

Underdeveloped; more political participation?!

The intensity and nature of political participation of ethnic minorities in Enschede Noord and Tamana compared.

Name:	Annemiek van der Velde	University of Twente supervisors: Dr. G.H. Reussing Dr. M. Skutsch
Student number:	0070262	
Telephone:	06-29178535	
E-mail:	a.m.vandervelde@student.utwente.nl	
Address:	Rietmolenstraat 62 7512 XW Enschede The Netherlands	

Samenvatting

Dit onderzoek richt zich op de politieke participatie van etnische minderheden. In India heb ik een onderzoek verricht naar de politieke participatie van tribals in de lokale politieke processen in Tamana. Naar aanleiding van dat onderzoek is het idee ontstaan om de politieke participatie van deze etnische minderheid te vergelijken met de politieke participatie van een etnische minderheid in bijvoorbeeld Nederland in plaats van het te vergelijken met het ideaalbeeld van democratie.

In dit onderzoek wordt de aard en intensiteit van de politieke participatie van de Turkse etnische minderheid in Enschede Noord vergeleken met de aard en intensiteit van de politieke participatie van de tribal etnische minderheid in Tamana. Deze vergelijking wordt gemaakt aan de hand van literatuur evenals interviews, een enquête onderzoek en observaties.

Verba, Schlozman en Brady (1995) verstaan onder politieke participatie: Alle activiteiten die de intentie of het effect hebben om overheidshandelen te beïnvloeden, door direct het maken of implementeren van beleid te beïnvloeden, dan wel de selectie van de mensen die het beleid maken te beïnvloeden (Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995:38). Vanuit democratisch oogpunt is het belangrijk dat alle bevolkingsgroepen gelijke invloed uitoefenen (o.a. Dahl 1998, Lijphart 1997) maar ook vanuit het oogpunt van integratie in de samenleving (o.a. De Paus 1998, Tillie 2000). Uit onderzoek blijkt dat zowel de Turkse etnische minderheid in Nederland evenals de tribal etnische minderheid in India, gemiddeld gezien, minder participeren dan andere groepen burgers binnen het land. Dat heeft gevolgen voor de mate waarin de politiek op de hoogte is van de voorkeuren van deze groepen. Het structureel onderbelichten en minder representeren van ideeën van een bepaalde groep kan tot vertekeningen in beleid leiden, wat voor problemen in de maatschappij kan zorgen. Denters en Geurts (1998) hebben politieke gelijke participatie onderzocht aan de hand van negen indicatoren die zijn onderverdeeld in drie groepen, waaruit de aard van de participatie blijkt. Daarnaast worden factoren aangedragen die politieke participatie kunnen verklaren zoals onderwijs, geld en vrije tijd (Verba, Schlozman en Brady 1995) maar ook de mate van civic community (Putnam 1993).

In het derde hoofdstuk wordt de politieke participatie van de Turkse etnische minderheid in Enschede Noord besproken. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat de Turken de hoogste participatie graad hebben van de niet westerse allochtone groepen in Nederland. Toch blijkt de participatie graad vergeleken met autochtone Nederlanders niet heel hoog. Dit wordt geweten aan factoren als onderwijs en werk maar ook aan institutionele factoren zoals het rekruteren van politieke kandidaten binnen bepaalde autochtoon gedomineerde netwerken. In Enschede Noord blijken Turken nauwelijks te participeren in de officiële structuren en weinig gebruik te maken van inspraakrecht. Daarnaast is gekeken naar twee Turkse organisaties omdat deze volgens de civic community theorie van invloed kunnen zijn op participatie. Vanuit deze organisaties wordt relatief weinig gedaan om politieke participatie te stimuleren en de onderzochte organisaties hebben onderling geen structureel contact. De participatie van Turkse burgers in de officiële organen op gemeentelijk niveau is ook relatief laag te noemen. Zij zijn nauwelijks actief binnen politieke partijen en benaderen zowel politieke partijen als raadseleden nauwelijks. In Enschede zetelt slechts één raadslid met de Turkse etniciteit. Uit de analyse van de politieke participatie aan de hand van de indicatoren opgesteld door Denters en Geurts (1998) blijkt dat de aard van de politieke participatie van Turken meer probleem georiënteerd is dan hulpbronnen georiënteerd en dat institutionele mobilisatie een rol speelt maar niet een allesbepalende factor is. Onderwijs, evenals het hebben van werk blijken de politieke participatie positief te beïnvloeden. Daarnaast lijkt er in lage mate sprake te zijn van een civic community in Enschede Noord aangezien er weinig horizontale relaties tussen de inwoners onderling lijken te bestaan wat een negatieve invloed op de politieke participatie zou kunnen hebben.

In Tamana worden naast de politieke participatie binnen officiële structuren ook de structuren geïntroduceerd door Gram Vikas behandeld, omdat deze NGO veel invloed heeft in het dorp. In de organen binnen het dorp is de participatie hoog. In sommige organen zijn zelfs alle families in het dorp vertegenwoordigd, al lijken de leiders meer invloed te hebben. De politieke participatie in de organen op het Gram Panchayat niveau is beperkt tot leiders uit het dorp. De participatie analyse aan de hand van de indicatoren opgesteld door Denters en Geurts (1998) laat zien dat er voornamelijk geparticipeerd wordt in institutioneel gemobiliseerde activiteiten. Onderwijs blijkt van invloed te zijn op de participatie evenals de hoge mate van civic community.

In antwoord op de onderzoeksvraag blijkt dat de intensiteit van politieke participatie hoger is in Tamana. De aard verschilt in zoverre dat in Tamana duidelijk een voorkeur bestaat voor institutioneel gemobiliseerde participatie waar in Enschede Noord de participatie meer probleem georiënteerd gestuurd wordt. Voor een hogere intensiteit lijkt de mate van civic community van belang. Daarom wordt als aanbeveling gegeven om in Enschede Noord te proberen de civic community te versterken. In Tamana waar de participatie vooral is voorbehouden aan de leiders en mannen zou meer aandacht in de vorm van trainingen moeten komen voor vrouwen en arme bevolkingsgroepen. Daarnaast zou onderwijs moeten worden gestimuleerd in zowel Tamana als Enschede Noord aangezien in beide gevallen onderwijs een positieve invloed op participatie blijkt te hebben.

Summary

The focus of this research is on political participation of ethnic minorities. In India I conducted research on political participation of tribals in local self governance processes in Tamana. Afterwards the idea emerged to compare the participation of this tribal ethnic minority with the political participation of an ethnic minority in for example The Netherlands, instead of benchmarking it to the ideal of democracy.

In this research the nature and intensity of political participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord will be compared with the nature and intensity of the political participation of the tribal ethnic minority in Tamana. This comparison will be made with help of literature as well as interviews, a survey research and observations.

In this research the definition of political participation from Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1995) is used: *'By political participation we refer simply to activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action, either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies.'* (Verba et.al. 1995:38). It is important that all citizen groups have equal influence from a democratic point of view (e.g. Dahl 1998, Lijphart 1997), as well as from an integration point of view (e.g. De Paus 1998, Tillie 2000). Research shows that both the Turkish ethnic minority in The Netherlands as well as the tribal ethnic minority in India, on average, participate less than other citizen groups within their country. That has consequences for the responsiveness of the government towards these groups. When certain groups are structurally underexposed in government this can lead to a distorted policy, which may lead to social problems in society. Deters and Geurts (1998) have investigated political participation using nine indicators, which are grouped in three categories, to reveal the nature of the participation. Besides factors that can explain differences in participation are mentioned like education, money and spare time (Verba et.al. 1995) as well as the extent of civic community (Putnam 1993).

The third chapter is on political participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord. In general in The Netherlands it seems that Turks have the highest political participation rate of the non western ethnic groups. Nevertheless the participation rate is compared with ethnic Dutch citizens not very high. This is ascribed to individual factors like education and having a job, as well as institutional factors like recruiting of political candidates from within ethnic Dutch dominated networks. In Enschede Noord Turks seem to hardly participate in official structures and do not seem to use their right to question at district committee meetings. Besides two Turkish organisations are analysed as these can contribute to political participation according to the civic community theory. These organisations conduct little effort to stimulate political participation. The participation of Turkish citizens in official organs on the municipal level is also relatively low. Turkish citizens are hardly active within political parties and hardly seek contact with political parties, as well as councillors. In Enschede there is only one councillor with a Turkish ethnicity. From the analysis of political participation using the indicators of Deters and Geurts (1998) it follows that the nature of political participation is rather problem oriented, institutionalised mobilisation plays a role, but does not seem to be a decisive factor. Education as well as having a job seems to positively influence participation. Besides there seems to be a low level of civic community in Enschede Noord as there seem to exist few horizontal relations between inhabitants which may have a negative influence on the political participation.

In addition to political participation in official structures in Tamana, the participation in structures introduced by Gram Vikas is analysed as well, as this NGO has a large influence in the village. Within the structures in the village the intensity of participation is rather high in some structures all families are represented although village leaders seem to have more influence. The political participation in the structures on Gram Panchayat level is exclusive to village leaders. It follows from the analysis of the political participation using the indicators of Deters and Geurts (1998) that institutionalised mobilisation is a determining factor for participation. Education seems of influence on political participation just as a high level of civic community.

In answer on the research question it seems that the intensity of political participation is higher in Tamana. The nature differs in the fact that in Tamana there is a clear preference for institutional mobilised participation where in Enschede Noord the participation is driven more problem oriented. For a higher intensity of participation the level of civic community seems important. Therefore a recommendation is made to try to enhance the level of civic community in Enschede Noord. In Tamana participation is higher for village leaders and males, therefore more attention in the form of training for women and poor is recommended. Besides in Tamana as well as Enschede Noord education should be stimulated, as in both cases education seems to have a positive influence on participation.

Preface

This research has been conducted for my bachelor thesis in order to conclude my bachelor study Public Administration at the University of Twente. The first step towards this thesis can be found in the evaluating discussion I had with Margaret Skutsch on my minor report. She asked me how my findings on the political participation of an ethnic tribal minority in Tamana, India would look compared with a western democracy instead of compared with the ideal of democracy. My reply was that it might not look too bad as participation rates were actually quite high in Tamana.

Approximately a year later the idea to compare my findings with for instance a city in The Netherlands came forward again when I had a conversation with Rik Reussing on the possibilities for a bachelor thesis. In the summer of 2007 Rik Reussing and Margaret Skutsch both agreed to supervise my bachelor thesis which would compare the findings in Tamana with a city in The Netherlands, probably Rotterdam.

Due to circumstances I first followed my master courses before I really started with the thesis. Unfortunately I found it very hard to actually start as it was difficult to compare two totally different situations. However a conversation with both Rik Reussing and Margaret Skutsch was very helpful and with the switch from Rotterdam to Enschede Noord the comparison seemed possible for me again. I conducted several interviews with Turkish citizens in Enschede Noord, as well as with councillors from the town council. These interviews were very interesting and I really enjoyed the hospitality of my respondents.

The actual comparison still was quite challenging but while working on it, it also triggered my interest. I am very thankful for the efforts of Rik Reussing and Margaret Skutsch who read through two concepts of this thesis, even in Mexico, and gave me very useful comments. I am also grateful to my respondents who all took the time to answer my numerous questions.

This being said I am proud to present my bachelor thesis: *'Underdeveloped; more political participation?!'*

Enschede, September 3rd 2008

Annemiek van der Velde

Table of contents

Samenvatting _____	2
Summary _____	3
Preface _____	4
Table of contents _____	5
1. Preamble, research question and research design _____	7
1.1. Background of the research _____	7
1.2. Objectives of the research _____	8
1.3. Relevance of the research _____	8
1.4. Research question _____	8
1.5. Methodology _____	9
2. Theoretical framework _____	11
2.1. Why is equal political participation and representation important? _____	11
2.2. Do ethnic minorities in The Netherlands and India participate politically equal? _____	13
2.3. Which factors cause political inequality? _____	13
3. Participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord in local self governance structures _____	16
3.1. How does the Turkish ethnic minority participate in local governance structures in The Netherlands in general? _____	16
3.2. How does the Turkish ethnic minority of Enschede Noord participate in local self governance structures within Enschede? _____	17
3.3. How does the Turkish ethnic minority participate in local self governance referenced to the indicators of Denters & Geurts for local political participation? _____	22
4. Participation of the Tribal ethnic minority in Tamana in local self governance structures. _____	26
4.1. How does the tribal ethnic minority participate within the village of Tamana? _____	26
4.2. How does the tribal ethnic minority participate on the Gram Panchayat level? _____	28
4.3. How does the tribal ethnic minority participate in local self governance referenced to the indicators of Denters & Geurts for local political participation? _____	30
5. Conclusion and recommendations _____	33
5.1 Conclusion _____	33
5.2 Recommendations _____	34
6. Discussion _____	36
References _____	38
Annex 1: List of acronyms, concept explanations and translations _____	40
Annex 2: Determinants of political interest _____	41
Annex 3: Annexes for chapter 3 _____	42
Annex 3a: Governmental layers in The Netherlands _____	42
Annex 3b: Structure of the municipality of Enschede _____	42
Annex 3c: Ward Council (extra information) _____	43
Annex 3d: District committee. _____	44
Annex 3e: Political Parties in Enschede municipality _____	44

Annex 3f: City councillors with an ethnic minority background _____	45
Annex 3g: Denters and Geurts actual political participation and representation ratios _____	45
Annex 3h: Income of Dutch and Turkish citizens in The Netherlands and Enschede _____	45
Annex 3i: Educational level of Dutch and Turkish citizens in The Netherlands _____	46
Annex 3j: Political commitment _____	46
Annex 3k: Indicators of Denters and Geurts compared more elaborately _____	46
Annex 4: Structure Panchayat Raj _____	47
Annex 4a: Panchayat Raj in Orissa _____	47
Annex 4b: Structure Sihala Gram Panchayat _____	47
Annex 5: Gram Vikas _____	48
Annex 5a: Structure of Gram Vikas _____	48
Annex 5b: Representation within the VEC _____	48
Annex 6: Conducted interviews _____	49
Annex 7: Interview questions _____	51
In Enschede _____	51
In Sihala GP _____	54
Annex 8: Reading guide _____	60
Annex 9: Reflection Report _____	61
Preparation phase _____	61
The research _____	61

1. Preamble, research question and research design

1.1. Background of the research

In the summer of 2006 I conducted research on the 'Participation of tribal people in local self governance processes: The case of Tamana village, Orissa, India.' In India there exists a decentralised system within states called Panchayat Raj that has three tiers of which the Gram Panchayat (GP) is the lowest. It was introduced with the 73rd amendment of the Indian constitution in 1993. The GP operates on a local level and covers a cluster of little villages. For development of a community, influence in the GP is important as development schemes are distributed through the GP.

Because India has always been a very hierarchical and patriarchal society, tribal people traditionally do not have power. Officially the government has abandoned the caste system, but in practice hierarchical structures still exist in society. In 1993 the federal government also introduced the reservation seat policy this means that seats will be reserved in all the levels of government for backward groups in society like scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST) and especially women. A study by Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000) shows that in practice the 73rd amendment does not lead to more influence for tribal people, due to less effective participation which is a consequence of traditional power relations. That is problematic because tribal people are amongst the poorest in India and need the development funds distributed through the GP to develop themselves and their villages.

According to Phillips (1995:27) popular control and popular equality are the two key principles of democracy and these principles can be used as benchmark to evaluate democratic systems. The research in India showed that the political participation benchmarked against an ultimate democracy was not ideal. This ultimate democracy however does not function in practice and the question is how ideal the political participation of these poor tribal villagers is in comparison with the political participation of ethnic minorities in western countries, for example The Netherlands.

In The Netherlands ethnic minorities traditionally have less power than ethnic Dutch citizens (integratiemonitor, 2002). This can be partly explained through their on average lower level of education and income, but also seems to have to do with their background as a minority (Keuzekamp, Merens 2006; integratiemonitor 2002). Nevertheless, from a democratic point of view, it is important for these minorities to have influence in policy making, as one of the criteria for democracy is equal participation (e.g. Dahl 1998). Unequal participation leads to representational bias. According to Lijphart (1997:2) low turnout means a turnout in which classes are unequal represented, it is systematically biased against citizens with a lower socio-economic status. Keuzekamp and Merens (2006) show, that minorities are overrepresented among the groups with a lower socio-economic status. The theory of Lijphart states that this bias in low turnout consequently implies an unequal class influence on politics, which has consequences for the election of parties and therefore for the content of public policies (Lijphart 1997:4). That might lead to a feeling of lack of understanding within the particular minority group and ill suited policies, which might result in clustering and a poor integration in the Dutch society (Tillie 2000). A poor integration in Dutch society can subsequently result in a lot of different problems, for instance lesser chances to find a job.

The immigrant ethnic minorities in The Netherlands without Dutch nationality received a voting right in municipal elections in 1985 (Tillie 2000). The main argument to give immigrants voting rights was their integration in society (Van der Bie 2002; Tillie 2000). The minority policy paper in 1983 stated that the local voting right is one of the means minorities can use to increase their influence in society and to encourage emancipation. The government expected that the use of the voting right would give an important impulse to the democratic control on accessibility of public facilities on a local level (Van der Bie 2002). In addition it was thought that having the right to vote would mean that people would have to inform themselves on the political organisation in The Netherlands which would improve their integration as well (Tillie 2000:12). Research on the turnout rates of minorities at the municipal elections in 1998, showed that Turkish ethnic minorities have the highest turnout rate of four investigated non western ethnic minorities. These rates vary from 35 till 50 percent, all of these rates are lower than the average turnout rate in a municipality (Van der Bie, 2002).

In the light of the comparison, that raises the question if political participation of ethnic minorities in The Netherlands is higher than in India, or if the results of the case study in India were not that bad after all. Research of Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000) showed that turnout rates in India are high, but for other political activities participation rates are lower. A study from Berger, Fennema, Heelsum, Tillie and Wolf (2001) shows that similar to India participation rates in The Netherlands in other political activities are below the turn out rates at elections. Therefore an analysis of the political participation of ethnic minorities in The Netherlands could give a different perspective on the political participation of the tribal people in Tamana and reveal some reasons for differences and similarities.

1.2. Objectives of the research

In India achieving political participation is a more elementary need than in The Netherlands because minorities in The Netherlands have achieved a living standard most tribal people in India can not even achieve through participation in the Gram Panchayat. Nevertheless it is important to achieve near to equal political participation of minorities in The Netherlands as well, because minorities are not always represented in policy making. This could lead as explained in the background of the research to a representational bias which has an influence on the content of public policies. Consequently that could influence the development of minorities in The Netherlands, however on a different scale than in Tamana. Therefore it is interesting to see if both countries could learn from the political participation situation in the other country. Tamana is a small village in India which is included in a Gram Panchayat that consists of several villages, therefore the Dutch part of the research will focus on one ward within the municipality of Enschede. The objective of the research is to compare the political participation of tribal minorities in local self governance structures in Tamana to the political participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord and to reveal some reasons for differences and similarities.

1.3. Relevance of the research

Societal relevance:

The political participation of ethnic minorities is important for a genuine democracy, as in a democracy it is important that an equal representation of all voices is heard (Dahl 1998; Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995). This research gives insight in the political participation of a specific ethnic minority in Enschede, the ethnic Turkish citizens. Further the comparison with the results of the earlier research in India might lead to new insights on how to stimulate participation of ethnic minorities.

Scientific relevance:

This research views the political participation of ethnic minorities in local governance from a different perspective. The literature available in The Netherlands on this topic has a focus on voting behaviour especially in the big cities. This research is conducted in a middle-large city, Enschede, which takes into account not only voting behaviour, but also other indicators of political participation. Furthermore the political participation of a specific ethnic minority group is compared to the political participation of a specific ethnic minority in India which might shed a new light on the collected data.

Personal relevance:

In the summer of 2006 I conducted a very interesting research project on the political participation of tribal people, who are an ethnic minority, in local self governance in India. This research showed that the participation was not optimal when compared with the ideal of democracy, but to a certain extent the participation of the tribal people was above expectation. Therefore the question was raised as to how these result looked compared to the participation of ethnic minorities in western countries like The Netherlands.

1.4. Research question

The background of the research shows turn out rates in India are high, nevertheless participation rates in other political activities are low. According to the ideal of democracy the participation was rather low. However in The Netherlands turn out rates for ethnic minorities are lower than average as well while other political participation rates differ between cities, but in all cases are relatively low too. The objective of this research is to compare the political participation of an ethnic minority group in the two countries. This might lead to new insights on political participation in The Netherlands and India which could be used to improve the political participation policies. Therefore the main research question is:

In what ways is the intensity and nature of participation of allochtone groups in municipal government in The Netherlands similar to, and dissimilar from, participation of ethnic minorities in GP government in India?

1.5. Methodology

1.5.1. Comparative research

This research makes a comparison on the participation in local (self) governance structures of an ethnic minority in Tamana in India and in Enschede Noord in The Netherlands. The fact that a comparison is made typifies this study as a comparative study, more specific a cross-national comparison (Grix 2004). Comparative studies are according to Pennings et. al. (1999:3) '*one of the most important cornerstones of the development of knowledge about society and politics and insights into what is going on, how things develop and, more often than not, the formulation of statements about why this is the case and what it may mean to all of us.*' According to Grix comparative studies provide contextual knowledge on other countries and their system of governance. Insight in similarities and difference produces further information and knowledge through which the researcher places the own country in a wider context (Grix 2004:54).

1.5.2. Quantitative or qualitative research design

Different sorts of research methods can be used in order to conduct a comparison. The first distinction is between quantitative and qualitative research, these are both umbrella terms under which a variety of paradigms, approaches and methods are categorised (Punch 2000:139). According to Babbie (2007) the difference between quantitative and qualitative research is essentially the difference between numerical and non-numerical designs. Both types of data are useful for different research purposes and as Babbie states: '*every observation is qualitative at the outset*' (Babbie 2007: 23). Grix (2004:117) distinguishes quantitative research in three phases: finding variables for concepts, operationalise them and measure them. This research approach tends to '*abstract from particular instances to seek general description, or to test causal hypotheses; it seeks measurement and analyses that are easily replicable by other researchers*' (King et. al. 1994:3).

Qualitative research on the other hand is seen as the opposite. It usually involves in depth investigation of knowledge through interviews and observations. The methods used do not rely on numerical measurements, but may involve them (Grix 2004:120). In general qualitative researchers tend to work from an interpretivist perspective, using methods and data generation that is flexible and sensitive to the social context in which data is produced. Therefore qualitative research is often connected to case studies and social context instead of variables and hypotheses (Grix 2004:120). In contrast to quantitative research the qualitative researcher interacts with the object of study. According to Babbie (2007:309) the greatest advantage of field research is the presence of an observing, thinking researcher on the scene of the action. Critics nevertheless point out that these studies have a small scale and that it is not possible to generalise beyond the case researched. However qualitative studies are used when the researcher is interested in the nature and essence of a case and the goal of the study is understanding, description and discovery (Grix 2004:122).

Since the goal of this research is to understand and describe the differences in the nature of participation of two ethnic minorities in local self governance structures, this research will be conducted with qualitative research methods. In order to be able to understand this situation in depth interviews will be needed. A quantitative research design would not fit well with the need to observe. Babbie (2007) states that qualitative field research is a good way to produce data by studying and observing social phenomena as for example roles, relationships, groups and organisations. Relationships and organisations seem important for the nature of participation in local self governance. Through my in depth interviews no statistical data will be produced because observations are not easily reduced to numbers (Babbie 2007: 286-287).

1.5.3. Research design

To compare a situation in The Netherlands with a situation in a small village in India is challenging. After some discussion the decision fell to compare the situation in Tamana with the participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord in local (self) governance structures. This because the Turkish ethnic minority is a minority that has, in general, been in The Netherlands for several years and therefore the rule introduced in 1985 that ethnic minorities who live in The Netherlands for over five years have electoral rights in local governance is applicable to them. This rule introduced new rights for ethnic minorities while the 73rd amendment of the Indian constitution attributed new rights to the tribal ethnic minority in India. In addition to that, the general literature on minority participation in local governance in The Netherlands gives rather a lot of information on participation of the Turkish ethnic minority. Furthermore the Turkish ethnic minority is the largest non western ethnic minority in Enschede. The choice fell on the ward Enschede Noord as it is relatively well organised, and there are two Turkish organisations within this ward. Therefore it is accessible to conduct research. The research is focussed on Enschede Noord instead of the whole city of Enschede because Tamana is a ward within the official self governance structure of the Gram Panchayat and

Enschede Noord is an official level beneath the city council level in Enschede. This means that the entities are somehow comparable through the level they have in the hierarchy of (self) governance structures. That this research is partly based on the earlier conducted research in Tamana in India in 2006, has implications for the research design in the sense that the way of data gathering in Tamana is fixed.

In the first part of the research I explain the background of this research and come to the formulation of the research question, therefore I use the findings of the research in Tamana as well as literature. I also used literature to decide on the methodology and research design.

For the second part of the research, the theoretical framework, I conducted a literature review in order to frame the theoretical context in which the research takes place. This theoretical framework focuses on the need of equal participation as this assumption is at the basis of the rule introduced in 1985 in The Netherlands and the 73rd amendment in India. The sub questions answered in this part are:

- *Why is equal political participation and representation important?*
- *Which factors cause inequality in political participation?*

In the third part of the research I try to answer the sub questions:

- *How do non-western ethnic minorities and especially the Turks participate in municipal government in The Netherlands in general?*
- *How does the Turkish minority in Enschede Noord participate in neighbourhood, ward and municipal government in Enschede?*

I conducted a literature study on political participation in general and used in depth interviews for the situation in Enschede as there was hardly any information available on the participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord in local (self) governance. The advantage of interviews is that the interviewer can clarify questions and can observe respondents while asking questions for a complete picture (Babbie 2007: 264-265). I conducted interviews with Turkish citizens including the presidents of two Turkish organisations as the theory made clear that organisations might be of influence on the participation of citizens. Furthermore I interviewed councillors from nearly all political parties in Enschede in order to get an insight on the participation from a different perspective, as well as to retrieve information on policies to incorporate ethnic minorities in politics. Besides I used these interviews to cross reference some gathered information. These interviews all had an open structure, in order to be able to adapt the questions to the information given by the respondents. However I made use of a questionnaire with open questions which needed to be asked, these questionnaires can be found in Annex 7. In addition to interviews I used official documents to clarify demographic situations and the official local governance structure. This field research was conducted between May and August 2008 in Enschede, The Netherlands. Furthermore I used a survey investigation on political participation in the neighbourhood Deppenbroek conducted in 2006, 2007 and 2008 to complement my findings. The survey research is conducted by students of the course practice of research and statistics at the University of Twente. The survey questionnaire is developed by a senior researcher of the University Twente and all students followed interview training. In the final part of this chapter I analyse the nature and intension of participation by comparing my findings with the indicators Denters and Geurts (1998) distinguish.

For the fourth part of the research on participation of a Tribal ethnic minority in India I answered the sub question:

How do tribal minorities in Tamana participate in village and GP government in India?

I used the data gathered in India through in depth interviews on the situation in Tamana. These interviews were held as there was hardly any information available on the participation of the tribal ethnic minority in local self governance. I conducted structured interviews with tribal citizens of Tamana, the village leaders and with members of the local self governance structure Gram Panchayat. These were conducted to retrieve insights from different perspectives and to cross reference gathered information. Besides interviews I also observed meetings and used official documents to clarify the official local governance structure. This field research was conducted between July and September 2006 in Tamana, India. In the final part of this chapter I also analyse the nature and intension of participation by comparing my findings with the indicators Denters and Geurts (1998) distinguish.

1.5.4. Literature used

To conduct this research I used various secondary information sources. These are scientific books and articles on (equal) political participation as well as on political participation of ethnic minorities in general, in The Netherlands and in India. Furthermore I used official government documents to investigate the formal organisation structure of local self governance in The Netherlands and in India.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Why is equal political participation and representation important?

Democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely in the governing process according to Verba, Brady and Scholzman (1995:1), as through participation citizens seek to control those who will hold public office and therefore influence what the government does. This influence on what the government does is one of the basic ideas underlying democracy as democracy is governance through the people. Therefore according to Dahl (1998:38) the ideal democracy provides opportunities for effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising final control over the agenda and inclusion of adults. For this research I will use the definition of political participation taken from Verba, Scholzman and Brady: *'By political participation we refer simply to activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action, either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies.'* (Verba et.al.1995:38) In a meaningful democracy the people's voice must be clear in order for policy makers to understand citizens concerns. Voices should also be loud as democracy rests on the notion that each citizen has equal worth, which implies that governments should not only be responsive to citizen interests they hear, but ought to also equally consider the interests of each citizen. The needs and preferences of no individual should rank higher than those of any other citizen (Verba et.al.1995). This is also underwritten by Dahl (1998), although inequality appears to be natural to the human kind, a belief in democracy presupposes that *'citizens ought to be treated as political equals when they participate in governing'* (Dahl 1998:62).

When certain citizens are deprived of an equal voice in the government of a state, the chances are quite high that their interests will not be given the same attention as the interests of those who do have a voice. When an entire group is denied opportunities of participation in governing, their interests will not be adequately protected and advanced by those who govern (Dahl 1998:77). Exclusion from participation violates a fundamental principle of democracy, as those who are excluded from participation will be unable to protect their own interests. This implies an impossibility for the government to be responsive, resulting in a less favourable treatment from the government (Verba et.al.1995:10). Therefore Dahl argues that the citizen body in a democratically governed state must *'include all persons subject to the laws of that state except transients and persons proved to be incapable of caring for themselves.'* (Dahl 1998:78).

That inclusion of all persons subject to the laws of the state, is one of the main arguments on which the right to vote in Dutch local elections for minorities without the Dutch nationality, is based on. Another argument for the attribution of this right to ethnic minorities is the importance of ethnic minorities participating in the democratic achievements to encourage their integration (De Paus 1998:13). This effect is further elaborated by Tillie (2000:88), who says that the political integration of ethnic minorities improves when they participate as equivalents to active Dutch citizens. Political integration on its turn improves the interaction with the ethnic Dutch (*autochtone*) citizens, which will lead to mutual recognition and acceptance that improves integration in other facets of society as well.

However an ideal democracy in which all adults are included and participate equally is not workable on a large scale. Therefore large scale democracies often work with representation, these systems are called representative democracy. These democracies require: elected officials, free fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship (Dahl 1998:85). According to Dahl inclusive citizenship means that *'no adult permanently residing in the country and subject to its laws can be denied the rights that are available to others and are necessary to the five other institutions'* (Dahl 1998:86). Popular sovereignty can only be achieved when every citizen has the right to vote and when these votes are counted through the principle of proportional representation (Tillie 2000:86). Powell (2000:4) agrees that elections are a critical instrument of democracies. He elaborates on the legitimising function of elections, that can serve as a retrospective control or/and as a prospective choice. The retrospective function ensures that citizens can check on office holders, also known as accountability. While the prospective function can be seen as providing a mandate for the government, as it commits candidates to take the actions that citizens desire (Powell 2000:9). Legitimacy of chosen representatives is dependent on the turnout rates as well as the equal participation of different groups according to Michon and Tillie (2003). This means that a low turnout for minority groups at local elections implies that their ideas and wishes are underrepresented within the city council. Subsequently that may imply less responsiveness to their ideas and wishes (Michon et.al. 2003:129). That means that legitimacy problems can occur in the development and implementation of policies in the multicultural society, especially in a time when so called interactive policy development is progressing. If certain groups do not participate, it is difficult to render intended policies into actions

that are approved of by those groups (Tillie 2000:83), therefore high participation rates are the goal. The higher the participation rate, the more likely it is that no opinion will structurally be underrepresented. High participation rates imply a higher potential influence on policy by all groups of people, consequently resulting in a higher legitimacy of the policy (Tillie 2000:112).

This concern for equal participation is the subject of research of Denters and Geurts (1998:162). They state that if a representative democracy wants to adhere to the principle of equal consideration of interests of all adults residing in the country, the elected representatives should have adequate information on the political interests of all citizens. According to Verba (1996:1 in Denters et.al. 1998:159): *'Democracy implies responsiveness by governing elites to the needs and preferences of the citizenry. More than that it implies equal responsiveness; in the democratic ideal, elected officials should give equal considerations to the needs and preferences of all citizens. [...] If some citizens are invisible, one cannot respond to them. [...] Thus if, the government is to have the capability of giving equal consideration to the needs and preferences of all citizens, the public must be equally capable of providing that information.'* One of the most important institutions in a representative democracy, connected with the claim of responsiveness and the possibility to hear the preferences of citizens, are elections. According to Dahl the universal suffrage distinguishes modern representative democracy from all earlier forms of democracy (Dahl 1998:87). Elections are used by all democracies, as a great simplifying mechanism. Citizens have complex preferences on innumerable issues and their preferences differ in degrees of intensity. There are several ways to express these preferences. Therefore all societies are divided in complex ways along multiple axes of cleavage. This implies that descriptive representation on all relevant demographic dimensions probably cannot be realized within the restrictions of a legislator of manageable size (Verba et.al.1995:164). Hence elections give citizens a restricted number of choices, which relatively easy produce a decisive outcome on many complex issues. Since each voter can cast one vote and each vote weighs equal, elections are equalizing devices (Verba et.al.1995:12). However the choices are restricted, therefore elections do not provide representatives with all the opinions of the citizenry. Consequently it is more difficult to be responsive. Other forms of political participation are clearer in voicing preferences (Verba et.al.1995:509).

According to Verba (1996) the idea of responsiveness goes further than only the formal opportunities of participation. Dahl (1998) indicates that an unequal distribution of social resources leads to differences in opportunities for citizens to voice their political preferences, which can be seen as an infringement of the ideal of democracy. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995:3) agree with Dahl that an unequal distribution of resources, in their words capacities, like time, money and skills lead to differences in participation opportunities. They also add motivation, implying that those who are motivated to take part also need the resources that provide the opportunity to participate. According to Rosenstone and Hansen (1993:12) some people are better able to pay the price than others. Both Dahl (1998) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) stress that no political system can fully meet the standards of ideal democracy, as there are differences in opportunities for individuals within the society. According to Verba, Schlozman and Brady throughout history, *'most polities have not adhered, even in rhetoric, to principles of political equality'* (Verba et.al. 1995:11). However even equal political rights do not create substantive equality in their effective use, as there are large differences between individuals and groups in taking part at all and, if so, how much and in what ways (Verba et.al.1995:11). Consequently the voices of certain people with certain politically relevant characteristics are more present in participatory input (Verba et.al.1995:511).

According to Denters and Geurts (1998) political inequality can occur due to specific considerations of the individual, which from a democratic point of view creates no problem. Nevertheless the correlation between social and political inequalities suggests that for some citizen groups, e.g. due to a lack of knowledge and skills, it is more difficult to voice their political preferences and put their political demands on the agenda. That is a problem from a democratic point of view as political inequality then exists due to the inaccessibility of political decision making by some citizen groups (Denters, Geurts 1998:160). This problem is also recognised by Lijphart (1997:2), as he argues that low turnout means a turnout in which classes are unequally represented, in the sense that the turnout is systematically biased against citizens with a lower socio-economic status. When citizens with a lower socio-economic status are underrepresented in participation that implies that they, as a class, have less influence on politics. This because politicians can only be responsive to heard preferences. So if a class is underrepresented their preferences are not equally heard. Hence an unequal class influence on politics has consequences for the election of parties and therefore for the content of public policies (Lijphart 1997:4).

In short, political equality for ethnic minorities is important in two ways, as it implies that all citizens have the same chances to participate and are listened to equally. First, that is important

because the government should be responsive to the wishes of the citizens. The higher the participation the smaller the chances needs and preferences of certain groups are structurally underexposed. The equal exposure increases the chances that all different groups of people are equally represented and their needs and preferences are taken into account with policy making, implying that the policies are well equipped for the society. In addition to responsiveness participation also legitimises the policies of the government with a pre given mandate which is important for the implementation of policies. Second, equal political participation enhances the integration in society. Because political participation leads to interaction, and interaction leads to mutual recognition which is important for further integration in society. Therefore equal participation of ethnic minorities serves a two sided goal.

2.2. Do ethnic minorities in The Netherlands and India participate politically equal?

Research shows that in The Netherlands like Dahl (1998) and Verba (1996) stressed, political activity is spread unequally among citizens. This is also recognized by the 'sociale atlas etnische minderheden' which shows a table with turnout rates at local elections for four ethnic minority groups (SCP, 2006:239). Denters and Geurts (1998) call the phenomenon of unequally spread political participation, political inequality. Some citizen groups seem to participate politically less than other groups. This political inequality in participation seems to correlate with inequalities in the distribution of social-economic resources like income, status and educational level. Political participation rates are higher among citizens with a higher educational level than among citizens with a lower educational level (Denters, Geurts 1998:160). The 'sociale atlas etnische minderheden' of the SCP also uses these factors to explain that in general the political participation rate of ethnic minorities is lower than the average rate. However these general factors do not seem to be the only factors that explain the political participation rate of the different ethnic minority groups, as differences between different ethnic groups and differences between cities can't be explained by this (SCP 2006:240). One explanation for differences between cities can be sought in differences in campaigns, but these do not explain differences between ethnic groups. To explain that Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) refer to Fennema and Tillie (2001) who find the reason for differences in the organisation of the ethnic group.

In India political activity is also unequally spread among citizens, although the reservation seat policy was introduced to let all citizens groups participate equally. In India turn out rates are very high, but one of the reasons for such a high turnout is, according to Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000) the requests and pressure of competing candidates, examples are: social solidarity, the avoidance of later tension, or the fear to otherwise be removed from lists for later beneficiary projects. This shows that real representation and responsiveness will probably not be the case as patronage systems can influence the outcome of elections. Other forms of political participation have a much lower participation rate. Research shows that actual influence, influence out of own consideration which makes a difference, is biased towards women and the lower social groups like ethnic minorities (Alsop, Krishna, Sjoblom 2000). This means that, women and the lower social groups more often than men do not participate in various local self governance structures and when women do participate their influence within the organ is lower, as they are sometimes restricted by men or higher social groups in their influence.

2.3. Which factors cause political inequality?

There are several causes for political inequality. The most important precondition for political equality is a system that, at least in theory, aims for equal political participation. In these systems hindrance to political participation can occur for several reasons. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995:44) find that the amount of political relevant resources citizens have at their disposal is very important. Citizens have different amounts of time, political relevant knowledge and skills and money. This consequently means that the correlation between the different resources is not the same for all individuals, even within a class. When applied specifically to the political participation of ethnic minorities this means that within the group of ethnic minorities, differences can occur in the access to political resources.

Not all political participation activities require the same amount of resources. According to Denters and Geurts (1998) elections hardly require political relevant resources, as voting takes a limited amount of time and the skills required to actually vote (push the button) are not complicated and it does not cost money. Other non electoral forms of participation do claim certain resources. Campaigning costs time and money, while writing a petition costs time and skills. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) agree with Denters and Geurts (1998), they state that political participants differ from not participating citizens in their demographic attributes as well as in their economic needs. These disparities are exacerbated when the focus of analysis lies on more difficult types of

participation that convey more information and can be multiplied in their volume (Verba et.al. 1995:227). In addition to requirements of skills some forms of political participation are mobilised by institutionalised channels while other require own initiatives of citizens. Therefore Denters and Geurts (1998) distinguished four types of political participation:

Table 2.3.1: A typology of different forms of political participation (source: Denters et.al. 1998:165)

Institutional mobilisation?	Individual: resources needed	
	Low	High
No	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contact alderman and councillors - Contact civil servants - Write letters to municipality - Attend participation meetings
Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Voting - Signing a petition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Activities in neighbourhood associations - Activities of activity committee - Contact with political parties

With help of this categorization Denters and Geurts (1998) formulated several expectations with respect to political inequality. Their theory was that political inequality would be low when participants do not differ a lot in their access to resources needed. Furthermore political inequality would be lower when participation is institutionally mobilised. Moreover political inequality was expected to be related to income according to Denters and Geurts (1998), while Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) also relate it to spare time and emphasize the importance of skills. According to Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), skills correlate to a certain extent with someone's social position. This social position is determined by education and social participation, like participation on the labour market as well as voluntary work. Social participation gives people the opportunity to bring their skills into practice. Furthermore gender and age are of influence on the political participation. Social disparities in these variables are likely to cohere with inequalities in political participation as they effect the distribution of political relevant knowledge and skills (Verba et.al. 1995). Not only these factors are of influence, but also the scale of democracies as the scale of the political society correlates with the importance of intermediate structures. Furthermore political parties have an influence on the individual participation of citizens.

Denters and Geurts (1998:172) distinguish eight indicators for local political participation.

These are:

1. Contacting a councillor, an alderman or the mayor.
2. Contacting a municipal official officer (civil servant).
3. Sending a letter to the municipality.
4. Visiting a participatory meeting.
5. Participating in activities of a neighbourhood or ward organisation
6. Participating in the activities of a local action committee
7. Contacting a political party in the own municipality
8. Participating in a petition which was addressed to the municipality

However in the figure of Denters and Geurts voting is taken into account as well. Because of the importance of voting in a representative democracy I add this indicator to the list.

9. Voting in elections

These indicators are categorized in three groups. The first category is on institutionalised mobilisation, which requires little political resources (8-9). The second is on institutionalised mobilisation, which requires substantial political resources (5-7). The third category concerns non institutionalised mobilisation, which requires substantial political resources (1-4). The theory of Denters and Geurts (1998) was that in coherence with their formulated expectations the first and second category would have a lower political inequality than the third.

However the research of Denters and Geurts (1998) shows that the actual political participation is not divided perfectly among the lines of required resources. Voting is clearly the most popular form of political participation, but this is not followed by signing petitions and neighbourhood actions as Denters and Geurts expected. According to Denters and Geurts their research shows that when looking at social representation another division in three groups might be more accurate because social representation is higher when activities are problem oriented. The categorization between institutionalised and non institutionalised mobilisation seems to stay relevant. Therefore they propose a new division among the variables problem oriented and institutionalised mobilisation. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) also state that: '*activity may depend in large part on resources, generalized political engagement, and recruitment. But the citizen who becomes aroused will often speak up beyond what those factors would predict*' (Verba et.al. 1995:510). This implies that problems that affect the individual will lead to more participation, which corresponds with the expectation of Denters and Geurts (1998).

Tillie (2000) refers to the civic community model of Putnam (1993) to explain differences in participation. In a civic community horizontal social relations exist, therefore people feel involved in the issues that affect the community. When these horizontal social relations do not exist one is dependent upon hierarchical vertical relations. In the civic community described by Putnam a tight network of horizontal social relations exists, therefore people feel involved in the local community; they are members of local organisations and follow the local news. That involvement implies that people do not primarily operate out of self interest, but promote the community interests. Democratic institutions can be seen as products of the civic culture. The dominant community thinking implies that these institutions function better and the trust in these institutions is higher. The horizontal network of social relations enables political trust to spread through a community. This can happen through individuals, but also through the political elite of that community, institutions, organisations and associations.

Organisations are important, as a close network of societal organisations can contribute to the distribution of social trust among the members of those organisations. For the network the number of organisations is important as well as the number of double functions. A double function means that one person from a specific community takes place in one organ, but also in another. The more double functions the closer the network is and the higher the extent of civic community (Tillie 2000:103). Denters (2002) calls these social relations, social capital. According to Denters this social capital is important for political participation of citizens who do not have access to economic resources, time and money as well as human resources, education. Especially when economic and human capital is scarce, social capital is important for political participation. Social capital refers to three concepts; the participation in social networks, the trust of the individual in others and the standards that are in force in the community in the perception of the individual (Putnam 1993:167). Like Tillie explained, participation in networks leads to social trust and the emerging and maintaining of social standards of reciprocity (Denters 2002:29). Trust is important to enable citizens to gather in order to undertake collective action. However trust in the responsiveness of the city council, aldermen en mayor is also important to stimulate political participation (Denters 2002:30). Research of Tillie shows that of the larger ethnic minority groups in The Netherlands, the Turkish ethnic minority seems to have the largest extent of civic community. According to Tillie (2000:103) the more ethnic minorities read their own paper and watch their own television, the more involved they feel with the ethnic community. The origin of horizontal networks within an ethnic community is a long term process, which could find its origin in their ethnic country and culture. According to the theory of Putnam (1993) a higher extent of organisation means a higher level of civic community, which means more participation. Research of Tillie (2000) however shows that there exist differences in the participation rates of the Turkish ethnic community between cities. This implies that horizontal networks are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for political participation and trust. The explanation for this phenomenon is according to Tillie that; probably the networks that encourage people to vote, also are the networks that cause a low turn out. For instance when within the ethnic community the trust in politics declines, this decline in trust can spread through the horizontal networks of the community (Tillie 2000:99-106). According to Tillie *'the networks within an ethnic community function as irrigation channels; water can flow through them but they can also dry up'* (Tillie 2000:106).

In short, causes for political inequality are differences in political resources according to Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). Denters and Geurts (1998) add that institutionalisation of the form of participation is important, in the sense that more institutionalised forms of participation will be more used than less institutionalised forms. Furthermore they expect that problem oriented activities reach a higher social representation, which is agreed upon by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). Tillie (2000) adds that a cause for participation can be the organisation of the community in horizontal social relations, like the civic community theory of Putnam (1993) argues.

3. Participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord in local self governance structures

3.1. How does the Turkish ethnic minority participate in local governance structures in The Netherlands in general?

Since 1985 all citizens in The Netherlands with an ethnic minority background, that live for five or more years in The Netherlands, receive voting rights in local (municipal) elections (Tillie 2000:13). The political atmosphere in The Netherlands is divided into three levels; the national level, the province and the municipality. This last level is the local level on which ethnic minorities receive electoral rights. On the municipal level there is a council who represents the citizens and a board of mayor and alderman who run the municipality. In many middle large and large municipalities the municipality is further divided in district committees who cover the policies within the district. Within these districts there are ward councils in which citizens are seated and who can act as an advisory organ for the municipality (see annex 3a for information on the political layers in The Netherlands).

Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) have conducted a research on the political participation of non western ethnic minorities with a focus on women participation. This research shows that citizens with a Turkish background are the most active ethnic minority group, of all the councillors who belong to an ethnic minority 55% had a Turkish background. However only 2,4% percent of all councillors in The Netherlands belonged to an ethnic minority group, which is a rather low percentage when it is considered that 10% of the Dutch inhabitants belong to an ethnic minority group.

The reasons for this low participation can be found according to Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) in individual, as well as institutional factors. They find the individual reasons for this low participation in the educational level and work experience. Politicians are in general well educated, therefore differences in educational level can lead to an underexposure of groups which on average have a lower educational level. In general non western ethnic minorities have a lower educational level than ethnic Dutch citizens (Keuzekamp et.al. 2006; CBS 2008). Furthermore language and communication problems can hinder ethnic minorities, as handicaps in mastery of a language can cause problems during a debate. Work experience can also hinder, as in general ethnic minorities are less active in jobs that are seen as qualifying for a political function. That is especially a problem on the local level, where being a councillor is an additional task to a regular job (Keuzekamp et.al. 2006).

An institutional factor is the recruitment of candidates. Non western ethnic minorities often are less inclined to put themselves forward. In addition they are underexposed in the networks where candidates are recruited (Keuzekamp et.al. 2006). Most selection teams of political parties are composed of white men who operate within networks consisting of white men (Leyenaar 2004). Consequently recruiting candidates from an ethnic minority will cost additional efforts.

Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006:240) investigated the determinants of political interest for Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans (for the table see annex 2). This shows that education has a positive effect on political participation, the higher the level of education, the greater the positive effect. Being female has a negative effect on participation, as well as belonging to the Turkish ethnic minority. Participation in labour activities has a positive effect; this corresponds with the theory of Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). Besides, Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) investigated voting intention and political interest in general which showed that female members of ethnic minority groups participate less than male members and that Turkish women score lowest on political interest and following Dutch political news (Keuzekamp et.al. 2006:241). The attendance of actual gatherings and meetings is 1/3 for Dutch women and only 1/5 for women belonging to an ethnic minority background. Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) give as a possible explanation for low political interest of ethnic minorities the argument of the Council for the Public Administration (2001) that ethnic minorities only have a voting right on local level and not the province or national level, therefore they might have the feeling they are not viewed as equal citizens.

Tillie (2000:32) investigated the results of voting behaviour in various local elections for the Turkish ethnic minority. It shows that Turkish inhabitants in general are in favour of the PvdA and the CDA. On average there are no differences between women and men (Tillie 2000:19). Furthermore ethnic Turks seem to support a Turkish candidate more often than other ethnic minorities support a candidate of their own minority (Tillie 2000:77). However, support for an ethnic candidate is dependent upon the ideology of the political party the candidate stands for. Ideology is an important and decisive factor in the voting behaviour of migrants. Nevertheless, Turkish citizens who have an ideological preference for two parties will mostly vote for the party which has a Turkish candidate on its list (Tillie 2000:79). Fifteen years after the introduction of the right to vote for ethnic minorities in local elections,


minorities view the party system in a similar way as ethnic Dutch citizens do. Also the way in which they develop their preferences is similar to ethnic Dutch citizens. Noteworthy is that in some municipalities the turn out rate of Turkish minorities is even higher than the turn out rate of ethnic Dutch citizens (Tillie 2000:111).

In line with the theory of Putnam (1993), Tillie (2000) found that the Turkish ethnic minority is better integrated in the Dutch society with respect to political participation, as they have a close community that is based on horizontal networks, which are based on mutual trust. These networks contribute to what is called social capital and Turkish people participate more in democracy because they have access to more social capital. The solidity of the ethnic civic community seems to have a positive influence on the trust in political institutions and political participation on neighbourhood and ward level like attending gatherings and participatory meetings. For both trust in political institutions and political participation on a local level the Turkish ethnic minority scores highest of all non western ethnic minorities (Tillie 2000; integratiemonitor 2002).

3.2. How does the Turkish ethnic minority of Enschede Noord participate in local self governance structures within Enschede?

The city of Enschede had 154.745 inhabitants on 1st of January 2008. Of these inhabitants 0.9% have Turkish nationality while 5,8% have Turkish ethnicity. With this percentage the Turks form the largest ethnic minority within Enschede. In total Enschede has 8953 Turkish inhabitants. The municipality of Enschede is divided in five districts (*Dutch: stadsdelen*) which are made up of several wards (*Dutch: wijken*). These wards consist of several neighbourhoods. The ward Enschede Noord is made up of seven neighbourhoods. Together with two other wards it composes the district of Enschede Noord. In the figure below the structure of the municipality of Enschede is explained. For further clarification there is a map of Enschede included in Annex 3b and a table with the percentage of Turkish inhabitants in the several neighbourhoods that compose the ward Enschede Noord.

Figure 3.1.1: Structure Enschede Municipality



3.2.1. Participation in official self governance structures in Enschede Noord

In this research with Enschede Noord the ward level is meant. This ward comes under the district (*Dutch: stadsdeel*) Noord and consists of seven neighbourhoods (*Dutch: wijken*). When I refer to the district Enschede Noord this will always be explicitly stated. The ward Enschede Noord has 17 410 inhabitants of which 1513 are Turkish. This is 8,7% of the total number of inhabitants of Enschede Noord and nearly 17% of all Turkish inhabitants of Enschede.

3.2.1.1. Ward council (*wijkraad*)

Within the ward Enschede Noord there is an official participatory structure called ward council (*Dutch: wijkraad*) whose overall goal is to sustain the liveability of the ward and act in the benefit of the public interest. According to the municipality tasks are:

1. Keeping contact with inhabitants and the municipality.
2. Periodically keeping a public meeting and a weekly consulting hour.
3. Organising activities that enhance the involvement of inhabitants with their own environment.
4. Involving inhabitants in issues in the ward and subjects which the municipality asks advice on.

In practice this means, according to the chairman of the council, that the ward council serves the inhabitants of the ward. For instance through mediation with other governmental organs its inhabitants have to deal with. Inhabitants have to come of their own volition to the council meetings to get in contact with the ward council. These meetings are announced in the local papers. The ward council stands in regular contact with the municipality, with council members as well as civil servants. It operates as an advisory council towards the municipality with concern to plans that affect the ward.

At the moment the ward council Enschede Noord consists of five council members (for more information on the ward council see annex 3c). In the council minority groups, or allochtone inhabitants, are not represented. In the past Turkish as well as Moroccan members have had seats on the ward council but, according to the chairman, they resigned after they reached their personal goals, as they as well face time constraints. At present the ward council has hardly any contacts with the Turkish community as Turkish people do not attend the monthly public meetings or the special issue meetings for inhabitants.

A large survey in Enschede Noord concerning Turkish respondents shows that only two respondents, one in 2007 and one in 2008, out of a total of 128 Turkish respondents had contact with the ward council. The interviewed respondents for this research also state they do not attend meetings of the ward council although they are aware that meetings are held. Reasons not to attend are that the respondents are busy and do not have the time. They also state that they have never been stimulated to attend a meeting or participate in the council. Besides they do not know that the meetings are held. Furthermore results of these meetings are not seen. The chairman of foundation Ender has participated in the ward council meetings in the past, but stated that he stopped going there when the issues he came for were solved. This because the atmosphere was a bit hostile towards non western ethnic minorities, as a seat on the council was taken by a woman who was hostile towards all non western ethnic minorities and she dominated the atmosphere. Currently he is aware that the ward council still exists, but he never attends the meetings as he does not receive a personal invitation. Furthermore he would rather want to be active than just a spectator. Through attending a public meeting you still are not much more than a spectator, as the real decisions are taken by the council, members and attendees do not have a large say.

3.2.1.2. District Committee (*stadsdeelcommissie*)

Another official organ below municipal level is the district committee. The scope of this committee goes beyond the narrow definition of Enschede Noord, as it also includes the areas of the ward councils of Twekkelerveld and Lonneker, but it does have an influence on the governance in the ward of Enschede Noord. In the district committee 12 councillors from the city council have a seat (see annex 3d for the composition of the district committee). The alderman who is responsible for Enschede Noord is present at the meetings as well.

In the district committee meetings policies that affect the district or wards within the district are discussed between councillors. If agreement can be reached within the district committee than these policies will be dealt with in the town council meeting, as a policy document on which consensus is reached and therefore does not have to be discussed anymore. Nevertheless every party has the right to appeal to a voting statement when the party has changed its mind. In addition to official discussions on policies inhabitants also have the possibility to ask questions to the alderman or district manager and the councillors. These questions often are on safety and mobility, as well as inconvenience in the wards. Most people who use their right to speak do this on topics that affect themselves directly. In the meeting guarantees (*toezeggingen*) can be given on the topic by the alderman. This right to speak is used by various inhabitants, but it is not an option used by the wider public. Ethnic minorities including Turks make almost no use of this right according to political parties respondents, as well as Turkish respondents themselves.

3.2.2. Participation in Turkish organisations

The Turkish minority hardly participates in the official self governance organ, the ward council and they hardly make use of the right to speak at district committee meetings. According to the theory of Tillie (2000) minorities are often well organised and this organisation has, following the theory of Putnam (1993), influence on participation. Therefore I also conducted interviews with the Turkish Cultural Association Enschede (TCAE) and foundation Ender. TCAE has a meeting space in the community building Prismare of the neighbourhood Roombeek within the ward Enschede Noord. The foundation Ender is located in the neighbourhood Deppenbroek within the ward Enschede Noord and runs a mosque, as well as a youth organisation.

3.2.2.1 Turkish Cultural Association Enschede (*Turkse Culturele Vereniging Enschede*)

The TCAE has approximately 120 members. One of the goals of this organisation is to enhance the integration and active participation of Turkish people in the Dutch society. Furthermore they protect the interests of Turkish inhabitants of Enschede in the area of sports, culture, social affairs and economy. Their third goal is to encourage mutual adaptation in society by letting Turkish people get acquainted with Dutch people and vice versa.

The association organises several sessions and courses. At present these are not focussed on increasing political participation, but in the past the association has been more active on this topic. They made people aware of the chance to choose in elections and the importance of politics. Sometimes, they also recommend a candidate for the municipal elections to their members. This happened in 2002, but in 2006 this was not the case, as the candidate who asked for a recommendation had not done much for the Turkish community in his prior period as city councillor, according to the chairman of TCAE. During the election period some political parties come to the association and in that respect TCAE is a possibility for members to come into contact with local political governance. Furthermore, TCAE stimulates its members to vote by bringing the opportunity and importance of voting to their attention.

The sessions and courses organised by TCAE enhance the participation and integration of Turks in other than just political areas, for instance by making them aware of safety and health issues. The municipality sometimes contacts them for help with some project, which needs to include minorities. Yet TCAE does not act as an advisory organ towards the municipality nor the ward council.

The board of the association stands in contact with the municipality, the council and especially the district management, mostly for topics like subsidies and regulations. Because of the membership to the board the chairman of the organisation contacts councillors or alderman, has contact with a municipal civil servant and writes letters to the municipality. According to the board member and an ex- board member, most members of the association do not search contact with councillors, alderman and civil servants. Furthermore, they do not write letters to the municipality as this stands to far away from them.

3.2.2.2. Foundation Ender (*Stichting Ender*)

The foundation Ender has 500 to 600 members; most of them are Turkish families. One of the goals of this organisation is to enhance the integration and prevent the Turkish youth from becoming drop outs.

Ender organises several sessions and courses aimed at informing their members on topics like the role of agencies and services their members have to deal with. Mostly around 10 persons attend these meetings. In addition Ender represents the interests of its members if necessary. In that sense Ender functions as a mediator between Turkish inhabitants and the municipality.

The meetings Ender organises are not focussed on increasing political participation, but during election time Turkish candidates from several political parties come to the foundation. In these meetings, which have attendance rates of around 30 people, Ender stimulates their members to vote, but never recommends a candidate.

The association does not act as an advisory organ towards the municipality nor the ward council and has little contact with both organs. They do have a lot of informal contact with the district management. The board members of this organisation used to stand in contact with the ward council and have had contact with councillors, alderman and civil servants for issues that affect the association. Also in the role of chairman letters have been written to the municipality. These contacts most of the time are about subsidies, facilities and regulations. According to the chairman the members of foundation Ender are not emancipated enough to contact the municipality out of themselves. They are not interested in Dutch society, but watch Turkish television and read Turkish newspapers. Therefore the Dutch political system stands far away from them and they would never

contact the municipality. They rather come to Ender when they need assistance. In that sense Ender functions as a intermediate position between citizens and public organs.

3.2.3. Participation in self governance on the municipal level in Enschede

On the municipal level people can be active within a political party, or in the city council or the board of alderman and mayor. In Enschede there are no aldermen who belong to a minority group and the mayor has a Dutch ethnic background as well.

3.2.3.1. Political Party

Through participation in a political party the ideas of an individual have a chance to be heard on the municipal level. In Enschede there are seven political parties active on the municipal level. All these parties have council members as well as an own party organisation. In addition to participation within a political party one can make contact with a political party. Furthermore most political parties try to attract ethnic minorities in times of elections, as a candidate from an ethnic minority group, like the Turkish, attracts votes from within the ethnic group.

Participation within political parties

Not all interviewed political parties have Turkish members. For both the PvdA and CDA approximately 5% of their members are Turkish which is near to representative for the distribution within Enschede itself (5,8%). Christen Unie hardly has any Turkish members, this can be explained by the fact that most ethnic Turks do not practice the Christian religion. Within most parties no Turkish members fulfil an active role. The PvdA does have a Kurdish councillor who originally came from Turkey and the VVD has a councillor with the Turkish ethnicity. CDA has an active Turkish member who was councillor in the former period. In the boards of the various parties or in workgroups that support for example the PvdA and GroenLinks no Turkish citizens take place. The SP does have a lot of active non western ethnic members, but these are mostly political refugees. The chairman of foundation Ender explains this low participation by the fact that a lot of Turkish families are more oriented on Turkish politics than on Dutch politics. Some respondents do have interest in Dutch politics, but do not feel compelled to become an active member. (For more information on participation within specific political parties see annex 3e)

Contact with political parties

All interviewed political parties state that they are often contacted, most of the time this is not by the average inhabitant, but by organised inhabitants. Also all interviewed political parties state that markedly fewer inhabitants who belong to an ethnic minority contact the party. The Turkish ethnic minority hardly contacts the political parties at all. However GroenLinks can recall a conversation with a Turkish man who wanted to talk about a mosque where he was president and the CDA organised a meeting after the film *Fitna* from Wilders on request of a Turkish organisation. Turkish inhabitants state as a reason not to contact a political party that they are not interested in politics, or that they believe that it will not lead to action. In addition, they have not thought of the option. Nevertheless some boards of organisations do contact political parties, however they rather contact civil servants or specific councillors.

Policies of political parties to attract ethnic minorities.

Most political parties do not have structured policies to attract ethnic minorities. The PvdA is the only party who explicitly stated that it desires a more structural policy. Most parties do not differentiate in their approach towards autochtone and allochtone citizens. In addition most parties do not organise activities to encourage political participation of citizens. Furthermore no political party has a focus specific on the encouragement of political participation of ethnic minorities. In several political parties ethnic minorities are approached in a different way from autochtone citizens, in the sense that they get more attention, but there is no difference in the policy. This means that if the policy is that people are only approached when they show interest this is also the case for persons from an ethnic minority. However, most parties put more efforts in the contact with persons from an ethnic minority, due to cultural differences.

All parties except for the VVD have participated in the policy organ 'politieke participatie allochtonen' (PPA) which was focussed on the political participation of ethnic minorities in general. In this organ councillors and members of the board of political parties took place, who set up several projects to involve ethnic minorities in political participation. The aim was not to attract ethnic minorities for one of the political parties, but to encourage an interest in politics in general. Bureau migrantenwerk carried out the work. They organised gatherings where ethnic minorities could receive

explanation on the political system in The Netherlands. The financial resources for PPA came partly from the political parties and for a part from the municipality. When the municipality stopped the subsidy and simultaneously the coordinator of the PPA switched from job the PPA stopped to function. The effect of the PPA was not measurable, as no measurements before the project (*Dutch: nulmeting*) had been conducted. However a lot of people attended these gatherings and more persons from ethnic minorities asked questions to councillors and political parties even besides the PPA meetings.

3.2.3.2. City Council (*gemeenteraad*)

The city council consists of 39 councillors who belong to seven political parties. In the council there are five councillors who belong to a minority group. Three of them belong to the PvdA, one to CDA and one to the VVD. Councillor Uçar of the VVD is the only councillor with an ethnic Turkish background. One of the councillors from the PvdA comes from Turkey, but is Kurdish. This means that 2,5% of all councillors have a Turkish ethnic background while 5,8% of all citizens in Enschede have a Turkish ethnicity. (For information on the number of ethnic minority councillors see annex 3f)

Councillors have a lot of influence in the policies of the town, as the councillors take decisions on important issues concerning the whole city and control and judge the mayor and alderman. This implies that they have influence on all main decisions taken in the municipality. The councillors perform these tasks as representatives of the people, what means that the council should represent the ideas of all citizens in Enschede. This can be done by being responsive to the preferences of the citizens.

In the interviews with the councillors I asked if they felt they could represent their voters, all interviewed stated they could. Furthermore I asked if they felt that ethnic minorities could be better represented by a councillor from their own ethnic background, all councillors, the councillor with an ethnic minority background included, stated that they thought that was not the case. According to the councillor with an ethnic minority background they can, in general, better understand certain specific concerns in their context. However that is not a guarantee for better representation resulting in more effective policies, since effective representation is depended on the quality of the representative. Furthermore the ethnic minority background of a councillor can have an adverse effect in the sense that an argument can be tackled as speaking for the own group only instead of the public interest. However some councillors stated that they thought that ethnic minorities themselves sometimes do think they are better represented by someone of their own ethnic group, as it is known that candidates with an ethnic minority background often receive a lot of votes from their ethnic group. Surprisingly most interviewed Turkish respondents state that it is more important to vote for an ideology of a political party than for a Turkish candidate. That is partly in line with the theory of Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) that ideology is a decisive factor but it diminishes the factor of ethnicity that they, as well as Tillie (2000) found. This might have to do with the fact that the interviewed Turkish people where quite active and took a high place in the hierarchy within their organisation, or had a societal function like police officer in which they stand in contact with a large range of people. The chairman of Ender did tell that he thought that the average member of Ender does vote for a Turkish candidate as most members are mainly focussed on their ethnic group. The chairman of the TCAE had less insight in the voting behaviour of its members, but he also stated that overall a lot of Turkish citizens who vote, vote for a Turkish candidate.

Additionally I tried to find out if councillors with an ethnic minority background differ in the performance of their task as councillor from autochtone councillors. Therefore I asked this question to both autochtone as well as councillors with an ethnic minority background. The councillor with an ethnic minority background felt cultural differences in the sense of postulating individual or group interests. He himself works more from a group interest perspective, but he found that within the council many councillors seem to aim at profiling themselves, there is a difference in work style in this. Consequently the councillor with the ethnic minority background heard that he operated on the background. This has a positive intonation in the respondents own culture, but is not seen as positive in the Dutch political culture. It leads to personal dilemmas in performing the function of councillor for this councillor. Some autochtone councillors also state that councillors with an ethnic minority background are less visible. In addition to cultural differences autochtone councillors also subscribe this operating in the background to language differences. Although all councillors speak Dutch, using nuances in a debate seems to be difficult for non native Dutch speakers. That can be a handicap when debating an issue. However this is not the case for the Turkish VVD councillor as he speaks fluent Dutch and seems to have less cultural differences. The reaction on perceived language problems by autochtone councillors is different per councillor, as some state they think that the councillor with an ethnic minority background itself has more problems with this than the political parties and the council. However other councillors do think that councillors with an ethnic minority

background can be limited in their functioning, in the sense that they are less effective as councillor due to language differences that come forward in pronunciation and debating skills. One autochthonic councillor from a smaller political party observed that councillors with an ethnic minority background often have one or two themes attributed to them while that is not possible within a small political party.

Besides language other resources are also important for political participation within the city council. Therefore the municipality offers a course to get acquainted with the different subjects the council has to deal with and all political parties have their own courses to enhance skills. Besides all political parties screen potential candidates on their capacity before they get placed on the list of candidates for the elections, this screening looks at skills and earlier board functions etc. Some parties have the policy that potential candidates have to be an active member of the party for various years while other parties, mostly the larger parties, do not have such a policy.

3.2.3.3. Advisory organisations

In the municipality there has been an integration council (integratieraad) which advised the city council. This has emerged after an advice of an external partner, SMO, an advisory organization on integration on the province level whose name has changed in Variya. Before the integration council a 'migrantenplatform' existed, however an official advisory organ was seen as a more effective approach to involve ethnic minorities in policy making. This advisory organ was allowed to give asked and unasked advice to the board of the mayor and alderman and was composed of members from various ethnic groups. However there existed different expectations from the side of the members of the advisory organ and the board of mayor and alderman. The advisory organ expected more and quicker replies from the board, while the board seemed to see the organ as a formal, but powerless organ. Therefore the members of the advisory organ got frustrated as they did put a lot of time and effort in the organ, with for them little visible returns. Currently the organ does not exist any more (interview PvdA councillor, former member of integratieraad 16-06-2008).

3.3. How does the Turkish ethnic minority participate in local self governance referenced to the indicators of Denters & Geurts for local political participation?

Denters and Geurts (1998) investigated participation in Enschede, therefore they investigated which percentage of all citizens participates in several political activities. This investigation shows that voting is by far the most participated in activity, followed by contact with civil servants. The row is closed by contacting a political party which only 11% of the citizens has done. Furthermore they investigated the equal representation odds ratio for all these activities. A representation odds ratio of 1.00 means all citizens participate equal in this activity, a ratio below 1.00 shows there is unequal representation. Their investigation shows that certain groups are underrepresented in several participatory activities. Signing petitions is nearest to political equal participation while visiting participatory meetings (voice) has the highest political inequality ratio. This implies that the activity with the highest percentage of participants, voting, is not the activity with the highest representation odds ratio, which is signing petitions. This means that a high percentage of participants does not automatically mean more equal participation (For the table see annex 3g). In the following part I will analyse the nature of political participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord with help of the nine indicators of Denters and Geurts (1998). These indicators are grouped in three categories. For each indicator I will first mention the percentage of citizens of Enschede that participate in this activity according to the research of Denters and Geurts (1998) and make a comment on the representation odds ratio found by them. Thereafter I will use my interviews to give information on the participation of Turkish respondents in this activity, complemented with statistics retrieved from the survey investigation held in Enschede Noord.

Institutionalised mobilisation which requires little political resources:

1) Voting in elections

Voting is the activity that the citizens of Enschede most participate in with 77%. The representation ratio is on the low side of the average for all indicators, this means that participation is not very equal. Within my research most Turkish respondents seem to vote. The used survey investigation in Enschede Noord did not ask for voting intention on the local level, but of the 128 respondents 97 (75%) have the intention to vote on national level. Also the research of Tillie (2000) and Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) show an intention to vote of around 70%.

2) *Signing a petition which was addressed to the municipality*

Of the citizens in Enschede 23% participates in petitions, the representation ratio is the highest for this activity. This means that participation is relatively equally divided among several inhabitant groups. Of the Turkish respondents to the survey investigation 28 (21,9%) participated in a petition which makes this the most participated in activity within the survey (voting is not included).

According to my Turkish respondents, some Turkish citizens participate in petitions, but most of them do not. If the respondents or people they know participate this is not very often, as they state they do not feel much attached to issues of petitions.

Institutionalised mobilisation which requires substantial political resources:

3) *Participating in activities of a neighbourhood or ward organisation*

Of the citizens of Enschede 20% participate in social activities organised by neighbourhood or ward organisations. However in the ward Enschede Noord no Turkish citizens participate. There are no Turkish members in the board of the ward council and they hardly attend meetings. This is striking because the representation ratio of Denters and Geurts (1998) shows one of the highest ratios (most equal participation) on this indicator.

4) *Participating in the activities of a local action committee*

Of the citizens of Enschede 15% participate in activities of a local action committee the representation ratio shows unequal representation however this is higher than on average for the indicators. In the survey investigation only 8 of the 128 respondents (6,25%) have participated in an action committee. My interviews showed that only one Turkish respondent participated in a committee. This committee acted in a field that personally affected the respondent, the fire work explosion committee.

5) *Contacting a political party in the own municipality*

Of the citizens of Enschede 11% contacts a political party. According to political parties the number of persons who make contact with their political party is increasing. However Turkish citizens hardly contact political parties, according to both political parties and respondents. The representation ratio is lower than the average for all indicators as well and the survey shows that 3 respondents (2,3%) contacted a political party. An explanation for this low participation rate given by a Turkish respondents in my interviews, is that politics stand to far from the Turkish citizens. They are not interested in Dutch politics and do not think it will lead to action, furthermore these Turkish citizens do not think of the option.

6) *Visiting a participatory meeting*

Of the citizens of Enschede 16% visits participatory meetings, the representation ratio is very low. Nevertheless 6 respondents to the survey research (4,7%) have conducted this activity. According to my interviews Turkish citizens hardly attend, as meetings do not personally affect the respondents and politics stand far away from the average Turkish citizen. Hardly any respondents could name the mayor, an alderman or councillor. In my research leaders of the TCAE and Ender could name an alderman.

Non-institutionalised mobilisation which requires substantial political resources:

7) *Contacting a councillor, an alderman or the mayor.*

According to the figure of Denters and Geurts (1998) 18% of the citizens in Enschede contact a politician. The social representation ratio shows that not all social groups are represented equally, but in comparison with the other forms of participation it is not too bad. The survey investigation in Enschede Noord shows that of the 128 interviewed Turkish respondents 23 respondents have taken action to resolve a problem, of which 14 have had contact with agencies. Of them 3 have had contact with a councillor and 2 also with a member of the board of alderman and mayor. My research shows that for the Turkish ethnic minority mainly community leaders, the leaders of associations and foundations, contact politicians. Those contacts mostly are on subsidies, facilities and regulations for the organisation. The fact that only leaders seem to have contact with a councillor, alderman or mayor might be explained by the fact that this is in line with the traditional hierarchy in their culture where patron and client relationships are common. In such a situation it is not possible for the average citizen to contact councillors, alderman and mayors directly.

Furthermore it might be explained by the fact that these community leaders really need the contacts for their organisation. They stand closer to politics and they have the skills and network to contact councillors, aldermen or the mayor through their function within the board. However the survey data does not underpin this argument as of the four persons who contacted a politician only one was a board member. However it could be that those persons have been board members in the past or are active members in organisations. The survey question does not specify for that.

8) *Contacting a municipal official officer*

According to Denters and Geurts (1998) 31% of the citizens in Enschede have contacted a municipal official officer. The social representation ratio shows that the social marginalised groups are underexposed, but in comparison with the other indicators it is on average. Of the respondents to the survey 7.8% had contact with a municipal officer. My research shows that only leaders of Turkish associations and foundations contact official officers. Those contacts are mostly on subsidies, facilities and regulations for the organisation.

9) *Sending a letter to the municipality.*

Of the citizens of Enschede 24% writes a letter to the municipality, the representation ratio shows unequal representation. Of the respondents to the survey 11 respondents have written an appeal to the municipality of which 6 also have written a letter to the municipality just like 5 other respondents. In total 16 respondents (12,5%) have written one or several letters to the municipality. My interviews show that writing other than appeal letters to the municipality is mainly conducted by leaders of Turkish associations and foundations. Those contacts also are mostly on subsidies, facilities and regulations for the organisation. Of the 11 respondents that have written a letter other than an appeal 5 are a member of an organisation and 6 are not (survey investigation).

The combined data of the survey research and my own in depth interviews show that the original theory of Denters and Geurts(1998), just like in their own research, does not fit perfectly well as the non institutionalised activities which require substantial resources are quite popular to participate in while their original theory predicted this would be the least participated in activities (see annex 3k for more detailed information). In their own research their suggestion to cope with this difference between expectation and practice, is to divide the participation indicators in three groups among the axes of institutionalised mobilisation and problem oriented activities, instead of institutionalised mobilisation and required resources. In my analyses the problem oriented aspect of activities undertaken by Turkish citizens seem to be important as well, because writing letters and contacting civil servants is mostly conducted on issues that affect the person personally or the organisation he or she is working in. Also the argumentation behind participation in local action committees shows that the issue of the committee has to personally affect the participant. The effect of institutional mobilisation seems less clear, as non institutionalised participation forms requiring substantial resources are rather popular.

Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) as well as Dahl (1998) and Denters and Geurts (1998) refer to resources with respect to political participation. Denters (2002:27) supposes these resources are scarce for (ethnic) minorities in the less wealthy neighbourhoods in Enschede, parts of Enschede Noord can be seen as not very wealthy. Money which stands in relation to financial wealth is a resource mentioned by all authors. Therefore I gathered data from the CBS to inquire the income of the Dutch and Turkish citizens.

The table in annex 3h shows that Enschede as a whole has more citizens receiving assistance and less citizens having a job than average in The Netherlands. The figures also show that a higher percentage Turks receives assistance than the percentage of autochtone citizens. Therefore on average Turks seem to have less money. This also shows from the information on the average income that can be spent. In Enschede citizens on average have less income to spend than average in The Netherlands and Turks on average have a lower income than autochtone citizens. In the survey investigation income however does not significantly correlate with participation.

Another often mentioned resource is education. From the CBS statistics are not available especially for Enschede ,nevertheless the table in annex 3i shows that on average Turks have a lower educational level than autochtone Dutch citizens. The research of Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) shows education has a positive effect on participation. Analyses of the survey data in SPSS also shows that education has a positive effect on participation, however there is no significant relation between education and participation.

Other resources mentioned by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) are free time and motivation. Free time is hard to measure, but in general people who receive their income through assistance instead of through a job have free time. However several studies (e.g. Keuzekamp et.al. 1996; Verba et.al. 1995) show that labour activity has a positive influence on political participation. Motivation is also hard to measure, but Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) have measured the political interest of Turkish citizens. Political interest might be an indicator for motivation, but this cannot be said for certain. The table (annex 3j) shows that ethnic Dutch citizens are fairly more interested in politics than ethnic Turks and follow the Dutch politics better which might mean their motivation is higher.

Furthermore civic community is brought up as an explanation for political participation by several authors (Tillie 2000; Keuzekamp et.al. 2006). Therefore it is important to look at the organisations within the community. The survey investigation shows that of the 128 respondents, 61 are member of an organisation. These memberships vary from a sports association to an elderly foundation, but most respondents are member of the TCAE and Foundation Ender. Of these 61 respondents who are a member of at least one organisation, 14 are member of another association as well. Of these persons 4 are member of in total three organisations and 1 person is member of four organisations. All board members in the survey investigation are member of at least two organisations, which increases the number of double functions and one board member is a member of four organisations. These figures show that around 50% of the respondents are organised. That percentage is not enough to clearly say that there is a civic community. An argument to do say a civic community exists is the fact that both the TCAE as well as the Foundation Ender see them selves as intermediates to help find their members their way in the '*jungle of agencies*' (interview chairman Foundation Ender). That clearly shows one of the arguments of Putnam (1993) that when organisational structures exist people are less dependent on hierarchical structures in society. However the members of Ender agree more with the function of their organisation as intermediate than the members of TCAE. Furthermore TCAE and Foundation Ender do not seem to work together much, only on incidental occasions.

There does not seem to be a real civic community in Enschede Noord in general. This because many inhabitants, not only Turkish, do not feel attached to their ward organisation. Furthermore several respondents state that most Turkish citizens move within the circle of their Turkish acquaintances, but do not integrate very much with the other ethnicities in the neighbourhood. The leader of Foundation Ender feels very strong about this. Also the ex board member of the Turkish Cultural Association Enschede made this remark.

All in all the original theory of Denters and Geurts (1998) does not seem perfectly applicable, because non institutionalised activities which require substantial resources are more popular to participate in than institutionalised activities that require substantial resources. Furthermore for all indicators the participation figure is relatively low. Education seems to have an influence on participation, as well as having a job, this corresponds with the theory of Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1995) however the relationship is not significant within the survey data. There does not seem to be one civic community in Enschede Noord, as a lot of people do not feel attached with the ward council and because the chairman of foundation Ender stated that a lot of Turkish citizens in Enschede Noord operate within their own circle of acquaintances and hardly know the other citizens. This low level of civic community may lead according to the theory of Putnam (1993) to less participation. Besides the Turkish civic community is fragmented as there are several Turkish organisations which do not structurally work together, this may also decrease the degree of civic community.

4. Participation of the Tribal ethnic minority in Tamana in local self governance structures.

In India tribal minorities belong to a traditionally powerless group. Officially the government has abandoned the caste system, but in practice there still exist hierarchical structures in society. In 1993 the 73rd amendment of the Indian constitution was supposed to enhance the participation of traditionally powerless groups like tribal people, but also women and scheduled castes. A three tier decentralisation system was introduced called Panchayat Raj (PRI) (see annex 4a for more information on the layers of the Panchayat Raj).

The Gram Panchayat (GP) is the lowest of the three tiers of the PRI, the Gram Sabha (GS) is an organ that controls the GP. In the state of Orissa a fourth level called Pali Sabha (PS) was introduced as the villages in Orissa in general are too small to have a own GP per village. In the PS village problems can be discussed within the village itself. Consequently these problems can be taken to the GS, which can be seen as the parliament on the GP level and is the official decision making forum. The GP level decides which activities will be executed as there are not enough resources to solve all existing problems; therefore influence in the GP is important for the development of a village. The plans of the GP are sent to the Panchayat Samiti that sends their plans to the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) on district (Zilla) level; they finalize the plans and budget. The DRDA sends the money to block level that forwards the money to the different GPs who will distribute it among their villages (Biswal n.y.).

In addition to the decentralisation system the 73rd amendment introduced the reservation seat policy this means that seats will be reserved in all levels of government for backward groups in society like scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST) and especially women. These are backward groups as the caste system that was officially abandoned still is in practice in power relations. General Caste citizens are citizens who come from within the caste hierarchy. Scheduled Caste citizens are the lowest within the caste hierarchy. Tribal citizens officially are not included in the caste system. In practice this meant that they were seen as even below the lowest caste, which implies that they traditionally have few powers. A study of Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000:17) showed that in practice the 73rd amendment does not lead to more influence for traditionally powerless people, an example is that their research showed that 28% of the respondents felt that the education and personal qualities of the husband of a women who stands candidate, play an important role in the election. Furthermore a comparison of a village with a reserved seat for women and scheduled tribes with a village without this reservation did not show more participation of these marginalised groups (Alsop et.al. 2000:25).

4.1. How does the tribal ethnic minority participate within the village of Tamana?

Tamana is a small village of approximately 380 inhabitants who are all tribal. Tamana comes under Sihala GP which consists of six villages, of which most inhabitants belong to scheduled caste (the lowest caste level) or other backward communities. However the largest village, Jugudi, also has general caste inhabitants. Tamana is the only wholly tribal village in the GP. The GP consists of a Sarpanch who is the president, a Naib (vice) Sarpanch, and 16 ward members who represent their village. Larger villages have more ward members than smaller villages. All positions are elected and elections take place every five years. However in practice the ward members are asked by the PS instead of being elected. It is decided beforehand on state level which group and gender may put forward a candidate for each position (Orissa government 2006).

In addition to the official local self governance structures, the GP, GS and PS, Tamana also has two other self governance structures within the village, the General Body (GB) and the Village Executive Committee (VEC). These structures are implemented by Gram Vikas, a rural development non governmental organisation in the state of Orissa. Gram Vikas finds the Panchayat Raj Institutions important to pave the road for further development of the poor people. In order to enhance participation Gram Vikas incorporated self governance policies within their rural health and environment programme (RHEP). To start the programme in a village, the first requirement is to form a GB in which all households are represented by male as well as female members. The GB serves as a discussion forum within the village. The GB elects a VEC whose task is to monitor, manage and execute the implementation of RHEP (Gram Vikas 2001). Participation in the GB and VEC gives both men and women experience with participation in a self-governance body and it learns them to have an opinion, speak in public, debate and negotiate. In addition Gram Vikas aims to achieve a strengthening of the PRI by making elected VEC members familiar with PRI through trainings (Gram Vikas head of training department).

4.1.1. General Body

The GB serves as a discussion forum on all issues that are brought up and sometimes as a decision making forum. Meetings can be gathered on initiative of the villagers, but also on initiative of Gram Vikas. This implies it is not a 100% self governing organ. Participation in the GB gives people the opportunity to give their opinion on an issue, discuss, solve problems and it teaches them to speak in public (Gram Vikas head of training department). The attendance rate Gram Vikas aims at is 70-80%, people are supposed to come out of own motivation. In practice attendance rates differ per subject discussed, but vary between 20-30% and 45-55% depending on the issue under discussion (Gram Vikas ITDP MPR).

Villagers are encouraged to participate by requests of the Gram Vikas staff members who tell them that they have the power to decide. Besides empowerment training for women, stimulates females to participate. Furthermore there is an external motivation in the form of a fine system that encourages people to come as well, this fine is collected by the village coordinator and saved for development of the village. Households that are not represented at important meetings, for which everybody is invited personally, will receive a fine of 20 rupees. According to several interviews in Tamana this measure seems to work best as villagers cannot afford a fine. However this fine is only introduced for meetings on very important issues for which every family is personally invited.

The reason to participate voluntarily in the GB is according to all interviewed villagers mainly that it is a requirement for the development of their village. Within the GB joined action can be taken which proved successful, for example in the fight against moneylenders where the villagers together stopped the influence of these moneylenders on village inhabitants (interviews).

Due to the social structures in the village the number of male attendees exceeds the female attendees. Tribal people do not have such unequal gender relations as mainstream Indian society, but women in tribal communities are not supposed to take decisions either, according to the ITDP programme manager¹ of Gram Vikas. However the Kerandimal project coordinator (PC), who is responsible for a specific region of the area Gram Vikas works in, and therefore is the overall manager for Tamana, argues that women are empowered to take decisions, but that other reasons keep them from attending as women are busy with agricultural and housework. Ten years ago women were not empowered, but trainings and self help groups have started to change that situation.

4.1.2. Village Executive Committee

The VEC monitors, manages and executes the implementation of Gram Vikas RHEP. The structure of the VEC encourages gender empowerment as both a male and female signature is required when a decision is taken. The members of the VEC obtain management skills as well as skills in lobbying at the government and GP for funds. They receive several types of trainings (leadership, advocacy, network, gender and PRI) which increase their skills. Officially VEC members have a three year office period, but this is not strictly maintained. In general the attendance rate of male-female is 75-25%, but females participate equally to males when attending (Kerandimal PC). However the VEC meetings aren't attended very well as the attendance rate does not reach 20%. Reasons for non attendance are occupation with work or illness. VEC members give as main reason to participate that people selected them to do something for the development of their village.

With respect to representation the VEC is not a cross cut representation of all the villagers in Tamana (see annex 5b) as women are underrepresented as well as the landless people while the medium farmers are overrepresented. The representation ratio of BPL and APL households is quite good.

Verba, Brady and Schlozman (1995) explain that differences in representation are due to differences in political relevant resources like skills, time and money. In general land less people are the persons with less skills and money. Because VEC members are partly chosen on the basis of their skills it does not seem surprising that land less people are underrepresented. Furthermore women work in agriculture besides conducting the housework, therefore women have more time constraints than men. Time constraints as a negative influence on participation corresponds with the theory of Verba, Brady and Schlozman (1995) and could be a reason for less participation of women.

4.1.3. The Pali Sabha

The Pali Sabha (PS) is the meeting of all voters of a revenue village in the GP. All villagers above 18 are supposed to participate. Tamana has one ward-member she represents not only Tamana, but also the hamlets of Kanheiput and Santiga, therefore a PS is held with these three villages together. A meeting is held in February each year, but in case of necessity meetings can be

¹ For explanation of the Gram Vikas structure please see Annex 5

convened as may be decided by the GP. The quorum for PS is 1/10th of the electorate out of which 1/10th should be women in order to guarantee women participation. The ward-member representing the village presides over the PS. Unfortunately the PS is not able to carry out all the official functions of the PS as some decisions are taken at the GP level and other functions are already carried out by the structures implemented by Gram Vikas.

In practice not all villagers above 18 participate in the PS, but of the 84 households in Tamana approximately 75 to 80% attend the PS (Kerandimal PC). Some households are represented by both male and female. However most households are only represented by a male due to (house) work activities, therefore males exceed the females by far. The females that do attend do not say much according to the gathered data. According to the interviews village leaders take the decisions within the PS, this implies that average villagers do not have a lot of influence on the decisions taken which is in line with the cultural background of the tribal people.

Through participation in the PS resources can be retrieved from the GP level which otherwise would not come to the village. To receive a fund a decision has to be taken at the GP level, therefore it is important to have a representative at the GP level who can lobby for the village. In the PS meeting input can be given to this representative, the ward member. The main reason to participate in the PS is to receive resources. Another reason to participate is that people are called door to door to attend the PS by the village leader. That is a form of social pressure, which according to my interviews is an important factor to attend the PS. That this is an important factor can be explained by the social dependencies of the villagers on the village leader. One can argue if this measure is really democratic or if participation rates are enhanced by such a measure, but not the actual participation itself. That social pressure increases participation, corresponds with the civic community theory of Putnam (1993). Reasons not to attend the PS are health, housework and the fact that other villagers, like VEC members are already going (several interviews). Through participation in the PS knowledge and confidence to speak up are gained as well as knowledge on the topics discussed. Experience gained in the GB and the VEC make it easier for persons to participate in the PS (interviews). Nearly all PS participating respondents state they have influence on the decisions made in the PS. This is surprising because several respondents state that women who attend do not really participate and village leaders claim they have a great influence on decision-making within the PS.

4.2. How does the tribal ethnic minority participate on the Gram Panchayat level?

On the GP level there are two self governance organs. The Gram Panchayat consisting of the ward members, Sarpanch and Naib Sarpanch, as well as the Gram Sabha consisting of inhabitants of the villages residing under the GP. Officially the GS is the decision-making organ as it decides on the planning and budget of the GP. In practice however it seems that the Sarpanch does the planning and budget and the GS approves. (See annex 4b for the composition of Sihala GP)

4.2.1. Gram Panchayat

Officially all positions in the GP are filled up through elections. However in practice ward members are often asked by the PS rather than elected. Nonetheless there are election campaigns for the Sarpanch as mostly there are two or more candidates. All inhabitants of the GP who are 18 years or older and enrolled on the voters list are allowed to cast their vote (GP secretary). In large villages it happens that someone gets overlooked and does not end up on the voters list, but in Tamana all those entitled are enrolled. All respondents did cast their votes and according to the interviews it is normal for all villagers to cast their vote. However the choice of the person to vote for is often not really free. In the GB it is decided which contestant will be the best person for development of the village and all villagers will then cast their vote for the same person. In interviews respondents explicitly stated that they do not vote at the request of a candidate, but they do vote at the request of their village leader, for the person decided on within the GB.

Officially 1/3 of the ward members must be female. This is reached through the reservation seat policy which determines the group and gender of the person to fill a specific position. Consequently a ward member of the right gender and social group is chosen in unanimity by the PS. The role of the ward members is to signal problems through the PS and indicate these problems in the GP meeting. After a decision in the GP is taken by all ward members and the Sarpanch, the ward member presents the projects that come to the village in the PS.

In practice it seems that influence in the decision making process as a ward member is not dependent on participation in the organ, as an observed GP meeting showed that there were no plenary discussions in which all ward members and the Sarpanch together decided on an issue. Influence seems to be dependent upon the personal relationship of the ward member with the Sarpanch and her husband, as in the meeting decisions were taken in two on two discussions with

them. These discussions had very different outcomes for different ward members. An interview with the Sarpanch revealed that she discussed everything with her husband and therefore he can be seen as having great influence on decisions taken. Furthermore interviews implied that money has an influence on the decision making process, as respondents implied that the Sarpanch wishes a cut of development schemes appointed by her to an individual, before she appoints the development scheme. Otherwise the scheme will be awarded to someone else. In practice this implies, corresponding with the findings of Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000), that the poor are not the exclusive beneficiaries of these schemes.

Party politics do not seem to have a major influence on the functioning of the GP as the Sarpanch and ward members do not belong to a particular political party. However interviewed respondents argue that when the Sarpanch belongs to the same political party as the chairman of the block then the GP will receive more funds. This because in some Gram Panchayats there are more political connections and according to the respondents those receive more funds. Although this practice of favouring Sarpanches connected to the same political party seems to be common in India, I have found no evidence for this argument within Sihala GP. All interviewed Gram Vikas Staff members, the GP secretary and the Sarpanch stated that party politics play no role on the GP level in this part of Orissa.

The activities carried out by the GP show that the tribal minority ward member of Tamana does not have a lot of influence as few projects have been appointed to Tamana compared with the number of projects appointed to Jugudi. In the period 2002-2006 only one road project was partly funded by the GP. All problems which were signalled within Tamana (deforestation, stopping alcoholism and adult education) were not on the agenda of the GP. Health facilities though did appear on the agenda, which was an important topic for Tamana as well. The ward member herself claimed she had influence in the meeting, but the observation of the meeting showed that she had little interaction with the Sarpanch.

4.2.2. Gram Sabha

The GS is the forum that decides on GP actions and is supposed to hold GP members accountable. All the voters of all the revenue villages under a GP are members of the GS. The GS meets twice a year in February and in June, but the Sarpanch can convene additional meetings, the state can also authorise the Sarpanch to convene an extra meeting. The GS will be held by rotation in all the villages the GP consists of. At the meeting 1/10th of the electorate has to be present in order to reach the quorum, of the attendants 1/3rd is supposed to be women. If the quorum is not reached no legitimate decisions can be made (Government of Orissa, 2006). According to the study of Alsop Krishna and Sjoblom (2000) only village leaders attend these meetings and most inhabitants have never attended a meeting. A lawyer has analysed the powers of the GS and came to the conclusion that a number of provisions are unclear and certain rights of the GS are not supplemented with duties on the side of the GP. Furthermore some specific functions and manners of exercising such functions are to be subscribed by the state. That has consequences for the real power utilisation, in the sense that the GS will have to function along detailed prescriptions of the state (Upadhyay 2004). This makes the GS more an executive organ than a decision making organ.

In Tamana, just like in the research of Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000), only the village leaders attend the GS together with the ward member. According to interviews the other villagers of Tamana do not attend due to a lack of prior notice and the fact that it is not common that other than the village leaders attend. The GP secretary, who is appointed by the state and is in charge of the administration, explained that at most meetings there is an attendance rate of 30% of all inhabitants of the GP, but attendance differs per meeting. Inhabitants of the village near the GP office participate more. This may imply that the influence of the tribal people of Tamana in the GS is rather small as they are outnumbered by scheduled caste, other backward communities and general castes from other villages. However according to the village leaders and the ward member they do have influence as they have a pro active attitude within the meeting. The reason to participate in the GS is according to the village leader that people listen to him, which would imply influence. However this influence does not translate into projects coming to Tamana. Nevertheless in other matters, where money is not the key issue, more influence has been brought to bear. For example when there was a conflict on the village pond of Tamana which was given to another community. Through protests in the GS, Tamana regained her pond. Furthermore it seems that there is a discrepancy between the official functions of the GS and the practice which implies less influence of the GS on decisions taken.

4.3. How does the tribal ethnic minority participate in local self governance referenced to the indicators of Denters & Geurts for local political participation?

In this part I will use the indicators of Denters and Geurts (1998) to analyse the nature of the political participation of the tribal ethnic minority in Tamana, just like I did in chapter 3 for the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord. To conduct this analysis I will use information from my interviews. This analysis will show clearly that there are differences in the situation in The Netherlands and in India as some indicators are less relevant in Tamana than in Enschede.

Institutionalised mobilisation which requires little political resources:

1. *Voting in elections*
Approximately all entitled villagers cast their vote. However who to vote for is decided in the GB, in a discussion in which all candidates are evaluated on their potential benefit to the village. Village leaders take the final decision and recommend one candidate to all villagers to vote for. In practice nearly all villagers vote for this candidate.
2. *Signing a petition which was addressed to the municipality*
These kinds of actions are not at all common in Orissa and I do not have access to research data on this topic.

Institutionalised mobilisation which requires substantial political resources:

3. *Participating in activities of a neighbourhood or ward organisation*
The VEC can be seen as the ward organisation, because they implement the projects of Gram Vikas which cover all households in the village. All households are participating in the activities of the ward organisation.
4. *Participating in the activities of a local action committee*
Specific local action committees are not present in Tamana, when action is needed the GB comes together and decides which actions to take. Participation in the GB though differs very much with the topic. The attendance however lies around 20-45% which is quite high and means that most households are represented within this body.
5. *Contacting a political party in the own municipality*
Political parties do not have an influence on GP level politics contrary to what is common in most regions in India. Nevertheless contacting the ward member only happens within official structures. Following the original theory of Denters and Geurts (1998) this means that institutionalised mobilisation is of influence on participation.
6. *Visiting a participatory meeting*
The PS can be seen as a participatory meeting to identify the problems in the village. This meeting has a high attendance rate of 75-80% of the households in the village which can be subscribed to the social control involving personal invitations. However only the heads of the households attend and interviews reveal that only village leaders really have a voice in these meetings.

Non-institutionalised mobilisation which requires substantial political resources:

7. *Contacting a councillor, an alderman or the mayor.*
In Tamana the ward member who can be compared with an alderman is known by all villagers. Making contact with her however happens within the PS and inhabitants that do not attend the PS do not seem to make contact with the ward member on other occasions either. The Sarpanch who can be compared with the mayor is known only by the village leaders, who have contact with her within the GS. The GS can be compared with the council in some sense, but the comparison goes wrong on the fact that GS attendants are attendants and not elected.
8. *Contacting a municipal official officer*
There are no real municipal official officers as the only officer is the GP secretary, but he has a purely administrative function and therefore it is not common to contact him.
9. *Sending a letter to the municipality.*
In Tamana most inhabitants are illiterate; therefore writing letters does not happen. In addition, it is not a usual way of communicating in Sihala GP. Usually issues are brought to bear in an official meeting, therefore the literate inhabitants in the village do not write letters either.

This comparison with the indicators of Denters and Geurts (1998) shows that participating in neighbourhood or ward organisations is most popular as all households are represented. Also the attendance of participatory meetings is high as persons are invited door to door, showing there is a lot of social cohesion. That raises the question if democracy is enhanced by this or if only participation rates are enhanced. Nevertheless these are both institutionalised mobilisation activities that require substantial political resources. The participation rate for the local action committee is lower, however this differs per subject. That corresponds with the adjusted theory of Denters and Geurts (1998) that persons participate more in problem oriented activities that affect them. Also almost all entitled villagers participate in voting. That also corresponds with the theory of Denters and Geurts (1998) that institutionalised activities for which little resources are needed are participated in a lot. Contacting a ward member or Sarpanch seems to be done mainly by village leaders. Showing that non-institutionalised mobilisation is, like the original theory of Denters and Geurts (1998), the least common to participate in.

According to Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) as well as Denters and Geurts (1998) the resources that influence participation are money, education, time and motivation. Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000) conducted research on which factors influence participation in the GP in India.

Wealth, as measured by landholding, does not appear to be closely related with participation in political activity according to the research of Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000:15). However my research shows that the landless are underexposed in the VEC, whose members are seen as the village leaders. The ward member and the village leader of Tamana both come from a relatively wealthy family within the village as well. Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000:18) also place a remark on this finding. According to their data representatives who are landless participate to a significantly lesser extent than those who own land. Landless are likely to be more dependent economically, therefore they are according to case data, less likely to raise dissenting opinions against their potential employers in the village. In that sense wealth does influence participation a little.

Education is seen as a significant factor of influence on participation. The percentage of "low participators" decreases if the level of education increases. Only 16 percent of those who are entirely uneducated are "high participators", against 46 percent of those with 10 or more years of education (Alsop et.al. 2000:15). Each additional year of education is associated with a difference of about two points, implying that a person with 10 years of formal education scores 20 percent higher on the narrow index, all other things being equal, than a person who has no education at all (Alsop et.al. 2000:16). Education is not the exclusive privilege of those with large landholdings; therefore education does not show a significant relation with wealth. According to the research data education was perceived by 63 percent of the people as a very important asset that influences the effectiveness of an elected representative (Alsop et.al. 2000:17).

The policy of Gram Vikas on capacity building was based on the skills, that Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) labelled a political resource. The idea was that through courses and participation in the bodies introduced by Gram Vikas the people would develop dignity and skills to participate in and influence decision making in the Gram Panchayat.

Time was not researched as a factor influencing participation by the study of Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom. They however found that livelihood security is a significant attribute of elected representatives. Persons who need to think of their daily subsistence have no time, little interest, or power to be part of the Panchayat (Alsop et.al.2000:17). In my own research time was mentioned as a limiting factor by respondents various times. Occupation with work agricultural as well as housework limited participation of several villagers. I do not have significant quantitative data, but according to my qualitative case study data it can be argued that a lack of time has a negative effect on participation.

Motivation was not taken into account by the study of Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000:16) either, but access to information has been found significant. The addition of one more source of information to a person's repertoire tends to increase participation by more than five percentage points. In my research one external motivation came forward clearly, the fine which is imposed on households that aren't represented in important meetings for which everybody was invited personally. Also the personal invitation of the village leader for the PS meeting is an external motivation. Internal motivation was sought in the fact that a person was elected (for VEC members) or the fact that persons wanted to contribute to the development of the village, which is a very concrete motivation.

When looking at the civic community of Tamana an important indicator according to Putnam (1993) is the number of organisations. There are no real organisations within the village as the village is rather small, however the GB, VEC and PS organs do exist within the village. Persons who are active within the VEC also participate the most in the PS, in that sense there are double functions. Furthermore when observing village life it is clear that the village operates as one community with a lot of horizontal relationships. This comes forward in the joint action on forest management that was

taken after discussion in the GB in which almost all households in the village took part. This also comes forward in the fact that the GB selects one candidate, who is recommended by the village leader, to vote for. Almost all villagers follow this recommendation. This implies that the social trust within the community is high which results in the joint action in voting, therefore in my opinion the tribal community in Tamana can be seen as a civic community.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

In this conclusion I will try to answer the research question:

In what ways is the intensity and nature of participation of allochtone groups in municipal government in The Netherlands similar to, and dissimilar from, participation of ethnic minorities in GP government in India?

Within my research I have specified this rather broad research question to ethnic Turkish citizens in Enschede Noord in The Netherlands and ethnic Tribal citizens in Tamana in India. Enschede Noord and Tamana are quite different in their composition. Where Tamana wholly consists of ethnic tribal citizens who are a minority in the Sihala Gram Panchayat, Enschede Noord consists of various ethnic groups of which the Turkish citizens are the largest minority. The Turks also are a minority within the municipality of Enschede. Besides the composition also the number of hierarchical layers in self governance differs. Tamana has its own bodies, the GB and VEC, as well as a joint body with two hamlets, the PS and a higher body the GP. Enschede Noord has only one own body, the ward council, topped by a district council, which is a decentralised part of the municipal council. Within the ward Enschede Noord the Turkish citizens have their own Turkish organisation, but these stand open for all citizens of Enschede and not especially for citizens of Enschede Noord.

Despite these differences in structure and inhabitant groups some conclusions on the intensity and nature of participation of the two ethnic minorities in the self governance structures can be drawn. For both Enschede Noord and Tamana I have evaluated the political participation of the ethnic minorities against the indicators for political participation of Denters and Geurts (1998), which reveals the nature of participation.

In Enschede Noord the most popular political participation activity is voting. That is an institutionalised mobilisation activity that requires little resources. Remarkably thereafter non institutionalised activities that require substantial resources are most popular, writing letters and contacting civil servants. The theory of Denters and Geurts (1998) predicted that this would be the activities with the least equal participation. However their own adjustment of their theory, that problem oriented activities are participated in more equal than other activities, might explain this factor, as citizens who have a problem will contact councillors themselves instead of going to a ward council. The institutionalised activities which require substantial resources are the least popular. The nature of participation is therefore mostly problem oriented and none institutionalised, except for voting. This is in correspondence with the findings of Denters and Geurts (1998) themselves that the problem orientation of the action has more influence than the required resources, as required resources do not seem to influence participation a lot. The intensity of participation is quite high for voting, according to the survey 75% of the respondents have the intention to vote. However other forms of participation have a rather low participation rate varying between 21,9% followed by 12% and 2,3%, therefore the intensity of participation in those activities can be called quite low.

In India voting is also the most popular form of participation, according to research of Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000:4). However in Tamana institutionalised mobilisation activities that require substantial resources are very popular as well. This can be explained by the fact that the VEC structure, which functions as a neighbourhood organisation, requires full inclusion. For PS meetings, which can be seen as participatory meetings, personal invitations are given from door to door. Also the GB which functions as a local action committee has relatively high attendant rates, due to the requirement of full inclusion in this organ by Gram Vikas in order to conduct development works. The non-institutionalised activities are the least popular as hardly any citizen contacts a ward member outside official meetings. The nature of participation in Tamana is clearly through institutionalised mobilisation, resources do not seem to have a large effect. The problem oriented influence on participation can be seen in Tamana as well, as issues that affect persons lead to more participation in for instance the GB. The intensity of participation in Tamana can be called quite high, social control seems to have quite some influence on the participation rate. This however, as already mentioned in chapter 4, might lead to high participation rates, but it can be questioned if all attendants actually participate. Not all forms of participation Denters and Geurts (1998) distinguished, exist in Tamana. However the activities that do exist reach a higher participation rate than for the Turkish citizens in Enschede Noord.

A possible explanation for the difference in popularity of the institutionalised activities that require substantial resources might be sought in the socio-cultural differences. Putnam (1993) refers

to social cultural influences in his civic community theory. In Tamana everybody knows everybody, while in Enschede Noord this is the case to a far lesser extent. Therefore the social trust and social control, for example with door to door invitations, is greater in Tamana. This social trust and control motivates citizens to participate. In Enschede there are no door to door invitations for ward council or participatory meetings. In addition to that the ward council is not an exclusively Turkish organisation. Besides even within the Turkish community ties are more loose and interdependency is lower as the Turkish citizens are distributed over several independent Turkish organisations. Another explanation can be that the ward council is not a requirement for development in Enschede Noord. There are other ways to get things done, as the chairman of the ward council said: 'citizens go straight to a council member instead of to us' (Interview ward council chairman Enschede Noord) while in Tamana the VEC is necessary for the development of the village and joint action on certain topics like deforestation is a necessity for securing livelihood conditions. In Enschede basic livelihood conditions are guaranteed, as can be seen in the average income statistics and the fact that assistance can be received when citizens are out of a job, this might lead to less action. That corresponds with the theory of Denters and Geurts (1998) that problem oriented activities are participated in more.

The comment of the chairman of the ward council in Enschede Noord that citizens go straight to a council member shows the discrepancy between Enschede Noord and Tamana. In the latter there is no intention to contact the ward member outside of institutionalised gatherings. A possible explanation for the difference in the popularity of the non institutionalised activities like contacting a councillor, civil servant or writing a letter might be sought in a difference in skills. In The Netherlands the educational level is higher than in Tamana. Even though Turkish citizens have a lower educational level than ethnic Dutch citizens their average educational level is higher than in Tamana. Keuzekamp and Meerens (2006) found that education has a positive influence on political participation; therefore this might be seen as an explanation. Furthermore India is a very hierarchical society; average villagers are socially and economically dependent on the villager leader. Due to the hierarchy it is normal that only village leaders participate in organs like the VEC and the Gram Sabha and that they contact the ward member. Besides the caste system still has influence as well which means in practice that hierarchical layers are quite strictly obeyed. Within the Turkish ethnic minority this tendency can be seen to a lesser extent as well. Contacting a councillor or alderman does not happen very often and mostly by Turkish citizens who are member of an organisation. Besides according to my respondents mostly leaders write letters and contact civil servants. However according to the survey, writing letters is not done exclusively by leaders and the educational level differs fairly per respondent.

All in all it seems that the intensity of the participation in Tamana is not that bad after all. The civic community like Putnam (1993) and Tillie (2000) argue can be seen as an explanation for political participation. In Tamana the citizens of the village form a close community, there exist a lot of horizontal relations and interdependencies as well as vertical relations with village leaders. As a result social trust is high, which is expressed in the fact that a voting recommendation is followed by almost all citizens. In The Netherlands these social ties are looser. Voting recommendations are not given by a ward council and even in Turkish organisations where as an exception sometimes a voting recommendation is given, not all voters follow this recommendation. Besides the influence of the civic community the influence of resources can be seen as well. The influence of money is for both Enschede and Tamana small. Nevertheless the influence of education can be seen, however not for all indicators Denters and Geurts (1998) distinguished. These differences in resources might also be used to explain the difference in the nature of participation. Turkish citizens in Enschede Noord participate more in non institutionalised activities than the tribal citizens of Tamana. However the Turkish citizens of Enschede Noord do not participate with a large number in these activities as well.

5.2 Recommendations

The civic community seems to have a large influence on political participation in Tamana. Following the theory of Putnam (1993) this would mean that if the Turkish community in Enschede Noord would become more one community, social trust would enhance which could encourage political participation through the whole of the community. On the other side if the civic community in the ward Enschede Noord in general is enhanced this could lead to more participation as well. The comment of the chairman of foundation Ender, that the atmosphere in the ward council was hostile towards non ethnic Dutch citizens a decade ago and he therefore never attends meetings, shows that a lot can be gained in this sense.

Therefore:

1. Activities to enhance community building should be encouraged. The Prismare building in Roombeek in which various organisations are located can help with this. Nevertheless community building initiatives in the other neighbourhoods should also be encouraged.

2. To create a closer Turkish community the Turkish Cultural Association Enschede and the Foundation Ender as well as other Turkish organisations in Enschede could integrate more and work together regularly instead of on an ad hoc basis. However there might be good reasons why these organisations do not have close ties. The Turkish Cultural Association Enschede seems to be a more secular organisation than foundation Ender that also runs a mosque. Therefore there should be further investigation before it can be said that benefits can be gained from encouraging working together.
3. To improve the relations of the ward council with the Turkish community the ward council should have an informal meeting with the chairmen of Turkish organisations to start such a relationship. Besides the ward council should send a personal invitation for their meetings to the Turkish organisations. This because Turkish respondents in my interviews stated they would attend if they would be invited personally and that method showed results in Tamana as well.

In Tamana a civic community is already present. The patron-client relationship is common in India in which poorer citizens are economically and socially dependent on citizens that are higher in the hierarchy. However within a tribal community this patron-client relationship is visible only to a lesser extent. Nevertheless villagers are economically and socially dependent on the village leader. In Tamana the leaders of the village participate more than the women and poorest in the village, which is no amazing finding as the people also expect the leaders to participate more. In Tamana this unequal participation has to do with occupation with work as well as with traditional social structures. To create more equal participation possibilities, the women empowerment trainings of Gram Vikas seem to help.

Therefore:

1. Gram Vikas should offer women empowerment trainings to all women in the village on a regular basis.
2. Gram Vikas should offer empowerment trainings for the poorest in the village on a regular basis as well. That however could have little result as the poorest people often are dependent on village leaders for their livelihood security and therefore do not participate very active in order to keep their relationship well, according to research of Alsop Krishna and Sjoblom (2000:18)

Furthermore education seems to have a positive influence on participation within The Netherlands, this also applies to Turkish citizens. To enhance their political participation in Enschede Noord, education should be promoted. Foundation Ender already works with this principle in their youth organisation, also the Turkish Cultural Association Enschede aims at the participation in Dutch society through education. In Tamana education should be promoted more as not all eligible school children attend school yet. The courses of Gram Vikas can teach skills, but educating the youth really enhances future development. Child education is one of the policies of Gram Vikas.

Therefore:

1. Education should be promoted both in Tamana and in Enschede.
2. The efforts of the Turkish organisation to prevent the youth from dropping out of school should be esteemed.
3. In Tamana Gram Vikas should put more effort in the school attendance of children.

6. Discussion

In academic research the term validity is used to refer to the approximate truth of an inference (Shadish, Cook, Campbell 2002:34). When an inference is called valid this tells something about the extent to which relevant evidence supports that inference as being true or correct. Validity can be divided in internal and external validity. With internal validity the validity within the research is meant, this refers to the extent in which the research methods used measured the right effect to make a just inference. External inference is on the generalisation of an inference to other populations, settings and variables (Shadish, Cook, Campbell 2002:37).

There exist several threats to internal validity. One of the threats relevant for this research is selection. For the case study in Tamana the villagers interviewed were selected on basis of availability. Due to high season for agricultural work villagers were very busy and therefore it was difficult to find respondents. The villagers were categorised on forehand as participating and non-participating villagers. From both groups males and females were to be interviewed. In the village persons belonging to these categories were sought. GP-members were selected personally on the basis of their function. In Enschede the Turkish respondents were selected on the basis of availability as well. However due to starting holidays in July, I did not have the possibility to interview a large number of Turkish citizens. Therefore I interviewed the chairmen of the two Turkish organisations in order to cross check information given by average Turkish citizens. The chairman of the Turkish Cultural Association Enschede and the Foundation Ender were selected on the basis of their function just like the chairman of the ward council. For the political party interviews I selected councillors which were a member of the district committee Enschede-Noord. However in the case of the CDA and the SP I interviewed the party leader. For the PvdA I interviewed two non-western ethnic councillors. Unfortunately the VVD and the Burger Belangen Enschede could not be reached after several attempts in June. It was not possible to reach them in July either due to the recess of the city council. I also used a survey investigation held in Deppenbroek, one of the neighbourhoods in the ward Enschede Noord. The fact that only inhabitants of the neighbourhood Deppenbroek are interviewed may cause a validity threat because the ward Enschede Noord is composed of several neighbourhoods. The respondents to the survey investigation are randomly selected from the municipal data on inhabitants in the neighbourhood Deppenbroek. These interviews are conducted by students that follow the course practice of research and statistics. The survey used is developed by a senior researcher from the university. Due to the selection, it is possible that a certain group of respondents is overlooked. However due to time constraints and limited availability as a result of holidays it was not possible to make another selection. However by interviewing the leaders of both Turkish organisations and cross checking this information with interviews of members of both organisations I think I have a sufficient insight in the behaviour of organised Turkish citizens. The data of the survey investigation complements the data I gathered with in depth interviews and includes non organised Turkish citizens.

Another internal validity threat is the fact that for my interviews in Tamana I was dependent on a translator. Translations can cause misunderstandings or can be coloured by the translator, who in all cases was from Gram Vikas. Answers are probably interpreted from the translators own paradigm that, most possibly, is influenced by Gram Vikas and thus subjective. That may lead to a translation of answers, which were not exactly meant in that way. Understanding the answer given by the respondents in Oriya is not possible, therefore it is very hard to know if this is happening. In addition the researcher interprets observations and answers given from her own paradigm as well, although trying to be objective. Besides due to the presence of the translator a respondent might not talk freely. However some answers were definitely not socially correct, therefore this problem may have occurred, but not in the majority of cases. In The Netherlands I did not gather the data of the survey investigation myself which implies that there could be misunderstandings while conducting these interviews. All students however have had interview training. Furthermore I observed meetings in Tamana which were all in Oriya that complicated objective observations as I was dependent on translations, which could not be given all the time. The presence of an observer itself might influence the meeting as well, as I was only able to observe one meeting this possibility could not be out ruled.

Moreover the topic of this research is very complex. It is hard to compare two totally different cases which have totally different contexts. Nevertheless I have tried to achieve this by using the same indicators of Denters and Geurts (1998) for a comparison of the nature of the participation. Of course this meant that for the situation in Tamana some organs had to be translated to the organs mentioned in the indicators, this implies that it does not perfectly fit. However due to my observations in Tamana and in Enschede Noord I do think it is possible to make a comparison in this way.

With respect to external validity it will be hard to use the results of this research as applicable to other populations, settings and variables, this because I looked at two very specific case studies. An effect found in this research is not automatically going to hold for all populations in The Netherlands. Research of Berger, Fennema, Tillie and Heelsum already shows that the intensity of participation of Turkish minorities differs in four compared cities. They subscribe those differences to civic community (Berger, Fennema, Tillie, Heelsum; 2001:23). However it might be possible to make a valid external inference when this research is extended with four more cases in both countries. This because I used general literature on participation in The Netherlands and the study of Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom (2000) showed similar results to my findings in Tamana, although it was conducted in different parts of India.

References

Alsop R, Krishna A, Sjoblom D (2000), *Inclusion and local elected governments: The Panchayat Raj systems in India*, Worldbank, South Asia Social development unit.

Babbie, E.R. (2007), *The practice of social research*, Wadsworth / Thomson Learning, Belmont.

Berger M, Fennema M, Heelsum A, Tillie J, Wolf R, (2001), *Politieke participatie van etnische minderheden in vier steden*, Instituut voor Migratie en Etnische Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam.

Bie, van der R (2002), Een allochtone stem, *INDEX*, no. 4 pp 10-11.

Biswal B. (no year), *Decentralised governance through Panchayati Raj initiatives in Orissa*, Joint Secretary to Govt., Panchayati Raj Department, Govt. of Orissa. Retrieved from <http://orissagov.nic.in/panchayats/presentations> on 12-07-2006

CBS (2008), *dossier allochtonen*, retrieved from: statline databank, <http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/dossiers/allochtonen/nieuws/default.htm>

Dahl, Robert A (1998), *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Denters S.A.H. (2002), *Grootstedelijk bestuur: over stedelingen en stadsbestuurders*, rede Universiteit Twente, Enschede

Denters S.A.H. en Geurts P.A.Th.M. (1998), *Lokale democratie in Nederland, Burgers en hun gemeentebestuur*, uitgeverij Coutinho, Bussum

Gemeente Enschede (2008), *buurtmonitor*, retrieved from: <http://enschede.buurtmonitor.nl>

Gram Vikas (2001), *Rural Health and Environment Programme, an alternate paradigm for sustainable transformation of rural areas*, Gram Vikas, Mohuda village Berhampur.

Grix J (2004), *The foundations of research*, Palgrave MacMillen, New York.

Government of Orissa Panchayati Raj Department (2006), PRI elections 2007, letter retrieved from <http://orissagov.nic.in/panchayat/Election%20matter%20zp%208.4.2006.pdf> on 22 May 2006

Government of Orissa Panchayati Raj Department (2006), Gram Panchayat, document retrieved from <http://orissagov.nic.in/panchayat/administration> on 11 July 2006

Government of Orissa Panchayati Raj Department (2006), Gram Sabha, document retrieved from <http://orissagov.nic.in/panchayat/administration> on 11 July 2006

Government of Orissa Panchayati Raj Department (2006), Palli Sabha, document retrieved from <http://orissagov.nic.in/panchayat/administration> on 11 July 2006

I&O research (2008), *Enschede in cijfers 2008, bevolking*, retrieved from: http://cms3.enschede.nl/webs/enschedeincijfers/archief_documenten/Statistisch/hoofdstuk02.pdf/

Integratiemonitor (2002), *H8. Politieke en bestuurlijke participatie*, pp 123-139.

Keuzenkamp S en Merens A (2006) *Sociale atlas van vrouwen uit etnische minderheden*, SCP, Den Haag

Klausen J.E., Sweeting D. (2005) Legitimacy and community involvement in local governance, in: Haus M, Heinelt H, Stewart M (2005), *Urban Governance and Democracy. Leadership and community involvement*. Routledge, New York pp: 214-233

- Lijphart, Arend (1997). Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma, in: *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 1, pp. 1–14.
- Leyenaar, M.H. (2004). *Political Empowerment of Women. The Netherlands and Other Countries*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston.
- Rosenstone S.J., Hansen J.M. (1993) *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*, MacMillan Publishing company, New York.
- Shadish W.R., Cook T.D., Campbell D.T. (2002), *Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.
- Upadhyay Sanjay (2004), *Local Self Governance - Provisions of Panchayats (extension to scheduled areas) act, 1996 PESA and Orissa amendments*, Enivro-legal defence firm, Bhubaneshwar.
- Verba S (1996), The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy In: *The American Political Science Review* vol.90 no. 1 pp 1-7.
- Verba S, Schlozman K.L. Brady, H.E. (1995), *Voice and Equality*, Harvard University Press, USA.
- Paus, de R. (1998) *Opvallend aanwezig, participatie van etnische minderheden in zes gemeenten belicht*, Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek, Amsterdam
- Pennings P, Keman H and Kleinnijenhuis, J. (1999), *Doing research in Political Science. An introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics*, Thousand Oaks, London.
- Phillips, A (1995) *The politics of presence*, Clarendon press, Oxford.
- Powell, G.B. Jr. (2000). *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Punch K.F. (2000) *Developing Effective Research Proposals*, London, Thousand Oaks.
- Putnam, R.D. (1993), *Making Democracy Work, Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton
- Tillie, J. (2000). *De etnische stem: opkomst en stemgedrag van migranten tijdens gemeenteraadsverkiezingen 1986-1998*. Forum, Utrecht.

Annex 1: List of acronyms, concept explanations and translations

Allochtoon	Ethnic non-western citizens
Autochtoon	Ethnic Dutch citizens
CBS	Centraal Bureau Statistiek, the central bureau for statistics in The Netherlands.
DRDA	District Rural Development Agency
District	In Dutch a Stadsdeel, this level comes straight under the municipal level
GB	General Body (a body initiated by Gram Vikas in which all households are represented by a male and a female)
GP	Gram Panchayat; governmental organ
GS	Gram Sabha (body controlling the Gram Panchayat)
GV	Gram Vikas (NGO which works on rural development)
ITDP	Integrated Tribal Development Programme (the first programme of Gram Vikas)
Naib-Sarpanch	Vice-president of the Gram Panchayat
Neighbourhood	In Dutch a wijk in the sense of a buurt
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OBC	Other Backward Community
PC	Project Coordinator (manager of a project area for Gram Vikas)
PS	Palli Sabha; General body meeting of a village (governmental)
Panchayat Raj	Three tier political decentralisation system within states in the republic of India
RHEP	Rural Health and Environment Programme (started by Gram Vikas in 1992)
PESA	Panchayat Extension Scheduled Areas (law act 1996)
PRI	Panchayat Raj Institutions
Samiti meeting	Block level in PRI system
Sarpanch	President of the Gram Panchayat
SC	Scheduled Caste
SEC	State Election Committee (A state committee to ensure fair Panchayat elections)
ST	Scheduled Tribes
VEC	Village Executive Committee (Elected by the GB and responsible for the execution of the RHEP programme from Gram Vikas)
Ward	In Dutch a wijk in the sense of the area covered by a wijkraad, a ward can be composed of several neighbourhoods
ZP	Zilla Panchayat (district level)

Annex 2: Determinants of political interest

When the coefficient comes closer to one the effect of the variable is smaller. All coefficients below 1.00 imply a negative effect while all coefficients above 1.00 imply a positive effect, the higher above or below the greater the positive/negative effect.

Table 3.1.1: Determinants of political interest (in relative chances) (source: Keuzekamp, Meerens 2006)


	<i>Basic model</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Labour participation</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Active in society</i>
Sex Male =rg*	0,60	0,58	0,59	0,60	0,62
Turkish ethnic group Ethnic Dutch = rg	0,30	0,48	0,48	0,50	0,58
Education					
vbo/ mavo		1,59	1,55	1,53	1,48
mbo/ havo/ vwo		3,10	2,96	2,89	2,79
hbo/ wo		6,08	5,68	5,71	5,20
Labour participation			0,86	1,28	1,28
Age					
15-24 = rg					
25-44 years				0,85	(0,88)
< 45 years				(0,91)	(0,95)
Active and / or volunteer No = rg					1,70
Nagelkerke R2	0,07	0,17	0,17	0,17	0,18

* rg = reference group

Annex 3: Annexes for chapter 3


Annex 3a: Governmental layers in The Netherlands

Figure 3a: governmental layers in The Netherlands.



Annex 3b: Structure of the municipality of Enschede

Source: <http://cm3.enschede.nl/webs/enschedeincijfers/images/buurtkaat-def.gif/>






Table 3.b.1: Turkish inhabitants of the ward Enschede-Noord. (source: <http://enschede.buurtmonitor.nl>)

Ward	Number of Turkish inhabitants	Total number of inhabitants	Percentage
Walhof, Roessingh	78	2230	3,5%
Bolhaar	x	1760	x
Roombeek, Roomveldje	233	2980	7,8%
Mekkelholt	262	1920	13,6%
Deppenbroek	859	4740	18,1%
Voortman, Ameling	54	1420	3,8%
Drienerveld, UT	27	2360	1,1%
Total Enschede- Noord	1513	17410	8,7%

Annex 3c: Ward Council (extra information)

The ward council holds a monthly public meeting which at the same time is the consulting hour as a weekly consulting hour does not attract enough inhabitants. The ward council operates as an advisory council towards the municipality with concern to plans that affect the ward. Meaning the ward council has the right to give advice on for instance abolishment plans or the construction of new roads. Mostly the council formulates the advice by itself. However for large issues, meetings to involve inhabitants are held. However the ward council points out that this does not mean that action will always be taken by the municipality after an advice of the ward council. The ward council also has the right to give an unsolicited advice on for instance alterations in the structure plan. It may indicate what it considers the municipality should take account of.

Only inhabitants of the ward are allowed to take a seat on the ward council. Officially members of the council are elected, in the past this was the case for the council in Enschede Noord as well. However at present there aren't enough volunteers for becoming a member of the council therefore members are now invited. The reason why people do not want to become a member is according to the chairman that people do not have the time and want to be paid (interview chairman ward council). Still some people who have submitted a complaint at the ward council become enthusiastic. The people who become members of the ward council are informed that their role is to promote the public interest rather than their own personal interests.

At the moment the ward council Enschede Noord consists of five council members. According to the chairman a number of eight or nine members would be advisable as there are several subgroups within the council which are specialised on certain topics. Members of the council have to attend several meetings, among others municipal meetings. Rather a lot of these meetings take place

during the day time according to the chairman while ward council members have jobs and therefore are not available during the day.

In the council minority groups, or allochtone inhabitants, are not represented. In the past Turkish as well as Moroccan members have had seats on the ward council, but according to the chairman they resigned after they reached their personal goals, as they as well face time constraints. Others gave as a reason the fact that they could not be present during Ramadan. At present the ward council has a good relation with the Moroccan committee. However with the Turkish community the ward council has hardly any contacts as Turkish people do not attend the monthly public meetings nor the special issue meetings for inhabitants.

The monthly public meetings of the council used to have a high attendance. At present however people tend to approach the district committee and the municipal council themselves. The ward council is present at district committee meetings as well. Another cause for the low attendance is that the extensive rebuilding activities in the neighbourhood of Roombeek have been finished, which means inhabitants need less protection of interests, according to the chairman of the council.

Annex 3d: District committee.

Table 3.d.1.: District committee members (source: <http://www.enschede.nl>)

President of the district committee meeting	PvdA councillor
Members of the district committee	
PvdA	2
CDA	2
VVD	2
SP	1
Burger Belangen Enschede	1
Christen Unie	1
Groen Links	1
D66	1

Annex 3e: Political Parties in Enschede municipality

The PvdA is the largest political party in Enschede, this party has 588 members and delivers 15 of the 39 councillors as well as three alderman. Three belong to an ethnic minority group. Of the members around 25 till 30 members belong to the Turkish ethnic minority which implies that around 5% is Turkish which is near to representative for the distribution within Enschede it self (5,8%). Members of the PvdA can exert influence in the general member meetings; however these are not very well attended. Furthermore one can become an active member by taking place in a workgroup or in the council as well as the board of the party. No Turkish members take place in any of these organs. In a workgroup a certain specific topic is discussed, the output of a workgroup can be used as input by the councillors of the party.

The CDA has around 200 members of which approximately 10 will be from a Turkish background which is also around 5% of the total members and therefore also near to representative for the distribution within Enschede it self. CDA strives to be representative for the population of Enschede. CDA has three aldermen in the board. New people are sought through the network CDA members. There is no structured policy to recruit minorities, but when a member of a minority is interested, time is invested to get acquainted with the person. CDA has general meetings that can be attended as well as special meetings for their members. CDA does not organise gatherings to encourage political participation.

GroenLinks delivers one alderman; they have 180 members of which less than 10% will have a Turkish ethnic background. The party does not have a structured policy to attract ethnic minorities, but when a person from a minority group shows interest than special attention is given. However this is not different for autochtone groups. GroenLinks also works with workgroups in these workgroups of 7 persons there is one allochtoon, but no person with a Turkish background. GroenLinks is not actively involved in increasing local political participation.

D66 also has no specific minorities policy. Persons with an ethnic minority background who show interest in D66 are welcome. However the basis to join lies in the jointly shared vision on politics and society.

The Christen Unie is a political party with around 200 members who hardly has any members from an ethnic minority background and therefore hardly any Turkish members. The Christen Unie is especially focused on her members. With respect to activating political participation her activities are focussed on members who might become councillors in the future. For the Christen Unie potential

councillors work with the councillors for 7/8 years before they are eligible for election. The Christen Unie stands in contact with platform Aram, but these are mostly Syrisch Orthodox people.

The SP has around 500 members of which some are Turkish, but not many. There are however quite some members with an ethnic minority background mostly political refugees. The SP has a more active approach to encourage members to become active as members are asked to join in certain activities. However this approach does not differ between Allochtone en Autochtone leden. SP is the only political party in Enschede who has a stand in the city centre every second Saturday through this active approach SP wants to involve the average citizen in politics. There are some courses to increase political participation given by SP, but these are for members only. There are no active members within SP who have a Turkish ethnic background at the moment, in the past this has been the case but not many.

No party gives general training to increase the skills needed to participate in local governance. However some parties do have trainings for the (active) members of their party. Turkish minorities do not seem to actively take part in political parties.

Annex 3f: City councillors with an ethnic minority background

Table 3.f.1: city councillors (source: <http://www.enschede.nl>)

Political Party	Distribution of seats	Number councillors belonging to an ethnic minority group
PvdA	15	3
CDA	6	1
VVD	6	1
SP	3	0
Burger Belangen Enschede (BBE)	3	0
GroenLinks	3	0
ChristenUnie	2*	0
D66	1*	0

* The parties ChristenUnie and D66 also have a committee member. Who is not a member of the council but may serve as spokesman in committee meetings.

Table 3.f.2.: Number of ethnic minority city councillors. (source: Keuzekamp et.al. 2006)

Year	Number councillors belonging to an ethnic minority group
1986-1990	2 (of which one came from South Africa)
1990-1994	1
1994-1998	1
1998-2002	4
2002-2006	6
2006-2010	5

Annex 3g: Denters and Geurts actual political participation and representation ratios

Table 3.g.1: Actual political participation for different political participatory activities and average social representation (odds-ratio's) of participants in divers political activities (Denters et.al. 1998:174-176)

Political activity	% participants	Social representation odds ratio
Vote	77%	0.586
Contact civil servants	31%	0.628
Writing letter to municipality	24%	0.637
Signing a petition	23%	0.834
Neighbourhood actions	20%	0.723
Contact politicians	18%	0.638
Voice (inspraak)	16%	0.474
Actions and demonstrations	15%	0.644
Contact political party	11%	0.554

Annex 3h: Income of Dutch and Turkish citizens in The Netherlands and Enschede

Table 3.h.1: Source of income Dutch and Turkish citizens in The Netherlands and Enschede (Source: CBS 2008)

	Having a job		Receive assistance	
	The Netherlands	Enschede	The Netherlands	Enschede
Autochtonen	71,8%	66,5%	14,3 %	19,0%
Turks	46,9%	45,6%	28,8%	33,1%

Table 3.h.2: Average income that can be spend of Dutch and Turkish citizens in The Netherlands and Enschede (source: CBS 2008)

	Average income that can be spend	
	The Netherlands	Enschede
Autochtonen	€ 17.900	€ 16.000
Turks	€ 14.800	€ 13.400

Annex 3i: Educational level of Dutch and Turkish citizens in The Netherlands

Table 3.i.1.: Educational level of Dutch and Turkish citizens in The Netherlands (source: CBS)

		Educational level (x 1000 persons)				
		Primary education	vmbo, mbo1, avo	havo, vwo, mbo,	hbo, wo bachelor	wo master, doctoraal
Autochtone	15-24	1,31%	4,56%	4,55%	0,80%	0,19%
	25-34	0,37%	1,71%	5,68%	2,87%	1,62%
	35-44	0,71%	3,10%	7,08%	2,97%	1,69%
	45-54	1,27%	3,39%	5,67%	2,83%	1,40%
	55-64	1,67%	3,78%	4,24%	1,90%	0,99%
Turks	15-24	4,83%	5,90%	4,02%	0,54%	
	25-34	4,29%	4,29%	9,39%	1,07%	1,34%
	35-44	4,83%	4,29%	6,71%	0,54%	0,54%
	45-54	2,95%	0,80%	1,34%		
	55-64	2,41%		0,80%		

Annex 3j: Political commitment

Table 3.j.1.: Political commitment to ethnicity and sex for Dutch and Turkish citizens in The Netherlands, age 15-64, 2005/2005 (Source SCP)

	Rather / strong interest in politics		Follows Dutch politics daily or several days a week through tv, radio or newspaper	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Autochtone	55%	68%	74%	83%
Turks	23%	43%	36%	56%


Annex 3k: Indicators of Denters and Geurts compared more elaborately

This research shows that voting still is the most popular political activity for Turkish ethnic minorities. Followed by signing a petition, the data of the survey showed more enthusiasm for this activity than my own interviews, as persons stated that petition issues stood far from them. Remarkably the next most participated in activity is non institutionalised, writing a letter to the municipality. Following the original theory of Denters and Geurts (1998) this should be one of the least equal participated in activities. Just like the non-institutionalised activity of contacting civil servants. My research showed that mainly leaders of organisations contacted municipal civil servants. However according to the survey investigation of the 10 respondents that did contact a municipal civil servant 6 were a member of an organisation and 4 not. According to the survey research the next most popular activity is participating in a local action committee while in my own research only one respondent participated in a local action committee to which he felt much attached. Attending participatory meetings has a quite high negative representation ratio as well as political parties. My respondents state that Turkish minorities hardly attend these meetings. Nevertheless according to the survey interview 6 respondents attended a participatory meeting. Contacting a councillor is conducted according to the survey investigation by 3 Turkish citizens of whom two also contacted an alderman or the mayor. My research showed only leaders contacted politicians, of the three respondents two are member of an organisation and one is a board member. Contacting a political party is also conducted by three respondents of which two are members of an organisation and one is a board member. Two of the respondents are the same as the respondents who contact a politician. Participating in activities of a neighbourhood or ward organisation is hardly done by the respondents to my interview; in the survey research this question was not included. Also according to the ward organisation no Turkish citizens participate.


Annex 4: Structure Panchayat Raj

Annex 4a: Panchayat Raj in Orissa

Figure 4.1: Decentralised Decision making & Planning for Pro-poor Development (Source: Biswal)




Annex 4b: Structure Sihala Gram Panchayat



Annex 5. Gram Vikas

Annex 5a: Structure of Gram Vikas



Annex 5b: Representation within the VEC

Table 5.b.1: representation of social groups within the VEC (source: Gram Vikas)

Group	Percentage in the village	Percentage in the VEC
Women	51%	41%
Men	49%	59%
Landless	19%	6%
MAF	44%	53%
SF	32%	24%
MeF	5%	18%
BPL	80%	76.6%
APL	20%	23.5%

Annex 6: Conducted interviews

In Enschede

Ward council

- Chairman ward council 22-05-2008

Turkish Citizens

- President Turkish Cultural Association Enschede 27-05-2008
- Ex board member Turkish Cultural Association Enschede 27-05-2008
- Facility administrator Turkish Cultural Association Enschede 27-05-2008
- Turkish police officer member TCAE 27-05-2008
- Young Turkish citizen member TCAE 27-05-2008
- Young Turkish citizen member TCAE 27-05-2008
- Chairman foundation Ender 26-06-2008

Councillors and political parties

- Dutch Board member PvdA 16-06-2008
- Kurdish councillor PvdA 16-06-2008
- Egyptian councillor PvdA 16-06-2008
- Dutch party leader councillor CDA 20-06-2008
- Dutch councillor GroenLinks district committee member Enschede Noord 25-06-2008
- Dutch councillor Christen Unie district committee member Enschede Noord 25-06-2008
- Dutch party leader councillor SP 30-06-2008
- Dutch board member SP 30-06-2008
- Dutch party leader councillor D66 04-07-2008

In Tamana

Gram Vikas Head office interviews

- Head of PMED section and my reporting authority 09-08-2006
 - o explained the RHEP programme more into depth.
- Head of the training department of Gram Vikas 31-07-2006
 - o explained capacity building activities and trainings.

Gram Vikas Head office conversations

- PMED volunteer 05-07-2006
 - o informal conversation explaining the history of Gram Vikas
- Kerandimal PC 28-07-2006 till 28-08-2006
 - o informal conversations about participation in Tamana
- Manager ITDP 09-08-2006 and 10-08-2006
 - o informal conversations about ITDP
- ODAF member 13-08-2006
 - o informal conversation on PRI and power decentralisation

Sihala Gram Panchayat

- Sarpanch female 14-08-2006
- Ward-member Tamana female 14-08-2006
- Ex ward-member Tamana male 24-08-2006
- GP secretary male 20-08-2006

Tamana Villagers

- Tamana VEC chairman male 16-08-2006
- Tamana VEC member female 16-08-2006
- Tamana VEC member male 23-08-2006
- Tamana VEC member female 24-08-2006
- Tamana old villager female 23-08-2006
- Tamana old villager male 23-08-2006
- Tamana old villager female 24-08-2006

- Tamana villager male 24-08-2006
- Tamana villager female 24-08-2006
- Tamana villager female 24-08-2006

Observations

- Gram Panchayat meeting 20-08-2006
- PRI training 01-08-2006 and 02-08-2006

Used survey investigation

Van der Kaap 2008, Praktijk van onderzoek en statistiek enquête onderzoek Deppenbroek 2006,2007,2008.

Annex 7: Interview questions

In Enschede

Questionnaire political parties.

1. Hoeveel leden hebben jullie ongeveer en weet u welk percentage daarvan ongeveer Turks is?
2. Werven jullie actief naar minderheden om hen bij de partij te betrekken en eventueel op de kieslijst te zetten?
 - a. Zo ja hoe gaat dit in zijn werk? (bijvoorbeeld: persoonlijke benadering, gerichte activiteiten etc.)
3. Stimuleren jullie leden van minderheidsgroeperingen binnen de partij specifiek om actiever te worden binnen de partij?
 - a. Zo ja hoe gaat dit in zijn werk? (bijvoorbeeld: persoonlijke benadering, gerichte activiteiten etc.)
4. Hebben jullie beleid hebben om inwoners van Enschede (leden zowel als niet leden) meer te betrekken bij politieke participatie?
 - a. Zo ja: Wat voor beleid is dit en hoe wordt dit uitgevoerd?
 - b. Zo ja: Welke type mensen worden met dit beleid bereikt? (bijvoorbeeld: de mensen die toch al politiek geïnteresseerd zijn, voornamelijk bepaalde groepen burgers - ouderen/jongeren, allochtonen/autochtonen, mannen/vrouwen -)
5. Organiseren jullie bijeenkomsten om lokale politieke participatie te bevorderen (gericht op leden of juist op alle inwoners van Enschede)?
6. Organiseren jullie bijeenkomsten speciaal gericht op minderheden om hun lokale politieke participatie te bevorderen?
7. Wordt er wel eens contact met jullie als partij opgenomen door burgers?
 - a. Zo ja ook door Turkse burgers?
8. Wordt er wel eens contact gezocht met een van jullie raadsleden door burgers?
 - a. Zo ja ook door Turkse burgers?
9. Worden er wel eens handtekeningen acties aangeboden aan jullie als partij of aan de gemeenteraad?
 - a. Zo ja welk type burgers (mensen die vaak aanwezig zijn bij stadsdeelcommissie vergaderingen als inspreker, jong/oud, allochtoon/autochtoon) zijn bij deze actie betrokken en zijn hier ook Turkse burgers bij betrokken?
10. Organiseren jullie als partij of als gemeenteraad ook inspraakbijeenkomsten?
 - a. Zo ja komen hier ook Turkse burgers op af?
11. Hebt u persoonlijk het idee dat er veel obstakels moeten worden genomen om gemeenteraadslid te kunnen worden?
12. Hebt u persoonlijk het idee dat deze obstakels verschillen voor autochtone en allochtone (potentiële) raadsleden?
13. Hebt u het idee dat allochtone raadsleden in enig opzicht belemmerd worden in hun functioneren door bepaalde verschillen (bijvoorbeeld door taal/cultuur) ?
14. Hebt u het idee dat etnische minderheden beter worden gerepresenteerd door iemand uit hun etnische minderheid of maakt dat niet uit?
15. Hebt u persoonlijk het idee dat Turkse minderheden evenveel in de lokale politiek participeren (gebruik maken van stemrecht, spreekrecht, bezoeken bijeenkomsten, contact zoeken met partijen/raadsleden etc.) als autochtone inwoners van Enschede?
16. Hebt u persoonlijk het idee dat het bij de lokale politieke participatie van Turkse inwoners van Enschede voornamelijk om mannen of ook om vrouwen gaat?

Ward council Enschede Noord

1. Wat is het doel van de wijkraad?
2. Wie nemen er plaats in de wijkraad en worden zij gekozen?
3. Zijn verschillende bevolkingsgroepen vertegenwoordigd in de wijkraad?
4. Hoe functioneert de wijkraad?
5. Treed de wijkraad vaak in contact met de gemeente?
6. Organiseert de wijkraad inspraak bijeenkomsten?

Turkish citizens

1. Hoe lang woont u al in deze wijk?
2. Bezoekt u ooit bijeenkomsten in de wijk (van de wijkraad of de wijkcommissie)?
 - a. Als nee, waarom niet?
 - i. ...
 - ii. Druk met werk
 - iii. Druk met het huishouden
 - iv. Individuele belangen komen daar niet ter sprake
 - v. Daar weet ik te weinig van
 - vi. Er wordt toch niks met de uitkomsten van een bijeenkomst gedaan
 - vii. Ik weet niet dat die bijeenkomsten er zijn
 - viii. anders
 - b. Als ja; hoeveel bijeenkomsten woont u bij?
 - i. alle
 - ii. bijna alle
 - iii. Ongeveer de helft
 - iv. Niet veel
 - v. Bijna nooit
 - c. Als ja; wat is de reden om naar deze bijeenkomsten te gaan?
 - d. Als ja; levert het voor u individueel wat op om naar deze bijeenkomsten te gaan?
3. Wordt u vanuit de wijk gestimuleerd om deel te nemen aan deze bijeenkomsten?
4. Bezoekt u ooit bijeenkomsten van de Turkse Culturele Vereniging?
 - a. Als nee, waarom niet?
 - i. ..
 - ii. Druk met werk
 - iii. Druk met het huishouden
 - iv. Ik weet niet dat die bijeenkomsten er zijn
 - v. anders -----
5. Wordt u gestimuleerd vanuit de Turkse Culturele Vereniging om deel te nemen aan bijeenkomsten, cursussen, excursies etc.?
6. Spoort de Turkse Culturele Vereniging mensen aan om zich bezig te houden met politiek?
7. Spoort de Turkse Culturele Vereniging u aan om te stemmen?
8. Heb u gestemd voor de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2006?
 - a. Ja / nee
 - b. Als nee; waarom hebt u niet gestemd?
 - i. Druk met werk
 - ii. Druk met het huishouden
 - iii. Individuele belangen komen daar niet ter sprake
 - iv. Daar weet ik te weinig van
 - v. Ik weet niet dat er verkiezingen zijn
 - vi. Anders
 - c. Als ja; waarom hebt u gestemd? (asked as an open question)
 - i. Vraag van een kandidaat op de lijst
 - ii. Druk van een kandidaat
 - iii. Sociale solidariteit
 - iv. Het vermijden van latere spanningen
 - v. Anders -----
 - d. Als ja; op wie hebt u gestemd?
 - i. Een Turkse kandidaat
 - ii. Niet speciaal op een Turkse kandidaat
 - e. Waarom hebt u op deze persoon gestemd? (asked as an open question)
 - i. Capaciteiten
 - ii. Betrouwbaarheid
 - iii. Leeftijd
 - iv. Geslacht
 - v. Etniciteit
 - vi. Is mij aangeraden door derden
9. Hebt u voor eerdere gemeenteraadsverkiezingen gestemd? Waarom (niet)?
10. Bent u tevreden met het bestuur van de gemeente (college van B&W) ?

11. Hebt u wel eens:
 - a. Contact gezocht met iemand van de wijkraad of de wijkcommissie?
 - b. Contact gezocht met een raadslid, wethouder of de burgermeester?
 - c. Contact gezocht met een gemeente ambtenaar?
 - d. Een brief verzonden aan de gemeente?
 - e. Geparticipeerd in de activiteiten van een lokaal actie comité?
 - f. Deelgenomen aan een handtekeningen actie die gericht was aan de gemeente?
 - g. Deelgenomen aan activiteiten georganiseerd in de wijk?
 - h. Contact gezocht met een politieke partij in de gemeente?
 - i. Een inspraakbijeenkomst bezocht?
 - j. Gestemd?
12. Wat verwacht u van de gemeente?
13. Welke partij komt het dichtst bij uw verwachtingen?
14. Hebt u het gevoel dat een Turkse kandidaat uw belangen beter kan vertegenwoordigen?
15. Weet u wie de burgermeester van Enschede is?
16. Kan u een wethouder van Enschede noemen?
17. Bent u van plan om voor de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen in 2010 te stemmen?

City council member from ethnic minority

18. Sinds wanneer zit u in de gemeenteraad?
19. Wanneer hebt u voor het eerst kandidaat gestaan voor de gemeenteraad?
20. Wat was voor u de reden om u zelf kandidaat te stellen?
21. Had u voor uw kandidaatstelling al bestuurlijke ervaring opgedaan in bijvoorbeeld een vereniging?
22. Bent u door bepaalde mensen gestimuleerd om u zelf kandidaat te stellen?
23. U zit voor partij in de gemeenteraad, in hoeverre beïnvloedt de partij uw functioneren in de raad?
24. Krijgt u een training van de gemeente wanneer u lid wordt van de gemeenteraad?
 - a. Wat voor soort training krijgt u?
 - b. Is dit nuttig?
 - c. Als ja; op welke manieren is dit nuttig?
25. Krijgt u een training van uw partij wanneer u lid wordt van de gemeenteraad?
 - a. Wat voor soort training krijgt u?
 - b. Was dit nuttig?
 - c. Op welke manier was dit nuttig?
26. Wat is volgens u de reden dat u bent gekozen?
 - i. Capaciteiten
 - ii. Betrouwbaarheid
 - iii. Leeftijd
 - iv. Geslacht
 - v. Etniciteit
 - vi. Uw bekendheid
27. Denkt u dat u en uw partij collega's jullie achterban goed representeren?
28. Denkt u dat uw etniciteit u in staat stelt om mensen uit uw eigen bevolkingsgroep beter te representeren?
29. Heeft uw partij een specifiek beleid met betrekking tot de participatie van minderheden binnen de partij?
30. Hebt u het idee dat u kan bijdragen aan beslissingen die worden genomen in de gemeente?
31. Hebt u het idee dat u obstakels hebt moeten nemen om gemeenteraadslid te worden of bij het uitvoeren van uw taak?
32. Hebt u het idee dat autochtone raadsleden met dezelfde soort obstakels te maken hebben gehad?
33. Zou u weer kandidaat staan tijdens de verkiezingen van 2010?

Turkish Cultural Association Enschede

1. Wat is het doel van de Turkse Culturele Vereniging Enschede?
2. Ik heb op jullie website gelezen dat de algemene ledenvergadering de bestuurders van de TCVE kiest, wat voor type mensen stelt zich meestal kandidaat en uit hoeveel mensen bestaat het bestuur?
3. Worden de leden van de commissies ook gekozen of worden zij gevraagd of benoemt?
4. Welk type activiteiten organiseert TCVE?
5. Organiseert de TCVE bijeenkomsten / cursussen waarbij vaardigheden, zoals spreken in het openbaar, het schrijven van officiële brieven etc, kunnen worden aangeleerd of verbeterd?
6. Is de TCVE ook betrokken bij de plaatselijke politiek?

7. Treed de vereniging vaak in contact met de gemeente of de wijkraad?
8. Organiseert de vereniging ook bijeenkomsten die te maken hebben met politiek?
9. Doelgroep vereniging?
10. Hoe worden mensen betrokken?

Foundation Ender

1. Wat is het doel van de Stichting Ender?
2. Wie vallen onder de doelgroep van Ender?
3. Hoe worden mensen betrokken?
4. Welk type activiteiten organiseert Ender?
5. Organiseert Ender bijeenkomsten / cursussen waarbij vaardigheden, zoals spreken in het openbaar, het schrijven van officiële brieven etc, kunnen worden aangeleerd of verbeterd?
6. Is Ender betrokken bij de plaatselijke politiek?
7. Treed Ender (vaak) in contact met de gemeente of de wijkraad?
8. Organiseert Ender bijeenkomsten die te maken hebben met politiek?

In Sihala GP

Head training department

1. Simultaneously Gram Vikas was lobbying at the government with other NGO's for more power transfers to the Panchayats in 2001. This power transfer lobby concentrated on micro planning, control over revenue generation and financial utilisation. (Gram Vikas, 2001) Did this lobby succeed?
2. How is participation created on a village level, what efforts are taken by Gram Vikas to make people participate?
3. How is participation in the general body stimulated?
What are the tasks of the general body?
How does the general body contribute to capacity building?
4. How is participation in the VEC stimulated?
What are the tasks of the VEC?
How does the VEC contribute to capacity building?
5. What does Gram Vikas do to stimulate people to take part in GP elections?
6. What does Gram Vikas do to help (s)elected leaders?
7. What do people learn during a PRI training?
8. On which basis are people selected to join a PRI training?
9. What are the tasks of the GP?
10. How does the GP function?

Head PMED department

Tribal people

1. Do tribal villages have self-governing structures before interference of Gram Vikas?
2. How do you stimulate tribal people to participate in self-governing structures?

Create participation

1. How is participation created on a village level, what efforts are taken by Gram Vikas to make people participate in self governing peoples institutions?

General body

2. How is participation in the general body stimulated?
3. What are the tasks of the general body?
4. How does the general body contribute to capacity building?
5. Why do male exceed women in number at a meeting of the general body in Tamana?
6. Why do attendant rates differ between general body meetings in Tamana?
7. Why are not all families represented during a general body meeting Tamana?

Village Executive Committee

1. How are villagers stimulated to stand as a candidate for elections of the VEC / How is participation in the VEC stimulated?
2. What are the tasks of the VEC?
3. How does the VEC contribute to capacity building?

Lobby

1. Did the lobby for more decentralisation of powers to the GP in 2001 succeed?
2. Social security schemes
3. What do the following schemes provide money for: Annapurna, Antyodaya and PH?

4. When are you eligible to a scheme, who draws up the criteria?
How is it possible that in Tamana village not all people who are eligible for a social security scheme receive this scheme?

GP Members

1. What is your name?
2. What is your age?
3. What is your gender?
4. Which village do you live in?
5. To which social group do you belong?
 - a. Adivasis
 - b. Dalits
 - c. OBG
 - d. Other
6. Since when are you a representative of the Gram Panvhayat?
7. Who are the other members of the Gram Panchayat and which village do they represent?
8. When did you first stand as a candidate for the Gram Panchayat elections and how many times have you been a candidate?
9. How many times of them were you (s)elected?
10. To which political party do you belong?
11. What are the main points of this political party?
12. How does this political party influence your functioning in the GP?
13. Did you receive support of GV when you became a member of the GP?
 - a. What kind of support did you receive? (Training on PRI, practical support while in function)
 - b. Was this support useful?
 - c. if yes; In what way was it helpful?
14. Did you receive any support from the government?
 - a. What kind of support did you receive?
 - b. Was this support useful?
 - c. if yes; In what way was it helpful?
15. Did/do you participate in the general body of Gram Vikas?
 - a. If yes; what was the reason to participate in the general body of Gram Vikas?
 - b. If yes; how did/does the participation in the general body influence you personally, did you gain knew knowledge/experiences?
16. Did/do you participate in the Village Executive Committee of Gram Vikas?
 - a. If yes; what was the reason to participate in the VEC of Gram Vikas?
 - b. If yes; how did/does the participation in the VEC influence you personally, did you gain knew knowledge/experiences?
17. Did/do you participate in the Palli Sabha?
 - a. If yes; what was the reason to participate in the PS?
 - b. If yes; how dis/does the participation in the PS influence you personally, did, you gain knew knowledge/experiences?
18. Did you participate in the Gram Sabha before you became a GP member?
 - a. If yes; what was the reason to participate in the GS?
 - b. Did participation in any of the above bodies influence your participation in the GS?
 - c. Did your participation in the GS influence you personally?
19. What was the reason to become a candidate for the GP?
20. What were the reasons people selected/elected you?
 - a. Your level of education
 - b. Your trustworthiness
 - c. Your age
 - d. Your gender
 - e. Your economic position
 - f. Your strong social relation with villagers
 - g. Your economic relations with villagers
21. How did you campaign during elections?
22. How much money did you spend on your campaign and from which source did it come?
23. Does the participation in the Gram Vikas bodies have an influence on your participation in the GP?

24. Do you consult/discuss with other people about your work in the Gram Panchayat?
25. Are you able to help your village through your Gram Panchayat membership?
26. What benefits were achieved for the community through the Gram Panchayat?
27. What was your own role (your own contribution) in achieving these benefits?
28. What was the role (contribution) of the other members in the GP to receive these benefits?
29. Are you satisfied with your work in the GP?
30. Does the GP undertake the following activities:
 - Water supply
 - Public Health
 - Family Welfare
 - Sanitation
 - Creation and Maintenance of Roads
 - Street Lighting
 - Implementation of various Central and State Government Schemes
 - Garbage Collection and Disposal
 - Organizing Meetings of Members
 - Organizing Gram Sabha
 - Registration Births
 - Registration of Deaths
 - Maintaining all Accounts
 - Collection of House Tax
 - Collection of Light Tax
 - Collection of Lease/Rent
 - Issue of Construction Licenses
 - Issue of Trade Licenses
 - NOC for Water Connection
 - NOC for Electricity Connection
 - Issue of Certificates
 - Health facilities
 - Water scarcity
 - Deforestation
 - Stop alcoholism
 - Irregularity of school teachers
 - Adult education
31. Do you feel you can contribute to decisions taken in the GP?
32. Do you have to overcome any obstacles in carrying out your GP work?
33. How do you feel now in terms of respect by villagers and assets and before you attended office?
34. How does the reservation seat policy of the 73rd amendment influence the GP?
 - a. Who takes place in the GP on a reserved seat?
 - b. Are there more women, dalits, and adivasis in the GP since 1993?
 - c. Are there more schemes coming to the GP?
35. Do the women participate in the GP meeting?
36. Do the dalits participate in the GP meeting?
37. Do the adivasis participate in the GP meeting?
38. How much money does the GP receive from the government through schemes?
39. Do you get a commission for your work in the GP?
40. How many villagers attend the Gram Sabha, per village? (Approximate percentage)
41. Are these attendants a cross-section of the social groups in the village?
42. Do all GP members attend the GS?
43. Do all GP members participate in the GS?
44. Does the Gram Panchayat at the Gram Sabha meeting present:
 - a. Their planning and budget for the coming year
 - b. The last audit note
 - c. The levy of taxes, rates, rents and fees
 - d. Results of previous financial year
 - e. The annual statement of accounts
45. Does the GS have the power to approve of the above mentioned?

46. Can the GS call for information and data any time?
47. Does the GS have the power to:
 - a. Regulating control over use and sell of intoxicant
 - b. Ownership over minor forest production
 - c. Control over alienation of land of scheduled tribe and restoration of this land
 - d. Control over money lending.
48. Do the members of the Gram Sabha ask a lot of questions? What sort of questions?
49. Who has final decision-making power in the Gram Panchayat?
 - a. Its members
 - b. The Sarpanch
 - c. The Gram Sabha
50. Have all your dreams been achieved? Why (not)?
51. Will you stand as a candidate during the elections of 2007?

Villagers Tamana

1. What is your name?
2. What is your age?
3. What is your gender?
4. Which village do you live in?
5. To which social group do you belong?
 - a. Adivasis
 - b. Dalits
 - c. OBG (Other Backward Group)
 - d. other
6. Do you ever attend General Body village meetings?
 - a. if no; why not?
 - i. preoccupation with agricultural activities
 - ii. preoccupation with laboured work
 - iii. preoccupation with household activities
 - iv. No individual benefits can be gained
 - v. other -----
 - b. if yes; how many meetings did you attend?
 - i. all
 - ii. nearly all
 - iii. half of all meetings held
 - iv. not many
 - v. hardly any
 - c. If yes; what was the reason to participate in the general body of Gram Vikas?
 - d. If yes; how did/does the participation in the general body influence you personally, did you gain new knowledge/experiences?
7. How is participation in the general body stimulated by Gram Vikas?
8. Do you take place in the village executive committee?
 - a. if no; why not?
 - i. preoccupation with agricultural activities
 - ii. preoccupation with laboured work
 - iii. preoccupation with household activities
 - iv. No individual benefits can be gained
 - v. other -----
 - b. if yes; how many meetings did you attend?
 - i. all
 - ii. nearly all
 - iii. half of all meetings held
 - iv. not many
 - v. hardly any
 - c. If yes; what was the reason to participate in the VEC of Gram Vikas?
 - d. If yes; how did/does the participation in the VEC influence you personally, did you gain new knowledge/experiences?
9. Who take place in the village executive committee?
10. How is participation in the village executive committee stimulated by Gram Vikas?
11. Do you ever attend Pali Sabha meetings?

- a. if no; why not?
 - i. preoccupation with agricultural activities
 - ii. preoccupation with laboured work
 - iii. preoccupation with household activities
 - iv. No individual benefits can be gained
 - v. other -----
 - b. if yes; how many meetings did you attend?
 - i. all in this election period
 - ii. both meetings this year
 - iii. one meeting this year
 - iv. none
 - c. If yes; what was the reason to participate in the PS?
 - d. If yes; how did/does the participation in the PS influence you personally, did you gain new knowledge/experiences?
12. Do you make contact with the ward-member of Tamana to discuss problems?
13. Did you vote for the Gram Panchayat elections in 2002?
- a. yes / no
 - b. If no; why didn't you vote?
 - i. preoccupation with agricultural activities
 - ii. preoccupation with laboured work
 - iii. preoccupation with household activities
 - iv. No individual benefits can be gained
 - v. other -----
 - c. If yes; why did you vote? (asked as an open question)
 - i. Request of candidate
 - ii. Pressure of candidate
 - iii. Social solidarity
 - iv. The avoidance of later tension
 - v. The fear to otherwise be removed from lists for later beneficiary projects
 - vi. Other
 - d. If yes; who did you vote?
 - e. Why did you vote for this person? (asked as an open question)
 - i. Level of education
 - ii. Trustworthiness
 - iii. Age
 - iv. Gender
 - v. Economic position
 - vi. Strong social relation with candidate
 - vii. Economic relations with candidate
14. Did you vote in earlier Gram Panchayat elections? Why (not)?
15. Are you satisfied with the Gram Panchayat? Why (not)?
16. Do you ever attend Gram Sabha meetings?
- a. if no; why not?
 - i. Preoccupation with agricultural activities
 - ii. Preoccupation with laboured work
 - iii. Preoccupation with household activities
 - iv. No individual benefits can be gained
 - v. Other -----
 - b. if yes; how many meetings did you attend?
 - i. All in this election period
 - ii. Both meetings this year
 - iii. One meeting this year
 - iv. None
 - c. If yes; what is the reason to participate in the GS?
 - d. Do you think you can influence decisions made in the GS?
 - e. Did participation in any of the Gram Vikas bodies or PS influence your participation in the GS?
 - f. Did your participation in the GS influence you personally?
17. Do you have a voice in the Palli Sabha in which problems will be referred to the Panchayat?
18. Which activities does the GP undertake?

19. Do all GP members attend the GS?
20. Does the Gram Panchayat at the Gram Sabha meeting present:
 - a. Their plans for the coming year
 - b. The last audit note
 - c. The levy of taxes, rates, rents and fees
 - d. Results of previous financial year
 - e. The annual statement of accounts
21. Does the GS have the power to approve of the above mentioned?
22. Can the GS call for information and data any time?
23. Does the GS have the power to:
 - a. Regulate control over use and sell of intoxicant
 - b. Ownership over minor forest production
 - c. Control over alienation of land of scheduled tribe and restoration of this land
 - d. Control over money lending.
24. Do you ask a lot of questions to GP members in GS meetings? What sort of questions?
25. Has your village received any benefits through the Gram Panchayat? Which?
26. Did your village receive benefits through the Gram Panchayat before 1993? Which?
27. Did your village receive benefits through the Gram Panchayat since 1993? Which?
28. What kind of benefits would you like to receive through the GP?
29. Which party promises these benefits?
30. Do you feel you are better represented since the implementation of the reservation seat policy?
31. Do you know who is the Sarpanch and Naib-sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat?
32. Do you know your ward-member in the Gram Panchayat?
33. Do you know any other ward-members of the Gram Panchayat?
34. Are there more Adivasi, Dalit and women GP members since 1993?
35. Who has the final decision making power in the Gram Panchayat?
 - a. The Sarpanch
 - b. The members
 - c. The Gram Sabha
36. Did the Gram Sabha ever held a member of the Gram Panchayat accountable? When and how?
37. Are you planning to vote during the Gram Panchayat elections in 2007?

Annex 8: Reading guide

The focus of this research is on political participation of ethnic minorities. As a consequence of a research I conducted in India in the summer of 2006 on political participation of tribals in local political processes in Tamana, the idea emerged to compare the participation of this ethnic minority with the political participation of an ethnic minority in for example The Netherlands instead of benchmarking it to the ideal of Democracy.

The main research question of this research is:

In what ways is the intensity and nature of participation of allochtone groups in municipal government in The Netherlands similar to, and dissimilar from, participation of ethnic minorities in GP government in India?

The first chapter starts with the background of the research and mentions the objective and relevance of the research. Subsequently the research question is formulated followed by the methodology used for this research.

The second chapter dedicated to the theoretical framework. In this chapter the concept of political participation is explained as well as the need and of equal participation and representation. Denters and Geurts (1998) have investigated political participation with use of nine indicators that are divided into three categories to reveal the nature of the participation. These are introduced in the theoretical framework, besides factors that can explain differences in participation are mentioned.

The third chapter is on political participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in Enschede Noord. This chapter is started with an overview of research conducted on the political participation of ethnic Turks in The Netherlands, followed by an analysis of the political participation of the Turkish ethnic minority in the ward Enschede Noord. Therefore interviews and the data of a survey investigation in Enschede Noord are used. In addition to official structures the role of two Turkish organisations is analysed as well. Because the civic community theory of Putnam shows that organisations are of influence on political participation. Subsequently the participation in municipal organs is analysed. Finally the indicators of Denters and Geurts (1998) are used to analyse the nature of political participation of the Turks. Additionally the factors that explain participation are dealt with.

In the fourth chapter the political participation of the tribal ethnic minority in Tamana is the subject. First the political system is explained after which the participation in the organs within Tamana is analysed. In addition to the official structures also the structures introduced by Gram Vikas are dealt with as this NGO has a lot of influence in the village. Subsequently the political participation in the organs on Gram Panchayat level are analysed. For both analyses interviews are used. Finally the participation is analysed with help of the indicators of Denters and Geurts (1998), explanatory factors are mentioned as well.

The fifth chapter is on the conclusion and recommendations. The answer on the research is given in this chapter and the differences in nature and intensity of participation are tried to be explained with help of the theory. The recommendations follow from the findings.

Subsequently the sixth chapter discusses the validity of the research.

Annex 9: Reflection Report

Preparation phase

The preparation phase started in May 2007 when I visited Rik Reussing to discuss the possibility of extending the research I conducted for my minor in India towards a bachelor thesis. That discussion led to the idea of comparing the situation in Tamana in India with the situation in The Netherlands. Since the additional comment of my minor research already suggested that the found participation rates in Tamana might not be ideal compared with the ideal democracy, but benchmarked with other functioning democracies the results might be called quite good.

Margaret Skutsch who was my tutor for the minor research was willing to also tutor this bachelor thesis. Therefore I made a short research proposal which I discussed with Rik as well as Margaret in respectively June and July 2007. This research proposal was composed in a short time which influenced the quality of the proposal, but it showed the direction in which I wanted to conduct the comparison. A problem was that I could not find a lot of literature on the topic of political participation of ethnic minorities in The Netherlands which made it difficult for me to assess all research possibilities. In this research proposal I choose to compare the situation in Tamana with the situation in Rotterdam as that city has a large number of ethnic minorities and an active policy towards including ethnic minorities in political participation or at least in voting. The discussions with Rik and Margaret gave me more insight in the possibilities to search for literature. Because I had to follow my Master courses in the first semester of the next college year I did not adjust my research proposal directly.

In February I passed all my Masters courses and therefore there was time to start to adjust my research proposal. However due to my work as a student assistant I only started with this in March. At first I wanted to contact Rik and Margaret only when I had a good research proposal. However when I started to search for more literature and read more on the topic of ethnic minorities and political participation, I became quite lost in the subject. The literature I could find on political participation of ethnic minorities was mainly on voting and in Tamana I had paid little attention to voting as there was no party system like in The Netherlands. Besides the literature on political participation was very broad, but not easily applicable to the subject of my research. Furthermore Rotterdam is a large city in The Netherlands which is difficult to compare with a small village in Tamana. This feeling of getting lost in the subject decreased my motivation. Therefore I started to focus more on my work again which meant I spent less time on the research proposal. The time I did spend on the research proposal I sought for literature, which I read. In this phase I could have better started writing as writing could have explicated all the ideas I had in my head, which would have showed me which information I had and what the missing loop holes were. That clarity could have increased my motivation.

Finally I contacted Rik and Margaret by mid April as I felt that I really needed some guidance and made an appointment for the 6th of May. In between I found a good chapter by Denters and Geurts (1998) on political equal participation that did fit well in the concept of my research design. The discussion with Rik and Margaret together in May led to the idea of comparing the situation in Tamana with Enschede Noord instead of Rotterdam. This would be an answer to the problem of a lack of empirical data on political participation of ethnic minorities as I was able to conduct interviews. Furthermore, Enschede Noord is smaller than Rotterdam which made the situation better comparable to Tamana.

The research

With the new focus I started to adjust my research proposal, subsequently making an overview of all the persons I wanted to interview. I made questionnaires for the several groups based on the questionnaires in India to increase the comparability. Furthermore I composed questionnaires to find answers to loop holes in the gathered information and to cross check certain information. Thereafter I started to contact the persons I wanted to interview. On forehand this made me nervous, me asking their time for something they didn't ask for, but this was not necessary. I arranged the interview with the chairman of the ward council surprisingly quick. The new information really boosted my motivation. It was a pity that the contact information on the internet of the Turkish Cultural Association Enschede was not up to date, but after several attempts I decided to cycle to the Prismare building. That was a good move as I had the luck that there were some persons at the association who gave me the mobile number of the chairman. The interview was arranged quickly and the people were very hospitable which made it a really nice experience. Besides I received some contact information from Margaret for the Foundation Ender which was very helpful as well. It gave me the possibility to come in touch with a different group of Turkish citizens. A difficulty while interviewing the chairman of foundation Ender was that he was doing twenty other things during our interview as well, which made

me feel as if I was taking up his precious time. Therefore I asked him if it would be more convenient for him if I would come back another time. That was not the case and afterwards I had the full attention which was pleasant for the interview.

Some political parties were a bit harder to contact. While some replied very quick, others needed longer time. In general all the interviews I had were very pleasant. People were sincerely interested in the subject and did not give me the feeling I was taking up their time at all. Unfortunately I was not able to contact Burger Belangen Enschede and the VVD as in June they did not reply to my three attempts to reach them and in July they were with recess and impossible to reach at all. I learned while conducting interviews how to keep with the subject while respondents start to talk about less relevant subjects. Furthermore I adjusted my questionnaire a little in the process to better fit the research. I worked out all interviews immediately after the interview, which I emailed to the respondent for comments. This worked very well because misinterpretations could be corrected quickly, although this was hardly necessary, and most respondents liked the option to read the version of the interview I drew up.

Simultaneously with the interviews I was working out the theoretical framework and the background of the research. The interviews motivated while the fact that I had found some good literature motivated me as well. Furthermore I summarized the findings of my minor research into one chapter, which practiced my skills to distinguish the main points from the details.

After this stage I submitted a first incomplete version which I received feedback on from Rik in a meeting at his office and from Margaret by mail. Both were very helpful to point out the weak spots in the research. Furthermore the affirmation that the general structure was all right increased my confidence. The expectation of Rik that there would be attention for the analysis within the descriptive chapters gave me new insights in the structuring of the research, which was helpful in further writing.

The fact that there was a limitation to the amount of pages was challenging for me. The first complete version counted ten pages to much while I already had tried to write concise. However it was a good tactic to first write the whole report and afterwards trying to shorten it as it makes you more attentive to the main points of the research.

All in all I learned from this bachelor thesis that it is good to try figure out things by your own, but asking for help on certain times can be very useful as well, because new insights can lead to new motivation. Furthermore I learned from conducting the interviews that instead of being nervous for it, these experiences kept me motivated. Of course conducting the interviews itself increased my interview skills as well. I found it interesting to see that approaching different kind of peoples in different ways worked remarkably well. Moreover I really enjoyed writing the thesis after I had collected enough data.