Lobbying the REACH regulation : an empirical analysis of the “Meta game of triple P”

Krimphoff, H. (2007) Lobbying the REACH regulation : an empirical analysis of the “Meta game of triple P”.

Abstract:Knowing this, it is obvious that all different stakeholders will represent their interests in one way or another. They will lobby1 their interests. The present research tests how lobbying works. The focus lies on one particular strategy developed by Rinus van Schendelen. It is called the “Meta game of triple P“. Compared to other lobbying strategies this ‘game’ is exceptionally interesting. In brief, ‘triple P’ means that a lobby group/ lobbyist/ or IG2 walks to the friendliest person in the best position and with the most beneficial procedure for achieving the IGs’ interests. It is, the attempt of a lobbyist to approach different actors, to use factors affecting the behaviour of the official, and to create vectors, in order to change the situation in his own favour. It is interesting to find out, what was the case for the REACH regulation. It might be that one of the aforementioned stakeholders (government, companies, NGOs etc.)played the game of van Schendelen to achieve their requests. Therefore the research question is: Is the REACH regulation followed by the logic of the “Meta game of triple P”? Several sub-questions which will be answered in part B, are listed in chronological order: 1. What does the ‘Meta game of triple P mean’? (Chapter 5) 2. What are the key subjects of REACH and why was it developed? (Chapter 6) 3. How and with what result can the strategy (theory) of the “Meta game of triple P“ empirically be tested for the REACH regulation? (Chapter 7 and 8)
Item Type:Essay (Bachelor)
Faculty:BMS: Behavioural, Management and Social Sciences
Subject:85 business administration, organizational science
Programme:Public Administration BSc (56627)
Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/essays/58123
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