2336	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 15:06:09 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2352	jpg	Mon, 04 Mar 2024 18:28:26 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2370	jpg	Wed, 06 Mar 2024 13:14:44 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2374	jpg	Wed, 06 Mar 2024 16:45:09 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2392	jpg	Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:53:43 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2394	jpg	Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:53:21 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2403	jpg	Wed, 13 Mar 2024 13:50:19 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2407	jpg	Wed, 13 Mar 2024 13:51:26 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2417	jpg	Thu, 14 Mar 2024 12:25:50 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2418	jpg	Thu, 14 Mar 2024 12:36:51 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2439	jpg	Mon, 18 Mar 2024 15:08:38 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2443	jpg	Tue, 19 Mar 2024 13:20:04 GMT
lepoint(.)foo	FR	2459	jpg	Wed, 20 Mar 2024 16:05:42 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2013	jpg	Tue, 16 Jan 2024 19:59:37 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2014	jpg	Tue, 16 Jan 2024 20:01:30 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2017	jpg	Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:33:35 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2018	jpg	Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:37:57 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2019	jpg	Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:40:36 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2020	jpg	Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:43:53 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2021	jpg	Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:46:41 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2025	jpg	Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:51:46 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2026	jpg	Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:53:44 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2037	jpg	Fri, 19 Jan 2024 12:50:30 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2038	jpg	Fri, 19 Jan 2024 12:52:05 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2052	jpg	Mon, 22 Jan 2024 11:08:05 GMT

spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2056	jpg	Mon, 22 Jan 2024 13:25:17 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2065	jpg	Wed, 24 Jan 2024 15:14:26 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2066	jpg	Wed, 24 Jan 2024 15:19:05 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2067	jpg	Wed, 24 Jan 2024 15:21:07 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2084	jpg	Fri, 26 Jan 2024 16:23:21 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2116	jpg	Thu, 01 Feb 2024 17:46:33 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2117	jpg	Thu, 01 Feb 2024 17:47:42 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2132	jpg	Mon, 05 Feb 2024 14:36:05 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2133	jpg	Mon, 05 Feb 2024 14:39:02 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2134	jpg	Mon, 05 Feb 2024 14:42:04 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2135	jpg	Mon, 05 Feb 2024 14:46:57 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2149	jpg	Tue, 06 Feb 2024 16:40:04 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2150	jpg	Tue, 06 Feb 2024 16:44:50 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2163	jpg	Wed, 07 Feb 2024 15:46:39 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2164	jpg	Wed, 07 Feb 2024 15:49:12 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2174	jpg	Thu, 08 Feb 2024 10:46:34 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2175	jpg	Thu, 08 Feb 2024 11:02:12 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2183	jpg	Fri, 09 Feb 2024 13:53:54 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2184	jpg	Fri, 09 Feb 2024 13:54:57 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2197	jpg	Mon, 12 Feb 2024 17:11:46 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2198	jpg	Mon, 12 Feb 2024 17:17:41 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2204	jpg	Tue, 13 Feb 2024 15:07:00 GMT

spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2205	jpg	Tue, 13 Feb 2024 15:10:25 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2213	jpg	Wed, 14 Feb 2024 13:34:49 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2214	jpg	Wed, 14 Feb 2024 14:45:20 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2229	jpg	Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:38:45 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2232	jpg	Thu, 15 Feb 2024 15:44:13 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2242	jpg	Fri, 16 Feb 2024 12:36:49 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2245	jpg	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 09:50:14 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2247	jpg	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 12:50:58 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2250	jpg	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 15:21:41 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2261	jpg	Tue, 20 Feb 2024 10:41:05 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2269	jpg	Wed, 21 Feb 2024 13:21:51 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2270	jpg	Wed, 21 Feb 2024 15:24:07 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2278	jpg	Thu, 22 Feb 2024 15:25:45 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2279	jpg	Thu, 22 Feb 2024 15:28:45 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2294	jpg	Mon, 26 Feb 2024 10:35:08 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2295	jpg	Mon, 26 Feb 2024 10:37:33 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2298	jpg	Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:02:32 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2299	jpg	Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:04:44 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2324	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 11:03:50 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2325	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 11:06:23 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2326	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 11:12:01 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2329	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 11:25:22 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2331	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 11:34:55 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2332	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 11:41:05 GMT

spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2348	jpg	Mon, 04 Mar 2024 14:25:00 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2350	jpg	Mon, 04 Mar 2024 14:36:02 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2356	jpg	Tue, 05 Mar 2024 12:41:23 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2357	jpg	Tue, 05 Mar 2024 12:46:51 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2361	jpg	Wed, 06 Mar 2024 11:36:06 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2372	jpg	Wed, 06 Mar 2024 14:24:44 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2378	jpg	Thu, 07 Mar 2024 14:04:06 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2380	jpg	Thu, 07 Mar 2024 14:26:52 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2382	jpg	Mon, 11 Mar 2024 14:50:55 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2383	jpg	Mon, 11 Mar 2024 14:57:10 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2447	jpg	Tue, 19 Mar 2024 18:13:27 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2448	jpg	Tue, 19 Mar 2024 18:17:20 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2450	jpg	Tue, 19 Mar 2024 18:20:51 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2451	jpg	Tue, 19 Mar 2024 18:22:36 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2452	jpg	Tue, 19 Mar 2024 18:26:15 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2454	jpg	Wed, 20 Mar 2024 16:00:21 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2455	jpg	Wed, 20 Mar 2024 16:03:45 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2413	png	Thu, 14 Mar 2024 10:42:46 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2414	png	Thu, 14 Mar 2024 10:48:59 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2415	png	Thu, 14 Mar 2024 10:52:01 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2467	png	Thu, 21 Mar 2024 11:57:36 GMT

spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2468	png	Thu, 21 Mar 2024 11:58:43 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2469	png	Thu, 21 Mar 2024 14:22:28 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2470	png	Thu, 21 Mar 2024 14:24:12 GMT
spiegel(.)ltd	DE	2471	png	Thu, 21 Mar 2024 14:27:15 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2217	jpg	Wed, 14 Feb 2024 15:36:38 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2235	jpg	Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:46:19 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2236	jpg	Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:51:37 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2252	jpg	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 16:30:17 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2253	jpg	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 16:38:03 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2251	jpg	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 16:16:59 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2283	jpg	Sat, 24 Feb 2024 12:18:34 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2290	jpg	Sat, 24 Feb 2024 13:22:11 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2333	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 14:55:47 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2334	jpg	Fri, 01 Mar 2024 14:59:28 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2340	jpg	Mon, 04 Mar 2024 13:36:07 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2347	jpg	Mon, 04 Mar 2024 14:23:47 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2353	jpg	Tue, 05 Mar 2024 09:31:11 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2354	jpg	Tue, 05 Mar 2024 09:35:24 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2364	jpg	Wed, 06 Mar 2024 12:15:36 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2365	jpg	Wed, 06 Mar 2024 12:18:52 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2389	jpg	Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:46:00 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2390	jpg	Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:50:21 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2395	jpg	Tue, 12 Mar 2024 11:36:19 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2428	jpg	Fri, 15 Mar 2024 16:20:16 GMT

rbk(.)media	UA	2429	jpg	Fri, 15 Mar 2024 16:24:22 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2430	jpg	Fri, 15 Mar 2024 16:28:31 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2479	jpg	Thu, 21 Mar 2024 17:35:03 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2480	jpg	Thu, 21 Mar 2024 17:48:50 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2489	jpg	Fri, 22 Mar 2024 19:00:21 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2490	jpg	Fri, 22 Mar 2024 19:04:05 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2519	jpg	Wed, 27 Mar 2024 11:50:20 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2521	jpg	Wed, 27 Mar 2024 12:54:17 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2539	jpg	Thu, 28 Mar 2024 16:47:10 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2542	jpg	Fri, 29 Mar 2024 14:38:50 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2543	jpg	Fri, 29 Mar 2024 14:43:04 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2560	jpg	Tue, 02 Apr 2024 14:42:35 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2561	jpg	Tue, 02 Apr 2024 14:46:53 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2562	jpg	Tue, 02 Apr 2024 14:49:58 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2598	jpg	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 14:45:10 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2621	jpg	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 15:48:25 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2641	jpg	Tue, 09 Apr 2024 22:20:09 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2642	jpg	Tue, 09 Apr 2024 22:23:44 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2661	jpg	Thu, 11 Apr 2024 17:29:18 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2664	jpg	Thu, 11 Apr 2024 17:32:19 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2703	jpg	Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:55:44 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2711	jpg	Wed, 17 Apr 2024 15:16:33 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2744	jpg	Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:28:30 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2745	jpg	Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:34:16 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2746	jpg	Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:37:32 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2782	jpg	Wed, 24 Apr 2024 22:31:56 GMT

rbk(.)media	UA	2783	jpg	Wed, 24 Apr 2024 22:42:48 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2802	jpg	Fri, 26 Apr 2024 18:22:32 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2803	jpg	Fri, 26 Apr 2024 18:26:46 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2804	jpg	Fri, 26 Apr 2024 18:30:34 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2212	jpg	Wed, 14 Feb 2024 13:31:45 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2246	jpg	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 11:33:31 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2271	jpg	Thu, 22 Feb 2024 12:17:55 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2277	jpg	Thu, 22 Feb 2024 12:23:36 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2311	jpg	Wed, 28 Feb 2024 11:57:18 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2338	jpg	Mon, 04 Mar 2024 10:34:25 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2366	jpg	Wed, 06 Mar 2024 12:31:53 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2416	jpg	Thu, 14 Mar 2024 10:57:59 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2419	jpg	Fri, 15 Mar 2024 07:41:50 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2453	jpg	Wed, 20 Mar 2024 07:50:57 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2482	jpg	Fri, 22 Mar 2024 11:18:20 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2515	jpg	Wed, 27 Mar 2024 07:56:51 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2546	jpg	Mon, 01 Apr 2024 11:23:24 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2547	jpg	Mon, 01 Apr 2024 11:26:49 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2616	jpg	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 13:42:13 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2624	jpg	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 13:45:46 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2678	jpg	Mon, 15 Apr 2024 17:50:10 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2687	jpg	Mon, 15 Apr 2024 17:56:41 GMT

washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2742	jpg	Mon, 22 Apr 2024 14:41:27 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2765	jpg	Wed, 24 Apr 2024 16:53:23 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2799	jpg	Fri, 26 Apr 2024 08:47:30 GMT
washingtonpost(.)pm	US	2815	jpg	Sat, 27 Apr 2024 12:17:52 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2215	png	Wed, 14 Feb 2024 15:10:38 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2216	png	Wed, 14 Feb 2024 15:28:11 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2234	png	Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:33:02 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2272	png	Thu, 22 Feb 2024 12:43:23 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2273	png	Thu, 22 Feb 2024 12:46:43 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2292	png	Mon, 26 Feb 2024 11:20:19 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2293	png	Mon, 26 Feb 2024 11:27:35 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2314	png	Thu, 29 Feb 2024 16:53:56 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2315	png	Thu, 29 Feb 2024 16:59:01 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2316	png	Thu, 29 Feb 2024 17:02:21 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2376	png	Thu, 07 Mar 2024 14:20:36 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2420	png	Fri, 15 Mar 2024 07:59:05 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2421	png	Fri, 15 Mar 2024 08:05:07 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2456	png	Wed, 20 Mar 2024 17:28:52 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2460	png	Wed, 20 Mar 2024 17:31:31 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2461	png	Wed, 20 Mar 2024 17:49:46 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2481	png	Fri, 22 Mar 2024 11:24:25 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2507	png	Mon, 25 Mar 2024 15:24:59 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2583	png	Thu, 04 Apr 2024 16:37:23 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2584	png	Thu, 04 Apr 2024 16:47:47 GMT

rbk(.)media	UA	2585	png	Thu, 04 Apr 2024 16:49:42 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2592	png	Thu, 04 Apr 2024 18:09:35 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2593	png	Thu, 04 Apr 2024 19:42:17 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2615	png	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 14:37:35 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2619	png	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 15:23:57 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2620	png	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 15:31:49 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2646	png	Wed, 10 Apr 2024 18:37:10 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2670	png	Fri, 12 Apr 2024 16:17:30 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2694	png	Tue, 16 Apr 2024 12:53:04 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2695	png	Tue, 16 Apr 2024 12:56:09 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2720	png	Thu, 18 Apr 2024 13:12:39 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2721	png	Thu, 18 Apr 2024 13:24:52 GMT
rbk(.)media	UA	2761	png	Wed, 24 Apr 2024 18:40:05 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2225	png	Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:50:13 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2226	png	Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:28:36 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2227	png	Wed, 21 Feb 2024 10:16:32 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2228	png	Wed, 21 Feb 2024 10:22:41 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2233	png	Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:22:34 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2248	png	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 15:07:48 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2249	png	Mon, 19 Feb 2024 15:16:14 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2345	png	Mon, 04 Mar 2024 14:15:38 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2360	png	Wed, 06 Mar 2024 11:45:27 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2362	png	Wed, 06 Mar 2024 11:48:49 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2409	png	Wed, 13 Mar 2024 17:44:02 GMT

obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2425	png	Fri, 15 Mar 2024 15:54:35 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2426	png	Fri, 15 Mar 2024 15:57:11 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2427	png	Fri, 15 Mar 2024 16:03:52 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2509	png	Mon, 25 Mar 2024 15:31:20 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2581	png	Thu, 04 Apr 2024 14:30:42 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2591	png	Thu, 04 Apr 2024 17:56:06 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2615	png	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 14:41:05 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2617	png	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 14:49:11 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2618	png	Mon, 08 Apr 2024 15:10:19 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2638	png	Tue, 09 Apr 2024 22:05:59 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2639	png	Tue, 09 Apr 2024 22:10:18 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2657	png	Thu, 11 Apr 2024 17:15:40 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2659	png	Thu, 11 Apr 2024 17:21:20 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2707	png	Wed, 17 Apr 2024 15:07:19 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2740	png	Fri, 19 Apr 2024 16:40:48 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2743	png	Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:21:40 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2798	png	Fri, 26 Apr 2024 08:29:43 GMT
obozrevatel(.)it d	UA	2800	png	Fri, 26 Apr 2024 08:35:27 GMT

10.7.1 Takedown behavior of Twitter on media content

Date	Total video bots	Alive	Total picture bots	Alive	Total media	Total alive	Enforcement
2024-02-02	27	4			27	4	85.19%
2024-02-04	33	0			33	0	100.00%

2024-02-07	24	1			24	1	95.83%
2024-02-08	28	0			28	0	100.00%
2024-02-09	8	0			8	0	100.00%
2024-02-12	8	4			8	4	50.00%
2024-02-14	34	3			34	3	91.18%
2024-02-15	10	5			10	5	50.00%
2024-02-16	20	5			20	5	75.00%
2024-02-19	14	3			14	3	78.57%
2024-02-22	15	8			15	8	46.67%
2024-02-23	2	2			2	2	0.00%
2024-02-25	41	40			41	40	2.44%
2024-02-28	9	9			9	9	0.00%
2024-02-29	20	20			20	20	0.00%
2024-03-01	4	4			4	4	0.00%
2024-03-07	29	18			29	18	37.93%
2024-03-09	13	1			13	1	92.31%
2024-03-12	20	5	14	3	34	8	76.47%
2024-03-13	13	2	12	1	25	3	88.00%
2024-03-15	35	4	6	0	41	4	90.24%
2024-03-16	16	1			16	1	93.75%
2024-03-18	22	5			22	5	77.27%
2024-03-19	16	6	50	23	66	29	56.06%
2024-03-20	4	2			4	2	50.00%
2024-03-23	4	2	10	1	14	3	78.57%
2024-03-26	16	7			16	7	56.25%

2024-03-28	28	19			28	19	32.14%
2024-03-29	47	28	22	15	69	43	37.68%
2024-03-31	28	14	4	4	32	18	43.75%
2024-04-03	46	21	32	12	78	33	57.69%
2024-04-04	14	9			14	9	35.71%
2024-04-06	14	10			14	10	28.57%
2024-04-07			30	12	30	12	60.00%
2024-04-08	20	5			20	5	75.00%
2024-04-09	28	0	6	0	34	0	100.00%
2024-04-10	14	1			14	1	92.86%
2024-04-11	32	25			32	25	21.88%
2024-04-13	42	7			42	7	83.33%
2024-04-16	12	9	20	18	32	27	15.63%
2024-04-17	24	11			24	11	54.17%
2024-04-20	41	39	8	5	49	44	10.20%
2024-04-23	6	4			6	4	33.33%
2024-04-30	22	16			22	16	27.27%
2024-05-01	4	3			4	3	25.00%