

Colophon

Bachelor thesis in completion of the bachelor public administration at the faculty Management and Governance of the University of Twente.

Title:

The Origins of Terrorism: a comparison between the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands

Supervisors:

dr. Hoogenboom, M.J.M.

dr. De Vries, M.S.

Date:

September 2007

Author:

Chris Jan Geugies

Pathmossingel 174

7513 CM Enschede

(t) 06-23683567

(e) c.j.geugies@student.utwente.nl

Student number: 0091286

Preface

Terrorism is by many considered as the greatest challenge of the present-day world. I share this view. In order to contribute to the contemporary debate on terrorism, I made a comparative research, which focuses on the anti-terrorism strategies of the United States of America and the Netherlands. This research has been conducted as part of my bachelor education in public administration at the University of Twente, and is carried out in the period between June and September 2007.

Conducting research is to a large extent a lonely business. There are nevertheless some people that sincerely helped in improving the quality of this research. I would therefore like to thank Leonie Geut and Elleke Bal for their suggestions, corrections and, more in general, for their motivating support. Furthermore, I am grateful to my supervisors, Marscha de Vries and Marcel Hoogenboom, for their comments, remarks and constructive critique.

Chris Jan Geugies

Enschede, September 2007

Summary

Introduction

On the 11th of September 2001, when two airplanes crashed in the American World Trade Centre, everyone became aware of what will be the central theme of this research: terrorism. This event made politicians aware that action was required in order to prevent similar events. As a result, fighting terrorism was made top priority. Numerous policies have been taken in order to stop the terrorist threat, both in international and in domestic perspective. By means of this research, I investigated the international anti-terrorism strategies of both the Netherlands and the USA. Reason for doing so concerns the observation that both countries seem to approach terrorism in a different way. That is, in fighting terrorism, the Netherlands appears to adopt a preventive approach by focusing at addressing the causes of terrorism, whereas the USA seems more concerned with fighting the manifestation of terrorism itself (repressive). This research' objective is to investigate if a different view these countries have on the origins of terrorism could be at the basis of such a difference. By investigating this, I made use of the following research question: *What are the differences and similarities between the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands concerning the fight against international jihadist terrorism and to what extent are those strategies of both countries based on different analyses of the origins of terrorism?*

In order to answer the main question, I divided this research in four parts. Chapter 2 dealt with the meaning of terrorism. By presenting a definition of terrorism, and by distinguishing between different types of it, I was able to focus on a specific kind of terrorism, and accordingly able to narrow my research. The next chapter dealt with a theoretical exploration of the origins of terrorism. By investigating existing research, I made an inventory of the available literature dealing with causes leading up to terrorism. The following two chapters dealt with the investigation of the measures proposed in the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA (Chapter 4) and the Netherlands (Chapter 5).

Definition

In Chapter 2, I discussed the definition of terrorism, thereby discriminating two core concepts: its psychological effect of fear (1) and its focus on political objectives (2). Furthermore, I identified the concept of terrorism in two ways. Firstly, I made a distinction between old- and new-style terrorism. The latter style has three characterising aspects: a global reach, ruthless ways of violence, and a network structure. The second way in which I defined terrorism was by identifying several kinds of it, including religious terrorism. I drove that distinction further by focusing on jihadist terrorism. This type of terrorism refers to 'jihad', which is Arabic for 'fight' or 'struggle'. Jihadistic terrorists' ultimate goal is to establish a society which is the reflection of what the original sources of Islam

prescribe. In short, this chapter provided the opportunity to narrow my study by distinguishing new-style jihadist terrorism as the focus of research.

Conceptual model

Chapter 3, named 'the origins of jihadist terrorism', dealt, as its title reveals, with those factors and conditions that cause terrorism. Such was considered necessary because it would give structure to the following parts of research. This chapter was divided in two parts. Firstly, I made an inventory of the literature that is available on the origins of terrorism. Researchers have presented divergent factors that in a way explain the emergence of terrorism. Such factors could either be considered as structural (prime movers) or as facilitating. This inventory however proved to be of inadequate utility, because the factors could not be regarded sufficiently distinctive. Therefore, I restructured these factors, thereby building a conceptual model in which I identified distinguishable and comparable causes of terrorism. The purpose of the model is by no means to present a definitive model. Instead, I merely created a reproduction of existing academic research, modified in a way that it fits the purpose of this study: providing structure to the investigation of the American and Dutch anti-terrorism strategies.

The conceptual model as presented in Chapter 3 consists of three phases. The first phase deals with structural underlying conditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. These conditions can in turn be roughly divided in three different clusters. The economic cluster is composed of two factors: 'absolute poverty' and 'relative poverty'. The former concerns situations of dependency in which people are increasingly susceptible to the recruitment of terrorist groups, because such groups can for example provide stable living. Relative poverty is about the economic equality between groups of people. Economic inequality can contribute to people's anger and frustration because they perceive their unequal situation as increasingly unacceptable. The political cluster accommodates three origins of terrorism: 'political voice', 'political oppression', and 'dissimilarity of power'. Political voice is about the existing democratic opportunities people get offered, i.e. the extent to which people are able to express themselves politically. Ability of expression generates political relief, and induces the formation of responsive governments which are likely to produce desirable social outcomes. In that way, the need to reach for violent methods in order to get influence decreases. The second factor of the political cluster, political oppression, concerns the relationship between the individuals (or certain groups) and the government. In situations where people cannot live their lives in freedom because of constant interference of the state, to these people, terrorist methods may seem the only way to change their situation. The third factor of this clusters is called dissimilarity of power. This factor concerns situations of political, economic, or cultural dominance that could lead people to perceive themselves as increasingly marginalised. In unbalanced situations, when a certain group is able of making decisions by its own at the cost of others, such could lead people, when other options are absent, to

turn to violent methods. The social cluster is the final one, and is composed by two factors: 'education' and the 'diminishment of traditional social patterns'. Education explains the emergence of terrorism in two ways. It is first to be considered as an underlying cause contributing to absolute poverty, because insufficient education result in a lack of practical skills, often necessary to guarantee economic subsistence. Furthermore, the factor education can strengthen the relationship between relative poverty and terrorism. After all, those that have followed decent specific education are more likely to have greater prospects of their future. If those people nevertheless have to face a situation of inequality, this is to be considered as intensifying the relationship between relative poverty and terrorism.

In the second phase I elaborated on the process of radicalisation, i.e. the process in which people become increasingly prepared to apply terrorist methods. Three (interconnected) factors can be distinguished in this phase: 'individual radicalisation', 'alternative organisations', and 'terrorist organisation'. To begin with the first factor, there are roughly two ways in which radical Islam channels the process of individual radicalisation. Firstly, researchers have stressed that radical Islam can provide meaning to one's life. Radical Islam for example provides the idea that one can find its identity in 'pure Islam', by living like 'pure Muslims', according to outlined prescriptions. Subsequently, researchers have identified a second way in which radical Islam channels individual radicalisation. Radical Islam – and radical ideologies in general – can seriously lower the bar for turning to violent measures because it can provide religious justification, legitimisation and glorification. People who have been fully radicalised, and consider violent methods as completely legitimised and are subsequently willing to commit terrorist attacks, are likely to organise by establishing organisations with kindred persons, or to join already existing groups which apply terrorist methods. The third and final factor of this phase concerns alternative organisation that can play an important role in encouraging and stimulating people to become radicalised. An example of such an organisation would be groups providing aid as explained when I discussed absolute poverty.

The third and final phase concerns the causes that make it likely that a terrorist attack will actually occur, i.e. factors that facilitate terrorism. We distinguished between four factor, including state sponsorship. Support of states can take several forms, such as providing financial means and safe havens.

Conclusions

Chapters 4 and 5 dealt with the actual investigation of the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands. In the comparing sixth and final chapter, I concluded which differences and similarities between both countries' strategies exists and to what extent a different analyses of the origins of terrorism underlie these strategies. I made this comparison on the basis of the three phases as distinguished in the conceptual model. The Dutch government recognises the majority

of origins as distinguished in phase 1 of this model. According to the Netherlands, factors as political voice, oppression, and a dissimilarity of power, relative poverty, absolute poverty, and the diminishment of traditional social patterns are all likely to cause terrorism. The Dutch recognition of this comprehensive set of origins of terrorism underlie the broad range of measures the Netherlands proposes for stopping the next generation of terrorist from emerging (prevention). In its strategy, the Netherlands proposes many measures in different fields to prevent future terrorism, such as promoting good governance, human rights, democracy, economic prosperity, inter-cultural dialogue, long-term integration, and non-discrimination. In short, at the basis of the Dutch anti-terrorism strategy lie factors of all three clusters – political, economic, and social – of the conceptual model. The USA does not identify a similar comprehensive set of origins of terrorism. The Bush Administration solely emphasises the political cluster, and political voice in particular, of the conceptual model. According to the Bush Administration, a lack of political voice, that is, the inability of political expression, is the most important factor in explaining terrorism. This view is at the basis of the actual measures the USA proposes in its anti-terrorism strategy: to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging, the Bush Administration solely stresses the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy. So, in short, whereas all three clusters are at the basis of the Dutch broad range of preventing measures, the USA solely recognises factors of the political cluster as origins of terrorism, and has accordingly promoted the advancement of effective democracy as the preventing strategy only.

Similar to the comparison of phase 1, when one compares the USA and the Netherlands on the second phase, some remarkable differences emerge. According to the Netherlands, recognising the process of radicalisation is of vital importance in order to understand the emergence of terrorism. The Dutch government therefore greatly emphasises the factor ‘individual radicalisation’ as distinguished in the conceptual model. This specific analysis of the process of radicalisation is likely to be at the basis of certain particular anti-terrorism measures as the Netherlands proposes in its strategy. The Dutch government for example stresses that non-discrimination and long-term integration measures are of importance, because that would prevent certain people from alienating from society, which in turn makes it less likely that those people radicalise. By contrast, the USA does not consider the process of radicalisation to be of importance. That is, in its strategy, the Bush Administration does not give evidence of situations in which one could become increasingly convinced and prepared to use terrorist methods.

The USA does however put forward two other origins of terrorism, factors that deviate from the conceptual model as presented in Chapter 3. The first factor concerns the fact that the anti-terrorism strategy of the USA is largely based on a clear good-wrong perspective. In that context, the Bush Administration considers ‘evil’ as a factor that explains the emergence of terrorism. This idea of ‘evil’ as an origin of terrorism seems to underlie USA’s strategy for fighting terrorism significantly.

By recognising evil as a cause of terrorism, the USA seems to embrace the idea that the only way to evil (terrorism) is by eliminating it, i.e. by conducting harsh repressive measures. The second factor that deviates from the conceptual model concerns the sponsorship of states. Although researchers generally consider 'state sponsorship' as a factor that facilitates terrorism, the USA sees it as a more significant origin of terrorism. In fact, the USA seems to consider state sponsorship of such importance, that it would not only make the occurrence of a potential terrorist attack more likely, but that it is a structural factor of terrorism as well, conducive to the organisation of terrorist groups as such. This particular view towards state sponsorship underlies certain specific measures the USA proposes in its anti-terrorism strategy, such as disrupting financial support and safe havens to terrorists, significantly.

All in all, I can conclude that the Netherlands and the USA both propose different measures in their anti-terrorism strategies and present a different view on the origins of terrorism that is at the basis of those strategies.

Table of contents

Preface		p. 2
Summary		p. 3
Chapter 1	Introduction	p. 10
	1.1 Background	p. 10
	1.2 Jihadistic terrorism	p. 10
	1.3 Rationale for doing this research	p. 11
	1.4 Definition of the problem	p. 12
	1.5 Research questions	p. 12
	1.6 Structure of research	p. 13
	1.7 Methodology	p. 13
Chapter 2	Terrorism defined	p. 15
	2.1 Two core concepts	p. 15
	2.2 New-style jihadist terrorism	p. 16
	2.3 Conclusion	p. 19
Chapter 3	The origins of jihadist terrorism	p. 20
	3.1 Introduction	p. 20
	3.2 General remarks	p. 20
	3.3 Exploration of the origins of terrorism	p. 21
	3.4 Conceptual model	p. 30
	3.5 Conclusion	p. 39
	3.6 Closing off	p. 39
Chapter 4	The USA	p. 41
	4.1 Introduction	p. 41
	4.2 What is the USA fighting?	p. 41
	4.3 USA's strategy: two different battles	p. 42
	4.4 USA's analysis: the origins of terrorism	p. 47
	4.5 Translation to conceptual model	p. 52
	4.6 Conclusion	p. 57
Chapter 5	The Netherlands	p. 59
	5.1 Introduction	p. 59

	5.2 What is the Netherlands fighting?	p. 59
	5.3 The Dutch strategy: a four pillar approach	p. 61
	5.4 The Dutch analysis: the origins of terrorism	p. 64
	5.5 Translation to the conceptual model	p. 69
	5.6 Conclusion	p. 75
Chapter 6	Conclusions	p. 77
	6.1 Recall	p. 77
	6.2 Comparison	p. 78
	6.3 To conclude	p. 82
Epilogue		p. 83
Literature		p. 84
Appendixes		p. 87

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

On the 11th of September 2001, when two airplanes crashed in the American World Trade Centre, everyone became aware of what will be the central theme of this research: terrorism. Since then, the world has experienced more terrorist events. An attack in Bali killed over 200 people, bombs on a train in Madrid had approximately the same effect, and in London 52 people died because of explosions that took place in underground trains.¹ Some authors said that everything has changed since the ‘outbreak of terrorism’. In this context, Kegley states that the primary product of 9/11 is the generation of fear: ‘Terrorism was no longer a marginal problem, a nuisance in other countries to be watched on the evening news. It had become a sadistic assault on the principles a political culture of the United States and its allies – on their very way of life’.² As a response, terrorism was raised to the top of the political agenda. Western states, the United States being the most notorious, have declared fighting terrorism as their primary objective. Both in international and domestic perspective, fighting the dangerous threat that terrorism poses has become top priority.

1.2 Jihadistic terrorism

Before I introduce the main questions of this research, it is necessary to define the concept terrorism first. That is, 9/11 indeed raised the awareness about terrorism, it however did so in a rather narrow manner. Nowadays, it seems that terrorism is equated with Islamic violence, and Al Qaeda in particular. Terrorism is however a broad concept that has its origins in the French Revolution.³ Therefore, terrorism is not a phenomenon of recent years and is certainly not exclusively related to Islam. Schmid’s typology of terrorism illustrates its broad character. He distinguishes between five types of terrorism: social-revolutionary terrorism (left-wing), right-wing and racist terrorism, single-issue terrorism, nationalist and separatist terrorism (including ethnic terrorism), and finally, religious terrorism.⁴ Within this study, I will focus on the latter: religious terrorism. Reason for doing so lies partly in the fact that religious terrorism is recently growing: ‘In the years after 1990, communalism – especially based in religion – reappeared as a major source of dissident terrorism’.⁵ Within this investigation, I will even go one step further by focusing on a particular kind of religious terrorism: jihadist terrorism, i.e. terrorism that is based on a radical interpretation of the Islam. Reason for

¹ Giddens, 2006, Politics, Government and Terrorism, in: *Sociology* (5th edition), p. 880-881.

² Kegley, 2003, *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 1-2.

³ Giddens, 2006, p. 881.

⁴ Schmid, 2005, Prevention of terrorism: towards a multi-prolonged approach, in: *Root Causes of Terrorism*, New York: Routledge, p. 224.

⁵ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 129.

doing so concerns the current significance rise in extreme Islamic fundamentalist groups.⁶ In the next chapter, I will elaborate more extensively on the meaning of terrorism.

1.3 Rationale for doing this research

This research will not just generally describe the phenomenon of terrorism. More specifically, it will focus on two countries that have developed anti-terrorism strategies: the Netherlands and the United States of America. The reason for selecting these two states is because they seem to have a different vision on global matters. In general, the United States embraces the idea that we live in a dangerous world, which poses a lot of threats. The USA reacts to those threats by using its power, preferably military power. The Netherlands (or in a broader context: Europe) on the other hand retains a vision which prescribes a world that should be trusted. Of course, threats exist, and some of them indeed have a severe character. However, instead of using brutal violence, the Netherlands (and Europe more in general) prefers a ways characterised by political dialogue and conflict prevention.⁷

More specific, when focusing on the problem of terrorism, the Netherlands and the USA seem to apply a very different approach towards this problem. The USA seems to find it necessary to conduct harsh measures, and to embrace a violent approach in which tracing, arresting and the elimination of terrorists appear to have priority.⁸ ‘Counter-terrorism measures include the sensitive acts of infiltration, electronic surveillance, interception of mail and phone calls, and the sharing of information among intelligence services about the characteristics and behaviours of profiled individuals and groups’.⁹ The vision of the Bush Administration is one with a great faith in military solutions. USA’s strategy for fighting terrorism is therefore often called to be a military approach. Within this context, Hippel argues that counter-terrorism campaigns incorporate both fighting symptoms and causes of terrorism. She continues by stating that with regard to the US government, there is a strong determination on the former, and that rooting-out activities will therefore be the priority in the years to come.¹⁰ Or, to put it the way Ehrlich & Liu did: ‘There is much talk on the long war on terrorism, but little attention (at least in the US government) [on] changing the basic conditions that generate terrorist acts’.¹¹ The picture that arises from these authors is that the USA seems to fight terrorism mainly by using actions of repression.

By contrast, the Netherlands (or Europe in general) appears to conduct a different policy. This approach has a softer character, one in which conflict-prevention plays a central role. With regard to the problem of terrorism, this means that Europe is mainly concerned with the causes giving rise to terrorism: a preventive approach. Like Weigand – spokesman of the European Commission – said

⁶ Wilkinson, 2005, *Why Modern Terrorism: Differentiating Types and Distinguishing Ideological Motivations*, in: *The New Global Terrorism*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 122-123.

⁷ Speech of Minister Michels (Belgium), the 19th of December 2002.

⁸ Trouw, the 14th of September 2001.

⁹ Kegley, 2003, p. 175

¹⁰ Hippel, 2002, *The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths*, in: *The political quarterly* (3), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p. 25.

¹¹ Ehrlich & Liu, 2002, *Some Roots of Terrorism*, in: *Population and Environment* (24), p. 183.

about the different approach between the USA and Europe: our position in the fight against terrorism is similar, the ways to reach this goal are however not the same.¹² The division Bjørgo makes in his introduction comes close to this notion. He states that on the one hand, some prefer the vision that terrorism is evil, poses a threat and should therefore be crushed and uprooted. Others argue that without addressing the conditions that produce radicalisation and (eventually) terrorism, one could never succeed in fighting terror.¹³

1.4 Definition of the problem

So, the USA and the Netherlands seem to act differently to the problem of terrorism. Within this context, Schmid stresses the distinction between two schools of thought: on the one hand those who are mainly concerned in addressing the causes of terrorism. On the other hand, those who are more interested in fighting the manifestations of terrorism itself.¹⁴

A first investigation would embrace a verification about the truth of this observation: does the USA mainly focus on terrorism by means of repression, and does the Netherlands merely propose anti-terrorism measures aimed at removing the causes of terrorism? If this is the case, a very relevant follow-up question would be if a difference in vision these countries have on the origins of terrorism could be at the basis of such a different approach.

In short, on first sight, the USA and the Netherlands seem to deal with terrorism in a different way. Could a difference in the origins of terrorism these countries put forward in their policies be at the basis of such a different approach?

1.5 Research questions

The following research question can be derived from what is written above:

What are the main differences and similarities between the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands concerning the fight against international jihadist terrorism and to what extent are those strategies of both countries based on different analyses of the origins of terrorism?

The following sub-questions can be derived from this main question:

1. The USA

- a. What kind of measures does the USA propose in its anti-terrorism strategy aimed at fighting international jihadist terrorism?*
- b. On which analysis of the origins of terrorism is this strategy based (legitimisation)?*

2. The Netherlands

¹² NRC Handelsblad, the 7th of February 2002.

¹³ Bjørgo, 2005, *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*, New York: Routledge, p. 1.

¹⁴ Schmid, 2005, p. 223.

- a. *What kind of measures does the Netherlands propose in its anti-terrorism strategy aimed at fighting international jihadist terrorism?*
 - b. *On which analysis of the origins of terrorism is this strategy based (legitimisation)?*
3. *When compared, what are the differences and similarities between the anti-terrorism strategies of both countries concerning the fight against international jihadist terrorism and concerning the analyses of the origins of terrorism that are at the basis of these strategies?*

By answering these questions I will try to achieve an objective that is twofold. Firstly, this research will describe what kind of international anti-terrorism measures both the Netherlands and the USA propose. Subsequently, I will give insight into the analyses of the origins of terrorism that are at the basis on the American and Dutch anti-terrorism strategies. The aim of this research is eventually to find out which differences and similarities could be discovered between the USA and the Netherlands and if differences and/or similarities in the analyses of the origins of terrorism could be at the basis of that.

1.6 Structure of research

Before I am able to start with answering the sub-questions, I have to finish two other matters first. More extensive than I did above, I shall firstly have to describe what terrorism exactly is, what different kinds of terrorism exist, and on which one I will focus. Chapter 2 is the one dealing with these matters, and is called 'Terrorism defined'. Secondly, it would be injudicious to dig into policy documents in search for factors that explain the origins of terrorism without having any idea of what kind of explanations could be found. Therefore, I will discuss various theories about the origins of terrorism that scholars came up with. By distinguishing between several causes that explain the emergence of terrorism, this research becomes categorised. Using categorised causes of terrorism will help in placing the view on the origins of terrorism of the Netherlands and the USA, thereby enhancing the structure of this research. In that way, I am better able to compare the anti-terrorism strategies of both countries. Chapter 3 is the one which deals with these matters, and is called 'The origins of jihadist terrorism'. Subsequently, the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands will be exposed to research. The findings are reported in Chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 6 will conclude by comparing the anti-terrorism strategies of both countries.

1.7 Methodology

This final section elaborates on the way this research will be held. I shall make use of two different methodologies. The first part of this research consists of a literature study. I shall not conduct any empirical research myself, but will found on the work of others. That is, by investigating the work of other researchers, we shall try to present a clear inventory of factors that give rise to terrorism.

When we reach Chapters 4 and 5, the methodology will change. As already mentioned, for these parts, I will investigate policy documents concerning international anti-terrorism measures. Babbie calls this kind of methodology content analysis and is about '[...] the study of recorded human communications [...]' (2004, p. 314). With the theoretical findings of Chapters 2 and 3 in mind, I shall deduce analyses that both countries use in their policy documents on the origins of terrorism. A consequence of taking the anti-terrorism strategies (policy documents) into account only, is that one does not investigate the actual policies as conducted. This research shall therefore only elaborate on the ways the USA and the Netherlands think they can fight international terrorism, i.e. on their policy intentions. While it is fair to assume that intentions are at the basis of the eventual measures that are taken, other factors are also likely to determine the policies that are eventually conducted.

The reason why I have chosen the Netherlands and the United States of America for further research became already clear from what is written above. However, I have not yet emphasised the selection of the policy documents of both countries. For both countries, it is possible to make a division between documents that are about international terrorism, and documents concerning domestic terrorism. With regard to the USA, this comes down to two different kind of policy documents¹⁵: *the National Strategy for Homeland Security* focuses on fighting terrorism within the US, while the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* targets the identification and diffusion of terrorist threats before they reach America. When the Netherlands is taken into account, one could note a similar separation between international and domestic terrorism measures. That is, whereas the Ministers of Domestic Affairs and of Integration have written several memoranda about domestic terrorism, the Minister of Foreign Affairs principally deals with terrorism in an international perspective. As already became clear from the research questions, I shall focus on anti-terrorism strategies that are taken in such an international perspective.

To conclude, I shall shortly elaborate on this research' objective. Geurts states that a research can be made up in several ways (1999, p. 29). The goal of a research could be either of a descriptive or an explanatory character, and the procedure of the research could be either explorative or testing. The research I will conduct will have an explanatory character, with an explorative method of working. Geurts (1999, p. 29) has called the combination of these two factors 'the tracing of possible causes'. This is exactly what I intent to do. By exploring the analyses of the origins of terrorism laid down in anti-terrorism strategies, I will try to find out if a difference in these analyses could be at the basis of a different way in which the Netherlands and the USA approach terrorism.

¹⁵ Separation is made by Petrosino (2005) in his work document: *the United States and counterterrorism: history, measures and lessons*.

Chapter 2: Terrorism defined

2.1 Two core concepts

The concept of terrorism is used to cover many phenomena. Despite the fact that terrorism recently seems to be equated with violence that is justified by the Islam, the origins of terrorism lie in a period long before 9/11. Giddens for example states that the word 'terrorism' has its origins in the French Revolution of 1789.¹⁶ Also in the 20th century, the world experienced terrorism on large-scale, Nazi Germany being the most notorious example. A more recent example of terrorism would be the terrorist methods that are used by separatist movements like the Basque ETA.

The fact that the concept of terrorism covers a broad range of events has resulted in difficulties when one wants to define terrorism. Scholars have not been able to agree on certain aspects of terrorism. For example: is terrorism only about attacks on civilians or also about attacks on military targets under non-war conditions? and, should terrorism also cover state actors as terrorists? More in general, scientists have claimed the impossibility of defining terrorism by stating that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. In other words, it would be impossible to agree upon an objective definition on terrorism, because the defining process '[...] depends entirely on the subjective outlook of the definer [...]'.¹⁷

However, although researchers have come up with over 200 definitions to describe the phenomenon of terrorism, there is actually a growing consensus among scientists about its core meaning.¹⁸ Firstly, consensus has been reached with regard to the means terrorist use, their essence of activities. Terrorism involves violent behaviour, or the threat of violent behaviour, which is primarily aimed at citizens. In that way, terrorists try '[...] to achieve a psychological effect of fear on others than the immediate victims'.¹⁹ The purpose of terrorist attacks is to cause unrest within groups of people. Therefore, terrorism is not that much about the actual lethal victims it claims, but about the terrorising effect it has on populations. Or, as Kegley states it: 'Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is theatre'.²⁰

Secondly, the aim of the activities terrorists exploit are always political, like changing a regime, changing the people in power, or changing social or political conditions, etc'.²¹ Some have added ideological and religious objectives to the list of political aims. However, 'political aims' are to be considered in a broad sense. 'The motivation – whether ideological, religious, or something else – behind the political objective is irrelevant for the purpose of defining terrorism'.²² Take for example Al Qaeda. At first sight, this organisation seems to be of a religious character only: they are using

¹⁶ Giddens, 2006, p. 883.

¹⁷ Ganor, 2002, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?*, in: *Police Practice and Research* (3), p. 287.

¹⁸ Bjørge, 2005, p. 1-2.

¹⁹ Bjørge, 2005, p. 2.

²⁰ Kegley, 2003, p. 22.

²¹ Ganor, 2002, p. 294.

²² Ditto.

religious language to legitimise their actions and are fighting a holy war (jihad). However, '[...] we should not overlook that Bin Laden's organisation has a definite political agenda. They want to force the United States into withdrawing from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region generally. They want to overthrow what they regard as collaborationist regimes in the Muslim world, which they accuse of betraying 'true' Islam, and they want to unite all Muslims in a pan-Islamic Caliphate that would rule according to the principles of 'true' Islam'.²³

So, in short, terrorism is about two core concepts: creating a psychological effect of fear (1) in order to achieve some political objective (2). The definition that covers these two distinctive characteristics of terrorism well is the one stated by Kegley: 'Terrorism is violence or the threat of violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm – in a word, to terrorise – and thereby bring about some social or political change'.²⁴

Now I have elaborated on two distinctive characters of terrorism, it is possible to differentiate terrorist occurrences from other political or violent events. Because terrorism is about violence (or the threat of violence), strikes and peaceful demonstrations could not be considered as terrorist. The same notion holds for felonies or criminal delinquencies because these do not have a political character. And finally, guerrilla warfare or civil insurrections are also not covered by the concept of terrorism, because these phenomena are not primarily aimed at civilians but on military targets instead.

2.2 New-style jihadist terrorism

Despite the fact that I have discriminated between several manifestations of political violence, I have not been distinctive enough yet. That is, terrorism as such is already a very broad concept: '[...] the label of terrorism is used to cover a wide range of rather different phenomena'.²⁵ Moreover, causes that give rise to terrorism do not necessarily have to be the same for these different phenomena: 'Some root factors may impact differently on various types of terrorist groups [...]'.²⁶ Therefore, it is necessary to separate various forms of terrorism. One could do that in two ways: either by distinguishing between old-style terrorism and new-style terrorism, or by differing between several kinds of terrorism.

Let me firstly elaborate on the distinction between the two styles of terrorism. Old-style terrorism covers terrorism that is mainly linked to nations without states. The name of this style of terrorism is kind of misleading, because old-style terrorism still exists today. People acting in such terrorist groups are willing to use terrorist methods in order to establish a state in a specific national area. Therefore, old-style terrorism '[...] is fundamentally local because its ambitions are local'.²⁷ As a result of that, this kind of terrorism is limited in the use of violence as well. A prototype example of an

²³ Wilkinson, 2003, p. 124.

²⁴ Kegley, 2003, p. 16.

²⁵ Bjørge, 2005, p. 1.

²⁶ Bjørge, 2005, p. 4.

²⁷ Giddens, 2006, p. 884.

old-style terrorist group is the separatist Basque movement ETA, like mentioned earlier. The main goal of this group is to establish a separate state in the northern of Spain: a local objective.

‘While some terrorists are still patriots and genuine revolutionaries, this pattern is no longer typical’.²⁸ The current pattern is one that has been called new-style terrorism. In scientific literature, three distinguishing aspects of new-style terrorism are often stressed: its broader scope of claims, its ruthless ways of violence, and its network structure. With regard to the first characterising aspect, Giddens states that new-style terrorism has a global spread because it wants to restructure world society.²⁹ Together with being global in its ambitions, new-style terrorists use extensive and ruthless ways of violence as well. From this perspective, Gupta stresses that new-style terrorism increased the threat of widespread death and destruction because of the development of weapons of mass destruction and other technologies like communication and transportation.³⁰ Finally, the organisational structure of terrorist groups is noteworthy when naming distinguishing aspects of new-style terrorism. Terrorist groups are very comparable to so-called network organisations. ‘There is a lot of autonomy in local cells and these can reproduce without necessarily having any strong direction from the centre’.³¹ In other words, new-style terrorist groups are very loosely connected, something that resulted in ‘[...] unprecedented levels of communication and coordination’.³² Although these three aspects are being presented as typical for new-style terrorism, one could doubt about this notion. With regard to the first aspect, before 9/11 – even before the existence of Al-Qaeda – there were groups aimed at restructuring world society. Most notorious examples are of course communist-groups trying to establish communism globally. Also the second aspect of what would be typical for new-style terrorism is only partial true. Indeed, it is correct that 9/11 was the deadliest terrorist attack. However, the statement that new-style terrorism is so ruthless because of the development of weapons of mass destruction seems exaggerated, since these weapons have not been used by any terrorist group until today. Also with concern to the third aspect of new-style terrorism, one could doubt if this is exclusively typical for new-style terrorism. The network structure is no invention of new-style terrorists since there have been communist-groups using this kind of communication in the beginning of the 20th century. In short, whilst the three named characteristics of new-style terrorism roughly describe what this phenomenon is about, it is not exclusively typical for new-style terrorism.

The second way in which one can define the concept of terrorism is by differing between several kinds of it. Schmid has made an extensive division of terrorism by using a typology which distinguishes between five kinds: social-revolutionary terrorism (left-wing), right-wing and racist terrorism, single-issue terrorism, nationalist and separatist terrorism (including ethnic terrorism), and

²⁸ Laqueur, 1998, *Terror's New Face: The Radicalization and Escalation of Modern Terrorism*, in: Harvard International Review, European edition (20), p. 48.

²⁹ Giddens, 2006, p. 886.

³⁰ Gupta, 2005, *Exploring roots of terrorism*, in: *Root causes of terrorism: myths, reality and ways forward*, New York: Routledge, p. 29.

³¹ Giddens, 2006, p. 887.

³² Kegley, 2003, p. 4.

finally, religious terrorism.³³ Within this study, I shall focus on the latter: religious terrorism. Religious terrorism can be considered as a weapon for religious persecution and religious warfare.³⁴ Reason for focusing on this kind of terrorism is mainly based on the fact that religious terrorism is recently growing. Rapoport for example states that terrorism could be divided in four (chronological) waves.³⁵ The third wave – a revolutionary one – began to ebb away in the 1980s. ‘The religious wave began in the same decade’.³⁶ Within their study, Lutz & Lutz come to a same observation by writing: ‘In the years after 1990, communalism – especially based in religion – reappeared as a major source of dissident terrorism’.³⁷

Within this investigation, I will even go one step further by focusing on a particular kind of religious terrorism: jihadist terrorism, i.e. terrorism that has its roots in Islam. To be clear, every religion – may it be Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, or Judaism – has its terrorists. Religious terrorism should therefore never be equated with Islam in general. ‘However, it is also extremely important not to underestimate the significance of the rise of groups of extreme Islamic fundamentalists [...]’.³⁸ Among other things, this observation resulted in the overriding attention of jihadist terrorism on the public agenda.

Religious terrorism is about ideas and ideals that are religiously inspired. Within scientific research, a definition on the concept of this particular kind of terrorism seems to be lacking. If one however has to define jihadist terrorism in a single sentence, it would emphasise its use of terrorism against enemies of the Islam, in order to realise a society which is the purest reflection of what the original sources of the Islam (‘true’ Islam) prescribe.³⁹ Jihadistic terrorism refers to ‘jihad’, which is Arabic for ‘fight’ or ‘struggle’. Both media and politicians often use the term ‘armed jihad’ to clarify what they are talking about: a holy war against those who threaten Islam. Wilkinson stresses the key feature every jihadist terrorist group has: ‘[...] they are bitterly opposed not only to the United States and Israel, but to all Western countries’.⁴⁰

The most notorious jihadist terrorist group is of course the Al Qaeda network. In every TV-message Bin Laden releases, he quotes verses from the Koran and summons Muslims to step up and fight in their holy war. At the same time, Al Qaeda is in many ways a prototype of what has been called new-style terrorism: Al Qaeda is a network type of organisation that has global goals and is – as experienced on the 11th of September, 2001 – extremely lethal. Because Al Qaeda both reflects new-style terrorism and jihadist terrorism, it will be at the centre of attention in this study. However, important to comprehend is that the jihadist Al Qaeda network is not the only representative of new

³³ Schmid, 2005, p. 224.

³⁴ Wilkinson, 2003, p. 121.

³⁵ Respectively an anarchist wave, an anti-colonial wave, a new-left wave, and finally, a religious wave.

³⁶ Rapoport, 2003, The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11, in: *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 43.

³⁷ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 129.

³⁸ Wilkinson, 2005, 122-123.

³⁹ Definition is used in a letter of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs on breeding grounds of (international) terrorism.

⁴⁰ Wilkinson, 2003, p. 123.

terrorism. Or, as Morgan states it: '[...] Islamic radicalism is not the only form of apocalyptic, catastrophic terrorism'.⁴¹ Take for example the Oklahoma City bombing by American right-wing militants, which claimed 168 lives and was the most lethal terrorist attack on American soil before 9/11.⁴²

2.3 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has served as an introducing one. That is, I elaborated on the definition of terrorism, thereby discriminating two core concepts: the psychological effect of fear (1) and the focus on political objectives (2). Furthermore, I defined the concept of terrorism in two ways. Firstly, I made a distinction between old- and new-style terrorism. The latter kind has three characterising aspects: a global reach, ruthless ways of violence, and a network structure. This type of terrorism will be the one this research focuses on. The second way in which I narrowed this research was by identifying several kinds of terrorism. I stated that jihadist terrorism will be the focus of research. This kind of terrorism concerns people that use terrorist methods against enemies of the Islam, in order to realise a society which is the purest reflection of what the original sources of the Islam ('true' Islam) prescribe. By identifying new-style jihadist terrorism as the focus of research, I shall now turn to the identification of causes that explain the emergence of this kind of terrorism.

⁴¹ Morgan, 2004, *The Origins of the New Terrorism*, in: *Parameters* (34), p. 30.

⁴² Ditto.

Chapter 3: The origins of jihadist terrorism

3.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, I dealt with the meaning of terrorism. Among other matters, I distinguished between the transformation from old- to new-style terrorism. However, whilst the latter is different from most other kinds of terrorism the world experienced before, Lutz & Lutz argue that '[...] the most important recent change in terrorist activity is not related to underlying causes [...]'.⁴³ That is, whereas the manifestation of terrorism has altered, the underlying process that causes people to commit terrorist attacks could still be considered the same. Based on prevalent scientific research, this chapter will describe such underlying processes. I will do so in two ways. Firstly, I will make an exploration of the literature that is available on the origins of terrorism, thereby identifying several factors that explain the emergence of terrorism. Subsequently, I shall restructure these factors in order to make them suitable for this research. However, before I get started on that, two general remarks have to be made in order to understand the origins of terrorism better.

3.2 General remarks

Among scientific researchers, there is overwhelming consensus about the fact that not one of the major religions produces more terrorism than others. There does not exist any evidence '[...] that citizens of countries with larger share of their population affiliated with any of the major religious faiths are more or less likely to be involved with international terrorism. None of the religions has a monopoly on terrorism'.⁴⁴ Wilkinson comes to the same conclusion by stating that '[...] religious fanaticism and terror are not the exclusive preserve of any single major religion'.⁴⁵ Although these scientists are predominantly correct, they forget that – until now – new-style terrorism is mainly linked to Islam. After all, no other group besides Al-Qaeda has committed such ruthless attacks as those in the 11th of September. However, next to the manifestations of new-style terrorism, the world has experienced Christian terrorism (preaching white supremacy and anti-Semitism) and Jewish fundamentalism as well. Therefore, when turning to the focus of this research, the Islam as such can probably not be considered an origin of terrorism. Since none of the religions of terrorism has a monopoly on terrorism, there must be deeper rooted causes that explain the existence of it.

Secondly, as explained, this chapter deals with those deeper rooted causes. One should realise that there exists '[...] no single root cause of terrorism, or even a set of causes'.⁴⁶ 'Terrorism occurs in poor countries as well as in rich ones, in authoritarian societies as well as in democracies. What seems likely is that certain forms of terrorism are outcomes of certain combinations of factors: some of which

⁴³ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 168.

⁴⁴ Malečková, 2005, Impoverished terrorists: stereotype or reality, in: *Root Causes of Terrorism*, New York: Routledge, p. 37.

⁴⁵ Wilkinson, 2003, p. 122.

⁴⁶ Bjørge, 2005, p. 257.

may be more fundamental than others'.⁴⁷ These factors can be divided in two categories: preconditions and precipitants. Bjørge explains this division by citing Crenshaw (1990): 'Preconditions set the stage for terrorism in the long run. They are of relatively general and structural nature, producing a wide range of social outcomes of which terrorism is only one. [...] Precipitants much more directly affect the emergence of terrorism. These are the specific events or situations that immediately precede, motivate or trigger the outbreak of terrorism'.⁴⁸ Lutz & Lutz seem to agree with the division made by Crenshaw by stating that the emergence of terrorism could be explained by using both long-term and short-term components. The former, which are to be considered as more long-term general causes⁴⁹, coincides with the concept of preconditions. Because of their specific character, it would be impossible to draw some general conclusions concerning anti-terrorism strategies of both the Netherlands and the USA when using precipitants. Therefore, this research will mainly focus on preconditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. Bjørge drives its distinction of levels of causation even further by distinguishing between 'structural causes' and 'facilitator causes'. 'Structural causes are causes which affect people's lives in ways that they may or may not comprehend, at a rather abstract macro level'.⁵⁰ Examples are demographic imbalances, globalisation, rapid modernisation, transitional societies, relative deprivation, etc. Facilitator causes are different from structural causes because they '[...] make terrorism possible or attractive, without being prime movers'.⁵¹ Both kinds of causes are relevant in the search for the origins of terrorism. It is to the exploration of those origins I now turn.

3.3 Exploration of the origins of terrorism

Like explained in the introduction, it would be injudicious to dig into policy documents in search for factors that explain the origins of terrorism without having any idea of what kind of explanations could be expected. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to present a clear inventory of origins that give rise to terrorism. Such will give structure to the following parts of research. Like written in the preceding section, I shall focus on structural preconditions (i.e. underlying factors with a long-term character) and on facilitator factors that explain the existence of terrorism. I shall successively deal with the following structural factors: poverty, democracy, inequality and oppression, education, globalisation and modernisation, and finally evil. In addition, I will distinguish four facilitators: state structure, state sponsorship, press freedom in democracies, and finally the radical interpretation of religion.

⁴⁷ Bjørge, 2005, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Bjørge, 2005, p. 258.

⁴⁹ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 13.

⁵⁰ Bjørge, 2005, p. 3.

⁵¹ Ditto.

3.3.1 Poverty

Within scientific research, the concept of poverty as a (root) cause of terrorism is the one where is most elaborated about. Some researchers seem to logically accept that poverty creates terrorism. There are two main argumentations that are at the basis of this perception. First, terrorism is more likely to emergence when people notice their (economic) situation as (increasingly) imbalanced compared to others. Karen Amstrong for example states that ‘[...] fundamentalist extremism has risen in nearly every cultural tradition where there are pronounced inequalities of wealth [...]’.⁵² A sense of economic inequality could contribute to the anger of people. Poverty is in that respect an underlying factor contributing to the process of radicalisation. That is, when people see their economic position as (increasingly) unequal, they can accordingly become more and more prepared to ‘adopt ultimate consequences’. The second way poverty contributes to the emergence of terrorism concerns the situation in which people become increasingly susceptible to recruiting methods of terrorist groups. Such groups – the argumentation goes – can provide a stable economic situation for deprived people. In this context, Hippel stresses the importance of fundamentalist charities: ‘[...] some Islamic charities, along with several governments (such as that of Iran) espouse a [...] radical agenda trough their aid’.⁵³ In other words, people that live in rough circumstances and in need for aid, are increasingly susceptible to charitable groups. While delivering required aid to deprived people, such organisations can simultaneously abuse their positions by propagate radical ideas.

Despite these two theoretical arguments, research that is explicitly aimed at revealing a causal connection between poverty and terrorism does not contain any clear-cut evidence which points in that direction. A study which is commonly accepted as authoritative on this matter is conducted by Krueger & Malečková. They come to quite a remarkable conclusion: ‘Any connection between poverty [...] and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak’.⁵⁴ Within their study, both authors can find no evidence which suggests that terrorists tend to be more impoverished. More than that, in their investigation about the likelihood to join the Hezbollah militants, ‘[...] the results suggest that poverty is inversely related with the likelihood that someone becomes a Hezbollah fighter [...]’.⁵⁵ They continue by stating that such a contrary relationship actually makes sense. After all, commitment to issues and efforts relating to terrorism are probably more likely when people have sufficient ‘[...] income to concern themselves with more than minimum economic subsistence’.⁵⁶ Although such a hypothesis should be exposed to further research, one can validly conclude that the findings ‘[...] provide little support for the view that those who live in poverty [...] are

⁵² Amstrong, 2003, *Our role in the terror: The West must accept its share of the blame for the growth of fundamentalist violence*, in: The Guardian.

⁵³ Hippel, 2002, p. 36.

⁵⁴ Krueger & Malečková, 2003, *Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?*, in: the Journal of Economic Perspectives (17), p. 119.

⁵⁵ Krueger & Malečková, 2003, p. 133.

⁵⁶ Krueger & Malečková, 2003, p. 142.

disproportionately drawn to participate in terrorist activities'.⁵⁷ Constantino supports this view by stating that much of the academy unfortunately refuses to acknowledge the fact that 'hopeless poverty' and 'economic deprivation' are no root causes for terrorism.⁵⁸

However, within the academic field, no overwhelming consensus exists on this conclusion. For example, researchers like Tyson (Dean of the Haas School of Business at the University of California), have written about poverty as being an accepted root cause of terrorism: '[we live in] a world so interconnected that poverty and despair in a remote region can harbour a network of terrorism dedicated to our destruction'.⁵⁹ Moreover, researchers have come up with more complicated connections between poverty and terrorism. For example, Schmid stresses the possibility of an indirect relationship between the two concepts: relatively well-to-do men and women that feel so strongly identified with the impoverished class that they act as 'self-appointed champions'.⁶⁰ Or consider Sahar Mohammad who brings up the perceived inequalities of the capitalist system as a possible cause. Middle-Eastern countries are for example full of economic potential resources, but many well-educated citizens are left without jobs.⁶¹ However, once again, despite a lack of consensus in the academic world about poverty being a root cause of terrorism, the actual research that is available on this topic denies a clear-cut causal relationship.

3.3.2 Democracy

When economic considerations do not seem to contribute to the emergence of terrorism, a next potential factor would be one related to democracy. After all, the definition like stated in the preceding chapter prescribes that terrorism is eventually about political objectives. Within that context, Malečková stresses that terrorism is '[...] mainly an answer to political complaints and of terrorists motivated by political involvement and belief in a political causes [...]'.⁶² He continues by stating that conditions that give rise to terrorism seem to be more of a political nature, rather than of an economic one. Since terrorists want to bring about some political change – the argumentation goes – democracy has to be a root cause of terrorism.

However, just as with the concept of poverty, such a relationship is not as clear-cut as it is on first sight. In fact, researchers have come up with two chains of reasoning: one that suggests that democracy reduces terrorist incidents, and another that prescribes the total opposite of that. With concern to the first chain of reasoning, democracy is considered as a tool of conflict prevention and resolution. Democracy gives people the opportunity to express their preferences, it gives people a 'voice'. An important form of political expression are free and fair elections. That is, voting enables

⁵⁷ Krueger & Malečková, 2003, p. 135.

⁵⁸ Constantino, 2004, *Does Affluence Cause Jihad?*, in: Frontpage Magazine.

⁵⁹ Tyson, 2001, *It's time to step up the global war on poverty*, in: Business Week.

⁶⁰ Schmid, 2005, p. 229.

⁶¹ Sahar Mohammad, 2005, *Roots of terrorism in the Middle East: internal pressures and international constraints*, in: *Root Causes of Terrorism*, New York: Routledge, p. 105.

⁶² Malečková, 2005, p. 41.

people to express their grievances. This ensures that desirable social changes can be brought, which in turn reduces the need to resort to violence'.⁶³ From this perspective, democracy is a way to achieve goals by peaceful means, a non-violent alternative for conflict resolution. When a democratic deficit is present, people are hampered in expressing themselves. A continuous inability to express one's preferences and to address one's grievances could fuel people's anger. Therefore, a lack of democratic opportunities is likely to contribute to the process of radicalisation. In line with this reasoning is Malečková's notion of civil liberties. These liberties are inextricably linked to modern democracies. Civil liberties are those liberties that give freedom to '[...] develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy without interference from the state'.⁶⁴

The second chain of reasoning is provided by Li in his investigation about the relationship between democracy and (transnational) terrorist incidents. He states that instead of decreasing the likelihood of terrorist events, democracy could actually contribute to terrorism. Institutional constraints on decision-making power of the government are of concern here. Institutional constraints – also known as institutional 'checks and balances' – are a very crucial aspect of democracy because they balance power in order to prevent tyranny. However, the drawback of these constraints is that such often result in political inaction and deadlock. More constraints and more balances result in more veto players, which in turn result in political indecision. 'Policy inaction and political deadlock, induced by institutionalised checks and balances, will increase the grievances of marginalised groups, pushing them toward violence'.⁶⁵ So, according to Li's argument, democracy does not decrease the likelihood of terrorist incidents by definition.

In short, just as with regard to the poverty-argumentation, researchers deny a clear-cut relation between democracy and terrorism. Democracy can both contribute to and reduce terrorism. Li puts it like this: 'Overall, democracy is demonstrated to encourage and reduce transnational terrorist incidents, albeit via different causal mechanism'.⁶⁶ Even though such is true, the argumentation that is at the basis of these causal mechanism is to be considered similar. After all, an inability to express one's grievances which hampers the formation of responsive governments, can be brought about both by a lack of democracy and by institutional constraints resulting in political deadlock. So, although democracy does not reduce the likelihood of terrorism by definition, the argumentation that is at the basis of the democracy-terrorism relationship is similar.

3.3.3 Inequality and oppression

This subsection deals with oppression and inequality as contributing factors to terrorism and is thereby related to the two argumentations of poverty and democracy. That is, when I discussed the

⁶³ Li, 2005, *Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents*, in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (49.2), Sage Publications, p. 280.

⁶⁴ Malečková, 2005, p. 41.

⁶⁵ Li, 2005, p. 283.

⁶⁶ Li, 2005, p. 294.

relationship between poverty and terrorism, I already touched upon the notion that an imbalance between (groups of) people could contribute to terrorism. However, within that subsection, I merely spoke about inequality in the context of poverty. Additionally, scholars have come up with reasons that explain terrorism as being caused by a more general inequality-aspect. In this context, next to poverty, Armstrong stresses the importance of inequalities of power and status when describing origins of terrorism.⁶⁷ Additionally, Friedman stresses that the importance of a ‘poverty of dignity’ instead of a ‘poverty of money’.⁶⁸ Krueger & Malečková go even further by stating that an imbalance on non-material matters only contributes to terrorism: terrorism is more accurately viewed as a response to ‘[...] long-standing feelings (either perceived or real) of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics’.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Bjørge speaks about inequality of power which could lead to terrorism: ‘When local or international powers possess an overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, and the latter see no other realistic ways forward their cause by normal political or military means, ‘asymmetrical warfare’ can represent a tempting option’.⁷⁰ When people perceive a situation as unequal, such could result in a feeling of oppression. Oppression is in turn likely to be an underlying factor of the process of radicalisation. Eventually, when oppressed groups can no longer face a superior other and have no other opportunities to change their situation, they could turn to terrorist methods. In this context, both Lutz & Lutz⁷¹ and Crenshaw⁷² state that terrorism is ‘a weapon of the weak’. That is, oppressed and unequally treated groups (i.e. ‘the weak’) are more likely to use terrorism, especially when other means to change their situation are lacking. So, in short, aspects like dignity, power, and status determine the level of equality between people. When – because of indignity, dominant power, differences in status, or whatever kind of other factor – inequality is present, people start feeling oppressed. Oppression fuels people’s anger and frustration. When other options are lacking, this could lead such people to employ ‘the weapon of the weak’.

3.3.4 Education

Some researchers state that education – or to put it rightly: a lack of education – contributes to terrorism. Researchers have brought forward different arguments in which education relates to terrorism. The first one is offered by Hippel who states that when children do not get decent education, they will not learn the practical skills ‘[...] that can be used in the global marketplace’.⁷³ Stern notices the same matter by stating that when children do not learn practical skills – such as maths and science – they will not be equipped for work in modern society.⁷⁴ The second way education gives rise to the emergence of terrorism in the Islamic world concerns the existence of so-called ‘madrasas’: hard-line

⁶⁷ Armstrong, 2003.

⁶⁸ Friedman, 2002, *The Core of Muslim Rage*, in: the New York Times (151), p. A21.

⁶⁹ Krueger & Malečková, 2003, p. 119.

⁷⁰ Bjørge, 2005, p. 259.

⁷¹ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 9.

⁷² Crenshaw, 2003, *The Causes of Terrorism*, in: *The New Global Terrorism*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 97.

⁷³ Hippel, 2002, p. 30.

⁷⁴ Stern, 2002, *Pakistan’s Jihad Culture*, in: *Foreign Affairs* (79.6).

Quranic schools which preach a violent interpretation of the Islam. Mostly, these schools are free to join, thereby attracting many people. According to Stern, the main aim of the madrasas is to recruit students for the jihad. Beside the lack of practical skills that are being taught, these schools learn to despise ‘corrupting Western influences’. Especially – but not exclusively – people of an early age are to be considered susceptible to the indoctrination used in madrasas. Madrasas schooling should however not be considered as a structural factor of terrorism. For example, the Al-Qaeda members responsible for the 9/11 attacks were not educated in madrasas.⁷⁵ From that perspective, one should consider madrasas as a facilitator rather than being a prime mover. So, equally to other relationships, consensus about the direction of the relationship between education and terrorism is absent. Education – both on a structural and a facilitating level – can reduce terrorism by equipping people with necessary skills, but can promote terrorism as well.

3.3.5 Globalisation and modernisation

Another potential factor that could explain the emergence of terrorism can be found in two processes that occur worldwide: globalisation and modernisation. Let me firstly elaborate on the meaning of these two processes. Both are used to cover many sub processes and are therefore used as umbrella terms. Morgan has defined globalisation as a process that involves the diminution of boundaries between countries across the world in technological, political, economic and cultural spheres.⁷⁶ Globalisation is about worldwide integration and interdependence, about a world that is turning ‘smaller’. In this line of reasoning, Walters describes globalisation as a ‘[...] social process in which the constraints of geography on economic, political, social, and cultural arrangements recede [...]’.⁷⁷ While researchers are in general capable of presenting definitions and descriptions of globalisation, scientists who write about modernisation as being an explanation of terrorism do generally not explain what they think is covered by this concept. If one however has to characterise modernisation, one would probably stress the transition of societies from feudal, agricultural, and closed ones to capitalistic, industrial, and open societies.⁷⁸ Such a transition influences numerous matters, in economic, social, political and cultural fields.

As becomes clear from their definitions, both globalisation and modernisation have a ‘changing’ character. Globalisation and modernisation bring a process of transformation, thereby affecting societies. Like Lutz & Lutz put it: ‘[With modernisation and] globalisation come changes in economic structures, which of course are related to the social and political structures of most societies’.⁷⁹ In that way, ‘[...] globalisation and modernisation can place societies and political

⁷⁵ Hippel, 2002, p. 30.

⁷⁶ Morgan, 2004, p. 37.

⁷⁷ Walters, 2001, *Globalization* (2nd edition), London: Routledge, p. 5.

⁷⁸ Vranken & Hendrickx, 2004, *Het speelveld en de spelregels: een inleiding tot de sociologie*, Leuven: Uitgeverij Acco, p. 337.

⁷⁹ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 16-17.

systems under great stress'.⁸⁰ Modernisation for example brings the idea of individualised people who should be able of making own decisions, independently of what others prescribe. Especially with regard to religious terrorism, 'the project of modernity' – pleading for a secular, individualistic, and technological developed world – could be considered as alien, making religious alternatives extraordinarily appealing.⁸¹ The same holds for the process of globalisation. Take for example economic globalisation. People could get the feeling that transnational commerce results in an import of dominant westernised popular culture, which is in their eyes incompatible with their values. For example, Juergensmeyer states the possibility that American and European music, videos, and films could threaten '[...] to obliterate local and traditional forms of artistic expression'.⁸² Another example is provided by Lutz & Lutz who state that '[...] rampant consumerism that has come with recent globalisation can be seen as one factor that undermines the basic values of a society'.⁸³

In short, to put it like Lutz & Lutz did: 'With [modernisation and globalisation] new ideas, institutions, products, and forms of organisation encroach on local societies'.⁸⁴ That is, globalisation and modernisation can stimulate a breach of highly appreciated values and principles. Such values could be so sincere and deep-rooted, that the transformation of those values is considered unacceptable. Religious communal groups are often reacting to such changing circumstances. For example: 'Many Islamic groups, including Al Qaeda, have been opposed to the intrusion of foreign Western values, modernisation, and secularism'.⁸⁵ In this context, Ehrlich & Liu stress the importance of religious beliefs, which could be that genuine and sincere that it makes people '[...] extremely resistant to change and may promote a willingness to die for beliefs [...]'.⁸⁶ Morgan explicitly recognises the fact that the process of globalisation contributes to terrorism by stating that the '[...] intrusion of Western values and institutions into the Islamic world through the process of free-market globalisation is an alternative explanation for the growth of terrorism [...]'.⁸⁷

3.3.6 Evil

Some researchers, not many, have stressed the possibility that acts of terrorism stem from 'evil'. Howell for example states that one of the theories on the causes of 9/11 was that '[...] the attacks were an act of evil'.⁸⁸ In this reasoning, terrorism is something used by uncivilised people, barbarians, by people at the wrong side. People are in a way possessed by a power of evil that is to be considered as the main factor behind terrorism.

⁸⁰ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 16.

⁸¹ Juergensmeyer, 2003, The Religious Roots in Contemporary Terrorism, in: *The New Global Terrorism*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 190.

⁸² Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 189.

⁸³ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 17.

⁸⁴ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 16.

⁸⁵ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 147.

⁸⁶ Ehrlich & Liu, 2002, p. 187.

⁸⁷ Morgan, 2004, p. 37.

⁸⁸ Howell, 2003, Is the New Global Terrorism a Clash of Civilizations? Evaluating Terrorism's Multiple Sources, in: *The New Global Terrorism*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 179.

3.3.7 State structure

The preceding factors were mainly of a structural character. The subjects I now turn to are different in a way that they are facilitating, i.e. not prime movers. I will successively deal with state structure, state sponsorship, press freedom in democracies, and radical interpretation of religion. To begin with, state structure is another factor that contributes to terrorism in several ways. One can roughly distinguish between three types of state structures: authoritarian, democratic, and collapsed states. The latter concerns a state without an effective government ruling over the country.

With regard to authoritarian states, terrorism does not really seem to occur: 'Domestic terrorism was almost totally absent from totalitarian societies such as Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union, or Saddam Hussein's Iraq'.⁸⁹ Reason for this lies mainly in the advantages such states have in dealing with terrorists. 'The security forces present in such countries deal with suspected terrorists quickly and effectively'.⁹⁰ They can make use of a broad range of anti-terrorism measures which would not be accepted in democracies upholding human rights, such as torture or the capture of family-members. One should however note that it is difficult to measure terrorist incidents in authoritarian states, because information flows are heavily controlled and censored by the central government, resulting in a reporting bias.⁹¹

Secondly, Lutz & Lutz note that the state structure of democracy seems more conducive for producing terrorism since democracies face more constraints in employing anti-terrorism measures. That is, '[...] a country that experiences terrorist attacks often attempts to prevent future attacks by adopting policies that circumscribe the freedom of terrorists'.⁹² However, in democratic societies, such circumscription would '[...] restrict civil liberties for society as a whole'.⁹³ Since we value our civil liberties (like freedom of speech, association, and movement) so greatly, such a restriction is often considered to be unacceptable. To put it shortly like Crenshaw did: '[the] desire to protect civil liberties constrains security matters'.⁹⁴

Thirdly, with regard to state structure, weak or collapsed states could contribute to the emergence of terrorism as well. Bjørgo states this notion pithily: 'Failed or weak states lack the capability or will to exercise territorial control and maintain a monopoly of violence. This leaves a power vacuum that terrorist organisations may exploit to maintain safe havens, training facilities and bases for launching terrorist organisations'.⁹⁵ In short, states that lack an effective government to control things around are often called to be 'breeding grounds' of terrorism. Hippel however disagrees with this by stating that such lawless and ungoverned areas involve difficulties for terrorists as well. In collapsed states security itself is highly fragmented, infrastructure is often unreliable, and there are

⁸⁹ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 15.

⁹⁰ Lutz & Lutz, 2003, p. 15.

⁹¹ Li, 2005, p. 281-282.

⁹² Li, 2005, p. 282.

⁹³ Ditto.

⁹⁴ Crenshaw, 1981, *The Causes of Terrorism*, in: *Comparative Politics* (13.4), p. 383.

⁹⁵ Bjørgo, 2005, p. 258.

often no local candidates with whom a reliable partnership can be developed.⁹⁶ These are all circumstances that can not be considered very conducive when preparing terrorist attacks. Hippel underpins his argumentation by stating that it was Bin Laden who, when he took refuge in Sudan, did not settle in the lawless southern parts of the territory, but the northern part where government was firmly in control. Logically, Hippel rejects the notion that collapsed states are used as safe havens where terrorists 'breed'.

3.3.8 State sponsorship

Another distinguishable contributing factor to terrorism is state sponsorship. In this context, state sponsorship is about the providence of training facilities, financial means, and safe havens to (autonomous) terrorist groups by governments.⁹⁷ Some consider state sponsorship as such a crucial aspect, that they perceive it as a clear root cause of terrorism.⁹⁸ This conclusion however needs reconsideration. Richardson gives the example of terrorist groups who have been sponsored by Iran: 'While each of the groups supported by Iran is significantly strengthened by Iranian support, they are no sense creatures of Iran'.⁹⁹ Iran – he continues – has its own interest and is therefore using terrorist groups in achieving those interests. In that context, state sponsored terrorism is to be considered as an instrument of foreign policies. Logically, in each state sponsored instance, states have capitalised on pre-existing conflicts rather than providing a root cause itself. Or, to put it in a different terminology, state sponsorship is certainly contributing to terrorism, but can not be considered as a structural (root) cause. It however facilitates terrorism importantly: 'State sponsorship is clearly an enabling factor of terrorism, giving terrorist groups far greater capacity and lethality than they would have had on their own'.¹⁰⁰

3.3.9 Press freedom in democracies

Another factor that plays an important facilitating role concerning terrorism is press freedom. After all, terrorism is about causing fear among populations. 'Press freedom increases the opportunities for terrorists to be heard and watched by a large audience and hence their ability to create widespread fear'.¹⁰¹ In states where the freedom of press is not warranted and hence, news flows are centrally controlled, information about terrorist attacks is less easily spread among populations. Therefore, press freedom is an important vehicle for terrorists in reaching their goal: causing fear among as many people as possible.

⁹⁶ Hippel, 2002, p. 31.

⁹⁷ Richardson, 2005, State sponsorship – a root cause of terrorism?, in: *Root Causes of Terrorism*, New York: Routledge, p. 196.

⁹⁸ Richardson, 2005, p. 191.

⁹⁹ Richardson, 2005, p. 193.

¹⁰⁰ Bjørgo, 2005, p. 257.

¹⁰¹ Li, 2005, p. 282.

3.3.10 Radical interpretation of religion

By means of the introducing remarks, I made clear that no single religion has a monopoly on terrorism. I therefore concluded that there must be underlying causes which explain the emergence of terrorism. However, this notion does not exclude religion from being a factor that could facilitate terrorism. The main way in which a radical religious version could facilitate terrorism is by validating and legitimating terrorist attacks. In this way, religion is an attendant factor making it 'easier' to turn to terrorist matters. It is a facilitating factor, which – under certain circumstances – could lead to terrorism. Bjørge phrases this pithily by stating that extremist ideologies can certainly explain terrorism, '[...] although people usually adopt such extremist ideologies as a consequence of more fundamental political or personal reasons'.¹⁰²

An important matter related to the foregoing is the notion Post stresses: 'In contrast to social-revolutionary and national-separatist terrorists, for religious fundamentalist extremist groups, the decision-making role of the pre-eminent leader is of central importance. For these true-believers, the radical cleric is seen as the authentic interpreter of God's word, not only eliminating any ambivalence about killing, but endowing the destruction of the defined enemy with sacred significance'.¹⁰³ So, a religious leader is able to justify terrorist acts even further. There is no ambivalence concerning the use of violence because of the hierarchical structure of religious terrorist groups: '[...] the radical cleric provides interpretation of the religious text justifying violence, which is uncritically accepted by his true believer followers [...]'.¹⁰⁴

3.4 Conceptual model

In the preceding section, I presented several origins of terrorism as identified in academic research. Every factor described explains in some way the emergence of terrorism. However, with regard to my research, these identified factors are not satisfactory useful yet because of two reasons. First, not every factor is levelled at the same 'order'. Some factors describe a fairly specific occurrence (for example education), while others cover a very broad phenomenon (like the processes of globalisation and modernisation). Partly because of that, there exists some overlap between the identified factors. For example, at this moment, democracy is used to describe around three or four different aspects. In other words, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the identified factors. This hampers a decent analysis of the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands, because it becomes impossible to validly compare these factors. Therefore, this section modifies the factors as identified above. It will do so by restructuring the factors to the same

¹⁰² Bjørge, 2005, p. 259.

¹⁰³ Post, 2005, The social-cultural underpinnings of terrorist psychology: 'When hatred is bred in the bone', in: *Root Causes of Terrorism*, New York: Routledge, p. 58.

¹⁰⁴ Ditto.

‘order’ and by removing overlap, thereby creating distinguishable origins of terrorism. This will result in the construction of a conceptual model that is better suited for comparison.

Before I elaborate on the contents of the conceptual model, it is of pivotal importance to discuss the purpose of it first. The following model is by no means a definitive model. It does in no way claim to be the termination of academic research concerning the origins of terrorism. This model only presents a description of the works of others. I merely modified the existing views of academic researchers, thereby restructuring the literature in a way that it suits this study. In short, this conceptual model is by no means a universal model embracing every conceivable factor relating to terrorism, but is just a structural reproduction of existing research.

In making such a modification of available literature, three phases will be distinguished. The first phase deals with the structural causes that explain the emergence of terrorism. The second phase concerns the radicalisation process in which people become increasingly convinced that terrorist methods are warranted. The third and final phase is about those factors which make it likely that a terrorist attack will actually occur. The complete conceptual model is graphically reflected in a causal model presented in annex 1.

3.4.1 Phase 1: structural social conditions

Phase 1 deals with several distinguishable structural causes which can be considered as the underlying conditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. I shall successively treat absolute poverty, relative poverty, political voice, political oppression, dissimilarity of power, the diminishment of traditional social patterns, and finally education. These causes can be divided in three clusters: the first two belong to an economic cluster, the next three causes to a political cluster, and finally the last two to a social cluster. Below I will treat every single cause separately.

3.4.1.1 *Absolute poverty*

Despite the lack of academic evidence that suggests a relationship between poverty and terrorism, that connection will again be treated here. While it is plausible to reject poverty as being a cause of terrorism, it could be that policy-makers nevertheless stress that terrorism stems from poverty. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish this factor once more.

Within scientific literature, scientists use poverty to describe two distinguishable factors which I call ‘absolute poverty’ and ‘relative poverty’. This subsection deals with the former. Absolute poverty is about those who live below the poverty line. Such people have to deal with circumstances in which they have no guarantee for economic subsistence. In this way, these people form a vulnerable group because of their dependence on certain organisations. For example, it is likely that such groups come in contact with charity organisations providing aid poor people need for survival. While such organisations can provide a stable living, at the same time, some of them espouse a radical agenda

through their aid. In this way, impoverished people come in contact with certain organisations and their radical ideas. An example that illustrates the vulnerability of impoverished people would be the dependence on so-called Quranic madrasas. People who live in absolute poverty are not financially able to send their children to regular schools. Impoverished people are thereby dependent on these madrasas for education, the more so since these hard-line Quranic, in which children become penetrated by a certain version of Islam that justifies and glorifies violent jihad schools, are often free to join. So, in short, absolute poverty creates a situation of dependency in which people are increasingly susceptible to radical (recruiting) terrorist groups.

3.4.1.2 Relative poverty

Relative poverty deals with something different. That is, some scholars have considered poverty in relation and comparison to others. In that way, it is irrelevant if one is able to guarantee itself survival. Relative poverty is about the economic equality between groups of people. If people perceive significant inequalities of wealth, and accordingly perceive their situation as increasingly unacceptable, this is likely to result in feelings of frustration and anger. In this way, relative poverty is an underlying factor stimulating a process of radicalisation. Eventually, when such people see no other way out, they can step up and employ the 'weapon of the weak'. I now turn to the political cluster of the conceptual model.

3.4.1.3 Political voice

This subsection deals with the main argumentation as explained by the subject of democracy. Researchers have stressed that democracy can both increase and decrease the likelihood of terrorist occurrences. However, like explained, the argumentation that is at the basis of this observation can be considered the same. Such argumentation is covered by the notion of 'political voice'. Political voice is about the existing democratic opportunities people get offered, i.e. the extent to which people are able to express themselves politically. The ability of political voice is a way to gain influence, a way to have a say in the running of one's country. Such does not only generate political relief, political expression also provides people an opportunity to seek resources to their (political) grievances.¹⁰⁵ In this way, political voice induces the formation of responsive governments, which are likely to produce desirable social outcomes. In short, political voice offers opportunities to address preferences and grievances, thereby increasing satisfaction and political efficacy. By expressing oneself politically, non-violent resolution of political conflict can be brought about. In that way, the need to reach for violent methods in order to have a say in the running of one's countries decreases. Or, to put it

¹⁰⁵ Li, 2005, p. 280.

inversely: 'If the opportunities for political involvement are limited, terrorism may appear to extremists as the only viable means of communication or influence'.¹⁰⁶

3.4.1.4 Political oppression

Political oppression is another distinguishable cause of terrorism that is covered by the general notion of democracy. Political oppression is about the relationship between the individual (or a certain group) and the government. Oppressed people are those that cannot live their lives without inference from the state. Civil liberties are of a crucial aspect here because these determine the amount of freedom individuals have in society. Freedom of speech, religion, association, and assembly are a few of the main liberties that create personal views and autonomy and determine the rights individuals possess vis-à-vis the state. Political oppression leads to a state of affairs where people are pushed to situations in which they see no way out. This results in frustration and anger, which in turn underlie a process of radicalisation. In situations where people cannot live their lives in freedom because of constant interference of the state, to these people, terrorist methods may seem the only way to change their situation.

The notion of political oppression is clearly connected to the one of political voice. That is, civil liberties are of fundamental importance in democratic societies, since they provide the necessary space to develop alternative views and ideas in order to express one's preferences. In this way, a lack of civil liberties contributes to the inability of expression, which, as explained, in turn contributes to the emergence of terrorism.

3.4.1.5 Dissimilarity of power

This factor is closely related to the preceding one. However, whereas the previous subsection treated political oppression, this one concerns situations of power inequality, which do not necessarily have to result in oppression. The argumentation is very similar to that of relative poverty. That is, the subsection about relative poverty dealt with economic inequality as a factor that could lead to anger and frustration. It is likely that the same argumentation holds concerning situations in which one perceives dissimilarities of power. Situations of political, economic, or cultural dominance could lead people to perceive themselves as increasingly marginalised. In unbalanced situations, when a certain group is able of making decisions by its own at the cost of others, such could lead people, when other options are absent, to turn to violent methods. Bjørge puts this notion pithily: 'When local or international powers possess an overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, and the latter see no other realistic ways forward their cause by normal political or military means, 'asymmetrical warfare' can represent a tempting option'.¹⁰⁷ In short, when people see no other way out to end a

¹⁰⁶ Malečková, 2005, p. 41.

¹⁰⁷ Bjørge, 2005, p. 259.

situation of inequality, they can eventually step up and employ the 'weapon of the weak'. I now turn to the social cluster of the conceptual model.

3.4.1.6 Education

Within scientific research, education is often put forward in explaining terrorism. However, in doing so, researchers make use of different arguments. Like explained, there is some dispute about the causal direction between education and terrorism. To structure the relationship between education and terrorism, one can distinguish between two different categories. The first category is about situations in which people are under-educated or not educated at all. Like explained, in such situations, children will not learn the practical skills necessary to be equipped for work in society. In other words, when people do not have chances to follow decent education, they lack the skills necessary to make a decent living. In this way, a lack of education is an underlying cause contributing to absolute poverty, which in turn could lead to recruitment and terrorism.

One could accordingly state that proper education reduces the likelihood of terrorism. However, the second category is about those who have been decently educated, but are nonetheless jobless. Schmid stresses that – in such situations – terrorist methods are quite attractive to highly educated young men: 'When they see no solution to their situation in the prevailing political and social circumstances, they become more susceptible to the false promises of those who favour terrorist methods to bring about social and political change'.¹⁰⁸ A connection to the notion of relative poverty becomes clear from this. That is, it seems likely to accept that the relationship between relative poverty and terrorism is stronger when the level of education is higher. After all, those that have followed decent specific education will probably have greater prospects of their future. If those people nevertheless have to face a situation of economic inequality, such is to be considered as intensifying the relationship between relative poverty and terrorism.

3.4.1.7 Diminishment of traditional social patterns

The preceding section dealt with the processes of globalisation and modernisation as factors that contribute to terrorism. One can however not state that these processes cause radicalisation and terrorism. That is, both globalisation and modernisation cover so many phenomena that the identification of these processes as a cause of terrorism is not sufficient distinctive. With regard to this research, the relevance of these processes lies in their changing character. Like explained, with modernisation and globalisation come changes in economic, social, and political structures. Modernisation for example brings ideas about individualism, secularism, and developments in

¹⁰⁸ Schmid, 2005, p. 228.

technology. Thereby, '[...] globalisation and modernisation can place societies and political systems under great stress'.¹⁰⁹

More specifically, the changing character of both globalisation and modernisation could lead to the diminishment of traditional social patterns. After all, it is for good reason that Touraine has described modernisation '[...] as being in opposition to and representing a break from tradition'.¹¹⁰ When traditional certainties fall apart, one could start feeling alienated and estranged. Alienation from traditional values and certainties may well be felt as threatening to one's identity. Such a situation can make people to reach for other certainties to identify with. These could for example be found in radical Islam, which provides clear prescribed practices and responsibilities. Bjørge phrases this pithily by stating that when '[...] traditional norms and social patterns crumble or are made to seem irrelevant, new radical ideologies (sometimes based on religion and/or nostalgia for a glorious past) may become attractive to certain segments of society'.¹¹¹ In other words, alienation – produced by the diminishment of traditional social patterns – is likely to contribute to people's susceptibility for radical ideas of terrorist recruiters.

3.4.2 Phase 2: the development of potential terrorists

This section deals with the second phase of the conceptual model and is about the development of potential terrorists. That is, this phase centres on the process of radicalisation, i.e. the process in which people become convinced that terrorist methods are warranted, and thereby increasingly prepared to commit terrorist attacks. There are three contributing factors to be distinguished in this phase which explain terrorism: the radicalisation of individuals, the organisation of terrorist groups, and finally, alternative organisations that perform a facilitating role. This separation is a theoretical one, used to comprehend the process of radicalisation. In reality, the distinguished factors have common characteristics and a delimited distinction between them is therefore not present. I shall now turn to the separate treatment of each of these three factors.

3.4.2.1 Individual radicalisation

By means of phase 1, I have merely distinguished several structural causes that are at the basis of terrorism. These causes do however not directly cause terrorism, but are to be considered as underlying factors that can stimulate a process of radicalisation. This subsection deals with that process. One could define radicalisation as the phenomenon by which certain individuals holding certain points of view, opinions and ideas may be led to commit terrorist acts.¹¹² Two aspects become clear from this definition. First, radicalisation refers to views, opinions, and ideas, i.e. a certain ideology. Within the process of radicalisation, people come in contact with such ideas, in this case a

¹⁰⁹ Lutz & Lutz, 2005, p. 16.

¹¹⁰ Kivisto, 2004, *Key Ideas in Sociology*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., p. 122.

¹¹¹ Bjørge, 2005, p. 258.

¹¹² Definition is presented by the information service of the European Union SCADPlus.

particular view on Islam. Roughly, there are two ways in which radical Islam channels the process of radicalisation. Firstly, researchers have stressed that radical Islam can provide meaning to one's life. Especially those that struggle with identity problems are likely to be susceptible to a radical version of Islam. That is, by associating with such radical ideas, these people assure themselves of another self-image. Radical Islam provides for example the idea that one can find its identity in 'pure Islam', by living like 'pure Muslims', according to outlined prescriptions. Subsequently, researchers have identified a second way in which radical Islam channels individual radicalisation. Radical Islam – and radical ideologies in general – can seriously lower the bar for turning to violent measures because it can provide religious justification, legitimation and glorification. In scientific research, the legitimation of terrorism is phrased in several ways such as 'divine validation'¹¹³, 'theological justification'¹¹⁴, 'the authority of religion giving moral legitimacy'¹¹⁵, or the 'justifying of atrocities'¹¹⁶. Radicalisation is about the increasing faith one has in a certain ideology and its justification aspect.

3.4.2.2 Terrorist organisation

The second aspect that becomes clear from the presented definition of radicalisation is that this process occurs prior to terrorism. Radicalisation does not necessarily have to lead to terrorism, but it could at worst do so. Radicalisation could well lead to situations in which people consider violent methods as completely legitimised and are subsequently willing to commit terrorist attacks. This is the point in which people can no longer be considered a faithful follower of a particular version of Islam, but as people wanting to use ruthless violence, i.e. as terrorists. Such people are likely to establish an organisation with kindred persons, or to join already existing groups that adopt terrorist methods. Again, such people have become fully radicalised, and will – if the circumstances are there – commit new-style terrorist attacks. While I treat this factor among those listed under phase 2, it actually belongs to the grey area between the second and the third phase. After all, phase 2 is about the developing process of radicalisation, while 'terrorist organisation' deals with those groups that can radicalise no further since they consider terrorist attacks already completely legitimate, or even necessary.

Until now, I merely stressed the possible relationship between individual radicalisation and the organisation of terrorist groups. However, a reversed relationship is also likely to exist. People do for example never become completely radicalised by one's own. Those that already are completely convinced of a certain ideology will persuade people that are not. By using recruiting methods, terrorist organisations are in that respect likely to have influence on the individual radicalisation process.

¹¹³ Sahar Mohammad, 2005, p. 105.

¹¹⁴ Howell, 2003, p. 178.

¹¹⁵ Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 186.

¹¹⁶ Bjørge, 2005, p. 258.

3.4.2.3 Alternative organisations

While there are often other fundamental causes that are at the basis of the emergence of terrorism, certain organisations can play an important role in encouraging and stimulating people to become radicalised. Some scholars made this for example clear by discussing absolute poverty as a cause of terrorism. They stressed that those that depend on aid for economic subsistence are more likely to be susceptible for certain recruiting organisations preaching a radical version of Islam. The same argumentation applies to the subsection about the diminishment of traditional social patterns. Those that alienate because of an erosion of traditional certainties could become more susceptible to those groups advocating radical ideologies in order to obtain some sort of identity. Another example would be the Quranic madrasas in which children become penetrated by a certain version of Islam that justifies and glorifies violent jihad. When one repeatedly hears a certain ideology without getting offered any alternative, such can become an important cause of terrorism. In general, scholars have stressed that organisations preaching radical ideologies can be considered as important vehicles in recruiting and radicalising people. However, again, radical ideologies offered by such alternative organisations are to be considered as an intermediate cause. That is, people usually embrace such ideologies as a result of more fundamental structural causes.

Again, relationships to the other factors in this phase exist. For example, in the course of time, certain alternative organisations could develop in such way that they transform to terrorist organisations. The rise of Hamas can be explained in this way, since that organisation was formerly a charity organisation operating in the Palestinian territories, establishing hospitals, education systems, and social services. In general, it seems likely that each of the three distinguished factors relate in some way to one another. The separation between the factors in this phase is, as already explained, to a certain extent an artificial one, not completely in line with reality. For example, terrorist organisations can also provide aid or education like alternative organisation do, and certain people of alternative organisation are radicalised in such way that they are to be considered terrorist, willing to apply terrorist methods.

3.4.3 Phase 3: development of a terrorist attack

This third and final phase deals with the facilitating causes that are distinguished in academic research. Whereas the first two phases dealt with structural causes leading up to radicalisation and with the radicalisation process as such, this phase is merely about those factors which make it likely that a terrorist attack will actually occur. That is, this phase deals with the majority of those factors that researchers have considered facilitating. Again, I shall treat each factor separately.

3.4.3.1 Openness of victim societies

In the preceding section, I stressed that scholars often elaborate on state structure as a factor that influences the likelihood of terrorist occurrences. According to these researchers, democratic states in general face more trouble in combating terrorism. Like explained, open (democratic) societies are hampered in their range of anti-terrorism policies compared to close authoritarian societies. That is, circumscribing terrorists would restrict liberties for societies as a whole, a result which is often considered unacceptable. To put it shortly like Crenshaw did: '[the] desire to protect civil liberties constrains security matters'.¹¹⁷ In general, the level of 'openness' of the potential country of assault is likely to facilitate the perpetration of a terrorist attack. Take for example the extent to which news disseminates. Such can be considered larger when a society is 'open' because open societies are in general more likely to respect press freedom and reject censorship. Such large-scale dissemination of news and information is likely to facilitate terrorism, since it enables terrorist to achieve their objective to create widespread fear. In short, the level of openness of societies is a distinguishable factor, likely to facilitate terrorism.

3.4.3.2 ICT and transportation technology

As explained, this research focuses on new-style terrorism. One should realise that a fundamental process lies at the basis of new terrorism: 'globalisation'. That is, a world that has not undergone the process of globalisation would be one without new-style terrorism. In this context, Giddens stresses that [...] 'new-style terrorism is made possible by the changes in communications technology that are driving globalisation [...]'.¹¹⁸ Such technology provides terrorists for example the ability to set-up a transnational network organisation, capable of immediate and straight communication. ICT technology also increases terrorists' opportunity to create far-reaching fear across populations. After all, Internet, television, and the like, provide direct and widespread information about possible attacks. Besides communications technology, transportation technology is another important facilitating factor of new-style terrorism. In the first place, this enables terrorists to move quickly around the globe. Moreover, it provides terrorists an opportunity to cause mass damage, like revealed on the 11th of September when two airplanes crashed in the World Trade Centre. According to Kegley, the contemporary world is '[...] a hospitable environment for the practice of terrorist tactics and contributed to the transformation of terrorism from an subnational instrument of political change to one whose methods now almost invariably and inescapably transcend national borders'.¹¹⁹ In short, ICT and transportation technologies are both causes that enormously facilitate terrorist practices.

¹¹⁷ Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383.

¹¹⁸ Giddens, 2006, p. 885.

¹¹⁹ Kegley, 2003, p. 8.

3.4.3.3 State sponsorship

The subject of state sponsorship in the preceding section does not need great modification. Researchers made clear that the sponsorship of terrorism is to be considered as an enabling cause of terrorism, i.e. as facilitating. Sponsorship can take several forms, such as providing financial means and safe havens. Furthermore, it would be fair to range the factor 'failed states' with state sponsorship. After all, like already stressed, by their inability to exercise territorial control, failed states provide a power vacuum terrorist organisations may exploit to maintain safe havens.¹²⁰ To my concern, such inability of failed states can be considered as indirect sponsoring.

3.5 Conclusion

Based on prevalent research, this chapter dealt with the origins of jihadist terrorism. In section three, I explored the academic literature that is available on this subject. Researchers have presented divergent factors that in a way explain the emergence of terrorism. Such factors could either be considered as structural or as facilitating. The fact that these factors could not be regarded sufficiently distinctive because there existed some overlap between them, turned out to be problematic. Therefore, in section four, I restructured these factors, thereby building a conceptual model in which I identified distinguishable and comparable causes of terrorism. The purpose of this model is by no means to present a definitive model. Instead, I merely created a reproduction of existing academic research, modified in a way that it fits the purpose of this study.

The conceptual model consists of three phases. The first phase deals with structural underlying conditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. These conditions can roughly be divided in three different clusters: a political, a economic, and a social one. In the second phase, I elaborated on the process of radicalisation, i.e. the process in which people become increasingly prepared to apply terrorist methods. I distinguished between two ways which could channel the individual radicalisation process. That is, radical Islam can both provide increasing religious legitimisation for terrorist methods and can provide meaning to life for those people that feel alienated. In the third and final phase I discussed the causes that make it likely that a terrorist attack will actually occur, i.e. factors that facilitate terrorism.

3.6 Closing off

Reason for creating a conceptual model in which several comparable causes are identified is because of structuralising purposes. After all, the following two chapters will deal with an exploration of the origins of terrorism as presented by the USA and the Netherlands. In order to provide a structural analysis of both countries, a model like presented here is of pivotal importance. By using this conceptual consisting of comparable origins of terrorism, I am better able to place the analyses as

¹²⁰ Bjørge, 2005, p. 258.

presented by the USA and the Netherlands. I shall do so by converting the origins both countries bring forward in their strategies to the distinguished causes of the model. In both Chapter 3 and 4, I shall devote a separate section which deals with such conversion, thereby enabling a valid comparison between the Netherlands and the USA. In that way, this chapter is to be considered of crucial concern since it determines the quality of the following parts of this research. Chapter 5 shall deal with an analysis of the proposed measures of the Netherlands. I shall however firstly turn to the analysis of USA's international anti-terrorism strategy.

Chapter 4: The USA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will deal with the international anti-terrorism strategy of the USA. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I will describe what kind of measures the USA proposes in its fight against international terrorism. In doing this, I will make use of the five pillar strategy the Bush Administration has constructed. This strategy is laid down in the so-called 'White House Counter-terrorism Reports'. The report which is of largest relevance for this research is the 'National Strategy for Combating Terrorism' (2003 and 2006). As the Bush Administration puts it: '[...] the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders'.¹²¹ This document is to be considered as the main strategy in the USA's fight against international terrorism. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is backed up by several other relating documents, like 'The National Security Strategy'. This Strategy has a broader nature in that it deals with other security dangers besides terrorism. However, it may be clear that – since 9/11 – (international) terrorism poses the biggest threat to security. Therefore, this document is also of importance with regard to this research. Furthermore, two evaluation documents will be taken into account in determining USA's strategy towards international terrorism: the 'Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism' and '9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges'. Finally, I will make use of three different speeches of president Bush, held on different points in time: one just after the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon (September the 20th, 2001), the other two more recently (October the 6th 2005, and September the 5th 2006). The second objective of this chapter is to identify which origins of terrorism the USA distinguishes in its anti-terrorism strategy. That is, I will attempt to uncover on which analysis of the origins of terrorism this strategy is based. Thereby, I try to find out in which way the USA legitimises the measures it proposes for fighting international terrorism. So, in short, the objective of this chapter is on the one hand to describe which anti-terrorism measures the USA proposes in its fight against international terrorism, and on the other hand to identify which analysis of the origins of terrorism is at the basis of those measures.

4.2 What is the USA fighting?

Whilst the focus of this research – jihadist terrorism – has been stressed several times, it does not make clear what the USA recognises by that. It could be that the USA and the Netherlands fight a different kind of terrorism, or have their focus on different kinds of terrorism. Therefore, it is relevant to determine the terrorists threat the American anti-terrorism measures are aimed at.

To begin with, in its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Bush Administration puts forward a definition of terrorism: '[...] premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated

¹²¹ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 2.

against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents'.¹²² The USA makes clear that it is primarily fighting jihadist terrorism by stating that the '[...] terrorist enemies exploit Islam to serve a violent political version. Fueled by a radical ideology [they want to] establish regimes that rule according to a violent and intolerant distortion of Islam'.¹²³ Subsequently, the USA recognises the notion of 'new-style terrorism' like I did the second chapter: 'While terrorism is not new, today's terrorist threat is different from that of the past. Modern technology has enabled terrorists to plan and operate worldwide as never before'.¹²⁴ In other words, the USA recognises that the terrorists they are fighting are different from others because of their global reach and objectives. Furthermore, the Bush Administration identifies another characterising aspect of today's terrorism by stating that the terrorist threat is a flexible, transnational network structure characterised by loose interconnectivity.¹²⁵ In short, the USA recognises the characterising aspects of new-style terrorism as identified in the second chapter.

More specifically, the Bush Administration is quite clear about the identification of the terrorist threat by stating that the enemy is Al-Qaeda. However: '[...] the enemy we face today in the War on Terror is not the same enemy we faced on September 11. [...] Today, the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organisations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends'.¹²⁶

4.3 USA's strategy: two different battles

Anti-terrorism measures have developed rapidly since the 11th of September 2001. Most American policy documents concerning terrorism start with the atrocities that occurred on 9/11. The message behind this is to remember the fact that America is fighting a War on Terror: 'America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001'.¹²⁷ Lots of measures in very different fields have developed since, including the formation of an entire new department (Department of Homeland Security). A look at the budget reveals that – only concerning homeland security – terrorism has gained enormous attention: it raised from \$9 billion in 2000 to \$32 billion in 2005.

Before getting in the details of the international anti-terrorism measures the USA conducts, one should recognise the ultimate goal that is behind these measures. To the Bush Administration, defending the home country is of primary importance. Such is made clear by stating that the '[...] U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist

¹²² The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 1.

¹²³ Ditto.

¹²⁴ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 10.

¹²⁵ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 8.

¹²⁶ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 5.

¹²⁷ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. i.

attacks'.¹²⁸ Although the protection of the homeland is USA's main objective, this does not imply that homeland security measures (such as border controls, extensive security checks in official building, etc.) is all that counts. On the contrary: 'The United States can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run'.¹²⁹ In short, to the USA, a good defence does also concern offensive matters.

In its National Strategy on Combating Terrorism, the Bush Administration distinguishes two elements in the War in Terror. According the USA, the War on Terror cannot be considered as an ordinary war like America has experienced in the past. That is, to the USA, this War is not only a 'battle of arms', it is also a 'battle of ideas': 'Our strategy also recognises that the War on Terror is a different kind of war. [...] Not only do we fight terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists' perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule'.¹³⁰ The distinction between a battle of arms and ideas is one between respectively short-term and long-term objectives: in the short-term the USA wants to eliminate terrorists that have plans of committing terrorist attacks, in the long-term they want to present an alternative to the terrorists murderous ideology.

4.3.1 The short-term approach: a battle of arms

Like stated, over the short-term, the USA considers the fight against terrorism as a 'battle of arms'. Such a battle is necessary to create the space and time for the long-term solution (see below) to take root. The battle of arms consists of four distinguishable pillars. Like the Bush Administration puts it: '[...] to win the War on Terror, we will [...] prevent attacks by terrorist networks (1); deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them (2); deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states (3); deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching for terror (4) [...]'.¹³¹ Until now, the Bush Administration pays great attention to the battle of arms. This can be deduced from a speech of president Bush in which he declares that '[...] the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows'.¹³² A similar conclusion emerges from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. That is, according to the Bush Administration, '[...] the best way to defeat terrorism is to isolate and localise its activities and then destroy it through intensive, sustained action'.¹³³ I now turn to the separate treatment of each of the four (short-term) pillars.

4.3.1.1 Prevent attacks by terrorist networks

¹²⁸ The White House, *Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism*, September 2003, p. 2.

¹²⁹ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 8.

¹³⁰ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 1.

¹³¹ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 1.

¹³² Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, 20th of September 2001.

¹³³ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 15.

The Bush Administration identifies three important ways of preventing attacks by terrorist networks. In the first place, the USA shall *attack terrorists and their capacity to operate*. This is of primary importance since ‘[...] the hard core among our terrorist enemies cannot be reformed or deterred; they will be tracked down, captured, or killed’.¹³⁴ By attacking these terrorists, the USA tries to diminish their capacity to operate effectively, thereby preventing future attacks by terrorist networks. ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ is by far the most notorious measure taken within this sub-pillar. The second way in which the Bush Administration tries to prevent future attacks is by *denying terrorists entry to the United States and disrupting their travel internationally*. By impeding terrorist mobility, the USA tries to inhibit their effectiveness. They have introduced several measures in this field, such as improving border security and visa screening and improving international information exchange. Finally, the Bush Administration will *defend potential targets of attack*. The targeting trend has been away from hardened sites (such as official government facilities) towards softer targets that can anyway produce mass casualties, economic damage, or both. Therefore, the USA is determined to deter and disrupt attacks, thereby protecting critical infrastructures and key resources, such as public health, energy facilities, and banking and finance services.

4.3.1.2 Deny weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states and terrorist allies

The second pillar that makes up the battle of arms is the one that enjoys great attention of the Bush Administration. In one of his speeches on the global war on terrorism, Bush declares that ‘[the] greatest threat this world faces is the danger of extremists and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction [...]’.¹³⁵ Therefore, the USA has taken aggressive steps in order to make sure terrorist organisations do not have the capability of committing attacks with weapons of mass destruction. The Bush Administration has come up with a comprehensive approach for addressing WMD. First, the USA tries to determine intentions, capabilities and plans to develop or acquire WMD. Furthermore, they try to deny, detect, and disrupt access to materials, expertise, and other enabling capacities required to develop WMD. Subsequently, the USA deters terrorists from employing WMD. If these attempts do not sort out any effect and the possibility of an attack by weapons of mass destruction against the United States has been detected, the Bush Administration is determined to ‘[...] contain, interdict, and eliminate the threat’.¹³⁶ The invasion of Iraq – starting on the 20th of March 2003 – showed that the USA is indeed willing to adopt aggressive measures in order to deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states. In its National Security Strategy, the Bush Administration again declared that it will not exclude future military force: ‘Taking action need not involve military force. [...] If

¹³⁴ Ditto.

¹³⁵ Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *President Discusses Global War on Terror*, 5th of September 2006.

¹³⁶ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 14-15.

necessary however, under long-standing principle of self defense, we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack'.¹³⁷

4.3.1.3 Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states

The Bush Administration is determined to thwart states that support terrorist organisation in every way they can. The USA considers states that support terrorists as equally guilty to murder: 'The United States and its allies and partners in the War on Terror make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbour terrorists. Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace'.¹³⁸ At the moment, the USA recognises five state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, Sudan, North-Korea, and Cuba. The Bush Administration is determined to maintain sanction against these nations and promote their international isolation until they give up their efforts of supporting terrorist organisations. In that way, the USA is trying to end the support of states to terrorists as a whole. Furthermore, according the Bush Administration: '[until] we can eliminate state sponsorship of terror, we will disrupt and deny the flow of support from states to terrorists'.¹³⁹ Iraq is a good example of what the USA thinks that needs to be done in order to stop the support of states to terrorists. 'Through Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States and its coalition partners defeated Saddam Hussein's regime, effectively eliminating a state sponsor of terrorism [...]'.¹⁴⁰ Thereby, the USA has eliminated Iraq as a sanctuary for the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi network, which helped to establish a training camp in the northern-eastern part of the country.

4.3.1.4 Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a launching pad for terror

Finally, with regard to the battle of arms, the removal of so-called 'safe havens' is of importance in War on Terror as well. To put it literally: 'Our terrorist enemies are striving to claim a strategic country as a haven for terror. From this base, they could destabilise the Middle-East and stroke America and other free nations with ever-increasing violence'.¹⁴¹ The USA aims at the removal of such states, so that terrorists are not provided with areas in which that they can prepare and organise their acts. Again, Iraq can act as an example here: '[...] along with our Coalition and the Iraqi government, we'll stop the terrorists from taking control of Iraq, and establishing a new safe haven from which to attack America and the free world'.¹⁴² Also Afghanistan illustrates this pillar, since the USA has '[...] deprived Al-Qaeda of safe haven in Afghanistan and helped a democratic government to rise in its place.'

¹³⁷ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 23.

¹³⁸ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 15.

¹³⁹ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 16.

¹⁴⁰ The White House, *Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism*, September 2003, p. 5.

¹⁴¹ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 16.

¹⁴² Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *President Discusses Global War on Terror*, 5th of September 2006.

Within this pillar, the Bush Administration distinguishes between four different kinds of launching pads: physical safe havens (geographic territories with for example weak government control), legal safe havens (legal systems in which effective investigation, prosecution, and extradition of terrorists is hampered), cyber safe havens (making use of the internet to disseminate propaganda, recruit new members, raise and transfer funds, etc.), and finally, financial safe havens (fiscal sanctuaries in which terrorists store and transfer funds). Measures on all these fields are necessary in fighting terrorism. That is, not only the establishment of firm control in certain areas in of importance in order to deny physical safe havens, one should also modify legal systems in a way that it makes it easier to deal with terrorists, deny the internet to terrorists, and secure banking systems.

4.3.2 The long-term approach: a battle of ideas

In the long run, the War on Terrorism is a battle between very different ideologies, and is also considered as the fifth pillar of the strategy for fighting terrorism. Just as with its short-term approach, the Bush Administration is very clear and straightforward about its long-term approach as well: ‘The long-term solution for winning the War on Terror is the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy’.¹⁴³ According the USA, terrorism will end if a decently functioning democracy is present. Roughly, the USA distinguishes two manners to establish this: by ensuring internal stability and external stability. Internal stability can be ensured in different ways. First of all, an effective democracy includes returning elections: ‘Elections are the most visible sign of a free society and can play a critical role in advancing democracy’.¹⁴⁴ The primary function of elections is to establish a *responsive government*, one that listens and submits to the will of the people. But – as the Bush Administration continues – elections alone are not enough. In a broad sense, democracy is about *honouring and upholding basic human rights*, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press. In this way, democracies are protectors of freedom, *limiting the reach of others – including governments – on people’s lives*. Furthermore, effective democracies *maintain order within their borders*. That is, democracies are able of addressing causes of conflict peacefully, can punish crime, and can resist corruption. In other words, the system of democracy makes sure that jurisdictions are decently governed and that it can function properly. External stability is the second way which helps in ending terrorism. That is, by establishing a democratic system, one avoids weak or failed states that become a sanctuary for terrorism and thereby constitute a source of international instability.¹⁴⁵ To the USA, democracies are the most responsible members of the international system. By establishing democracy, the Bush Administration aims at creating a political system that lives up to its international responsibilities.

¹⁴³ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 9.

¹⁴⁴ Ditto.

¹⁴⁵ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 23.

4.4 USA's analysis: the origins of terrorism

Until now, I outlined the international anti-terrorism measures as the USA proposes. In this section I turn to the next objective of this chapter by describing the underlying conditions that are at the basis of USA's international anti-terrorism strategy. That is, this part of research will be used to investigate USA's view towards the origins of terrorism: according to the Bush Administration, what are the factors that give rise to terrorism, i.e. what causes terrorism? Such underlying conditions are not always explicitly put forward in the policy documents of the USA. Sometimes, I have to deduce such arguments from the actual measures proposed. This part of research will again be divided in two parts: one that deals with the short-term approach and one that deals with the approach in the long-term.

4.4.1 Underlying conditions of 'the battle of arms'

This subsection will deal with two underlying factors that are at the basis of USA's short-term strategy: evil and civilisation, and the support from rogue states.

4.4.1.1 *Evil and civilisation*

USA's view towards terrorism is unambiguous: 'The hard core among our terrorist enemies cannot be reformed or deterred; they will be tracked down, captured, or killed.'¹⁴⁶ To the Bush Administration, these terrorists are 'evil', people at the wrong side. This notion is one which Bush explained several times in his speeches. To name just a few: 'The question is: Will we listen? Will we pay attention to what these evil men say?'¹⁴⁷, or: 'History teaches that underestimating the words of evil and ambitious men is a terrible mistake.'¹⁴⁸, or: 'Recently our country observed the fourth anniversary of a great evil [...]'¹⁴⁹, or, finally: 'They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.'¹⁵⁰ According to the USA, these evil men are united because they share an ideology consisting of oppression, violence, hate, and fear. They are an enemy that do not recognise peaceful coexistence with those that do not subscribe their vision and tolerate no alternative points of view. To the USA, terrorist methods are used by evil men who cannot be reformed or persuaded. No further underlying causes are put forward by the Bush Administration when it comes to the short-term approach of terrorism. Therefore, the Bush Administration states that the fight must be taken to the enemy in order to keep terrorists on the run. Apparently, to the USA, terrorism is something that exists, and to keep terrorists on the run is the only way to prevent future terrorist occurrences. The solution to terrorism in the short-term is to eliminate it, either by capturing

¹⁴⁶ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 11.

¹⁴⁷ Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *President Discusses Global War on Terror*, 5th of September 2006.

¹⁴⁸ Ditto.

¹⁴⁹ Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy*, 6th of October 2005.

¹⁵⁰ Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, 20th of September 2001.

or killing. Or, like already stated, '[...] the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it wherever it grows'.¹⁵¹

In this line of reasoning, the Bush Administration has repeatedly stated that – no matter what the conditions might be – acts of terrorism are uncivilised, and that in particular the attack of 9/11 was one against the very idea of civilised society.¹⁵² To put it literally: '[...] we have made clear that any government that chooses to be an ally of terror has also chosen to be an enemy of civilisation'.¹⁵³ According to the Bush Administration, the War on Terror is a clash between civilisation and those who want to destroy it.¹⁵⁴

4.4.1.2 Support from rogue states and safe havens

The second origin of terrorism the USA distinguishes concerns the support from rogue states. That is, two out of four of USA's short-term approach pillars deal with some kind of state support. With regard to the third pillar, which is about the denial of terrorist support and sanctuary from rogue states, the Bush Administration considers state sponsors as a critical resource for terrorists. Therefore, the Bush Administration repeatedly stresses that it makes no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbour terrorists. The fourth pillar, which deals with the denial of nations that function as a launching path for terror, is related to the third one, since it deals with a special kind of support rogue states can grant: safe havens. By distinguishing between four different kinds of safe havens, the USA appears to see this kind of state support as a critical contributing factor to terrorism as well. Like already stated in the third chapter of this research, some have a '[...] preference for seeing state sponsorship as such a crucial aspect, if not necessarily the root cause, of terrorism.¹⁵⁵ By identifying state sponsorship as the lifeblood¹⁵⁶ of terrorist groups and by stating that financial support and safe havens are the matters that terrorists need for survival¹⁵⁷, USA's anti-terrorism strategy is clearly based on such a preference.

In his research, Richardson explicitly turns to the USA by stating that American policy makers have continued to focus on state sponsorship as a root cause of terrorism. Formerly, it was the Soviet Union that posed a threat to the USA by sponsoring anti-West terrorist groups. The type of state support has however changed from Communist to Islamist: 'Today the threat is perceived to come from radical Islamic fundamentalists directed by rogue states such as Iraq or Syria rather than Communists directed by Moscow. The attention on the state continues'.¹⁵⁸ According to Richardson, the reason as to why the USA considers state sponsorship as a root cause of terrorism is threefold. The first reason Richardson brings forward concerns USA's simplified view of the world. The USA do not

¹⁵¹ Ditto.

¹⁵² The White House, *Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism*, September 2003, p. 2.

¹⁵³ Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *President Discusses Global War on Terror*, 5th of September 2006.

¹⁵⁴ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 29.

¹⁵⁵ Richardson, 2005, p. 191

¹⁵⁶ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 17.

¹⁵⁷ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 8.

¹⁵⁸ Richardson, 2005, p. 189

eagerly recognise internal complexities of other countries, such as multilateral institutions or nebulous sub-state movements. Instead, the USA has a '[...] preference for perceiving the world in traditional state-to-state terms with traditional forces such as military [...]'.¹⁵⁹ Secondly, the USA perceives state sponsorship as such an important factor because of their concern with weapons of mass destruction: 'The prevailing fear in the USA is that rogue states will hand over weapons of mass destruction to terrorists to use against them'.¹⁶⁰ The final reason Richardson comes up with has to do with Iraq: 'For all the arguments against Saddam Hussein, the only one which called for immediate action was the link with terrorism'.¹⁶¹ USA's urge to mobilise support for the war in Iraq resulted in an increasing focus on state sponsorship as a root cause of terrorism.

The evidence that could be found in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and related documents points in the same direction as Richardson's notion. After all, the War on Terrorism started with the invasion of two states: Afghanistan and – what is contemporary considered to be the primary battlefield – Iraq. However, some nuances have to be added regarding Richardson's view. That is, the Bush Administration has repeatedly stressed that this is a war dissimilar to others: 'Unlike conventional enemies, terrorists do not fight on a defined battlefield. They are found throughout the world, even in countries that are friendly to us'.¹⁶² Whilst the USA might have a preference for perceiving matters in state-to-state terms, such is not entirely true with regard to the War on Terror. However, USA's genuine concern of state sponsorship as a root cause of terrorism seems without dispute.

4.4.2 Underlying conditions of 'the battles of ideas'

The preceding subsection dealt with distinguishable origins of terrorism the Bush Administration puts forward in its short-term anti-terrorism strategy. This section deals with the long-term approach of the USA. Again, my aim is to distinguish underlying factors that according to the Bush Administration contribute to terrorism. Considering the measures the USA proposes in its long-term approach, the USA mainly brings democracy-related arguments forward that could explain the emergence terrorism. However, this section will also concern two other contributing factors: a murderous ideology, and market economy.

4.4.2.1. *Myths according the USA*

First of all, the Bush Administration wants to make clear that it does not recognise some factors which are generally considered as contributing to the emergence of terrorism. To put it literary: 'To wage the battle of ideas effectively, we must recognise what does and what does not give rise to

¹⁵⁹ Richardson, 2005, p. 191

¹⁶⁰ Richardson, 2005, p. 190

¹⁶¹ Richardson, 2005, p. 191

¹⁶² The White House, *9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges*, September 2006, p. 20.

terrorism'.¹⁶³ First, the Bush Administration stresses that there is no evidence suggesting that poverty causes terrorism: 'Terrorism is not the inevitable by-product of poverty. Many of the September 11 hijackers were from middle-class backgrounds, and many terrorist leaders, like bin Laden, are from privileged upbringings'.¹⁶⁴ Subsequently, the USA does not consider terrorism as a result of hostility to its anti-terrorism measures: 'The al-Qaida network targeted the United States long before the United States targeted al-Qaida'.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, with special regard to anti-terrorism policy in Iraq, the Bush Administration clarifies that the USA was attacked on the 11th of September 2001, well before they toppled the Saddam Hussein regime. Finally, the USA stresses that terrorism is not simply a result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 'Al-Qaida plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the 1990s, during an active period in the peace process'.¹⁶⁶

4.4.2.2 Democracy: the all-embracing answer

After having elaborated on explanatory myths of terrorism, the Bush Administration continues by stating four factors that actually give rise to terrorism. To put it literally: 'The terrorism we confront today springs from:

- § *Political alienation.* Transnational terrorists are recruited from populations with no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse political vision based on violence and destruction.
- § *Grievances that can be blamed on others.* The failures the terrorists feel and see are blamed both on others and on perceived injustices from the recent or sometimes distant past. The terrorists' rhetoric keeps wounds associated with this past fresh and raw, a potent motivation for revenge and terror.
- § *Subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation.* Terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving propaganda.
- § *An ideology that justifies murder.* Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents. Islam has been twisted and made to serve an evil end, as in other times and places other religions have been similarly abused'.¹⁶⁷

According the USA, in the long-run, these are the four main factors that give rise to terrorism. Although these factor are quite diverse in nature, they have in common that each of them could be countered by the establishment of an effective democracy. According the USA, in place of political alienation, democracy provides a chance to shape one's own future. By participating politically, one is able to determine the future of its country. Voting for example gives people the chance to choose a

¹⁶³ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 9.

¹⁶⁴ Ditto.

¹⁶⁵ Ditto.

¹⁶⁶ Ditto.

¹⁶⁷ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 9-10.

government near to their preferences. Concerning the second contributing factor the USA distinguishes, instead of festering grievances, '[...] democracy offers the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the habits of advancing interests through competition'.¹⁶⁸ In this context, the Bush Administration stresses that promotion of democracy is the most effective measure for conflict prevention: 'Effective democracies may still have disputes, but they are equipped to resolve their differences peacefully [...]'.¹⁶⁹ With regard to the third distinguished factor, democracy is immune to a culture of conspiracy, discredit falsehoods and propaganda. That is, democracy provides the freedom of speech and independent media which are crucial vehicles in producing alternative ideas, independent from propaganda-makers. And finally, democracy is about valuing and respecting human dignity, in which murderous ideologies cannot settle. The Bush Administration believes that the establishment of a democratic system resolves each of these four explaining factors of terrorism. Therefore, to the USA, the fundamental underlying cause of terrorism is a lack of democracy (and the matters that spring from such a deficit).

So, in short, to the Bush Administration, democracy is the answer for combating terrorism. One could accordingly conclude that in decently functioning democracies, terrorism is something that is absent. The Bush Administration however stresses the possibility that terrorism can also be present in democratic countries: 'Democracies are not immune from terrorism. In some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in society'.¹⁷⁰ These groups are often referred to as 'home-grown terrorists', i.e. terrorism which developed in (democratic) Western states, like the USA and the Netherlands. Also for these terrorists, the Bush Administration does not distinguish other possible circumstances that could explain the emergence of terrorism: 'Even in these cases, the long-term solution remains deepening the reach of democracy so that all citizens enjoy its benefits'.¹⁷¹ Clearly, to the USA, a lack of democratic opportunities is the main origin that is at the basis of terrorism.

4.4.2.3 A murderous ideology

The Bush Administration has repeatedly stressed that the War on Terrorism is a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. At the same time, they make clear that this war should not be considered as a conflict between religions: 'While the War on Terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of religions'.¹⁷² America is not at war with faithful followers of Islam. After all, religions beside Islam have been similarly abused to make it serve terrorist goals. The same holds here: 'Islam has been twisted and made to serve an evil end [...]'.¹⁷³ The problem consists of those who exploit Islam, those who become so fundamentalist that everyone who is in their eyes a dissident, should die. To the USA,

¹⁶⁸ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 10.

¹⁶⁹ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 15.

¹⁷⁰ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 10.

¹⁷¹ Ditto.

¹⁷² The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 9.

¹⁷³ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 10.

the problem is an ideology that justifies murder. They put this pithily by stating: 'Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents.'¹⁷⁴

4.4.2.4 Market economy

Like stated, the USA does not consider poverty as a (root) cause of terrorism. In its policy documents, the Bush Administration does however recognise that economic conditions can nevertheless play a role in explaining terrorism. That is, to the USA, freedom is indivisible: 'Political, religious, and economic liberty advance together and reinforce each other. [...] Over time, as people gain control over their economic lives, they will insist on more control over their political [...] lives as well'.¹⁷⁵ 'Economic freedom empowers individuals, and empowered individuals increasingly demand greater political freedom'.¹⁷⁶ In this way, economic freedom reinforces political freedom by expanding free flows of ideas, limiting the reach of government, and exposure to new ways of thinking and living.¹⁷⁷

To the USA, the way of enhancing such economic prosperity is by seizing the opportunities the globalised world provides: 'Globalisation presents many opportunities. Much of the world's prosperity and improved living standards in recent years derive from the expansion of global trade, investment, information, and technology'.¹⁷⁸ Therefore, the USA is severely opposed to protectionism and favouritism. Instead, they want to promote the '[...] enduring vision of a global economy that welcomes all participants and encourages the voluntary exchange of goods and services based on mutual benefit [...]'.¹⁷⁹ According the Bush Administration, they have been a leader in promoting economic globalisation. They have for example worked to create open markets and integrate the global economy trough launching the Doha Development Agenda. As a result, the global economy is more open and free, and many people around the world have seen their lives improved in terms of economic prosperity.¹⁸⁰

4.5 Translation to conceptual model

Until now, this chapter has dealt with two objectives. I firstly described the proposed anti-terrorism measures of the USA. I noticed that among these measures, one can distinguished between measures relating to a battle of arms and those relating to a battle of ideas. Subsequently, I described USA's view towards the origins of terrorism that is at the basis of this international anti-terrorism

¹⁷⁴ Ditto.

¹⁷⁵ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 4.

¹⁷⁶ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 25.

¹⁷⁷ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 27.

¹⁷⁸ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 47.

¹⁷⁹ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 27.

¹⁸⁰ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, p. 25.

strategy. Among other findings, I concluded that to the USA, democracy plays an vital role in explaining terrorism.

However, on the basis of these findings, I can still make no meaningful comparison between the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands. In order to enable such, I need to convert USA's view on the origins of terrorism to the terms of the conceptual model. This section deals with such conversion. I shall successively deal with each phase like distinguished in the previous chapter. With regard to phase 1 of the model, I shall both treat political voice and political oppression. Furthermore, I will treat 'economic freedom', a factor that cannot be explicitly placed in terms of the conceptual model. Subsequently, I will treat both phase 2 and phase 3 in which I will elaborate on two factors that are of sincere importance to the USA: evil and state sponsorship.

4.5.1 Phase 1 according to the USA

When taking a look at the preceding chapter, one can notice that the USA does mainly distinguish political factors that are likely to contribute to the emergence of terrorism. Like explained, to the USA, democracy is the all-embracing answer to terrorism. Also for those that live in (Western) democracies but nevertheless become convinced of radical ideas (so-called 'home-grown terrorism'), deepening democratic benefits is what is considered necessary to the Bush Administration. Accordingly, the political cluster as distinguished in the conceptual model is the one which enjoys USA's emphasis. I shall now turn to the individual treatment of the structural causes of terrorism as distinguished by the Bush Administration.

4.5.1.1 *Political voice*

Like explained, to the USA, terrorism emerges when a democratic deficit is present. Such could happen in different ways. The USA starts with its notion of 'political alienation' as a main cause in explaining terrorism. That is, the Bush Administration considers the lack of political expression and the inability to promote change in one's country as factors that contribute to the emergence of terrorism. Such a lack and inability could in turn produce festering grievances. If one does not have a stake in society, no chance to shape its own future, one cannot alter such situation. However, if one is able to express itself, peaceful resolution and advancing interests can be brought about.

This argumentation reconciles with the notion of political voice. Like explained, political voice is about the existing democratic opportunities people get offered. That is, the extent to which people are able to express themselves is a factor in explaining terrorism. Like stressed, political voice induces the formation of responsive governments which are likely to produce desirable social outcomes. In other words, political voice offers opportunities to reduce (political) grievances, thereby increasing satisfaction and political efficacy. So, in short, according the Bush Administration, a lack of political voice could lead people to turn to other methods in order to shape one's own future.

4.5.1.2 Political oppression

The Bush Administration does not endorse the main argumentation like presented by the notion of political oppression. That is, the USA does not explicitly put forward a relationship between the intensity of state interference and terrorism. The Bush Administration does however recognise the contributing aspect of political oppression to political voice. That is, in the preceding chapter I explained that civil liberties are of fundamental importance in democratic societies, since they provide the space to develop alternative views and ideas necessary in order to express one's preferences. To the USA shares this view by stating that liberties like freedom of speech and press are important vehicles in exposing and discrediting falsehoods, prejudices, and dishonest propaganda and stimulate the development of alternative ideas, independent from propagandists.

4.5.1.3 Economic freedom

Finally, the establishment of a market economy is of great importance to the USA. Like explained, such system will give people control over their economic lives. When that happens, people will insist on more control over their political lives as well. Those that are free to live economic lives, are more likely to insist on ways of political expression. In short, according to the USA, improved economic lives contribute to political demands, which in turn lowers the likelihood of terrorist occurrences. In that way, economic freedom is an underlying cause of political voice.

To the USA, the way to reach such economic prosperity is by creating open markets and by integrating the global economy, i.e. by economic globalisation. Therefore, the USA is severely opposed to protectionism and favouritism. Such argumentation is to a certain extent in contrast with the conceptual model. Although not only focussing on economic globalisation, I stressed the transformational character of this process. Such could lead to the erosion of traditional patterns, which in turn could be felt as threatening to one's identity. Such a situation can make people to reach for other certainties to identify with, including radical ideas. In contrast, to the USA, globalisation can eventually only decrease the likelihood of terrorism. According to the Bush Administration, economic globalisation stimulates economic prosperity, which in turn stimulates political prosperity.

4.5.2 Phase 2 according to the USA

Phase 2, which deals with the process of radicalisation, is one the USA does not put great emphasis upon. The Bush Administration does for example not bring forward a definition of radicalisation, nor does it emphasise a process that is likely to occur prior to terrorism. In the National Strategy on Combating Terrorism, the word 'radicalisation' is not mentioned once by the Bush Administration. In short, the Bush Administration does not give evidence of situations in which one could become increasingly convinced, and accordingly, increasingly prepared to adopt terrorist

methods. It does for example not recognise that radical Islam can channel individual radicalisation because it provides meaning to life for those that feel alienated.

The Bush Administration does however recognise the contributing role of a radical ideology. Like stressed earlier: 'Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents.'¹⁸¹ Phrases like these reveal that the Bush Administration puts great emphasis on the justification and glorification aspect of (religious) ideologies. In the preceding chapter, I however treated justifying aspects of radical Islam as a matter that channels the individual radicalisation process because it can increasingly lower the bar for turning to terrorist methods, as the process of radicalisation continues. The USA considers this however differently. To the Bush Administration, the justifying and glorifying aspect of a radical ideology is not part of a process of radicalisation. Instead, to the USA, the radical interpretation of Islam is a tool to legitimise terrorist attacks for those people that are already terrorist. In that way, to the Bush Administration, the use of a radical ideology seem to be intrinsically related to those groups that find terrorist methods (already) warranted, or even necessary.

4.5.3 Phase 3 according to the USA

While the USA does not distinguish a process of radicalisation prior to terrorism, it does discern a factor that is not present in the conceptual model as presented in the preceding chapter: 'evil'. While this factor cannot be explicitly placed in terms of the conceptual model, I nevertheless deal with that factor here. Furthermore, the USA puts great emphasis on state sponsorship as a cause of terrorism. I shall therefore treat that origin as well.

4.5.3.1 Evil

Like explained, the USA considers terrorists as evil, irrelevant from whatever condition. Terrorists are people at the wrong side, people that cannot be reformed or persuaded. Acts of terrorism are barbaric, uncivilised, and particularly the attack of 9/11 was one against the very idea of civilised society. According to the Bush Administration, by prescribing hate, violence, and fear, terrorists threaten USA's way of life. Terrorists embrace a preserve and murderous ideology which is made to serve an evil end. By repeatedly stating that terrorists and the ideology they exploit are innately evil, the USA seems to recognise this factor as one of main importance in explaining terrorism.

In the third chapter, I stated that evil cannot be regarded as a true origin of terrorism. The USA considers this however differently. That is, the anti-terrorism strategy of the USA is largely based on a clear good-wrong perspective. This becomes for example clear from phrases that the War on Terror is a clash between civilisation (i.e., good) and those who want to destroy it (i.e., wrong), or from statements of Bush's speech that the USA is fighting evil without any sides of grey. In this context, the

¹⁸¹ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006, p. 10.

Bush Administration discerns evil as a distinguishable factor which can explain the emergence of terrorism in two ways. Firstly, the USA seems to accept that there just are evil men around the world willing to commit terrorist attacks. Bjørgo illustrates this by stating that some argue that addressing the conditions that produce radicalisation is of pivotal importance, while others '[...] prefer the vision that terrorism is evil, poses a threat and should therefore be crushed and uprooted'.¹⁸² By giving no evidence of a radicalisation process that occurs prior to terrorism, and by putting great emphasis on terrorist being evil, the USA's anti-terrorism strategy is clearly based on such a vision. Secondly, the USA stresses that evil can influence and shape people to turn to terrorist methods. The USA makes this clear by stating that it wants to preserve people from getting into contact with evil ideas. Like stressed, by the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy, the USA wants to present an alternative for the perverse and evil ideology of terrorist groups. In other words, the USA considers democracy (political voice) as a underlying cause, that, if sufficiently guaranteed, can preserve people from turning to evil ideologies and practices.

The factor 'evil' is hard to place in terms of the conceptual model. In the first place, it is not a structural factor leading to a process of radicalisation (phase 1), and it is also not part of the radicalisation process itself (phase 2). After all, the USA does not recognise such a process. Since the USA considers evil of fundamental importance, it is also not to be considered as merely facilitating (phase 3). In fact, 'evil' is different from the other factors, because it cannot explicitly be captured by any of the distinguished phases. Instead, 'evil' is to be considered as a kind of background factor, playing an important role throughout the entire process that leads up to terrorism.

4.5.3.2 State sponsorship

The final origin of terrorism the USA distinguishes is about the support of rogue states that can provide financial means and safe havens. In the preceding chapter, I named such support 'state sponsorship'. Researchers stressed that the sponsorship of states is a factor which can make it more likely that potential attack will actually take place. State sponsorship is in that respect to be considered as one of the conditions which produce a conducive environment for new-style terrorist attacks to occur. The USA however considers state sponsorship as a factor that is more than just facilitating. Such becomes in the first place clear from the Bush Administration which repeatedly stresses that those who harbour terrorists are as equally guilty of murder. To the USA, state sponsorship is the lifeblood of terrorists groups, essential for their survival. Furthermore, I presented an argumentation of Richardson that explains why the USA does consider the support of rogue states as more than just facilitating. In fact, the USA seems to consider state sponsorship of such importance, that it would not only make the occurrence of a potential terrorist attack more likely, but that it is a structural factor of terrorism as well, conducive to the organisation of terrorist groups as such.

¹⁸² Bjørgo, 2005, p. 1

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the analysis of USA's international anti-terrorism strategy. I did so in three ways. Firstly, I explored the measures as proposed by the USA in its anti-terrorism strategy. Secondly, I investigated USA's view on the origins of terrorism. Subsequently, I translated those origins to the terms of the conceptual model.

In its anti-terrorism policy documents, the Bush Administration stresses that America is fighting a War on Terror. This war consists of a short- and a long-term battle. To the Bush Administration, in the short-run, the fight against terror is a battle of arms. This implies that the USA is fighting terrorism by destroying terrorists and their sanctuaries, and by eliminating them the necessary support they need to survive. In the long-run, the USA is fighting a battle of ideas by presenting an alternative to the terrorists murderous and perverse vision.

Subsequently, with regard to the exploration of USA's origins of terrorism, I did two important findings. The first one relates to USA's focus on the political cluster of structural conditions. To the USA, the establishment of an effective democracy is the all-embracing answer to end terrorism. More specifically, according to the USA, a lack of political voice, that is, the inability of political expression, is an important factor in explaining terrorism. Such a lack produces irresponsible governments that are unable and/or unwilling to remove people's grievances, thereby contributing to the emergence of terrorism. Moreover, a lack of civil liberties – such as the freedom of speech – reinforces the inability of political expression. In addition, the Bush Administration recognises another underlying condition of terrorism, one that is not distinguish in the conceptual model: economic freedom. According to the USA, economic freedom empowers individuals, and empowered individuals increasingly demand greater political freedom. In that respect, economic freedom is to be considered as a underlying factor affecting the political cluster.

The second major finding with regard to USA's view on the origins of terrorism concerns the fact that the Bush Administration puts little, if any, emphasis on phase 2 of the conceptual model (the process of radicalisation). In the preceding chapter, I treated 'radical ideology' (radical Islam) as a matter that channels the individual radicalisation process. The Bush Administration does however not give evidence of situations in which one could become increasingly convinced, and accordingly, increasingly prepared to employ terrorist methods. The USA does stress that terrorism ultimately depends on a radical ideology that provides religious legitimisation and glorification for committing terrorist attacks. However, to the USA, such is not part of a radicalisation process, but is considered as a propagating tool to legitimise terrorist attacks for those people that are already terrorist.

While the USA does not distinguish a process of radicalisation prior to terrorism, it does discern a factor that is not present in the conceptual model: 'evil'. In general, the anti-terrorism strategy of the USA is pervaded of a good-wrong mentality. In that context, the USA considers evil as a distinguishable origin of terrorism. On the one hand, the Bush Administration seems to accept that

this world hosts evil men willing to commit terrorist attacks. It on the other hand stresses that, under certain circumstances, including political voice, people can be persuaded by evil ideas. The USA wants to prevent such by presenting an alternative to the terrorists evil ideologies and practices. Furthermore, the USA considers state sponsorship as an important factor to terrorism. To the Bush Administration, state sponsorship is the lifeblood of terrorist groups, crucial for their survival. Accordingly, the USA deems those that harbour terrorists as equally guilty of murder. In short, the USA seems to consider state sponsorship as such an important origin, that it would not only make the occurrence of a potential terrorist attack more likely, but that it is a structural factor of terrorism as well, conducive to the organisation of terrorist groups as such.

The view of the USA on the origins of terrorism, in which it focuses on the political cluster of phase 1, evil, state sponsorship, and the non-focus on phase 2 (process of radicalisation) is graphically reflected in a conceptual model as presented in appendix 3.

Chapter 5: The Netherlands

5.1 Introduction

Whereas the preceding chapter dealt with strategy of the USA, this chapter will deal with the international anti-terrorism strategy of the Netherlands. Again, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I will describe what kind of measures the Netherlands takes in its fight against international terrorism. In doing so, I will make use of several policy documents. Unfortunately, unlike USA's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Netherlands does not have an overall policy strategy for fighting terrorism. Instead, most appropriate information about Dutch international anti-terrorism measures is laid down in so-called memoranda (letters) that are written by Dutch Ministers. The memorandum that is of largest relevance is one written by the former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and deals with the breeding grounds of international terrorism. This memorandum is largely based on an advice of the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV). Besides this letter, there are other memoranda that are written by the former Ministers of Justice and Immigration. Whilst these are mainly concern with domestic terrorism matters, some arguments that are used in these memoranda are also to be considered appropriate for this research. Furthermore, in combination with its fellow member states, the Netherlands also has developed anti-terrorism measures on the European level. The most important documents in this context are 'The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy' and 'The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism'. Some of the Dutch memoranda contain an explicit reference to these EU policy documents. Therefore, I can validly use these European anti-terrorism strategies as well. The second objective of this chapter is to identify which origins of terrorism the Netherlands distinguishes within its international anti-terrorism strategy. That is, I will attempt to uncover on which analysis of the origins of terrorism this strategy is based. Thereby, I try to find out in which way the Netherlands legitimises the measures it proposes for fighting international terrorism. So, in short, the objective of this chapter is on the one hand to describe which anti-terrorism measures the Netherlands proposes in its fight against international terrorism, and on the other hand to identify which analysis of the origins of terrorism is at the basis of those measures.

5.2 What is the Netherlands fighting?

Like explained in the previous chapter, whereas the focus of this research – jihadist terrorism – has been stressed several times, such does not make clear what the Netherlands recognises by that. It could be that the Netherlands and the USA fight a different kind of terrorism, or have their focus on different kinds of terrorism. Therefore, it is relevant to determine the terrorist threat the Dutch anti-terrorism measures are aimed at.

To begin with, the Netherlands recognises two crucial aspects of terrorism by stating that it is violence aimed at non-combatants, perpetrated in order to influence the political decision-making process.¹⁸³ Furthermore, the Netherlands seems to endorse the notion of new-style terrorism. That is, in his memorandum on the breeding grounds of international terrorism, former Minister Bot stresses that today's terrorists are guided by an agenda that has a global reach.¹⁸⁴ Additionally, he also recognises that jihadist terrorists are willing to use ruthless violent means in order to achieve maximum effect. Finally, the Netherlands recognises another characterising aspect of new-style terrorism by stating that terrorists make use of network-organisations and all kinds of information- and communication technologies.¹⁸⁵ In short, the Netherlands recognises the characterising aspects of new-style terrorism as identified in the second chapter.

More specifically, the Dutch government stresses that globally, the emphasis in the fight against terrorism is on jihadist terrorism. They define jihadist terrorism as the exertion of terrorism against enemies of the Islam, in order to establish a society which is the purest reflection of what the original sources of the Islam prescribe.¹⁸⁶ Despite its ability to define jihadist terrorism in one sentence, the Dutch government considers radical Islam as a plural and dynamic phenomenon. Ideally, three different kinds of radical Islam can be distinguished. The first one, named radical political Islam, focuses on the dominant political power of the West. Therefore, the resistance to dominant Western power is where this type of radical Islam centres on. The second type, radical Islamic Puritanism, is different from the first one because it emphasises the cultural dominance of the West, instead of on its political dominance. The focus is on the resistance to the pernicious western way of life, that is to be considered as a threat to 'pure Islam'. The third kind of radical Islam is called radical Muslim nationalism. This type is less religiously inspired, because it does not so much centre on Islam as a religion, but on 'being a Muslim', i.e. belonging to the Muslim community.

To the Netherlands, the plural phenomenon called jihadist terrorism is the one where its international anti-terrorism strategy centres on. Especially jihadist terrorist group Al-Qaeda deserves great attention: '[...] the terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and extremists inspired by Al-Qaeda has become the main terrorist threat to the Union. While other types of terrorism continue to pose a serious threat to EU citizens, the Union's response [...] focuses on this type of terrorism'.¹⁸⁷ However, to the Netherlands, Al-Qaeda is not a very narrowed group of terrorists that threaten their way of life. Instead, the Dutch government makes an elaborate distinction between different kinds of Al-Qaeda: Core Al-Qaeda, allied Al-Qaeda, and those that feel inspired by Al-Qaeda. The first kind refers to the 'old' organisation around Bin Laden, i.e. those that were responsible for the 9/11-attacks. The second

¹⁸³ Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 27th of September 2006, p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 27th of September 2006, p. 4.

¹⁸⁵ Van Aartsen, J.J., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: Islamitisch radicalisme in het Midden-Oosten en Centraal Azië*, 10th of November 2001, p. 4.

¹⁸⁶ Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 27th of September 2006, p. 1.

¹⁸⁷ Council of the European Union, *The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, 24th of November 2005, p. 2.

kind is about those cells, groups and networks that are in contact with Core Al-Qaeda, but that are not managed by it. The final kind refers to those that are not in contact with Core Al-Qaeda, but are nevertheless inspired by its ideology. Al-Qaeda, as the Dutch government makes clear, has become a trademark, even for those networks that autonomously operate from Core Al-Qaeda.¹⁸⁸

While emphasising jihadist terrorism, the Dutch anti-terrorism strategy mainly focuses on domestic terrorism. Until now, the Netherlands has merely experienced terrorism perpetrated by those that were settled in the country itself. The best-known terrorist group in this context is the Hofstad-network which assembled regularly in Amsterdam, the capital of The Netherlands. For this reason, most proposed measures of the Dutch government are about so-called home-grown terrorists. This explains why most documents about anti-terrorism measures are written by the Minister of Domestic Affairs and the Minister of Integration. However, despite the fact that this research is focused on international terrorism, some arguments used in the domestic anti-terrorism policy documents are also appropriate for this study.

5.3 The Dutch strategy: a four pillar approach

Before getting into the details of the Dutch international anti-terrorism strategy, one should realise the ultimate goal that is behind this strategy first. The Netherlands considers terrorists and their indiscriminate murderous activities as a severe threat to the constitutional state. However, not only terrorist methods are incompatible with the principles of the constitutional state. Also radicalism as such is to be considered irreconcilable with such principles because of its conviction of own superiority and inaccessibility for reasonable debate.¹⁸⁹ The fight against terrorism is one in order to protect the constitutional state and its democratic rule of law. It is therefore of genuine importance that anti-terrorism measures aimed at defending the democratic rule of law do not damage that principle. That is, throughout the entire period in which terrorism is combated, the Dutch government will make sure that the measures for fighting terrorism will not undermine respect for fundamental rights.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, the fight against terrorism is one that should take place within certain principles: legality, legitimacy, and proportionality.¹⁹¹ First, anti-terrorism measures should be based on legal competences. Subsequently, measures against terrorism are to be considered legitimate. In that way, effectiveness only cannot be the leading criterion to determine which policies will be developed. Finally, one should be aware that anti-terrorism policies are proportionately conducted and do not produce overreaction. This means that the battle against terrorism can only be considered effective if human rights are fully respected and observed. In other words, according to the Dutch government, the fight against terrorism should not erode that what it is willing to protect.

¹⁸⁸ Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 27th of September 2006, p. 3.

¹⁸⁹ Donner, J.P.H., *Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Terrorisbestrijding*, 19th of August 2005, p. 6.

¹⁹⁰ Council of the European Union, *The European Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, 24th of November 2005, p. 4.

¹⁹¹ Donner, J.P.H., *Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Terrorisbestrijding*, 19th of August 2005, p. 13.

As explained, in its anti-terrorism strategy, the Netherlands mainly focuses on domestic terrorism. The Netherlands nevertheless recognises that jihadist terrorism poses a global threat as well, which demands for an international approach. Therefore, by signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, which established an area of freedom, security, and justice, terrorism became part of the first pillar of the EU. As a result, many of the Dutch international anti-terrorism measures are proposed on EU-level. These international policies are taken according a four pillar approach. In its Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the EU stresses that its objectives are ‘[...] to *prevent* new recruits to terrorism (1); better *protect* potential targets (2); *pursue* and investigate members of existing networks (3) and improve the capability to *respond* to and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks (4)’.¹⁹² I shall successively treat each pillar in the following subsections.

5.3.1 Prevent

The first pillar of the EU Strategy has a preventive character. The main objective is to prevent people from turning to terrorism and to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging.¹⁹³ This pillar consists of a combination of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ measures. To begin with the former measures, the EU aims at tackling the root causes which lead to radicalisation and recruitment. According to the EU, there is a divergent range of conditions in society which create an environment in which individuals can become easily radicalised, such as poor governance, and a lack of political, economic, and educational opportunities. Among other measures, the Union tries to counter these conditions by promoting good governance, human rights, democracy, and economic prosperity. Furthermore, according to the EU, in fighting radicalisation, one has to target inequalities and discrimination and promote inter-cultural dialogue and long-term integration.¹⁹⁴ The last measures – the inter-cultural dialogue and long-term integration – seem to enjoy special emphasis of the Union. According to the EU, encouraging the intercultural dialogue – both within and outside the Union – will lead people to appreciate cultural diversity. It will for example create clarity about the distinction between a radical version of Islam and the mainstream interpretation.¹⁹⁵ Such will stimulate mutual understanding, respect and tolerance between cultures and religions, thereby producing an environment in which people become less susceptible to radical ideas and practices. One of the measures the EU wants to take in this context is to declare 2008 as the European Year of the inter-cultural dialogue.

The second way in which the EU wants to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging is by conducting so-called ‘hard’ measures. This means in the first place that the Union is determined to disrupt activities of networks that draw people into terrorism, thereby concentrating on recruitment hotspots like prisons and places of religious training and worship. In that context, the Union wants to establish a strong legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising violence.

¹⁹² Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 30th of November 2005, p. 6.

¹⁹³ Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 30th of November 2005, p. 7.

¹⁹⁴ Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 30th of November 2005, p. 9.

¹⁹⁵ Donner, J.P.H., *Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme*, 24th of June 2003, p. 17.

Furthermore, the EU recognises that the Internet is an essential source for terrorists that want to get support for their radical propaganda. Therefore, the EU is determined to impede terrorist recruiters using the Internet.

5.3.2 Protect

This pillar deals with the defence of the Union's key targets. The EU wants to reduce vulnerability to attack, and also reduce the resulting impact of a terrorist attack.¹⁹⁶ In doing so, the Union distinguishes three areas which demand protection: infrastructure, borders, and citizens. To begin with, the EU considers the protection of infrastructure of major importance. After all, the destruction of infrastructure can damage the EU economy severely. Such is becoming increasingly likely as new technologies (like the Internet) and market liberalisation (e.g. electricity and gas supply) mean that much infrastructure is part of a larger network.¹⁹⁷ The EU also emphasises the necessity to protect the transport sector, i.e. airports, seaports, and aircraft arrangements. Until now, the measure that is of greatest importance in this context is the establishment of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), a programme which contains a '[...] clear definition of critical infrastructure and which sets out the key principles for protection of critical infrastructure [...]'.¹⁹⁸ Secondly, the Union wants to enhance border protection to make it harder for known or suspected terrorists to enter or operate within the EU. In increasing the effectiveness of its border controls, the EU wants to make improvements in technology for both the capture and exchange of passenger data, and the inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel documents.¹⁹⁹ Finally, the EU distinguishes the protection of citizens. It does so by stressing that it has to develop methodologies for protecting crowded places and other soft targets from attack.

5.3.3 Pursue

This pillar deals with those measures aimed at pursuing terrorists across borders and disrupting terrorist activities. The Union distinguished between three phases within this field: the identification of a terrorist, followed by pursuing of terrorists, and finally the prosecution of terrorists, i.e. bringing the terrorists to justice. In this context, the EU adopted the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which allows the arrest of criminal suspect for trial or detention valid throughout the EU, and is thereby an attempt to increase the speed of extraction throughout EU countries.

The second cluster of measures is about the disruption of terrorist activities, which could happen in different ways. First, according to the EU, terrorists must be deprived of the means by which they mount attacks, i.e. weapons and explosives.²⁰⁰ The EU considers all interested parties, in

¹⁹⁶ Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 30th of November 2005, p. 10.

¹⁹⁷ European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/protection, retrieved in the 1st of August 2007.

¹⁹⁸ Ditto.

¹⁹⁹ Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 30th of November 2005, p. 10.

²⁰⁰ Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 30th of November 2005, p. 13.

particular the industry (like producers, transporters, researchers), responsible for the reduction of the possible misuse of weapons. Furthermore, the ability of terrorists to communicate and plan undetected should be impeded by the retention of telecommunications data and limiting the opportunities offered by the Internet.²⁰¹ Finally, to the EU, tackling terrorist financing is of importance in combating terrorism. According to the Union, terrorist financing covers two distinctive aspects: '[...] on the one hand the financing of terrorist attacks and on the other the financing of terrorist networks, including recruitment and promotion of terrorist causes'.²⁰² The EU aims at impeding money transfers by terrorists, in which tackling the misuse of the non-profit sector is a priority.

5.3.4 Respond

The fourth and final pillar concerns responding measures. The EU stresses that it cannot reduce the chance of a potential terrorist attack to zero. Therefore, when prevention fails, it is of importance to prepare, manage, and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack.²⁰³ Of course, solidarity, assistance, and appropriate compensation to the victims of terrorism and their families is of largest importance here. Furthermore, the EU aims at consolidating alert-systems, which is guaranteed by setting-up ARGUS: a central crisis coordination system which links all specialised EU systems for emergencies. The final key element of response planning is the necessary processes for decision making in the event of a crisis, as established by the EU.

5.4 The Dutch analysis: the origins of terrorism

Until now, I outlined the international anti-terrorism measures as the Netherlands is conducting. In this section I turn to the next objective of this chapter by describing the underlying conditions that are at the basis of the Dutch international anti-terrorism strategy. That is, this part of research will be used to investigate the Dutch view towards the origins of terrorism: according to the Netherlands, what are the factors that give rise to terrorism, i.e. what causes terrorism? Such underlying arguments are not always explicitly put forward in the policy documents of the Netherlands. Sometimes, I have to deduce such arguments from the actual measures proposed.

To the Dutch governments, there does not exist something like breeding grounds of terrorism. Such notion would suggest that it is understandable that some people turn to terrorist methods. However, according to the Netherlands, terrorism is unjustified under every single circumstance. Therefore, the Dutch governments rather speaks in terms of 'factors that contribute to terrorism'.²⁰⁴ Former Minister Bot stresses that one is able to distinguish three kind of factors: structural (prevailing

²⁰¹ Ditto.

²⁰² European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/fsj_terrorism_prevention_disrupt_en.htm, retrieved on the 1st of August 2007.

²⁰³ The Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1195&lang=en&mode=g, retrieved on the 1st of August 2007.

²⁰⁴ Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 27th of September 2006, p. 3.

conditions), motivating (the way individuals interpret and perceive structural factors), and trigger factors (incidents that can accelerate a terrorist process).

According to the Dutch government, until now, the factors that contribute to the emergence of terrorism can be covered by four broad categories: political and social marginalisation and exclusion (1), perception of Western society as an enemy (2), local and regional conflicts (3), and finally, poverty (4).²⁰⁵ These categories are distinguished in a memorandum about the factors that give rise to international terrorism. The conclusions like presented are to a large extent derived from an advice of the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV).

5.4.1 Political and social marginalisation and exclusion

To the Netherlands, marginalisation and exclusion of certain communities in a quickly evolving world has produced an important, maybe even the most important factor contributing to the emergence of terrorism. In his memorandum, Bot firstly elaborates on social marginalisation. With regard to that, the Dutch government stresses that large social changes are of importance here. Many of the Middle-East countries find themselves in a process of transition.²⁰⁶ These processes can involve modernisation, rapid economic growth, or the transition from an autocracy to a democracy. Such can lead to fundamental changes in society, like increasing cleavages between social classes, or a growth of Western influences. Those that do not want to keep up with such changes because they perceive them as a threat to their traditional norms and their identity, could start to feel misunderstood, i.e. marginalised.²⁰⁷ In this context, former Minister for Development Cooperation Van Ardenne stresses that changing processes like modernisation and globalisation are likely to play a role in the emergence of terrorism. According to the Minister, both processes inevitably influence traditional religious convictions and practices, which in turn could be felt as a threat of one's identity. Van Ardenne stresses that the fear for losing one's own identity in a globalising world is undoubtedly one of the main causes behind each kind of fundamentalism.²⁰⁸ In that way, the desire to preserve traditional norms could lead to violence resistance.

In his memorandum, former Minister Bot continues by elaborating on political marginalisation. That is, according to the Dutch government, large parts of the population in Islamic states do not have opportunities to participate in the decision-making process and have no say in the development of their countries. The combination of a lack of democracy, civil liberties, good governance, and the rule of law is at the basis of such inability.²⁰⁹ People that encounter situations in which they have no influence on the decision-making process and additionally have no chance to enjoy any perspective or resolution, are more likely to be susceptible to radical ideas and methods.

²⁰⁵ Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 27th of September 2006, p. 5.

²⁰⁶ Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 10th of April 2006, p. 2.

²⁰⁷ AIV, *Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief*, September 2006, p. 13.

²⁰⁸ Van Ardenne, A.M.A., *Niet om zieleljes te winnen, maar om levens te redden*, 12th of September 2005.

²⁰⁹ AIV, *Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief*, September 2006, p. 14.

Clearly, to the Dutch government, structural factors like political and social marginalisation are at the basis of terrorism. This however does not mean that structural factors directly cause terrorism. Factors like political and social marginalisation can lead to situations in which people become increasingly susceptible to extremist groups and their ideologies. Such ideologies are therefore to be considered as a motivating factor to terrorism because they stimulate a process of radicalisation. The reason why so many people feel attracted to radical Islam is because other ideologies, such as socialism and pan-Arabism, have lost their attractiveness since, despite their promise, they did not bring about any social or economic development. Therefore, it was necessary to find a new ideology that was not discredited yet and could fill up the vacuum. According to the Dutch government, susceptibility among people as a result of structural shortcomings in society provides opportunities for recruiting organisations. Political marginalisation has for example contributed to the attractiveness of 'pure Islam' as a way to end one's grievances, i.e. as an option for improvement. In short, the search for solutions in the radical Islam for problems that have become structural factors in society, is to be considered as a motivating factor of terrorism.²¹⁰ According to the Dutch government, radical Islam can in turn provide opportunities to legitimise and propagate terrorism. Core Al-Qaeda for example claims to represent pure Islam, thereby abusing religion to justify their role as warriors for Islam.

5.4.2 Presenting Western society as the enemy

The next distinguished Dutch factor that contributes to terrorism is the following. The Dutch government stresses that in substantial parts of the Islamic world, people have an ingrained image of the West as the ultimate enemy. According to the Netherlands, many Muslims embrace the idea that the fight against terrorism primarily consists of a battle against the Islam as such. In that context, the Dutch government stresses that radical activists often refer to certain incidents in order to demonstrate that Islam itself is under fire. For example, radical Muslims continually proclaim that Muslims living in Europe are being discriminated and discourteously treated, thereby reinforcing the feeling that Muslims are not accepted in Europe.²¹¹ Many in the Middle-East are convinced of certain stereotyped and degraded views about the Western world and its outlooks and interests. The Dutch government has identified this as 'Occidentalism' and stresses that certain concrete events of anti-terrorism policies, like the incidents of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, are likely to reinforce such.²¹² To a lesser degree, same convictions towards the Muslim population exist in Western societies. The attack on 9/11 for example caused negative stereotypes about Islam, and an increasing suspicion among

²¹⁰ Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 27th of September 2006, p. 6.

²¹¹ Donner, J.P.H., *Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme*, 24th of June 2003, p. 6.

²¹² AIV, *Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief*, September 2006, p. 15.

Western people towards Muslims.²¹³ This development gave Muslims the feeling that they are indeed not welcome in Europe, thereby pushing some of them towards radical Islamic groups.

The ideas and images about the Western world are often imposed by either governmental or religious leaders and have sometimes resulted in explicit feelings of hatred towards Western society. To these people, the West is the cause for everything that is wrong in one's country or region. Besides, some in the Arabic world see their culture and religion as superior and have great problems in accepting Western political and economic dominance. This, in combination with popular conspiracy theories and familiar accusations against the West, contributes to a sphere in which (support for) terrorism is likely to thrive. In short, according to the Netherlands, the negative perception in the Arabic world towards the West can become an important motivating factor of terrorism.

5.4.3 Local and regional conflicts

The next category that provides a contributing factor to terrorism is covered by the notion 'local and regional conflicts'. To the Netherlands, it are not conflicts as such – like Kashmir, Chechnya, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and Iraq – that provide an distinguishable cause of terrorism. Such conflicts often take place in similar situations in which certain people of a population do not consider themselves as part of that population as a whole. Instead, they believe to have a distinctive identity, one that is insufficiently recognised by those outside their own group. To the Netherlands, such a neglected position in combination with a lack of political means to end such a situation could lead certain people to reach for terrorist methods.

Again, radical Islam can play an important motivating role here. That is, radical Islam has caused these conflicts to become characteristic examples of the inferior positions of Muslims throughout the world. To these people, such conflicts prove the existence of a distorted balance of power, i.e. a situation in which Muslims are suppressed and harassed. Of course, such visions contain an element of truth. The Dutch government stresses that the Islamic world has experienced great periods in which it has been leading in world history. Nowadays, it is the Western world that is to be considered dominant in political, economic and cultural sphere. According to the Netherlands, such can be perceived as an unfair situation of power dissimilarity in which people feel dominated by foreign rule. However, the vision of inferiority clearly presents a perception of reality. For example, in the view of those that cherish radical Islam, other conflicts – such as NAVO-interference in Kosovo – in which Western countries stepped up to protect the Muslim population, are not taken into account. According the Dutch government, these perceptions of reality can become an important motivating cause of terrorism.

²¹³ Donner, J.P.H., *Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme*, 24th of June 2003, p. 6.

5.4.4 Poverty

The Netherlands states that poverty (social-economic deprivation) is often brought forward for explaining terrorism. The Dutch government conversely stresses that it is convinced of the incorrectness of this notion. After all, many terrorists throughout the world came from prosperous middle-classes. The Dutch government however continues by stating that social-economic positions can contribute to terrorism, because they offer opportunities for certain radical organisations. That is, in situations where governments are unable to offer elemental needs, radical organisations can provide the necessary charitable activities. Such organisations can for example offer education and health care, thereby providing a social safety net. In providing such essential needs, these organisations are likely to gain support for their radical views and actions among the population. According the Dutch government, some even succeed in actively recruiting people to participate in terrorist activities. In short, underlying social-economic conditions can provide opportunities for certain radical organisations, thereby contributing to the emergence of terrorism.

Furthermore, the Dutch government stresses that in Islamic countries, differences in affluence are likely to occur. This could for example be the result of increased oil revenues, leading to the enrichment of certain groups of people. According to the Netherlands, because of such internal inequality, excluded persons are likely to become susceptible to terrorist ideas and methods.²¹⁴ For that matter, the leaders of certain terrorist groups do often not turn out to be very disadvantageded themselves. They however claim to represent those that are poor and marginalised.

5.4.5 Alienation: a crisis of identity

Like explained, in its anti-terrorism strategy, the Netherlands largely focuses on domestic terrorism. In those policy documents, the major argument that is used to explain the emergence of terrorism is covered by the concept of integration. To put it literary: '[...] if integration fails it can provide fertile ground for violent radicalisation to develop.'²¹⁵ In general, according to the EU, violent radicalisation is a mixture of both negative feelings, and positive (mobilising) feelings about becoming part of a group.²¹⁶ Negative feelings cover those matters that can alienate people from the existing system. Such could happen when people perceive their situation as iniquitous, because they have the feeling of being excluded or discriminated. According to the EU, this is likely to happen to certain people of immigrant groups. Especially young people born to immigrant parents and raised in Europe can face such situations. That is, many of these people do not longer feel great fidelity to their parents' countries of origin. Therefore, they can only really become part of the country where they have been raised and where they live. However, some of them can have the feeling that they are not completely accepted because they encounter discrimination on the basis of for example cultural, linguistic, or

²¹⁴ AIV, *Terrorismbestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief*, September 2006, p. 14.

²¹⁵ European Commission, *Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation*, 21st of September 2005, p. 6.

²¹⁶ European Commission, *Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation*, 21st of September 2005, p. 14.

religious differences. Such alienation from both parental roots and the society they live in, makes these people susceptible to other matters they can identify with. This is where, according the EU, positive feelings start to contribute: 'It is this crisis of identity that can be seen as being a strong motivating force for many to become involved in organisations with strong beliefs who wish to avenge certain people or society in general, through terrorist acts'.²¹⁷ In short, when people are not sufficiently integrated and thereby encounter the feeling that they are not fully accepted in society, they can start feeling alienated. This can make it '[...] more likely for a person to look for a sense of identity and belonging elsewhere such as in a powerful extremist ideology'.²¹⁸

While the presented argumentation above is concentrated on domestic matters, the same reasoning can be used with regard to this research about international terrorism. That is, apart from the alienation of both parental roots and the society in which one lives, it is perfectly possible that other developments lead to similar situations in which one feels uprooted. According to the EU, globalisation can for example result in situations in which one feels its identity is being threatened. Again, such experiences can result in alienation, frustration, and anger, thereby making it more likely for some to look for a sense of identity, something radical Islam can provide.

5.5 Translation to conceptual model

Until now, this chapter has dealt with two objectives. I firstly described the proposed anti-terrorism measures of the Netherlands. I concluded that the Dutch government wants to prevent new recruits to terrorism, to protect potential targets, to pursue terrorists, and finally, to respond to the consequences of a terrorist attack. Subsequently, I described the Dutch view towards the origins of terrorism that is at the basis of this international anti-terrorism strategy.

However, on the basis of these findings, I can still make no meaningful comparison between the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands. In order to enable such, I need to convert the Dutch view on the origins of terrorism to the terms of the conceptual model. This section deals with such conversion. I shall deal with each phase like distinguished in the third chapter. With regard to phase 1 of the model, I shall successively treat absolute poverty, relative poverty, political voice, political oppression, dissimilarity of power, and diminishment of traditional social patterns. Subsequently, I shall turn to phase 2 in which I will elaborate on the individual process of radicalisation, and on alternative organisations. This section concludes by elaborating on phase 3.

5.5.1 Phase 1 according to the Netherlands

When taking a look at the preceding section, one can notice the broad range of structural factors the Dutch government distinguishes. The Netherlands recognises that every cluster as put

²¹⁷ European Commission, *Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation*, 21st of September 2005, p. 14.

²¹⁸ European Commission, *Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation*, 21st of September 2005, p. 6-7.

forward in Chapter 3 is likely to contribute to the emergence of terrorism. Besides the measures the I discussed above, such is also emphasised in a memorandum by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Aartsen. Among other things, he stresses that the yawning gap between the poor and the rich (economic), the inability to organise politically (political), and the introduction of lifestyles irreconcilable with traditional values (social) are likely to create a conducive environment for becoming radicalised.²¹⁹ I shall now turn to the individual treatment of every structural cause of terrorism as distinguished by the Dutch government.

5.5.1.1 Absolute poverty

Like explained, the Netherlands does not consider poverty as a root cause of terrorism. However, it subsequently stresses that social-economic positions could play a role in explaining terrorism. That is, according to the Dutch government, social-economic circumstances could in certain cases provide opportunities to radical organisations. Such organisations can offer elemental needs, thereby obtaining support among the population for their radical ideas and actions.

In the third chapter, I brought forward the same argumentation by the notion of ‘absolute poverty’. I stressed the vulnerability of people living below the poverty line, because they are dependent on aid for survival. Subsequently, I stated that it is likely that such vulnerable groups come in contact with charity organisations. While such organisations can provide a stable living, at the same time, some of them espouse a radical agenda through their aid. In other words, those that cannot guarantee themselves full economic subsistence are increasingly susceptible to radical ideas of certain groups.

5.5.1.2 Relative poverty

Besides recognising absolute poverty, the Netherlands distinguishes ‘relative poverty’ as a factor that can contribute to terrorism as well. While not elaborately discussing this matter, the Dutch government stresses that internal inequality, caused by a yawning gap between the poor and the rich elite, contributes to the susceptibility of these excluded groups to turn to radical ideas and terrorist recruiting organisations.

In chapter 3, I stressed the same argumentation. Researchers have explained that relative poverty is about the economic equality between groups of people. If one perceives significant inequalities of wealth, this could contribute people’s frustration. In that way, relative poverty is an underlying cause that could lead people to become radicalised. So, in short, the Netherlands distinguishes both absolute and relative poverty as underlying causes that explain the emergence of

²¹⁹ Van Aartsen, J.J., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: Islamitisch radicalisme in het Midden-Oosten en Centraal Azië*, 10th of November 2001, p. 6.

terrorism. Thereby, the Netherlands recognises the entire economic cluster as brought forward in the conceptual model.

5.5.1.3 Political voice

As already stressed in the introduction of this subsection, to the Netherlands, the inability to organise oneself politically could be considered a factor contributing to the emergence of terrorism. More specifically, according to the Dutch government, large parts of the population in Islamic states do not have opportunities to participate in the decision-making process and have no say in the development of their countries. This could lead to situations in which one experiences a lack of perspective and resolution to one's grievances. In this context, the Dutch government stresses for example that if one perceives himself in a neglected position and lacks the political means to end that situation, this could lead certain people to reach for violent methods. In short, according former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bot, a freedom deficit – a lack of democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights - is likely to play a role in explaining terrorism.

By these comments, the Netherlands recognises that a lack of 'political voice' is a distinguishable contributing factor of terrorism. After all, if people could organise and express themselves politically, participation in the decision-making process would be established, thereby giving people a say in the running of their countries. In that way, the need to turn to other methods in order to get influence, diminishes. Furthermore, political voice increases political efficacy and satisfaction, thereby producing responsive governments. Governments that honour the preferences of citizens can actually provide perspective and a resolution to one's grievances. In that way, good governance can be established.

5.5.1.4 Political oppression

Only marginally stressed, in its policy documents, the Netherlands brings a lack of 'civil liberties' forward as a potential cause of terrorism. That is, by stating that some Islamic countries do not provide people the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, the Dutch government stresses that this is likely to be the result of a lack of civil liberties, democracy, and the absence of a constitutional state. Such a phrase comes close to the argumentation that political oppression, as defined in the third chapter, is related to the factor of political voice. That is, civil liberties are of fundamental importance in democratic societies, since they provide the necessary space to develop alternative views and ideas in order to express one's preferences. It is however fair to state that the Dutch government does not extensively elaborate on this matter. Therefore, I cannot with full certainty conclude that the Netherlands perceives political oppression as an indirect of terrorism, because it would hamper political voice.

5.5.1.5 Dissimilarity of power

As explained in the preceding section, nowadays, it is the Western world that is to be considered dominant in political, economic and cultural sphere. According to the Netherlands, for some in the Arabic world, this can be perceived as a distorted situation. Such is especially considered so, because the Islamic world has experienced great periods in which it has been leading in world history. To the Dutch government, in considerable parts of the Islamic world, the dominance of the West is conceived unjust, unfair, and unreasonable, thereby generating an environment in which terrorism is likely to thrive.

In the conceptual model, this argumentation is covered by the notion of 'dissimilarity of power'. That is, researchers explained that inequalities as a result of unbalanced situations of power are likely to contribute to the emergence of terrorism. I for example cited Bjørgo by stating that if some possesses overwhelming power compared to others, the latter can be pushed to situations in which it sees no realistic ways to improve its position. According to the Dutch government, this is likely to occur in the Arabic world, because of their relative powerlessness and the resulting resentment towards Western society.

By fully appreciating 'political voice' and 'dissimilarity of power' as causes that explain the emergence of terrorism, and by briefly mentioning political oppression as a potential indirect contributing factor, the Netherlands put great emphasis on the distinguished political cluster of the conceptual model as well. I shall now turn to the social cluster, by elaborating on the diminishment of traditional social patterns.

5.5.1.6 Diminishment of traditional social patterns

As already stated in the introduction of this section, to the Dutch government, the introduction of lifestyles irreconcilable with traditional values is likely to contribute to the emergence of terrorism. Such new lifestyles can come about by social changes in society, like rapid modernisation. To the Netherlands, those that do not want to keep up with such changes because they perceive them as a threat to their traditional norms and their identity, could start to feel misunderstood, i.e. marginalised. Like explained, former Minister Van Ardenne stresses that the fear for losing one's own identity is undoubtedly one of the main causes behind each kind of fundamentalism.²²⁰

In the conceptual model, this argumentation is covered by the notion of 'diminishment of traditional social patterns'. That is, I explained that such diminishment can lead to situations of alienation. Alienation from traditional values and certainties could in turn be felt as threatening to one's identity. If the resulting identity crisis is severe enough, such can lead people to turn to other certainties offered by radical ideas.

In addition, the Netherlands stresses the same argumentation in its domestic anti-terrorism policy documents. Like explained, people born to immigrant parents are more likely to be susceptible

²²⁰ Van Ardenne, A.M.A., *Niet om ziertjes te winnen, maar om levens te redden*, 12th of September 2005.

to radical ideas: '[...] alienation from both the country of origin and the host country can make it more likely for a person to look for a sense of identity and belonging elsewhere such as in a powerful extremist ideology'.²²¹ Despite the fact that it is not the diminishment of traditional social patterns that is at the basis of this argumentation, the causal reasoning is similar to that notion.

5.5.2 Phase 2 according to the Netherlands

As explained in the third chapter, phase 2 deals with the process of radicalisation, i.e. the period that covers the development of potential terrorists. The Dutch government stresses that such a process of radicalisation is generally prior to terrorism. Or, to put it differently, according the Dutch government, the process of radicalisation could at worst lead to terrorism.²²² The Netherlands has defined radicalisation as the '[...] increasing preparedness to accept the ultimate consequences of ones views regarding the change of the existing system and putting it into action, which generates an uncompromising attitude towards those who think differently'.²²³ To analyse this process, the Dutch government created a so-called ring model in which it distinguishes four different rings, each representing a different group of people. The exterior ring covers the population in general. The next one consists of those that have sympathy with terrorist acts and that are therefore susceptible for recruitment. The third ring covers those that actively support terrorist networks in diverse ways. And finally, the interior ring consist of the actual terrorists that are willing and able to apply terrorist methods. To the Netherlands, centripetal motions are to be considered as processes of radicalisation.²²⁴ I shall treat two of the factors as put forward in the conceptual model: individual radicalisation and alternative organisations.

5.5.2.1 Individual radicalisation

As explained, the Dutch government distinguishes between structural and motivating factors. Whereas phase 1 dealt with the structural aspects, this subsection covers the motivating factors that, according to the Netherlands, are at the basis of terrorism. To the Dutch government, radical Islam can provide a motivating factor in three ways. Firstly, radical Islam can provide meaning to one's life. That is, those who alienate from society can feel a strong attraction to a powerful extremist ideology with which they can identify. Radical Islam can provide solutions for identity problems by offering plain objectives, duties, and certainties to hold on to. In the third chapter, I stressed the same argumentation by stating that radical Islam provides the idea that one can find its identity in 'pure Islam', by living like 'pure Muslims', according to outlined prescriptions.

²²¹ European Commission, *Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation*, 21st of September 2005, p. 14.

²²² Ministry of Domestic Affairs, *Van dawa tot jihad: De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde*, December 2004, p. 6.

²²³ Donner, J.P.H., *Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Terrorismebestrijding*, 19th of August 2005, p. 2.

²²⁴ AIVD, *Contraterrorisme in Nederland*, June 2003, p. 7.

Secondly, the Dutch government thinks a process of radicalisation is channelled by the legitimising power of radical Islam. That is, according to the Netherlands, religious convictions can both increase the preparedness and reduce the reticence to commit violent acts.²²⁵ Such is for example realised by glorifying martyrdom. In the third chapter, I came to a similar conclusion by stating that (radical) ideologies can seriously lower the bar for turning to violent matters because they can provide religious justification and glorification.

Finally, contrary to the conceptual model, the Netherlands distinguishes a third way in which radical Islam channels the process of radicalisation. The Dutch government stresses that (radical) ideologies offer people an option for improvement by providing both solution to and explanations of one's grievances. According the Netherlands, such explanations are often provided by depicting the Western world as an ultimate enemy, responsible for everything that is wrong in one's country or region. In short, according the Dutch government, radical Islam offers people an explanation for grievances and an outlet for anger by propagating a supposed proof of a clash between the West and Islam.²²⁶

5.5.2.2 *Alternative organisations*

As stated in the third chapter, certain organisations can play an important role in stimulating people to become radicalised. I explained that organisations preaching radical ideologies are important vehicles in obtaining support and in recruiting people. The Netherlands stresses the same notion. That is, just like the argumentation as presented in the third chapter, the Dutch government stresses that those that live in rough social-economic circumstances are likely to come in contact with charitable organisations which espouse a radical agenda through their aid. In providing essential needs, these organisations are likely to gain support for their views and actions among the population. Furthermore, similar to the notion of Quranic madrasas, the Netherlands endorses that in situations where hatred is the only matter that is being thought, such can become contributive to terrorism.²²⁷ In other words, similar to the conceptual model, the Dutch government recognises the facilitating character of these (alternative) organisations.

5.5.3 Phase 3 according to the Netherlands

This subsection treats the third and final phase as distinguished in the conceptual model, i.e. the conditions which make it likely that a terrorist attack will actually occur. The Dutch government indicates the transition from phase 2 to phase 3 by stating that among those that accept an extremist

²²⁵ AIV, *Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief*, September 2006, p. 15.

²²⁶ Council of the European Union, *The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, 24th of November 2005, p. 4.

²²⁷ Van Ardenne, A.M.A., *Niet om ziele te winnen, maar om levens te redden*, 12th of September 2005.

ideology, only few actually turn to terrorism.²²⁸ The Netherlands however seems to put little emphasis on this phase because it does not distinguish many conditions that make such a turn more likely. The Dutch government does for example only marginally mention that supporting organisations can help terrorists in performing their acts, and it does not at all stress that rogue states could play an important role in making a potential terrorist attack more likely. The only factor on which the Dutch government largely elaborates is what researchers distinguished as 'ICT'. The Netherlands stresses that communication technology have increased the opportunities for terrorist organisations to correspond, plan, and organise. In this context, the Dutch government seems to regard the Internet as an important matter, since the government stresses that it can be used both for preparation and recruitment activities. On the one hand, Internet provides a way for anonymous and sheltered communication, thereby enhancing terrorist planning. On the other hand, Internet offers opportunities for recruiting organisations since it has a great reach for spreading radical propaganda.²²⁹

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the analysis of the Dutch international anti-terrorism strategy. I did so in three ways. Firstly, I explored the measures as proposed by the Netherlands in its anti-terrorism strategy. Secondly, I investigated the view of the Dutch government on the origins of terrorism. Subsequently, I translated those origins to the terms of the conceptual model.

In its fight against international terrorism, the Netherlands does not make use of a comprehensive strategy that singles out its focus. The Dutch government however indicates that jihadist terrorism is a global threat, which needs to be combated on an international level. Therefore, since 1997, when the member states of the EU put their signature under of the Treaty of Amsterdam, terrorism belongs the supranational first pillar of the EU. The Union does have a comprehensive strategy for fighting terrorism. This strategy is based on four pillars. The EU aims at *preventing* new recruits to terrorism, *protecting* targets of attack, *pursuing* terrorists, and *responding* to the consequences of a terrorist attack.

Subsequently, with regard to the Dutch view on the origins of terrorism, I did two important findings. Firstly, I became aware of the broad range of structural factors the Dutch government distinguishes. In terms of the conceptual model, the Netherlands fully recognises the economic cluster of phase 1 by stressing that both absolute poverty and relative poverty are likely to contribute to terrorism. Secondly, the Dutch government largely recognises the political cluster as distinguished in the conceptual model. According to the Netherlands, both political voice and a dissimilarity of power are factors that explain the emergence of terrorism. Besides, it marginally states that political oppression could contribute to a lack of political voice. Finally, with regard to the social clusters, the

²²⁸ Council of the European Union, *The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, 24th of November 2005, p. 2.

²²⁹ NCTb, *Jihadisten en het internet*, December 2006, p. 8-10.

Dutch government recognises that diminishment of traditional social patterns could contribute to the emergence of terrorism, since alienation from traditional certainties can stimulate people to turn to ways to adopt some other sort of identity, something radical ideologies can provide.

The second key finding relates to the motivating factors the Dutch government distinguished. In terms of the conceptual model, this means that the Netherlands puts great emphasis on phase 2, the individual process of radicalisation in particular. Roughly, the Netherlands distinguishes three ways in which radical Islam channels individual radicalisation. First, radical Islam can provide meaning to one's life, because it prescribes that one's true identity can be found in 'pure Islam' by living according to outlined prescriptions. Secondly the Netherlands realises that radical Islam provides religious justification and – perhaps even more important – glorification, for example by praising martyrdom. The Dutch government recognises that this can seriously lower the bar for turning to violent methods. Finally, the Netherlands distinguishes a third way in which radical Islam channels radicalisation. According to the Dutch government, radical Islam provides explanations to one's grievances by depicting the Western world as an ultimate enemy, responsible for everything that is wrong in one's country or region. That is, according the Dutch government, radical Islam offers people an explanation for grievances and an outlet for anger by propagating a supposed proof of a clash between the West and Islam.

The view of the Netherlands on the origins of terrorism, in which it recognises divergent structural conditions that are at the basis of terrorism (phase 1) and in which it puts great emphasis on the individual process of radicalisation (phase 2), is graphically reflected in a conceptual model as presented in appendix 3.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Recall

On the 11th of September 2001, when two airplanes crashed in the American World Trade Centre, everyone became aware of what will be the central theme of this research: terrorism. This event made politicians aware that action was required in order to prevent similar events. As a result, fighting terrorism was made top priority. Numerous policies have been taken in order to stop the terrorist threat, both in international and in domestic perspective. By means of this research, I investigated the international anti-terrorism strategies of both the Netherlands and the USA. Reason for doing so concerns the observation that both countries seem to approach terrorism in a different way. That is, in fighting terrorism, the Netherlands appears to adopt a preventive approach by focusing at addressing the causes of terrorism, whereas the USA seems more concerned with fighting the manifestation of terrorism itself (repressive). This research' objective is to investigate if a different view these countries have on the origins of terrorism could be at the basis of such a difference. By investigating this, I made use of the following research question: *What are the differences and similarities between the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands concerning the fight against international jihadist terrorism and to what extent are those strategies of both countries based on different analyses of the origins of terrorism?*

In order to answer the main question, I divided this research in four parts. Chapter 2 dealt with the meaning of terrorism. By presenting a definition of terrorism, and by distinguishing between different types of it, I was able to focus on a specific kind of terrorism, and accordingly able to narrow my research. The next chapter dealt with a theoretical exploration of the origins of terrorism. By investigating existing research, I made an inventory of the available literature dealing with causes leading up to terrorism. The following two chapters dealt with the investigation of the measures proposed in the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA (Chapter 4) and the Netherlands (Chapter 5). I shall shortly recall the contents of both Chapters 2 and 3 first.

In Chapter 2, I discussed the definition of terrorism, thereby discriminating two core concepts: its psychological effect of fear (1) and its focus on political objectives (2). Furthermore, I identified the concept of terrorism in two ways. Firstly, I made a distinction between old- and new-style terrorism. The latter style has three characterising aspects: a global reach, ruthless ways of violence, and a network structure. The second way in which I defined terrorism was by identifying several kinds of it, including religious terrorism. I drove that distinction further by focusing on jihadist terrorism. This type of terrorism refers to 'jihad', which is Arabic for 'fight' or 'struggle'. Jihadistic terrorists'

ultimate goal is to establish a society which is the reflection of what the original sources of Islam prescribe. In short, this chapter provided the opportunity to narrow my study by distinguishing new-style jihadist terrorism as the focus of research.

Chapter 3, named 'the origins of jihadist terrorism', dealt, as its title reveals, with those factors and conditions that cause terrorism. Such was considered necessary because it would give structure to the following parts of research. This chapter was divided in two parts. Firstly, I made an inventory of the literature that is available on the origins of terrorism. Researchers have presented divergent factors that in a way explain the emergence of terrorism. Such factors could either be considered as structural (prime movers) or as facilitating. This inventory however proved to be of inadequate utility, because the factors could not be regarded sufficiently distinctive. Therefore, I restructured these factors, thereby building a conceptual model in which I identified distinguishable and comparable causes of terrorism. The purpose of the model is by no means to present a definitive model. Instead, I merely created a reproduction of existing academic research, modified in a way that it fits the purpose of this study: providing structure to the investigation of the American and Dutch anti-terrorism strategies. The conceptual model as presented in Chapter 3 consists of three phases. The first phase deals with structural underlying conditions that explain the emergence of terrorism. These conditions can roughly be divided in three different clusters: a political, a economic, and a social one. In the second phase I elaborated on the process of radicalisation, i.e. the process in which people become increasingly prepared to apply terrorist methods. There are two ways in which this could happen. Radical Islam can channel the individual radicalisation process both by providing increasing religious legitimation for terrorist methods and by providing meaning to life for those people that feel alienated. The third and final phase dealt with the causes that make it likely that a terrorist attack will actually occur, i.e. factors that facilitate terrorism.

6.2 Comparison

The following two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) dealt with the actual investigation of the international anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands. In those chapters, I both described the actual measures that are proposed in these strategies and I discussed the view of both countries on the origins of terrorism. This conclusion provides room for the final part of this research: a comparison between the USA and the Netherlands. In this section, I compare both countries by discussing the similarities and differences of the actual anti-terrorism strategies and by discussing the (different) analyses of the origins of terrorism that are at the basis of those strategies.

Both the USA and the Netherlands have laid down their anti-terrorism tactics in a national or common strategy. In its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the USA distinguishes between a battle of arms (the short-term approach towards terrorism), and a battle of ideas (the long-term approach). Although the Netherlands itself does not provide an anti-terrorism strategy, it refers to the

strategy of the EU as the leading approach for combating terrorism. The strategies of both countries are very broad, involve numerous measures and plans, and therefore contain considerable similarity. There are however also notable differences between the approach of both countries. The next subsection deals with those measures of both countries that contain considerable similarity. By contrast, the subsequent subsections shall successively compare the Netherlands and the USA on each of the three phases, and will discuss some considerable differences, both with regard to the anti-terrorism measures proposed and the underlying origins of terrorism these countries distinguish.

6.2.1 Non-distinctive measures: respond and protect

Policies that both the USA and the Netherlands find necessary in the fight against international terrorism concern *responding* and *protecting* measures. These are measures that do not differ greatly between both countries. I also did not expect to find such a difference in these fields. After all, to adequately respond to a future attack, and to protect certain areas in order to reduce the consequences of a future attack are such rational actions to take, that probably any country facing the threat of terrorism would find it necessary to develop such measures. I will therefore just shortly compare the strategies of the USA and the Netherlands in this fields.

When prevention fails, the Netherlands is determined to prepare, manage, and minimise the consequence of an attack, i.e. to *respond* to a (future) terrorist attack. One of the proposed measures in this field is the establishment of a central crisis coordinating system. Similarly, despite its best efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks, the USA considers preparedness and response of importance as well. Therefore, it does also stress the necessity of a national system to bring together and coordinate all required response. So, responding measures are both to the Netherlands and the USA considered necessary in the fight against international terrorism.

Another set of measures that contains considerable similarity concerns the *protection* of possible targets. In this context, the Netherlands has developed measures aimed at reducing both the vulnerability to be attacked, and the resulting impact of an terrorist attack. In doing so, the Netherlands distinguishes three areas which demand protection: infrastructure, borders, and citizens. The USA also considers defence of potential targets of attack necessary. It is determined to deter and disrupt attacks, thereby protecting critical infrastructures and key resources, such as public health, energy facilities, and banking and finance services. So, also protecting measures are both to the Netherlands and the USA considered necessary in the fight against international terrorism.

6.2.2 Phase 1

Whereas the responding and protecting measures of the USA and the Netherlands can largely be considered similar, other parts of their anti-terrorism strategies contain substantial differences. Let me start with *prevention* measures. Although the objective, stop the next generation of terrorists from

emerging, is the same, the actual measures that both countries propose in this field are to be considered dissimilar. In its strategy, the Netherlands proposes many measures in different fields to prevent future terrorism, such as promoting good governance, human rights, democracy, economic prosperity, inter-cultural dialogue, long-term integration, and non-discrimination. At the basis of this broad range of measures lies a similar comprehensive set of origins of terrorism as distinguished in phase 1 of the conceptual model. According to the Netherlands, factors as political voice, oppression, and a dissimilarity of power, relative poverty, absolute poverty, and the diminishment of traditional social patterns are all likely to cause terrorism. In short, at the basis of the Dutch anti-terrorism strategy lie factors of all three clusters – political, economic, and social – of the conceptual model.

Compared to the Netherlands, the USA has not developed a broad and divergent range of preventing measures. To stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging, the Bush Administration solely stresses the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy. In different ways, it argues that democracy and political opportunities are the key matters that need to be promoted in order to prevent future terrorism. At the basis of this preventing strategy lies the American focus on the political cluster, and political voice in particular, of the conceptual model. According to the Bush Administration, a lack of political voice, that is, the inability of political expression, is the most important factor in explaining terrorism. Such a lack produces irresponsible governments that are unable and/or unwilling to remove people's grievances, which in turn is contributing to the emergence of terrorism. Other factors, such as political oppression and economic freedom, are also likely to play a role in explaining terrorism, although both of these factors relate to political voice. So, in short, whereas all three clusters are at the basis of the Dutch broad range of preventing measures, the USA solely recognises factors of the political cluster as origins of terrorism, and has accordingly promoted the advancement of effective democracy as the preventing strategy only.

6.2.3 Phase 2

Similar to the comparison of phase 1, when one compares the USA and the Netherlands on the second phase, some remarkable differences emerge. As explained, phase 2 of the conceptual model deals with the process of radicalisation. According to the Netherlands, recognising this process is of vital importance in order to understand the emergence of terrorism. The Dutch government therefore greatly emphasises the factor 'individual radicalisation' as distinguished in the conceptual model. By stressing that radical Islam can provide religious legitimisation, meaning to life, and a solution to one's grievances, the Dutch government discerns three ways in which one could become increasingly convinced, and accordingly, increasingly prepared to employ terrorist methods. This specific analysis of the process of radicalisation is likely to be at the basis of certain particular anti-terrorism measures as the Netherlands proposes in its strategy. The Dutch government for example stresses that non-

discrimination and long-term integration measures are of importance, because that would prevent certain people from alienating from society, which in turn makes it less likely that those people radicalise. Furthermore, the Dutch government stresses that the process of radicalisation is about the intolerable idea that the Western world is the cause for everything that is wrong in one's country. These kind of experiences has increased suspicion among Western people towards Muslims in general. The Dutch government responds to this situation of polarisation by for example promoting the intercultural dialogue. Such should stimulate mutual understanding, respect and tolerance between cultures and religions, thereby producing an environment in which people become less susceptible to become radicalised. In short, phase 2 of the conceptual model seems to be largely at the basis of particular measures the Netherlands proposes in its anti-terrorism strategy.

By contrast, the USA does not consider the process of radicalisation to be of importance. That is, in its strategy, the Bush Administration does not give evidence of situations in which one could become increasingly convinced and prepared to use terrorist methods.

6.2.4 Phase 3

The USA does however put forward two other origins of terrorism, factors that deviate from the conceptual model as presented in Chapter 3. The first factor concerns the fact that the anti-terrorism strategy of the USA is largely based on a clear good-wrong perspective. In that context, the Bush Administration considers 'evil' as a factor that explains the emergence of terrorism. On the one hand, the Bush Administration simply seems to accept that this world hosts evil men willing to commit terrorist attacks. It on the other hand stresses that, when democracy and freedom are absent, people can easily become persuaded and attracted by evil ideas. This idea of 'evil' as an origin of terrorism seems to underlie USA's strategy for fighting terrorism significantly. By recognising evil as a cause of terrorism, the USA seems to embrace the idea that the only way to evil (terrorism) is by eliminating it, i.e. by conducting harsh measures. Compared to the Netherlands, the USA noticeably proposes such repressive measures with a harsh character. Take for example the prosecution of terrorists. While the Netherlands merely speaks of bringing terrorists to justice within a framework in which legality, legitimacy, and proportionality are guaranteed, the USA expresses itself in terms of attack, eliminate, capture, and kill. According to the Bush Administration, the best way to defeat 'evil terrorism' is to isolate and localise its activities and then destroy it through intense, sustained action. In short, the USA does not recoil from proposing harsh and far-reaching measures, including military force, in order to disrupt terrorist activities. On the contrary, by means of its battle of arms, the USA actually emphasises the necessity of such repressive measures.

The second factor that deviates from the conceptual model concerns the sponsorship of states. Although researchers generally consider 'state sponsorship' as a factor that facilitates terrorism, the USA considers it as a more significant origin of terrorism. To the Bush Administration, state

sponsorship is the lifeblood of terrorist groups, crucial for their survival. In fact, the USA seems to consider state sponsorship of such importance, that it would not only make the occurrence of a potential terrorist attack more likely, but that it is a structural factor of terrorism as well, conducive to the organisation of terrorist groups as such. This particular view towards state sponsorship underlies certain specific measures the USA proposes in its anti-terrorism strategy significantly. That is, by means of its battle of arms, the USA elaborates on the divergent ways states can support terrorism. The Bush Administration has accordingly devoted three pillars of its strategy that should deal with state distribution of weapons of mass destruction (1), the financial support of states (2), or the provision of safe havens (3). The USA stresses that, if necessary, the USA will use military force to eliminate the threat WMD expose, and to deny terrorists the necessary support and sanctuary of rogue states.

6.3 To conclude

This research has been an exploration of the anti-terrorism strategies of the USA and the Netherlands. The reason for doing this study concerned the general image that both countries approach terrorism differently. Whereas the USA would mainly deal with the manifestation of terrorism itself (repressive approach), the Netherlands would be more concerned with addressing causes of terrorism (preventive approach). By investigating the proposed anti-terrorism measures, I have been able to conclude that such an image is largely warranted. That is, in its strategy, the Netherlands does indeed propose various divergent measures to prevent future terrorism, and seems less concerned with repressive methods. By contrast, half of USA's strategy is composed of a 'battle of arms', with which the Bush Administration proposes a variety of such harsh repressive measures. The USA is however not exclusively concerned with fighting the manifestation of terrorism. It in fact developed a 'battle of ideas', with which it proposes preventive measures, though in a more narrow way than the Netherlands.

By observing this difference in approach, I subsequently wondered if a different view these countries have on the origins of terrorism could be at the basis of that. By investigating the analyses of the origins of terrorism both the USA and the Netherlands bring forward in their anti-terrorism strategies, I have been able to conclude that both countries indeed do consider different factors to be causes of terrorism. Whereas the Netherlands sees political, economic, and social factors, in combination with a process of radicalisation to be at the basis of terrorism, the USA does solely emphasise political factors, evil, and state sponsorship to be causes of terrorism. In fact, every phase as distinguished in the conceptual model presents considerable differences between the USA and the Netherlands. All in all, I can conclude that the Netherlands and the USA both propose different measures in their anti-terrorism strategies and present a different view on the origins of terrorism that is at the basis of those strategies.

Epilogue

In exploring the Dutch and American view on the origins of terrorism, I noticed a discernible difference in delicacy between both countries. On the one hand, there is the Netherlands recognising terrorism as a multiform phenomenon, characterised by its intricacy. One can identify such a notion throughout the entire Dutch analysis of the origins of terrorism. For example, instead of speaking of jihadists in general, the Netherlands discriminates between different movements of radical Islam, such as radical political Islam and radical Islamic Puritanism. Furthermore, like already extensively stressed, the Dutch government considers different factors, which are divergent in nature (political, economic, and social), to contribute to the emergence terrorism. Moreover, the Netherlands regards the process of radicalisation and its various ways that can lead to the emergence of terrorism as a matter of importance as well. To my mind, the Dutch view on the origins of terrorism is based on a profound analysis, in which it recognises the complex process that terrorism is, and the diverse relationships leading up to it.

The USA on the other hand lays out the emergence of terrorism differently. In general, USA's anti-terrorism strategy is typified by its populist characteristics, and is therefore less subtle. This mainly concerns USA's solicitude with 'evil' as an origin of terrorism and the central role the USA devotes to it for explaining terrorism. Although the Bush Administration constantly stresses the importance of this factor in its anti-terrorism strategy, it does not elaborate on how evil should to lead to the emergence of terrorism. The USA merely stresses that a lack of political opportunities and freedom can cause people to turn to 'evil ideas', but why this exactly happens, and how that subsequently should results to a terrorist attack remains far from clear. In this respect, to emphasise evil as a origin of terrorism seems more a way of mobilising public support, than of proper analysing efforts. In short, compared to the USA, the way the Netherlands presents terrorism is in my opinion one of a more sophisticated character.

Literature

Scientific publications

- Armstrong, K. (2003), *Our role in the terror: The West must accept its share of the blame for the growth of fundamentalist violence*, in: The Guardian, 18 September.
- Babbie, E. (2004), *The Practice of Social Research* (10th edition), Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Bjørgo, T. (2005), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths reality and ways forward*. New York: Routledge.
- Constantino, Z. (2005), *Does Affluence Cause Jihad?*, in: *Frontpage Magazine*, August.
- Crenshaw, M. (1981), *The Causes of Terrorism*, in: *Comparative Politics* (13.4), p. 379-399.
- Crenshaw, M. (2003), *The Causes of Terrorism*, in: *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 92-105.
- Ehrlich, P.R & Liu, Jiango. (2002), *Some Roots of Terrorism*, in: *Population and Environment* (24), p. 183-191.
- Friedman, T.L. (2002), *The Core of Muslim Rage*, in: The New-York Times (151), p. A21.
- Ganor, B. (2002), *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?*, in: *Police Practice and Research* (3), p. 287-304.
- Giddens, A. (2006), *Sociology* (5th edition), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, p. 879-888.
- Gupta, D.K., (2005), *Exploring roots of terrorism*, in: *Root causes of terrorism: myths, reality and ways forward*, New York: Routledge.
- Hippel, K. (2002), *The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths*, in: *The political quarterly* (3), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 25-39.
- Howell, L.D. (2003), *Is the New Global Terrorism a Clash of Civilizations? Evaluating Terrorism's Multiple Sources*, in: *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 173-184.
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2003), *The Religious Roots in Contemporary Terrorism*, in: *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 185-193.
- Kegley, C.W. (2003), *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
- Kivisto, P. (2004), *Key Ideas in Sociology*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Krueger, A.B. & Malecková, J. (2003), *Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?*, in: *the Journal of Economic Perspectives* (17), p. 119-144.

- Laqueur, W. (1998), *Terror's New Face: The Radicalization and Escalation of Modern Terrorism*, in: Harvard International Review, European edition (20), p. 48-51.
- Lewis, B. (2003), The Roots of Muslim Rage, in: *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 194-201.
- Li, Q. (2005), *Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents*, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution (49.2), Sage Publications, p. 287-297.
- Lutz, J.M. & Lutz, B. (2005), *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Malečková, J. (2005), Impoverished terrorists: stereotype or reality, in: *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*, New York: Routledge, p. 33-43.
- Morgan, M.J. (2004), *The Origins of the New Terrorism*, in: Parameters (34), p. 29-43.
- Post, J.M. (2005), The social-cultural underpinnings of terrorist psychology: 'When hatred is bred in the bone', in: *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*, New York: Routledge, p. 54-69.
- Rapoport, D.C. (2003), The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11, in: *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 36-52.
- Richardson, L. (2005), State sponsorship – a root cause of terrorism?, in: *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*, New York: Routledge, p. 189-197.
- Sahar Mohammad, A.Y. (2005), Roots of terrorism in the Middle East internal pressures and international constraints, in: *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*, New York: Routledge, p. 103-118.
- Schmid, A.P. (2005), Prevention of terrorism: towards a multi-prolonged approach, in: *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*, New York: Routledge, p. 223-240.
- Stern, J. (2002), *Pakistan's Jihad Culture*, in: Foreign Affairs (79.6).
- Stewart, F. (2004), *Terrorism will thrive while economic inequality continues between arab states and the West*, in: Financial Times, 19 March.
- Tyson, L. (2001), *It's time to step up the global war on poverty*, in: *Business Week*, 3 December.
- Vranken, J. & Hendrickx, E. (2004), *Het speelveld en de spelregels: een inleiding tot de sociologie*, Leuven: Uitgeverij Acco.
- Walters, M. (2001), *Globalization* (2nd edition), London: Routledge.
- Wilkinson, P. (2003), Why Modern Terrorism? Differentiating Types and Distinguishing Ideological Motivations, in: *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, p. 106-138.

Policy documents of the USA

- Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, 20th of September 2001.


- Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *President Discusses Global War on Terror*, 5th of September 2006.
- Bush, G.W., Speech of the President of the United States of America: *President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy*, 6th of October 2005.
- The White House, *9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges*, September 2006.
- The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003.
- The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, September 2006.
- The White House, *Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism*, September 2003.
- The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006.

Policy documents of the Netherlands


- AIVD, *Contraterrorisme in Nederland*, June 2003.
- AIV, *Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief*, September 2006.
- Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 10th of April 2006.
- Bot, B.R., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken*, 27th of September 2006.
- Council of the European Union Homepage, retrieved from the World Wide Web in August 2007, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1195&lang=en&mode=g.
- Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 30th of November 2005.
- Council of the European Union, *The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, 24th of November 2005.
- Directorate General of Freedom, Security and Justice Homepage, retrieved from the World Wide Web in August 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/protection.
- Donner, J.P.H., *Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme*, 24th of June 2003.
- Donner, J.P.H., *Brief van de Minister van Justitie: Terrorismebestrijding*, 19th of August 2005.
- European Commission, *Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation*, 21st of September 2005.
- Ministry of Domestic Affairs, *Van dawa tot jihad: De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde*, December 2004.
- Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, *Jihadisten en het internet*, December 2006.
- Van Aartsen, J.J., *Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: Islamitisch radicalisme in het Midden-Oosten en Centraal Azië*, 10th of November 2001.
- Van Ardenne, A.M.A., *Niet om zieltjes te winnen, maar om levens te redden*, 12th of September 2005.

Appendixes

Appendix 1: Conceptual model



Appendix 2: The USA



Appendix 3: The Netherlands

