University of Twente
PO Box 217
7500 AE Enschede
The Netherlands

University of Münster
Scharnhorststr. 100
48145 Münster
Germany

The Reforms in the United Nations and British Foreign Policy

Thesis submitted for the degree

Master of Science

Programme: European Studies

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhardt Meyers

Second Supervisor: Prof. Ramses Wessel

Written by:

Rosica Stoyanova

Student number: NL: s012243; D: 293814

Tel: 0044 79 12881899

E-Mail: rosy_st@yahoo.de

Address: 8 Downbarton House

Gosling Way

SW9 6LX London, UK

Contents

List of Abbreviations

EU	European Union
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MS	Member States
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
SMG	Senior Management Group
SPU	Strategic Planning Unit
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference of Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq – Kuwait Observation Mission
UNSCOR	United Nation Special Commission on Refugees
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

In the light of the 60th anniversary of the UN, the debates for the reformation of the World Organization are more urgent than ever. The reformation process is running for a couple of years and still there is no visible effect from the changes that are taken. The UN is a World Organization dealing with peacekeeping and fighting poverty and inequality. During the last years, the Organization was confronted with many problems and its reformation was unavoidable in order to proceed its mission. The members of the UN are interested in the effective reformation, but on the other side are also unable to reach a consensus on these urgent matters.

The UK as a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN and as a member of the Union is an important player and designer of the UN reformation and of European Foreign Policy. In relation to these facts, the UK Government set a number of goals, which shall be achieved in the coming decades. These goals involve the United Nations Organization more or less active, because the British Government is realizing many of its missions through the organization.

In this sense an interesting research question could be: How does British Foreign Policy affect the reformation of the United Nations Organization? To start the research I should analyse the history of the United Nations. In the respect my first sub-question will be why was the UN established? This sub question is important in order to understand the aims for the establishment and function of the UNO. By drawing these first views about the UN, I will be able to distinguish between the aims and the failure of the UN. This first brainstorming will form the way of the reformation and distinguish between the different priorities.

In this respect my second sub-question will be how is the UN structured? In doing this, I will be able to distinguish between the different responsibilities of each institution and point out their failure. This sub-question will form the basis for my next sub-question, which should be what are possible reforms in the UN? By collecting the reform's proposals or taken decisions by the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, I could begin with the analysis in my research, because the main research question is how the UK's interests affect these. Therefore, the collection of the proposals for reform will serve as a basis for the selection of these reforms, which are interesting for the UK and in this respect are more supported than other ones.

My fourth sub-question concerns the criticism on some of the reforms. How is the reform process on some important issues criticised. I will deal here with the Secretariat, the Security

Council and the mechanisms for maintaining global peace and security because they are some of the essential elements for a successful United Nations.

I will take the UK as an example because the country is not only member of the Union, moreover is also a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This fact makes the country an important designer of the UN and involves the country in important decisions on security and defence matters. My fifth sub-question will be what is the position of the UK regarding the reformation of the UN? In this part, I will deal with problems such as, what is the British position in international military interventions and the reform of the Security Council. Moreover, taking into account the shift in the government in the UK, I will examine, if there will also be a shift in the politics toward UN. Answering all these sub questions, I will be able to answer in the conclusion my main research question, how far the British interests in security matters affect the reformation of the UN.

The reformation of the UN is a difficult issue and probably every country has its own vision about that. The most discussed issue is the reformation of the Security Council. Plenty of reports and discussions have been made on the topic but no one succeed to deliver an appropriate solution to the problem. The American Government obviously support a reformation of the UN, which will make the organization just a tool for fulfilling the American goals. Many scientists support this position and argue that one of the reasons for the failing of the UN lies in the corrupt and non-democratic structure of the organization[1].

Different models for the reformation have been introduced to the international arena. Some of the models see an enlargement of the Security Council with other permanent members, but some speak about one voice for Europe, which does not meet necessarily the interests of all EU countries and especially of the UK. However, the positions do not only differ in problems concerning the reformation of the Security Council. Many of the writers argue about the position of UN in security matters. One part of the writers supports a strong position of the UN, in which the organization shall use the troops not only to maintain peace, moreover to preserve peace in conflicts[2]. Other groups of writers base their assumptions on the history and point out, that the organization has been more successful when it was involved in actions at the end of a conflict and not during the conflict.

There are also different positions in other issues concerning the reforms of the UN and in these aspects, the UK has developed a positions and strategies to fulfil these goals. During the analysis of the available literature, I will try to look behind the interests and develop a possible effect of UK politics over issues of the UN reformation.

---

[1] More about this topic will be presented in Chapter 6.
[2] On this assumption is argued in Chapter 6.

2. Methodology

I will first collect relevant literature on the researched topics. I will collect reports, researches, articles dealing with the reformation of the UN and the UK's position in these matters. As the topic is quite interesting and important, I will also visit lectures and debates dealing with the UK's position in these processes. Interviews and meetings with members of the government or members of independent organizations could be a possibility to receive authentic information in this subject. Sub questions will help for the data collection. Therefore a list with sub questions will be made. For the data collection, I will use qualitative and quantitative research methods to get detailed information

After the information has been collected, the next step in the research will be the data analysis. The collected information will be split to the following groups: information on the available reforms of the UN. A second group will be formed on the information about the UK position on UN reform. In a third group will be selected information on the reasons for the failure of the organization. In addition, the last group will be based on the outcomes of the British politics toward UN.

A third step of the research will be the interpretation of the data, when an answer of the given question will be found. In doing this, the characteristics of each group will be viewed and put in relation with the rest. That is the only one possibility to give a realistic answer on the question I gave in the beginning of the research.

Taking into account the complexity of the researched topic, I realize that I should probably split these three sub-questions into different points, because their formulation is too broad and I will not be able to analyze it, if taken together. The different positions on the subjects should be distinguished in relation to the discussed issues, because if I take an example with the different proposals for the reform, by trying to include all the reforms in one chapter, I could mess them up, which will disturb the clear line of the research.

With regard to the methods I would like to use, the interviews with the members of the Government might be not as efficient as I wished them to be, because I do not think that the person in question will tell me any detailed information on the issues. Usually the members of the Government stick to the official position of the state and I will not be able to go behind this position. The interviews with members of independent organizations would be much more effective in my research, because these organizations are usually established to take critical positions to political matters. In addition, the open lectures and debates might be an enormous source of information in this respect.

3. History of the United Nations Organization

Already in August of 1944, even before the Second World War was finished, four Great Powers the USA, the UK, the Republic of China and the Soviet Union compiled a draft for the foundation of a world security organization, the United Nations[3]. This happened at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, named after the estate where the meetings were held. The purpose of this draft was the aim of the American presidents Roosevelt for collaboration on economic issues and a permanent system of security. This draft was concretised and ended, in the end, with signing the UN - Charter by all fifty participants on the 26th June 1945. one month later, the United States become the first member to ratify the Charter. It took only three months for a sufficient number of countries to ratify the document.

However, the idea to set up a global union for the peace protection was new by no means. Already after the First World War, the League of Nations had been founded by will of the American President Wilson. This alliance should punish international aggressors with sanctions, or fight also with military power. Nevertheless, the League of Nations did not get to unite the states. Many states did not join to the alliance at all and only formed regional alliances, which took the possibility of the Union to act. Thus, it could also not prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. One wanted to avoid these mistakes with the second attempt to found an international community of states. Thus, one stuck among other things in the Charter of the UN that all Member States should be committed to the principles of the charter.[4] This means that the Membership in the UN in contrast to League of Nations was probably thought to be obliging juridical and compelling.

However, this was only one point, which one wanted to improve. An other important change to his precursor consisted in the fact that all Members had to volunteer for a conflict solution free of power: *" … for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."*[5]

The special position of the great powers, which was still existent in the League of Nations, was supposed to be abolished in UN, what does not happen in reality, because the members in the Security Council have veto power by the decision – making process. In the statute of UN -

---

[3] Singh (1995): p. 11.
[4] Chapter 1, Art. 2.2, at the Charter of the United Nations, 26. June 1945.
[5] Chapter 1, Art. 1.1, at the Charter of the UN, 26. June 1945.

Charter the sovereign equality of all member states became consistent by joining the Union.[6] De facto, everything has been undertaken by the foundation of UN to avoid the mistakes of the League of Nations, and to put the international community of states on a more secure foundation than his precursor. Because the United Nations exist for now 60 years, and the third world war is missing, the founding fathers seem to have made everything right. Thus, it seems at least at first sight. Indeed, criticism is raised during the last years repeatedly with regard to the UN. After the East – West Conflict was finished in the beginning of the nineties and international politics did not have to concentrate any more upon the discussion between Capitalism and Communism, it became clear that the East – West Conflict had covered many problems of the international community of states. The acutest problems lie among other things in the construction of the UN, the competence distribution of the individual member states, the financial structure and, above all, in global conflict prevention or conflict defusing. In the 21st Century the world forms anew - which globalizes economy, the discrepancy between poor and rich becomes bigger and bigger what walks along increasingly with violent conflicts. Therefore, the UNO also has to master the new tasks. Indeed, it must be asked whether it can master these new problems with the existing structures. To keep a better impression about the problems and the reform thoughts linked with it of the UN, the origin and objective of the UN must be looked at first. Because the reform problems refer among other things also to the structure of UN, is it to be analyzed after the representation of the historical development, the construction and the composition of the UN. Only after investigation of these both points, the real reform debate should be treated in the main part of the work. The question, which positions itself at first, is how it generally came to the fact that the UN originated and what the foundation members made of it.

3.1. The Pre-History of the United Nations Organization

Some political theoreticians such as Abbé de Saint Pierre or Emanuel Kant required already in the 18th and 19th Century an international state alliance to ensure stability and peace.[7] This was however at that time not possible under the constellation of power in Europe. At that time, the states were still concentrating to intersperse their hegemonic potential over the other states. In addition, the two Conferences of Peace in The Hague in 1899 and 1907 remained

---

[6] Chapter 1, Art. 2.2, at the Charter of the UN, 26. June 1945.
[7] Knapp and Krell (1996): p. 479.

even with the introduced innovations with no big success. Only after the sorrowful Events of the First World War, the attempt was undertaken for the first time, to establish one international organization for the safety and preservation of the world peace. The American President Woodrow Wilson placed already in 1918 to the Congress of US his fourteen points concept, in which he suggested under point 14 the creation of an international union for the protection of world peace. In 1920, 42 States signed in Geneva the statute of the League of Nations. However, this statute did not contain a paragraph, which planned a general force prohibition. The League of Nations was supposed to serve the member states only for the avoidance of future military conflicts. This should be reached by disarmament negotiations as well as arbitration and conciliation procedures. The statute of the League of Nations planned further that by declarations of war of a member state against another state, this state should be regarded, as if it would have made a declaration against all other Union's members. This formal equality principle was an up to date new Concept of „collective security ".

In addition, the statute planned that in such a case the particular state should be occupied by economic and diplomatic sanctions and more important, he should even be fought with military means. This authority was given to the Council's members under Article 16 of the League's provisions. The requirement of unanimity made action by the Council very difficult to achieve, but they clearly institutionalized the special prerogative given to great powers. On the basis to this fact, it shows itself that the desirable goal to the safety of the world peace was condemned to fail.[8]

A further point of criticism existed in the fact that the four great powers (Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan)[9] were excluded from the equality principle. They should carry the responsibility for the peace and form the permanent members of the Council. A further disadvantage of the League of Nations consisted of the fact that some of the great powers like the USA, Germany or Russia belonged not at all or only occasionally to the Federation. Instead of the planned universality of the League of Nations, it developed therefore a European predominance. In addition, the desirable goal, to integrate regional alliances under the roof of the League of Nations did not reach. Already at the end of the 20's and at the beginning of the 30's various regional alliances had been established.

In addition, even these regional alliances could not prevent the decay of the League of Nations and the outbreak of the Second World War. The attempt to create one World Safety Organization had failed with the League of Nations, it gave however to report also positive results. The League of Nations succeeded twice to settle martial conflict. In 1933, a

---

[8] Ansprenger (2000): p.122.
[9] USA never was a member of the League of Nations.

contingent of the League of Nations took over the administration over the city Leticia, on which both Peru and Colombia raised requirement, and settled the conflict after negotiations. Between 1934 and 1935 supervised 3300 soldiers the referendum in the Saarland[10] and provided for its smooth procedure.[11]

Perhaps, the fact that the League of Nations advanced anti-colonialism, by which it did not divide the colonies of the defeated German Reich and the Arab occupied areas of the Osmani under the victory powers as a war gift, but it, left them under the supervision the League of Nations.[12] Despite these two positive examples, the League of Nations did not succeed, however, to secure the global peace and to prevent the Second World War. That failure of the League of Nations did not mean, however, that the idea of the security of the world peace had failed, which is to be recognized later by the establishment of the UN, what is treated in the next section.

3.2. The Establishment of the United Nations Organization

The structure and the sanctions of the League of Nations were clearly too weak, in order to ensure a durable international stability. Although the idea of the collective security with the League of Nations had failed, the international security community of states undertook during and after the Second World War again the attempt to institutionalize that concept of global security - however with substantial restrictions in the comparison to the League of Nations. The Charter of the United Nations contains the principle of strict war proscription. All member states are obligated, with the pursuit of their international interests on any menace to avoid the application of force.[13]

Already with the announcement of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 the American President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Churchill spoke out for the creation of a system of durable peace – keeping measures regarding the Post-War Period. Particularly Roosevelt saw in the „ One – World – Concept "an equipment for the establishment of a peaceful Post – War – Order. The basis for the peace – keeping measures and their maintenance should be formed, according to Roosevelt, by the five Great Powers the USA, UK, France, China and Russia. During the Second World War, the ideas of Roosevelt were

---

[10] Löwe (1994): p.34 -35.
[11] Löwe (1994): p. 37f.
[12] Ansprenger (2000): p.122.
[13] Chapter 1, Art. 2.4, at the Charter of the UN, 26. June 1945.

concretized and developed. From August until October, the evenly specified five Powers held a conference in Dumbarton Oaks (near Washington D.C.), on which was compiled one common drafting of a statute to the establishment of the United Nations. Finally from April to June in the following year in San Francisco took place the conference of the establishment of the United Nations, which with the signing of the UN-Charter by the 50 establishment members[14] ended on 26 June 1945.[15]

3.3. The aims of the UNO

The most important principle, which the UN gave itself by its establishment, was universality and the sovereign equality of the member states. By the time, 1945, of the Signing of the UN - Charter there were „only "50 states, which wanted to be part of the preservation of the world peace. After the overcome of the entry barrier, which developed during the East – West – Conflict, ever more states joined the community. In addition, the former colonial states were taken up to the UN immediately after their independence. After the decay of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the number of the members grew again, so that the UN counts a membership of 192 states in 2007.[16]

This means, that nearly all states of the world, with exception of the Vatican, are represented in the UN. Therefore, the requirement for universality seems to be completely fulfilled. In addition, the goal for the sovereign equality of the members is fulfilled at least in the UN - General Assembly. During discussions in the Plenary Assembly, all states have only one voice. However, we can still find further objectives in the UN – Charter. As already mentioned in the introduction, the UN should serve to protect the world peace and the international security. If a violation of the peace should be committed nevertheless, then this is to be eliminated „… by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law… "[17]. This is probably the most important objective of the UN. In addition, the promotion of the international relationship is located in the centre of the principles of the UN.

The Charter enjoins that the organization will seek to solve international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems on a basis of cooperation among nations and that will

---

[14] Poland came later as 51. member state.
[15] Löwe (1994): p.39.
[16] Ansprenger (2000): p.126.
[17] Chapter 1, Art. 1.1, at the Charter of the UNO, 26. June 1945.

promote and encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."[18]

In pursuit of the purposes stated in Article 1 of the Charter, Article 2 prescribes certain principles, which may be described as the basic rules of international ethics in accordance with which the organization and its members shall act[19].

These principles are:

1. The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.
2. All members shall fulfil in good faith their obligations as set forth in the Chapter.
3. The members shall settle their disputes by peaceful means.
4. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner, inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
5. All members shall assist the United Nations in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.
6. The organization shall see to it that non – members also act in accordance with the principles of the Charter.
7. The United Nations shall not intervene in matters, which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

In accordance with the first principle of sovereign equality of all states, all member states are granted equal representation in the General assembly and an equal number of votes. This means nothing else than, that each member state has one vote in the General Assembly and no state can be threatens in other way than the other states. However, the preponderant role of the Big Five in the Security Council arising out of their veto power compromises largely the principle of sovereign equality of all states.

---

[18] Chapter 1, Art. 1.3, at the Charter of the UNO, 26. Juni 1945.
[19] Singh (1995): p.17.

4. Structure of the United Nations

4.1. General Information

In order to carry out the extensive objective of the UN – Charter, the central organization of the UN was first created with their head office in New York. This head office has still two further addresses in Vienna and Geneva. Besides the New York central organization, however, there still exist many special organizations and supporters[20] with own statutes and budgets. The central organization of the UN is divided into six different main organs[21]:

1. General Assembly
2. Security Council
3. Economic and Social Council
4. Trusteeship System
5. International Court of Justice
6. Secretariat

The main organs listed above are still supported by various committees, with which however is not to be dealt in greater detail. In addition, the different special organizations are not to be nearly described, because they are not from importance for the problem definition of the work. For the investigation of the reform debate, the six main organs seem to be more important. They are to be represented briefly over their functionality in order to understand better the function of the UN.

4.2. The Central Institutions

4.2.1. The General Assembly

The General Assembly consists of all members of the UN. Each member can send independently from its size up to five representatives into the General Assembly. However, each state has only one voice. Thus, the sovereign principle of the equality is to be guaranteed for all member states. The General Assembly can take position in principle to each question

---

[20] Special organizations and supporters are for example ILO, WHO, UNESCO or IMF.
[21] Knapp and Krell (1996): p. 481.

or affair, which concerns the field of the UN, discusses and then delivers a recommendation in the form of a resolution. However, these recommendations are not seen as binding according to international law. If the Security Council of the UN treats an international point of issue, the General Assembly may not deliver in addition a recommendation, with exception, that the Security Council would request it in addition.

The General Assembly meets once a year for a meeting of several weeks, with exception, there exist acute current problems, which must be treated. In this case, a special meeting will call up. A further important task of the meeting is it to negotiate on the for two years specified household of the UN and to sign it.[22]

The General Assembly deals with three broad areas: definition of norms that should apply to certain areas of world politics; commitment of UN resources to various programmes and management of conflicts between and among nations. The General Assembly represents the best place for discussions over general norms of international behaviour, because almost all states of the world are members of the United Nations. In the history of the Assembly, we can find enough approvals of the discussions on international behaviour, which on their side have marked the development of the international norms and international self – determination.

The Assembly is also the best place for discussions concerning the UN resources to various programmes. In addition, there is the place, where new organs are created and where the allocation of the budget of the UN is controlled.

Next to these functions, the General Assembly has the power to influence the UN system in several ways. The representatives in the Assembly can influence the activities of some principal organs of the organization through their power to elect member. They can directly control activities by the Secretariat or subsidiary to carry out a considerable amount of formal and informal restructuring of the UN system. In contrast to the influence over the Secretariat, its power over the Security Council and the International Court of Justice is limited, because limitations on the power of election and their relatively small size prevent the full application of ideas that their composition should reflect. The Assembly has greater influence in the Secretariat because of its control over the budget and hence over appointments.

---

[22] Knapp and Krell (1996): p.482.

4.2.2. The Security Council

According to the statute of the UN, the main responsibility for the maintenance of the world peace and international security is incumbent on the Security Council.[23] The Security Council consists of altogether 15 members[24] of which five states[25] hold permanent seats. The non-permanent members are elected from that General Assembly for two years in each case...[26]

A special characteristic of the Security Council consists in the fact that all permanent members possess a right of veto. Decisions of the Security Council are valid in accordance with Article 27 the UN - Charter only if all permanent members and still at least four further members give their agreement.[27] The Security Council is organised so, as to function continuously. The representatives of the Big Five and the other non – permanent members are supposed to be present at all times in the United Nations Headquarters.

Nevertheless, with the given rights of veto some problems arise within the Security Council, which attracts attention and controversy? To understand the problems let us examine the relevant provisions of the Charter.

Article 27, which deals with the voting procedure lays down, that each member state in the Security Council has one vote and decisions are taken by the votes of seven members. This means that for the decision making process are required the votes from the permanent members and from two non – permanent members. The right of veto in this sense means, that one permanent member of the Council can block every decision, which can result in the disability of the Security Council to meet its duties. In the most cases veto – power was used to block membership applications and has stood in the way of maintaining harmonious relations among the permanent members of the Council, which is a basic requirement for the principles of the Charter.

---

[23] Chapter 7, Article 39, at the Charter of the UN, 26. June 1945.
[24] Until 1965 there have been 11 members.
[25] The Peoples Republic of China, France, United Kingdom, Russia and USA.
[26] Chapter 5, Article 23.2, at the Charter of the UN, 26. June 1945.
[27] Knapp and Krell (1996): p.483.

4.2.3. The Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council[28] of the UN was established by the Charter as the principal organ to coordinate the economic and social work of the United Nations and the specialised agencies and institutions – known as the "United Nations family" of organizations. The Council consist of 54 members, which are selected from the General Assembly. It has, from the General Assembly observed, the task to coordinate and to train the actions of the UN in the economical, social and cultural range as well as in the area of the human right protection. In addition, the Council can give recommendations to the members of the UN, to the General Assembly or to the concerned special organizations. Thus, it places at the same time a link between the central institutions and the various special organizations.[29]

Although afforded the status of a principal origin by the Charter, the Economic and Social Council functions under the authority of the General Assembly. In many respects its activities resemble those of the main Assembly committees and it has occasionally been accused of duplicating or competing with the work of the Second (Economic and Financial) and Third (Social) Committees of the Assembly.[30]

The failure of ECOSOC in so many debates to materialise debates into effective actions has let to a frustration among many developing nations, aggravated by present rivalries and deep – rooted antagonisms of the past. Despite grave discrepancies between the hopes of the framers and the accomplishments of the Council, it has carries out on a vast amount of useful and potentially useful work.

4.2.4. The Trusteeship System

Originally, the Trusteeship System had the task, to supervise the administration of some territories, which were subordinated at the present of the establishment of the UN under the international trust system. The Trusteeship System of the UN under Art. 77 took over from the League of Nations mandate system, assuming responsibility for the remaining territories that had not reached independence. However, as the largest number of these areas is today

---

[28] ECOSOC.
[29] Knapp and Krell (1996): p.483.
[30] Singh (1995): p. 80.

independent states or parts of such, the Trusteeship System has today practical no more meaning.

4.2.5. The International Court of Justice

Contrary to the Trusteeship System, a very high meaning comes to the International Court of Justice. The Court has its head office in The Hague, the Netherlands. The main part of its work is to maintain his own statute, which is also embodied in the UN - Charter. All members of the UN are contracting parties of the International Court of Justice. Mainly the Court of Justice worries about law cases between individual states. In such a case, the Court of Justice can however only become active if the respective controversy parties are ready for a statement of judgment clause.

Another possibility of switching to the International Court of Justice consists in the fact that all member states explain themselves ready for it. The Security Council has the right to implement the decisions of the Court. No means are given to the International Court of Justice for the implementation of its judgements. The judgements of the International Court of Justice are however only then binding for the respective party, if the party in an earlier declaration in the jurisdiction of the Court recognises them as binding. To that time,[31] only 43 states have signed such a declaration.[32] Apart from the judgements in controversies, the International Court of Justice provides in addition, opinions for the General Assembly, the Security Council and other committees.

4.2.6. The Secretariat

The sixth and thus last central organ of the UN is the Secretary, which consists of the Secretary-General and his subordinated administrative machinery. The Secretary-General represents the World Security Organization as a chairman. He takes part in all meetings of the other central institutions of the UN[33] and fulfils all tasks, which are given to him by the

---

[31] Stands for 1996.

[32] Countries that do not accept the binding legislation are the Peoples Republic of China, Russia, USA, Germany, France and Italy.

[33] except the International Court of Justice.

organs. Moreover, the Secretary-General can request from the Security Council the treatment of certain affairs, which after his beliefs endanger world peace and international security.

The position of the Secretary-General can be defined as a combination of chief administrative officer of the United Nations and global diplomat with a portfolio that covers countless topics. Although the Secretary-General has to fulfil also diplomatic tasks[34], he has no diplomatic apparatus for the realisation of this and he does not fulfil the formal criteria of a diplomat. He represents the institution, but he can act independently of the policy organs even when resolutions have condemned a party to a dispute, maintaining lines for communication and representing the institution's commitment to peaceful settlement and alleviation of human suffering.[35] In general, international officials also participate directly in the decision – making process of their governing bodies, what is not the case by the Secretary-General. In this sense he does not fulfil the criteria, which apply by the description of the diplomats. The great influence among existing international bodies is probably the influence over the staff of the World Bank, who not only frame the programme for discussion by the Executive Directors and Governing Board, but also generally secure their approval for what the Bank President and his staff recommend.

The situation is however quite different in the UN General Assembly, where most agenda items are proposed by member states, or mandated by previous resolutions, and simply compiled by the Secretariat in a preliminary agenda. Although the Secretary – General may suggest additional items, he does not submit a legislative programme, as it is done in some other international agencies. However, when legislation involves programmes administered by the Secretariat, the views of the Secretariat may carry weight, especially since the positions of member states are likely to have been solicited in formulating the Secretariat views.

4.3. Sub-Conclusion

If one regards the developing history of the UN, it remains as the most important to note the thesis that the international community learned from the errors of the League of Nations. The principle of the UN – Charter, which is mandatory for all member states, really means a progress in relation to the League of Nations. In addition, the thought of sovereign equality of all states, which is embodied in the Charter, is to be evaluated as positive. Unfortunately, this

---

[34] For example the Secretary – General Kofi Annan keeps talks in relation to the Middle East Conflict.
[35] Karns and Mingst (2004): p. 120.

thought was not implemented consistently. If all states are to be really equally treated, the Security Council is to be abolished, because in the long run the whole responsibility for the receipt of international peace is incumbent on it. Since however the five great powers France, Russia, China, Great Britain and the USA are permanent members in the Security Council and also still possess a right of veto, with which they can outvote all other members, we cannot speak of sovereign and equal treatment for all member states. This point is in my opinion a very large deficiency of the UN.

To be evaluated perfectly positive is however the fact that all international dispute according to UN - Charter must be settled peacefully. In addition, the general prohibition of force, which was fixed in the Charter, must be signed out as positive. Here once again we can consider that the international community has actually learned from the errors of the past.

In my opinion, everything possible was undertaken during the setting of the objectives of the UN, in order to create a better basis to preservation and security of world peace. However, I see some serious errors during the conversion to these objectives into the reality. With the creation of the system of the UN, according to my opinion, there occurred too many errors and/or compromises.

The first point, which underlies criticism, is the General Assembly. It has, according to my view, much too less authority. It is to remember that it forms the only organ, which guarantees the equality of all states. It would have to decide in my view on the measures, which are necessary for the keeping of the world peace. The Security Council forms an organ capable of action only if all five permanent members are of the same opinion – and that is hardly the case in international politics, since the own interests of the individual states forms always the centre of attention. But not only the General Assembly and the Security Council are to be criticized, also the International Court of Justice has to exhibit serious disadvantages. Although, or perhaps straight because it represents a meaningful and indispensable mechanism of the UN, its power of decision to act is far too much limited. This condition cannot be accepted further. In my opinion, all member states of the UN would have to be obliged to accept the judgements of the International Court of Justice. Otherwise, it has de facto no right of existence.

The role of the Secretary-General is to be pointed out as a last point of criticism. In addition, he has actually no power as a political authority. He takes a representation position within and outside of the UN, may not make however important decisions beyond that point. He is supposed to be awarded with more powers.

In summary, one can already say that alone the structure of the UN gives sufficient material for a reform debate. In the next chapter, I would like to go further on the reform thoughts within the UN. However, in the following chapter the General Assembly and the Security Council should not only form the centre of the reform discussions, but also the financing, the human rights and the concept of intervention.

5. The Reforms of the United Nations

5.1. The Reform of the Security Council

Independently of the objectives of the different reform suggestions, which are mostly discussed since the beginning of the nineties, nearly all member states represent the fundamental voice that the Security Council of the UN has become undemocratic and outdated.[36] It prevails a clear agreement over the fact that the five permanent members possess too many privileges and so that the principle of the equality is not given any more. Meanwhile more than 140 states submitted reform suggestions concerning the Security Council.

A possible variant for the reform would be the extension of the number of permanent members of the Security Council. In order to manufacture a larger balance between the members of UN the Council could for example be extended by the strong economic states of Japan and Germany as well as several representatives of the individual continents such as India or Indonesia for Asia, Nigeria or South Africa for Africa and Brazil for Latin America. Johannes Varwick sees however at least two serious arguments, which speak against an extension of the security council: „On the one hand there is no common position between „North " and „South " over the criteria for a permanent seat. In particular, Germany and Japan argue with their economic power, while others refer to the size of their population. [...] On the other hand, another composition requires a change of Charter according to Art. 108 and 109, this is only applicable with two thirds of the voices of the General Assembly and with agreement of all permanent members of the Security Council. "[37]

Also Helmut Volger is the opinion that an enlarging of the Security Council is not realizable:

„From the fundamental Charter - revisions it is to be advised against any new composition of the seats in the Security Council because they will roll up again the question of the

---

[36] Varwick and Gareis (2006): p. 31.
[37] Varwick and Gareis (2006): p. 31.

distribution of power in the United Nations [...] and it is not safe that the new solution will work better than the old one. "[38] In addition, there it is to be considered the material balance of power, which will not correspond to each other.[39] Both Varwick and Volger are of the opinion that the past permanent members would grant surely no right of veto to the possible new permanent members. In addition, Volger set up the thesis that after the enlargement of the Council its ability to work would strongly suffer.

In principle, both authors have right in their acceptance that this reform model would not have a positive effect. Since the most important task within the UN comes to the Security Council, also its further effectiveness must be ensured. A possible variant to reform the Security Council would be, to separate it on few regional communities, such as the European Union or the OAU, which would then alternate in a rotation mechanism with the permanent seat. This would be probably the most meaningful variant in my opinion, in order to satisfy all representatives within the United Nations Organization.

However, with this solution it would have to be ensured that the representatives of the regional alliances are united regarding their requirements and their politics. If one considers however, that even within the European Union prevails a disagreement over the fundamental questions, then one must probably assume that this suggestion will be hardly converted into practice.

But still more heavily than the discussion around an extension of the Security Council weighs the problem that the Security Council has to accept a more largely becoming authority loss. According to statements from the former UN - Ambassador Detlef Graf Rantzau the Security Council possesses no more reliability: *„Staff from the UN – Secretariat tells me openly that they do not hear any longer, what is decided there. "[40]*

This fact results probably from the fact that within the Security Council the national interests of the permanent members are represented in first line and than come the international interests of all member states. How one could work against this problem, will be analyzed in the next section.

---

[38] Volger (1994): p. 190.
[39] Volger (1994): p. 191.
[40] Graf Rantzau 1995.

5.2. The Reforms in the General Assembly

A possibility to counter – fight the authority loss of the Security Council, would be to revalue the position of the General Assembly. In accordance with the Charter the General Assembly is a central executive body of the UN however takes not a central role in reality. This is also not supposed to be according to the same UN Charter. In Article 12 of the Charter is located that it is forbidden to the General Assembly to deliver a recommendation in case of a dispute: „As long as the Security Council is in the position to fulfil the tasks assigned in this Charter to his responsibility in a dispute or a particular situation, the General Assembly may not deliver a recommendation regarding this dispute or situation, except it is on request of the Security Council. "[41]

The General Assembly has in reality many administrative and controlling tasks, but these have moved ever more into the background in the course of the years. The reality looks in such a way that the Security Council shall determine all measures, which serve for peacekeeping measures. This situation creates much scope for criticism. *„Das entscheidende Medium der Vereinten Nationen ist [...] die Kooperation. Sie kann nicht erzwungen werden, sie muß erzeugt werden. Dafür ist die Generalversammlung mit ihren Ausschüssen ein geeigneter Ort. In ihnen artikuliert und formuliert sich das politische Bewusstsein der Welt. "[42]*

One can only follow this statement. It would surely increase the acceptance and the legitimacy of the UN decisions, if these were approved by one improved General Assembly. At the same time, also the undemocratic right of veto would lose its meaning. However in order to receive a democratic authentication for the General Assembly, it is discussed to establish a Two – Chamber – System. The One Chamber is to consist as before according to the „One State – One Vote – Principle"of the government representatives of the individual member states, and the Second Chamber[43] is supposed to be formed from selected delegated parliamentarians.[44] This argument does not consider however the fact that the momentary government representatives are mostly democratically legitimized in the UN, since they are sent by usually democratic governments into the UN. Besides, the UN maintains a quite intensive co – operation with so – called NGOs. Many of more than 1000 NGOs registered by the UN step by the United Nations – Conferences and take position for instance on topics such as

---

[41] Article 12 of the Charter of the UN, 26 June 1945.
[42] Czempiel (1995): p. 42.
[43] By talks is common the following use: „Assembly of the Peoples of the United Nations".
[44] Varwick and Gareis (2006): p. 33.

Environmental Questions, Human Rights or Development Policy, in order to participate in the work of the UN.[45] No one can say that the social cooperation would be missing in the UN. Indisputable it is however that the General Assembly would win power over the decision – making process by this reform and substantially more reputation.

In addition, the responsibility for employments of the UN - peacekeeping forces would have to be transferred to the responsibilities of the General Assembly, exactly as is the case in Germany, where also the Bundestag decides over those delegations of the German Federal Armed Forces. The peacekeeping forces and the associated policy of peace of the UN is the next point, which will be criticised. Some reform thoughts, which are discussed in the scientific world, are also included in the next part.

5.3. The Reform of Intervention Politics

In 1992 the former Secretary-General Butros – Ghali revived a request from the five Government Representatives of the Security Council to make suggestions for an extensive reform within the range of the peacekeeping measures. In June 1992, he submitted his „ Agenda for the Peace " to the world public. In principle Butros – Ghali differentiates with respect to it five fields of the peacekeeping measures:

1. Preventive diplomacy
2. Peace creation with civilian and military means
3. Peacekeeping measures by Blue Helmets
4. Peace consolidation
5. Reinforcement of regional organizations

With the preventive diplomacy, (see point 1.) Butros – Ghali wanted to eliminate international tensions and their causes already in the run-up. In addition so-called „fact finding mission" should be developed and strengthened, i.e. mechanisms for fact determination. In the meaning of the peace creation by civilian and military means the fixed equipment defined by the UN - Charter should be taken more strongly in requirement than so far. Among other things, the

---

[45] Varwick and Gareis (2006): p. 33.

decisions of the International Court of Justice should be awarded with more commitment. In addition, third parties should be secured better materially with their conciliation projects.

Moreover, finally the Armed Forces of the Security Council fixed in Chapter 7, Article 42 of the UN – Charter should be made available. Peace consolidation means durable peacekeeping measures by conflict aftercare. In addition, according to Butros – Ghali's view peace consolidation also comprises disarmament of war parties, the disposal of mines, the political re-organization as well as the approximation of the conflicting parties.[46] In this sense peacekeeping is a complex measure, which requires cooperation and understanding for the problem.

The „Agenda for the Peace "has found the way into the internal discussions of the UN, but none of the suggestions became concretized and converted into action. The only exception seems to be the establishment of national „stand by forces". The German General Manfred Eisele was assigned for long time with the structure of a mobile UN – Headquarters. Theoretically, since 1996 the UN would be able to use this apparatus for the application of peace missions. Importantly to mark is that this „stand by forces" are callable at the request of the Secretary – General, however are subject of the mandate of the Security Council. The strike force is supposed to be formed from national contingents and be callable at each time. However, these troops are trained local.[47]

The conversion of the concept is a first step, which shows the reform willingness of the UN. However, a large discrepancy prevails between the readiness of the individual states and the conclusion of concrete agreements. According to Varwick this is a symptomatic „downward commitment"for the whole system of the UN. The best example of this inadequacy has given the Kosovo – Conflict a couple of years ago. Since Russia granted its veto in the Security Council against an employment of the UN, the capacity to act of the UN was once again destroyed. NATO has led the employment in Kosovo as well known more or less successfully.

The institutional lack within the range of the peacekeeping measures has brought even Kofi Annan[48] to the point to give priority to ad – hoc – unions of the UN peacekeeping forces. He did even not mention the establishment of rapid deployment forces in its reform report from 1997.

Much more importantly than the military component of UN employments, in my opinion however, is the conflict prevention forms. The UN should put their attention rather on the

---

[46] Boutros – Ghali 1992.
[47] Varwick and Gareis (2006): p. 34f.
[48] Kofi Annan was Secretary – General of the UN since 1997.

prevention of international disputes. This will in addition come also substantially cheaper, than the expensive employments of military troops and material. With consideration of the financial situation of the UN, this measure would be connected with large advantages. Exactly the financing raised further reform suggestions, which are to be regarded in next section.

5.4. The Financial and Administration Reforms

The financing of the UN is strictly speaking simply regulated, throws however in practice already for a long time problems, which led again for the discussion of many reform suggestions. The contributions for the UN, which should be paid, are not regulated according to the equality principle, what would be also absurd. Rather those contributions arrange themselves according to the resources of the respective member. Following a special key, the contributions are calculated and fixed. The household is fixed in each case for two years and approved by the General Assembly. Often there are cases, in which the administration of the UN is blamed mostly by American delegates for not regulate and enormous spending.[49] However, if one regards the household for the years 1998-99, which amounted to 2.532.331.200$ (see below), then one must say that these reproaches miss any basis.

UN - Contribution-corrode from more than 1% of the regular budget of 1998[50]

USA	25,000 %	Japan	17,981 %
Deutschland	9,630 %	Frankreich	6,494 %
Italien	5,394 %	Großbritannien	5,076 %
Rußland	2,873 %	Kanada	2,825 %
Spanien	2,571 %	Niederlande	1,619 %
Brasilien	1,514 %	Australien	1,471 %
Schweden	1,099 %	Belgien	1,096 %

---

[49] Ansprenger (2000): p. 138.
[50] United Nations Handbook (1998): p. 342 – 344.

The budget of the UN is generally much too small, in order to make thereby possible efficient working.

In order to be able to work with this small budget more efficiently, the position of a „general inspector" was created, who is responsible for the rationalisation of the UN – system. However, one may not forget that the UN is not a business enterprise, where efficiency is reached by cancellation of new jobs.

Kofi Annan converted some good reform thoughts into the act within this range. Thus, he established the office for Internal Supervision Service, which employs itself with audit, evaluation and monitoring. Furthermore, the point posts within the UN are lowered since 1992 by around 30%.[51]

However, it must be stated that itself within many ranges of the UN the work overlaps and thus lead to some waste of resources. That means that several subsidiary organizations are involved with environmental questions and for humanitarian activities are responsible several welfare organizations. Here there are surely still possibilities for improvement. Regarding the financial misery of the UN there must be found further possibilities, in order to save the unnecessary expenditures of the organization.

The household of the UN seems to be the largest problem during the accomplishment of the existing problems. It is under the solid pressure of the USA not larger, rather still, it was shortened in the year 1998 by around 100 million dollar. Besides, it was planned to shorten the administrative expenses during the last years from 38 to 25 per cent. In response to it, the costs of the peacekeeping - employments have substantially risen in the run of the nineties. In the year 1995 the amounted entire expenditures of the UN was estimated on approx. eight billion dollar - the budget in the year 1998 on approx. 2 ½ billion DM. This explains, in what a catastrophic situation is the UN for several years.

Nevertheless, not only therefore the financing stands on a very unstable stand. Many member states pay their contributions irregularly or hold back them completely. This is also the case, when the UN stood, according to press reports, almost before the bankruptcy, because the USA held back to the repeated times their contribution. The USA are also approx. 1.2 billion dollar beside Russia with approx. 600 million dollar the largest debtors of the UN.[52] Contrary to Germany, the Americans have decided to shorten their contribution to the peacekeeping measures from 31 to 25 per cent in 1995. The Federal Republic however increased its contribution to 9.6 per cent. (see table p. 22). At the same time, the USA demand repeatedly reforms for the UN, which appears absurd in view of the financial situation. Without a safe

---

[51] Varwick and Gareis (2006): p. 40.
[52] Varwick and Gereis (2006): p. 41.

financial foundation, reforms can be accomplished probably hardly in the UN. Kofi Annan said to *'Der Spiegel'* in an interview briefly after his assumption of office: „ *Ich möchte den Amerikanern sagen: Ihr seid Mitglied in einer Weltgemeinschaft, die nach festen Regeln funktioniert. Ihr werdet dort gebraucht, eure Führung ist wichtig. Aber auch ihr seid auf diese Organization angewiesen. [...] Im übrigen – die Vereinigung der Staaten der Welt gibt weniger Geld aus als die New Yorker Polizei und beschäftigt weniger Angestellte als der amerikanische Kongress. [...] Wenn alle vertragsmäßig zahlen würden, hätten wir keine Finanzkrise. Ich wünschte mir Regeln, nach denen säumige Zahler ihr Stimmrecht bei der UNO nur ausüben können, wenn sie ihre Beiträge tatsächlich voll oder mindestens zur Hälfte bezahlt haben – Stimmrecht nur gegen Geld.* "[53]

It is not like that that there would not be such a regulation. In accordance with the UN - Charter Annan would have had the possibility to take the Americans their right to vote in the General Assembly. However, this would never happen, because the USA are first much too powerful and influential, and secondly because the UN is dependent on the contributions of the Americans. What could now be a possible solution method from the financial dilemma that UN?

A possibility, which is discussed within the UN, is the mechanism of a reserve fund, which can be fast taken into use if necessary. A further conception, in my opinion the better solution, goes into the direction for the creation of a kind "world-taxes" for the UN.[54] These "world-taxes" could be financed by deliveries on weapon businesses and foreign exchange transactions or the use of the oceans and/or space. This would be a quite meaningful possibility of securing the financing of the UN. Politically seen this variant will probably hardly be converted into action, since the industrial nations would not accept this. No other possibility remains apparent of appealing than to the payment moral of the states.

5.5. The Creation of New Institutions

Like already mentioned in Chapter 4.2.3 the Economic and Social Council is actually this institution, which coordinates and leads the environmental, economic and social questions of the UN. However, since this happened only insufficiently in the past, ever more voices now become strong, which demand a new organ for these tasks. Neither the ECOSOC nor one of

---

[53] „Stimmrecht nur gegen Geld", in: Spiegel, Hamburg 21.07 1997.
[54] Varwick and Gareis (2006): p. 41.

its course-thought special organizations like those UNCTAD, UNIDO, the UNDP or the UNEP have an effective contribution to the fight of the North – South – Downward – Position or the global environmental degradation can carry them out. The reason, why the ECOSOC could not sufficiently advice the international cooperation in economics and social questions, lies in the justification that the western industrial nations give this task rather to the IWF or the World Trade Organization, because the have the saying there.[55]

In order to repair this bad position, there are several reform suggestions, which have the aim to establish in the place of ECOSOC an Economic Council similarly as the Security Council. This new institution should then defuse those problems between the North and the South with high authority equipment and authentication. Also the different development assistance organizations are to be summarized under an organization, in order to increase their effectiveness. With idea for the creation of an Economic Council lies however the assumption that this institution will mutate to a kind G-20 or G-23 group, which could attach then contacts to the ICF or the World Trade Organization. These doubts are logically articulated by the third world countries, which are also all too understandable. The goal of such reform must be, to leave all states the possibility to take part at the mechanism of the Economic Council.

Nevertheless, not only the creation of an Economic Council is demanded. Also within the range of the Health, Education and the Population Questions there are thoughts to establish a Social Council. This Council would take besides also the responsibility for the reconstruction of the communities in ruins as for example in Somalia. At the same time, it could replace the already long redundant Trusteeship System.

However, it remains questionable by all these good reform suggestions, whether the UN is the suitable suggestion for the solution of all these problems around the world. In the Charter of the UN stands, that the UN shall serve the peacekeeping and peace preservation measures, but it offers in my opinion the only meaningful forum, to solve social and financial problems of the international policy. Exactly because in the 21st Century the international companies win ever more on power and influence, the UN must give a platform, from which it can confront the arising problems in the world.

Despite all these problems, a first step was already taken with the establishment of a new institution. In 1998 the „International Criminal Court of the UN for the punishment of mankind crimes" was established. Altogether 120 states spoke itself for the establishment of a world Court, who should punish the crime such as genocide, war of aggression, war crime and heavy violations of human.

---

[55] Varwick and Gareis (2006): p. 36.

5.6. Sub-Conclusion

We can distinguish three different fundamental types of reform suggestions. First, there are reforms, which aims at a stronger effectiveness and efficiency of the UN – institutions, however without changing thereby the Status – Quo of the UN. Second, there are reforms, which have a structural transformation of the UN as a goal, like for example the establishment of new institutions or reforms of the Security Council. Third, reforms exist, whose aim lies in the fundamental change of the objective of the UN, like the admission of new problem fields into the agenda of the UN. However, to expect that all reform thoughts represented here will be converted into the reality is not realistic. The national interests will further stand in the foreground, which is to be regretted very much. Even if no radical changes are in view, then at least some fundamental things must be ensured, in order to enable that the UN will remain also in 21. Century authorized to act. The financial disaster must be overcome as soon as possible out of the way, if the UN wants to secure further the preservation of the world peace. Beyond that, it must become clear for the involved actors that meanwhile no longer, only the peacekeeping measures are the centre of attention, like before fifty years. Those problems, which result from the new world order, must clearly be integrated into the task range of the UN.

6. Criticism on some of the Reform Proposals of the UNO

In the following Chapter, I will discuss the problems related with the reformation of the institutions of the UNO and the criticism raised from these problems and dilemmas. In the first Chapter, I argued what are the aims and the principles of the UN, which lead the organization on its way to development and self – determination. Keeping these thoughts in mind and analyzing the reforms made or the drawn proposals for reforms, we can take a closer look at the outcomes of these reforms and in how far are they in consensus with the aims and principles of the world organization. In this Chapter, I will first distinguish between the different proposals for reform of the UN Secretariat. After that, I will go through the proposals drawn for the reformation of the Security Council and finish with the possibilities, which the UN has to intervene in different crisis or conflicts.

6.1. Secretariat

The Secretariat of the United Nations has been for long time on the agenda to reduce its scale and to improve its efficiency. Some of the pressures derive from the desire to reduce its expenditure on administration, what resulted from the serious budgetary shortfalls introduced by the reformation process. These were brought about mainly by the attempts by the Reagan Administration in the USA and the right – wing Republican Party to obtain greater control over the budgetary process in the UN system.[56] Next to these attempts to control, the UN system emerged the need to restructure the Secretariat in order to keep it capable to deal with new tasks, such as more active peacekeeping, and to cope with greater demand for transparency and accountability within the Secretariat, whilst continuing to satisfy the terms of the Charter regarding equitable geographical distribution.

It is important to be mentioned that the Secretariat of the UN is the vehicle by which the United Nations interact with the world community. Whether supervising national plebiscites[57] or conducting fact – finding missions[58], providing humanitarian relief[59] or maintaining borders among feuding nations[60], United Nations personnel discharge the global responsibilities assumed by the various institutions of the United Nations system. In this sense, I will argue that the current concept of international public service has fallen short of the envisioned under the UN Charter. The objectives of efficiency, integrity, impartiality and independence, stated by a speech of the former Secretary – General Javier Pérez de Cuéller[61], have been compromised by the lack of proper political restraint on the part of the parties involved. Member states' pressure for accommodation of national interests threatens a return to the multinational 'conference diplomacy' of yesterday. Such pressure violates one of the

---

[56] Taylor (1997): p.265

[57] The United Nations has supervised numerous elections and plebiscites in trust territories (e.g., the Cameroons and the United States Pacific Trust Territories), in colonies prior to their independence (e.g., the Cook Islands and West New Guinea), and, most recently, in Namibia (November 1989) and Nicaragua (February 1990). See Reuters North European Service, 4 July, 1984 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current File); United Press International, 21 November 1986 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current File); NY Times, 11 January 1990, at A3, col. 1; NY Times, 23 February 1990, at A3 col. 4; NY Times, 22 July 1990, at A10, col. 6.

[58] Most UN fact – finding missions have been undertaken to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights. See GA Res. 35/176, 35 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 48), UN Doc. A/35/48 (1980).

[59] For example, the United Nations announced its intention to send personnel to Iran to aid the humanitarian efforts following the June 1990 earthquake which claimed over 35 000 lives: NY Times, 24 June 1990, at A16, col. 1.

[60] Most notable are the UNs' personnel in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) that maintain delicate truce along the common borders of Lebanon, Israel and Syria, and the UN forces stationed between the Turkish and Greek forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). SC Res. 425, 33 UN SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions) at 5, UN Doc. S/ 12610 (1978) (establishing UNIFIL); SC Res. 186, 19 UN SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions) at 2, UN Doc. S/ 5571, (1964) (establishing UNFICYP).

[61] Report of the Secretary – General (1985)

UN's main objectives. This objective states that the UN is established to provide for a supra – international approach to global cooperation that employs a permanent institution and a neutral civil service to achieve 'purposes on behalf of all the members of the organization'.[62] A politicized Secretariat, ignoring these Charter principles may become a place for disputes and endless pressures for national interests. However, even if these topics were discussed during the last years, the new Secretary-General has been informed by the UK Government that it will soon be putting forward two candidates for the post of Under-Secretary-General for political affairs.[63] The same counts for Japan, which was used to occupy the post for incumbent.

Moreover, the shortcomings of the UN civil service appear at a time in which the world community has revitalized its use of and respect for the United Nations. Having some successful missions in the past[64], the UN is becoming an ever-growing partner in the international affairs. In short, the UN has evolved a need for a 'system in which an increasing number of activities beyond the control of individual governments can be carried out by international or even supranational institutions'.[65] The increased United Nations activities underscore the importance of a competent, efficient and independent professional UN staff. Probably the only way to establish a new perception of the Secretariat's competence and loyalty will be to reassert the attributes of an independent international civil service through a common recruiting programme monitored by an independent central administration.[66] This programme shall focus on proposals put forward for the attempt to counter the gradual politicization engendered by the ad hoc style of recruitment traditionally pursued by the UN.

Member states should respect the legal provisions calling for a Secretariat that is international in its orientation and matter. As envisioned by Sir Eric Drummond at the League of Nations[67] and later adopted for the preparation process of the UN, the international civil servant should be responsible to the international institutions rather than her state of origin. She should stay loyal to her principles laid down in the Charter of the UN or in case that the principles and laws for action are not sufficient to seek the representative opinion of the member governments[68]. In this sense, the international civil servant is effective because she remains independent from the political biases of the other actors in the international arena. Buttressed by provisions of the UN Charter, she acquires the legal authority given by each member state

---

[62] UN Charter Art. 100, para. 2
[63] Strategic Comments (2006).
[64] As already mentioned the UNO has been successful in missions in Nicaragua, Namibia and other. See note 54.
[65] Urquhart (1990): p.12.
[66] Bulkeley (1997): p. 269f.
[67] Graham and Jordan (1980): p. 8.
[68] Schachter (1983): p.46.

of the UN. Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations embraces this conception of the international civil service. Provision one of the Article emphasizes the duty of the civil servant to refuse instructions from member states or 'any other authority external to the Organization'.[69] Provision Two of Article 100 emphasizes the reciprocal duty of a member state to refrain from violating the independent nature of the Secretariat.[70] Together, these provisions require the formation of an impartial and independent civil service.

Unfortunately, contrary to the express intent of both provisions of Article 100 of the Charter, the UN system and its Secretariat have been both politicised and nationalized. Individual member states have pushed the administrative body into frustration by bringing pressure to bear in advancement of their own particular interests.[71] In this respect, any proposal for reform within the Secretariat must address the unhealthy influence of the member states, which they use to boost national interests. The proposals drawn by the former Secretary – General Kofi Annan were thought to improve the structure, functions and position of the UN, but they also received many reactions in different kind. The Group of 77 countries[72] was adamant that the reforms of the organization should have been geared more towards strengthening its development functions. The Group did not feel that the reforms should be motivated by the aims of the UN. For others, like US President Bill Clinton, however, the proposals were sound enough that he used them as a lure for Congress to agree to start paying arrears to the UN. He was positive about the reform proposals just like the Prime Minister Toni Blair in UK, who declared as an official position of the British Government, that the UK will support the drawn proposal for reform and promote for its implementation among the other members of the UNO.

Independently of these reactions, I will shortly analyze the Annan Agenda for reformation of the Secretariat. The Senior Management Group that Annan proposed, and which he has now constituted acted as his Cabinet and consisted of all senior UN administrators in the Secretariat. This, coupled with his weekly teleconferencing meetings with other senior officials in the UN offices around the world, is at the core of where and how the UN should react to changes.[73] In addition, Annan has put into action a Strategic Planning Unit in order to input to the SMG pertinent information related to the UN's activities and to act as his think-tank.

---

[69] UN Charter, Article 100, para. 1.
[70] UN Charter, Article 100, para 2.
[71] UN Staff Report (1990).
[72] Bhatta (2000): p. 178f.
[73] Magariños (2006): p. 68f.

On the matter of the post of Deputy Secretary – General, Annan had recommended that one be created and staffed at the earliest possible time. This post has been pushed by the USA, which felt that the Secretary – General was spending too much time with unimportant activities of the UN, instead to focus on the most important task – the big business of global affairs. The smaller countries in this respect wanted similar post too, but it was supposed to be focused on development. [74] However, taken together on these and other issues, Annan caved into the Americans' demand, and he recommended the creation of Deputy Secretary – General post and the 1977 General Assembly session provided it. By March 1998, he was able to staff the position.

6.2.Security Council

The compositions and the functions of the Security Council have been a matter of discussions since its establishment. Already in the 1940s, there have been discussions on how to establish the Security Council, so that it was both representative and effective. Almost seven decades later, the issue of the Security Council reform is back on the agenda.

In August 1993, Richard Gott, writing in *The Guardian*, argued that progressive reform of the Security Council is unimaginable.[75] He wrote that it would be better, if we rid ourselves of any residual enthusiasm for the United Nations and accept its terminal decline. However, in reality, the states still appear to regard the UN as the only possible final arbiter for international disputes, despite successive disappointments at the role played by the UN in recent years.

As Michael Howard has noted, the Security Council of the UN is 'basically a condominium of the victorious major Allies, who would jointly keep the rest in order'.[76] In the decades since the Security Council was established, the permanent seats occupied by France and Britain have appeared increasingly anomalous, apparently owing less to their international status than to their position as recognized nuclear – weapon states. The UN has become a place for growing disputes in a number of cases dealing with national and international priorities and this brings the organization at risk of failure and consequent criticism of Security Council decisions and operations.

---

[74] As a wish of placing the developing countries, Annan also specified that the Deputy Secretary – General would be actively involved in generating more money for development operations.
[75] Gott(1993): p. 27.
[76] Michael Howard (1989): p. 147

The fact that the Security Council is not an accurate reflection of the equal power granted to all members according to the UN Charter undermines the legitimacy of its decisions and gives points for criticism. The Security Council could be reformed to ensure more equitable geographical representation, to reflect political reality in the distribution of power or both. Ramesh Thakur, advocating greater geographical representation in the Council, argues that 'although the principle of equitable geographical representation has been brought into disrepute … it is essential to the philosophy of the organization and adds to its legitimacy'.[77] However, Evan Luard has noted the emptiness of voting victories in the UN General Assembly, which ignore the reality of power. If this is true for the General Assembly, than it is reasonable to assume that it will also be true for the Security Council. That would suggest that reform of the Council would need to reflect the distribution of power amongst UN member states perhaps more than it would need to reflect equitable geographical distribution.[78] Hence, perhaps the strongest argument for reform is that any change, which better reflects the political realities of the 21st Century rather than of the 1945, will enhance the legitimacy of the Security Council.

An additional argument for reform derives from the fact that the five recognised nuclear – weapon states or better known the Big Five, make the entire permanent members of the Security Council. When the Council and the UN Charter were founded, the USA was the only member of the Council, which had nuclear weapons. During the following years the tendency to spread also through the other members of the Security Council and they also received the nuclear – weapon status. In this respect, it emerged the opinion that the nuclear – weapon status is walking hand in hand with power and status for its owner. The inclusion of states that do not possess nuclear weapons in the permanent membership of the Council, perhaps combined with the removal of one or more of the nuclear – weapons states from the Council, would effectively divorce the possession of nuclear weapons from permanent member status – in actual and in perceived fact[79].

Demands for reform in the Council have been countered in recent years with two key arguments. First, it has been argued that the composition of the Security Council is linked to the ability to exercise international responsibility. This ability was and still is the first consideration in deciding if a member state should become a permanent seat or not. The procedure for deciding on the non – permanent members of the Council is based on the same ability. The argument for selecting the current five permanent members of the Security

---

[77] Thakur (1993): p. 12.
[78] Luard (1989): p. 217.
[79] Leigh-Phippard (1997): p.420.

Council was based on the assumption that the strength of these five states both permitted and obliged them to accept special responsibility in ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

Second, it has been argued that the UN is now working far more effectively than ever before. The Security Council debates are no longer characterized by familiar Cold War polemics and the Council is taking decisions and authorizing UN operations on an unprecedented scale, what is the true. Nevertheless, the Security Council can ever be as effective as its members want it to be. Bourtos – Ghali, the UN Secretary – General, noted this point in *An Agenda for Peace* when he stated that 'the United Nations is a gathering of sovereign states and what it can do depends on the common ground that they create between them'.[80] This means nothing else than that the system of collective security depends on the success of the cooperation of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Council is able to take decisions only when its permanent members want these decisions to be taken.

A reformed Security Council, with additional or replacement permanent members, could work just as effectively if its membership was committed to its continuing efficacy. Handell has argued that the effective working of the Security Council depends to a large degree on the financial cooperation of Germany and Japan. Unfortunately neither of these is a permanent member of the Council. He proposes that, in calling on Germany and Japan to provide the Council with financial backing for the economic and military blockage against Iraq following Iraq's invasion in Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council admitted that its resources were inadequate.[81]

Following these arguments, we can conclude that the effectively functioning of the Security Council depends partly on these two states. In this sense, there have been proposals drawn for the enlargement of the permanent members of the Council. A coalition of Germany, Japan, Brazil and India, better known as Group of Four (G-4), has drawn a proposal for the enlargement of the Council.[82] This is an alliance, by which the countries pretend for permanent seats in the Security Council and launch the applications for other permanent memberships for two African countries. In the proposal the names of these two African countries are not given, because by the time the African countries could not decide on which two countries should be nominated.[83] The vision of the proposal involved the enlargement of

---

[80] Boutros – Ghali (1992): para. 2.
[81] Hindell (1990): p. 216.
[82] Ward (2005).
[83] Ward (2005).

the Council with six permanent seats and four non-permanent seats. In this case the total number of seats in the UN Security Council will be 25.

These proposals see Germany and Japan in the Council, but the seats for both countries are as controversial as the idea for enlargement itself. Japan is regarded as having the strongest case for permanent membership, by virtue of both its international economic importance and its significant financial contributions to the UN budgets.[84] However, the Japanese case is complicated by Germany, which is also big contributor to the UN budget and potential candidate for a seat in the Council. However, if Germany and Japan become members of the Security Council, the distribution of permanent seats will contradict with one of the general principles of the UN. As Leigh-Phippard argues, Britain, France and Germany in the Security Council would be unacceptable, because the UN principle of equitable geographical representation will be disregarded[85]. This would mean nothing else than that the regional groups, which are not currently represented in the Security Council will lobby against such a reform and will attract a large interest in the media.

Moreover, the controversies about the G-4 proposal include the disagreement of some member states. In this sense the Japanese nomination provoked "a mobilization of 'grassroots' anti-Japanese sentiment" in China and "distinct cooling of relations" between both countries.[86] The mobilisation took form of campaigns through the country, which included demonstrations and signing of petitions. However, not only the Japanese seat in the Council underlies criticism. The Group of 'like-minded states', led by Italy and Pakistan, launched a new proposal for reform. They suggested to increase the number of the non-permanent member seats to 20, while stressing that, whatever happens, reform of the Council must proceed on the basis 'a negotiated and consensus formula'.[87] The coalition was also supported by Mexico, Argentina, South Korea and Spain. The Group had a good specified aim, which was to block the G-4 proposal. Spain and Italy were against German membership. Pakistan does not want to see India as a permanent member of the Un Security Council and Argentina and Mexico resent Brazil's claim to represent Latin America.

Next to this problem concerning the enlargement of the Security Council comes the veto right of each of the members of the Council. One the one hand, the veto rights ensure, that no decision is taken against the wishes of the permanent members of the Security Council. On the other hand, the veto rights are the reason why, most of the UN decisions and missions did

---

[84] UN Documents ST/ ADM/ SER.B/ 387, 6 October 1992.
[85] Leigh-Phippard (1997): p. 425.
[86] Ward (2005).
[87] Strategic Comments (2005).

not succeed.[88] The removal of the veto power would definitely lead to the improvement of the work of the Security Council by ensuring that no member could block a decision, which is supported by the majority of the members. However, the veto right serves as a protection for the individual interests of each member and it would not be in his interest to give up this right[89]. Moreover, the removal of the veto rights would mean an amendment of the UN Charta, what requires the approval of the permanent members of the Security Council. As these have no interest in giving up their veto powers, the successful implementation of this reform seems impossible.

Furthermore, the retention of the veto includes some advantages for the successful functioning of the UN. The veto power guarantees that the work of the UN Security Council is underlying some kind of control and regulates the number of operations, in which the UN is involved.[90] The desire to maintain the consensus among the permanent members of the Council evaluates in launching more and more UN operations. This desire, however, contradicts with the budget of the UN and the organization is confronted with the demands placed upon it[91]. The removal of the veto power would mean that these problems and the control over them would worsen.

The removal of the veto rights could also lead to loss of interest in the member states, which are members of the Security Council. This already happened once in the history of the UN, when in the 1960s the USA found itself outvoted in the General Assembly and its proposals vetoed in the Security Council. The situation, in which such a case could be repeated is not in the UN's interest and could work against its political and financial prosperity[92].

6.3. Mechanisms for Maintaining Global Peace and Security

Different proposals have been drawn to improve the peacekeeping measures used by the UN. These included the response to the increasing range of demands on the United Nations. The world has changed since the establishment of the UN in the 1940s and the aims of the organization should be adapted to the needs of the modern world. In this sense, it was argued, if the actions of the UN should be limited to the more traditional forms in peacekeeping, or shall the organization move towards actions that are more active.

---

[88] Annual Review of the Global Peace Operations 2006, p. 131 – 151.
[89] Speech of Joshua Muravchik in front of LSE, 15.03.2007
[90] Leigh-Phippard (1997): p. 423.
[91] Annual Review of the Global Peace Operations 2006, p. 131 – 151.
[92] Truab (2006): p. 362f.

In the discussion emerged the idea, that the countries would probably not support the more active role of UN in peacekeeping operations[93]. The use of force for maintaining peace and security was not the strongest side of the UN and the member states would prefer to use their forces in other organizations, which are familiar and successful in these operations. Muravchik argues, that the historical examples from the UN missions show, that the Organization was more effective in operations, which did not involve military forces. In this sense, he recommends to concentrate on the humanitarian support after a conflict is over and not to try to intervene during the conflict and loos its effectiveness[94]. Moreover, the American Professor from the American Institute of Enterprises and author of the book *The Future of the United Nations: understanding the past to chart a way forward* added that it is in interest for the UN to introduce more co – operation with other organizations in its work. The system of co – operation could bring many benefits for the United Nations, as the Organization will be able to concentrate on missions for humanitarian aid, which result in maintaining peace and security.

The report of the Secretary – General's High – Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change[95] identifies a correlation between the increased involvement of the UN in maintaining peace – missions and the decline in civil wars since the Organization involves in its work NGOs and other governmental organizations. Moreover, indeed, many of the peacekeeping operations, which were leaded by the UN, but under national or regional command – from Namibia to East Timor and Kosovo – have helped to stabilize the countries and regions and to boost the political and economical support. However, there also have been some failures. In some cases, such as Sierra Leone, progress in strengthening missions came only after rebels effectively challenged peace agreements and peacekeepers, and local inhabitants were subjected to vicious attacks resulting in large – scale loss of life[96].

The failures were the reason why, UN was supposed to re – think its strategy for peacekeeping. At the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations it was agreed, "that consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self – defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping."[97] More broadly, the United Nations is supposed to develop strategies, which involve peace operations on multidimensional level and relate it to economical, political and social development. In cases of crisis, the Organization should seek

---

[93] Taylor (1997): p. 65.
[94] Speech of Muravchik in front of LSE, 15.03.07.
[95] United Nations (2004): p. 86.
[96] United States Institute of Peace (2004): p. 89.
[97] United Nations (2004).

to develop a strategic assessment of the crisis situation, in order to ensure that a full range of measures are implemented and effectively prevent the crisis.

In general, the further work of the UN should concentrate on more humanitarian support and minimize as much as possible the use of force. The co – operation with other NGOs will be beneficial for the success of the UN missions, as the building of ad – hoc groups has a well-known success and the sharing of power among the different actors in a conflict will lead to a less responsibilities for each party. In this sense, the United Nations could concentrate on these subjects, in which it was ever successful – humanitarian support, peacekeeping and peace – building.

6.4. Sub Conclusion

The reformation of the United Nations is a long and controversial process, which attracted great interest among the media and the scientific world. The proposals for reforms were taken by the UN member states with different feelings and support. The independent bodies often criticised the ideas and methods introduced by these proposals. In general, it could be summarized that the positions differ in three aspects.

First, the success of the UN reforms suffers from the interests of the powerful and less powerful states. The representation and relative power of the less powerful states in the General Assembly and the Security Council is the reason why, most of the smaller states do disagree with the reform proposals. They argue that the proposals are drawn to serve the interests of the big and powerful states, which design the way in which the UN is acting. In this sense, any proposal introduced by alliances of small states is dismissed from the bigger states on the basis that it wants to minimize the power of the powerful states and increase the co – decision power of the smaller states.

Second, the criticism on the Security Council and the reforms on it are related to the 'fight' between the permanent and non – permanent members of the Council. One the one hand, both parties recognize that the Council urgently need reformation. On the other hand, neither the permanent, nor the non – permanent members want to make compromises in order to reform successfully the Security Council. The problem of the number of seats and the regulations for the decision – making process are the areas, in which both parties do not agree on a proposal for a reform. In addition, the question of veto rights is also controversial. As already discussed in Chapter 6.2. the veto power of the permanent members is the reason for and against the

success of the UN missions. Unfortunately, the solution of this problem lies in the hands of the permanent members of the Council and they do not have interest to give up this right. Fortunately, the veto power serves for the control of the UN actions, so it ensures that no action is taken against the wish of a member of the Council and controls the number of missions leaded by the UN.

Third, the positions among the member states differ in respect of the role of the UN missions. The history has shown that the UN has been more successful in missions, in which the Organization did not use military force to ensure peace. However, some authors support the argument that UN should try to increase its role in the peacekeeping and peace – building process by acting with force. Other, on the contrary, support a 'softer' position of the UN on the international arena. The point is that there are many organizations, which have more experience in military actions than the UN. According to this, it will be wiser for the UN to leave the responsibility for military actions to such organizations and to concentrate on tasks, in which it has more experience.

Next to these differences in the role and functions of the UN, most of the criticism concerns the point that the UN is built in a way, which does not allow the successful implementation of any reform without an amendment of the Charter. According to the principles of the UN, the Charter could be successfully amended, if all member states agree on it. As each member state acts first in its own interest and than in interest of the UN, no change and no reform can come through.

7. British Foreign Policy towards the UN

In this Chapter, I will deal with the British Foreign Policy and the interest towards the UN and its reform. In the previous Chapters, I discussed the history of the UN, the functions and responsibilities of the different institutions of the UN, the proposals for reforming the organization and the criticism towards it. In the conclusion of the last Chapter, I came to the assumption that the member states act in first view according to their national interests and next, in interest of the UN. Here I will examine the aims of the British Foreign Policy and the interests towards the UN, because the UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and automatically designer of the decisions of the Organization. By doing this, I will analyze, if the British interests act toward or against the successful reform of the United Nations.

As any reform can be implemented only by the approval of the permanent members of the Security Council, the role played by the UK is essential for the process of reformation. Of course, the UK is not the only member of the Security Council, but the strong position of the country in the Council can serve to draw some lines for the future. In addition, the changes in the leadership of the British Government can lead to fundamental changes in the international orientation of the Kingdom's politics. The former Prime Minister Toni Blair has shown his dedication to the USA, but if Gordon Brown will take the same path in his mandate, he could mark the way in which the British Foreign Affairs will go.

To summarize, in this Chapter I will first examine the aims of the British Foreign Policy beyond Europe and than the direction of the British politics in respect to the mechanisms for action of the UN in peacekeeping and peace – building. In doing this, I will start with a general introduction to British Foreign Policy and proceed with a chronological analysis of this. I will examine the way, which the British politics took in the 1990s and go through the politics of Toni Blair and Gordon Brawn. As last point of the Chapter, I will analyze the British position in the UN Security Council reform, because the country is as already mentioned a permanent member of the Council and an active designer of the process. I am not going to make a full analysis of the British Foreign Policy since the 1990s, because the topic covers too many areas and this is a topic for another thesis. I will concentrate only on the British interests in peacekeeping in relation to the UN visions and on the British interest in UN Security Council reform.

7.1. The Direction and Aims of the British Foreign Policy

In the Post – War – Period, the Labour Party was committed to the Atlantic Alliance, as well as to the post-Imperial Commonwealth.[98] This pro-Atlantic orientation was directed to supporting the United States in the cold war against the Soviet Union and its allies. Britain's and especially Labour's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and the Commonwealth was part of the Post-War worldview of the country, which was reinforced by Britain's position within the world's economy.

In terms of Foreign Policy of the Labour Party, the 1990s can be characterized as pro-European and pro-American. Toni Blair and Gordon Brawn were and are great admirers of

---

[98] Driver and Martell (2006): p.170.

the United States. The politics of Toni Blair have shown that there is no need to choose between the two continents. Given geo-political realities and Britain's historical position within international relations, as Andrew Gamble argues, such a position is inherently unstable and has led successive governments to leave unresolved the choice between Europe and America.[99] Moreover, the danger is that this position will look, and probably will be, more pro-American than pro-European. In this respect, it will draw criticism, as it was the case for example with the Iraq-War.

The chances of the Labour Government and the Labour Party splitting over America looked slim in 2000. The newly elected Republican President, George W. Bush was hardly a man to continue the third way with Prime Minister Blair. By their first meeting at Camp David in February 2001 was cordial enough, but the political chemistry between Blair and Clinton was absent, even if some doubt whether the leaders of the global third way were ever quite as close personally as it appeared.[100] However, the post 9/11 developments were to have a profound and lasting impact in the course of Blair's administration.

The events following the terrorist attacks from September 2001 have come to place a huge strain not just on the New Labour coalition but also on the central plank of Blair Government's Foreign Policy to be pro-European and pro-American. In many respects, as Driver and Martell argue, New Labour in foreign affairs has returned to the party's roots in the Atlee government – with angry internationalists shouting from the backbenches.[101] On 2 October 2001, the defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, announced that his ministry would evaluate whether the 1998 Strategic Defence Review was still adequate 'to cope with the new threats we face'.[102] He suggested that while 'military alone is not the answer … there may not be an answer where military action does not play a vital part'. The result of his ministry's reflection was a new Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review focused on how the UK could best counter terrorism abroad.[103] It concluded that security policy should aim to engage its enemies as far from the UK as possible. In order to succeed, the operations outlined in the New Chapter would have to form part of a broader political strategy.

 The clearest indication of what this broader political strategy would look like emerged from the process of reflection initiated within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office by the new Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw. Straw's remit was to clarify Britain's strategic priorities for the forthcoming decade. With 9/11 Blair's Government claimed that UK Foreign Policy had

---

[99] Gamble (2003).

[100] Riddel (2003).

[101] Driver and Matell (2006): p. 172.

[102] Hoon (2001).

[103] The Strategic Defence Review and Supporting Information and Analysis (2002).

entered a new and unprecedented era. According to Williams, Britain's major Foreign Policy challenge had been achieving stability in Europe in the aftermath of the Balkan wars. After 9/11, the most devastating potential threats to Britain's security emerged from the nexus between radicalism and technology, especially weapons of mass destruction.[104] One could argue that the potential links between radicalism and technology were not new, but 9/11 significantly altered threat perceptions within the British Government and the level of threats that would be tolerated without an active response. This new era was said to require a more proactive and engaged Foreign Policy across a broad agenda. It also brought challenges that would require the UK to work with a wide range of alliances and institutions, the most important being the EU, the US, NATO and the UN.

The UK International Priorities document suggested that *"Strengthening commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to a global partnership between Europe and America will be the single most important goal for the decade ahead, because only through such a partnership will we be able to achieve our policy priorities around the world"*.[105] Beyond relations with the US and the EU, the document identified Russia, China, Japan and India as important global players with whom the UK must develop constructive relationships both bilaterally and through the EU. It went on to outline eight strategic international goals[106]:

1. A world safer from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
2. Protection of the UK from illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other international crime
3. An international system based on the rule of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts
4. An effective EU in a secure neighbourhood
5. Promotion of UK economic interests in an open and expanding global economy
6. Sustainable development, underpinned by democracy, good governance and human rights
7. Security of UK global energy supplies
8. Security and global governance of UK's Overseas Territories

Among the many foreign policy instruments that would be necessarily to achieve these objectives, the ability to project armed force, managing relations with the Islamic world, and

---

[104] Williams (2005): p. 15f.
[105] UK International Priorities (2003): p.26.
[106] UK International Priorities (2003): p.30.

the ability to boost exports and attract investment through commercial diplomacy were identified as crucial.

While the document represented Britain's future Foreign Policy priorities, it was not without its problems and limitations. First, as Williams noted, it attempted to court audiences in both Washington and Brussels but skirted around the major points of disagreement between the two such as the debate about the preventive use of military force, the relationship between security and development, or whether Foreign Policy should be more concerned with 'rogue' of 'failed' states.[107] Second, perhaps in attempt to appease Washington, the document drew no explicit conclusions about the fact that although the UK chose to align its future strategic choices primarily with the US, its economic future remained firmly tied to Europe.[108] Third, the document did not spell out what constructive engagement with the Islamic world would entail. Finally, it was marked by several 'evasions'. In particular, whether, without significant change, the Blair Government's strategy of 'co-binding' to the US during a second Bush Administration would damage the UK's other key international relationships; and to what extent the UK could continue its ostensible 'bridge-building' role between the US and the EU after the Iraq war?[109]

7.2. British Interest in Intervention

7.2.1. Politics in the early 1990s

British Foreign Policy under the Labour Government is characterized by active military action and strong political interest in international matters and especially in international disputes. The United Kingdom had extensive dealings with Iraq in terms of arms under the UN and NATO and the country is an active player by the dealings with Iraq since the Gulf War[110]. In a speech in Boston on 11 April – just as the Security Council President was informing the Iraqi Ambassador of the coming – into – force of a case – fire along the Kuwait border and the deployment of UNIKOM – Vice-President Dan Quayle laid the same case in more detail:[111]

Would America's involvement in Iraq civil war advance vital national interests? ... I'm afraid the answer is 'no.' What are the vital interests of the United States in Iraq's civil war? Very

---

[107] Williams (2005): p. 21f.
[108] Walker (2004): p. 11-12.
[109] Dune (2004): p. 893-909.
[110] Malone (2006): p. 89.
[111] Hiro (1992): p. 410.

little, if any... What would be the clearly defined military objectives of our intervention in Iraq? Overthrow Saddam Hussein? Impose Western – Style Democracy? Achieve a U.S. brokered reconciliation among Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites? Dismember Iraq? Prevent Iraq from being dismembered? Merely to pose these questions demonstrates how complicated the situation is – how easy it would be to get into Iraq, but how hard it would be to get out of the quagmire.[112]

Nevertheless, just five days later, on 16 April 1991, the United States, joined by the United Kingdom and France, decided to send in ground troops to support humanitarian relief efforts and provide Kurdish refugees with safety and security. According to these developments, it is remarkable that the British interests in intervention on Iraqi territory have been characterized with strong pro – American commitment. Even the intervention on Iraqi territory has been defined by Van Walsum as unwise and with no interest for the USA, the American and British government decided to send troops, in order to secure peace for the Kurds. The UN Secretary – General's Executive Delegate, Sudruddin Aga Khan and senior UNHCR official Stefan di Mistura, has approved the following actions.[113] The actions followed in the coming months involved the UN High Commission for Refugees with the responsibility for the refugee camps. Moreover, the trend was recognized that there was an attempt to replace the Western initiative with an UN mission.

Encouraged by these developments, and trying to ensure that the UN mission would not develop into a kind of 'immunity' for the Kurds; Hussein began negotiation process with the Coalition of the three countries and agreed on Memorandum of Understanding with the UN on humanitarian relief.[114] However, that presence was not without controversy. President Bush and Prime Minister Major have succeeded a decade later in their wish to send troops in Iraq through a Resolution 688 of the Security Council. Indeed, even as Iraq agreed to MOU with the UN, it denounced the presence of western troops as interference in Iraqi internal affairs.[115]

The Secretary – General, Pérez de Cuéllar, was asked whether a Western military presence could be established under UN authority without Iraqi consent and his answer was "No. No. No. We have to be in touch first of all with the Iraqis."[116] At the same time, it seemed that he is able to act the other way if the Western forces decided to act alone, as long as the UN was not asked to use force. In this respect, the Secretary – General, China and Russia agreed, that

---

[112] Quayle: Military Intervention in Iraq Would Be Unwise, www.fas.org
[113] Van Walsum (2004): p. 182.
[114] Da Silva (2004): p. 207.
[115] Malone (2006): p. 90.
[116] Bone and Oakley (1991).

whether the two members of the Security Council might have vetoed the authorization of force by the UN, they did not speak against the decision of the Coalition to use Western troops.

The British politics in the case of the Iraq in 1991 are very clear-cut. In Coalition with the USA and France, they agreed to use Western unilateral enforcement even outside of the umbrella of the UN. For the UN was clear that the use of force is unacceptable. In this respect the Security Council and the Secretary – General de Cuéllar preferred the humanitarian intervention. The Coalition learned a good lesson about the elasticity of the Security Council's tolerance for unilateralism and about the creative use that can be made from the Council's Resolutions.

The special relation between the USA and the UK was the reason for the British support toward USA after the first Gulf War. The US approach attempted to balance Iraq and Iran by playing them off against each other. In the same time the other members of the Security Council have shown their wary. As it became clear that the USA was pushing for the indefinite extension of sanctions against Iraq and as result it became clear that the American dominance over the Gulf's oil would not stop, sanctions became a tripwire fir a showdown between the US – UK alliance and the other powers in the Security Council.[117]

The 1996 US – UK baking of the "Oil – for – Food Programme" was not the only one compromise Saddam Hussein managed to wring from the UN during the 1990s. Among others, Hussein managed to agree on use of UN Guards rather than a continued Western military presence, the slow expansion of the humanitarian exception to the sanctions regime, the increase of the oil export ceilings and the wilful Council blindness toward oil smuggling.[118] These agreements signalized, on the one hand, to Hussein that he may rely on the UN support and find peaceful solutions to his showdowns with the United States and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, they were also a reminder for the USA and the UK that the UN was acting in favour of Hussein and both powers were supposed to wary about these developments. As Malone argues, that dynamic brought with it a probability that at some point the United States and UK would abandon the UN, and deal with Hussein themselves.[119] Moreover, as the history has shown, this happens in 2003.

The Iraq Policy could be summed up as contain and punish. This was achieved through the use of the UN Special Commission and the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection

---

[117] Malone (2006): p. 137.
[118] Krasno (2004): p. 206f.
[119] Malone (2006): p. 137.

Commission inspectors, military force and UN economic sanctions.[120] Within the UK, the first two policies attracted relatively little controversy compared to the question of sanctions. In the UN Security Council, however, the UK and the US walked a consistently lonely path. The UK's objective was to ensure that Iraq complied with its obligations as set out in Security Council resolution 687 of April 1991. The problem was that like Clinton's Administration in Washington, Blair's Government was convinced that this would never happen while Saddam Hussein's regime remained in power.[121] As a result, Blair was prepared to acknowledge that "*a broad objective of our policy is to remove Saddam Hussein and to do all that we can to achieve that... If we can possibly find the means of removing him, we will.*"[122]

The British interest in intervention and military enforcement in the 1990s is close related to the special relations with the USA at that time. However, as long as the USA showed scepticism about the UN, the UK Government was urged to use its position of privilege with the US to make an effective case for multilateralism, expressly linking American long-term interests with a strong, credible system of collective security centred on the UN[123]. In providing this leadership, the British Government was urged to give consistent and explicit support for the primacy of the Security Council, under the UN Charter, in the sphere of international peace and security. In the next part, I will build on these arguments and develop the relationship between both powers and the influence of this relationship over the British influence over Security Council's decisions for peacekeeping.

7.2.2. British Foreign Affairs under Toni Blair

The issue of Iraq continued also in the late 1990s, when Toni Blair became Prime Minister in 1997. The British Government was seeking to build bridges with Washington on Iraq, leveraging its own close ties with the United States. This involved a willingness to shoulder a significant proportion of the military burden on the ground in Iraq and in the no-fly zones over it, and to lead on much of the diplomatic heavy lifting in New York, for Foreign Office, negotiation skills are widely recognized. At the political level, the relationship between the USA and the Kingdom became absolute under the Prime Minister Blair. While this provided

---

[120] Williams (2005): p. 185f.
[121] In October 1998, the US passed the Iraq Liberation Act. This committed the US to regime change in Iraq and to finance several Iraqi opposition groups.
[122] Toni Blair's Speech in front of Hansard (Commons) (1998).
[123] Carter and Mucha (2005): p. 48f.

British diplomacy with a degree of authority it otherwise might not have had, as Roberts argued, it also "seriously constrained the leeway of the United Kingdom within the Security Council and beyond."[124]

Although Hussein's regime had displayed at best partial and reluctant cooperation with the UN since the 1991, once both London and Washington began openly talking of the need to bring about his downfall, any incentive Hussein had to cooperate was dramatically eroded. But this situation also put the UK and the US in a difficult position because although the Security Council resolutions made numerous demands on Hussein's regime, they did not authorize overthrowing it by force. As it turned out, these aspects of UK policy turned out controversial. The first was the way in which Blair's Government turned a blind eye to Turkey's military incursions into the northern no-fly zone, ostensibly in pursuit of supporters of the Kurdistan Workers' Party.[125] At times, British pilots patrolling the no-fly zone were ordered to return to their base while Turkish aircraft conducted bombing operations against Kurdish targets.[126]

The second controversy revolved around the use of military force. Before 9/11 Blair's Government conducted sporadic air strikes against targets in Iraq. By mid-December 1998, the UK had conducted some 15,500 sorties in and around the no-fly zones.[127] These were justified on two grounds: to protect the 'safe heavens' and no-fly zones established after the end of the 1991 war, and to enforce the disarmament provisions of Security Council resolution 687. There were four main problems, as Williams argues, with the UK's legal argument. The first was that resolution 1154 and 1205 did not contain the phrase 'all necessary means', which following resolution 687 had become the standard pseudonym for using military force. Taken in isolation this was not a decisive factor. However, combined with the other problems it certainly did not help the UK's case. Second, even given that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations under resolution 687 at the time of the invasion, it was far from clear that the US and UK were authorized to act as the judge of the Security Council.[128]

In the beginning of 2003, when USA announced the 'war on terror' in Iraq, the British Government was split between the options it had. Although Washington gave to Blair a number of options, the Prime Minister decided to support the American decision and turn against France and Germany. Moreover, Blair was widely credited to force the United States

---

[124] Roberts (2004): p. 149f.
[125] Human Rights Watch (1998).
[126] Curtis (2003): p. 45.
[127] Speech of Robertson (1998).
[128] Williams (2005): p. 188f.

to opt for the 'UN route' by using soft actions and humanitarian aid, but when both partners failed to secure a resolution, which authorized the military actions in Iraq, his emphasis on Security Council authorization worked against his own arguments that the war was legal regardless.

In March 2003, when the two governments finally took military actions against Iraq, they relied on the main legal rationale: Iraq's failure to implement certain UN Security Council resolutions and the continuing authority of the coalition to use force based in particular on Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441.[129] In relation to the US – UK arguments for the beginning of the war in Iraq, Roberts argue that the argument that past Security Council resolutions provide a continuing authority to use force, in a different situation and a dozen years later, may seem tortuous, but as he examines their terms, it emerged the suggestion that there is substance to it. In relation to it, the legal justification for the US – UK lead military actions would have been simpler, if both governments have succeeded in their efforts to persuade the UN Security Council to follow up with a so-called second resolution[130]. Such a resolution would have determined that Iraq was in breach of its obligations, and might have specifically authorized the use of force. However, this was not the case, as the other permanent members of the Security Council were the opinion that this resolution would be too far.

Toni Blair disregarded the position of the other members of the Security Council, including the non-permanent ones, and stayed close to the USA and its military actions. However, while the UK forces on the ground generally performed with distinction, the UK's military sector anchored by Basra proved much more the UN peaceful way of intervention. UK input to post – conflict management was characterized more by the professionalism of its personnel than by their apparent on US decision – making.

Nevertheless, the 'war on terror' was not only based on the Iraq's disregard to certain UN Security Council Resolutions. Bush was not alone in his analysis that the strategic conclusions from the 9/11 include a possible connection between the international terrorists and the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Prime Minister Blair has drawn similar conclusions:

"[A]ll those worries I'd had about weapons of mass destruction and proliferation were thrown into sharp relief... What does that mean? It means sending the right signal across the

---

[129] See letter dated 20 March 2003 from the permanent representative from the United States to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council; See also the five-page document titled „Iraq: Legal Basis for the Use of Force", from 17 March 2003, provided to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on the same date; and *House of Lords Hansard*, written answers, 17 March 2003, at www.fco.gov.uk
[130] Baehr and Gordenker (2005): p. 79.

world that from now on if you develop this in the face of UN resolutions you're going to be in trouble."[131]

Although both partners recognized Hussein and Iraq as a 'troublemaker', they disagreed on what role the UN should take in this process of war. This is made clear by a confidential 'Downing Street Memorandum', published by The Times of London on 1 May 2005, which contains minutes from a July 2002 meeting of Prime Minister Blair with principals, including Geoff Hoon (UK Defence Secretary), Lord Goldsmith (UK Attorney General), and John Scarlett (head of the Joint Intelligence Committee). Scarlett indicated that in Washington,

"[m]ilitary action [against Iraq] was not seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military actions, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The National Security Council had no patience with the UN route... There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath of military action."

Scarlett's assessment suggests that Bush had determined to go to war with Iraq, with intelligence being 'fixed' to that end.[132] Many other indications have emerged since then, that Washington pushed intelligence officials to find and report this, what Washington was interested to hear and not the reality. The memorandum also suggested that post – conflict planning was not included in the US agenda. Most revealing was what the memorandum revealed about the differing UK and US positions to the UN. Jack Straw, UK Foreign Secretary argues in this record that:

"It seems clear that Bush has made up his mind to take military actions, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his weapons of mass destruction capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. [The UK] should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspection. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force."

Thus, UN weapons inspections could serve as means and not only as ends. This was acknowledged in publicity in mid-2003 by US Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, who stated that weapons of mass destruction were 'settled on' as 'the one reason that everyone could agree'.[133] As Mark Donner Points out,

"[t]he key negotiation in view at this point... was not with Saddam over letting in the United States inspectors... The key negotiation would be between the Americans, who had shown

---

[131] UK Prime Minister Toni Blair in interview for NBC, 3 April, 2002.
[132] A much overlooked *Knight Ridder* report of 13 February 2002 had laid out the same conclusion. See Walcott and Strobel (2002).
[133] Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair, 9 May 2003

'resistance' to the idea of involving the United Nations at all, and the British, who were more concerned than their American cousins about having some kind of legal fig leaf for attacking Iraq."[134]

Danner concludes, that the hard – liners on the administration 'feared' 'the UN route' not because it might fail but because it might succeed and thereby prevent a war that they were convinced had to be fought.[135]

The United States owed the United Kingdom great deal, since without its support it would have seemed even more isolated internationally than it was. The outcome of the Iraq issue did not influence a further deepening of these special relations, moreover, the public opinion questioned the merits of this relationship and the Blair's strategy over Iraq[136]. The public disagreement was the reason for the recognition that even the relationship between the USA and the UK remains special, both countries will continue to differ in their foreign policies. The United Kingdom has proved its interest in the economic development has maintained the needs for robust multilateral action on climate change and took a position on how to support failing states.

The central issue facing UK Foreign Policy – makers was thus whether the indifference of Saddam Hussein's regime to the plight of the vast majority of his people[137]and his refusal to fully comply with the conditions set out in resolution 687 justified the continuation of economic sanctions against Iraq's entire population. The official answer was that they did. Consequently, Blair's Government continued to advocate the collective punishment of an entire population for the decisions taken by Saddam Hussein's regime, a position that was widely condemned by several UN officials and commentators alike.[138] Three important factors suggested that the UK's position was immoral, probably illegal, and unlikely to be effective. First, according to Cortright and Lopez, the sanctions were unlikely to be effective because no concessions were given to Baghdad when it complied with some of its obligations. This left no incentive for Hussein's regime 'to take further steps toward compliance' and meant that the 'sanctions lost the bargaining leverage so crucial to their effectiveness'.[139] Second, since 1994 the UN Security Council has decided that all subsequent sanctions regimes would be of the targeted variety rather than the more comprehensive type imposed

---

[134] Danner (2005): p. 71-2.
[135] Danner (2005).
[136] Baehr and Gordenker (2005): p. 80f.
[137] During the sanctions, Saddam's regime consistently favoured certain groups (particularly the military, police and security forces) with economic and other privileges. In 1995, those groups were estimated to constitute some 3.5 million people. This left out another 17.2 million Iraqis or 83% of the population. Alnaswari (2000).
[138] Curtis (2003): p. 28-33. ; Williams (2005): p. 187-1991.
[139] Cortright and Lopez (2000): p. 56-7.

upon Iraq. This decision was the result of a consensus that general trade sanctions were a blunt instrument that punished entire populations without the realistic prospect of changing their government's behaviour. Third, five years later, Blair's Government also launched 'a new policy of better targeted "smarter" sanctions' that would 'sharpen the focus and effectiveness of sanctions whilst trying to minimize their impact on ordinary people, including children, and on our own commercial and economic interests'. However, it continued to justify its unique policy towards Iraq by suggesting that the spite of its review's conclusions, 'comprehensive sanctions' would continue in 'cases where the objective is to isolate and contain a very serious transgressor'.[140]

7.2.3. The Future of the British Politics

Since 27 June 2007, Britain has its new Prime Minister. Gordon Brown is now responsible for the securing of the UK's future and according to it, is supposed to take decisions, how will the British Foreign Policy look like. It is questionable, if the Prime Minister Brown will follow the politics of Toni Blair, or is he going to shift into a new stage of development?

In a RUSI Journal from April 2006, Mr. Brown explains his views over the future of the British Foreign Policy:[141]

"*While our long – term aim must be to prevent the indoctrination of future generations of terrorists our immediate priority is how to protect our citizens against the threat we face now. ... But to take the right security and policing measures it is important to understand in specific detail how different these conspiracies and networks are from the past – like the investigation into the ricin chemical plot in Britain, its significance is that it had to span twenty – six countries and that the twelve indicted had, between them, 120 assumed identities. ... what do we conclude from the scale of complexity of all these? First, the starting point is a strong frontline of domestic defence... And we need to continue to build on the strategy for our Armed Forces set out in July 2004 to develop our military capabilities in the fight against terrorism with the ability to mount operations across the world and our capacity to prevent failed states and stabilize lawless areas and support nation – building – a strategy evident in our current operations in Afghanistan, where we are working together with America, NATO and the UN to build a new democratic government.*"

---

[140] Speech of Lloyd (1999).
[141] Brown (2006): p. 15.

In his article for the RUSI Journal, Mr. Brown argues, that the future aim of the UK is to prevent any terrorist actions and to secure the nation – building and development in the failed states. The Prime Minister did not go explicitly on how he wants to implement these aims, but so much is clear, that the United Kingdom will build further on the relationship with America and will continue the operations with NATO and the UN. In respect to the development of the Foreign Affairs, Toni Blair also argues that "[The Armed Forces] will usually fight alongside other nations, in alliance with them; notably, but probably not exclusively with the US."[142]

The former Prime Minister was often asked to give comments on the possible way, which Gordon Brown should take. Michael Codner argued, that the position of Blair will always be leaded by the 'moral motivation' for intervention, and adds, that the occupation of Kosovo in the absence of a United Nations mandate was justified on the grounds of an urgent and overwhelming humanitarian need.[143]

The Prime Minister mentioned in his article the need to prevent the United States from shifting into isolation. This reference is particularly interesting because it is indicative of the fundamental tenet if British security policy: maintain influence over America, in the interests of both the United Kingdom and a safer world. We have had the possibility to see this influence as a matter of modifying aggressive American behaviour by a close relationship on the inside and military partnership. The challenge may indeed be one of engaging an isolationist America but, as important, there is the need to ensure that interventionalism and internationalism go hand – in – hand. To be sure, the only success of British policy in this respect in the lead up to the Iraq War was to persuade the Bush Administration to go through due United Nations.

Lord Owen, who argued that the expected changes in the composition and influence of the Foreign Office over British politics are the first main difference between Blair and Brown, also confirmed Brown's different view on the British Foreign Policy.[144] The politics of Gordon Brown will be characterized with change in the mechanisms of the Government, open dialogs and use of experience to tackle the problems that emerge by conflicts.

The Brown's vision about the future of the British politics is absolutely shifted toward the UN aims. The maintenance of peace through dialogs and the finding of solutions without military force is the world, which the United Nations aims to create. The terms by which a military force should be used have to be redefined, because even the biggest partner of the Americans recognized that the use of force is not as successful as it was in the past. The world has

---

[142] Blair (2007): p. 15.
[143] Codner: (2007): p. 17.
[144] Speech of Lord Owen in front of LSE (2007).

changed and the international peace and security requires new understanding and new ways of action.

Lord Howe argued in his speech in the London School of Economics that Britain has missed many possibilities for cooperation in the past, because the country was too proud, but the future under Gordon Brown promises closer cooperation with the many different players in international politics.[145] Exactly because of the emergence of so many players, a dialog and cooperation are more important than ever. This position corresponds with the European way of dealing with terrorism and international disputes. The shift in the British politics will increase its role in the EU and contribute to the improving of the statute of the European Union on the international arena.

Brown has already shown serious authority tendencies but he has limited choice, because no matter what his views about the Foreign Policy of Britain are, he is supposed to deal with the Americans and especially with Bush at least until the next Presidential Elections in 2009. The close relationship with the Americans is an issue, in which Brown is supposed to show more pressure, but cannot quit it, even if he does not support it. The right way to deal with the Americans, so Sir Rifkind argues, is for Brown to do everything, what Blair refused to do. Moreover, the challenge for Brown is to distance himself and Britain from the American influence by showing that the support for the US is not unconditional.[146] Disagreement is not all the times desirable, but in fundamental issues is. If Brown takes this approach and implement it, the understanding for the global problems and pressures will be redefined.

7.3. Power in the Security Council

7.3.1. Increasing the Number of Seats in the Security Council

Until today, there cannot be recognised positions to concrete proposals. In general, United Kingdom was initially reluctant to recognize the proposal for additional permanent seats for Japan and Germany. It was clear from the beginning that any such addition would give testimony to a relative loss of global power of the United Kingdom and might increase Germany's regional influence over France. However, United Kingdom became an active supporter of the German candidacy.

---

[145] A Speech of Lord Howe in front of LSE (2007).
[146] A Speech of Sir Malcom Rifkind in front of LSE (2007).

In the beginning of the debate about increasing the number of the permanent seats, the Northern industrial countries disliked the idea of creating new permanent seats for the developing countries. As quoted by Fassbender, they argued that the more players there are the less efficient and effective the work of the Security Council will be.[147] Later the position of the industrial states changed in favour of the developing countries, because the firm position of the African states could work against a reform of the Charter, if the industrial states stayed at their position. The United Kingdom declared to be in favour of "additional seats for Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean."[148]

However, all the support is given as long as the problem of veto powers is not discussed. In the view of the British Government, any proposal for increasing the number of the seats in the Security Council may be approved, as long as Britain keeps its veto power. Questionable is also the position of the Kingdom about the veto power of the eventually new permanent members. Widespread is the meaning, that the veto power for the new members will automatically complicate the decision – making process in the Security Council, and the prime question here is how to enhance, not weaken the Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and security.

As the sponsors of Uniting for Consensus, whatever their individual motivations, quite rightly point out: "enlargement of the Security Council in itself, does not assure that peace and international security will be better served" and "there is no solid evidence that an enlargement of permanent members will render a more effective Security Council." [149] In fact, a much stronger case can be made for the opposite view: that enlargement will make the Council more unwieldy, less likely to reach consensus and more prone to defection, especially by the United States, as argued by Berdal.[150]

In this sense, there is no information on what position should take the United Kingdom, but so much is clear: the Britain supports the enlargement of the Security Council with particular members, but the conditions and under what circumstances this might happen is not clear.

[147] Fassbender (2004): p. 347.
[148] Manley (1996): p. 2.
[149] Uniting for Consensus (2005).
[150] Berdal (2005): p. 11.

7.3.2. Limits for Security Council Sanctions

It is true, that the interest of the different members of the Security Council for the improving Council sanctions has varied since the end of the Cold War. As Cortright and Lopez point out, the "sanctions fatigue" generated by humanitarian controversies and political differences over UN policy in Iraq slowed the momentum for reform and made agreement on contentious issues more difficult[151]. Power politics and national interests acted against the aim for improved ability of the Security Council to design and implement effective sanctions.

The most important component of the reform proposals was the introduction of 'time limit' for the Council's sanctions. It was argued, that all sanctions should be time – limited, with a specified date for the lifting of the particular sanction unless the Security Council took action to extend it. Cortright and Lopez added that this proposal for 'time limit' for the sanctions directly relates to the experience in Iraq, where sanctions continued indefinitely and some permanent members would not even consider easing them.

The USA and the United Kingdom, of course, were absolutely against any proposal including 'time limit' for the sanctions. The Governments in Washington and London argued that the time limits would divert the attention of a targeted regime from meeting the necessary conditions for compliance to waiting until sanctions were lifted.

Although the United States and the United Kingdom rejected time limits as a general principle, they agreed in actual practice to a number of time limitations in several recent sanctions episodes: the arms embargo against Ethiopia and Eritrea[152], the arms embargo and further sanctions imposed against Afghanistan[153], and the diamond embargo and other sanctions against Liberia.[154] In each of these cases, the Americans and the Brits voted with the other members of the Security Council to accept time limits of one year for the duration of the imposed measures. Despite this practice and primarily to avoid its application in the case of Iraq, the UK remains in opposition of the introduction of the concept as a general principle.

On proposals on decision – making procedures within sanctions committees, the United Kingdom, again in alliance with the United States, wanted to retain the existing consensus rule: by the will of one or two members of the Council. This position is again related to the

---

[151] Cortright and Lopez (2004): p. 175f.
[152] A Resolution 1298 [2000].
[153] A Resolution 1333 [2000].
[154] A Resolution 1343 [2001].

actions in Iraq. The British and American Governments did not want to lose their ability to place holds on the import of dual – use goods into Iraq[155].

7.4. Sub – Conclusion

The British politics toward the reformation of the UN has made different stages with different impact on participation. In general, I can conclude that the special relationship with the USA has led the destination of the British interests and mostly of the British actions. There is no doubt that Britain is interested in the successful reformation of the United Nations and the country supports the proposals drawn by Kofi Annan about the preconditions and forms, which the reform should take.[156]

The enlargement of the Security Council is supported by the UK and the country has shown its position about which states should join the Council, in case a reform is taken. However, it is not clear under which circumstances these new members should join the Council and what role are they going to have. The problems of the veto power are not discussed from the British Government, but one is clear, the UK does not want to give up its veto power in the future.

In the case of other reforms, such as the mechanisms for peacekeeping and intervention, Britain has again shown its close relations with the USA. The international priorities of the country lead their actions and these are sometimes fulfilled without the UN delegation. This was the case with Iraq in the 1990s. In addition, as the UK, so the USA, keep searching for resolutions, which may approve their intervention in Iraq. More than 10 years later, in 2003, both partners used the same resolutions and argued that the UN Resolutions should not be time limited, to send their forces again in Iraq and start the war on terror.

However, there is a shift in the British politics, toward more UN led missions and about more humanitarian aid. This was not all the times supported by their friends, the Americans, but as argues, the new Prime Minister, shall use its power and show to the Bush Administration that the United Kingdom is and will remain partner of the USA in the fight against terrorism, but not by any conditions.[157]

---

[155] Cortright and Lopez (2004): p. 176.
[156] British International Priorities (2003)
[157] A Speech of Sir Malcolm Rafkind in front of LSE (2007).

8. Conclusion

The reformation of the United Nations is a long and continuing process. Many problems and different interests, predominantly national interests, which paved the success of the reform, marked it. The countries are so divided in their discussions about how should the reform look like that reform proposals are still drawn and coalitions are formed, which stay behind particular ideas for reformation. In general, there is a division between North and South: the industrial countries from the North against the developing countries from the South.

The United Kingdom, as a strong industrial country is backing the reformation of the United Nations as long as its powers and its influence remain as strong as now, or become stronger. United Kingdom with the United States on its side form a strong coalition, which as the history has shown, may act with or without the UN. However, UK, as a permanent member of the Security Council, remains one of the designers of the reform and designer of the future of the World Organization.

In the light of the 60th anniversary of the Organization, the UN has come over different types of criticism. Some see the Organization as the only one, which can deliver peace and security, other criticize it about the Iraq crisis in 2003 and many other issues, but since the Iraq crisis the pressure over the UN is enormous. One is true, the United Nations expanded extremely its work and responsibilities through the last decades, without to make any fundamental change in the UN Charta, which established the UN and includes its aims, principles, responsibilities and obligations. The number of members by the time of establishment increased almost four times and from an Organization, whose aim was to deal with war problems, the UN developed into an international arena for all global problems in the world.

Taking into account the increased number of member states and the increased number of aims and responsibilities, one is clear: the Organization should be reformed, because its structures and actions do not meet the political reality. However, the reformation process is long and lasting. Each reform should begin with an analysis of the global challenges. Next to these challenges, another problem should be solved. This problem concerns the member states of the World Organization. As already discussed, the national interests have always been leading the decision – making process in the UN. This should be changed in order to make the organization successful.

After these problems are solved, we can talk about the implementation of the reform process. In addition, in this sense comes first the reformation of the Security Council of the United Nations. The reform of the Security Council counts to one of the most difficult and at the

same time to the one of the most sensitive ones, because the political power of the permanent members comes into question. According to Article 24 of the UN Charta, the members of the Security Council are responsible for the maintaining of the world peace and security. In this respect, many of the members of the UN believe that the powers granted to the five permanent members are undemocratic and based on self-interests.

However, the reform of the Council is difficult because at least of two reasons. First, there is no consensus about the preconditions and powers, under which the new members should be accepted. As already mentioned, the Big Five do agree more or less on to which states should be granted permanent membership, but the powers they should share are controversial. Second, the increased number of seats in the Security Council requires a change in the Charta, what is only possible, if two thirds of the Assembly and all five members of the Council give their agreement. This means, that there should be a situation, in which all members of the UN see an advantage in the reform. Each member state puts its national interests behind the global ones in this situation. Unfortunately, such a loss of national interest is not in sight.

This is also the case with the UK. As long as the debates are on who shall join the Big Five in an enlarged Security Council, the British support the proposals and are able to negotiate, but as the debates move on topics such as loss of veto rights, or veto rights for the new members and other powers, the British support is not as enthusiastic as earlier. This is just another confirmation of the unwillingness of the members to put national interest behind the global needs.

In this sense, a reform of the Security Council is not possible now. The process of reformation should continue, but as long as the member states are not ready to look global to the problems facing the world, the reform of the Council will be very difficult for implementation. However, in order to make any success, the members states should concentrate on other issues, which concerns the peacekeeping process and represents an important part of the UN status on the international arena.

Since the Iraq crisis and the US and UK intervention without an UN approval, the question of military intervention and the position of the UN comes central. By which circumstances a military intervention should be approved and by whom is something, what the UN member states should decide. The world has changed since the UN establishment in 1945. This means that the UN has to cope with different problems and different means of conflicts, what requires that the principles of the Organization should be adapted to the changing world. The peacekeeping and peace – building are difficult issues and require the cooperation of many actors.

To leave the military interventions to other players and to concentrate on peacekeeping through humanitarian aid, will probably be the wisest thing the UN could do, in order to keep its international reputation as a 'world peace' organization. The history has shown that the UN has ever been more successful in maintaining peace after the end of a conflict that by using military force during conflicts. Therefore, the cooperation with other organizations, such as NATO for example, will keep the authority of the UN and maintain it as a successful organization in the peacekeeping and peace – building measures.

Here comes the role of the UK into question. UK, as a member of the Security Council, is responsible for the making of such decisions. On the one hand, UK as a close partner of the USA is supporting the American interpretation of the need for military intervention. On the other hand, UK is a member of the EU, what makes him an important player on the European arena and the views about military intervention in Europe differ from the American one. The British politics under Toni Blair has shown that he was on the American side no matter what the European opinion was about it. Under Gordon Brown, this might change. Even Toni Blair recognized that the Bush Administration acts as an independent power that can achieve victory by any price. This was the reason why, even so many Americans, widely criticized the American politic.

The future politics of the UK toward the United Nations depends on what position will Brown take toward USA. As he criticized, that the Blair's politics were not successful, we can draw lines for the future that Brown will probably deal harder with Bush and will make clear that the Kingdom's support for USA is not without preconditions. Of course, the British politics will not change fundamentally right now, because Gordon Brown is supposed to deal with Bush until the new President Elections in the USA in 2009, but systematically the politics will change.

The British politics shift more to cooperation in order to succeed in conflict resolutions and open dialogs with the different parties in the conflict. This shift is clearly more pro – UN, what will probably evaluate the British position on the European level as well. The terms, by which a military intervention should be approved, have to be defined, because we do not have anymore the classical terms of war, which we had by the Cold War. In this respect, the shift in the British position could have a double meaning. One the one hand, the shift toward UN could improve the British authority among the European Union and provoke more respect. On the other hand, the special relationship to USA can be used as a way to put pressure on the Bush Administration in order to act more in UN terms.

The reorientation of the American interests toward United Nations could make the first step on the way to successful reformation, because the United States has used the Organization to realize its goals, which were not really successful and supported by the people all over the world. The shift in the American views about conflict resolutions and terms for intervention may lead to a 'rebirth' for the aims of the United Nations and to the coming back of the UN on the international arena as a respectful organization, which cope the global problems successfully.

9. Sources

Literature

1. **Alnaswari, Abbas (2000):** Iraq: Economic Embargo and Predatory Rule. In: Nafziger, Wayne, Stewart, Frances and Väyrynen, Raimo (eds.): *War, Hunger and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies.* Vol.2. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

2. **Ansprenger, Franz (2000):** *Wie unsere Zukunft entstand. Von der Erfindung des Staates zur internationalen Politik – ein kritischer Leitfaden.* Wochenschau Publishers. Schwalbach.

3. **Ask, Sten and Mark, Jungkvist (2005):** *The Adventure of Peace. Dag Hammarskjörd and the Future of the UN*. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.

4. **Baehr, Peter and Gordenker, Leon (2005)**: *The United Nations: Reality and Ideal. Fourth edition*. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.

5. **Barkin, J. Samuel (2006):** *International Organization: Theories and Institutions.* Palgrave Macmillan. New York.

6. **Barnett, Michael and Finnemore, Martha (2004):** *Rules of the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*. Cornell University Press. Ithaca and London.

7. **Bhatta, Gambhir (2000):** *Reforms at the United Nations: Contextualising the Annan Agenda*. Singapore University Press. Singapore.

8. **Boutros – Ghali (1992):** *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. United Nations. New York.

9. **Bulkeley, R (1990)**: Depolitizing United Nations Recruitment: Establishing a Genuinely International Civil Service. In: The United Nations System: prospects for reform. *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, New York University, (4), Summer

10. **Carter, Sarah and Mucha, Laura (2005)**: British Foreign and Defence Policy. In: Williams, Paul (2005): *British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997-2005*. Palgrave Macmillan. London.

11. **Cortright, David and Lopez, George (2000):** *The Sanctions Decade*. Lynne Rienner. Boulder.

12. **Cortright, David and Lopez, George (2004)**: Reforming Sanctions. In: Malone, David (2004): *The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21st Century.* A Project of the International Peace Academy. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

13. **Curtis, Mark (2003)**: *The Web of Deceit.* Vintage. London.

14. **Czempiel, Ernst – Otto (1991):** *Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Das internationale System nach dem Ende des Ost – West – Konflikts.* C.H. Beck'sche Publishers. Munich.

15. **Czempiel, Ernst – Otto (1995):** Aktivieren, reformieren, negieren?, Zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Vereinten Nationen, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, No: 42. Bonn.

16. **Danner, Mark (2005)**: *The Secret Way to War.* New York Relief of Books. New York.

17. **Da Silva, Pascal Teixeira (2004)**: Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Iraqi Case. In: Malone, David (2004): *The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21st Century.* A Project of the International Peace Academy. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

18. **De Wet, Erika (2004)**: *The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council. Hart Publishing.* Oxford and Portland Oregon.

19. **Drechsler, Hanno-Hilligen, Wolfgang-Neumann, Franz (1995):** *Gesellschft und Staat, Lexikon der Politik.* Vahlen Publishers. Munich.

20. **Driver, Stephen and Martell, Luke (2006):** *New Labour.* Polity Press. Malden.

21. **Fassbender, Bardo (2004)**: Pressure for Security Council Reform. In: Malone, David (2004): *The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21st Century.* A Project of the International Peace Academy. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

22. **Fenton, Neil (2004):** *Understanding the UN Security Council. Coercion or Consent?* Ashgate Publishing. Hampshire.

23. **Gamble, Andrew (2003):** *Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics.* Palgrave Macmillan. Basingstoke.

24. **Göller, Josef – Thomas (1995):** *Anwälte des Friedens. Die UNO und ihre sechs Generalsekretäre.* Dietz Publishers. Bonn.

25. **Graham, N and Jordan, R (Eds.) (1980):** *The International Civil Service: Changing Role and Concepts.* UNITAR.

26. **Hilaire, Max (2005):** *United Nations Law and the Security Council.* Ashgate Publishing. Burlington.

27. **Hindell, K (1990):** The UN Security Council: Filling the Gaps. In: *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs. December.

28. **Hiro, D (1992):** *Desert Shields to Desert Storm. The Second Gulf War*. Routledge. London.

29. **Howard, M (1989):** The Un and International Security. In: Roberts, A and Kingsbury, B (Eds.): *United Nations, Divided World*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

30. **Karns, Margaret P. and Mingst, Karen A. (2004):** *International Organizations. The Politics and Process of Global Governance*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

31. **Kennedy, Paul (2006):** *The Parliament of Man. The United Nations and the Quest for World Government*. Penguin Group, London.

32. **Klabbers, Jan (Ed.), (2005):** *International Organizations*. Dartmouth Publishing Company. Hants.

33. **Knapp, Manfred-Krell (1996):** *Einfuerung in die internationale Politik*. Oldenburg Publishers. Munich-Vienna.

34. **Krasno, Jean (Ed.) (2004):** *The United Nations. Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

35. **Laatikainen, Katie Verlin and Smith, Karen E. (Eds.), (2006):** *The European Union at the United Nations. Intersecting Multilateralisms*. Palgrave Macmillan. New York.

36. **Leigh – Phippard (1997):** Remarking the Security Council: The Options. In: *The World Today*. Royal Institute of International Affairs, August – September.

37. **Lempinen, Miko (2001):** *Challenges Facing the System of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights*. Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Gummerus Printing. Saarijärvi.

38. **Löwe, Volker (1994):** Peacekeeping – Operationen der UN. Aspekte einer Beteiligung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: *Bonner Beiträge zur Politikwissenschaft*. 3rd Edition. Münster.

39. **Luard, E (1989):** The Contemporary Role of the United Nations. In: Roberts, A and Kingsbury, B (Eds.): *United Nations, Divided World*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

40. **Luck, Edward (2006):** *UN Security Council. Practice and Promise*. Routledge. New York.

41. **MacLeod, Lisa A. Hall (2006):** *Constructing Peace. Lessons from UN Peacebuilding Operations in El Salvador and Cambodia*. Lexington Books. Oxford.

42. **Magariños, C. (2006):** Economic Development and UN Reform. Towards a Common Agenda for Action. UNIDO. Vienna.

43. **Malone, David (2004):** *The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21st Century*. A Project of the International Peace Academy. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

44. **Malone, David (2006):** *The International Struggle Over Iraq. Politics in the UN Security Council 1980 – 2005*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

45. **Mingst, Karen and Karns, Margaret (2007):** *The United Nations in the 21st Century. Third Edition*. Westview Press. Cambridge.

46. **Riddel, P. (2003):** *Hug Them Close*. Politico's. London.

47. **Roberts, Adam (2004):** The Use of Force. In: Malone, David (2004): *The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21st Century*. A Project of the International Peace Academy. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

48. **Sarooshi, Dan (2005):** *International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers*. Oxford University Press. New York.

49. **Schachter, R (1983):** The International Civil Servant: Neutrality and Responsibility. In: Jordan, R.S.: *Dag Hammarskjörd Revisited: The UN Secretary – General as a Force in World Politics*.

50. **Singh, Sukhbir (1995):** *Structure and Functions of the United Nations Organization*. Kanishka Publishers Distributors, Kailash Nagar, Delhi.

51. **Smith, Courtney (2006):** *Politics and Process at the United Nations. The Global Dance*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

52. **Schweitzer, Glenn E. and Schweitzer, Carole D. (2006):** *America on Notice. Stemming the Tide of Anti – Americanism*. Prometheus Books. New York.

53. **Taylor, Tom, Daws, Sam and Adamczick-Gerteis (Eds.), (1997):** *Documents on Reforms of the United Nations*. Darthmouth Publishing Company. Vermont.

54. **Thakur, Ramesh (1993):** *The United Nations in a Changing World*. Security Dialogue. New York.

55. **Thakur, Ramesh (2006):** *The United Nations, Peace and Security. From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

56. **Traub, James (2006):** *The Best Intentions. Kofi Annann and the UN in the Era of American Power*. Bloomsbury Publishing. London.

57. **Urquhart, B (1990)**: *The United Nations and its Discontents*. New York Review of Books, 15 March.

58. **Van Walsum, Peter (2004)**: The Iraq Sanctions Committee. In: Malone, David (2004): *The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21ˢᵗ Century*. A Project of the International Peace Academy. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

59. **Varwick, Johannes and Gareis, Sven (2006)**: *Die Vereinte Nationen. Aufgaben, Instrumente und Reformen*. 4th Edision. Budrich Publishers. Opladen.

60. **Volger, Helmut (1994):** *Die Vereinten Nationen*. Oldenburg Publishers. Munich.

61. **Ward, R (2005):** The British Labour Party. In: Williams, Paul (2005): *British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997-2005*. Palgrave Macmillan. London.

62. **Williams, Paul (2005)**: *British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997-2005*. Palgrave Macmillan. London.

63. **Wilson, Zoë (2006):** *The United Nations and Democracy in Africa. Labyrinths and Legitimacy*. Routledge. New York and London.

64. **Zweifel, Thomas D. (2006):** *International Organizations and Democracy: Accountability, Politics and Power*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

Reports and Articles

65. **Amnesty International (2005):** *2005 World Summit: Unique Opportunity to Strengthen the Three Pillars of the United Nations – Development, Security and Human Rights*. Amnesty International. London.

66. **Berdal, Mats (2004)**: The UN After Iraq. In: *Survival.* The IISS Quarterly Vol. 46 No. 3. Autumn 2004.

67. **Berdal, Mats (2005)**: The UN's Unnecessary Crisis. In: *Survival.* The IISS Quarterly Vol. 47. No. 3. Autumn 2005.

68. **Blair, Toni (2007)**: Defence Perspectives: Defending the United Kingdom and its Interests. In: *RUSI Journal*. February 2007. Vol. 152, No. 1.

69. **Bone, James and Oakley, Robin (1991)**: Secretary – General Clashes with West over Forces for Northern Iraq. In: *The Times*, 18 April 1991.

70. **Boutros, Ghali (1992)**: *Agenda für den Frieden*. Vienna-New York.

71. **Brown, Gordon (2006)**: Securing our Future. In: *RUSI Journal*. April 2006. Vol. 151. No. 2.

72. **Centre on International Cooperation (2006):** *Annual Report of Global Peace Operations 2006*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. London.

73. **Codner, Michael (2007)**: A Note of Prime Minister's Lecture. In: *RUSI Journal*. February 2007. Vol. 152, No. 1.

74. **Der Spiegel (1997)**: Interview with Kofi Annan. Stimmrecht nur gegen Geld. In*: Der Spiegel*. No: 30. Hamburg.

75. **Dunne, Tim (2004):** When the Shooting Starts: Atlanticism in British Security Strategy. In: *International Affairs*. 80:5.

76. **Evans, Gareth (2004)**: When is it Right to Fight? In: *Survival*. The IISS Quarterly Vol. 46 No. 3. Autumn 2004.

77. **Federation of Swiss Protestant Churches (2005):** *Reforms for Strengthening the United Nations. Orientations and Proposals of the Federation of Swiss Protestant Churches*. 11 April 2005. Bern.

78. **Gott, Richard (1993):** Nations Divided by a Lost Vision. In: *The Guardian*, 28 August, 1993. p. 27.

79. **Hoon, Geoff (2001)**: This Fight Will be Long and Hard, speech to the Labour Party Conference. Brighton, 2 October.

80. **Human Rights Watch (1998)**: *World Reports: Iraq and Kurdistan* at: http://hrw.org/reports/world/reports, visited on 7 June 2007, 18: 54.

81. **Manley, Simon (1996)**: Statement to the Open-Ended Working Group, 28 March 1996, in: *UK Mission to the UN press release*. No: 023/96. 28 March 1996.

82. **Strategic Defence Review and supporting Information and Analysis (2002):** *A New Chapter*. Cm 5566, Vol.1. and Vol. 2. London.

83. **UK International Priorities (2003)**. Published by Foreign and Commonwealth Office. London.

84. **United Nations (1985):** *Report of the Secretary – General on the Work of the Organization*. 40 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) at 5, UN Doc. A/44/49

85. **United Nations (1990)**: *United Nations Staff Report*. United Nations. New York.

86. **United Nations (1992)**: *UN Documents*. ST/DM/SER.B/387. 6 October 1992.

87. **United Nations(1998):** *United Nations Handbook*. United Nations. New York.

88. **United Nations (2004):** *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.* Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. United Nations. New York.

89. **United Nations (2006):** *Annual Report of the Global Peace Operations*. United Nations. New York.

90. **United States Institute of Peace (2004):** *American Interests and UN Reform. Report of the Task Force on the United Nations*. Washington D.C.

91. **Uniting for Consensus (2005)**: Proposal for Security Council Reform. United Nations.

92. **Walcott, John and Strobel, Walter (2002)**: *Bush Has Decided to Overthrow Hussein*. A Knight Ridder Report. Knight Ridder News Service. February 2002.

93. **Walker, Martin (2004)**: Mind the Gap. In: *World Today*. 60:1.

94. **Wochenschau Publishers(1999):** Internationale Organizationen in der Reform. In: *Politische Bildung 1*. Edition 1999. Wochenschau Publishers. Schwalbach.

Internet

95. **Graf Rantzau, Detlef (1995):** *Statement over Reliability of the Security Council*, at www.un.org, visited 5 June 2007, 22:15.

96. *House of Lords Hansard*, written answers, 17 March 2003, at www.fco.gov.uk, visited on 17.06.2007, 10:05.

97. „*Iraq: Legal Basis for the Use of Force*", provided to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 17 March 2003, at www.fco.org.uk, visited on 10 June 2007, 12:40.

98. Letter from the permanent representative from the United States to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council, 20 March 2003, at www.un.org, visited on 23 May 2007, 16:47.

99. **New York Times (1990):** at A3, col. 1., 11 January 1990.

100. **New York Times (1990):** at A4, col. 4., 23 February 1990.

101. **New York Times (1990):** at A16, col. 6., 24 June 1990.

102. **New York Times (1990):** at A10, col. 6., 22 July 1990.

103. **'Quayle**: Military Intervention in Iraq Would Be Unwise', USIA Wireless File, April 11, 1991, at: www.fas.org/news/iraq/1991/910411-179992.htm.

104. **Reuters North European Service (1984):** LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File. 4 July 1984.

105. **IISS Strategic Comments (2005):** *Reforming the UN Security Council. Enlargement and Efficiency.* Vol.11, Issue 4, June 2005. At www.iiss.org/stratcom, visited on 01 August 2007.

106. **IISS Strategic Comments (2006):** *The United Nations. Change at the Top.* Vol. 12, Issue 8, October 2006. at www.iiss.org/stratcom, visited on 01 August 2007.

107. **United Press International (1986):** LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File. 21 November 1986.

108. **Wolfowitz (2003):** Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair, 9 May 2003, at www.defencelink.mil/speeches/2003, visited 06 April 2007, 11:46.

Speeches

109. Speech of Edward Mortimer at London School of Economics and Political Science. *Kofi Annan's Legacy.* 25 January 2007.

110. Speech of Professor Stephen Stedman at London School of Economics and Political Science. *UN Reform in an Era of Soft Balancing.* 01 March 2007.

111. Speech of Joshua Muravchik at London School of Economics and Political Science. *What's Wrong with the UN?* 15 March 2007.

112. Speech of Lord Howe, Lord Hurd, Lord Owen, Sir Malcom Rifkind, Dr. Robin Niblett and Gideon Rachmanat London School of Economics and Political Science. British *Diplomacy.* 30 April 2007.

113. Speech of Sir Stephen Wall at London School of Economics and Political Science. *Will Blair's European Dream Be Brown's British Nightmare?* 3 May 2007.

114. Speech of Lt Gen the Hon Roméro Dallaire at London School of Economics and Political Science. *International Military Interventions and the Constrains Facing the United Nations.* 17 May 2007.

115. Speech of Toni Blair in front of the Hansard of Commons. 17 December 1998.

116. Speech of George Robertson in front of the Hansard of Commons. 17 December 1998.

117. Speech of Tony Lloyd in front of the Hansard of Commons 15 March 1999.

UN Resolutions

118. Resolution 35/176 [1980], 35 UN GAOR Supp. No. 48, Doc. A/35/48.

119. Resolution 186 [1964], 19 UN SCOR at 2, UN Doc. S/5571.

120. Resolution 428 [1978], 33 UN SCOR at 5, UN Doc. S/12610.

121. Resolution 678 [1991]

122. Resolution 687 [1991]

123. Resolution 1154 [1998]

124. Resolution 1205 [1998]

125. Resolution 1298 [2000]

126. Resolution 1333 [2000]

127. Resolution 1343 [2001]

128. Resolution 1441 [2003]

All resolutions to be find at www.un.org

10.Annex

UN Secretary-General (1946 – 2007)

Secretary-General	Nationality	Dates of Service
Tryge Lie	Norway	1946 – 1953
Dag Hammarskjöd	Sweden	1953 – 1961
U Thant	Burma	1961 – 1971
Kurt Waldheim	Austria	1972 – 1981
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar	Peru	1982 – 1991
Bourtos Boutros - Ghali	Egypt	1992 – 1996
Kofi Annan	Ghana	1997 – 2006
Ban Ki Moon		2006 – present

Relevant Articles from the UN Charter

Article 1 (1)

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

Article 1 (3)

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the organisation shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the proceeding

two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.

Article 23 (2)

The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

Article 24 (1)

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to

the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Principles for the Use of Force

• The seriousness of the threat
• The proper purpose of the proposed military action
• Whether means short of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat
• Whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand
• Whether there is a reasonable change of success

Models for Security Council Reform

Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Regional area	No. of seats	Permanent States (continuing)	Proposed new permanent seats	Proposed two-year non-renewable seats	Total
Africa	53	0	2	4	6
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6
Europe	48	3	1	2	6
Americas	35	1	1	4	6
Totals models	192	5	6	13	24

Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Regional area	No. of seats	Permanent States (continuing)	Proposed four-year renewable seats	Proposed two-year non-renewable seats	Total
Africa	53	0	2	4	6
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6

Europe	**48**	**3**	**2**	**1**	**6**
Americas	**35**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**6**
Totals models	**192**	**5**	**8**	**11**	**24**

From Reform of the UN.org, visited on 02 August 2007, 10:20.