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## ESDP and NATO: Establishing New Links for a Trustworthy and Efficient Global Security Relationship

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“While there have been practical achievements in NATO-EU Co-operation, the realization of a mature and efficient security relationship is hostage to the illusion of a ‘grand bargain’, agreement at the highest political levels on the purposes and character of transatlantic security co-operation. In order to create a virtuous circle of efficient and mutually supportive co-existence between NATO and the EU, the solution must be to abandon for the time being the pursuit of a ‘grand bargain’ and concentrate instead on achieving what is actually required to meet predicted security risks and challenges. In time, the practice of learning by doing might even lubricate the highly politicized transatlantic security debate which has for so many years proved to be an impediment to effective cooperation.”

Dr. Paul Carnish. EU AND NATO: Co-Operation or Competition (Policy Department of External Policies – European Parliament) /October 2006

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## **Abbreviations:**

<b>EU:</b>	European Union
<b>USA:</b>	United States of America
<b>NATO:</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>EDC:</b>	European Defence Community
<b>NRF:</b>	NATO Response Force
<b>ESDP:</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>CFSP:</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>EDA:</b>	European Defence Agency
<b>ERRF:</b>	European Rapid Reaction Force
<b>EUBG:</b>	European Union Battle-group Project
<b>CTNSP:</b>	Center for Technology and National Security Policy
<b>INSS:</b>	Institute for National Strategic Studies
<b>WEU:</b>	Western European Union
<b>WMD:</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction
<b>PFP:</b>	Partnership for Peace
<b>EAPC:</b>	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
<b>EUMS:</b>	European Union Military Staff
<b>ISAF:</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>ACA:</b>	Allied Command Atlantic
<b>ACT:</b>	Allied Command Transformation
<b>ACO:</b>	Allied Command Operations
<b>SACEUR:</b>	Supreme Allied Commander
<b>SHAPE:</b>	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
<b>INF:</b>	Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement
<b>ESDI:</b>	European Security and Defence Identity

## Abstract

Since the end of the Cold war, a great deal has been said and written by the representatives of both organizations, Diplomats, Political Analyst and International Relation Theorists about the relationship between NATO and the European Union. The difference of opinion between the two Organizations became even more intense, after the EU created the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), where, the logic of its creation was disputable from the NATO allies that weren't part of the EU, such as the United States and Turkey. Since, a full range of wrong political statements and press releases came out from both sides, alarming the World and the oppositions for a 'second sheriff' in the Transatlantic Security and Defence Business, as NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop recognized<sup>1</sup>, they assumed, that the aim of the EU was to drive NATO out of business. This much concerned and discussed relationship for the future of the "fragmented"<sup>2</sup> Global Security and the spicy, mixed up cooperation between the EU's ESDP and NATO, with the inescapability for the modernization of the procedures that this two institutions treat security issues, describes the topic that I chose to handle and research for my Thesis report. The prosperous literature written in this transatlantic relationship, and my decision to contact my interviews and present my questionnaires, for the results of my research, in an Annual Conference organized in co-operation with the European Commission and the German foundation Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung<sup>3</sup> (KAS) named "NATO and ESDP: Forging New Links", entail not only my assumption that NATO and EU's ESDP would never be rivals, but also that those two Institutions could never only, just co-exist in the global security. The future of this highly politicized, and deficient so far Transatlantic Security Relationship appears "fragmented", but the research obtained in this paper, showed that both organizations and some of their common member states call for a change, as the realization of an efficient and trustworthy security relationship thus far, was hostage to the illusion of a 'grand bargain'<sup>4</sup>. This research recognizes and presents those links that can bring closer NATO and the EU, in order to complement each other for the sake of Global Security.

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<sup>1</sup> **NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer keynote speech.** NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter (29<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 2007 Berlin, Germany [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int) – retrieved 24 /05/07)

<sup>2</sup> **Heike Krieger.** Common European Defence: Competition or Compatibility with NATO? – European Security Law: Edited by Martin Trybus and Nigel D White (Oxford University Press 2007)

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.kas.de> or [www.konrad-adenauer-foundation.eu](http://www.konrad-adenauer-foundation.eu)

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Paul Carnish. EU AND NATO: Co-Operation or Competition (Policy Department of External Policies – European Parliament) /October 2006

## 1.0 Introduction

“Security is the absence of a threat to the stability of the international system to countries, continents or individuals worldwide”<sup>5</sup>

Sean Kay, 2003

**T**hese words spoken by Sean Kay indicate the utmost value of security and feeling threatened in our day to day activities, safety and existence. Where it appears, that except of the natural disasters of Tsunami, hurricanes, earthquakes and climatological changes that we can face and be threatened surprisingly at anytime, sadly enough, is still not our only devastating fear. The globalization of security concerns and the terrorist attacks beginning on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 and followed in Madrid and London. Made us feel scare and insecure again for our future and the possibility of another shattering world war, of new obliteration and fatalities in our lives, which will scar even more, the worlds already cynical history.

Fear was essentially the reason that the relationship between NATO and EU begun. After the end of the Second World War, the French, Italians and Benelux countries, in response to the American call for the rearmament of West Germany, proposed a suitable plan for forming a Pan-European defence force community (EDC) as an alternative to Germany's proposed accession to NATO, binding its military potential in case of conflict with the Soviet Bloc. The Treaty was signed in 1952 but never implemented, holding up the Dream for Pan-European Defence Community to build up a Pan-European Economic Community, revising the structure of the Western European Union<sup>6</sup> and co-operating with NATO for a more secure transatlantic World.

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<sup>5</sup> **Sean Kay.** Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace

<sup>6</sup> For more thorough info on ESDP's historical Development , see Appendix C

## 1.1 The topic and its relevance

After close examination that I have conducted the past two months in the EU's ESDP and NATO relationship, I decided to devote my thesis statement topic, discussing the concluding fact that many Scholars' handling with the overall topic came through, and just try and move toward a step further. Those Scholars and heads of both sides demonstrated over and over, that the relationship between the two organizations is really important and crucial, stepping through the focused direction and argument that both institutions will never be rivals. Considering and examining the persuasive argument that the oppositions would never choose to go against each other, I would raise my main research question on the unilateral measures that has to be established for the future for a trustworthy and efficient Transatlantic and Global Security Relationship. Reorganizing and dividing the labour of the Global Security and Defence Structure, especially after both Organizations are evolving in numerous and different directions, and since they just try to limit the damage to the minimum, by playing down any conflict between them for a while now.

## 1.2 Research Objective

The aim of this paper would be to explore this relationship, from the very beginning to the most recent developments and pressures that both these organization are facing, in order to be able to have a political dialogue and solve their differences, creating the proper for both Organizations circumstances, and collaboration policies that will permeate them to get on with new and more important issues rather than resurrecting predominant problems from the past.

The main research question is:

**In what direction should the EU's ESDP and NATO lean their efforts, in order to re-establish their relationship as efficient and trustworthy towards complementing, co-operating, or coexisting in the global security?**

## **Sub Questions and Outline**

In the path for researching and answering my main research question, I would need first to handle with the following sub-chapters and questions, which I believe would materialize my argument and contribute to useful conclusions for the future of this relationship at stake. The sub-chapters that need to be dealt with are:

### **1) Introduction**

Chapter one, thus this chapter, confers a brief overview of the overall topic, its relevance, research question and methodology.

### **2) Status Quo in the relations between ESDP and NATO**

In order to explore the relations between the EU's ESDP and NATO and propose new links to be formed first one need to know the history and updates of what one is actually exploring. In view of that, the extended discussion would be focused, in order to specify why this relationship, even with all its problems and its 'frozen' co-existence from time to time is still strong, and there would be efforts on making it rise again, in one way or another. Indicating a clear picture of the past and reasons of the creation of NATO, and later of the ESDP, and the reasons why the EU created the ESDP and maintained operations with out NATO.

At last an outline of the life after EU's ESDP creation would be discussed, with the subjects of the hypothetical rivalry between the two Organizations, such as the Berlin plus agreement, the resource and capability for rapid reaction force planning, the enlargement of both organizations and the anti-terrorism responses and reactions, that would be dealt with more explicit research and details in the following chapters.

This leads to the following sub-questions dealt with in chapter 2:

- What was the rationale and scope for the creation of NATO, and if this changed through time?
- How important was the role of the European Union in NATO?



- What were the major reasons and concerns that turn the European Union to pursue the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy?
- Why NATO felt threaten from the European Security and Defence plans?

### **3) The Contour Rivalry Assumption**

After having analyzed, the history of the creation and relations-reactions between both organizations, an assessment of diverse interpretations of visions and debates of the relationship between NATO and the EU would be depicted. In order to view what have been so-called around this relationship, in an effort to prove that, even with the apparent problems, diverse opinions and interests that the two Organizations and or their members' states individually, politically fool around with. The main element of the relationship between NATO and the EU, even with the differences between the two, is that the rivalry option as solution was never really an option, but just an allegory for the media.

This leads to the following sub-questions to be dealt with in chapter 3:

- What were the major images and interpretations that stigmatized this relationship and what is their importance?
- How is the factor (military capabilities) essential for relations between the two institutions?

### **4) Recognizing the problems and agreeing on responsibilities might be the first step.**

After we have reached a more insightful understanding of the fragile liaison between ESDP and NATO, a closer discussion and interviews would eventually take a stand on the diverse flexibility policies and problems that need to be solved, and the responsibilities and actions that each one of NATO and EU willingly agree to seize and maintain for the near future. This chapter will try to give a broad overview of the realizations and lessons made so far in this relationship and the necessity that comes across for both organizations for technological innovation and research. Fill you in to the new global security and reconstruction threats, and the determination that members of the two organizations, indicate over and over in order to find the formula that will permeate to those organizations to resurrect the past and handle with the new perspectives,

setting new strategic frameworks goals and bonds for a healthy compatibility, co-operation or coexistence competition for the security business in the Transatlantic area and globally.

This creates the following sub-questions to be dealt with in chapter 4:

- What is the current state of affairs between the NATO members and the EU's ESDP members in Brussels and what are the changes that have to be made in their judgment, in order to re-establish their relationship as efficient and trustworthy?
- How suitable is the Berlin plus Agreement in this relationship?
- In what direction should the ESDP and NATO lean their efforts, towards complementing, co-operating, or coexisting in the global security?
- What are the realizations and lessons made so far?
- How is the necessity for technological innovation and proper security and defence spending and research important for establishing new links between the organisations?

## **5) Conclusions**

In the last and concluding chapter of the paper, answer to the research question will be presented based on the outcomes of the sub-chapters and towards establishing a more trustworthy and efficient global security relationship.

## **1.3 Establishing New Links**

Both the EU and NATO especially, seems that they started comprehending the survival of each other and their apparent co-existence, and since them both face the same pressures – for a more clearly defined security strategy, a shortage of resources and to admit Balkans and Black Sea countries as their future members. They seem to be ready to ‘do what is necessary’<sup>7</sup>, extending the political dialogue between them in order to get on with new issues rather than resurrecting with the past, and forge new links for complementing each other for a more trustworthy and

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<sup>7</sup> Main point that Jaap De Hoop Schefer, General Secretary of NATO made for the Relations between NATO and ESDP Forging New links Conference in Brussels 08/06/2007

efficient Global Security Relationship. Forging a new working NATO-ESDP Framework before 2009, that NATO would celebrate sixty years of existence and would proceed on forming<sup>8</sup> a new strategic concept also, there is a window of opportunity now in Europe with the elections and forming of Governments in France, United Kingdom, Germany, Greece and other European Member states to discuss and find an acceptable and effective solution that please each and every one.

I chose to use the following three forms of compatibility partnership approaches, from the research field to examine the perspectives and form of relationship that is most feasible for ESDP and NATO to proceed with their relationship:

- First, a *complimentary partner's perspective* could be applied in order for both organizations to balance each other within a form with out duplicating.
- Second, a *co-operating partner's perspective* could be applied if both partners find the formula for a successful geographical division of labour and responsibilities.
- Third, a *co-existing partner's perspective* could be applied if the Organizations decide that the two first partners' perspectives seem unattainable and find a peaceful coexistence solution between them for a healthy competitive relationship.

To avoid drawing theoretical boxes and filling them with data, the three compatibility perspectives would be treated as convenient sorting devices for the analysis, not as strict categorizations devices, that would be discussed in the sub-conclusions of each sub-chapter throughout this Thesis statement, helping with the in depth compatibility analysis research, for finding the most appropriate approach for re-establishing or re-inventing the relationship between ESDP and NATO.

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<sup>8</sup> NATO Secretary General and the US representative of Pentagon both, emphasized in their speech on the June 8 conference in Brussels, the directions they obtained from the US president for reforming the NATO Strategic Concept in the Organizations 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary in 2009.

## 1.4 Methodology

In order to answer the research question and sub questions, I have carried out in the most part, a second hand research that I have collected and studied, and conducted semi-structured interviews questionnaires with high representatives from both organization's member states (see Appendix D) when I visited Brussels in the 8<sup>th</sup> of June during a conference organized by the European Union and the German foundation KAS: 'NATO and ESDP: Forging New Links'<sup>9</sup>. For the second hand research I accessed various libraries, different electronic journals and newsletters, newspapers and online information from different institutions. All the information's that I have collected will hopefully help me to answer my research question and offer a realistic way out on the relationship between EU's ESDP and NATO.

## 1.5 Scope and limitations

The extend to which different assessments can be made concerning the up to date ongoing developments on the relationship and efforts taken by one or the other organization, is restricted in two simple ways. Firstly, assessments can be made on developments and thoughts stated in documents already published. Secondly, the information on progress by EU's ESDP and NATO covers only the period until June 2007 and the conference 'NATO and ESDP forging new links'. In general the content of this paper reflects the status quo of June 2007 or other if indicated.

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<sup>9</sup> See Appendix A: for the schedule and speakers of the conference

## 2.0 Status Quo in the relations between EU and NATO

### 2.1 Introduction

In this first chapter a definition of the objectives of the creation of NATO and an up to date history of NATO, covering the role of the EU, will be explored. Secondly, an overview of the European Union and the necessity for the creation of the Common Foreign Security Policy pillar first, and then the European Security and Defence Policy with the Strategic Plan and finally, would tell apart the existing problematic areas and policies between the EU's ESDP and NATO.

### 2.2 What was the rationale and scope for the creation of NATO, and if this changed through time?

In the aftermath of the Second World War, political and ideological insecurities divided Europe, between the Eastern that fell under the domination of the Soviet Union and Western that was feeling threatened that Soviet Union would seek to extend its strict jurisdiction of Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent. As a result, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom, signed on 17 March 1948 the Treaty of Brussels<sup>10</sup>, establishing military alliance between the five member states and was considered as the precursor to the NATO agreement. However, for the five member states, later to become the Western European Union, in order to counter the military power of the Soviet Union, American Participation was more than necessary and therefore talks for a new military alliance began almost immediately. The result of the talks was the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington DC on April 4 1949 by the European states, that signed earlier the Treaty of Brussels as well as the United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The North Atlantic Treaty states:

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<sup>10</sup> The Treaty of Brussels created the Western Union, and was aimed primarily at defending against possible German rearmament. It was the effort towards European post-war security cooperation, defence pact. [www.europa.eu/history](http://www.europa.eu/history)

*The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.*

*They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.*

*They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty<sup>11</sup>: - Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949*

(cited – NATO library,2007)

The significance of the Alliance was of great value for Western Europe, especially after the acceptance of Greece and Turkey in 1952 and of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. Western Europe and North America not only jointly defended their independence but also achieved an unprecedented level of stability, which laid the sustained cornerstone for today's European economic cooperation and integration.

The rejection of membership to the Soviet Union from the NATO members in 1954 and the incorporation of West Germany into the Organisation were described as: "a decisive turning point in the history of our continent" by Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway at the time<sup>12</sup>. As an immediate response the Soviet Union and the countries under its hegemony, created and signed the Warsaw Pact<sup>13</sup>, officially defining the lines between the two opposing sides of the Cold War<sup>14</sup>.

The long lasting Cold War with the Soviet Union, rather than serving the foreign policy of deterrence of the NATO Treaty, and helping to sustain peace in Europe, purposely created the first black clouds among its members, with the biggest troublesome, to be the use of Nuclear Weapons to deter an attack from the Soviet Union. United States officials generally insisted that NATO should rely on nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet attack. The Western European member states of NATO, however, vehemently opposed the use of these weapons and doubted that the United States would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Europe. Their doubts were based on the initial reality that the

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<sup>11</sup> Information's on NATO from Online library Basic Texts: [www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty](http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty)

<sup>12</sup> NATO Library information's: [www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/history](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/history)

<sup>13</sup> The members of the Warsaw Pact pledged to defend each other if one or more of the members were attacked. The treaty also stated that relations among the signatories were based on mutual noninterference in internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty and independence -however this would later be violated with the interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

<sup>14</sup> The term "Cold War" was first used in 1947 by Americans Bernard Baruch, close adviser to President Truman, and Walter Lippmann, describing emerging tensions, conflicts and competition between the two former wartime allies.

Soviet Union also had a powerful nuclear force, and the use of nuclear weapons from United States to protect Europe, would have indicated an answer from the Soviet Union towards United States. That was the major reason why United Kingdom and France assembled their own nuclear weapons, and for France to withdraw its active troops from NATO collective troops in 1966. NATO, as a response to this move from France, decided to move its regional headquarters to its current location in Brussels. Despite the fact that the relationship between the NATO member states was tainted in several occasions and seemed to be obscure in others, the NATO remained unaffected and became even more powerful than ever before, having a crucial role for the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the division of the Soviet Union into a number of independent states, that rejected Communism. The end of the Cold War however, was the warning sign for many people, or the awoken call for the European Allies that NATO was about to lose its rationale, initiating political and social debates for NATO's future and the new World order.

### **2.2.1 The post cold war environment**

The rapid international transformations, especially after the conclusion of the INF agreement<sup>15</sup> that indicated the end of the Cold War, found NATO against proposals for the formation of a joint Franco-German co-operation, as the first steps towards a European Military Force. Shortly afterwards, the member states of the WEU adopted a 'Platform on European Security Interests' declaring 'that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.'<sup>16</sup> At the same time, the continuing cost of membership, including stationing and hosting forces and other constrains of action, threatened to undermine whatever support remained for the Alliance.

The necessity for a new NATO transformation and purpose was indisputable, the Cold War reached the finish line and NATO, just needed a new purpose, a strategic security concept to be able to follow the new security challenges and World order after the division of the Soviet Union. NATO's Heads of State willingly agreed in a scheduled meeting in July 1990, to reflect a new, more

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<sup>15</sup> The Treaty signed in 1987, between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, requires destruction of the Parties' ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures and support equipment within three years after the Treaty enters into force.

<sup>16</sup>The Hague platform 1987 - Bretherton and John Vogler: The European Union as a Global Actor, 2006

promising era in Europe, with a far-reaching impact in which its eventual ambitions would be met in the future, while reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception. Assuming nonetheless, the continuance and completion of the Soviet Military forces retrieved from the Eastern and Central European adversaries, re-establishing in this way that NATO would have an important stabilizing role to play, at least in the medium term, and that west Europe is better off with NATO than without it, expressing the 'Insurance Policy Concept.'<sup>17</sup>

Clearly, NATO as it was often said at the time, had "to go out of area or go out of business", as US Senator Richard Lugar noted in 1993, "the common denominator of all the new security problems in Europe is that all lies beyond NATO's current borders."<sup>18</sup> In line with the necessary need for transformation, the Alliance did not consider the former Soviet Union states and its Warsaw Pact adversaries as threatening states anymore, and invited them to establish new diplomatic discussions. Announcing on the same time, that the Alliance's reliance on a flexible response weapons would be reduced accordingly, rather than their reliance in nuclear weapons would stay the same, even with the end of the Cold War. The concept affirmed that the core purpose of the Alliance remained collective defense, but since the Cold War and the Soviet Union were dissolved, the risks to Allied Security were 'multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.' Foreseeing adverse instability consequences security problems, arising from serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries, fail states, and territorial disputes, faced by many central or eastern European Countries at times. In addition, the new security concept identified common security interests in the southern Mediterranean and Middle East<sup>19</sup>.

The change in concept brought several institutional innovations:

- The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) a political consultative body, established in 1991 including NATO and Former Warsaw Pact members, that later become members.

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<sup>17</sup> Martin A. Smith comprehensively analyzes and describes the NATO in the First Decade After the Cold War, 2000

<sup>18</sup> Zoltan Barany: NATO's Post Cold War Metamorphosis: From Sixteen to Twenty-Six and Counting

<sup>19</sup> Celeste A. Wallander: Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War, Cambridge Journal 2000



- The Partnership for Peace (PfP) a project aimed at creating trust and cooperation between NATO members and former Warsaw Pact members, choosing their own priorities for cooperation in January 1994.
- Mediterranean Dialogue: a forum of cooperation between NATO and seven countries of the Mediterranean, with aim to contribute in the stability and security of the region and Europe, formed in 1994.
- Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) a multilateral forum, created to replace the functions of NACC, and signed partnership and cooperation agreements with Russia and Ukraine, counting 49 members and formed in May, 1997.<sup>20</sup>

Except from the Institutional innovations that resulted from NATO's security doctrine, NATO suffered of substantial reduction in its conventional and nuclear forces. The United States reduced its forward presence in Europe from 325,000 to 100,000 troops, and the European members cut their forces by more than 500,000 troops<sup>21</sup>. By the end of 1999, NATO land, sea and air units had been reduced by 30-40 percent, with only 35-60 percent kept at thirty-day readiness level compared with the 70-90 percent in the 1990. As a result, NATO shifted its military strategy from positional defense based to Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces (following the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force) and the Augmentation Forces, reducing the number of major NATO commands from three to two, Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT).

The early 90's, even when NATO finally modernized with some essential changes that resulted from the New Strategic Concept, found the Alliance uncoordinated and unprepared to deal with new security problems in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO still had a collective defense mindset and structure, and it had not exercised nor planned and practiced for any other operations except its Cold War missions under Article 5<sup>22</sup>. The NATO members were very

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<sup>20</sup> More information's on [www.nato.int/issues/library](http://www.nato.int/issues/library)

<sup>21</sup> Data Retrieved from Celeste A. Wallander: Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War, Cambridge Journal 2000, and confirmed by the European Union and NATO Website.

<sup>22</sup> Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties,

reluctant on pushing forward the Alliance's collective defense capabilities, in a mission for the uncharted world of 'Non-Article 5' in Yugoslavia. The adaptation through the new Strategic Concept appeared even more difficult to rapidly evolve within the new security concerns, and only when the UN proved unable to prevent the conflict and the assault on civilians of different ethnic groups, the attention and the burden turned to NATO.

In defense and support of the UN forces, NATO enforced the blockage of UN against the former Yugoslavia, and on the 28 February 1994, NATO took its first military action, shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircrafts, violating UN no-fly zone over central Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO's military action continued until the 20<sup>th</sup> of December 1995, when with an air strike, defended the UN safe areas and personnel, helping to bring the war in Bosnia to an end, signing the Dayton Agreement of November 1995<sup>23</sup>. The experience in Yugoslavia, resulted in new military command adjustments, the reduction and transformation within new security problems and 'non-Article 5' missions, of command headquarters from sixty-five to twenty, and the insistence of NATO members on preparing the Alliance command to a Post-Cold War unified, mobile command structure, creating new crisis coordination center, for the easier adaptation in the demands of future operations. Those adjustments however paid off, NATO appeared far more prepared for deployment and combined task force, when the crisis in Kosovo was on its way in March 1999.

### **2.2.2 From Military to Political-Military Organization**

The necessity for adaptation to the new security challenges however, was not only military-wise but political-wise as well. 'The Alliance of the pro-Cold War contributed in the European Security, within threats of nuclear weapons, the Alliance of the Post –Cold War needed to contribute in the European Security within political discussions'. NATO's first approach however, was creating the NACC, where policies and internal purpose appeared different from the Alliance, (since the structure of NACC was not military based but political based) in the call for enlargement, did not attract many important neutral European states. The excuse behind the idea for the NACC's enlargement was the experience and assets that the Alliance indicated as an institution that promoted security,

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such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

<sup>23</sup> The general framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina reached at an Air force Base near Dayton, Ohio and signed in Paris on Dec. 14, 1995.

cooperation, integration and prosperity between its members. With this argument NATO insisted on getting politically larger, appearing to the new Central and Eastern European states as their redeemer and only way back to the beneficial International community, and could help them as helped Germany in the post World War II. A possible resistance of the invitation from the former Warsaw Pact members seemed as a fundamental contradiction for NATO since NACC was promising that those nations to enter should never be concerned again for being threatened from the defense policies and military capabilities of one another again. Enlargement of the NACC however, proved to be a problematic policy, and the fact that the alliance purpose remained linked to the external commitment of Article 5, wasn't making enlargement easier, and many countries in Europe wouldn't opt for membership any time sooner with out overcoming that weakness.

What was lacking from NACC, and restricted to the nation's armed troops to focus on closer cooperation, was stressed by NATO in the groundwork's for the creation of 'Partnership for Peace'. The idea as described earlier, was to generate military activities for nonmembers similar to those generated by NATO members in order to garner the same effects on Cooperation as NATO.<sup>24</sup> PfP agreements provided for joint military planning, training, exercises, and peacekeeping missions, were nonmembers were invited to observe exercises. As those exercises proved successful, the popularity and membership request for the PfP was getting bigger and bigger, since governments "eagerly sought"<sup>25</sup> the influence and association of cooperating with NATO's military practices and procedures on their own militaries. So, gradually, rather than some first transition doubts (US military eagerness), NATO command began to share its military - exercising planning and implementation procedures with the partners. Changing at the same time, the attitude of the NATO members' militaries toward non-Article 5 peace operations, but furthermore, military adaptation of NATO again developed further than the Political development that still lacked, even from PfP. The lack of Political development was the impetus behind the creation of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997, enabling them to discuss the political issues arising from PfP building consensus and elicit views.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Celeste A. Wallander: **Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War**, Cambridge Journal 2000

<sup>25</sup> Phrase used by Celeste A. Wallander describing PFP

<sup>26</sup> Interview of the Defence Secretary of the U.S Information agency used by A. Wallander on NATO after the Cold war.

The black clouds above NATO and every effort for political development (EAPC), appeared once again during the Kosovo conflict, when Russia and other partners expected that decision making consulting for the peace mission (non-Article 5) would be taken from EAPC. But rather, NATO made clear once again that decision making takes place only within the North Atlantic Council and only there, making two steps backwards rather than forward to their political development. The impact of the unsettling political-military that evolved in the Kosovo crisis questioned again, NATO's future and enhanced even more the overall aims for European defence and security capabilities.

### **2.2.3 NATO after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack**

For the first time in the alliance's 52 years of existence, the European members invoked the treaty's mutual defence guarantee – pledging that “an attack on one ally would be treated as an attack to all<sup>27</sup>”, not a single signatory could have imagined that the first invocation of the Article 5 would involve the European members coming to the aid of the United States rather than the other way around. Indeed, on the 27<sup>th</sup> of September NATO defence ministers had offered their military support, however, they were told by the United States that they did not require NATO's response, failing at the same time the 52 year old Article 5<sup>28</sup>. Political Analyst from all over the World characterized that period for NATO as really crucial since on the one hand, the United States, recalling the bad coordination, planning, ill-preparedness and lack of suitable European capabilities that had marked the Kosovo military campaign, choose to operate solo against Al Qaeda. On the other hand The United States Army, demanded for the full cooperation for the facilities and air flight zone clearance of the NATO members, partners and neutral states, in order to fully attack Al Qaeda, while even drawing down units reportedly engaged in Balkan operations. This act from the United States fuelled the doubts of the European member states about the long-term commitment of the United States to multilateral solutions<sup>29</sup>.

No one could disagree on the seriousness of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack, or even in the unilateralism indicated by the US, but it was clear that the continuation of NATO existence would be just ironic.

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<sup>27</sup> **Gordon, Philip H.** , (2001) 'NATO After 11 September', *Survival*, 43:4, 89 – 106(2001)

<sup>28</sup> **Anne Deighton.** The Eleventh of September and beyond: NATO the Political Quarterly 73 (s1), 119–134.(2002)

<sup>29</sup> Perception on the U.S, act: NATO Review

The conditional nature of the symbolic nature of 'Article V' was exposed, in the vested interests of defying an (effective) fight by the United States. In front of the fiasco of the refusal of NATO's help, the United States, officially proposed to the allies a request for eight specific measures involving with this way, any individual or collective support to the American Campaign, and purposely making, finally more of the Article 5, to the US request. The measures included:

- enhanced intelligence sharing, both bilaterally and within NATO;
- blanket over flight clearances for US and other NATO aircraft;
- assistance to allies and other states that might be subject to terrorist threats as a result of their cooperation with the United States;
- measures to provide increased security for US facilities in Europe;
- backfilling certain allied assets in the NATO area that might be required elsewhere for the campaign against terrorism;
- access for the United States and other allies to ports and airfields on NATO territory;
- the deployment of standing NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean; and
- the deployment of NATO airborne early warning-and-control systems<sup>30</sup>

The Article V, the New Strategic Concept of 1991 and even the revoking responsibility measures that the United States enforced in Article V where many of the NATO members regret in the years to follow, clearly did not provide a durable tool for the prolongation of NATO operations. Washington however, rather than discussing the issues that bother its European Allies, promoted the idea of NATO maintaining global operations, constituting that an admission to Alliance security risks could be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, disruption of the flow of vital resources and the uncontrolled movement of large movements of people as a result of armed conflicts<sup>31</sup>, could also pose problems for the security and stability affecting the Alliance. Apparently after the attack, NATO needed to redefine its objectives, to reach the United States Capabilities campaign against terror, or else the United States would have continued alone.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> **Gordon, Philip H.**, (2001) 'NATO After 11 September', *Survival*, 43:4, 89 – 106(2001)

<sup>31</sup> Information on extending risk security interests on [www.nato.int/docu/21-cent](http://www.nato.int/docu/21-cent)

<sup>32</sup> In keeping with the priorities of the new US Quadrennial Review, R.Rumsfeld - US Department of State

In the outcome of the September 11 attack, new structures were also formed while old ones were abolished; The NATO's Response Force (NRF) was launched in the Prague Summit of 2002, where a coherent, high readiness, technologically advanced, flexible, deployable unit that can be rapidly deployed by NATO as a collective defence, crisis management, stabilization force or to act as an entry force, available for a six-month period in a full spectrum and any part of the World. The Allied Command Atlantic (ACA) was abolished and replaced by the Allied Command Transformation,<sup>33</sup> established in Virginia USA and was responsible for the transformation and training of NATO forces. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) originally headquarters' of the operational forces of the Allied Command Operations (ACO), controls since 2003 all the allied operations worldwide. Further membership enlargement was decided in the Prague Summit, and completed shortly before the Istanbul Summit of 2004, with the accession of seven more Northern and Eastern European Countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania after the acceptance of Hungary, Czech Rep. and Poland in 1999 to NATO, enlarging the number of members to twenty six.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the early show of solidarity from the European member states of NATO to the decisions and structural changes enforced from the United States, the crisis was inevitable and did happen when France and Belgium, carried by Germany, vetoed the procedure of silent approval concerning the timing of protective measures for Turkey, in case of a possible war with Iraq. When the reservations of drawing command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan came by Germany and Netherlands, the two states leading ISAF at the time, the Alliance showed greater unity and approved the impending decision unanimously. This was the first in NATO's history that the Alliance took charge of a mission out of the North Atlantic Area.

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<sup>33</sup> A military command, which was originally formed in 1952 as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

<sup>34</sup> The data was found in the [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int) website

## 2.3 The EU and the Security and Defence Plan

*It is my belief that in this global age of a Union of our size, with our interests, history and values, has an obligation to assume it's of share responsibilities...The question, therefore, is not whether we play a global role, but how we play that role*

(Solana 2002)<sup>35</sup>

### 2.3.1 CFSP

The belief that Javier Solana talks about, the High representative of the CFSP, represents the modern perspective of the common belief of the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, which served as a basis for the Western Union and set down the foundations for the North Atlantic Treaty a year later. The Treaty of Brussels was the first passionate idea towards European security and mutual defence cooperation from European Nation States, primarily against Germany. The weaknesses of the WU states though, from the reparation and the unavoidable division caused by the Second World War, and the good bonds with the hegemonic United States, which provided the treasuries and means for rebuilding Europe. Designated that the European mutual defence would have to postpone WU states mutual belief for an indefinite period, and involve other Atlantic nations as well, in order to involve the United States in their plans.

The Involvement of the US and the other Atlantic states however, rather that did serve well the WEU states basis, for European economic recovery, especially after the modification of the Brussels treaty and acceptance of the West Germany and Italy in 1954. NATO's or United States major threat-purpose was the Soviet Union, and not necessary the mutual security and defence cooperation between the Allies. This was the reason why, in the most parts of the Cold War, the European Allies, were caught up between the nuclear threats and spy-war between the United States and the Soviet Union with a small minor political role.

Following the termination of the Cold War, with the resulting fragmentation of the transatlantic security order, the possibilities were there again to pursue the belief of mutual security and defence that was set way back, but was never fully completed. The members of the European Community,<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Javier Solana High Representative of CFSP 2002:3, emphasis in original - Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. The European Union as a Global Actor: Second Edition published by Routledge Group, 2006 page 162

<sup>36</sup> The European Community (EC) was originally founded on March 25, 1957 by the signing of the Treaty of Rome under the name of European Economic Community. The 'Economic' was removed from its name by the Maastricht treaty

in 1992 decided and signed in Maastricht, the Treaty of the European Union TEU, after realizing that finally the economic power of the Union must be articulated to a stronger sense of collective political and cooperative security purpose.<sup>37</sup>

The TEU with its turn, introduced the Common Foreign Security Policy CFSP, as one of the three pillars of the European Union,<sup>38</sup> representing an attempt to create and provide the conditions for proactive foreign policy making – that is, provision of strategic direction, greater overall policy coherence and assured access to external policy instruments, in the previous foundations of the EPC.<sup>39</sup> In practice the TEU “proved disappointing,”<sup>40</sup> because on terms of strategic direction the objectives of the CFSP were very broadly stated (in TEU, Article 11):

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
- To promote international cooperation,
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.<sup>41</sup>

These general objectives however, reflect the common desire and will of sharing information and responsibilities to protect the Union from negative external influences, and to develop where appropriate a foreign policy posture distinct from that of the USA. Therefore, they have also contributed to the formation of the EU image as a value based player, further commitment to multilateralism (UN), and to the promotion externally of the values embraced by the Union. Within the framework of the TEU objectives, the European Council provided the ‘general political

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in 1992, which at the same time effectively made the European Community the first of three pillars of the European Union, called the Community (or Communities) Pillar.

<sup>37</sup> Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. *The European Union as a Global Actor: Second Edition* published by Routledge Group, 2006

<sup>38</sup> The first or 'Community' pillar concerns economic, social and environmental policies. The second or 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' (CFSP) pillar concerns foreign policy and military matters. The third or 'Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters' (PJCC) pillar concerns co-operation in the fight against crime. This pillar was originally named 'Justice and Home Affairs

<sup>39</sup> European Political Cooperation was introduced in 1970 and was synonym for EU foreign policy.

<sup>40</sup> Page 167 - *The European Union as a Global Actor*

<sup>41</sup> TEU Article 11: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu>



guidelines' of the EU. Identifying five initial priority areas for CFSP actions: links with Central and Eastern European Countries, support of the Middle East peace process, conflict resolution and humanitarian relief efforts in former Yugoslavia, and support for democratic process in South Africa and Russia.<sup>42</sup> Rather than the Joint Actions expanded the horizon of the CFSP, the absence of an acting strategy and relations with NATO, ensured that, CFSP would remain reactive to external event.

### **2.3.2 The TEU amendments and the origin of ESDP**

Two years after CFSP's operation, both the Council and Commission published their reports plainly commenting their disappointment at the failure to progress towards a more proactive and coherent external policy.<sup>43</sup> The amendments' in the TEU were unavoidable, and in the subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam, (signed in 1997, came into force 1999) substantial changes were announced, in order to increase the effectiveness and visibility of the Union and CFSP, appointed Javier Solana, (previous prime minister of Spain and at the time Secretary General of NATO) as the Secretary General of the Council /Higher Representative of CFSP, in order to provide political direction and strengthen the CFSP image and recognition from NATO and USA, using diplomacy methods acquired from his previous experience and connections.

Between, at the NATO summit in Berlin a year earlier, it was agreed that the ESDI<sup>44</sup> the forerunner policy of ESDP, carried in the 90s by the WEU and structured within NATO after the demand of the United Kingdom, using the Alliance's headquarters and assets for possible missions or threats, preventing this way duplication between NATO and WEU. The result, was that the most close description of policy, incorporating defence and security that existed in Europe, became "separable but not separate"<sup>45</sup> part of NATO. The meaning was, that once again the European plans for mutual security and defence plans, had to involve NATO.

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<sup>42</sup> Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. *The European Union as a Global Actor: Second Edition* published by Routledge Group, 2006

<sup>43</sup> (Council 1995; Commission 1995b)

<sup>44</sup> The **European Security and Defence Identity** is a term which was used to describe a European common defence and security policy in the 1990s, now effectively replaced by the European Security and Defence Policy.

<sup>45</sup> Madelyn Albright speech in NATO HQ, Nov. 2000

CFSP's lack of access to military instruments to support the policy aims of the Union was an embarrassing burden for the Union, and the urgent need for a solution, was stipulated by incorporating the WEU's, Petersberg tasks<sup>46</sup> in the of Treaty of Amsterdam. The Petersberg tasks review a great range of possible military missions, security and defence policies; that could deal with humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping. The most important fact to this is that the range of tasks that the EU can commit is limited from NATO's approval, since the task of territorial defence is considered the domain of NATO and there are many provisions that prevent the competition or duplication with NATO. This is a very foremost issue in the relations between NATO and EU and will be discussed extensively in (Chapter 4).

Following the absorption of the ESDI from NATO, and the incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty revisions, at the Anglo-French summit at Saint Malo in 1998, the British finally accepted and agreed with the rest European member states that any operations attempt by the WEU had to be within the whole EU Framework. The Saint Malo summit, which is described by scholars and commentators, to be of far more greater significance than Amsterdam summit, amounted to a 'military revolution.'<sup>47</sup> The result was formalized in a declaration following the meeting of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the French President Jacques Chirac, decided on the shifting of the focus of the ESDI away from the WEU and within the European Union. They stated that:

"The European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises"...

(Cited in Bretheron and Vogler 2006)

This formal agreement represents a significant milestone in the European Union history, since it was the first time that the United Kingdom reversed its long-standing position and allowed such a capability to exist outside NATO. It was said later that the bad experience in former Yugoslavia,

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<sup>46</sup> The **Petersberg tasks** are a list of military and security priorities incorporated within the European Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. The Petersberg tasks were first formulated by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 during a summit in at the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn. In 1997, during the European summit in Amsterdam, the tasks were incorporated in the Treaty on European Union. Both the WEU and the EU are empowered to enforce the Petersberg tasks.

<sup>47</sup> Cited from Andreani et al. 2001 - Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. The European Union as a Global Actor.

demonstrated that the WEU expedient was inadequate and that the US dramatic action (greatly reinforced, within weeks, by the very bad experience of the US-led NATO campaign over Kosovo) to provide military cover for incapacity might not always be available.<sup>48</sup> Within the conclusion of the Saint Malo summit and the Union's military enterprise, ESDP was formally launched by the 1999 Cologne Council, defining the Union's military role in terms of the Petersberg Tasks. Later that year, the European Council after examining the proposals of the High Representative of the CFSP, announced in the scheduled session of the Council in Helsinki, the EU's ESDP 'headline goal' of assembling 60,000 troops available to ESDP by 2003 and initiated throughout the Nice Treaty of 2001, the institutional set up of the EU's ESDP three new decision-making military bodies. The role of the military bodies is to be in charge of crisis management operations and the member states cooperation link between: the Council – CFSP - and the Operational Headquarters in NATO. The assemblies agreed among their other tasks, described below, to be responsible of the day to day business of every EU's ESDP Battle group.

- **The Political and Security Committee or PSC**, which was decided to monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and contribute by delivering opinions to the Council of Ministers, either at its request or its own initiative, monitoring also the correct implementation of the agreed policies.
- **The EU Military Committee or EUMC** is a department of military officials under the High Representative of the CFSP and the PSC. The EUMC gives military advice to the PSC and the high representative. Overseeing at the same time the European Union Military Staff.
- **The EU Military Staff or EUMS** supervises operations within the realm of the ESDP. It is directly attached to the private office of the High Representative of the CFSP, and is formally part of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Its main task is to perform "early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks" and to implement ESDP missions. The EUMS current consists of 200+ military and civilian personnel.

(2001/80/CFSP, annex article 2)

Within only five years, since Saint-Malo agreement for European military cooperation, ESDP was obliged to launch of the first ever European Union military mission. The period between was well

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<sup>48</sup> **Anne Deighton**. The Eleventh of September and beyond: NATO the Political Quarterly 73, 2002 and **Jolyon Howorth**. ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock – Nordic International Studies Association (Sage Publications, 2003)

marked from the ‘constant succession of major international developments,’ such as the 1999 Kosovo crisis and NATO military operations in former Yugoslavia; growing tensions between the EU and the US over missile defence schemes; the election of President George W. Bush and the “advent of a new, less Euro-friendly administration from Washington”; the September 11<sup>th</sup> of 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington and the USA’s denial of accepting any help from NATO within the Alliance Article 5; the war in Afghanistan and the “the global war on terrorism by the US “and the renewed US National Security Strategy with its emphasis on the doctrine of Preemptive warfare; the launch of Euro; a radical renewal of NATO’s membership, structures and remit; the war over Iraq and the US occupation; the convention on the future of Europe and the Intergovernmental Conference on a European Constitution; nuclear alerts from North Korea and Iran; and last but not less important the drafting of the EU’s first security strategy document<sup>49</sup>. Beyond any doubt, this five year period that has been marked by so many significant events, acknowledged the necessity for the European member states and Regional Global neighbors’ in general, for thinking collectively about security issues and threats.

## 2.4 European Security Strategy

A *strategy* is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy *objectives* to be achieved and the basic categories of *instruments* to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the definition of the *means* – i.e. the civilian and military capabilities – that need to be developed.

(Cited from Sven Biscop. The European Security, 2003)

### 2.4.1 The absence of a European Strategy

The creation of the EU military bodies for European cooperation, and the necessity to improve the usability and difficulties to field of the European armed forces, in the consequential crisis and peacekeeping operations that ESDP was obligated to attend, was the most strong evident, of the

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<sup>49</sup> **Jolyon Howorth**, assessment discussion of events that marked the world from Saint-Malo agreement to EU first military mission: SAINT-MALO PLUS FIVE: AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF ESDP – Policy papers No 7 Notre Europe, Nov. 2003

absence of a European Security Strategy plan. A task that seemed impossible to complete, especially before the Saint-Malo agreement, as the political and strategic views of the member states widely differed, far beyond the creation of the ESDP. Because of those divisions of views and in order not to lose the momentum, it was decided, as happens so often in European decision-making, to push through with those elements on which an agreement already existed, assuming that once these were in place the strategic debate would inevitably have to follow<sup>50</sup>.

There was no common strategic vision behind the consensus on the demand to gradually develop more effective military capabilities for the EU, as a consequence, the EU external action was lacking of direction, determination and consistency. Characteristics that the US and NATO possessed for many years now and were an essential point, to the restriction of the Union to a classic reactive role. The EU needed to promote its own policy priorities, in terms of both objectives and instruments in the 'European way', so as to distance themselves from US policy with which they could not agree and highlight alternatives and comprehensive methods, preserving the same time the transatlantic partnership, that was perceived to be threatened from the ESDP existence, rather than be relieved that Europe as well, could be held responsible for security and crisis management operations. It was not until the informal meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Greece on May 3<sup>rd</sup> 2003, that Javier Solana produced a draft strategic document, that later the same month, the European Council welcomed Solana's document, 'A secure Europe in a better World',<sup>51</sup> and charged him with the work for the completion of the European Security Strategy<sup>52</sup>, as expected the European Council adopted the plan in their meeting in Dec.2003.

#### **2.4.2 New Security Environment and Objectives**

The EU member states that had been long halted being a threat to one another, but rather were readily agreed to joint the Union, enlarging it to twenty seven member states in 2007, had to secure the enlarged number of European civilians and neighbors', from the negative spill-over effects of the globalize terrorism, armed conflicts between or within third states, organized crime, illegal migration,

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<sup>50</sup> **Dr. Sven Biscop.** The European Security: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security: (Royal Defense College Brussels In: 'Sécurité & Stratégie', Paper No. 82, March 2004)

<sup>51</sup> Javier Solana, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'. <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf>

<sup>52</sup> 'A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003'. <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/78367.pdf>.

social and economic underdevelopment, lack of democratic institutions and human rights, failed states and the most tremendous of all ecological problems, that threatens the proper functioning of our planet. The security changed meaning, because it further meant that the security of one dependent on the security of the other and the stability of International system.<sup>53</sup>

At the Dec. 2003 Brussels meeting, when the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy and highlighted the fact that 'Europe had never been so prosperous, so secure nor free' and which 'as a union of twenty five states and over 450 million people actively producing a quarter of the World's Gross National Product, and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, is inevitably a global player', hence 'Europe should be ready to equally share the primary responsibility for global security and in building a better World'. The security strategy is then organized into three chapters: a critical analysis of the security environment and the impact of the globalisation, specifying threatening features of the globalized world (poverty; diseases such as HIV/AIDS; competition of scarce resources, notably water; global warming; illegal migration movements; and Europe's energy dependence). The second part of the analysis, recognize five 'key threats', all of which are closely interconnected: Terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.

The second part of the policy defines the strategic objectives outlined in the strategy: the first of the three 'Addressing the threats' list of the initiatives and missions that EU had already taken. The strategy then confirms that the EU cannot be a Global actor, as 'the new threats are dynamic' and spread vastly if neglected', 'conflict and threat prevention cannot start too early', because none of those new threats is purely military, substantially nor of those events can be tackled by purely military means'. Prevention will require the application of 'a mixture of instruments', that the European Union is particularly well equipped, following the comprehensive approach of security<sup>54</sup>.

The second objective in the strategy, defines the ideal design of 'building security in Europe's neighborhood', including the Balkans, Russia and Ukraine, Southern Caucasus and the

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<sup>53</sup> Ideas described in the work adopted by the Commission of **Dr. Sven Biscop**. The European Security: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security, Paper No. 82, March 2004)

<sup>54</sup> The *comprehensive* view of security: reflects the three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. The OSCE considers 'the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with economic and environmental cooperation [...], to be just as important for the maintenance of peace and stability as politico- military issues'. Security is further seen as indivisible. 'States have a common stake in the security of Europe and should therefore cooperate', to the benefit of all parties, since 'insecurity in one State or region can affect the well-being of all'.

Mediterranean countries. Preventing conflicts and acts of aggression against the EU; settling ongoing disputes and conflicts; establishing close economic and political partnerships based on shared values, prosperity and security; controlling migration and trafficking into the EU; decisively securing the protection of the EU citizens living abroad. The neighborhood policy objective should be nothing less than top priority of the Union, as terrorism and threats are the outcomes of those failed states and disputes among neighborhood states.

The third objective of the Strategy, involves the formation of an 'effective multilateral system': a stronger international society, well functioning as international institutions, such as the WTO, OSCE, Council of Europe, African Union and NATO, in a rule-based international order. The centre of the system is the UN, thus, it's the EU priority to equip the UN to fulfill its additional duties and act effectively to the scheme of offering justice and opportunity for everyone. The EU should be ready to provide worthy support and help states 'that want to rejoin the international community', but, be ready also to make to understand those who are unwilling to rejoin, that there is a realistic price to be paid.

In the final chapter of the Strategy, 'Policy Implication' the plan calls for a more active, more capable, more coherent and more cooperative EU, which in the global environment plays a more prominent role than on the European continent, with out escaping the projection of military power, within the bounds of the UN Charter, in order to ensure peace and stability. As the strategy puts it, for both prevention and crisis management: 'A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight and enhances its credibility on the international stage'<sup>55</sup>.

### **2.4.3 Operations**

The strategy specifies an objective for the formulation of a new extended 'Headline Goal 2010', in regard with the operations, the strategy emphasized the importance of having the capacity and capability to react fast and forcefully in the states that don't want to rejoin the international community peacefully, and seeing that the original headline goal of 60,000 strong reaction force, was difficult to implement, the concept of the EU Battlegroup of the 1,500 units was launched and could be formed by one nation or several, promising to form fifteen of them till 2007.

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<sup>55</sup> Analysis of the 2003 Security Strategy Objectives in the work of the **Dr. Sven Biscop**. The European Security: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security and the European Security Strategy

The ESDP within the operations framework 'should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously, by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities' which nowadays applies to the most if not all operations. Ending this way, the hottest debate between ESDP and NATO relations, on the proposal that Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg launched at the 'Quadrilateral Defence Summit,' to set up a fully-fledged EU operational headquarters centre outside of NATO assets when no national headquarters of one of the member states was used, in the Brussels suburb of Tervuren<sup>56</sup>.

The Strategy is mentioning on its final draft, the Berlin Plus arrangement, which was signed between the EU and NATO, providing to the EU with assured access to NATO operational planning headquarters and NATO assets and capabilities and command options for EU-led operations. It is mentioned as a factor of enhancing the EU capabilities, to an extended definition of the Petersberg Tasks, where the ESDP has to get the approval of NATO for proceeding with a key operation. The paper will have a further discussion on the Berlin Plus Agreement in (chapter 3), since is one of the major disagreements, in the current relationship between NATO and EU's ESDP, and since ESDP was involved with crisis management and peace keeping operations, prohibiting this way further discussion between the both Organisations. Several successful military or police operations was launched with or with out NATO's assets and capabilities, to monitor the implementation of peace, to support of the UN mission, or transfer the control from the NATO-led SFOR force to the EUFOR in order to oversee the democratic implementations' that was set, or train police officers and judges for security and democratic reforms. Demonstrating the crucial job and impact that the ESDP could accomplish, within soft or hard operations in areas of needs, making NATO and the US to reconsider the role that the ESDP could accomplish, establishing new links to retain the Europe's trustworthy friendship.

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<sup>56</sup> The agreement reached further provides for an EU cell within SHAPE to run EU operations with the use of NATO assets. 'EU Establishes Autonomous but Non-Permanent Military Headquarters'.



## 2.5 Conclusion

Since the end of the Second World War, the states of the WEU first and afterward the states of the Union, visualize the image of a strong economic and interdependent Europe, liable to provide the essential security and necessary defence, in order to protect the European citizens first from the hatred and big plans of the past, and then willingly cooperate with the Worldwide Peacekeeping stability efforts. NATO's creation was the alternate and easier solution of that effort from Europe, because of authorizing for action with Article 5, the one of the two dominant powers after the War, United States, against the other dominant power Soviet Union, forming the long lasting Cold War.

The role of the WEU states in NATO and the Cold War, as can be seen in this chapter was minor to compulsory, but important enough because gradually helped the Western Europe to stabilize their national economies, when at the same time were always in the middle of each Cold War nuclear weapon threat, between the opposing powers of the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, the threats of attack and the constraints of alliance solidarity that had bound Europeans and the US together for so long were suddenly diminished, and the rapidly changing international climate of the period suggested both new demands and new opportunities for European Security and Defence autonomy. The outbreak conflicts that reportedly occurred in former Yugoslavia indicating a hypothetical threat within Europe, that needed to be managed, signified the weak institutional structure and inelegance of Europe's armed forces, to prevent or manage those collective defence arrangements, impetus prerequisite, in which an EU security identity and capability was compulsory to be established. At the same time NATO announced the Organization's readiness to become engaged in peacekeeping operations, ending the controversial embargo that prohibited NATO, from operating 'out of area,' and signifying NATO's intentions and plans for a more augmented role in security, than earlier.

In order to set the research question for this paper, an assumption was made that NATO and ESDP would never be Rivals. The following chapter would examine closer and more detailed the reasons and conclusions that drove this discussion to that assumption, pointing some interesting details that kept this relationship alive even with all the differences between the two Organizations.

## 3.0 The Contour Rivalry Assumption

### 3.1 Introduction

The Contour Rivalry is an artistic technique used to purposely make multiple possible visual interpretations of an image or a condition. An image or a certain condition, such as the relationship between NATO and the EU, may be viewed as depicting one thing when viewed in a certain way; but if the image and or the condition of this relationship are carefully examined from different angles, the same lines that formed the previous interpretations, form an entirely new series of interpretations.

With the Contour Rivalry technique, this chapter of the research would attempt to provide popular series of images, statistics and interesting opinions from published journal authors, IR scholars and diplomats that was discussed and made some impact, on this scrutinize relationship. Within these interpretations, this research anticipates to offer the material evidence to prove that, even with the apparent problems, diverse opinions and interests' that the two Organizations and or their members' states individually, politicize around with. The main element of the relationship between NATO and the EU, even with the differences between the two, is that the rivalry option as solution was never really an option.

### 3.2 What are the major visions and debates that stigmatized this relationship and what is their importance?

Whenever we look in the present world situation we see nothing but deadlock – whether it is the increasing acceptance of a war that is thought to be inevitable, the problem of Germany, the continuation of French recovery, the organization of Europe... From such a situation there is only one way to escape: concrete, resolute action on a limited but decisive point, bringing about on this point a fundamental change, and gradually modifying the very terms of all the problems.

(Jean Monnet 1950, quoted in Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 193)

The vision from Jean Monnet for a broader European integration process, were shared by a number of prominent Western politicians and intellectuals, and served as the starting point of the ECSC, the first of the European Communities, founded initially upon economic integration, a Community of security in Western Europe. Security which was obtained in the most part from NATO, as the EC

was lacking of military instruments and crisis management control to support the policy aims of the Union, conceived however as a ‘civilian power’, playing an important role in the promotion of the World Peace<sup>57</sup>. The events in the Balkans in the 1990s, contributed to pressure the members of the EC, for the development of an EU defence dimension and the development of a European Security and Defence Identity with the difficult task of negotiating the relationship of the new European Security and Defence Policy with NATO.

### **3.2.1 Alternative Debate**

An alternative perspective to the development of the EC and the vision that was shared and supported via NATO, focuses upon the EU's presence as an Island of Peace in Europe, serving as a reference point for its relatively unstable East and South neighbours<sup>58</sup>. This vision was interpreting the security of the EU itself and of the region more widely, which can be best be ensured through extension of the stability and prosperity enjoyed within the EU. Consequently, the key issue to the EU is not to defend of its territory, which is no longer the predominant issue, but the need to construct a policy towards its neighbours that responds in a sensitive manner to aspirations for inclusion and fears of exclusion. The interpretation of this image described by (Bretherton and Vogler 2006) emphasize that the soft security set by the EU should be prioritized, and the construction of exclusionary, defensive walls with the use of hard security from NATO and the EU both, should be avoided.

The end of the Cold War initiated myriad debates about the future of NATO, and the opportunity that came up for the western European politicians to construct the EC's ‘civilian power’ role, but since NATO hypothetically transformed and survived, the debate remained between the WEU and on the eventual framing of a common defence policy. In the concern of achieving this goal, the WEU was declared to be an important piece of the development of the Union and was requested to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications (Article J.17.2). In a declaration attached in the Treaty of the European Union, the role of the WEU was stated to be the ‘the defence component of the European Union’ and the ‘European pillar of the

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<sup>57</sup> Originated by (Duchene 1972) and referred by Bretherton and Vogler 2006:190

<sup>58</sup> (Tunander 1997; Smith 2000 and Bretheron and Vogler 2006)

Atlantic Alliance<sup>59</sup>. This dual role for the WEU, envisaged a lot of different contour rivalry assumptions among its members over the future of the European security architecture and revealed three important for the follow up of this paper, but broad positions on European defence and security: the Pro-Atlanticists or the New Europe<sup>60</sup>, led by the UK and supporters of the US agenda and NATO interests; the EU defence dimension believers on Old Europe<sup>61</sup>, led by France and Germany; and the neutral countries (Scandinavian countries), which preferred to de-emphasize military defence in favour of 'soft security'. The debate weighted in the part of those who was convinced that the time for real European Autonomy had arrived, particularly after the conflict in the Balkans provided the final raison d'etre for an EU security capability identity.

### **3.2.1a 'NATO is Dead school' and the 'NATO Rides Again School'**

Jolyon Howorth<sup>62</sup> believes that the anxiety between NATO and EU's ESDP or (EU and USA) relationship was intensified when the Alliance, appeared to have sprung back to life at its Prague summit in November 2002, announcing the creation of a new NATO Response Force with a global character in order to deem itself, with a global role in the war on terror. Welcoming at the same time, most of the countries of the former Soviet Union, and offering security guarantees to Turkey in the event of a threat from Iraq. Ever since, experts remain bitterly divided in a debate between the 'NATO is Dead school' and the 'NATO Rides Again School'

**The 'NATO is Dead school':** The Alliance is, to all intents and purposes, already dead as military instrument, there are four main instruments underpinning this thesis. The first has to do with the Effects of the enlargement: The more Eastern and Central European countries the NATO embraces the more it will resemble the (OSCE) and become little more than a talking shop. The enlargement will weaken rather than strengthen the Alliance. The second instrument has to do with Military Considerations: the capabilities gap between the US military forces and the rest NATO member states has been broadened up ever since the acceptance of the Central Eastern European states.

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<sup>59</sup> Declaration I of the Treaty of the European Union described by Bretheron and Vogler 2006:194

<sup>60</sup> Pro-Atlanticist or New Europe is a term that was used from the former US Defence Director Donald Ramsfield for the EU member states that supported the invasion in Iraq.

<sup>61</sup> Old Europe is the term that D. Rumsfield used to describe France, Germany and the other EU states that did not support the Invasion of the US Army to Iraq.

<sup>62</sup> Jolyon Howorth. ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock – Nordic International Studies Association (Sage Publications, 2003).

The US army has highly preferred to fight high intensity warfare alone or with one or two allies capable of interoperability. The (NRF) that was created to solve or bridge that problem, proved too small force to make much of a difference, the US military is increasingly marginalized from the Alliance. This capability gap, in unity with the fourth year of the War in Iraq, makes the NATO Dead School experts to question the US commitment on NATO. The third set of arguments has to do with the nature of the Alliances in general and of NATO in particular: NATO's primary function Article V on (Collective Defence) is now neither necessary nor guaranteed. While its secondary function (Collective Security) has become more ill-defined and diffuse. Attempts to keep the old NATO alive since 1989 have been based on nostalgia, corporatism or simply cynicism in the senior Pentagon officials D. Feith remarks 'keep the myth alive'. The fourth set of arguments, and probably the most substantial for this paper research, has to do with EU-US divergence: These critics argue that, especially since the 9/11, "transatlantic differences have become so intense that the Alliance will not be able to stand the strain". The EU and the US have very different strategic or security culture, enormous disparities of power and capability, very opposing ultimate global objectives and policy priorities, different methods and approaches. For these reasons, the critics believe that if the Alliance would stay on its traditional military form, NATO will be sidelined from the US and ultimately dissolve.

Even the most optimistic, pro-NATO expert recognized that the arguments of the 'NATO is dead School' constitutes a major image of the NATO's state of affair, the necessity for transformation was indisputable, and the international experts supporting the 'NATO rides again schools' describe it:

**The 'NATO Rides Again School':** Can NATO be 'transformed' (Buzz word of Prague meeting), there are 3 separate schools of transformation, the first school was aspiring to recreate a transatlantic community like the one in the 50s and theorized by Karl Deutsch (1957) in terms of a 'security community' reinventing it self, "based on norms and values and genuine greater sharing as well as military adaptation to the post-Westphalia world. The second transformation school visualizes NATO, to continue its activities as a simple guarantor of Regional Stability in its classic (Euro-Atlantic) zone - concentrating on collective security and stability rather than collective defence, gradually the Europeans via ESDP will come to dominate this system (Yost 1998; Foster and Wallace, 2002). The third and last school of transformation and by far biggest group was visualizing

NATO, to transform into a pseudo-global alliance, in order to tackle the new challenges of international terrorism, shoulder to shoulder with out any geographical limits to the reborn of the Alliance's designated area of operations.

In this debate, it is difficult to weigh the opposing contour rivalry viewpoints between the two schools, since NATO from the Prague summit of 2003 is allegedly transforming and since the EU's ESDP, has made significant progress. The conclusion the J.Howorth formulates is that divorce is simply not an option between the two and NATO will survive as the EU needs NATO because, for the foreseeable future, it will remain military impotent without it and the US needs NATO to legitimize its ongoing presence and influence in Europe. However, the form in which the bond will survive remains very unclear.

### **3.2.1b Institutional Overlap in the Realm of Security**

Stephanie C. Hofmann<sup>63</sup> argues that the problem between the NATO and the ESDP is the institutional overlap between the two Institutions and that the existence of each institution influences the other one in three different ways: first, the institutional design of the institutions, secondly, their understanding of policy field at large, and third and last the strategies that are available to each actor to influence the formulation of security policies. Demonstrating in particular that these strategies are played out on different levels of potential coordination and cooperation, between the competitive dynamics that were created by the institutional overlap between NATO and ESDP, accelerating in the same time, NATO's shift towards comprehensive security, with the integration of civilian capabilities into its doctrine and operations through cooperation with NGOs and other international organizations, or within NATO itself.

When it comes to the day to day politics, the Institutional overlap between the two esteemed institutions can be observed in the different strategies pursued by the players involved. The writer distinguishes those strategies in four categories, described below: (i) "turf wars", (ii) "obstructionism", (iii) "muddling through," and (iv) "ignoring the politicians."

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<sup>63</sup> Stephanie C. Hofmann. Institutional Overlap in the Realm of Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP (Princeton.edu, Feb. 6, 2007)

**Turf Wars:** concerns the geographic scope of both organizations, their respective mandate with regards to the inclusion of the civilian aspect of security, and resources earmarked for the EU's ESDP, NATO, or both.

**Obstructionism:** Turkey and Cyprus (and to a lesser degree Malta, with occasional backing of Greece and France) use their “single” membership to obstruct cooperation between NATO and the EU's ESDP. Since the EU's enlargement in 2004, particularly the accession of Cyprus and Malta, the two institutions have not been able to meet on a formal level to discuss political and strategic issues in the format “26-27” (I.e. All members of both institutions). Instead, based on formalities, all reservations of strategic importance are discussed with states that have a security agreement with the respective organization. For example, this leaves Malta and Cyprus out of meetings that consider EU's use of NATO assets and capabilities in its EUFOR ALTHEA operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many observers suggest that by making more concessions to Turkey with regards to EU accession and by seriously getting involved in the Cyprus problem with Turkey, the strategic partnership between the two organizations could be improved significantly – despite other problems that remain.

**Muddling Through:** Since the formulation of the official cooperation between the EU's ESDP and NATO, consists of more meetings postponed or cancelled rather than the ones they actually take place. The informal and irregular meetings are the dominant mode of interaction between those two organizations. The EU Council Secretariat and NATO's International Staff, as well as some states interested in a better working relationship between the institutions, have established informal meetings on basically all political and military levels (such as the meetings taking place for the Security and Defence Agenda). After all, concerns such as terrorism, energy security or Darfur are of interest to both organizations. But due to political impediments, these topics cannot be instantly placed onto the agenda in a formal meeting. For example, the foreign or defense ministers meet in so-called “transatlantic luncheons” to discuss implications of the changing security environment. However, as these meetings are informal, there is no record taken and no communiqué or decision to be presented to the electorate. These meetings merely help exchanging ideas in a less constrained environment.

**Ignoring the politicians** Despite arguments, obstacles, and vanities at the political strategic level, the military and police operating under the guidance of these institutions manage to work together and end their mission lucratively. Day-to-day cooperation occurs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Darfur, and around the coming ESDP missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Many practitioners in Brussels as well as in the capitals point out that the military and police are simply forced to work together as their actions often decide over life and death and there isn't any time to waste as if the politicians.

### **3.2.1c Power and Weakness**

Robert Kagan<sup>64</sup> argues that the European's and Americans should stop deluding oneself to the illusion that 'Europeans' and 'Americans' would share a common world view or even live in the same world. Considering Power, as the main rationale for the disagreements between NATO and the EU, the way that the Americans and the Europeans conceptualize of the efficacy of power, the morality of power, and the desirability of power differ. For Kagan, Europe is turning away from power into a self contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace"<sup>65</sup>. United States though still exercise power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international debates today, Americans described to be coming from Mars and Europeans from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less.

Americans generally see the world divided among good and evil, among friends and enemies, while Europeans see a more complex picture. Europe, because of its unique historical experience, with the creation of the European Union, has developed a comprehensive set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power, differentiated their morals from the ideals and principles of the Americans, who have not shared that experience. If the strategic chasm between the United

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<sup>64</sup> Robert Kagan. Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe see the world differently? (Policy Review, 2002)

<sup>65</sup> Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace: refers to a state of affairs where peace is permanently established



States and Europe appears greater than ever today, and grows still wider at a worrying pace, it is because these material and ideological differences reinforce one another. The divisive trend they together produce may be impossible to reverse.

Kagan also argues that Europe lost its strategic centrality and hegemonic protection from the US, after the Cold War ended, but rather than the controversial political analyzer Samuel P. Huntington<sup>66</sup> predicted that the coalescing of the European Union would be “the single most important move” in a worldwide reaction against American hegemony. The 90s witnessed not the rise of a European superpower but the decline of Europe into relative weakness. The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the decade revealed European military incapacity and the political disarray in the Brussels heart. The Kosovo conflict at the decade’s end exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern warfare that would only widen in subsequent years. Outside of Europe, the disparity by the close of the 90s was even more plainly obvious as it became clear that the ability of European powers, individually or collectively, to project decisive force into regions of conflict beyond the continent was utterly negligible.

Recognizing that Europeans provided eventually, peacekeeping forces in the Bosnia and Kosovo, but arguing that they even failed to introduce and sustain a fighting force in potentially hostile territory, even in Europe. As Kagan put it, the real division of labor consisted of the United States making the dinner and the Europeans doing the dishes.

Europeans focus on issues “challenges”<sup>67</sup> where European strengths come into play but not on those “threats”<sup>68</sup> where European weakness makes solutions elusive. It is because Europe's strategic culture today places less value on power and military strength and more values on such soft-power tools as economics and trade. Americans for Kagan, seems to acknowledge the existence of threats earlier than the Europeans, even to perceive threats where others may not see any.

The European strategic culture of the 21<sup>st</sup> century qualities is the augmented emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction

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<sup>66</sup> Samuel P. Huntington was a controversial US political scientist known for his analysis of the relationship between the military and the civil government

<sup>67</sup> EU ‘Challenges’ can be consider, problems such as ethnic conflict, migration, organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation.

<sup>68</sup> The US perceives “threats” to be problems such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and ‘rogue states.

over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism. It is true that these are not traditionally European approaches to international relations when viewed from a long historical perspective. But they are a product of more recent European history. The modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European *machtpolitik*<sup>69</sup>. It is a reflection of Europeans' passionate and understandable desire for never returning to the past, to the dangers that arise from unconcealed power politics, from an excessive reliance on military force, from policies produced by national egoism and ambition, even from balance of power. As German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer put it in a speech outlining his vision of the European future at Humboldt University in Berlin (May 12, 2000), "The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648." The European Union is itself the product of a dreadful century of European warfare.

The main element of the European Union in the eyes of Kagan, is all about subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law, and with its long experience of successful multilateral governance has in turn produced an ambition to transfer to the world the rule of law. R. Prodi<sup>70</sup> commended that Europe "has a role to play in world 'governance,'" a role based on replicating the European experience on a global scale. In Europe "the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of power . . . Power politics has lost their influence." And by "making a success of integration, we are demonstrating to the world that it is possible to establish a method for interim tranquility."

Kagan, assertions and contour rivalry image, might be observed by Europeans as unfavorable comparisons between a potent and warlike United States and a pacific and ineffectual European Union and to the Americans as a glorious hegemonic United States and an ungrateful Europe, but since the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, either with NATO or with unnecessary wars and their obsession with power, makes it impossible for them to enter the paradise themselves and need the relationship of NATO with the EU, in order to be a more 'complete' Alliance.

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<sup>69</sup> *Machtpolitik* : is a state of international relations in which sovereigns protect their own interests by threatening one another with military, economic, or political aggression.

<sup>70</sup> R. Prodi president of the EU Commission from 1999-2004 and Prime minister of Italy since 2006.

### **3.2.2 US vs. EU Military Capabilities**

The United States are a military-hyper power many times more than its potential rivals. In 2003 its defence budget stood at €330 billion in comparison to the EU 25's combined total of €180 billion. They possessed 400.000 deployable ground troops, global power protection capabilities in its carrier battle groups and applied military technology so advance as to raise questions about the continued possibility of combined operations with its allies. The same time the EU, in 2004 had 1, 8 million personnel under arms and its aggregate defence budget was actually equivalent to those of China, Russia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, India and South Korea combined, but the need to improve the usability of the EU armed forces and the collective defence spending was an evident to all member states<sup>71</sup>. The EU however, does retain an alternative identity from the US and NATO and thus, acquiring of limited military instruments does not imply militarization or an attempt to imitate or reach someday, the US approaches to security. The EU's ESDP, unlike NATO, is not a clearly defensive organization and does not possess the capability for large scale war-fighting. Actually, its submission to the UN High Level Plan reads like a critique of US security policy since 2000. Military intervention is only justifiable for the EU's ESDP if there are no other valid options.<sup>72</sup>

### **3.2.3 Limits**

The language of the ESDP is not helpful in divining its purposes. The use of the word 'defence' might imply a commitment to the territorial defence of its Members. Although there is an enticing reference in the Treaty of the Union that the collective defence of the territory of the Union continues to be covered under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and under the same article of the vestigial WEU Treaty. Major armed aggression against its territories is, in any event, seen as 'improbable' and the ESDP is clearly not configured for territorial defence. War fighting and global power protection are not functions of the EU's ESDP, but stabilization and peace enforcement, with

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<sup>71</sup> Information's on 'military capabilities between the EU and US obtained via Dr. Sven Biscop work: The European Security: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security: (Royal Defense College Brussels In: 'Sécurité & Stratégie', Paper No. 82, March 2004

<sup>72</sup> (Bretherton –Vogler 2006:204)

the capability to operate beyond Europe, inquiring for the attention of a broader and more unambiguous agenda for the limits of the EU's ESDP.

The Battle group forces available and the ones that are under development suggest that the scale of operations is likely to remain relatively small. Future planning envisages EU's ESDP forces that are much more rapidly deployable and capable of undertaking tasks.<sup>73</sup>

### **3.2.4 Multifunctional role**

The EU's ESDP has a highly intergovernmental character and the new structures for crisis management have thus been developed within the Council Secretariat. In terms of policies and institutions, the ESDP is embedded within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It generously supplies it with additional instruments while supporting its normative positions and commitment to multilateralism. As we have seen, it is also overwhelmed by the problems posed by the separation of the pillars and the need to articulate military, police and judicial assets contributed by Member States with extensive Community action in the same area. The achievement of making these changes, rather than the more visible 'headline goals' of forces committed to the ESDP, will probably be the ultimate determinant of effectiveness. As from the examples seen so far, almost every worldwide major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. The ESDP needs greater capacity to bring all the necessary civilian resources to bear in crises and post crisis situations. The EU is developing an understanding of its role as a security actor that differs both conceptually and operationally from the conventional model of a great power. While essentially is still a civilian power, providing help to the police and judicial support, in order to counter drug trafficking and organized crime<sup>74</sup>.

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<sup>73</sup> Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report – International Affairs (Blackwell Publishing ltd, Jul. 1 2005)

<sup>74</sup> EU Commission 2001c

### 3.2.5 Conclusion

The general feeling and conclusion from what we have seen in this chapter can be described with the words of Dr Paul Cornish<sup>75</sup>, “Modus Vivendi” and have a meaning as the agreement of those who agree to differ. The concept for the use of this chapter in this particular point of the research, serves as a reflection image on the Contour Rivalry debates that we have seen above, describing and deducing this relationship from different and opposed angles, tackling some of the real issues between those two Organizations that really matter, as it can no longer be enough to define NATO-EU relations primarily as a game of hide and seek. The two institutions from what we have seen so far are dependent upon one another and neither organization is meeting expectations in resources and capability planning, and it would therefore be reckless not to expect too much in terms of co-operation in this area. An incremental, ‘bottom-up’ approach to co-operation is more likely to ensure that NATO-EU co-operation is expertise-led, rather than institutional focused.

The debates and visions that compromise the contour rivalry assumption that these two Institutions would never choose the Rivalry as solution on their problems, recognizing as well some of the major bottom-up problems that indulge this relationship communication. The following chapter however, will touch further some of the problems that we saw in this chapter and make records from interviews prepared, on opinions from important personnel that was quest speakers or important quest in the seminar of the Security and Defence Agenda “NATO and ESDP forging new links” on what they assume to be the tribulations in this relationship, possible new links for solutions and how these personnel imagine this relationship in the future.

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<sup>75</sup> **Dr Paul Cornish.** EU AND NATO: Co-Operation or Competition (Policy Department of External Policies – European Parliament) /October 2006

## 4.0 Recognizing the problems and agreeing on responsibilities, might be the first step.

### 4.1 Introduction

After having established an overview of the different Contour rivalry images and debates on the relationship between the EU's ESDP and NATO, from the scholar's and political analyzers that tag along this relationship for years now, an assessment of the precise state of affairs in the interactions between EU and NATO personnel internally is needed. This includes an overview of different opinions from an assessment of the interviews prepared for this research, as well as an indication of the main problematic areas and what will have to change and when, in order to establish new links for a trustworthy and efficient global security relationship.

### 4.2 Security and Defence Agenda and the Conference on (NATO and ESDP 'Forging New Links' Brussels, 8 June 2007)

*"This is the sort of Platform for new thinking and ideas that we need in Brussels to help forge consensus on common policies. For too long debates on defence and security in Brussels have been conducted in separate circles - almost in parallel universes, this initiative will undoubtedly enhance close cooperation and consultation between NATO and the EU to their mutual benefit."*

Javier Solana EU high representative for CFSP and  
Secretary General for the Council of the EU

The Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) is the only Brussels-based independent organisation without institutional or corporate ties security and defence think-tank<sup>76</sup> for EU institutions, NATO, national

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<sup>76</sup> A think tank (also called a policy institute) is an organization, institute, corporation, or group that conducts research and engages in advocacy in areas such as social policy, political strategy, science or technology issues, industrial or business policies, or military advice.

government representatives, parliamentarians, industry, specialised and international media, think-tanks, academia and NGOs to gather regularly and discuss security and defence policies<sup>77</sup>.

The Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) was launched in early 2002 under the patronage of Javier Solana, Chris Patten<sup>78</sup> and Lord Robertson of Port Ellen<sup>79</sup>, to provide a common meeting ground for defence and security specialists from NATO and the EU that would meet on a regular basis. The aim of the (SDA) was to give greater prominence to the complex questions of how the EU and NATO policies can complement one another, and to stimulate reaction within the international press. The SDA quickly became the only Brussels-based platform solely devoted to defence and security issues, funded from membership dues and event or report sponsorship from a mixture of companies active in the fields of defence, security, transport, pharmaceuticals and IT, national ministries and diplomatic missions, leading national research institutes, international organisations and foundations on both sides of the Atlantic.

One of the foremost points of interest, for conventionally concentrating together important and not only personalities, that form the association of people behind NATO and the EU's ESDP. Is a part of the SDA's series of annual conferences, this international event that looks at EU - NATO relations, concentrated also the major attention for the Interviews that was used for this study. The key question raised in the conference, was concerning the prospects for future collaboration and how can the two learn from each other?<sup>80</sup>

In the next sections of the following chapter, the research would obtain a glance in the Contour Rivalry images and debates from a key official entourage of the conference, such as NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, EU Military Staff Director General Lt. Gen. David Leakey and British Secretary of State for Defence, Desmond Browne.

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<sup>77</sup> Information's obtained from SDA's promotional material and via the website of the think-tank service: [www.securitydefenceagenda.org/AboutSDA/Whatwedo](http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/AboutSDA/Whatwedo)

<sup>78</sup> British Conservative politician, last British Governor of Hong Kong and European Parliamentarian.

<sup>79</sup> Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, between October 1999 and early January 2004; he succeeded Javier Solana in that position.

<sup>80</sup> For more information's on the conference and the officials attendances please look at the Appendix A.

### 4.3 Old Europe - New Europe - Neutral Europe

As have been mentioned in an earlier chapter on this research essay, an important characteristic for the objectivity of this research, is the differentiation of Political follow ups (believes) between the thirty two member states of both Organization. Apparently, the distinction started in 2003 when ten of the EU candidate countries back then or the Vilnius group<sup>81</sup> as have been called, and five of the traditional Old-European states, signed a declaration supporting the US Invasion of Iraq. The term Old-Europe / New-Europe surfaced after the former U.S Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld referring to the countries that did support or did not support the Invasion, that move from US bothered the French and German leaders that reacted angrily. Neutral states are the ones that highly prefer not to be part of any opposition. However, since the weapons of mass destruction was nowhere to be found in Iraq and the Invasion in Iraq is still occurring, there might be slightly changes, in the Political follow ups table below. This line up would be considered, when figuring out the conclusions from the Interviews.

Table 1: NATO and EU's ESDP membership and Old- Europe - New Europe –Neutral Europe

Common Members	NATO only (Pro-Atlanticist)***	ESDP only
Belgium (Old-Europe)	Canada	Austria* (Neutral)
Bulgaria (Pro-Atlanticist)	Iceland	Cyprus (Old-Europe)
Czech Republic (Pro-Atlanticist)	Norway	Finland* (Neutral)
Denmark (Pro-Atlanticist)	Turkey**	Ireland* (Unclear)
Estonia (Pro-Atlanticist)	USA	Malta (Unclear)
France (Old-Europe)		Sweden* (Neutral)
Germany (Old-Europe)		
Greece (Old-Europe)		
Hungary (Pro-Atlanticist)		
Italy (Pro-Atlanticist)		
Latvia (Pro-Atlanticist)		
Lithuania (Pro-Atlanticist)		
Luxembourg (Old-Europe)		
Netherlands (Old-Europe)		
Poland (Pro-Atlanticist)		
Portugal (Pro-Atlanticist)		
Romania (Pro-Atlanticist)		
Slovakia (Pro-Atlanticist)		
Slovenia (Pro-Atlanticist)		
Spain (Pro-Atlanticist)		
UK (Pro-Atlanticist)		

\* (PfP) Partnership for Peace Partners with NATO

\*\* Candidates for EU membership

\*\*\* Pro-Atlanticist or New Europe according to Donald Rumsfeld

<sup>81</sup> Vilnius group was a group of NATO aspirant candidate countries, created in May 2000, aiming at practical cooperation, exchange of information and lobbying with NATO. In 2003 they have all signed a declaration of support for the United States' aim of régime change in Iraq by means of an invasion.



#### 4.4. In what direction should the EU's ESDP and NATO lean their efforts, in order to re-establish their relationship as efficient and trustworthy?

##### 4.4.1 Introduction

This important section of the paper is devoted to the Contour Rivalry images, of the most appropriate implicated group of people in this relationship, the same group that have to attend the meetings of NATO or the EU's ESDP keeping the agenda of each organization undisclosed from one another. This group can criticize and evaluate this relationship, but emphasize as well the necessity for the EU and NATO to re-establish their relationship and look toward the future, rather than continue looking in the past. The following appraisal of interviews and conference programmed speeches recorded in the 'NATO & ESDP forging new links conference' was edited for this research, in order to answer the unreciprocated questions, for the prepared research questionnaire in the Appendix B.

##### 4.4.2 Extending the Political Dialogue<sup>82</sup>

*When we first came together it was good idea then and it would be a grater idea now coming together again, within the new challenges forging new links would be necessary.*

*Peter Weileman opening speech, Director of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung / June 8, 2007*

**The highest official spokesman of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Schefer** was invited to open the annual conference that was established as an attempt to bring closer the two organizations and a forum for extending the dialogue in Brussels, even within informal boundaries. The General Secretary set in motion his speech, by inviting the European Union to get in "business" again with NATO and handle with the problems that need immediate solutions, rather than resurrecting explosive reservations of the past. It might be a great solution he continued, since NATO and EU proved that can work well together.

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<sup>82</sup> Jaap de Hoop Schefer General Secretary of NATO opening conference speech

Afghanistan admitted, is a difficult test for NATO, since NATO is not a development Organization such as UN and EU and need to profitably invest more on humanitarian issues in order to succeed, in the Riga summit, he continued, all the twenty six member states of NATO and eleven partners for peace states, were dedicated to make progress in comprehensive actions, such as (reconstruction, police education and creating new jobs). Nevertheless, progresses is slow, admitted, and invites again everyone for talking to each other and “do whatever is necessary” to disengage from disagreements, and that the key for that issue, would be the ‘extended political dialogue’, especially for re-establishing and furthering partnership with the European Union, and other nations for the global security.

The U.S as far as the General Secretary concern, have done and offered a lot for NATO and Global security, but the Organization is still lacking behind, as the partner allies, mentioning the EU, should get more involved, especially for Afghanistan. In a question made on the establishment of separate headquarters’ for EU’s ESDP, the Secretary General answered that NATO is not interested if the EU would have its own headquarters’ and supports now the EU in this task, but insists on open agenda discussions, since operations need both Organizations involvement in line to be successful.

Another key issue in the speech of Jaap de Hoop Schefer, is the efforts that NATO puts together, to keep Russia honoring its commitments against the allies. The answer for NATO, accordingly, is the Indivisibility of security, which is NATO's jargon for the principle that all allies are afforded with a similar level of protection under the founding pledge (Article V) of the alliance to come to the help of any member under attack. This point indicates once again, the difficulty that NATO has since the end of the Cold War to revise its principles and transform away from the Article V that proved unreliable.

The last issue that the NATO General Secretary handled with was the changes that have to be made in the institutional level between NATO and the EU. “We need to initiate a discussion for figuring out a framework for taking wise decisions between the 21 common members” as my self continued, and the President of the Commission Jose Manuel Barroso cannot solve on our own.

In a question about NATO – EU – Turkey: The Secretary General responded that “you need three to dance the Tango” especially in the Cyprus Problem with Turkey, that needs a complex winning combination of a higher level of Institutional Support with the highest degree of Political sensitivity to be pragmatic. It's an ambition of both Organization and will of good faith to bring Cyprus and Turkey together, but we are concerned not to get involved into a blame game between the two.

#### **4.4.3 How to bind NATO and the EU in order to be together and successful?**

*Wearing NATO uniform or the EU's ESDP uniform shouldn't matter as Europe has to play a major role in the Worldwide Security...*

*G. Merrit, Director of the Security and Defence Agenda June 8, 2007*

The second unofficial appraisal of interviews for this research comes from Turkey<sup>83</sup>, **the Director General for International Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Tomur Bayer**. Turkey's role and position in this relationship between NATO and the EU, appears to be vital for the re-establishment and future efficiency of this relationship. The Director General of Turkey gave the vague impression of being fully acknowledged of this fact and talked on ‘how to bind again, this Allies in order to be successful’, since NATO and the EU's ESDP are the most important components for the issues that terrorize the Global World. Today he continued, NATO and the EU are not rivals just the reasons for not talking to each other, lays on the differentiation of opinion and believes between the two Organizations, on the Indivisibility of Security. It is more than natural for the two Organizations, sustained, to have differences and disagreements: ‘EU is unique in its own part and NATO is not only a military based organization’, but both Organizations' agree and acknowledge that the participation of the two of them and their member states, is necessary for fighting against Global security issues. However, the current approach between NATO and the EU's ESDP in the official meetings, that essentially, both Organizations keep separate agendas rather than working together, jeopardize the missions in Brussels, where in Battlefields Forces look to work well together, and leave a lot of unexploited parts in this relationship that could hurt and put in danger this mission first, and then this relationship. Turkey, apparently from what Mr. Bayer insisted, backed up from their

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<sup>83</sup> Turkey has an important role in the relationships between the EU and NATO, as it appears as the one partner of the US Government in NATO supporting the US invasion in Iraq and is on the negotiations with the EU for its membership, the same time when the pro-Atlanticist states of the EU, with United Kingdom ahead supports Turkey's membership, when France and other member states, are all against Turkey's full membership.

political believes in several occasions, taking part in all operations that was invited, showing flexibility and goodwill for this relationship. The same time when the EU, have presented to Turkey that their efforts and believes was never been appreciated and respected from the European Union. Clearly, the Turk representative continues the Turkish Political will that Turkey eagerly followed for years now, that it is to attack and make efforts for steps forward, rather than backing up in order to approach a common and acceptable solution, especially for the thirty three years old Cyprus issue, recognizing the Armenian Genocide, and with the rights of the Kurd's in Turkey.

On the questioning part, the Turkish Director was asked on the official position of Turkey's on the Berlin plus Agreement, and if this Agreement became very narrow, causing problems to this relationship. The Director responded that Turkey's view on Berlin plus, it is that, EU has to be held responsible and answer to Cyprus and Malta why they willingly complied with NATO in the end of 2003 in such agreement, since they already knew that Cyprus and Malta would become permanent EU members. The Berlin plus agreement continued, is a fault that has to be recognized from the European Union and NATO and Turkey should not be held responsible for the Union's indoors unresolved difficulties.

**The German Representative Clemens von Goetze**<sup>84</sup>, talked right after his Turkish colleague and the traditional views of (Old-Europe), on how to combine the two Organizations and an answer to the Turkish Director on Berlin Plus was some of the questions that was expected to answer. The representative began his speech recalling, two missions of 1900 men (Althea and Macedonia) that on the EU's site account as two very good examples of successful operations between NATO and EU's ESDP. Nevertheless, continued, We agree that Berlin plus agreement does not cover all the parameters for cooperation among the two Institutions and the idea from Germany that was heading of the EU the last six months, is to sit on the negotiation table and “discover their common views together”, because Berlin plus it is not the only way and apparently the correct way for the two Organizations' to come closer, because there are already bases on common thoughts but must have political dialogue to find solutions, as there are so many parameters that have to be considered among the two partner Organizations with the twenty one common member states.

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<sup>84</sup> Clemens von Goetze Permanent representation of Germany to the EU, responds for the German site and as the president of European Council for the last six months.

In a relevant question made on leadership, the German Rep. responded that there are discussions daily and are really clear views, between the two and Germany view the problem, not as part of any lack of political responsibility and decisions but the problems seems to be found elsewhere.

**Costas Miltiades**<sup>85</sup> Permanent Representative of Cyprus in the EU and been the only member states with Malta in the EU, that cannot get involved in the meeting and missions, under this relationship because of the Berlin Plus agreement. Expressed the lack of appreciation that is been indicated from Malta and Cyprus. The Cypriot Representative held that, the non Involvement of Cyprus and Malta under Berlin plus operations indicates the failure of this agreement between the EU and NATO and rather than before was agreed in part of a resolution formula, now apparently seems to indicate a part of the problem between the two Organizations, and probably part of a solution from the deadlock. Negotiating a new agreement concluded, could lead to further agreements between the two Organizations.

**Kestutis Jankauskas**<sup>86</sup> with his turn, expressed the disagreement of the Lithuanian Government on this relationship issues between NATO and EU's ESDP, since as a member of both Organizations, have to sit in the ESDP meeting on one day and sit on the NATO meeting the following day, keeping ESDP's agenda close from NATO and vice versa. As a new member state in NATO and the EU is at our belief, that the two Organizations look so similar, with the only thing lacking in his personal view out of the arranged meetings, the high political will and development that is reluctant, and it doesn't seem that will arrive any time soon.

The Lithuanian representative proposed that the EU, have to recognize NATO as not only a military based Organization but Political as well, and NATO have to recognize that ESDP is not only able of soft power missions but for hard as well. The inquiry continued, for comprehensive management and for complimenting one another is a fact. This relationship problem concluded, in our opinion is in a Political level, but we have to acknowledge the fact that it is fatal to work together.

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<sup>85</sup> Costas Miltiades Permanent Representative of Cyprus in the EU and ESDP, talked on the disagreement of Cyprus and Malta for the Berlin Plus agreement.

<sup>86</sup> Kestutis Jankauskas Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the EU and NATO, talk on the views of one of the new members of the EU and NATO

**Cezary Lusinski**<sup>87</sup>, the Polish representative and also one of the newest, biggest and consequently influential member states of NATO and the EU. Expressed caustically, Poland's view that rather than they are full member of the EU from MAY 2004, they did not understand anything yet in respect of the EU's ESDP, and if it is still a soft power policy instrument. However, commending in respect of the Polish NATO membership recognized that USA and Turkey created and reacted with more hostility, since the development of the EU' ESDP and this is the reason which the Polish opposition believes that cause all this tension. The views of Poland for the future however, is that the EU's ESDP and NATO could unearth the links to compliment each other in an enormous amount of issue levels for the necessity's of the Global security.

#### **4.4.4 How the EU could bring a change in Global Security?**

*“We have a lot of Army in the 27 member states of the EU, spending an enormous budget all together, but still we need our American Allies to stop the Terrorists”.*

*European Parliament - Committee on Security and Defence: German Karl von Wogau, June 8 2007*

**David Leakey**<sup>88</sup> Director General of the EU military staff, offers a different Contour Rivalry image, the one of the forces whose lives is in most danger and the people that most of the times have to fight the missions of both Organization's with separate uniforms and offers an assessment of the lessons from working together.

Between the EU and NATO personnel acknowledged, there are some “chemical reactions” personal friendships at the moment and this relationship in order to operate in the field need these relationships' to “Tango”. In order for an operation to have the optimum effect, It should not be an operation of one organization but operation of both EU's ESDP and NATO, in order to reach the optimum result and maybe in the future and with the better cooperation of other organizations, life time success could be accomplished in the Global security.

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<sup>87</sup> Cezary Lusinski Director in the dept. of International policy in the Ministry of Defence of Poland

<sup>88</sup> David Leakey Director General of the EU military staff, having a background within NATO talks about the way the Forces react in this relationship.

**Frank H.J. Hye**<sup>89</sup> The NATO Commander of Transformation in Europe uttered his opinion on this relationship and its needs, revealing that in order to approach today's' Global threats and Terrorism, we need comprehensive views for using military and non military action, the EU's ESDP is in line with the NATO's crisis management and technology has solutions but the human part and discussions is still very difficult. Solutions, co-operation or co-existence for a mission, which is up to NATO and the EU's ESDP, proved to be easier to be taken in the battle-fields between us rather than in this nice environment here in Brussels and that is because:

- a) EUFOR and NATO Forces agreed on not killing each other.
- b) Since we fight for the same cause and for our lives, we should not leave the decisions to be made up to the Lawyers.
- c) EU's ESDP even from its early goings, worked with NATO on the military Issues of a problem and not only for the soft power issues.

That leads us to the Conclusion, he continued, that the forces have and should work together for the successful outcome of an operation rather than work separately by completing only a part of their jobs and widely expect the others to finish what they have started.

**Lars-Erik Lundin**<sup>90</sup> **European Commissioner**, set the views of the Commission on the question who should command between the two allies battle group in the field. Expressing the Commission's view, that the people of Europe are the ones that should decide and command of the NATO and EU Battle groups, and the ones that need to be considered and protected from the combination of threats of the European Security. EU's ESDP and NATO persisted, are important to each other and can offer a lot to the people of Europe and Globally. Europe spends six to seven billion Euros annually for helping and defending security worldwide and the Europeans would like to occasionally see the outcomes of those budgets spend, and rivalry between the EU and NATO can only create more problems and expenses rather than solving any. The EU Commission decided that “no distinction should be made in matters of defending of civil rights and security threats” and President Bush and

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<sup>89</sup> Frank H.J. Hye<sup>89</sup> NATO Security Allied Command Transformation in Europe, talks about the NATO – EU forces.

<sup>90</sup> Lars-Erik Lundin European Commissioner: Head of the security policy unit / Directorate General for External relations expressed the positions of the people of Europe.

the United States agreed, attaining the position that they looked forward for a closer co-operation again, with Europe in that direction.

**Mihai Carp**<sup>91</sup> **Deputy Head, Crisis Management Policy Section of the NATO**, acknowledged that unity of efforts between NATO, EU and OSCE helped in the development and interactions of security in Europe and globally and the answer in the problems between them might lie in the effort to fill the gaps between the two Organizations in military and policy tasks rather than on political level and the keywords that might be looked at, should be ‘pragmatism’ and ‘thinking out of the box’ and in the personal interest of the people of Europe, co-operating, complementing or co-existing have to be discussed and decided, because rivalry is not the solution that serves the World and the Global Security.

#### **4.4.5 Thinking Out of the Box and Co-operating Pragmatically**

**Desmond Browne**<sup>92</sup> Agreed with the title of the Conference and commended that it is the U.K's aspiration to help with forging of new links between NATO and the EU, because if we do not he continued, we will all fail to meet the challenges that the thirty two states in one or other or both organizations' will continue to face. “It's now ordinary to say that the security challenges, we face are multifaceted and interconnected”. Armed Forces continued, cannot hope to solve these combinations of problems on their own, so we need international cooperative solutions that can be able to address the full breadth and depth of the issues. NATO and EU have to work together and do much better than any other time. The key in all of these places is to build up, and combine more effectively, civilian, development, foreign policy, internal security and military tools. Because a lesson that we have been taught, from history, is that the better results come if work together rather than individually, each accepting responsibility and playing to its strengths, working to a common agenda, and exploiting the political synergies that will emerge from the common effort and as French Prime minister said: “The future of security in Europe and globally, can't not account on the shoulders of only three – four countries, rather that each and every country must carry its burden of responsibility”.

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<sup>91</sup> Mihai Carp: Deputy Head, Crisis Management Policy Section of the NATO

<sup>92</sup> Desmond Browne Secretary of State for Defence Ministry of the United Kingdom had the closing speech of the conference, reevaluating the UK's role between the two Organizations.



The Contour rivalry of the United Kingdom of this relationship sustained is clear: we need 'effective modern institutions working better together'. We believe that NATO remains the most effective international security Alliance the world has ever seen. However, it must continue to adapt to ensure that it can play its part in addressing the full range of this complex security challenges and deliver effectively. The EU on its side, need to be able to make its own unique contribution (diplomatic, economic, development, policing, rule of law and military) whether alongside NATO or on its own, including with hard power forces when NATO is engaged, its potential is enormous, but it delivers less than the sum of its parts.

The UK continued, worked with France at St. Malo to launch ESDP because it was clear that the EU had a vital part to play in addressing international security challenges. We are still committed to continuing that effort, but also on establishing new links and make NATO and the EU work better together. In order to succeed in this task, there are certain key institutional requirements:

- We need the EU and NATO to be inside each others heads as situations develop – sharing assessments and thinking about possible responses. This is not a new idea – it was the vision agreed by Member States at the European Council at Nice in 2000.
- We need them to be able to share relevant information and plans, both in theatre and in Brussels. Our forces need to be complementary and interoperable on the ground, which is why it is important we share common standards and procedures
- We need to ensure we have effective planning and command arrangements able to deliver integrated civil-military effects on the ground.

But an even more important challenge that we have, is to ensure that we have the capabilities we need. The real problem that European defence faces is insufficient and inadequate military capability. Most European nations spend a very small amount of their budgets on defence. Through spending too little of those inadequate budgets however, limits the capacity that both NATO and the EU need for acquiring the modern technologically advance capability. If we keep the focus on capability, it is my personal opinion, that there would be no tension between the two institutions. Both have analysed their future needs, and both have come, unsurprisingly, to the same conclusion. "We need greater ability to deploy our forces at range, to manoeuvre and to be

interoperable in theatre, to sustain them on operations, to use information technology in order to maximize their gradual effect”.

Both NATO and the EU, the Defence minister continued, have developed processes that help the failed states to identify their requirements and ways in which they might help them to meet those. There are also processes and mechanisms that are intended to ensure transparency between the two organizations, though these needs to be revitalised. Nonetheless, repeating the view of the UK government that all these processes and mechanism are all futile if nations here in Brussels and Europe primarily, though not exclusively, do not decide to step up to the plate and commit the necessary resources, spending smarter as well. Nations assumed to need to think about where they can make the best contribution, building on what they are best at, cooperating pragmatically, on the basis of relative advantage.

As last part of his speech the Defence Minister identified five challenges that will underpin the UK approach to this relationship. “It is, I suggest, an agenda that should unite the two great institutions housed in this city”:

**First, activity**

Both NATO and the EU need to be ready to rise to the challenges we face by accepting the responsibility to contribute where they can make a difference. The key question should be how can each institution best contribute?

And member states need to be more willing to commit to operations to help solve the common challenges we all face, making the case for action with their populations where that is needed.

**Secondly, capability**

Member states, working through NATO or the EU need to invest in the capability that the two institutions need if they are to live up to their international obligations. NATO and the EU both need balanced armed forces, properly equipped to go to places like the Congo or Afghanistan.

The requirements are largely the same, and improvements will be for the benefit of both. We cannot afford wasteful duplication admitted.

**Thirdly, partnership based on realism**

We need to recognize continued, that these two institutions will always need to work together. Redoubling our efforts to overcome the obstacles in the way of that and achieve the vision set out at Nice. The solutions need to be pragmatic not dogmatic, strengthening the same time both NATO and EU relationships with other actors like the UN and with partner countries around the world.

**Fourthly, reform**

Both NATO and the EU need to reinvigorate their internal processes to make them better suited to the demands of the 21st century. In the case of NATO this means delivering the Comprehensive Political Guidance. This will require adapting both the Brussels HQ and the military command structure, but also the underlying culture and processes to make them robust for the claims the Alliance now faces. For the EU it means ensuring that Europe truly can deliver a coherent effect, across its pillars, and work with other players to achieve the effective multilateralism called for by the European Security Strategy.

**Finally, resources**

Unless Europeans spend more on defence, and more of their defence budgets on capability, both NATO and the EU will be “hamstrung”. For Europe to have more capability its members must spend more collectively rather than individually.

Concluding his interesting speech, the minister of the British Defence, proclaimed that the UK will continue to “preach the gospel of pragmatism in European security and defence issues”. The EU continued, has made good progress in setting up the institutional arrangements for ESDP and running successfully a number of operations. The distance however, NATO has traveled from the end of the Cold War to Afghanistan is remarkable. But there is more to be done. Let us focus first and foremost on getting the tools we need to do the job. Poorly equipped, static forces are no use to NATO or EU's ESDP. Let's reform both NATO and the EU, put in place healthy, effective relationships between EU, NATO and the UN so that each Organization can play to its strengths, and they can achieve maximum effect between them in bringing peace and stability to troubled parts of the world.

## 4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter of our research we recalled the Contour Rivalry images as those were delivered in the conference that was decided to formulate the first hand research for the outcomes of this work. Offering an assessment from the dialogue and guest speeches, in addition with the question asked interviewing the officials at the gathering after the conference end. Concluding it is difficult to indicate to what extend the problems and solutions proposals that we gathered above, would ever be discussed in an official meeting between the two Organizations, or if the material that we collected is objectively enough, to cover the Contour Rivalry views of the thirty member states between the two Organizations and for the needs of the Global Security World. It is enough however to accept that 'recognizing the problems and agreeing on responsibilities, might be the first step' for these two allies, which will bring them together and make them discuss again. Having the same agenda and discussing for new links that will make them work together again with efficiency and trust, leaving the past behind by concentrating into newer and shorter agreements that are more approachable, leaving away the Berlin Plus Agreement. Working in the problems of the member states in the same time in order to be able to work together.

In the meantime, we have seen that the threats and Terrorism of security in Europe, Atlantic and the World need immediate attention and management and capability decisions that would help the EU's ESDP, NATO or both, to adapt and get ahead of those threats, in order to create someday, a single trained and technologically innovated and sustained European soldier of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which is prioritized for hard as well as soft power missions. For this to happen, the technological gap between the USA – Canada from the NATO side and Europe from the ESDP side have to be filled, finding the way in Europe to spend wisely and collectively, because the defence budget in a lot of countries is short and should remain that way, if the country has more crucial problems and we have seen in several occasions that the only way to solve a problem is the comprehensive way, the human way, where the technology cannot really offer anything at all, the comprehensive way appear to exist throw history between the allies, but need to be sharpened.

## 5.0 Conclusions: ‘Effective Modernized Institutions Working Better Together’

*The realization of a mature and efficient security relationship continues to be hostage between a division of declaratory, rather than practical politics of ‘hard power’ from (NATO) and ‘soft power’ from the (EU), or along the geographical lines, where several years of repeated declarations have served merely to reiterate and reinforce differences, rather than provide solutions.*

Dr. Paul Carnish / October 2006<sup>93</sup>

In an effort to resemble this ‘fragmented’<sup>94</sup> transatlantic bond between the NATO and the EU with any other correlation, apparently, the only similarity that I could see, is that with an old unhappily married couple<sup>95</sup>. This couple came together, after the end of the Second World War because the US-husband helped the EU-Wife with the reconstruction of Europe, in the period till the end of the Cold War. The EU wife remained in the marriage because her husband continued to pay the military bills. At the end of the Cold War and with the creation of the European Union and then the ESDP the displeased EU wife, develop into more independent and showed to her husband that is strong enough now, to fight its own battles. The classic US husband doesn't like to be taken for granted and is getting tired of his wife's constant nagging and lack of contribution. The only reason they firmly stay together in this marriage, is because they both know that they do work better as one, bringing international parties together and protecting their neighborhood from the new negative spill-over effects of globalization in their security environment and divorce would not look nice for their historic stability reflection bond.

The above humoristic resemblance between the NATO and EU relationship and the relationship of an old but enduring couple can teach us a lot, since in order for two Institutions such as NATO and the EU, that are situated in the same city and share the 75% of personnel and military capabilities,

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<sup>93</sup> Dr. Paul Carnish. EU AND NATO: Co-Operation or Competition (Policy Department of External Policies – European Parliament) /October 2006

<sup>94</sup> **Heike Krieger**. Common European Defence: Competition or Compatibility with NATO? – European Security Law: Edited by Martin Trybus and Nigel D White (Oxford University Press 2007)

<sup>95</sup> Similarity that was described from Bjorn McClintock / NATO and ESDP Roommates or Rivals Sweden, 2006.

that are connected from the past, with personal friendships<sup>96</sup> and experiences of more than sixty years of allied crisis management co-operation. NATO and the EU should not and cannot be in competition, the trends show that Europe with or without ESDP will be very difficult for European forces to remain interoperable with the NATO forces in the full range of military missions. Yet NATO, rather its high-level force protection capability, it cannot compete with the EU in many areas of policy. Conversely, the EU has neither the ability nor the need to rival NATO on all levels and in all places. What the EU requires, instead, is sufficient, fairly low modernized military comprehensive security capability, in order to be fully equipped as a complex security actor, either working alone or either co-operating or complementing NATO. On the other hand, NATO and the US with the problems they created in Iraq and with their global agenda for fighting terrorism, they want to decrease (match EU states power) their military role within NATO, reserving its military power against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction worldwide, prompting the EU to spend more in military technology and close the gap between them both.

Having in mind the previous chapters, the above scenario and the new security environment of the negative spill-over effect of globalize terrorism, weapon of mass destruction, armed conflicts, failed states, organized crime, illegal migration, social and economic underdevelopment and the lack of democratic Institutions'. The answer to the main research question, *in what direction should the EU's ESDP and NATO lean their efforts, in order to re-establish their relationship as efficient and trustworthy towards complementing, co-operating or co-existing in the Global Security?*, can be drawn first, from the passage that inspired this research and was obtained at the opening, when Dr. Paul Carnish. EU AND NATO: Co-Operation or Competition, concluded that EU and NATO, in order to re-establish their relationship as efficient and trustworthy, should be able to abandon for the time being the pursuit of a 'grand bargain' and concentrate instead on the 'bottom-up' achievement of what is actually required in the 'real world' of security risks and challenges that we live in today, rather than 'resurrecting the past'<sup>97</sup> and trying to solve, or reinforce differences on the remote past, and with a somewhat abstract goal of an institutional accommodation between the EU and NATO in the far-away future.

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<sup>96</sup> Interview with David Leakey Director General of the EU military staff, having a background within NATO talks about a (chemical reaction) in this relationship.

<sup>97</sup> Sentenced used by NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Schefer on his interview on June 8 in Brussels for describing what has to be done between NATO and the EU.

The security changed meaning, the constant threats changed form and novelty and both organizations enlarged through common directions, their military generals in the interviews and the results of the missions fought together are more than positive working together rather than working individually. However, both organizations seem to react as if they are the old married couple from above, resurrecting their problems from the past rather than being able to see the same Contour rivalry image of both working either by co-operating, complementing or co-existing for the same cause and on the grounds of their flourishing history. It is more than clear from the research obtained; that the relationship problems are not a question of the differences in law and applicable conflict norms, either of problems between the military personnel on planning and executing a mission, but, it is a problem on the political level, because of NATO's continuing doggedness on the inadequate (Article V) formed in the origins of the Organization and supposedly modernized in 1999 as the 'Indivisibility of Security' and the EU's eagerness to invite NATO in a political dialogue in order to obliterate the Berlin plus agreement and revise the terms in which NATO and EU can finally work together in efficacy.

The general feeling and axiom that this research wants to represent, and which was drawn out of the conference, the speeches, the interviews and scholars that did handle with this relationship is that '*effective modernized institutions working better together*' however, in order to see results the following 'bottom – up' links would be a functional necessity:

- Need and owed to work together for the people of Europe, the World and their security and defend.
- Extent the formal Political Dialogue in issues and threats where both Organizations have common views and agree in responsibilities and plan of action.
- Recognize the immediate problems and threats with out distinct, on matters of defending civil rights and security threats globally.
- Agree on the Non Duplication of the operations between them.
- NATO should recognize the right of the EU's for having its own Headquarters and acting individually in operations if this is the act preferred.
- Both Organizations should get involved and bring closer the member states that have obstructionism problems between them, such as (Turkey and Cyprus) with out been scared

of get involved in a blame game as NATO General Secretary admitted. By seriously getting involved in the Cyprus problem with Turkey, the strategic partnership between the two institutions could be improved significantly – despite other problems that remain. I believe that these two Organizations have the power to help in that direction.

- Extend the discussions on a framework for taking decisions among the twenty one common member states and eventually revise the Berlin plus agreement to fit all the thirty two member states and the PfP states involved.
- NATO has to finally agree to turn away from Article V.
- The EU needs to spend collectively but wisely in order to close as soon as possible the military technological capability gap between the US forces and transfer this knowledge to its member states.
- Form common agenda meetings, in ministerial level, in order to discuss implications of the changing security environment.

The key in all of these links is to build and prepare each step well enough, concentrating on the common points and going forward, with out looking backwards, and combine more effectively, civilian, diplomacy, foreign policy, policing and rule of law, internal security first and technology. Because a lesson that we have been taught, from history, is that the better results come if work together rather than individually, each accepting responsibility and playing to its strengths, working to a common agenda, and exploiting the political synergies that will emerge from the common efforts, which potentials are enormous, but it delivers less than the sum of its both parts.

In the second part of the research question, we searched and asked the opinion of twenty five officials from the conference, for finding the most appropriate and more feasible approach for re-establishing the relationship between ESDP and NATO as efficient and trustworthy, between the following three forms of compatibility partnership approaches. In the search for the answer however, the general feeling both from the majority of the officials and scholars, was that complementing would be the best but most optimistic approach of relationship that is appropriate for ESDP and NATO to proceed with their relationship, however they all acknowledged the fact that we should work at first on establishing and beginning working on the new links to bring together these two



Institutions, rather than presume for an approach that only the future could indicate what would it be. The results from the twenty five officials however, were:

- First, the *complimentary partner's perspective* with twenty one votes out of twenty five, in order the both organizations balances each other with out duplicating and agreeing on responsibilities and form of action.
- Second, the *co-operating partner's perspective* with four votes out of the twenty five and which could be applied if both partners find the formula for a successful geographical division of labour and responsibilities.
- Third, the *co-existing partner's perspective* with none votes out of twenty five, showing their disapproval in the approach that could be applied if the Organizations decide that the two first partners' perspectives seem unattainable and find a peaceful co-existence solution between them for a healthy competitive relationship, but is the most close approach to the rivalry if the organization cannot find the peaceful co-existence solution.

Thus, wrapping up of the conclusions and the research question with a message that was delivered in the conference from NATO, the US representatives and the Pro-Atlanticist States and has to do with the changing of perspectives, Governments and happening throw the World, offering an anticipation for the establishment of a trustworthy and efficient complementing global security relationship between NATO and EU. Forging rapid but smaller steps, that can change the scenery right away, as the message that was delivered, was that NATO in 2009, would obtain for a New Strategic Concept in the Organizations sixty year anniversary, and with the presidential election of the American administration at the end of 2008. The US government and NATO challenge all the implicated member states of the two Organizations, to politically discuss and come up with a new NATO-EU common framework for working together, that if satisfies would be adopted. This offer from the US was offered as have been admitted, as a gesture of the current US government for changing the last year's negative environment in the EU-US and NATO relationships. And thus, as a window of opportunity with the change of governments in the most of the European member states and US to accomplish this new political framework among modernized states that look forward to 'effective modernized institutions working better together'.

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## Appendix A

### European Office

*For the European Union and the Benelux Countries*

[http://www.kas.de/proj/home/events/9/2/year-2007/month-5/veranstaltung\\_id-25928/index.html](http://www.kas.de/proj/home/events/9/2/year-2007/month-5/veranstaltung_id-25928/index.html)

#### Event

**"NATO and ESDP: Forging New Links"**

**Annual conference organised in co-operation with "Security & Defence Agenda".**

*Friday June 8, 2007*

*Brussels, Bibliotheque Solvay, Parc Leopold*

#### **PROGRAM**

**9:00 Opening Keynote: JAAP DE HOOP SCHEFFER, Secretary General of NATO**

**9:30 – 11:00 SESSION 1: HOW COMPLEMENTARY ARE NATO AND ESDP?**

The overlap between NATO and the EU's emerging identity has at times been a contentious feature of both the transatlantic and intra-European political debates. But how justified are these concerns? Are US policymakers aware of the ESDP's potential for promoting global stability through hard as well as soft power, and what do they think of it? Are the strongest supporters of an independent European military capability beginning to acknowledge that NATO is still a flexible and effective instrument for furthering joint transatlantic interests? Because both the EU and NATO face the same pressures – for a more clearly defined security strategy, a serious shortage of resources and to admit Balkans and Black Sea countries as future members – how much new scope is there for complementary policymaking?

*11:00 Coffee Break*

**11:30-13:00 SESSION II: CASE STUDIES IN CO-OPERATION**

**11:30 Keynote: LT. GEN. DAVID LEAKEY, Director General of the EU Military Staff**

It is now widely accepted in most European capitals that forms of outreach, like peacekeeping in Africa and the Balkans, should be EU-led, while others like current operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban fall under NATO, and others still, like policing post-conflict Lebanon, should be UN-led. How do military planners and political decision-takers see the future terms and rules for civil-military expeditions? Could NATO's Afghanistan mission usefully be supported by an ESDP-backed programme for development assistance or civilian-led police training? How should NATO support the EU led pre-settlement political process in Kosovo? Is Berlin-plus an adequate mechanism for future cooperation or is an EU Military Staff Command and Control capability gaining acceptance? How much more do NATO and the EU need to coordinate with international organisations like the UN, the World Bank, the African Union and the OSCE, and with major players like Russia and China?

**13:00-15:00 VIP LUNCH DEBATE: INTEROPERABILITY AND ARMAMENTS COOPERATION**

Rising demand for multinational forces cooperation is placing greater emphasis on the lessons NATO has learned in Afghanistan on interoperability. Are current acquisition and investment programmes meeting future needs? What more can NATO and the EDA do to stimulate more transatlantic defence and industrial cooperation, and are transatlantic partnerships now being increasingly stimulated by the emergence of a European market? What are terrorism threats doing to promote the drive for more dual-use technology solutions? Will European countries be able to coordinate NATO's demands with a more EU-driven security research agenda? Is there a way for the US and Europe to engage in collaborative R&D that improve transatlantic interoperability? How damaging is the controversy over missile defence likely to be to EU-US cooperation?

## Appendix B:

### EU's ESDP and NATO: Establishing New Links for a Trustworthy and Efficient Global Security Relationship

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Department of European Studies

**MA Thesis Questionnaire:** Please Indicate – EU Member Cit  NATO Member Cit

**Please Indicate with few words in the space available your opinion in the following questions, your opinion is valuable and respected.**

1. Do the partners of both sides try to limit damage by playing down any conflict between the two Organizations although; they are increasing pursuing divergent policies?

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2. How can each institution best contribute and be productive?  
(In what extent the EU is able and willing to take over tasks and functions so far being performed by NATO)

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3. How far is the US factor (e.g. military participation) essential for relations between the two institutions?

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4. How suitable is the Berlin plus Agreement in this relationship?

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5. Does the ESDP need more room for flexibility and standing operational and planning capabilities of its own and should there be a geographic scope for ESDP?

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## Appendix C

### **Chronology of the Development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)<sup>98</sup>**

#### **December 1991: The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU)**

Article J.4: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”.

#### **June 1992: The Petersberg Declaration**

The Petersberg tasks are defined to include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

#### **June 1996: The Nato Berlin Council**

An European Security and Defence Identity is created within Nato. Nato structures and assets shall be made available to the Western European Union (WEU), which today is merged with the EU.

#### **December 1998: The Anglo-French Summit at St-Malo**

Prime minister Tony Blair and President Jaques Chirac issue a joint statement that calls for autonomous European capacities and credible military force.

#### **May 1999: The Franco-German Summit in Toulouse**

The Eurocorps are made available for EU crisis management operations.

#### **June 1999: The Cologne European Council**

WEU is merged with the EU, Javier Solana is appointed to be the EU’s High Representative and the EU’s military capability is agreed to entail the Petersberg tasks.

#### **December 2000: The Nice European Council**

The new ESDP body, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is enshrined in Article 25 and guidelines for EU military operations are agreed upon.

#### **January 2001:**

The first meeting between the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC)

#### **May 2001: The EU-NATO Budapest Summit**

First joint-summit ever of EU and NATO foreign ministers.

#### **June 2001: Franco German Defence and Security Council in Freiburg**

France and Germany commit themselves to achieve further progress on ESDP.

#### **June 2001: First meeting of EU and NATO Military Committees**

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<sup>98</sup> A simplified overview of the contributed development evolution of ESDP, used by Björn **McClintock**. NATO and ESDP – Roommates or Rivals?



**March 2002: Council Joint Action on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)**

When the EU decides to take over the International Police Task Force's mission in Bosnia from the UN, the first operation of its kind undertaken by the EU.

**November 2002: NATO Prague Summit**

Seven East European countries are accepted by the alliance and NATO-members agree on creating the NATO Response Force (NRF).

**December 2002: EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP: Berlin-Plus**

The EU receives access to NATO-assets for crisis management and the EU agrees to involve non EU-members of NATO in ESDP as much as possible.

**December 2002: The EU Police Mission (EUPM) is launched in Bosnia.**

The EU's first ESDP operation consists of 531 police men and 400 civilian staffers and is mandated until the 31 December 2005.

**March 2003: Operation Concordia is launched in FYROM**

The first ever EU mission that utilizes NATO-assets in agreement with the Berlin-Plus arrangement, consists of 350 lightly armed troops.

**June 2003: Operation Artemis is launched in DRC**

The first EU operation outside Europe and without NATO-assets involves 1800 troops, mostly from France.

**December 2003: The Brussels European Council**

The European Security Strategy (ESS) is adopted.

**February 2004: Franco-British-German Proposal on EU-Battle Groups**

The Big Three propose the creation of 9 battle groups, 1500 soldiers each, to be deployed urgently at the request of the UN.