

# **The right-winged politics' influence on and control of Governments since 9/11**

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## *Summary*

The 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001 a terrorist attack destroyed the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, USA. Soon it became clear that Muslim terrorists had been responsible for this attack and since then this has been an important point on the agenda of world politics. What consequences did this have for politics in the EU member states? Did the EU members states become more right winged?

In this thesis I examine whether the governments of five founders of the ECSC have moved more towards the right, i.e. whether these governments have become more right winged since 9/11, which is also the main research question. For this, first I had to map the different political parties which, after doing research, has been done by using the Left-Right scale of Castles and Mair (1984) and the Cleavage groups given by Lane and Ersson (1999). In the theory part these two theories and the theory on party families is discussed.

Also in this thesis the possible influence of (extreme) right winged parties on the governments since 9/11 is being researched. In chapter five it is shown that extreme right winged populist parties in Belgium, France and The Netherlands do influence politics and the acting of the governments.

It is also shown that the expenditures of right winged regarded ministerial departments under control of a right winged party member have risen significantly. Although right winged parties do influence the governments, they do not necessarily control the actual government decisions and plans on right issues. Neither can it be proven that that indeed since 9/11 the influence of these parties on the government has emerged or increased.

Regarding the main research question, this thesis shows that looking only at the average score of the political parties and not their size, in two countries there seems to be a shift towards the right on the Left-Right scale, however looking at the countries individually the governments did not move more towards the right. Although The Netherlands and France have a higher mean since 9/11, only in France there seems to be an indication of a shift towards the right. The total mean of the governments discussed in this thesis is higher since 9/11, however this does not show that indeed governments have become more right winged and the governments in the ECSC are in fact to be considered as centre governments.

Concluding, in this thesis it is shown that since 9/11, which is considered as a major happening in the globalized world and had an enormous impact on society and mankind, there seems to be an indication that right winged politics gained more influence and control but this cannot be clearly stated.

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## 1. Introduction

On 11 September 2001 the world changed. A terrorist attack destroyed the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, USA. Soon it became clear that Muslim terrorists, the Al Qaeda, had been responsible for this attack which cost thousands of people's lives. Since then Muslim terrorism has become an important point on the agenda of world politics and both in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States, along with the NATO and the UN, tries to retain order and security in order to secure safety throughout the world. Also in the European Union Muslim terrorism had a huge impact on the society. In March 2004 a series of bombs exploded against the train system in Madrid, and in July 2005 a series of bombs exploded against the public transport system in London. Furthermore in September 2004 the Dutch writer and movie maker Theo van Gogh was killed by a Muslim terrorist.

What did those terrorist attacks in both the United States as well as in the European Union mean for politics in the EU member states? Did the EU members states as a result became more right winged? The tendency appears to be there that indeed due to the Muslim terrorist attacks society has become more xenophobic, hard and less private: Strong safety checks at the airports, safety checks for the public transport, extra security for the government buildings and politicians, extra safety checks for non domestic citizens and a massive intensification of the secret services.

In this thesis I will examine the national election results and particularly the government outcomes of the EU countries which started the European cooperation through the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951: Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy, in order to see whether a trend can be seen since the 1970's, to determine what kind of trend this then is and to discuss whether this trend is ECSC wide.

Furthermore I will discuss whether since 9/11 governments have changed and whether a trend braking pattern can be seen in these five EU countries.

The reason why I take 9/11 as breaking point for this thesis seems rather logic however I shall discuss the reason for this briefly here since what is logic in the ‘real world’ might not be logic in politics.

9/11 has been interpreted in different ways: as a symbolic savage protest by the dispossessed of the Third World, as a shrewd move to break hegemony, and as the opening of the new World War III between the Islam and the West. It is said that 9/11 ended the post-Cold War era, and that it changed the course of American history for ever. 9/11 also led to the new War on Terror of the United States, in which other countries could be either against or with them. All this lead to decision making in the ECSC countries too: they had to decide whether to be with or against the United States, and in both ways they had to change their foreign politics and their intelligence services (Baylis and Smith, 2005, pp. 152-155).

So as shown briefly here, 9/11 not only means the bombing of the Twin Towers and the murder on thousands of innocent citizens, it also means the start of a new period in which world politics has changed and new threats have risen and tried to be dealt with.

In the last parts of this thesis I will discuss whether the influence of right winged parties has increased or at least is moderate. Therefore I will discuss the Extreme right winged populist party family and their influence in politics. But I will also discuss whether government parties have moved towards the right regarding certain issues and whether right winged parties claimed certain positions in the current government.

The main research question will thus be whether the governments in the five countries discussed in this thesis have move more towards the right, i.e. whether the governments of the EU countries have become more right winged since 9/11.

Consequently, the first sub-question is how the different national political parties can be mapped in order to answer the main research question.

The second sub-question is whether the influence of (extreme) right winged parties on the current government since 9/11 has emerged or increased.

This will be researched in different ways in order to see whether indirectly governments since 9/11 have moved more towards the right: The focus here

will lie on the influence of extreme right winged populist parties in politics, their possible direct and indirect influence, and an analysis of certain government issues related to the (extreme) right winged.

In order to do such research on influence of the right we also need to know what influence is. The Palgrave dictionary of political thought defines influence as a form of power, distinct, however, from control, coercion, force and (probably) interference. It involves affecting the conduct of another through giving reasons for action short of threat (Scruton, 2007, p. 331). Therefore is must be said here that not only the influence of the right is being discussed but also (admitted, in a slighter way) the control of the right, looking at the definition of influence and that of control according to The Palgrave dictionary of political thought: Control is when one agent can provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the seconds' actions (Scruton, 2007, p. 141).

As mentioned in the beginning of the introduction 9/11 did have major implications for the international community and relations. There can even be literature found about the impact of 9/11 on arts (Plate and Smelik, 2006) showing that not only for politicians but also for the citizens throughout the world including EU citizens the world seems to have changed and a new era in the history of the world has begun, although it's still too early to state that in fact this is really the case. Furthermore there have been many studies not only about the possible cause of the destroyed Twin Towers but also about the possible implications and the way the different actors like the US Government and the European Union acted (f.i. Bono, 2006; Sides, 2005; Lansford and Tshev, 2004). Although I will not outline the implications in the different scientific fields in which 9/11 is supposed to have made an impact, it should be clear that indeed 9/11 did influence the whole world in many different ways which makes it interesting to do research on whether since 9/11 right winged politics had (more) influence and control over the governments in Europe.

Since it is too complex work to do research for all EU countries in this thesis, I will as mentioned above focus my research on five founders of the European Union. These five countries have, along with Luxembourg, been the founders

of the ECSC. In 1951 the predecessor of the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, was established and despite the collapse of the proposed European Defense Community and the European Political Community in 1954, in 1957 the European Economic Community Treaty was signed by the ECSC member states in which the attention was mainly focused on economic integration. In 1973 three more countries joined the EEC treaty and many more countries followed in the years after that. In 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht was founded, followed by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the Treaty of Nice in 2000. These new Treaties where the follow-up of the prior Treaties and where more and more specific and arranging, for example the institutional changes, the enlargement, and the recognition of the ECHR have been arranged in the different Treaties. The reason for the European Integration initially was to secure safety and ruling out the chance of a new war in Europe, however this was soon followed by the idea that Europe needed Economic Integration which can be seen as the main impulse for the European Integration (Weiler, 1999, pp. 3-5; Pisuisse and Teubner, 2002, pp. 12-14). Since the ECSC thus can be regarded as the Predecessor of the European Community, the countries which established the ECSC are to be the ‘predecessor countries’ of the EU. To do research on those countries would be a good way to see what, at least for the ‘old’ member states, 9/11 had as a result. Of course also Luxembourg is one of these countries which established the ECSC, however I will not examine the political situation of this country since this does not seem necessary and useful for this thesis because of the small size, small number of citizens and small budget of the country and the fact that it’s economy and market is too much integrated into the Benelux and the European Union.

## 2. Theoretical chapter

In this part the different theories and approaches will be discussed in order to make analyses further on in this thesis. First the mapping of the political parties will be discussed and after that theories on extreme right winged populist parties and their possible influence will be discussed.

### *2.1 Mapping the political parties*

In order to discuss whether governments have become more right-winged since 9/11, we first have to know which parties can be called right-winged and on what basis.

There are different methods to make distinctions between the political parties. Therefore I will discuss three methods below in order to get a clear view on what method can be best used for this thesis, and whether a combination can be made of these three methods.

I will start with discussing the party families' method and discuss which approach can be best used for this thesis. Second I will discuss the cleavage theory. Thirdly in this part I will discuss the Left-Right scaling.

#### *Party Families*

In this part the Party Families theories will be discussed and, mainly based on Mair and Mudde (1998), the most suitable party families' theory for this thesis will be further discussed in order to understand the theory in general.

Much has been written about parties and party families since the 1980s.

In 1980 Seiler constructed a typology termed the ‘famille politique’ being the first party families’ typology. In 1985 Beyme’s ‘Politische Parteien in Westeuropa’ was translated which was most important for its classification based on the criteria of ideology. After this it seems that family groupings are often treated as self-evident categories in order to compare parties in time or across space.

Mair and Mudde (1998) deal with the party family study and give four different approaches for the concept of the party family found in the

literature: party families based on the origin, the membership of/belonging to international federations or other transnational groupings, party families based on party policy or party ideology, and party families based on the party name or label (Mair and Mudde, 1998, p. 215).

Before deciding which approach would be best to use for this thesis, I will first discuss the generic problems of the party family classification given by Mair and Mudde (1998) and their suggestions. First, they state that it is difficult to decide how many party families should exist. For example some authors, like Smith (1988), make distinctions between the Liberal party family, while others add new party families like the Greens or the Extreme right winged party family (see further in this thesis about the extreme right winged populist party family). This non fixed number of party families makes it difficult to compare different parties from different countries in case more or less party families are defined in the different countries. Therefore its necessary to use either a fixed number of party families in which all the parties from the different countries can be placed, or to use the party families approach of the country with the fewest party families. This means that for the other countries the parties which are being placed outside one of those party families should be situated within one of those. Mair and Mudde (1998) suggest that parties are to be identified on the basis of their shared origins, their shared genetic identity leading to separate party families.

The second problem they give is the distinguishing of the borders of the party families. For example the border between the conservatives and the right winged populists and the border between the communists and the socialists.

This relates with the first problem, namely that for this thesis it can be the case that in the different countries similar parties can be placed in different families. This problem should be solved by putting similar parties in the same party family. Mair and Mudde (1998) suggest that parties should be characterized on the basis of their ideological profile, so what they are, instead of what they do. This way parties can be placed better in party families cross-national and cross-time.

The third and last generic problem given by Mair and Mudde (1998) is the instability and flux, meaning that by measuring the membership of or belonging to a party does not necessarily give a correct view of the existence

and or size of a party family in a specific country. It could for example be that a conservative party moved from a conservative federation to a Christian federation making it look like the conservative party family has lost its member party and size, while in fact the party still exist only grouped in a different federation. For this thesis, awareness of this possible moving from different party families should be there because this instability can give false outputs for analyzing the influence of right winged parties in governments. On the other hand however, the movement and instability of parties might also indicate the influence of right winged parties, this because it could be that due to their actions and policies other parties have moved towards other policies and/or federations as a reaction.

Mair and Mudde (1998) state that in order to give the best party family structure, both the genetic and the ideological approach should be used but regarding the diachronic analysis, in which the fortunes of party families over time are being traced, the genetic approach is most effectively.

Since in this thesis the strength and influence of the right winged parties are being measured in different countries over time, and not the explanation of differences between different countries is examined, the genetic approach would fit best. The genetic approach which make it possible to identify parties on their shared origins, their shared genetic identity and based on that distinguish different party families makes it possible to group the different parties in the different countries discussed in this thesis in a number of fixed and cross national party families. And although Mair and Mudde (1998, pp.221-225) suggest adding the ideological approach to this, for this thesis this does not seems to be necessary.

So after concluding that the genetic approach of party families fits best for this thesis, a closer look at the actual approach should be given and a way to use this approach should be analyzed.

The genetic approach dates back to the classic study of Rokkan on which Seiler based eight political families in which individual parties could be placed based on looking at their origins and the character of its contemporary electorate and the nature of its affiliated interest associations: ‘bourgeois parties, workers’ parties, centralist parties, populist parties, Christian democrats, anticlerical parties, agrarian parties and communist parties.

One of the main critiques on this approach, that it was developed primarily for Western Europe, does not affect the usefulness of this approach for this thesis since only Western European countries are being discussed. The other critique is that time renders the approach increasingly inadequate, making it an approach that according to Mudde and Mair (1998, pp. 215-216) risks neglecting more than it can offer. A third critique can be that this approach is based on eight political families which themselves can be regarded as old fashioned and no longer representative for the existing parties to be placed in those families.

After discussing the party families' theory of the different types and critiques of Mair and Mudde (1998), it can be concluded that the genetic approach would fit best for the purpose of this thesis even though critique can be given on this approach as well. However the classification given is sufficient to use for this thesis.

### *Cleavage theory*

In this part the cleavage theory, outlined among others by Lane and Ersson (1999), will be discussed in order to understand this theory in general and to be able to decide whether this theory is useful for the purpose of this thesis.

Lane and Ersson (1999) map the different parties in different European countries into structural parties and non structural parties.

Based also on Rokkan (same as for the Party families approaches) they map the political parties based on cleavages instead of party families. Cleavages are divisions of individuals among which conflict may arise. Divisions of individuals, groups or organizations can constitute cleavages if there is some probability of conflict. Political parties may organize themselves on the basis of identification of cleavages. The identification of the cleavages to be studied depends upon theory or theoretical assumptions, (Lane and Ersson, 1999, pp. 41-73) same as for party families. Lane and Ersson (1999) define three different types of cleavages: Religion, ethnicity and class. Based on these cleavages they map the different political parties into party groups.

The structural party groups are: Religious parties, ethnic parties, agrarian parties, socialist parties and communist parties. The non structural parties are: Left-socialist parties, liberal parties, conservative parties, discontent parties, green parties and the ultra-right parties. The parties are placed in the groups based on the cleavages but clearly, especially the non structural groups, are based on not only the genetic similarities, but also based on the ideology, membership of a federation and the party name or label (Lane and Ersson, 1999, pp. 79-88).

They thus use the cleavages as their starting point, however using the four approaches, which are also used for party family theory, to decide the position of a party regarding the cleavages. The advantage is that it can be used for both diachronic as synchronic analyzes and that all aspects seem to be included in order to categorize the different parties in the different countries into a specific number of groups.

The disadvantage is first the number of groups. Although the structural groups might be reasonably fixed, the non structural groups might be instable and change over time. This is a problem given by Mair and Mudde (1998) as the main critique for all the party family approaches as well.

The second disadvantage is that the parties can easily move from one group to another, a problem also given by Mair and Mudde (1998).

Third, again the same critique as Mair and Mudde (1998) give, the situation when parties move from one federation to another and end one membership to start the membership of another international movement.

Finally, the grouping of parties through labeling might seem obvious, however one should handle with the greatest care in this case, since names and labels do not always imply the same group. For example the Dutch word ‘Democraten’ used by i.e. D66 (Democraten ’66) and the former CD (Centrum Democraten) while these parties cannot be compared in any way.

However combining all these approaches, and then ‘fitting what’s best’, as Lane and Ersson (1999) do, seems to be an acceptable way to group different parties in a select number of structural and non structural groups. And even though the number of groups can increase or decline over time, this method seems to give a good overview for political parties cross national at a certain

time. And even in a certain (short) time period, as long as the parties are not being replaced into different groups occasionally, this method seems to be rather effective.

After discussing the party families' theories and the cleavage theory, in the next part the Left-Right scale will be discussed and outlined in order to make an overall conclusion on which method to use for this thesis.

### *Left-Right Political Scale*

In this part the Left-Right political scaling will be discussed and outlined in order to get a clear view on this scaling and to determine whether this can be used for the purpose of this thesis.

The scaling of political parties is mainly done by distinguishing the Left from the rest. However when wanting to assess shifts between ideologically defined blocks or tendencies, it becomes necessary to locate parties next to each other. But since empirical foundation for valid cross-national scales, (a cross-national scale is necessary for this thesis) rarely exists, the Left-Right scales have been created on ad hoc basis (Castles and Mair, 1984, p. 73). Lane and Ersson (1999) underline this by saying that it's due to the fact that the politics of Western Europe has become less and less one-dimensional and the Left-Right model is too crude to capture all the nuances of the party's ideologies and practices (Lane and Ersson, 1999, p. 88). However, according to Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994) analyses in publications of the Manifestoes Research Group have found a strong cross-national consistent tendency for the party programs to array along a left-right dimension (Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, 1994, p. 38). Budge, Robertson and Hearl (1987) also contribute to this in their research done in nineteen democracies by saying that the principal conclusion is the emergence of a central and clearly Left-Right dimension being the first factor in determining the difference between political parties in a country (Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987, p. 392-397).

Castles and Mair (1984) give rise to three main strategies for the creation of party location scales:

1. To rely on a reading of country experts.
2. To combine a reading of country experts with ad hoc decision rules which specific party location.
3. To use mass survey techniques to devise scales measuring the perception of national respondents ‘as to the ideological positioning of parties on one or more countries.’

In their view the alternative is the creation of a party location scales based on the view of country experts, devised in such a way as to make judgments of ideological position both explicit and non-idiosyncratic across as wide of range of countries as possible (Castles and Mair, 1984, pp. 74-75). Indeed this method also seems best for the research of this thesis, since five countries are to be compared and all the political parties on those countries should be scaled in one. And although criticism is given on the Left-Right scaling, especially cross-national, I will outline the Left-Right scaling of Castles and Mair (1984) below in order to bring in possible new parties of the specific countries to make it up-to-date.

Budge, Robertson and Hearl (1987) show that in Belgium, France, Italy and The Netherlands the Left-Right Dimension is the leading dimension in political comparative analysis. They state that this is not surprising since most party conflict has been interpreted as an opposition of Left versus Right, but that now the ‘generalizability and predominance of the Left-Right cleavage has been resoundingly reconfirmed’. The fact that West Germany does not have the Left-Right dimension as a leading dimension is due to the Social Democrats’ own acceptance of the social market economy, the concentration on welfarism and the threat of the East (Germany) which leads to two dimensions reflecting some of the concerns of the Left-Right dimension (Budge Robertson and Hearl, 1987, pp. 390-392).

In the above three methods and the theories have been discussed in order to be able to map the political parties in a way which is useful for this thesis. In chapter three an analysis is made and the political parties will be placed on a scale in order to use the data for elaborate purpose.

## *2.2 The extreme right winged populist parties*

The following part of this theoretical chapter is about the extreme right winged populist parties; this in order to understand the possible influence and control of these and the ‘normal’ right winged parties on government and government decisions.

Rydgren (2005) wrote a clear article about the extreme right winged populist parties, and I will mainly use his view in order to see if this can be applied on the politics in the EU countries I discuss in the thesis after 9/11. Jakman and Volpert (1996) also wrote an interesting article about the extreme right parties and their possible influence on government parties, which I will use to see whether this is really the case after 9/11.

After the ‘golden age’ which ended after the 1970s, due to unemployment becoming a larger issue again, the extreme right began to become more popular (popular meaning that they were being represented in parliament) (Jakman and Volpert, 1996, pp. 501-502). Also because of WWII the extreme right was de-legitimized and stigmatized along with the fascist and Nazi ideologies, while after the ‘golden age’ the level of political trust decreased rapidly (Rydgren, 2005, pp. 413-414).

This lead to a new type of extreme right parties called Extreme right populist parties by Rydgren. He gives three possible ways of explaining a possible success and failure of political parties and social movements: ‘through the development of potent master frames and how they may be rendered impotent by sociopolitical changes; the presence/absence of societal strain, sometimes caused by economic hardships and relative deprivation, that may result in waves of social protest; and through the expansion or contraction of political opportunities such as the level of trust in established political institutions’. He assumes that there must be an opportunity, niches, and no existing party identification close to one hundred percent for these parties to emerge. These niches exist when the voter distribution shifts in one direction and the political parties cannot adjust to that with the same speed, because for political parties it takes longer than for voters to adjust in case they want to.

These niches also mainly evolve when there is a rapid shift in the voter distribution due to a new or earlier weak cleavage dimension. After the ‘golden age’ these niches evolved due to, as indicated above, unemployment but also due to economic, political and cultural globalization which had according to Rydgren four political effects: ‘First, they have altered the interests of certain voter groups; second, they have resulted in a situation in which some voter groups have perceived a threat to their identity; third, they have fueled increased discontent with (established) politicians and political parties because of the perceived inability of these actors to solve the anomalies of the postindustrial society (such as high unemployment rates); and, finally, they have resulted in a situation in which certain voter groups perceive that their ‘old’ frames of understanding reality have become increasingly ineffective.’ These effects lead to anti-political-establishment populism, welfare chauvinist racism, xenophobia and becoming increasingly susceptible to adopt new frames. This makes it possible for extreme right winged populist political parties to ethno nationalism, xenophobia and to foment popular discontent and political protest. Also, voters seeing the established parties as far away from the voter, all the same, and not discussing the issues voters regard as important are conditions favoring the extreme right winged populist parties. Furthermore, mass media (the commercial broadcast networks and also the internet), and finally prevalent strategies external to the parties give Extreme right winged parties opportunities (Rydgren, 2005, pp. 417-426).

It is also argued that most supporters of extreme right winged populist parties are persons who suffer from relative deprivation or are losers in the competition over scarce resources (Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2004, p.287) which can be regarded as a target group for these parties.

Rydgren states that the new master frame for the extreme right winged populist parties can emerge under the above conditions. In France the Front National has been the first party using this master frame. Extreme right winged parties in other European countries used the Front National case as their example however modified to the conditions in its own country. The master frame is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient frame (Rydgren, 2005, pp. 432-433).

Jakman and Volpert give the following reasons for significant indirect political effects by which extreme right winged parties influence the larger and government parties: ‘First, the fragmentation (the number of parties in a given party system) and polarization of party systems (the proportion of legislative seats held by extremist parties) have been identified as factors that undermine political stability, defined as government duration. Secondly, in responding to the positions adopted by parties of the extreme right, other parties move closer to those policy locations. In the process, extreme-right positions obtain a place in the mainstream political agenda, and thus accrue a degree of legitimacy.’ They also show for instance the case of Front National in France which seemed to influenced the other parties in France indirectly with its ‘hard talk’ on immigrants which resulted in that those larger parties also came with ‘right winged’ proposals regarding immigrants and the possibility to send them back to their countries of origin (Jakman and Volpert, 1996, pp. 503-504).

### 3 Analyzing the political parties

In the previous chapter the Party Families' theory, the Cleavage theory and the Left-Right scale theory have been discussed in order to be able to map the political parties of the five countries discussed in this thesis. By mapping the political parties in terms of left and right it will be possible to look at whether the governments have moved more towards the right since 9/11. Therefore parties before and after 9/11 are given a score below.

There are at least seven different Left-Right political scales (Lane and Ersson, 1999, p. 89). However the scale given by Castles and Mair (1984) will be used in this thesis as outlined above.

The Cleavage theory groups can be used to determine the average score of a party not yet given a score by Mair and Mudde (1999). Since these scores given by them do not include the newest parties in the different countries, through analyzing their position the new parties are also included in the score tables. The first critique point on using the scales of Mair and Mudde (1999) is that it could be that some parties have in recent years moved more towards the left or the right. This could mean that the scores outlined by them are not totally accurate in present time. However since these scores have been given according to their theory and by professionals I will nevertheless use these scores since such expert scores cannot be found for a more recent period and these figures are very reliable. The second critique is that the scores for the new parties are given based on the former party they derived from and/or based on the cleavage theory group the party fits in best. This leads to a situation in which two kinds of scores are given: Scores given by professionals based on the theory of Mair and Mudde, and scores given by myself based on party programs and the cleavage theory group in which the party fits best. However, I feel the following tables do give scores which can be considered valid and useful to work with in present time.

### *3.1 Belgium*

**Table 3.1**

**Political Parties in Belgium**

<i>Party Name</i>	<i>Score</i>
Communist Party	1,4
Parti Socialiste	2,5
Rassemblement Wallon	2,6
Socialistische Partij	2,9
Agalev/ECO	4,5
Front Democratique des Francophones	5,6
Christelijke Volkspartij	5,8
Parti Social Chretien	6,3
Volksunie	6,8
Parti Reformateur Liberal	7,6
Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang	7,8
Respect voor Arbeid en Democratie	9,2
Vlaams Blok	9,8
Socialistische Partij Anders	2,9
Groen	3,6
Christen Democratisch en Vlaams	5,8
Open Vlaanderen	6,3
Centre Democrate Humaniste	6,3
Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten	6,8
Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie	6,9
Movement Reformateur	7,7
Lijst Dedecker	8,3
Front National	9,6
Vlaams Belang	9,8
<i>Total Average</i>	<i>6,1</i>

(Source: see appendix tables A1 and A2)

As table 3.1 shows, in Belgium far-right winged parties are being represented in the Parliament. Especially the Front National (French speaking party) and the Vlaams Belang (Dutch speaking party) can be considered as significant far right winged parties.

The tables also show that since the 1980s many new or reformed parties have arisen, like indeed the new right winged parties, while the number of far left scaled parties has declined. Notable is the new left winged green party Groen!

The scores of all parties from both tables give an average score of 6.1 on the Left-Right scale. By looking at the different average scores between the ‘old’ parties and the ‘new’ parties the possible difference could give an indication on whether the total score of all parties has moved more towards the right. When looking at Belgium it shows that the parties given a score by Castles and Mair (1984) have an average score of 5,6 while the parties given a score by myself in this research have an average score of 6.8 on the Left-Right scale (see also Appendix). So looking only at the scores of the different parties, and not at the size or influence of the parties, it can be noted that the average score has moved more towards the right and away from the centre of the scale.

### *3.2 Germany*

In Germany, as table 3.2 shows, there seems to be a reasonable stability in the number and types of political parties. The CSU can be regarded as the most right winged party in the Bundestag, while looking at the parties on the Left-Right scale the new party L/PDS leads to an overrepresentation of left winged parties compared to the representation of the right winged parties.

Notable here is that the CDU and the CSU are sister parties which work together in national elections: The CSU only takes part in the elections in Bavaria while the CDU takes part in the elections in the other parts of Germany (Schweitzer, 1995, pp. 202-218).

The average score of all the parties gives an average score of 4.2. Taking a look at only the parties which have taken seat in the latest Bundestag we can see that compared to the average scores of given a score by Castles and Mair (1984) of 4.5, the average score has remained pretty much the same. However it must be stated again that the averages are only averages of the scores of the parties not calculated on the basis of the size of the parties.

**Table 3.2**  
**Political Parties in Germany**

<i>Party Name</i>	<i>Score</i>
Kommunistische Partei	1,4
Die Grunen	2,8
Socialdemokratische Partei	3,3
Freie Demokratische Partei	5,1
Christlich Demokratische Partei	6,7
Christlich Soziale Union	7,9
Die Linkspartei/PDS	1,9
Total Average	4,2

(Source: see appendix tables A4 and A5)

### 3.3 France

In France it can be seen that since the 1980's also a lot of parties have been reformed leading to new parties in the Assemble (see also the appendix).

In general it can be noted that these parties have moved more towards the centre, except for the new parties Les Verts and the MRC which are both considered to be rather left winged parties. The average of all the parties listed in Table 3.3 shows an average score of 5,8 on the Left Right scale. The parties given a score by Castles and Mair (1984) together have an average score of 6.0, while the parties given a score by myself for this research have an average score of 5.2 (see also the appendix).

**Table 3.3**  
**Political Parties in France**

<i>Party Name</i>	<i>Score</i>
Parti Communiste	1,4
Parti Socialiste	2,6
Ecologiste	3,5
Radicaux de Gauche	3,8
Union pour la Democratique Francaise	6,6
Rassemblement pour la Republique	8,2
Centre National des Independants et Paysans	8,6
Front National	9,8
Parti des Forces Nouvelles	9,8
Mouvement des citoyens	2,2
Mouvement Republican et Citoyen	2,2
Les Verts	3,6
Parti Radicale de Gauche	3,8
Mouvement Reformateur	3,8
Parti Radicale	4,8
Mouvement Democrate	5,6
Mouvement des Reformateur	5,7
Nouveau Centre	6,4
Centre democratie et progres	6,6
Centre des democrates sociaux	6,6
Union pour un Movement Populaire	7,0
Mouvement pour la France	8,1
L'Union des democrates pour la Republique	8,2
DL	8,2
Republicans-Independants	8,6
<i>Total Average</i>	5,8

(Source: see appendix tables A9 and A10)

Looking at these averages scores, which are only based on the scores of the parties in France and not on the size of the parties, it can be noted that the France political average score has moved more towards the centre of the scale.

### *3.4 Italy*

Italy is a country in which new parties are being started and old ones quit on regular basis. Table 7.13 shows the parties of the 1980s, of which only the PS still currently exists, although now called the new PS. Some new parties, of table 7.14, derived from (parts) of older parties but half of them are completely new compared to the parties of table 7.13.

Italy having a rather left political history with only the Movimento Sociale as a far right winged party currently shows three more right winged parties in the Parliament, namely the FI, AN and the UDC although none of these parties are regarded as far right winged according to the research done by myself based on the cleavage groups, the scores of older parties given by Castles and Mair (1984) and several studies showing that the AN is to be less extreme than its predecessor the MS which was considered as the strongest Neo-fascist party in the world for years (Lubbers, 2001, pp17-19). This while on the far left side of the scale the new parties DS, PdCI and PRC are placed. The average scale of all the parties of both table 3.4 shows an average score of 4,1 on the Left-Right scale.

Comparing the average score of the parties given a score by Castles and Mair (1984) with the new made table we can see that the old list gives an average score of 3,9 and the new list gives an average score of 4,6 (only considering the new parties) on the Left-Right scale. This shows that on the political map Italy remains a left winged country looking only at the average of the total number of parties, but this average has moved more towards the centre.

This of course does not imply that looking at the averages it can be said that a country is left or right overall, it just gives an average score of the parties in that country and thus the total average score of the country based on the political parties, not looking at the size of the different parties.

**Table 3.4****Political Parties in Italy**

<i>Party Name</i>	<i>Score</i>
Democrazia Proletaria	0,5
Partito di Unita Proletaria	0,6
Partito Comunista	1,6
Partito Radicale	2,3
Partito Socialista	3,1
Partito Repubblicano	4,8
Partito Socialdemocratico	5,4
Democrazia Cristiana	5,4
Partito Liberale	5,9
Movimento Sociale	9,1
Partiti della Rifondazione Communista	1,4
Partitit dei Comunisti Italiani	1,4
Socialisti Democratici Italiani	2,5
Sinistra Democratica	2,5
Democratici di Sinistra	2,5
Partito Democratico della Sinistra	2,5
Federazione dei Verdi	3,6
Partico Democratico	3,8
La Margherita	4,5
Sudtiroler Volkspartei	5,0
Union Valdotaine	5,0
Lega Nord	5,5
Unione dei Democratici Christiani e di Centro	6,5
Centro Cristiano Democratico	6,5
Forza Italia	6,7
Alleanza Nazionale	7,8
<i>Total Average</i>	4,1

(Source: see appendix tables A13 and A14)

### *3.5 The Netherlands*

In The Netherlands we can see that several parties have joined in new parties and with that moving more towards the centre. The total new parties however can be considered as far left and far right parties. The total average score of the parties listed in 3.5 gives a rather centric average score of 5,1. Comparing the average score of the parties given a score on the Left-Right scale by myself for this research with the average score of the parties given a score by Castles and Mair (1984) we can see that the average score of the newer parties is 6,7 (considering only the new parties) while the average score of the parties given a score by Castles and Mair (1984) is 5,1 (see also the appendix).

Of course many of the parties from the table given by Castles and Mair (1984) are still active in present, this comparison does however show that the average score of the parties which were not in the table of 1984 is somewhat higher and moving more towards the right on the Left-Right scale.

**Table 3.5**

**Political Parties in The Netherlands**

<i>Party Name</i>	<i>Score</i>
Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij	0,6
Communistische Partij	0,8
Politieke Partij Radicalen	1,6
Partij van de Arbeid	2,6
Democraten '66	4,4
Christen-Democratisch Appel	5,7
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democatie	7,4
Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond	9,0
Reformatorische Politieke Federatie	9,2
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij	9,2
Socialistische Partij	1,4
Groen Links	2,3
Democratisch Socialisten '70	3,0
Christen Unie	7,8
Lijst Pim Fortuyn	8,3
Partij voor de Vrijheid	8,5
<i>Total Average</i>	5,1

(Source: see appendix tables A16 and A17)

It should be noted that of course when comparing the tables of 1984 with the ‘self-made’ tables of this research, all the parties which were active in this period after 1984 but no longer existed after 9/11 are not taken into this comparison. This could lead to a wrong view and interpretation of the scores and the average scores. However since these tables are mainly made in order to see whether right-winged parties have been part of the Governments in the last decades this does not necessarily have to be a problem. All parties which have been in the Government have been given a score in the tables. For the comparisons between the parties given in the tables by Castles and Mair (1984) and the current parties, the parties which have been in the Government before 9/11 are not taken into account since this would obviously give a false view when comparing the total average of parties in both tables per country.

In the above the different political parties in the five countries discussed in this thesis have been placed in a Left-Right scaling according to Castles & Mair and Lane & Ersson. This has been done after discussing the different theories on mapping political parties both cross-national as cross-time.

It can be noted that there are some differences between the five countries discussed regarding the number of parties, the flux in the number of parties and the place the parties are placed on the Left-Right scale. Italy is a country with a huge fluctuation of parties while Germany has a rather stable (small) number of political parties on national level. In both France and Italy it can be seen that the average score of all the parties on the Left-Right scale has moved more towards the centre, in Italy moving from the left to the right and in France the other way round. In both Belgium and The Netherlands it can be seen that the average score has moved more towards the right of the Left-Right scale. Furthermore, in Belgium, France, Italy and The Netherlands there have been quite a few shifts in the number of parties, both through merges as through the start-up of new parties. Germany seems to be the ‘odd one out’ in this list, since the number of political parties acting on national level as well as the average score of all political parties on the Left-Right scale over time has remained stable and almost completely fixed.

By mapping the political parties on this left-right scale, also using the cleavage theory, a rather stable and fixed scaling of the political parties has

been established. This because by using this scaling as outlined above, all political parties in all five countries have been mapped in a similar way leading to a scaling of these parties which can be used for the purpose of this research, namely to compare the governments over time in the different countries and to check whether governments have become more right winged since 9/11.

As explained in the appendix, for the new tables I had to give the scores myself. I have done this first by investigating which ideology and/or subjects are important for the different parties and by that in which cleavage group given by Lane and Ersson (1999) they thus can be placed. Second I did research on either from which party the new party derived from, or of which party with already a score given the party was the predecessor.

In the next part I will therefore outline the different governments in the five countries since the 1970s until the latest elections. I will investigate whether right scaled/winged parties have taken seat in government and what type of governments existed in the last thirty to thirty-five years. I can do this now by using the scores given to each political party in this part.

#### 4 The Governments of the ECSC countries since the 1970s

Now the political parties on national level for the ECSC-countries have been mapped in the Left-Right scaling in the previous chapter, a closer look at the governments of these countries can be taken.

In this part I shall outline the governments and their score on the Left-Right scale and analyze the types of governments since then and the possible more right winged governments since 9/11. Whether the government is to be regarded as left, centre or right can be found in the appendix. But how is the score on the Left-Right scale given to the governments? For this I will use the data available on how many government posts each party in government has, meaning that I will count for each government party the posts in that government. Since each party has been given a score in the previous part I can combine the number of posts with the score and by that get a total score of the party in the government.

By doing this for each party in government and then divide that total score with the total number of posts held by political parties in that government an average score for the government is given. For example party A has a score of two and holds four posts, party B has a score of five and holds seven posts and party C has a score of eight and holds ten posts. The score for this government is then  $(2 \times 4 + 5 \times 7 + 8 \times 10) / 21 = 5.9$ . This government is then also regarded as a centre government. Since zero (0) is most left and ten (10) is most right, five (5) is centre. In the following part I will call governments left when the score given is three (3) or lower. I will call governments right when the score given is seven (7) or higher. Between three and four I will call centre-left, between six and seven centre-right. Consequently governments having a score between four and six are regarded as centre governments.

In the appendix for all governments the type, parties in the government and the posts held by each party in government are given.

#### *4.1 Belgium*

The current Belgium party system shows an extreme case of centrifugal multipartism. The main reason for this is the linguistic polarization between the Flemish and the Walloon part of Belgium which has lead to a party system in which the traditional parties have split along both poles (Broughton and Donovan, 1999, pp. 183-206).


**Table 4.1**

**Belgian  
Governments**

<i>Starting year</i>	<i>Name of Prime Minister</i>	<i>Score on Left-Right scale</i>	<i>Right winged party in Government</i>
1972	Eyskens-Cools	4,4	No
1973	Leburton-Tindemans-Declercq	5,2	Yes
1974	Tindemans	6,6	Yes
1977	Tindemans	4,7	No
1978	Van den Boeynants	4,7	No
1979	Martens	4,5	No
1980	Martens	4,4	No
1980	Martens	5,4	Yes
1981	Eyskens	4,5	No
1981	Martens	6,8	Yes
1985	Martens	6,7	Yes
1987	Martens	6,7	Yes
1988	Martens	4,4	No
1992	Dehaene	4,1	No
1995	Dehaene	4,2	No
1999	Verhofstadt	4,4	Yes
2003	Verhofstadt	4,9	Yes

When a closer look at the election result in Belgium is given, see also appendix, it can be noted that since the 1970s the Christian Democrats have always been in the government until 1999 either with the Liberals or with the Socialists (the centre-left, centre-right and centre-mixed governments). This pattern seems to be broken by the elections of 1999 which led to a government without the Christian Democrats, namely the Government of Verhofstadt including the Liberals, the Socialists and the Greens.

**Figure 4.1**



The first national election after 9/11 resulted into a continuance of the pattern braking trend in that the second Government of Verhofstadt resulted from the elections. However there is no sign of a more right winged government type since 9/11 and the governments score remains a centre score.

The latest elections of 2007 upon now did not result into a new government; the coalition forming is still underway.

## 4.2 Germany

**Table 4.2**

**German  
Governments**

Starting year	Name of Prime Minister	Score on Left-Right scale	Right winged party in Government
1972	Brandt-Schmidt	3,8	No
1976	Schmidt	3,8	No
1980	Schmidt-Kohl	3,7	No
1983	Kohl	6,7	Yes
1987	Kohl	6,7	Yes
1990	Kohl	6,6	Yes
1994	Kohl	6,6	Yes
1998	Schröder	3,2	No
2002	Schröder	3,1	No
2005	Merkel	5,3	Yes

Since the 1970s we can see a rather stable pattern of government types. Already before 9/11 we can see the decline of the FDP which has been in all governments since the 1970s till 1998. In the following governments there seemed to be no more room for the FDP and instead the left winged party Die Grünen has been in those governments till 2006. The latest election resulted into a new government with the CDU as the major party and delivering the Bundes Chancellor Angela Merkel. So on national level there have not been more right winged governments since 9/11 in Germany. When looking at the scores, it can be noted that Germany in the past either had a centre-left or a centre-right government until the latest government of Merkel with a centre score of 5.3.

**Figure 4.2**



#### 4.3 France

Having one of the oldest and most sophisticated party systems in the world, the French party system remains polarized between the Left and the Right (Broughton and Donovan, 1999, pp. 48-67)

**Table 4.3**

**French  
Presidents**

<i>Starting year</i>	<i>Name of President</i>	<i>Right Winged President</i>
1974	Giscard d'Estaing	Yes
1981	Mitterrand	No
1988	Mitterrand	No
1995	Chirac	Yes
2002	Chirac	Yes
2007	Sarkozy	Yes


**Table 4.4**

**French Governments**

<i>Starting year</i>	<i>Name of Prime Minister</i>	<i>Score on Left-Right scale</i>	<i>Right winged Government</i>	<i>party</i>	<i>in</i>
1972	Messmer	8,1	Yes		
1973	Messmer	8,1	Yes		
1974	Messmer	8,2	Yes		
1974	Chirac	7,2	Yes		
1976	Barre	7,6	Yes		
1977	Barre	8,0	Yes		
1978	Barre	7,1	Yes		
1981	Mauroy	2,8	No		
1981	Mauroy	2,6	No		
1983	Mauroy	2,5	No		
1984	Fabius	2,7	No		
1986	Chirac	7,5	Yes		
1988	Rocard	3,1	No		
1988	Rocard	3,4	No		
1991	Cresson	2,8	No		
1992	Bérégovoy	2,8	No		
1993	Balladur	7,4	Yes		
1995	Juppe	7,5	Yes		
1995	Juppe	7,5	Yes		
1997	Jospin	2,7	No		
2002	Raffarin	7,8	Yes		
2002	Raffarin	7,0	Yes		
2005	De Villepin	7,0	Yes		
2007	Fillon	6,7	Yes		
2007	Fillon	6,5	Yes		

In France, when we take a look at the Presidential elections, we can see that the (extreme) right winged candidate Le Pen made it to the second round in the elections of 2002. This has been the first time since the 1970s that such an extreme candidate made it to the second round of the presidential elections, although he was beaten with enormous numbers in this second round. The latest presidential elections have been won by the right winged candidate Sarkozy. In these elections Le Pen did not make it to the second round, but the new right winged presidential win of Sarkozy shows that in France there seems to be a shift towards the right regarding the president which composes the government. Since 9/11 it can thus be noted that not only an extreme right winged candidate made it to the second round in 2002, in the latest elections a new right winged president won. A closer look is given at the Presidents of France since he appoints the government and its ministers. When looking at the French governments it can be noted that until 1981 the French governments were always having a right score of 7.1 or higher. Till 1993, except for the Chirac government, the governments have been left or centre left with scores between 2.5 and 3.4. From 1993 to 2005, except for the Jospin government, all governments have a score on the Left-Right scale of 7 or higher. Since Sarkozy is the new president of France, being a member of the right winged party UMP, the governments are considered as centre-right.

**Figure 4.3**



#### 4.4 Italy

Since the 1990s the party system in Italy has undergone a rapid change in that new parties have arisen and traditional parties disappeared. The reason for this is the political corruption and the following electoral system reform.

Currently the party system remains a multi-party system which leads to governmental instability and short-term governments (Broughton and Donovan, 1999, pp. 75-92)

**Table 4.5**

**Italian  
Governments**


<i>Starting year</i>	<i>Name of Prime Minister</i>	<i>Score on Left-Right scale</i>	<i>Right winged party in Government</i>
1972	Andreotti	5,5	No
1973	Rumor	4,8	No
1974	Rumor	4,8	No
1974	Moro	5,2	No
1976	Moro	5,4	No
1976	Andreotti	5,4	No
1978	Andreotti	5,4	No
1979	Andreotti	5,3	No
1979	Cossiga	5,5	No
1980	Cossiga	4,7	No
1980	Forlani	4,8	No
1981	Spadolini	5,0	No
1982	Spadolini	5,0	No
1982	Fanfani	5,0	No
1983	Craxi	5,0	No
1986	Craxi	5,0	No
1987	Fanfani	5,4	No
1987	Goria	5,0	No
1988	De Mita	5,0	No
1989	Andreotti	5,0	No
1991	Andreotti	5,0	No
1992	Amato	5,0	No
1993	Ciampi	5,0	No
1994	Berlusconi	6,8	Yes
1995	Dini	5,0	No
1996	Prodi	3,8	No
1998	D'Alema	3,5	No
1999	D'Alema	2,7	No
2000	Amato	3,4	No
2001	Berlusconi	7,0	Yes
2006	Prodi	3,5	No

In Italy we can see that already before 9/11 a rather right winged government was established. The second Government of Berlusconi is one of the few governments in Italy who has lasted for longer than two years, but again already a new government has been appointed.

Due to the different coalition formations and the different parties with their own distinct interests there is no pattern to be seen in the types of Governments in Italy except for the fact that till 1993 all governments have a score between 4.7 and 5.5. In 1993 the electoral system was changed from a proportional system to a more plural system in which individual party members could not get directly chosen for the parliament through preference votes (Furlong, 1994, pp. 8-24)

But due to rapid changes and short lasting governments the situation in Italy does not show any pattern in that specific types of governments can be seen, nor does it show any trend breaking or more right-winged governments since 9/11. It can be noted that only since the last ten years governments in Italy are no longer centre governments but instead left (or centre-left) or right (or centre-right) which shows that at least the trend of having centre governments is broken.

**Figure 4.4**



#### 4.5 The Netherlands


**Table 4.6**

**Dutch  
Governments**

<i>Starting year</i>	<i>Name of Prime Minister</i>	<i>Score on Left-Right scale</i>	<i>Right winged party in Government</i>
1971	Biesheuvel	5,6	Yes
1973	Den Uyl	4,1	No
1977	Van Agt	6,3	Yes
1981	Van Agt	4,2	No
1982	Van Agt	5,2	No
1982	Lubbers	6,6	Yes
1986	Lubbers	6,3	Yes
1989	Lubbers	4,2	No
1994	Kok	4,8	Yes
1998	Kok	4,8	Yes
2002	Balkenende	7,0	Yes
2003	Balkenende	6,2	Yes
2006	Balkenende	6,5	Yes
2007	Balkenende	4,6	Yes

In the Netherlands we can see that on 22.07.2002 the Government Balkenende, which lasted only till 25-05-2003, included the new Right winged political party LPF. This being the first new government after 9/11 it shows a rather right winged government with thus the LPF, but also the Right winged liberal party VVD and the right centrist party CDA. Although the CDA and the VVD had been in several governments before, now with the LPF also being a right winged government party this first Balkenende government is the also first mainly right winged government. Notable is however that this government only lasted a couple of months, and disputes especially in the LPF fraction led to a new less right winged government only ten months later. The above does show that the first government after 9/11 in the Netherlands has been a far more right-winged government than before with the LPF having 26 seats in Parliament being the second largest party and putting a mark on this government.

**Figure 4.5**



The latest elections of November 2006 show that there doesn't seem to be a new trend in that the right winged parties remain in government. The new government currently remains rather left-centrist with the CDA and the PvdA although the CU with a score of 7.8 is a right winged party in the new government. But the size of the party and the number of posts in the new government is small, and the score of 4.6 shows that this government can be considered as a centre government instead of a right or centre-right government which the other governments were since 9/11.

So we could say that after 9/11 in the Netherlands the first government has been a right winged government, however this break in the overall pattern since the 1970s does seem to decline already. The reason for the first Balkenende government does not really seem to be 9/11 but rather the rise of Pim Fortuyn and his ideas on current politics and immigration (something that might have been further empowered by 9/11 though).

The reason that the CU now takes seat in the Government can be a religious one, namely the cooperation between the CDA and the CU. Also the fact that the PvdA and the CDA did not have majority in the Second Chamber together can be seen as a reason that the CU joined the coalition because the adding of this smaller party to that coalition leads to a majority and thus a more stable Government.

When looking at the government scores over time in The Netherlands it can be noted that all governments except for the first Balkenende government have been centre, centre-left or centre-right.

#### *4.6 Conclusion*

This chapter shows all the governments in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands; the type of government; and whether a right winged political party has taken seat in the different governments. The results show that only in France there seems to be a sign of a shift towards right-winged governments, based also on the type of President. Since 9/11 all governments in The Netherlands also included a right winged party. However, when looking at the size of the parties in government the influence seems to decline after the first elections since 9/11, making it hard to state that indeed since 9/11 Dutch governments really have moved more towards the right looking at the parties in the government.


When we take a look at the mean before and after 9/11, shown in table 4.7, we can see that only in France and The Netherlands since 9/11 the mean is higher (thus more towards the right) than before 9/11. However in The Netherlands this mean is 6.1 meaning not a right winged Government mean, but a centre-right. In France with a mean of 7 since 9/11 we can see a right winged trend which contributes to the analysis given above in which it is stated that there seems to be a sign of a shift more towards the right on the Left-Right scale. Finally when we take a look at the total mean for all countries we can see that both before and since 9/11 the average mean is a centre score, but this score is moving more towards the right since 9/11 which might indicate that for the whole ECSC the governments are moving more towards the right on the Left-Right scale since 9/11 based on the total number of elections in the ECSC out of which governments were formed.

The first governments after 9/11, except for Germany, all include a right winged party but there does not seem to be enough evidence to show that this is a trend braking pattern or even a new trend. In fact looking at the different types of governments since the 1970s, the governments since 9/11 do not seem to differ relatively from the governments before 9/11 in that (new) right winged parties have taken control of the government since then.

**Table 4.7****Government Scores Mean**

	Period	Score	Higher since 9/11
Belgium	before 9/11	5,1	
	since 9/11	4,9	No
France	before 9/11	5,5	
	since 9/11	7,0	Yes
Germany	before 9/11	5,1	
	since 9/11	4,2	No
Italy	before 9/11	5,0	
	since 9/11	3,5	No
The Netherlands	before 9/11	5,2	
	since 9/11	6,1	Yes
<b>Total</b>	before 9/11	5,2	
	since 9/11	5,9	Yes

From this chapter it can be concluded that governments in the five countries discussed individually in this thesis did not move more towards the right since 9/11, based on the parties and its scores present in the governments. Although The Netherlands and France have a higher mean since 9/11, only in France there seems to be a real sign of a shift towards the right. And although the total mean since 9/11 is higher for the ECSC, this does not show that the governments indeed have become more right winged. It does show that since 9/11 there seems to be a sign more towards the right, however the mean also still shows that the governments in the ECSC are to be considered as centre governments.

**Figure4.6**

When we take a look at the overall trend of these five countries in the last thirty-five years, as shown in figure 4.6, it can be seen that the underline, meaning the lowest/most left-score on the left-right scale is higher since 9/11 compared to the period 1984 until 2001. In fact it seems that since 9/11 upon now the differences between the most left and most right governments has declined. It could be argued that since 2001 governments seem to be more stable and less extreme regarding their score compared to the previous period.

## 5 The influence of (extreme) right winged parties on the current government

After we have seen that there is no significant trend braking regarding the government formation in the different EU countries discussed in this thesis, the idea rises that perhaps right winged parties influence the governments' policy and view. This because although right wing parties did not become more represented in governments it could be that still their issues and ideologies has become more important. More important in a way that those parties got more votes and thus larger representation in parliament, and more important in that governments have moved more towards the right.

Therefore the theories on the current extreme right winged parties have been discussed in the theoretical chapter which shows the conditions and reasons for the upcoming extreme right winged parties in Europe since the 1970s. In order to see whether this also applies for the EU countries discussed in this thesis I will take a look at the voting results since then. Also I will take a look at whether after 9/11 these parties got more votes and were larger represented in parliaments and whether new extreme right winged populist parties emerged. After that I will discuss the possible influence of (extreme) right winged parties on government and government parties and the possible influence after 9/11.

In order to analyze whether these extreme right winged populist parties have gotten a larger role in parliament, first we have to define the extreme right winged populist parties which shall be done based on the left-right scale. These new parties are not only extreme right, but also based on populism and cultural clashes. Therefore in this thesis, all the parties which are not based on pure conservative and religious ideas, like the Dutch SGP and the CU, but having a score on the Left-Right scale of a populist party, which is given a score of 8.3 on the Left-Right scale, meaning 8.3 or higher are to be considered as extreme right winged populist parties. This because, as can be read in the theories part, extreme right winged populist parties are parties which are at least populist parties and furthermore edged on the right of the Left-Right scale.

In the table 3.1 the extreme right winged populist parties in the five countries discussed in this thesis are being outlined. As the table shows, there are in total six parties to be considered as extreme right winged populist parties since 9/11 with Belgium having three of these parties.

In Germany and Italy no extreme right winged populist parties taking seat in national parliament after 9/11 can be defined, see the parties' lists earlier in this thesis. Although, as earlier mentioned, there remains discussion over the Italian political party AN, and also the Lega Nord, which is by some considered as an extreme party while others consider it as a centre party or a protest party (Lubbers, 2001, p.18), In this thesis I found enough information for concluding that those two parties are not extreme right winged populist parties. One also has to keep in mind that the predecessor of the AN, the MS was not considered as an extreme right winged populist party but simply as an extreme right winged party. The reason for this is that this party was not liberal or populist in the way the current extreme right winged populist parties are.

In Germany there are several extreme right winged parties like the Deutsche Volksunion, the NDP and the Republikaner. All three parties had regional successes in Germany but they never managed to reach the 5% threshold at the national elections. Furthermore it is again doubted whether these parties can be considered as extreme right winged populist parties since they do not seem liberal nor populist (Lubbers, 2001, pp. 11-13)

**Table 5.1**

Extreme right winged populist parties in Parliament since 9/11 of the ECSC countries

Country	Party name	Score
Belgium	Lijst Dedecker	8,3
	Vlaams Belang	9,8
	Front National	9,6
France	Front National	9,8
The Netherlands	Lijst Pim Fortuyn	8,3
	Partij Voor de Vrijheid	8,5

(Source: party scores, see appendix for full scores)

So what can be concluded from table 3.1? First of all, it can be concluded that in three of the five countries extreme right winged populist parties are active

in Parliament. Second, it can be noted that in Belgium there are even a couple of extreme right winged populist parties in Parliament which can partly be explained by the language division leading to the Front National (which aims at keeping Belgium united and like its French counterpart also is characterized by aiming for traditionalism, lower taxes, market oriented, and connecting the unemployment to immigrants) representing the French speaking extreme right winged populist and the Vlaams Belang (which aims at an independent Vlaanderen and clearly opposes the established parties, a extreme right winged populist party characteristic) (Lubbers, 2001, pp.14-16 and pp. 25-26), and since the last elections the Lijst Dedecker, representing the Flemish or Dutch speaking extreme right winged populist part of Belgium. Third, it can be concluded that since 9/11 in these three countries extreme right winged populist parties have been active in all Parliaments chosen.

So although governments did not move more towards the right regarding the political parties in the government since 9/11, the Parliament in three out of five countries does constantly represent extreme right winged populist parties. Whether this is due to 9/11 cannot be said here, and whether this is a trend braking pattern also is a doubt. This because before 9/11 in both Belgium and France the Front National already existed, in Belgium also the Vlaams Belang already existed (first under the name Vlaams Blok).

In The Netherlands the Centrum Democraten, an extreme right winged party, took seat in Parliament for a couple of years, however this party is not regarded as extreme right winged populist but as said before as extreme right winged.

In the next part the influence of these parties will be considered in order to measure their possible impact on the government and the government parties.

### *5.1 Did right winged populist parties influence government?*

After having discussed the extreme right winged populist parties, in this part I shall discuss whether these parties influence government.

The figures in this thesis show, in the EU countries discussed here no right extreme winged populist parties were involved in cabinet formations and governments. However, as outlined in the theoretical chapter, there seem to be reason to believe that there are significant indirect political effects by which extreme right winged parties influence the larger and government parties (Jakman and Volpert, 1996, pp. 502-503).

Indeed it is shown that extreme right winged parties thus can influence larger and thus government parties. Even when looking at Germany where the extreme right winged parties, which as said never managed to get in national parliament, aim at a halt to immigration; a return of foreigners and the fear of becoming a minority in their country, the CDU; CSU; FDP and the SPD all call for immigration restrictions too (Lubbers, 2001, pp. 11-13).

In order to see whether this seems to be (more) the case after 9/11 we will have to take a look at some different things. First whether the current government parties have addressed the so called extreme right winged populist issues like immigration, asylum seekers, cultural differences, the Islam and their possible threat in their own election propaganda. Second, whether they have addressed such issues in their government plans.

For this part, especially regarding the first point mentioned above, we also need to know which issues are to be regarded as right winged issues. Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge made a composition of Left-Right scale in which they summed up the following right issues: Pro-Military, Freedom and Human Rights, Constitutionalism, Effective Authority, Free Enterprise, Economic Incentives, Anti-Protectionism, Economic Orthodoxy, Anti-Social Services, National Way of Life, Traditional Morality, Law and Order, Social Harmony (Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, 1994, p. 40).

When a closer look at the Belgian governments since 9/11 is given, it can be seen that regarding the Vlaams Belang a cordon sanitaire has been established meaning that with this party no discussion and cooperation will be made. Furthermore there doesn't seem to be an indication that since 9/11 the extreme right winged issues have become a larger issue on the Government's agenda. In fact currently the overshadowing issue in Belgium remains the problems between the Wallonian and the Flemish part of Belgium, resulting in a situation in which other policies are being moved more towards the background.

In France we can see that since the Front National several parties have become more right winged, and making right winged issues their own. In the theoretical chapter Jakman and Volpert (1996) discuss this already, and in fact the current President of France did make some extreme right winged issues, especially immigration a prior issue when being Minister under the former President according to Jakman and Volpert (1996).

In The Netherlands we can see that since 9/11 and the murder on Theo van Gogh immigration has become a major issue in politics for a while. However the governments did not make this issue an important issue on their agenda, apart from one Minister, namely Verdonk, which had to resign from related duties in the Government due to her making immigration and asylum seekers an important issue on which she wanted to act hard in a right winged manor.<sup>1</sup>

The above shows that both in Belgium, France and The Netherlands the extreme right winged populist parties and issues had indirect influence on government. Although the political agenda of the governments did not always proclaim these issues, in practice these issues were being discussed and talked about. The cordon sanitaire in Belgium shows that indeed the political parties in Government could not neglect and deny the issues of the Vlaams Belang.<sup>2</sup>

In France indeed after noticing that the Front National did get votes by their issues, the established and government parties reacted in presenting a harder line on those issues too. And in The Netherlands immigration and asylum

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<sup>1</sup> [http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rita\\_Verdonk](http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rita_Verdonk),  
<http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article378360.ece>,  
<http://www.elsevier.nl/dossier/asp/dossier/588/index.html>

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.vlaamsblok.be/standpunten\\_dossier\\_4.shtml](http://www.vlaamsblok.be/standpunten_dossier_4.shtml), <http://www.standaard.be>

seekers did become an important issue although the results were not always in line with the expectations of the extreme right winged populist parties (several media and organizations also formed files on this matter<sup>3</sup>).

Nevertheless it shows that the extreme right winged parties do bring up issues before the governments resulting in a situation in which the government had to choose a certain approach. And even neglecting those issues can be regarded as an approach, namely to try to diminish the impact of the extreme right winged parties, although this obviously doesn't mean that the Governments have moved more towards the right.

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.elsevier.nl/dossierhoofdstuk/asp/dossier/588/hoofdstuk/5/index.html>,  
<http://www.peil.nl>

## *5.2 Governments and right winged issues*

After discussing the possible influence of the extreme right winged populist parties on the government and the Government parties, now a closer look will be given to whether the governments have addressed right issues, and whether the right winged parties in government have taken the Ministerial posts belonging to those right issues. I shall do this only for the three countries also having extreme right winged populist parties in Parliament, because in these three countries positive results on the questions raised here will have give more implications than for the other two countries, Germany and Italy.

I will only look at three Ministerial posts, namely Defense, Domestic Affairs and Justice. The reason for this is that these three posts can clearly be distinguished as right winged posts in that intensifying the expenses of these posts leads to a more right winged government, although for Domestic Affairs especially the National Intelligence Services part is most important. For Defense it could be said that this post relates highly to both the right winged, since high military expenditures align with right winged attitudes (see the previous part), but also closely relates to 9/11 itself since the consequences of 9/11 are the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and United States expecting to join them in their war on terrorism.

It is very difficult to analyze the exact expenses of different Ministerial posts, but for Defense and Justice it is rather clear that in general higher expenses are investments in either expanding or improving the functioning of the national defense or justice affairs. For Domestic Affairs this is less clear, however it also gives a (less value-worth) indication. Since in the composition outlined above, pro-military is regarded as right on the Left-Right scale, and effective authority and law and order are also being regarded as such, these three posts will be looked at below.

In Belgium the Ministerial posts of the Verhofstadt Government of Defense and Justice are both being held by Ministers coming from the left winged party Parti Socialistes (with a score of 2.5 on the Left-Right scale): The department of Justice is held by Onkelinkx, and the department of Defense by Flahaut.<sup>4</sup> This party can be regarded as anti-military according to the composition of the left-right according to Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, which makes it quite interesting that members from this party became Ministers of these posts. The Minister of Domestic Affairs in Belgium for the last years has been Dewael, coming from the party Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten with a score of 6.8 on the Left-Right scale.

In France since 9/11 the Ministerial post Defense and Justice have been held by UMP party members. The UMP has a score of 7.0 on the Left-Right scale meaning that this party is a right winged party.<sup>5</sup> That members of this party are Ministers at these departments is first of all explained by the political colour of the President at that time, but thus also by the fact that these posts are regarded as right posts.

In The Netherlands the Defense post has been taken by a right winged politician since 9/11: First Korthals of the VVD (scoring 7.4 on the Left-Right scale), then Kamp of the VVD and currently Van Middelkoop of the CU (scoring 7.8 on the Left-Right scale). The department of Justice currently is being held by Hirsch Ballin of the CDA (scoring 5.7 on the Left-Right scale) and before that by Donner also of the CDA. Domestic Affairs has been controlled, since 9/11, by first Remkes of the VVD and only since this year by Ter Horst of the PvdA (scoring 2.6 on the Left-Right scale). So for Defense indeed a right winged party has had control after 9/11, for Domestic Affairs also a right winged party had control till this year and for Justice a more Centrist party did.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.belgium.be>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.france-politique.fr>

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.regering.nl/Het\\_kabinet](http://www.regering.nl/Het_kabinet)

When we take a look at the Military expenditure stats given by the Stockholm International Peace Research Centre, the average expenditure on military is 2,3% of the GDP.

Table 5.2 shows the expenditure on defense in Belgium for the last nineteen years, and shows that the expenditure on defense has remained rather stable with a growth of 4,3% since 2001, and related to the GDP even is declining with 1.1% in 2005 and 2006 (see also appendix).

**Table 5.2**

**Military expenditure in m.euros**

Year	Belgium	France	The Netherlands	Total
1988	3700	33000	6000	
1989	3800	34000	6200	
1990	3800	35000	6100	
1991	3900	37000	6100	
1992	3300	36000	6300	
1993	3200	37000	5900	
1994	3300	38000	5900	
1995	3300	36000	5800	
1996	3300	36000	6000	
1997	3300	37000	6100	
1998	3300	36000	6200	
1999	3400	37000	6600	
2000	3500	37000	6500	
2001	3400	37000	6900	
2002	3300	39000	7100	
2003	3400	41000	7400	
2004	3400	43000	7600	
2005	3400	43000	7700	
2006	3500	43000	7900	
<i>Mean before 9/11</i>	3400	36000	6200	15000
<i>Mean since 9/11</i>	3400	42000	7500	18000
<i>Significant (&gt; 5%) higher</i>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

(Source: <http://www.sipri.org>)

For France we can see that the expenditure on military has risen in amounts with 16% since 2001, a bit declining regarding the percentage of the GDP in the last nineteen years, but rather stable in the last six years with an average percentage of 2,6, which is shown in table 5.2 meaning that Defense is still an important post for the Government of France.

In The Netherlands we can see that the military expenditures in amounts also have risen significant with a growth of 14%, and that in the last six years the expenditures are about the same percentage of the GDP, namely 1,6.

It can be noted that Belgium spends far less on Defense as The Netherlands and especially France do, also after 9/11. A reason for this could be that since 9/11 in France and The Netherlands right winged persons have taken seat in this department, while in Belgium a left winged person did. However the pattern in these tables does not seem to have changed dramatically since 9/11, in fact the pattern regarding expenditures in all three countries seems rather stable, the reason for the differences in military expenditure probably has more to do with the size of the country and perhaps even the colony past of France and The Netherlands. Fact is however that since 9/11 the expenditures on military in The Netherlands and France is significantly higher than before 9/11, and the total military expenditure for these three countries with extreme right winged populist parties in parliament also is significantly higher since 9/11.

When a closer look is given at the Justice and Domestic Affairs expenditures over the last few years in Belgium, France and The Netherlands we can compare the total expenditures on these two posts over the last years and look at the parties controlling these posts and the possible influences.

In table 5.3 it can be seen that in Belgium since 2001 the expenditures on Justice have risen with 28% and the expenditures on Domestic Affairs with almost 35%. Noted should be however that in Belgium there is a different Ministerial and budgetary post for the Police enforcement. Table 5.3 furthermore shows that in France in 2001 the expenditures on Domestic Affairs have been extremely higher than the following years. In fact the expenditures seem rather fluctuating in the years after 2001. Regarding the expenditures on Justice in France we can see that these have risen with 39% Also table 5.3 shows that in The Netherlands since 2001 the expenditures on Justice have risen with 13% and the expenditures on Domestic Affairs with 25%.

**Table 5.3**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Post</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Belgium	Justice	1.100	1.100	1.200	1.300	1.400
	Domestic Affairs	300	300	400	400	500
France	Justice	3.900	4.300	5.000	5.300	5.500
	Domestic Affairs	110.000	18.000	20.000	13.000	14.000
Netherlands	Justice	4.900	5.200	5.700	5.600	5.600
	Domestic Affairs	4.500	4.800	4.900	5.100	5.600
Total	Justice	9.900	11.000	12.000	12.000	12.000
	Domestic Affairs	120.000	23.000	25.000	19.000	20.000

(Source: see appendix tables 7.3, 7.8 and 7.18)

It can be noted that in both Belgium and The Netherlands expenditures on Domestic Affairs have risen with twenty-five percent or more since 2001.

Regarding Justice it can be noted that in Belgium far more costs are made every year, while in The Netherlands this seems to go in-line with the Defense expenditures. In France the expenditures on Justice in the last five years have risen fastest of all three countries and also the fastest of all three posts in France. When looking at the total expenditures of these three countries we can see that the Justice expenditures have risen, but the Domestic Affairs expenditures are unstable, meaning that the one year they rise and the other year they decline, as can been seen in table 5.3 above.

### *5.3 Conclusion*

Although Defense, Justice and Domestic Affairs are not the only issues regarded as right issues, and of course the immigration and asylum issues strongly brought up by the extreme right winged populist parties, the above does give some indications.

By analyzing these posts the question whether Government has addressed more right winged issues and the question whether right winged parties tend to hold right issue departments in Government can be partially answered here. The figures and stats show that indeed right winged parties in France and The Netherlands have control over the Defense department and in slighter way also over Justice since 9/11. And also when looking at the expenditures on the Military it shows that in France and The Netherlands where right winged parties control this department, the expenditures are higher than in Belgium where a left winged party controls Defense. When looking at Domestic Affairs it shows that under control of a right winged party member in both Belgium and The Netherlands expenditures have raised significant. In France the fact that in 2001 the expenditures were more than six times higher than in 2002. The following years the expenditures on Domestic Affairs first remained unstable in that in 2003 they first rose, then declined and then rose just a little with 3.2%.

However the analyses above are too simple for concluding that indeed right winged parties prefer these posts, and that right winged parties always want to and actually do increase the expenditures. In the country where most extreme right winged populist parties are present in the Parliament the expenditures on military are in fact the lowest, and left winged persons hold the departments of Defense and Justice. Domestic Affairs of course seems to show the opposite in Belgium.

Therefore, from the research done in this part, it can not be said that the Governments have addressed right winged issues more than before 9/11, but it seems that right winged parties do prefer right winged posts in Governments, although this is not really the case in Belgium. A reason for this not being the case in Belgium could be that the Government is a mixed government, meaning that it exists out of both left and right winged parties.

In such a situation it could be that in order to be able to work together both wings or poles get to control departments which are not regarding their own preferred issues. In this case the parties cannot disappoint their voters, and no big clashes on those issues can be made. On the other hand, one could expect that especially in such Governments parties tend to claim their ‘own’ posts in order to control these and to make sure policies can be followed. Laver and Shepsle also state that it does matter who is head of a ministerial department since the manner in which way the power will be exercised depends on who possesses it (Laver and Shepsle, 1996, pp. 13-15).

So concluding this part it shows that the extreme right winged populist parties do influence politics and the acting of the Governments. However, this part also shows that the actual acting of the Governments on right issue posts does not seem to have increased much, and right winged parties in government not necessarily claim these right issue posts in Governments. Regarding the things discussed in this part it can thus be said that right winged parties do influence the Governments; they do not necessarily control the actual Government decisions and plans on right issues, even though expenditures on military, domestic affairs and justice have risen since 9/11.

## 6 Conclusions

The main research question of this thesis is whether the governments in the five countries discussed in this thesis have move more towards the right, i.e. whether the governments have become more right winged. Before making conclusions on this main question, first conclusions have to be drawn from the sub questions.

The first sub-question is how the different national political parties can be mapped. In the second chapter the different theories on mapping political parties have been discussed and this resulted into that the Left-Right scores given by Castles and Mair (1984) are the best scores to be used for this thesis, since these scores have been given by experts in the different countries making it possible to map the scores of the political parties of all five countries discussed in this thesis in the same way, and by that making it possible to draw conclusions from those scores. Furthermore these scores align with the starting point of my research namely the 1970s.

As new political parties have emerged after the research results given by Mair and Mudde (1984) it was necessary to give these new political parties a score also. These political parties include all who have been part of a Government since 1972 until now and all the political parties which have taken part in the latest national elections. In this thesis these parties have been given a score by using the different cleavage groups given by the cleavage theory of Lane and Ersson (1999) and the scores of the political parties these parties derived from. So in chapter two all parties relevant for this thesis have been given a score in order to answer the main research question. This chapter also show that there are some differences between the five countries regarding the number of parties, the flux in the number of parties and the score parties have been given on the Left-Right scale. As mentioned in chapter two Italy is a country with a huge fluctuation of parties while Germany has a rather stable (small) number of political parties on national level. In both France and Italy it can be seen that the average score of all the parties on the Left-Right scale has moved more towards the centre, in Italy moving from the left to the right and in France the other way round.

In both Belgium and The Netherlands it can be seen that the average score has moved more towards the right of the Left-Right scale. Furthermore, in Belgium, France, Italy and The Netherlands there have been quite a few shifts in the number of parties, both through merges as through the start-up of new parties. Germany seems to be the ‘odd one out’ in this list, since the number of political parties acting on national level as well as the average score of all political parties on the Left-Right scale over time has remained stable and almost completely fixed.

The second sub-question is whether the influence of (extreme) right winged parties on the current government since 9/11 has emerged or increased. This sub question is being answered in chapter four which shows that the extreme right winged populist parties do influence politics and the acting of the Governments. However, this part also shows that the actual acting of the Governments on right issue posts does not seem to have increased much, and right winged parties in government not necessarily claim these right issue posts in Governments.

The right issues discussed in chapter four are Defense, Justice and Domestic Affairs which have been discussed for the three countries in which extreme right winged populist parties have been active after 9/11. By analyzing these posts the second sub-question is answered as much as possible, however only partial since other right winged posts like the asylum issue are not being discussed. Chapter four does show that in France and The Netherlands control over Defense and in a slighter way Justice is in the hands of right winged parties. Regarding Domestic Affairs it can be seen that under control of a right winged party member in Belgium and France the expenditures have risen significantly.

The analyses done in chapter four are however too simple for concluding that right winged parties prefer right winged posts and that they always tend to increase the expenditures on these posts. It does seem that right winged parties prefer right winged posts in France and The Netherlands but not in Belgium.

Regarding the things discussed in chapter four it can thus be said that right winged parties do influence the Governments; they do not necessarily control

the actual Government decisions and plans on right issues, even though expenditures on military, domestic affairs and justice have risen since 9/11. Consequently it cannot be proven or just simply said that the influence of (extreme) right winged parties on the current government since 9/11 has emerged or increased. The results merely show that there seems to be an indication that this is the case, however there is not enough evidence found for this.

After mapping the political parties in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands and concluding that, looking only at the scores given to the different parties and not their size, in just two countries there seems to be a shift towards the right on the Left-Right score; And after concluding that, when looking at the influence of (extreme) right winged parties on the current government since 9/11, there seems to be an indication that influence is there in more ways but it cannot be stated that this really is the case in Belgium, France and The Netherlands; Now the main research question, which is mostly being discussed in chapter three in which the governments have been given a score based on the research done in chapter two and the research done in chapter three itself, can be answered. From chapter three it can be concluded that governments in the five countries discussed individually in this thesis did not move more towards the right since 9/11, based on the parties and its scores present in the governments. Although The Netherlands and France have a higher mean since 9/11, only in France there seems to be a real sign of a shift towards the right. And although the total mean since 9/11 is higher for the ECSC, this does not show that the governments indeed have become more right winged. It does show that since 9/11 there seems to be a sign more towards the right, however the mean also still shows that the governments in the ECSC are to be considered as centre governments.

So the governments of the five countries discussed in this thesis did not move more towards the right: After 9/11, except for France, governments did not become right winged until now, they did not move more towards the right since 9/11 until now, and although there seems to be an indication that governments spend more money on right winged issues, especially when right

winged party members control the posts related to these issues, governments did not experience more influence of (extreme) right winged political parties.

In general, the results in this thesis show that the main research question of this thesis, whether the governments in the five countries discussed in this thesis have move more towards the right (i.e. whether the governments have become more right winged) can be answered with a no. Although there seem to be indications in some countries that governments did move more towards the right, it cannot be proven that indeed this is the case since 9/11 looking at the results and figures given in this thesis about the governments since the 1970s; the different political parties (especially extreme right winged populist parties) and their scores and influences; and the expenditures on right winged issues.

In the introduction 9/11 is being described as a major happening in globalized world which had an enormous impact on society and all men. 9/11 is being considered as the end of an old era and the beginning of a new one in which terrorism plays a main role. This thesis shows that, considering the European Union based on the findings for the five countries discussed in this thesis, although there seems to be an indication that since 9/11 right winged politics gained more influence and control, this cannot be proven and (thus) stated to be the case. In fact this could be in line with research and literature on the impact of 9/11 on other parts of society because it is clear that 9/11 did have a huge impact on the whole world, sometimes the real impact on the society itself could be overestimated and in fact politics in the European Union did not become more right winged due to 9/11.

Further research should be done on the party size of the political parties which are and have been active in the five countries in order to measure the Left-Right score in Parliament since the 1970s and especially the possible change since 9/11. Also there should be further research done on the differences in expenditures since 9/11 between Left issues and Right issues in order to compare the possible increases and thus to be able to say more about and perhaps being able to confirm the indications on whether expenditures on right winged issues have risen since 9/11.

Furthermore research can be done on the extreme right winged populist parties and whether they tend to have more influence since 9/11. This can be done by doing research on party competition and party utility using the indicators developed by Tillie to enable a study of party preferences underlying the electoral choice progress, and by that measure the degree to which allocation of parliamentary power to political parties may change (Tillie, 1995, pp. 37-54 and p. 81). Along with this also full control over Governments by right winged party can be measured. This is indeed very interesting in order to measure the possible influence right winged parties can have on other political parties and the government.

Finally it would be interesting to do further research on whether in other EU countries, and specifically the newer EU countries, governments have moved more towards the right since 9/11 in order to give a more overall conclusion for the EU as a whole and also to compare these results with the results of this thesis in which the ‘old’ EU countries have been discussed.

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## Appendix

**Table A0**

**Left-Right Scale for Cleavage groups**

Left-Socialist	1,0
Communist	1,4
Socialist	3,3
Green	3,6
Ethnic	5,1
Liberal	5,7
Agrarian	5,9
Religious	6,5
Conservative	7,6
Populist	8,3
Far-Right	9,6

(Source: Lane and Ersson, 1999, p.89)

*Belgium:*

**Table A1**

<b>BELGIUM</b>		<b>N Respondents: 4</b>		
<b>Party</b>		<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Range</b>	<b>Score</b>
Parti Communiste/Kommunistische Partij (Communist Party)		PCB/KPB	1-2.5	1.4
Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party - W)	PS		2.5-3	2.5
Rassemblement Wallon	RW		1.5-3.5	2.6
Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party - F)	SP		2.5-3.5	2.9
Agalev/ECO (Ecologists)	A/E		4-5	4.5
Front Democratique des Francophones	FDF		5-7.5	5.6
Christelijke Volkspartij (Christian Social Party - F)	CVP		5-7	5.8
Parti Social Chretien (Christian-Social Party - W)	PSC		5-7.5	6.3
Volksunie	VU		5-8.5	6.8
Parti Reformateur Liberal (Liberals - W)	PRL		7.5-8	7.6
Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang (Liberals - F)	PVV		7.5-8	7.8
Respect voor Arbeid en Democratie/Union pour la Democratie et le Respect du Travail	RAD/UDRT		8.5-10	9.2
Vlaams Blok	VB		9.5-10	9.8

(Source: Castles and Mair (1984), p. 76)

**Table A2**

Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (fromer PVV)	VLD	5.7-7.8	6.8
Front Democratique des Franophones	FDF	5.1-8.3-9.6	7.7
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (former VU)	N-VA	6.8-(6.2-7.6)	6.9
Vlaams Belang (former Vlaams Blok)	VBII	9.8	9.8
Christen Democratisch en Vlaams (former CVP)	CD&V	5.8	5.8
Socialistische Partij Anders (former SP)	SPA	2.9	2.9
Groen!	G	3.6	3.6
LijstDedecker	LD	(6.8-6.9)-8.3	8.3
Open Vlaanderen (former VLD)	OVLD	5.7-6.8	6.3
Movement Reformateur (former PRL-FDF)	MR	7.6-7.7	7.7
Front National	FN	9.6	9.6
Centre Democrate Humaniste (former PSC)	CDH	6.3	6.3

(Source: The scores for the parties in this list are based on the scores of their former parties, and the cleavage party group the parties can be placed in based on the information from [http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijst\\_van\\_Belgische\\_politieke\\_partijen](http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijst_van_Belgische_politieke_partijen). The 0-10 scores are derived from the former party score (Castles and Mair (1984), p. 76), the 0-10 scores are derived from the different party groups of the cleavage theory (Lane and Ersson (1999), p. 89).)

**Table A3**

Expenditures on Justice and Domestic Affairs of Belgium in Million Euros

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Justice	1054	1105	1196	1254	1353
Domestic Affairs	345	344	358	415	465

(Source: <http://www.begroting.be>)

**Table A4**

**Belgian  
Governments**

<i>Starting year</i>	<i>Name of Prime Minister</i>	<i>Parties in Government (number of posts in Government)</i>	<i>Type of Government</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Right winged party in Government</i>
1972	Eyskens-Cools	PS (8), CVP (8), PSC (7) en SP (6)	centre-left	4,4	no
	Leburton-Tindemans-				
1973	Declercq	CVP (9), PSC (6), SP (6), PS (7), PVV (4) en PRL (4)	centre-mixed	5,2	yes
1974	Tindemans	CVP (9), PSC (7), PVV (5) en PRL (4)	centre-right	6,6	yes
1977	Tindemans	CVP (8), PS (7), SP (5), PSC (4), FDF (3) en VU (3)	centre-left	4,7	no
1978	Van den Boeynants	PS (7), CVP (7), SP (5), PSC (4), FDF (3) en VU (3)	centre-left	4,7	no
1979	Martens	CVP (11), PS (8), SP (6), PSC (5), en FDF (3)	centre-left	4,5	no
1980	Martens	CVP (12), PS (10), SPA (5), en PSC (5)	centre-left	4,4	no
		CVP (10), PS(7), PSC (6), PVV (5), PRL (4) en SPA (4)	centre-mixed	5,4	yes
1980	Martens	CVP (11), PS(8), SPA (6) en PSC (7)	centre-left	4,5	no
1981	Eyskens	CVP (8), PVV (6), PRL (6) en PSC (5)	centre-right	6,8	yes
1981	Martens	CVP (10), PVV (6), PRL (6) en PSC (6)	centre-right	6,7	yes
1985	Martens	CVP (10), PVV (6), PRL (6) en PSC (6)	centre-right	6,7	yes
1987	Martens	PS (9), CVP (8), SPA (7), PSC (5) en VU (3)	centre-left	4,4	no
1988	Martens	CVP (5), PS (5), SPA (4) en PSC (2)	centre-left	4,1	no
1992	Dehaene	CVP (6), PS (5), SPA (4), en PSC (2)	centre-left	4,2	no
1995	Dehaene	VLD (5), PS (3), SPA (3), PRL (3), A/E (4)	mixed	4,4	yes
1999	Verhofstadt	VLD (5), MR (5), SPA (6), PS (5)	mixed	4,9	yes
2003	Verhofstadt				

*Germany:*

**Table A5**

<b>GERMANY</b>		<b>N Respondents: 12</b>	
<b>Party</b>	<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Range</b>	<b>Score</b>
Kommunistische Partei (Communist)	DKP	0-2.5	1.4
'Die Grünen' (Greens)	G	2-4	2.8
Sozialdemokratische Partei (Social Democrat)	SPD	2.5-5	3.3
Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democrat)	FDP	4.5-6	5.1
Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democrat)	CDU	5-8.2	6.7
Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social)	CSU	6-9	7.9

(Source: Castles and Mair (1984), p. 79)

**Table A6**

Die Linkspartei/Partei Demokratischen Socialismus L/PDS	1.0-1.4-3.3	1.9
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(Source: The score for the party given in this list is based on the scores of the party groups according to the cleavage theory (Lane and Ersson (1999), p. 89) based on the information from [http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijst\\_van\\_Duitse\\_politieke\\_partijen](http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijst_van_Duitse_politieke_partijen).)

**Table A7****German Governments**

<i>Starting year</i>	<i>Name of Prime Minister</i>	<i>Parties in Government (number of posts in Government)</i>	<i>Type of Government</i>	<i>Score on Left-Right scale</i>	<i>Right winged party in Government</i>
1972	Brandt-Schmidt	SPD (26), FDP (11)	Left-centre	3,8	no
1976	Schmidt	SPD (24), FDP (9)	Left-centre	3,8	no
1980	Schmidt-Kohl	SPD (33), FDP (9)	Left-centre	3,7	no
1983	Kohl	CDU(27)/CSU(9), FDP (7)	Right-centre	6,7	yes
1987	Kohl	CDU(29)/CSU(13), FDP (10)	Right-centre	6,7	yes
1990	Kohl	CDU(36)/CSU(13), FDP (12)	Right-centre	6,6	yes
1994	Kohl	CDU(24)/CSU(10), FDP (9)	Right-centre	6,6	yes
1998	Schröder	SPD (26), Die Grunen (11)	Left	3,2	no
2002	Schröder	SPD (22), Die Grunen (10)	Left	3,1	no
2005	Merkel	CDU(20)/CSU(5), SDP(21)	Mixed	5,3	yes

(Source: <http://www.bundestag.de>)

*France:*

**Table A8**

Expenditures on Justice and Domestic Affairs of France in Million Euros

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Justice	3935	4276	5037	5283	5461
Domestic Affairs	111382	17624	19569	13204	13625

(Source: <http://www.budget.gouv.fr>)

**Table A9**

**FRANCE** N Respondents: 6

Party	Abbreviation	Range	Score
Parti Communiste (Communist)	PCF	1-2	1.4
Parti Socialiste (Socialist)	PS	2-3	2.6
Ecologiste (Ecologist)	E	2.5-4.5	3.5
Radicaux de Gauche (Left Radicals)	MRG	3.5-4	3.8
Union pour la Démocratie Française	UDF	6.5-6.8	6.6
Rassemblement pour la République	RPR	8-8.5	8.2
Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans	CNIP	8.5-9	8.6
Front National	FN	9.5-10	9.8
Parti des Forces Nouvelles	PFN	9.5-10	9.8

(Source: Castles and Mair (1984), p. 78)

**Table A10**

L'Union des démocrates pour la République (predecessor of RPR)	UDR	8.2	8.2
Centre démocratie et progrès	CDP	6.6	6.6
Républicains-Indépendants (predecessor of CNIP)	FNRI	8.6	8.6
Centre des démocrates sociaux (predecessor of UDF)	CDS	6.6	6.6
Mouvement réformateur (predecessor of MRG)	MR	3.8	3.8
Mouvement des réformateur (later in UMP)	MDR	5.7	5.7
Mouvement des citoyens (predecessor of MRC)	MDC	2.2	2.2
DL (Raffarin, now part of UMP)	DL	8.2	8.2
Union pour un Movement Populaire(former DL/RPR)	UMP	5.7-8.2	7.0
Movement pour la France (part from former CNIP)	MPF	7.6-8.6	8.1
Parti Radicale (part from MRG)	PR	3.8-5.7	4.8
Nouveau Centre (part out of UDF)	NC	6.6-(6.5-5.7)	6.4
Movement Democrate (part out of UDF)	MD	6.6-(3.3-5.7)	5.6
Parti Radicale de Gauche (former MRG)	PRG	3.8	3.8
Les Verts	V	3.6	3.6
Movement Republican et Citoyen	MRC	1.0-3.3	2.2

(Source: The scores for the parties in this list are based on the scores of their former parties, and the cleavage party group the parties can be placed in based on the information from

[http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorie:Franse\\_politieke\\_partij](http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorie:Franse_politieke_partij).

The 0-10 scores are derived from the former party score (Castles and Mair (1984), p. 78), the 0-10 scores are derived from the different party groups of the cleavage theory (Lane and Ersson (1999), p. 89).)

**Table A11**

**French Governments**

Starting year	Name of Prime Minister	Parties in Government (number of posts in Government)	Type of Government	Right winged party in Government	Score on Left-Right scale
1972	Messmer	UDR (21), CDP (3), FNRI (5)	Right	yes	8,1
1973	Messmer	UDR (24), CDP (3), FNRI (7)	Right	yes	8,1
1974	Messmer	UDR (19), CDP (2), FNRI (5)	Right	yes	8,2
1974	Chirac	UDR (18), FNRI (11), MR (5), PR (7)	Right	yes	7,2
1976	Barre	UDR (9), FNRI (10), PR (5), CNIP (1), CDS (3)	Right	yes	7,6
1977	Barre	FNRI (19), RPR (11), CDS (5), PR (2), CNIP (1)	Right	yes	8,0
1978	Barre	UDF (24), RPR (11), CNIP (1)	Right	yes	7,1
1981	Mauroy	PS (39), MD (1), MRG (3)	Left	no	2,8
1981	Mauroy	PS (31), MD (1), PCF (4), MRG (2)	Left	no	2,6
1983	Mauroy	PS (40), PCF (4), MRG (2)	Left	no	2,5
1984	Fabius	PS (36), MRG (3)	Left	no	2,7
1986	Chirac	RPR (20), UDF (15)	Right	yes	7,5
1988	Rocard	PS (26), MRG (2), UDF (3)	Left-centre	no	3,1
1988	Rocard	PS (36), MRG (4), UDF (6), MDR (3)	Left-centre	no	3,4
1991	Cresson	PS (36), MDR (1), MRG (3)	Left	no	2,8
1992	Bérégovoy	PS (39), MRG (3), MDR (2)	Left	no	2,8
1993	Balladur	RPR (15), UDF (17) *	Right	yes	7,4
1995	Juppe	RPR (21), UDF (17)	Right	yes	7,5
1995	Juppe	RPR (17), UDF (13)	Right	yes	7,5
1997	Jospin	PS (44), PRG (5), MDC (1), V (3), PCF (4)	Left	no	2,7
2002	Raffarin	RPR (12), UDF (6), DL (5)	Right	yes	7,8
2002	Raffarin	UMP (31), UDF (1)	Right	yes	7,0
2005	De Villepin	UMP (28), UDF (1)	Right	yes	7,0
2007	Fillon	UMP (15), UDF (1), PS (1)	Right-centre	yes	6,7
2007	Fillon	UMP (22), UDF (3), PS (3)	Right-centre	yes	6,5

(Source: <http://www.france-politique.fr>)

\*For this government only the Minister posts are taken into account.

*Italy:*

**Table A12**  
**ITALY**

**N Respondents: 10**

Party	Abbreviation	Range	Score
Democrazia Proletaria	DP	0-1	0.5
Partito di L'Unita Proletaria	PdUP	0-1	0.6
Partito Comunista (Communist)	PCI	1-2.5	1.6
Partito Radicale (Radical)	PR	1-3.5	2.3
Partito Socialista (Socialist)	PSI	2-4.5	3.1
Partito Repubblicano (Republican)	PRI	3-7	4.8
Partito Socialdemocratico (Social Democrat)	PSDI	3-8	5.4
Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrat)	DC	4-7.5	5.4
Partito Liberale (Liberal)	PLI	5-8	5.9
Movimento Sociale	MSI	7.5-10	9.1

(Source: Castles and Mair (1984), p. 80)

**Table A13**

Forza Italia	FI	5.7-7.6	6.7
Centro Cristiano Democratico (now UDC)	UDC	6.5	6.5
Alleanza Nazionale (parts from former DC and MSI)	AN	(5.4-9.1)-8.3	7.8
Lega Nord- Movimento per l'Autonomia	LN/MA	5.1-5.9	5.5
Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e Democratici di centro	UDC	6.5	6.5
Partito Democratico della Sinistra (former PCI)	PDS	1.6-3.3	2.5
Democratici di Sinistra (former PDS)	DS	2.5	2.5
Sinistra Democratica (fromer DS)	SD	2.5	2.5
Partito Democratico (out of DS)	PD	3.3-(6.5-3.3)-(5.7-3.3)-2.5	3.8
Socialisti Democratici Intaliani (out of former PCI)	SDI	1.6-3.3	2.5
Federazione dei Verdi	FV	3.6	3.6
La Margherita	LM	3.3-5.7	4.5
Partiti dei Comunisti Italiani	PdCI	1.4	1.4
Sudtiroler Volkspartei (region)	SV	0-10	5.0
Partiti della Rifondazione Comunista (part of former PCI)	PRC	1.4	1.4
Union Valdotaine (region)	UV	0-10	5.0

(Source: The scores for the parties in this list are based on the scores of their former parties, and the cleavage party group the parties can be placed in based on the information from [http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elenco\\_dei\\_Governi\\_Italiani](http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elenco_dei_Governi_Italiani). The 0-10 scores are derived from the former party score (Castles and Mair (1984), p.80), the 0-10 scores are derived from the different party groups of the cleavage theory (Lane and Ersson (1999), p. 89).)

**Table A14**

**Italian Governments**

Starting year	Name of Prime Minister	Type of Government	Right winged party in Government	Parties in Government (number of Ministers in Government)	Score on Left-Right scale
1972	Andreotti	Centre	no	PSDI, DC, PLI	5,5
1973	Rumor	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI	4,8
1974	Rumor	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI	4,8
1974	Moro	Centre	no	DC-PRI	5,2
1976	Moro	Centre	no	DC	5,4
1976	Andreotti	Centre	no	DC	5,4
1978	Andreotti	Centre	no	DC	5,4
1979	Andreotti	Centre	no	DC-PRI-PSDI	5,3
1979	Cossiga	Centre	no	DC-PSDI-PLI	5,5
1980	Cossiga	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PRI	4,7
1980	Forlani	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI	4,8
1981	Spadolini	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI-PRI	5,0
1982	Spadolini	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI-PRI	5,0
1982	Fanfani	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI	5,0
1983	Craxi	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI-PRI	5,0
1986	Craxi	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI-PRI	5,0
1987	Fanfani	Centre	no	DC	5,4
1987	Goria	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI-PRI	5,0
1988	De Mita	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI-PRI	5,0
1989	Andreotti	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI-PRI	5,0
1991	Andreotti	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI	5,0
1992	Amato	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI	5,0
1993	Ciampi	Centre	no	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI	5,0
1994	Berlusconi	Right-centre	yes	FI (5), AN (6), LN (4), CCD (2) independent/technical	6,8
1995	Dini	Centre	no	PDS (8), LM (6), FV (1)	5,0
1996	Prodi	Left-centre	no	DS (7), LM (9), FV (1), PDCI (1), SDI (0)	3,8
1998	D'Alema	Left-centre	no	DS (7), LM (1), FV (1), PDCI (1)	3,5
1999	D'Alema	Left	no	DS (6), LM (7), FV(1), PDCI (1)	2,7
2000	Amato	Left-centre	no	FI (7), AN (6), LN (2), UDC (1)	3,4
2001	Berlusconi	Right	yes	PD (17), PRC (1), SD (1), PDCI (1), FV (1), LM (1)	7,0
2006	Prodi	Left-centre	no		3,5

\*For these governments no data on the number of posts per party has been found. Therefore the party of the Prime Minister has been given a double score, and the other parties their normal score. Consequently the total scores is then divided by the number of parties plus one.

\*\*For these governments the score is base don only the Ministers' posts, since no accurate and sufficient data was found for the other posts.

\*\*\*This government has been formed not on the basis of political parties but instead this party has an independent Prime Minister and independent persons holding the posts in Government.

*The Netherlands:*

**Table A15**

**NETHERLANDS** **N Respondents: 9**

Party	Abbreviation	Range	Score
Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (Pacifist Socialists)	PSP	0-1.5	0.6
Communistische Partij (Communist)	CPN	0-2	0.8
Politieke Partij Radikalen (Radical Political Party)	PPR	0-4	1.6
Partij van de Arbeid (Labour)	PvdA	2-3	2.6
Democraten '66 (Democrats '66)	D'66	3.5-5	4.4
Christen-Democratisch Appel (Christian Democratic Appeal)	CDA	5-7.5	5.7
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demokratie (Liberal)	VVD	6-8	7.4
Gereformeerde Politiek Verbond	GPV	8-10	9
Reformatieve Politieke Federatie	RPF	8-10	9.2
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij	SGP	8-10	9.2

(Source: Castles and Mair (1984), p. 80)

**Table A16**

ARP, KVP, CHU (now CDA)	ARP/KVP/CHU	5.7
Democratisch Socialisten '70 (part out of PvdA)	DS70	2.6-3.3
Groen Links (out of former CPN, PSP, PPR)	GL	(0.6-0.8-1.6)-3.6
Christen Unie (former GPV and RPF)	CU	(9.0-9.2)-6.5
Socialistische Partij	SP	1.4
Lijst Pim Fortuyn	LPF	8.3
Partij Voor de Vrijheid (out of VVD)	PVV	7.4-9.6

(Source: The scores for the parties in this list are based on the scores of their former parties, and the cleavage party group the parties can be placed in based on the information from [http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politieke\\_partijen\\_in\\_Nederland#Landelijke\\_partijen](http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politieke_partijen_in_Nederland#Landelijke_partijen). The 0-10 scores are derived from the former party score (Castles and Mair (1984), p.80), the 0-10 scores are derived from the different party groups of the cleavage theory (Lane and Ersson (1999), p. 89).)

**Table A17**

## Dutch Governments

Starting year	Name of Prime Minister	Type of Government	Right winged party in Government	Parties in Government (number of posts in Government)	Score on Left-Right scale
1971	Biesheuvel	centre-right		1 ARP (6), KVP (11), CHU (6), VVD (5), DS70 (4)	5
1973	Den Uyl	centre-left		0 PvdA (14), ARP (6), KVP (12), D66 (5), PPR (3)	4
1977	Van Agt	centre-right		1 CDA (26), VVD (15)	6
1981	Van Agt	centre-left		0 CDA (13), PvdA (13), D66 (6)	4
1982	Van Agt	centre-left		0 CDA (15), D66 (8)	5
1982	Lubbers	centre-right		1 CDA (16), VVD (17)	6
1986	Lubbers	centre-right		1 CDA (15), VVD (9)	6
1989	Lubbers	centre-left		0 CDA (13), PvdA (12)	4
1994	Kok	mixed		1 PvdA (10), VVD (10), D66 (7)	4
1998	Kok	mixed		1 PvdA (12), VVD (11), D66 (5)	4
2002	Balkenende	centre-right		1 CDA (11), VVD (8), LPF (9)	7
2003	Balkenende	centre-right		1 CDA (13), VVD (11), D66 (4)	6
2006	Balkenende	centre-right		1 CDA (13), VVD (11)	6
2007	Balkenende	centre-left		1 CDA (12), PvdA (12), CU (3)	4

(Source: [http://www.minaz.nl/Onderwerpen/Ministerraad/Kabinetten\\_sinds\\_1945/](http://www.minaz.nl/Onderwerpen/Ministerraad/Kabinetten_sinds_1945/))**Table A18**

Expenditures on Justice and Domestic Affairs of The Netherlands in Million Euros

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Justice	4928	5155	5654	5543	5578
Domestic Affairs	4488	4823	4942	5108	5615

(Source: [http://2008.rijksbegroting.nl/rijksbegroting\\_nl](http://2008.rijksbegroting.nl/rijksbegroting_nl))