European Conflict Settlement

(A Study about the European Union's Performance in Conflict Settlement in the Framework of the European Security and Defence Policy)

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Executive Summary

Within the global security domain several significant changes have been taking place which also influence the European Union (EU) due to its broad mandate. Particularly the comprehension of the nature of security, threats and conflicts has changed strongly. Security is no longer solely a concern of single nation states. It is more and more a matter of international organisations, whose members obligated themselves to find solutions in interaction with the other member states. Also, the definition of threats gets broader, including now concepts like cyber-attacks, proliferation, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. And finally, conflicts are not longer interstate issues, but they emerge within nation states due to ethnical differences.

The EU has been required to take action according to these changes, in order to become a global security entity. However, it is questionable whether the EU manages to deal with the changes and to adjust their strategies to them. Therefore, it is examined throughout this report '*In how far the EU is able to deal with the present security issues in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).*'

In order to conduct the research a two-pronged approach is used. First, a judgment concerning the EU's performance in conflict settlement is given, based on an analysis of the degree of implementation of the Headline Goals (HGs) 2010. And, in a next step the validity and reliability of this judgment is examined by using various methodological approaches that are connected to the topic. Due to the dispersion, caused by using on the one hand the HGs and on the other hand various methodological approaches, a more comprehensive and dependable outcome will be reached.

Through the analysis of the HGs it has been found that the EU's performance in conflict settlement is positive. This basically means that the EU's main task –broadening the range of civilian and military instruments and retaining coherence while meeting the challenges of an expanded range of action- has been addressed effectively. However, several restrictions exist to the outcome. Most importantly, the implementation of the HGs does not give any insight into the impact of the EU's missions on the security sector, thus the HG's can actually just reflect a small part of the EU's effectiveness – the institutional effectiveness. Therefore, an additional analysis concerning the EU-missions on the headline goals has been conducted. It shows that the EU lacks a systematic and robust lessons-learned process. Thus, the channel between the missions and the policy-plans lacks.

Another restriction to the positive outcome of the HG analysis is that it cannot explain underlying problems which cause the degree of effectiveness. At this point it gets obvious that a judgment based on one source is not reliable. Therefore, several methodological approaches have been brought in, in order to add other dimensions to the research. These approaches basically concern issues of cooperation between various stakeholders. While examining the methodology it has been found that the EU could enhance its performance in conflict settlement if it established a leading authority in this domain and facilitated the procedures of its decision-taking processes. This would lead to more coherence throughout the MS's cooperation, and it would increase the degree of flexibility and rapidity in the processes of the EU.

To sum up all the information, the EU is not able to deal with the present security issues in the framework of the ESDP. Thus the first judgment, given by means of the examination of the HGs 2010, has to be rectified. But, to this final outcome some restrictions exist. Surely the EU possesses strength in conflict settlement, what gets visible by the success of most of their missions. It clearly gains through its practical experiences in the missions and through a certain level of understanding the necessity to act together in order to be more effective and stay a global player. But still the system lacks major aspects that are necessary for a further development of the EU's performances in conflict settlement. The main problems which have to be overcome are a lack of *cooperation* and *coherence* on the one hand, as well as *a lack of flexibility* and *rapidity* on the other hand. Due to these gaps, the EU does not use all its advantages and all its strength. Surely, a start is made, but the EU could work more efficient and effective. Improvement could be reached by establishing a leading authority in this domain and facilitating the decision-making processes.

List of Abbreviations

CFSP → Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoM → Council of Ministers
EATC → European Air Transport Command
EDA → European Defence Agency
ESDP → European Security and Defence Policy
ESS → European Security Strategy
EU → European Union
EUMS → European Union Military Staff
HGs → Headline Goals
HR → High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
IER → Information Exchange Requirements
MS → Member States
NATO → North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEC → Network Enabled Capability
OpCen → Operation Center
SDR → Software Defined Radio
UN → United Nations

1 Introduction

'[…] EU Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union.' (European Council, 2004, p.1)

Throughout the last two decades the nature of European conflict settlement changed considerable. In earlier stages the focus has been characteristically on civilian approaches to conflict settlement. However, within the last years more and more military aspects have been integrated into the EU's approaches. Moreover, the security sector has been established as the major domain in the EU's foreign policy; thus its importance has increased effectually. In addition, a structure of institutions has been set up that deals particularly with the enforcement and the implementation of reaching and sustaining security in the scope of legally accepted boundaries. These developments show that the EU wants to establish as a global entity not only in the fields of monetary and fiscal interaction, but also with regard to security and stability issues.

Alongside, in the last decades the comprehension of the nature of security, threats and conflicts has changed strongly. In earlier times security has been a matter of the nation states, threats have been attacks by other states and conflicts where interstate issues. Nowadays security is more and more a matter of international organisations like the United Nations (UN) or the EU, whose members obligated themselves to find solutions in interaction with the other member states. Furthermore, the definition of threats has been broadened due to an increasing number of sources for threats. Currently, by many organizations and states define for instance cyber-attacks, proliferation, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as threat. Also, conflicts are no longer bound to interstate issues. Clashes often evolve within states and between differing ethnic-groups.

Due to all these changes the EU Member States (MS) agreed to take steps that allow them to cope with the changes and to effectively tackle current security issues. This finds expression in the quote placed at the beginning of this report. Briefly worded, it summarizes the latest answer of the European MS on the broad range of security challenges. In this thesis the two abovementioned movements, the efforts taken by the EU as well as the constant changes in the nature of security, will be integrated within one research. Therefore, the topic of the research concerns *'the EU's current performance in conflict settlement in the scope of the ESDP'.*

Conflict settlement is a complex concept which can imply a variety of possible definitions. Within this thesis it will be used in a broad range including actions which are undertaken to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts as well as actions that enforce peace-building. These are the concepts which the European Commission has determined as important tools of the EU in order to settle violent conflicts (Smith, 2004). A lot more concepts and processes are involved into the domain of European security policy. Thus, it is important to carefully examine how the EU copes with security issues, although a high degree of complexity exists. Therefore, the major research question reads as follows: *In how far is the EU able to deal with the present security issues in the framework of the ESDP?*

In order to answer the central research question, several fields will be addressed which trigger aspects that are basic to the structure of my report. After this general introduction some methodological approaches will be outlined. They build the backbone for the later analysis of the EU's performance in conflict settlement. To be more precise, these are the 'implementation deficit of the EU' as well as 'direct criticism on the EU's performance in conflict settlement'. These approaches offer the possibility to examine the EU's performance in conflict settlement from various perspectives.

Subsequently, the current goals of the European security policy will be presented. This means specifically the EU HGs 2010 (civilian and military), which serve as a benchmark to measure the

effectiveness of the European approaches. Therefore, the goals will firstly be conceptualized and afterwards their degree of implementation will be determined. By means of the examination of the goals, a judgment about the EU's performance in conflict settlement will be given. Additionally, the impact of the EU missions on the implementation of the headline goals will be analyzed. This is important to the research in so far, as the EU's manner of conflict settlement and its abilities, as well as changes in the attitude and the abilities will first be reflected in the missions.

After that the given judgement about the EU's performance in conflict settlement will be scrutinized concerning its correctness and stability. This will be done by revisiting the methodological approaches which have been outlined in the beginning. Thus, the EU's performance in conflict settlement will be discussed with regard to the 'implementation deficit' and the 'direct criticism on the EU's performance in conflict settlement'. Thereby other perspectives will be added to the research and the judgement taken -by means of the HGs- will either be confirmed or confuted. In any case the judgement will gain profoundness. Finally, the thesis will be ended up by a conclusion in which all significant information will be summarized and the EU's performance in dealing with the current security issues will be determined.

In this research it will *not* be examined why the implementation of each of the HGs 2010 has either been a success or a failure. This specific focus will be avoided as the aim of the thesis does not concern an analysis of the Headline Goals, but a judgment on the EU's performance in conflict settlement. In short, the HGs do only serve as a tool for giving a first judgement.

2 Main Part

2.1 Methodology

Within this report the performance of European conflict settlement will be determined. In order to be able to measure this performance a two-pronged approach is used. Therefore, the topic is on the one hand examined through several methodological approaches and on the other hand through the HGs 2010. The HGs will be processes in a later step. At first, the methodological approaches will be outlined and clarified.

By asking *'which methodological approaches are considered important in order to build an analytical framework concerning the EU's performance in conflict resolution?'* the methodological backbone of this report is shaped. As the main work of the EU is to recognize gaps and threats and to establish strategies and goals to overcome those, most of the approaches concern issues in cooperation. The first set of approaches concerns the EU's implementation deficit and is generally applicable to the context of the EU. The second set of approaches concerns criticism on the EU's performance in conflict settlement and therefore stands in specific context to the topic. All these methodological approaches add up to the research as they enable to engross the argumentation about European conflict settlement. Thereby, other indicators are recognized and are taken into account throughout determination of the EU's performance. And this in turn strengthens in particular the internal and the external validity of the research. The main thoughts of the methodology will be summarized in a sub-conclusion.

2.1.1 The Implementation Deficit

With regard to the EU also several approaches exist which are connected directly to the reasons for success and failure of goal implementation. The main assumption implies that the so called 'implementation deficit' is hindering the successful realization of certain aims. At European level, one of the main issues is that unanimity in the Council of Ministers (CoM) is needed for a

number of decisions (particularly with regard to foreign and security policy). In this context, especially the high number of MS and the competition between the MS restrict consensus and goal implementation. This is reinforced by the problem that the EU institutions and MS lack a common understanding of 'threats' and 'cases of priority'. Therefore they consider different aspects as being important while searching for a common solution (Monar, 2008). But, also issues on the national level contribute to an aggravated process of goal implementation. The main issue at national level emerges due to shortfalls in the legislative implementation. Although the Council sets up deadlines for the implementation of certain goals, the MS do not stick to these limits.

2.1.2 Common Criticism on EU Performance in Conflict Settlement

Aside from the implementation deficit scholars usually name several other aspects when they criticize the EU's performance in conflict settlement. Most of them are related to the concept of the implementation deficit in the way that they reinforce it. One aspect of criticism is the allocation of competences in the EU. Basically, the structure of the EU is hindering the establishment of more coherence. For instance, the resolution of security issues is proportioned between the European Commission and the CoM, both having different backgrounds and different preferences (Everts et al., 2004). Furthermore, coherence and trust are also missing between the MS. A lack in trust is hindering an efficient sharing of intelligence (Stumbaum, 2007). Thereby the EU's abilities in conflict settlement are lowered as well. Mainly, because coherence is needed in order to take solid decisions and enhance responsiveness.

In addition, although the EU as a global player in security issues has a broad mandate, due to the low number of personnel the EU is missing to meet the expectations and requirements of this broad mandate. This is also true for administrative personnel which is inter alia responsible for (preparing) the decision-making and -conducting as well as monitoring goal implementation (Lohmann, 2006). In addition, a too small budget that the MS can spend on security policy is hindering the realization of certain goals and therewith the EU's development as a global security player (Lohmann, 2006).

2.1.3 Sub-Conclusion

To sum up, various indicators exist for the EU's performance in conflict settlement. In order to be able to give a conclusive judgment in the end, the methodological approaches have to be taken into account. Later on, the main topic of this report will be discussed in detail with regard to the methodological approaches outlined above. Thereby, it will be considered whether the judgment given by means of the HGs can be confirmed or is proven to be wrong. Additionally, the utilization of the methodology indicates reasons for the state of the EU's performance in conflict settlement. Particularly helpful will be that the methodological approaches are taken from various standpoints. The first set concerns European issues in general and the second set contains criticism which is concretely directed at shortfalls in European conflict settlement. Through this dispersion a more comprehensive and dependable outcome is induced.

2.2 Analysis of the Headline Goals

In the following section the current goals of the European Security Policy will be outlined and evaluated. By means of the analysis a first judgment about the EU's performance in conflict settlement will be given. The sub-question on which the upcoming explanations are based reads as follows: '*What are the goals of European Security Policy?*' This question triggers a description of the EU's current goals in the scope of the ESDP; more precisely the HGs 2010. Subsequently, a detailed examination of the HG's degree of implementation will be given. Thereby, it can be seen how active and progressive the EU is with regard to goal implementation in the field of conflict settlement.

Afterwards a judgment about the EU's performance in conflict settlement will be given on the basis of the analysis concerning the HGs. This judgement represents an important milestone on the path to answer the main research question. Knowing that the judgment is rather restricted, its correctness and stability will be discussed in a later part of this report in context with the methodological approaches outlined in section 2.1.

2.2.1 The Headline Goals

The 'European Security and Defence Policy' is integrated into the second pillar of the EU's three pillar system. Within this pillar the MS are sovereign and decisions are taken on intergovernmental basis. In order to commonly develop the ESDP further, the EU MS agree from time to time on new strategies and aims. These strategies are seen as substantial to ensure the EU's position as a global actor in security issues. One of these strategies is to set up HGs which should be reached within a certain time frame. This is a functional manner to formulate concrete aims based on the rather vague statements in the European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council, 2004). The headline goals are not legally binding; they are guidelines on which the MS agreed.

The HGs 2010, which are used within this report, exist in two forms, military and civilian HG. The military HGs for have been determined in 2004 in order to realize the approaches included in the ESS. By reaching these goals, the EU is enhancing its capabilities of conflict settlement. More precisely, the flexibility, the availability of resources and the responsiveness throughout EU missions is improved (European Council, 2004). The civilian HGs for 2010 have been launched in 2007 in order to strengthen civilian crisis management as one of the major tools of the ESDP. To reach this general aim, four objectives have been determined, namely *improving quality, enhancing availability, developing instruments and achieving synergies*. For each of these four objectives the EU conceived approaches to fulfill those (European Council, 2007). The main issue which the HGs 2010 have to deal with is to retain coherence while meeting the challenges of an expanded range of action with regard to the place and the nature of missions (European Council, 2007). Therefore, the EU wants to broaden its range of instruments regarding both civilian and military means; and it wants to strengthen the synergy between those two. Even if approaches existed which could trigger the improvement of the EU's performance in conflict settlement faster or easier, for this report the HGs 2010 are chosen as the benchmark as they imply the compromise on which the European MS could agree altogether.

The degree of implementation of the HGs is determined through documental research in catalogues, documents or press releases as well as road-maps of action plans, monitoring reviews and other tools that show the progress of goal-implementation. The overall achievement of each goal could then be measured by checking whether they have been established fully, or whether action plans and tools have been developed in order to reach the goal. If action plans or tools have been developed, one would have to check in how far they are implemented by now. If the aim is reached or almost reached it will be judged in a positive way. If there are still major shortfalls or problems with the realization it will be judged in a negative way. An issue concerning the measurement of the implementation of all these headline goals is that roughly seen two categories of measurement exist. For some of the goals it can be clearly said that they either have or have not been implemented, as for example the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS. However, for other goals it cannot be determined as clearly in how far they have been reached or not. But as all these goals are outright different, no commonly applicable benchmark for a negative or positive valuation will be considered in this report. This implies that their valuation, as it is outlined in the table, is necessarily somewhat subjective. For determining their degree of implementation the approaches that have been made so far to fulfill each goal will be taken into account. A specified argumentation for the valuation of each HG is given subsequent to the upcoming table.

Additionally, special attention has to be paid, as some goals are considered as more important than others. Therefore they will also be valued be valued higher. The decision concerning which goals should be weighed more than others has also been fairly subjective. However, the continuously used benchmark is that the goals should aim at a change in the underlying mechanism of the policy field. The constitution of new institutions and processes is considered as more important within this report. Their influence is more widespread and therewith also stronger. And, in addition, they change the foundation on which future activities and decisions are based.

Despite all these issues that have to be taken into account, the scaling-method which is used in this thesis in order to categorize the degree of implementation of each of the HGs is kept fairly simple:

++   **=> HG has been implemented**

+   **=> significant approaches have been taken to implement the HG**

-   **=> little approaches have been taken to implement the HG**

--   **=> HG has not been implemented**

*   **=> goal is of particular significance and counted double**

《》   **=> no information found**

With the help of this categorization a facilitated overview about the differing degrees of the implementation of each HG will be provided. The biggest issue regarding this scaling-scheme concerns the differentiation between 'significant' and 'little' approaches that have been taken to implement a certain HG. As already mentioned above, the HGs are outright different from each other; therefore no common coding-scheme has been appropriate. Thus, the difference between 'significant' and 'little' has to be decided from case to case based on the documental research. Subsequent to the table, it will be outlined in detail for each of the HGs how their valuation is justified within this study. In the same way, the differences between the four characteristics of goal implementation ('full', 'significant', 'little', 'not at all') are not be commonly specified, but reconsidered for each goal.

2.2.2 Analyzing the HGs Degree of Implementation

In the following table the nine military and the 19 civilian HGs which the EU wants to fulfill latest up till 2010 are displayed and their degree of implementation is indicated by means of the before-mentioned scaling-method. Subsequently, the findings about the realization of the goals will be specified in order to explain their categorization. These steps will help, together with several lines of argumentation, to give a first judgment about the EU's performance in conflict settlement.

Tab. 1 The Degree of Implementation of the Headline Goals

Goal No.	Military Headline Goals	Degree of Implementation	Civilian Headline Goals	Degree of Implementation
1	the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS (in 2004)	++*	a robust and systematic lessons-learned process	-*
2	to be able to rapidly set-up an operation centre	++*	new missions = define new concepts and/or procedures accordingly	+*

3	to establish an agency in the field of defence capability development	++*	improved arrangements for timely and accurate support to missions	+
4	to implement by 2005 the creation of an EU strategic lift joint coordination	+	Improving field security, including intelligence where relevant	-
5	to develop an European Airlift command by 2010	-	further development of the interface between Police and the wider Rule of Law sector	-
6	to complete by 2007 the establishment of the Battle-Groups	++	further development of rapidly deployable police elements, notably Integrated Police Units and Formed Police Units (IPU and FPU)	+
7	to acquire the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008	--	taking concrete steps to evaluate, improve and the complete the Civilian Response Teams (CRT)	--*
8	to improve the communications compatibility by 2010	++*	mainstreaming of Human Rights and gender issues into concepts and conduct of the CHG 2010 process	+*
9	to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria for national forces	«›»	The targeting of training efforts to operational needs	-
10			Developing tools to facilitate the MS's review of their potential availability to contribute to ESDP missions	«›»
11			updated relevant information on civilian ESDP	-
12			the raising of secondable civilian personnel for ESDP	-
13			Practical/ technological applications for improvement of planning and conducting missions	+
14			accomplishing the Civilian Capability Management Tool	«›»
15			Information Exchange Requirements	«›»
16			Improving mission security	-
17			Synergies between civilian and military ESDP actors	+*
18			Synergies with third-pillar	+*

		actors	
19		synergies with other actors in civilian crisis management	**+***

(Sources: European Council, 2004 & European Council, 2007)

The first military headline goal, namely the establishment of a civil-military cell within the European Union Military Stuff (EUMS) in 2004, has been implemented fully and on time. The work of the cell has already been successful, for instance with regard to planning assistance of the civilian ESDP mission in Aceh (European Military Press Association, 2009). Therefore, this goal gets the most positive valuation possible in the range of the scaling system of the table above.

The established civil-military cell is also able to rapidly set up an operation center (OpCen) since January 2007. The main task of an OpCen is to conduct the operational, military and civilian planning for a certain mission and to strengthen the planning and command structure (Quille et al., 2006). As the headline goal has been clearly implemented it gets the according score in the table.

The third goal has been to build up an agency in the domain of defence capability development in 2004. This goal has been fully implemented as the so called European Defence Agency (EDA) has been constituted in summer 2004 (EDA, 2007). The main aim of the EDA is to support the EU MS in strengthening their military abilities by enhancing coherence among the MS. First results have been the so called 'Long Term Vision' and the constitution of the agency's strategic framework (Council of the European Union, 2009). As the EDA has been fully implemented in the planned timeframe and as it is already working on a lot projects this goal gets the most positive valuation possible in the range in the table above.

Another goal has been the establishment of a so called EU Strategic lift joint coordination by 2005. The task of the coordination has been to develop full abilities for strategic lifts in all three elements, land, air and water, until 2010 (European Union Center of North Carolina, 2007). As a fist big step, this coordination has been established on time. However, it is not likely that its aims will be accomplished by 2010. Therefore, the degree of implementation of this goal will be valued just slightly positive.

The fifth military headline goal, to develop an European Airlift Command by 2010 has not been fulfilled yet. The basic aim is to build up military airlift capabilities to decrease the dependence on civilian airlift capabilities. However, some small approaches like the European Air Transport Command (EATC) and the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF) have been made, which mainly focus on coordinating and pooling airlift capabilities between certain EU MS (Defence Industry Daily, 2007). However, these approaches cannot be considered as an airlift command structure; they just lay down some rules for the cooperation of willing EU MS concerning pooling of airlift resources. Therefore, this goal is valued slightly negative in the table.

Another military goal is to complete the establishment of the EU Battle-Groups by 2007. The EU MS agreed on the establishment of 18 Battle Groups whereby two are on constant standby (European Union Center of North Carolina, 2007). It has been reached that since 2007 two Battle Groups are available on standby in order to carry out two missions at the same time. And although the Battle Groups have not been used so far, a few problems are visible. Limits with regard to decision making processes exist, as well as lift- and equipment shortfalls and the interoperability between the various nations. Also, the limited size of the Battle-Groups limits the size of possible missions. Thus, this HG can just be seen as a start for rapid reaction in future conflicts (Mölling, 2007). Aside from all these limits, the HG itself has been fulfilled.

The seventh military HG has been to acquire the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008. This goal has not been implemented by 2008 and it is not likely to be fulfilled in the following years. What has been reached till now is that all countries which possess aircraft carriers consolidated in a project for providing aircraft carriers at ad hoc basis

(European Carrier Group Interoperability Program). However, all the other EU MS would have to join such a program as well in order to make it European (EURODEFENSE-UK, 2008).

In order to improve the communications compatibility by 2010 the EDA has launched and several initiatives. One of them concerns several research projects about Software Defined Radio (SDR). Thereby, the interoperability between the EU MS as well as between the military and the civil actors shall be improved (EDA, 2007 http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=115). A second initiative in order to enhance communication compatibility is the Network Enabled Capability (NEC). That does not solely concern the development of technology but also the establishment on common rules and norms in order to increase interoperability. Due to the significant developments and plans for even stronger developments till 2010, it is safe to say that this headline goal has been reached (EDA, 2007).

With regard to the last military goal, namely to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria for national forces no information were to be found. Therefore it will not be included in the valuation in the table above.

The first civilian HG 2010 is concerning a robust and systematic lessons-learned process. This HG has not been reached by now. And although the advantages are known and plans do exist, it could still take a while until a real procedure is introduced. Often the MS insist on their national procedures and concepts which are surely not applicable in the case of the EU as a whole. The MS's cooperation within the EDA and the establishment of the ECAP are steps that increase the probability that a robust and systematic lessons-learned process can be set up in the future. However, till now the EDA is highly dependent on the EU MS and therefore, first the MS's would have to agree on such a process and only then measures could be taken by the EDA to (fully) realize the goal (Stumbaum, 2007). As this goal is not likely to be implemented till 2010 and realization is highly dependent on the MS's arbitrariness, it is valued rather low at the scale for the table.

For the realization of the 2nd and the 3rd civilian HG, namely to define new concepts and procedures accordingly to the new types of missions, and to improve the arrangements for timely and accurate support to the missions, different actors are responsible. The EUMS is a body responsible for planning EU missions is generally determined as being responsible in this context. It could particularly benefit from the civil-military cell as it offers a broader approach which meets the current definitions of operations. When it comes down to specific missions the OpCen's are responsible for the planning and the accomplishment of the mission. Those responsible have been determined, however, about their precise work not a lot is known yet. Additionally, a change in procedures will barely take place as the area of EU security policy is still intergovernmental in nature. And the EU MS will not agree on procedural changes so easily. Due to the fact, that significant steps have been taken to fulfill these two HGs by determining the responsible actors, they are valued positive in the table.

Field security has been improved in so far that research has been conducted concerning the Software Defined Radio whereby communication is to be secured. Thereby, particularly the intelligence in the field shall be secured (EDA, 2007). Other approaches to implement the goal are not to be found, thus the goal has barely been fulfilled. Therefore, the degree of implementation of this goal is valued low in the table above.

Concerning the 5thHG, namely the further development of the interface between Police and the wider Rule of Law sector one approach is likely to have some impact. The EDA is integrating all various actors which are involved in EU security issues in order to set up common approaches and improve interoperability. However, there are no specific rules for the further development of the interface between the police and the wider judicial sector. Therefore, the goal is valued negative in the table above.

The following civilian HG concerns the further development of rapidly deployable police elements, notably Integrated Police Units (IPU) and Formed Police Units (FPU). The IPU and the FPU are used a lot. IPU is for example strongly integrated into the EUFOR Althea mission. Next to the missions the police units train constantly to keep their abilities up (EUFOR ALTHEA, 2009). Other aspects where developments have taken place to enable the police forces to intervene more in concrete cases mainly concern easier release and exchange of data within the EU. The newest project is the set-up of an agency which is responsible for the managements of the Schengen information system 2, the visa-information system and EURODAC (Europäische Kommission, 2009). All in all, the units are at work in various missions and their interoperability is increased by enhancements in data exchange. Thus, this goal is generally positively valued in the table.

Since 2008 no approaches have been made to take concrete steps in order to evaluate, improve and the complete the Civilian Response Teams (CRT). These teams have been build and trained, however they are not fully in use by now. As it is not likely that this headline goal will be implemented till 2010 due to its broad range, it can be said that it has not been fulfilled.

The mainstreaming of human rights and gender issues into concepts and conduct of the civilian HG 2010 process has been partly fulfilled. With the help of certain resolutions it has been laid down formally that human rights and gender issues should be included in all ESDP missions and procedures in the framework of the ESDP. However, the practical application of these aspects has not yet been completed successfully. But, the approaches are very specific and should therefore allow for improvements in the practical application of the goals (Council of European Union, 2008). The degree of implementation of the goal scores slightly positive in the table above.

The goal of targeting training efforts with regard to operational needs has been fulfilled to a certain degree. Mainly the training of experts for ESDP missions is a matter for each country itself. Subsequently, a wide variety of abilities exists among the experts who had different kinds of training in their MS. However, the EU tries to arrange training sessions which are held on multinational level and in the framework of the ESDP. An example is the training exercise from June 2009 (Council of the European Union 2009). In the future the number of these exercises shall be raised with the help of the Civilian Capability Management tool (Schuyer, 2008). Another positive example is the detailed training concept which has been developed for the first time in context with the EULEX mission in Kosovo. In another context the interaction in training efforts is increased with regard to strategic and administrative knowledge. In the scope of the European Security and Defence College the cooperation between institutes of higher education is intensified (Institute of Higher National Defence Studies, 2005). Due to the considerably high dependence on nation states or national institutions this goal scores rather low in the table.

The implementation of the following goal, the development of tools to facilitate the MS's review of their potential availability to contribute to ESDP missions would have to take place on MS level and not at a common European level. However, no information was to be found with regard to this issue. Therefore the goal will not be valued in the table above.

Another goal has been to provide updated relevant information on the civilian part of the ESDP. Nowadays, this information should be found on internet where new documents and press releases can be easily displayed. Most information that is provided, reach only until the HGs 2008. The civilian HGs 2010 and general civilian approaches for EU conflict settlement can also be found. However, no clear and easily accessible overview or review is given which is solely concerning new developments with regard to the civilian aspects of the European security politics. Thus, this goal is not fulfilled. Therefore, this goal is valued negative within the table.

The raising of secondable civilian personnel for ESDP is mainly taking place on national level. Every country builds up force-pools of civil servants trains them in order to prepare them for operations in civilian crisis management. One example is the Finnish Crisis Management Center (CMC

Finland, 2009). Due to the fact that at European level no strong regulations are set up in order to coordinate the raising of secondable civilian personnel the goal is valued rather negative.

The 13th goal implies the development of practical and technological applications in order to improve the planning and the conduction of missions in the realm of the ESDP. This goal has been fulfilled through approaches like the SDR and the NEC. Both shall enhance the interoperability of the EU MS as well as the civil and military actors in EU missions. Additionally, a lot more projects exist to increase the development of practical and especially technological applications (e.g. ETARE, WOLF and ESSOR) (EDA, 2007). This goal has been fulfilled and therefore it scores positive in the table.

Another HG 2010 has been the accomplishment of the Civilian Capability Management tool. This is basically a database which contains standard job descriptions with regard to civilian tasks in ESDP missions. Thereby it strengthens the generation of civilian capabilities and facilitates the planning of missions (Schuyer, 2008). In official documents it is stated that the work on this tool proceeds and that its finalization is conceivable (Political and Security Committee, 2009). But no clear overview concerning the following steps in order to implement the tool is to be found. Therefore it is not clear, whether the goal will be implemented before the end of 2010. Due to the lack of information the goal will not be valued in the table.

With regard to the Information Exchange Requirements (IER) not too much information could be found. However, in 2007 the work on the IER had already begun with regard to the exchange between civilian and military actors of the ESDP (Zehetner, 2007). Moreover, it can be assumed that the IER has been implemented as the CoM stated that it will serve as the starting point for the NEC. And as it has been outlined with regard to the eighth military headline goal, the work on NEC has been started (European Union @ United Nations, 2007). However, as no clear information has been found this goal will not be included in the valuation.

Another civilian goal concerns the improvement of mission security. In this context no clear steps have been determined to implement the goal. The only possible approach which has been taken and which could contribute to mission security is common training of personnel (administrative personnel as well as forces). However, of these common training exercises only very few have taken place. All in all, this goal has not been tackled specifically but it is rather a side approach during the planning and the conduction of an operation. Therefore, the goal is not implemented by now and is valued negative.

The last three goals concerning the enhancements of synergy between various actors have all been fulfilled. The civil-military cell established in the framework of the EUMS contributes to the enhancement of the synergy between civilian and military actors. The synergies between 1st and 2nd pillar actors with the 3rd pillar actors have been improved through the EDA just as the synergies with other actors in civilian crisis management. In addition to the cooperation with the EDA, the synergies among the pillars is also enhanced through the method of 'comprehensive planning' which has been worked out by the CoM and the EU Commission (Quille et al., 2006). Comprehensive planning leads to an easily understandable policy plan which includes the opinions of all actors. Due to the fact that this headline goal has been reached and further enhancements are conceivable, they are valued positively within the table.

By simply following the indication of the scaling and adding up the plus and minus symbols an overall positive outcome results. In the possible range between -50 and +50 the degree of implementation scores +17. This implies that the number of implemented HGs or those for whose implementation significant steps have been taken is outweighing the number of goals which have not been implemented or for whose implementation insignificant steps have been taken. At this point it has to be kept in mind that the utilization of the HGs cannot lead to a judgment concerning the effectiveness of the EU missions. It does lead to a judgment concerning the institutional effectiveness in the field of the EU which is due to the intergovernmental system based on trust and political will

among the EU MS. Thus, as a general outcome, with regard to the indications of the table above, the EU's institutional performance in conflict settlement is effective. However, as gets visible in the table, the proportion of positively valued military goals is notably higher than the same proportion among the civilian goals. This can basically be caused by a few reasons. Firstly, most of the military goals are clear and to the point as they deal with the establishment of specific things. In contrast, the civilian goals are rather vague as they concern abstract processes. These aspects do definitely have impact on the realization and the monitoring processes of the different goals. Secondly, as I noticed during my research the focus in European security policy is at the moment lying on the effort to increase Europe's military strength. This is mainly due to the fact that European conflict intervention has for a long time solely consisted of various civilian manners of conflict settlement. Only within the last years it has come to notice that the strong civilian tools which the EU possesses in should be developed further as they are fundamental within the resolution of current conflicts. A third reason could be that the EU makes already the best use possible from its civilian measures and no improvement is possible. However, this third reason is constantly disproved by researchers.

Apart from these issues, two more aspects had considerable impact on the realization of the HGs and therefore as well on the research. On the one hand the monitoring process has not been as intense as it has been promised beforehand. Concerning some of the HGs there exists barely more information than that they are part of the HGs 2010. This is surely a big disadvantage, also with regard to the construction of a functional and systematic lessons learned-system. On the other hand, the bottom-up approach regarding the implementation of the goals weakens the security policy significantly. As soon as the political will is missing, the MS simply do not comply with the goals anymore and thereby inhibit the whole system. This leads to significant shortfalls, particularly in combination with the natural demeanor that parties to alliances want to get the most out of the alliances with giving the least input. That leads to the situation, that every stakeholder involved is acting rather restrained in order not to take on them the burden of too many costs. This gets also visible in the distribution of successful implementation of the HGs. Most goals which have been implemented successfully concern rather practical issues. The main reasons for not fulfilling the goal (completely) are missing political will and a lack of leadership on the part of the EU. A type of 'nation-independent' leadership is likely to trigger cooperation and coherence.

By taking into account these issues which have had impact on the realization of the goals and on the research it can be concluded that the EU's progression in the field of conflict settlement is rather small. Although the overall implementation of the HGs is rather positive, several fundamental problems are not solved. Therefore, future developments can not be significant either, as they have to cope with the same issues regarding the intergovernmental mechanism in the 2nd pillar of the EU.

2.2.3 The Impact of the EU Missions on the Implementation of the HGs 2010

Throughout the analysis above it became clear that the lessons learned from the ESDP missions could particularly influence the progression of the EU's security-political steps. And it is a process on which the EU members count. Therefore, it is fundamental for this research to get a better insight in how far the ESDP missions influenced the degree of implementation of the HGs 2010. In the following, the most important impacts of the missions on the implementation of the HGs will be pointed out. The descriptions of this passage are based on the findings of the research which are displayed in more detail in Annex 2, Annex 3 and Annex 4. According to the division of the HGs 2010 into civilian and military HGs, also the missions will be examined due to their affiliation. Thus, one part will discuss military HGs with regard to military missions. Another part discusses the civilian HGs with regard to the civilian missions. And a third passage concerns mixed mission, within which civilian and military functions have to cooperate. For the conduction of this analysis the number of missions involved has been narrowed down. This has been done, as just an overview shall be given which includes the main points of impact on the HGs. The missions used in the analysis are chosen

due to several factors, such as location, mandate, timeframe and state of fulfillment. Thereby the fundamental rule has been to choose the missions as diverse as possible. Some of the missions are just started after the publication of the HGs 2010. However, as the implementation of the HGs describes a process which is supposed to take place until 2010, the later missions did not influence the design of the HGs anymore, but they do influence the progression of the HG's implementation.

Since 2003 the EU has been conducting 22 missions in the broader scope of conflict settlement. The missions have either been taking place in cooperation with other institutions -like the UN or the NATO- or they have been conducted solely by the EU in the framework of the ESDP. Several of these missions have been of 'military' nature. These missions mainly serve the stabilization of the security environment in a certain country or region. Most missions have however been of 'civilian' nature. They mainly concern monitoring or policing actions. Core point to them is the spreading of the EU's comprehension of the wider rule of law, as well as of human rights and gender issues. Aside from those to specific types, some missions are particularly based on the integration of civilian and military means and personnel. This type represents –with three- the smallest amount of missions which have been undertaken.

Generally, the analysis (which is outlined in more detail in Annex 2, Annex 3 and Annex 4) shows that the impact of the ESDP missions on the progression of the HGs' implementation could be relatively strong and steady. The strongest statement that can be conceived indicates that each mission displays an increase of cooperation in the EU's security sector. And the growing number of missions shows that this will grow even stronger in the future. By inducing this, each mission points out the necessity of European integration in order to have a successful security policy. And every bit of recognition of this, leads to stronger work on the implementation of the HGs 2010 which. However, till now, no good use is made of the experiences from the missions. This is due to the lack of a robust and systematic lessons-learned process. As already indicated before, also the HG which concerns the establishment of such a lessons-learned process has not been fulfilled by now. The basic problem is that the EU MS mainly stick to their national procedures and concepts of monitoring missions. However, these procedures are not applicable in the case of the EU as a whole. And institutions like the EDA within which such issues could be regulated, are too dependent on the MS arbitrariness. Therefore, the lessons learned throughout the ESDP mission cannot be processed in an ideal manner. Seen, in a pragmatic way, the channel is missing, which means in this case the lessons-learned process. This can be overcome if the MS's arbitrariness would be decreased.

2.2.4 Sub-Conclusion

Briefly worded, taking a judgment concerning the EU's performance in conflict settlement by means of the degree of implementation of the HGs 2010 indicates a positive outcome -if the scaling methods and approaches are used like in this research. That implies that the main task –to broaden the range of instruments in order to retain coherence while meeting the challenges of an expanded range of action- has been addressed effectively. However, the judgment has to be distinguished more precisely as the utilization of the HGs as a benchmark cannot lead to a measurement of the effectiveness of European missions. It does much more indicate the institutional effectiveness of the EU in the field of goal implementation. Therefore, the judgment reads as follows: the EU's *institutional* performance in conflict settlement is effective.

During the research certain issues have become particularly conspicuous. That is also reflected in the table. The militarian goals have been implemented stronger than the civilian goals. This is due to their clarity and practicality, but also due to the focus and political interest of the MS. Additionally the monitoring processes of the HGs have gaps. And also the intergovernmental bottom-up approach on which conflict settlement is based in the EU hinders particularly the fulfillment of the civilian HGs. Especially, as for the implementation of some of the civilian HGs some changes in basic mechanisms in the field of conflict settlement would have to take place. In an additional analysis the impact of the EU's missions on the implementation of the HGs 2010 has been examined. This has

been done as after all the missions reflect most clearly the principles in of the EU's security policy and any changes in these principles. However, the impact of the missions is not that strong after all, as no robust and systematic lessons-learned process could be established by now, and the EU MS act too arbitrary in this context. All these issues cause doubts with regard to the correctness of the judgment; particularly because the judgment is relatively scarce. Basically it could be the case that the rather positive outcome has only been reached by coincidence, for instance through the composition of the goals. It has to be clarified in how far the issues just named weaken or strengthen the given judgment. Therefore, they will be addressed in more detail in the subsequent discussion of the methodological approaches.

2.3 Revisiting Methodological Approaches

Within the subsequent analysis it will be determined *'in how far the methodological approaches named in part 2.1 prove the reliability of the judgement above'*. This part stands in close connection to the examination of the HGs above. Basically, other indicators for the EU's performance in conflict settlement will be discussed. Therefore the implementation deficit as well as the common criticism concerning the EU's manner of conflict resolution will now be examined in detail. This adds perspectives to the research and thereby increases its reliability and validity. The additional analysis is particularly necessary, as the examination on the HGs degree of implementation causes to many issues that question the correctness of the judgement. The main argument is that if solely the success or failure of the HG's implementation was measured, then a certain outcome would be received. However, no explanation would be delivered thereby. Thus, the general approaches enable that other indicators for the effectiveness of EU conflict settlement are taken into account. And in addition, by means of a detailed discussion certain explanations can be identified.

2.3.1 The Implementation Deficit

The concept of the implementation deficit provides explanations for the EU's failure in goal implementation. It consists of European-level as well as national-level issues. The biggest problem at European level is that for almost all decisions about the ESDP unanimity is needed in the CoM. This is an issue as any country has a veto-power concerning decisions. And, although the MS are generally fast agreeing on items that are important to set on the agenda, it mostly takes a long time until they can agree on any resolution (Everts et al., 2004). With regard to conflict settlement it is clear that the MS want to keep up their sovereignty in decision-making and therefore keep most of the decision-making power in the Council of Ministers. This is due to the fact, that they are finally the ones who have to explain to the population of their country, why their soldiers are sent into a conflict in the realm of European conflict settlement activities which does not threaten their own country. However, on the other hand decision-making by unanimity is slow, requires a high degree of willingness to make compromises by all MS and the outcomes are mainly non-progressive and very inflexible. The inflexibility of the outcomes does stand in controversy to an important feature for successful goal implementation, namely that actors have to be prepared for failures of certain goals and strategies. Flexibility is needed in order to respond fast to the new situation in a case of a failure.

Generally, two aspects aggravate the abilities for unanimous decisions-taking. Firstly, it has to be considered that all 27 MS are still autonomous nation states. Thus, they differ with regard to their political priorities, domestic politics, institutional structures and parliamentary procedures; although they all fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. These basic differences lead to varying understandings and perceptions of 'threats to security' and 'priority cases'; as well as different intends and resolutions (Monar, 2008). Generally, the more actors are involved, the more different perceptions and opinions are involved which in turn complicate and slow down the decision-taking processes. (For an illustration of the difficulties to find a common resolution in the CoM due to different backgrounds of

the MS see Annex 1.) Secondly, the competition which does take place between the EU's MS can cause a dysfunction of the whole system (Everts et.al, 2004). Basically, due to differences of the MS's representation in the EU, it is often the case that the countries with more votes are taking a leading role in decision making. Therefore, the MS with fewer votes feel threatened that their opinions and preferences could be by-passed in decision making-process and tend to make essential use of their veto-power in the CoM. At this point the functionality of the intergovernmental system is jeopardized as its success is based on cooperation and coherence. Therefore, a long time of preparation, discussion and clarification has to go ahead of a decision in order to bring all stakeholders into the same boat.

But in this context it is also important to keep in mind why the nation states agree to pool their sovereignty and commonly set up the EU -particularly regarding the ESDP. In general, nations build and enter international organizations as the leaders of the single nation states are convinced that taking part in such a close alliance is beneficial for the country. Gaining benefits in an international organization does in turn also bring benefits for the leaders of the nation states as success makes it more likely that they stay in office. In addition, international organizations are necessary in these days in order to tackle the current issues (also security issues). Those do not stop at borders anymore but get more and more global. Current examples for a global security threat are terrorist acts.

Moreover, especially with regard to the EU, the national governments think that cooperation and common European resolutions increase their strength. Thus the EU is seen as an effective manner to express opinions and preferences at the global stage in a way that they are heard. In this context, the two named aspects that aggravate the abilities for unanimous decisions-taking can also be seen positively. Firstly, an increase in the number of actors does also lead to an increase in the strength of the European voice. And secondly, the competition between the MS does lead to outbalanced decisions which are fair for all members. However, both aspects cause that the EU lacks flexibility and rapidity in decision making processes, which it requires in order to be a global player in the field of conflict settlement. Therefore, a good balance has to be found between the involvement of all MS in decisions and a facilitation of the decision-making processes. In the case of the EU, finding this balance would need a two pronged step. Firstly, the MS would have to build up a cooperation of trust, within which each MS trusts in the others to take decisions which are good for the community as a whole. And in the following, the decision-making processes would have to be facilitated in order to guarantee more flexibility in decision-taking. This would increase the abilities to act rapid and coherent; two characteristics which are needed in dealing with current threats. For instance in the case of a terrorist attack somewhere in the world, it is important to fast determine the EU's position and to take measures of help in the realm of that position. And when some other country is threatening the world by building and trying out atom-bombs, then a very coherent and strong strategy of the EU is needed about how to deal with the threat.

But, even if the problems at European level had been decreased, still major issues do exist at the national level, which reinforce the implementation deficit. The most important issue here is that the implementation deficit evolves due to shortfalls in the legislative implementation. The MS simply do not stick to the deadlines which the Council sets up in its decision. In many of these cases the Council has no abilities to punish these violations of the agreements as particularly in the domain of the CFSP (2nd pillar- the pillar to which 'conflict settlement' belongs) possibilities for infringement by the Council are restricted (Monar, 2008). This implies that even if a decision has been taken at European level, than skeptics could still influence its implementation at national level by delaying it and thereby keeping it in the focus of discussion. A lot of European framework decisions can serve as examples for the situation where planned EU measures of obvious relevance for the achievement of an aim have not been implemented on time. Thus, a gap exists between common goals and the political will to accomplish these goals (Everts et.al, 2004).

The abovementioned issue is reinforced by the re-appearing problem, that even if a common agreement was made at EU-level, its correct implementation would not be insured. Due to institutional differences agreements are implemented differently in each country and therefore it can not be assured that the final measures work as they were intended to work. The same problem is caused by differences in perception. Also if a common agreement was made, each EU-representative could understand it slightly different. This would cause again different ways of implementation which do not assure that the final measures work as they were intended to work.

In general, it is not as easy to eliminate the deficits in goal implementation. As Jordan stated: *'Implementation deficits will be difficult to eradicate completely because they serve to maintain the delicate 'balance' between governmental and supranational elements in the EU'* (Jordan, 1999, p.78). Thus, the only way to overcome the implementation deficit in a democratic sense would imply to leave the rather cooperative status of the EU behind and trigger a strong kind of European integration.

2.3.2 Common Criticism on EU Performance in Conflict Settlement

Apart from the aforementioned problems in the realm of the implementation deficit, some other points exist which are mostly mentioned when scientists criticize the EU's performance in conflict settlement. Thus, these aspects are specifically directed at the main topic of the research.

A common structural argument concerns the allocation of competences within the EU (Everts et.al, 2004). Basically, the resolution of security issues is divided among the three pillars of the EU, and mainly between the EU Commission and the CoM. This implies that some security political issues are dealt with at supranational level and others are dealt with at intergovernmental level. Thereby, the EU clearly divides external from internal security issues, as well as the requirement of soft-tools from that of hard-tools. However, as also Blockmans and Wessel determined, in the current security environment it can no longer be distinguished between either internal or external security issues and issues that require either soft-tools or hard-tools. To tackle the current security issues successfully the EU needs to integrate these characteristics in one strategy. Therefore, also their handling has to be interlinked, starting at the institutional level. That demands more synergy and coherence, at national and European level, horizontally as well as vertically.

To change the situation a rearrangement of the competences of the EU institutions as well as the MS is required. In order to drive a clear and coherent line at European level a leading authority is needed which is independent from any nation or political disposition so that the MS could trust it more. The appointment of the 'High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy' has been a first step to give the European Security Policy a face. And he has the ability to slightly coordinate and direct the development of the ESDP. Although the responsibilities of the office have already been widened, the realm is still restricted as in decision making issues the HR can only give advice to the CoM. In the near future, it is very unlikely that the EU MS are willing to accept a too strong leadership at the European level concerning security policy, as security is one of the main aspects which legitimize the existence of a nation state.

Moreover, synergy and trust is not only missing between the European institutions, but particularly between the MS. A number of scholars determined that MS often do not share intelligence due to a continuous lack of trust (Stumbaum, 2007). Thereby, the EU's ability of successful conflict settlement is diminished considerably. This aspect has also been recognized by the EU and its MS and therefore it has been integrated into the HGs 2008 as well as in the HGs 2010. They agreed on more and more policies which are triggering the exchange of intelligence as well as information. Most progress is made through the EDA within which projects have been launched to build up networks with regard to communication and information technology (EDA, 2007). But also in the realm of the Schengen Agreement developments are pushed forward; particularly through the set-up of an agency which is responsible for the managements of the Schengen information system

2, the visa-information system and EURODAC (Europäische Kommission, 2009). Additionally, the national police forces are interacting more and more in a regularized manner based on agreements. Thus, the missing exchange of information among the MS is a serious point of criticism which looses its concernment.

As a last aspect, the EU is said to lack resources in the field of conflict settlement, most importantly 'budget' and personnel'. Both aspects would clearly aggravate the implementation of most goals and therewith strongly jeopardize the overall success of the EU's performance in conflict settlement. But this standpoint is not completely true, with 200 Billion Euro per year the EU spends the second highest budget in the world on defence matters. With regard to the personnel however, the EU is only able to deploy and uphold 5% of their armed forces in missions, due to a shortage (Council of the European Union, 2008).Generally, the EU has a broad mandate at the global scale; however it is missing the personnel (also administrative personnel) to meet the expectations and requirements concerning the mandate (Lohmann, 2006). With regard to the resources the EU fully depends on its MS. But the more resources the MS transfer to the EU the fewer resources they have left to deal with affairs in their own nation states. Thus, about each new assignment of resources there is a big struggle as the MS have the natural drive that they want to keep their input as low as possible. In order to get enough resources plans are set up between the European Commission and the MS. With regard to the general budget that a MS has to pay into the EU pool clear percentages have been established as well as a punishment-system. However, throughout the last decade the regulations has been broken repeatedly but the punishment-system has not been applied. With regard to the personnel that MS should be able to provide goals are set-up, but they are not legally binding and no punishment-system has been constructed in the case the goals are not fulfilled. Thus, even if a lack exists, it is difficult to overcome.

In general, the differing points of criticism about the EU's performance in conflict settlement are mainly of constructional nature. What they all have in common is that they can be based on the same underlying problems. The MS are too focused on themselves and they do not find a common way yet to live the cooperation in EU to the fullest. Trust in each other as well as trust in the benefits of the cooperation is missing. Solutions to most of the criticized issues of European conflict settlement would be a clear and coherent European line along with the abilities to act flexible and rapidly. These characteristics could be reached through a 'nation-independent leadership' in combination with 'facilitated decision-taking processes'. But, in the end the EU is still an organization that is based on the confidence of its MS. Changes can only take place if the MS agree; especially in the intergovernmental domain of conflict settlement. Confidence and agreement are however not provided in the rather delicate domain of conflict settlement. In the end, activities and changes have to be in the line with the preferences and aims of the MS.

2.3.3 Sub-Conclusion
The work of the EU can be roughly summarized as three tasks: firstly threats and policy gaps have to be identified; secondly goals have to be agreed on to tackle the issues and thirdly strategies have to be determined and implemented in order to reach the goals. There are a lot of problems connected to each of the three tasks, whose intensities differ among the policy areas. In the paragraphs above the most important issues concerning the domain of conflict settlement have been clarified. This is an important step to be able to check-up upon the judgment about the EU's performance in conflict settlement which has been given in section 2.2.1.
As can be concluded through the discussion of the approaches, the EU lacks several aspects which are fundamental for a stronger development of effectiveness in the field of conflict settlement. It becomes clear that most of the problems named above can be reduced to a small number of missing characteristics. Basically, the European system of conflict settlement lacks

flexibility and rapidity on the one hand, as well as cooperation and coherence on the other hand. The gaps mainly emerge due to the voluntary bottom-up process utilized within the cooperation concerning the ESDP. By using the bottom-up approach the number of stakeholders involved rises strongly. This aggravates interaction and decision-taking due to the absence of a leading instance and inflexibility. In order to strengthen its effectiveness in conflict settlement the EU lacks a leading authority and facilitations in the decision-making processes. This leading instance should be independent from any commitment to nation states or other parties. Moreover, it should be working within all of the three main steps which the EU has to work on. More precisely: to indentify threats and policy gaps; to agree on goals in order to tackle the issues; and to determine and implement strategies in order to reach the goals. This would strengthen the integration of the MS into a common EU system. However, these approaches concern fundamental changes in EU mechanisms. As already the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty have been out-voted it is also not likely that the abovementioned approaches will be realized soon.

3 Conclusion

The strategy of this thesis is to give a judgment concerning the EU's performance in conflict settlement by means of the degree of implementation of the HGs 2010. Subsequently, the validity and reliability of this judgment is discussed by using various methodological approaches that are connected to the topic. By means of the examination concerning the degree of implementation of the HGs 2010 it can basically be judged that the EU's institutional performance in conflict settlement is effective. That means that the main task –broadening the range of civilian and military instruments and retaining coherence while meeting the challenges of an expanded range of action- has been addressed effectively. However, several restrictions exist to that outcome due to the fact the implementation of the HGs can just reflect a small part of the EU's effectiveness – the institutional effectiveness. And additionally, it cannot explain underlying problems which cause the degree of effectiveness. Thus, research has to be done with regard to the underlying reasons of the EU's performance. Therefore, several methodological approaches have been discussed with regard to the EU's performance in conflict settlement. These approaches concern at issues of cooperation between various stakeholders. They are taken from differing perspectives, as dispersion leads to a more comprehensive and dependable outcome.

Already during the research on the HGs some restrictions to the explicitness of the later judgment became clear. Firstly, the military goals have generally been better implemented than the civilian goals, which is mainly due to their clarity and practicality. Secondly, the implementation of the civilian HGs is often hindered by the intergovernmental bottom-up approach on which European conflict settlement is based. This is due to the fact that several civilian goals can only be reached by some changes in the basic institutional mechanisms in this specific domain, which are not likely to take place soon. Until now, the practical experiences that have been gathered in missions seem to be the main drivers for policy developments in this area.

However, as the additional analysis about the missions impact on the implementation of the HGs 2010 shows, the influence of the missions is rather low. Although the missions are definitely taken into consideration for policy decisions, their main contribution is that they show that future cooperation in the framework of the EU will increase and will be necessary. Basically, the EU lacks an effective lessons-learned process, by which the experiences from the missions could be used to the fullest in order to determine developments which have to be taken into account during policy making.

These and other restrictions have been addressed more precisely throughout the discussion of methodological approaches. Thereby it became clear that the EU lacks a number of factors which are necessary for further progressions in the domain of conflict settlement. Most of them can be

ascribed to the considerable shortage of flexibility and rapidity on the one hand, as well as cooperation and coherence on the other hand. The gaps originate from the voluntary bottom-up process which is used within the 2nd pillar of the EU. Thereby, the number of stakeholders who are involved in a certain issue rises strongly. This in turn, impedes interaction and decision-taking due to a lack of flexibility and the absence of a leading instance. That indicates that the EU can enhance its performance in conflict settlement by establishing an independent leading authority and facilitating its decision-taking processes. Both should be worked out with regard to the main steps which the EU has to work on. To be exact: the recognition of gaps and threats and the establishment of strategies and goals to overcome the gaps and threats. This would strengthen the coherence and the degree of cooperation among the MS as well as flexibility and rapidity in the processes of the EU. But, in order to reach the establishment of a leading instance and the facilitation of decision making processes two fundamental aspects have to be realized by the MS. First, they have to recognize the necessity and benefits of acting together. And second, they have to learn to trust each other.

By taking into account the main findings mentioned above it can be concluded that the EU is not able to deal with the present security issues in the given framework of the ESDP. This means that the first judgment given by means of the examination of the HGs 2010 has to be revised. However, some restrictions have to be made concerning the final outcome. Clearly, the EU possesses strength in conflict settlement, what can be seen by the success of most of their missions. Its practical experiences through the missions and its level of understanding the necessity to act together in order to be more effective and stay a global player enhances the EU's performance in conflict settlement. However, the system still lacks major aspects that are fundamental for a further development of the EU's performances in conflict settlement. Mainly, the EU lacks *cooperation* and *coherence* on the one hand, as well as *flexibility* and *rapidity* on the other hand. Therefore it does not use all its advantages and all its strength in order to enhance its performance in conflict settlement. Clearly they are already successful in their missions, but they could work more efficient and effective and thereby enhance their performance a lot. This can be reached by the establishment of a leading authority in the security sector and by the facilitation of the decision-making processes.

Aside from these findings, it has to be kept in mind that this outcome is just true with regard to the means that have been used in this report to address the topic. If other perspectives or means would be used, the outcome could differ considerably. Therefore, other research-proposals that are linked to the topic have to be considered in order to check the outcome. During the research and the writing process several possibilities for follow-up studies emerged. A first way would be to base the research on another methodological backbone. For instance, the examination of the HGs could be replaced through an examination of several EU missions. Or the discussion about the implementation deficit and the general criticism could be replaced by a discussion concerning other theories; for example by the 'Implementation Theory' by Maskin and Sjöström (Maskin & Sjöström 2001). Another possible follow-up study would imply to question the headline goals. Within the report above the HGs are used as a given instance. Additionally it has been argued that there could be goals or which are leading easier and faster to a more effective European security policy, but the HG's represent the compromise on which the EU MS could agree. However, it could be researched if there could be easier and faster implementable goals in general. And in addition it could be asked whether the EU could manage to agree on these other goals or not.

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
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http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st08/st08715.en09.pdf

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6 Annexes

Annex 1: Illustration Concerning Difficulties in Decision-Taking in CoM (p.15)
(The displayed opinions of the countries are just randomly chosen for this example and do not represent the true positions.)

Graph Two

Guns (Defence Expenditure)

Germany Greece

Spain

Butter (Trade Policy)

Graph Three

Latvia

Germany Greece

Guns (Defence Expenditure)

Spain

Butter (Trade Policy)

In each of the three graphs above a situation of decision making is illustrated with regard to the foreign policy issue *'Guns or Butter?'* The difference between the graphs is that within each of them another country is added that participates in the decision. With the help of these illustrations an example shall be given concerning the fundamental difficulties of decision-taking in the CoM shall be elucidated.

Within each graph the x-axis represents in how far trade policy shall be furthered. The further right, the more the trade policy shall be furthered. The y-axis represents in how far defence expenditures shall be furthered. The further up, the more defence expenditure shall be furthered. The opinion of each country lies in the center of the appertaining circle and the width of the circle

describes the realm within which the country is willing to agree on a compromise. The width of the circles is in the images above is determined by percental relation of the countries numbers of votes in the CoM to one another. The black-marked range in which the circles and thus the countries opinions overlap are called win-sets and they describe the area within which a compromise between the concerned parties is possible. When you examine the graphs in the order 'one' till 'three', it becomes clear that the more countries you add to the graph the smaller the win-set gets. That implies, the more countries are involved, the smaller the possibility for a compromise gets. This is mainly due to the fact that the countries differ strongly among their fundamental opinion. Although this effect is surely intended in these drawings to clarify the difficulties in decision-taking, still it reflects the truth. If you imagine that the EU has 27 MS and each of them would be represented with its opinion in such a graph, than you can imagine how unclear and non-transparent it would be. Moreover, so many different opinions would be involved that the win-set is in the beginning of many decision-taking processes either very small or not existing at all. However, as the EU wants to act commonly, they have to find a common win-set. Therefore, it is often the case that not all countries benefit from the compromises that are agreed on in the CoM.

Annex 2: The Impact of the EU Military Missions on the Implementation of the Military HGs 2010

Military HGs	EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnia & Herzegovina, since 2004, Troop strength: 2016 (ongoing)	CONCORDIA Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, since 2003 (completed)	EUFOR RD Congo, since 2006, Troop strength: 2300 (completed)
the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS (in 2004)	As this mission adds up to the monitoring and policing (civilian) missions in order to increase progression towards stabilization and integration, this mission contributes to the implementation of the goal.	The lessons learned form this mission contributed to the implementation of this goal. Particularly because civil/military interaction has been necessary as the military mission has been followed by the civilian mission EUPOL PROXIMA	The lessons learned form this mission contributed to the implementation of this goal. This is due to the fact as several civil/military missions followed the military EUFOR mission. These civilian missions could benefit from the experiences of the military mission.
to be able to rapidly set-up an operation centre	This mission has been planned in the long-term, thus no rapidity has been necessary.	As this mission has been based on the work of NATO, no rapid set-up of operation centers has been necessary.	As this mission has been based on the work of UN, no rapid set-up of operation centers has been necessary.
to establish an agency in the field of defence capability development	The mission clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.

to implement by 2005 the creation of an EU strategic lift joint coordination	The mission contributes to the implementation of the goal in so far as clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.	The mission contributes to the implementation of the goal in so far as clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.	The mission contributes to the implementation of the goal in so far as clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.
to develop an European Airlift command by 2010	The mission contributes to the implementation of the goal in so far as clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.	The mission contributes to the implementation of the goal in so far as clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.	The mission contributes to the implementation of the goal in so far as clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.
to complete by 2007 the establishment of the Battle-Groups	The mission contributes to the implementation of this goal, as it could serve as example how inter-action between European armies works out.	The mission contributes to the implementation of this goal, as it could serve as example how inter-action between European armies works out.	The mission contributes to the implementation of this goal, as it could serve as example how inter-action between European armies works out.
to acquire the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008	The mission does not contribute to the implementation of this goal.	The mission does not contribute to the implementation of this goal.	The mission does not contribute to the implementation of this goal.
to improve the communications compatibility by 2010	As the mission is still going on and one of the longest military missions of the EU in the frame of the ESDP it does con-tribute to the accomplishment of this goal. It represents a good possibility to test new ways and tech-nologies that improve the communication compatibility.	As the mission included the interaction of a number of EU MSs, it definitely showed that the communication compatibility should be enhanced in order to increase the success of future missions.	As the mission included the interaction of a number of EU MSs, it definitely showed that the communication compatibility should be enhanced in order to increase the success of future missions.

to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria for national forces	No significant information	No significant information	No significant information

(Source: European Council, 2004 & Council of the European Union, 2009)

Annex 3: The Impact of the EU Civilian Missions on the Implementation of the Civilian HGs 2010

Civilian HGs	EUPM Bosnia & Herzegovina, since 2003, Mission strength: 377 (ongoing)	EUPOL COPPS Palestinian territories, since 2006, Mission strength: 57 (ongoing)	EUPOL Kinshasa RD Congo, 2005-2007 (completed)
a robust and systematic lessons-learned process	As the mission is still going on and one of the longest military missions of the EU in the frame of the ESDP it does con-tribute to the accomplishment of this goal. It represents a good possibility to experience various phases through which missions could come.	Due to a variance in timeframe, place and mandate every ESDP mission has its lessons that the EU can learn from it. And although no robust and systematic lessons-learned process has been established by now, this mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. Once, when a process is in place it will be based on all experiences from former missions.	Due to a variance in timeframe, place and mandate every ESDP mission has its lessons that the EU can learn from it. And although no robust and systematic lessons-learned process has been established by now, this mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. Once, when a process is in place it will be based on all experiences from former missions.
new missions = define new concepts and/or procedures accordingly	Within the last decade it as been realized that for each new mission also concepts and procedures have to be redefined. Thus, through their variety, each mission contributes to the implementation of the goal.	Within the last decade it as been realized that for each new mission also concepts and procedures have to be redefined. Thus, through their variety, each mission contributes to the implementation of the goal.	Within the last decade it as been realized that for each new mission also concepts and procedures have to be redefined. Thus, through their variety, each mission contributes to the implementation of the goal.
improved arrangements for timely and accurate support to missions	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.

	integration.		
improving field security, including intelligence where relevant	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.
further development of the interface between Police and the wider Rule of Law sector	This mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. Although it is a policing-mission, still one of the core aspects is to address issues concerning the wider rule of law.	This mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. Although it is a policing-mission, still one of the core aspects is to address issues concerning the wider rule of law.	This mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. Although it is a policing-mission, still one of the core aspects is to address issues concerning the wider rule of law.
further development of rapidly deployable police elements, notably IPU and FPU	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.
concrete steps to evaluate, improve and the complete the Civilian Response Teams (CRT)	Due to the fact that future cooperation in the European security sector has been conceivable, the mission does contribute to the establishment of the CRT. However, as no further concrete steps have been taken to complete the CRT, the mission did not contribute to the implementation of this goal.	Due to the fact that future cooperation in the European security sector has been conceivable, the mission does contribute to the establishment of the CRT. However, as no further concrete steps have been taken to complete the CRT, the mission did not contribute to the implementation of this goal.	Due to the fact that future cooperation in the European security sector has been conceivable, the mission did contribute to the establishment of the CRT. However, as no further concrete steps have been taken to complete the CRT, the mission did not contribute to the implementation of this goal.
mainstreaming of Human Rights and gender issues into concepts and conduct	This mission contributed to the implementation of the goal, as human rights and gender issues are fundamental to the EU's guidelines and their protection is also part of	This mission contributed to the implementation of the goal, as human rights and gender issues are fundamental to the EU's guidelines and their protection is also part of the EU treaties. Therefore,	This mission contributed to the implementation of the goal, as human rights and gender issues are fundamental to the EU's guidelines and their protection is also part of the EU treaties. Therefore,

of the CHG 2010 process	the EU treaties. Therefore, within every action the EU makes it sets itself the goal to stick to its perception of the human rights and gender issues.	within every action the EU makes it sets itself the goal to stick to its perception of the human rights and gender issues.	within every action the EU makes it sets itself the goal to stick to its perception of the human rights and gender issues.
The targeting of training efforts to operational needs	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.
Developing tools to facilitate the MS's review of their potential availability to contribute to ESDP missions	no significant information	no significant information	no significant information
updated relevant information on civilian ESDP	The mission underlines the importance and success of civilian missions. This also triggers the interest in updated relevant information.	The mission underlines the importance and success of civilian missions. This also triggers the interest in updated relevant information.	The mission underlined the importance and success of civilian missions. This also triggers the interest in updated relevant information.
the raising of secondable civilian personnel for ESDP	As the raise of secondable civilian personnel for the ESDP is a matter of the EU MS, this goal depends on the interest of the actors involved in the mission. The more any MS is involved in a mission the more personnel will be raised by it. Thus, no mission can said to be groundbreaking in this context.	As the raise of secondable civilian personnel for the ESDP is a matter of the EU MS, this goal depends on the interest of the actors involved in the mission. The more any MS is involved in a mission the more personnel will be raised by it. Thus, no mission can said to be groundbreaking in this context.	As the raise of secondable civilian personnel for the ESDP is a matter of the EU MS, this goal depends on the interest of the actors involved in the mission. The more any MS is involved in a mission the more personnel will be raised by it. Thus, no mission can said to be groundbreaking in this context.

Practical/ technological applications for improvement of planning and conducting missions	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarified that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.
accomplishing the Civilian Capability Management Tool	No significant information	No significant information	No significant information
Information Exchange Requirements	No significant information	No significant information	No significant information
Improving mission security	As mentioned in the analysis of the HGs, this goal is rather a side effect which is somehow integrated as much as possible in the planning of every mission. Still each mission contributes to the implementation of this goal, as it is tried to keep the security as high as possible.	As mentioned in the analysis of the HGs, this goal is rather a side effect which is somehow integrated as much as possible in the planning of every mission. Still each mission contributes to the implementation of this goal, as it is tried to keep the security as high as possible.	As mentioned in the analysis of the HGs, this goal is rather a side effect which is somehow integrated as much as possible in the planning of every mission. Still each mission contributes to the implementation of this goal, as it is tried to keep the security as high as possible.
Synergies between civilian and military ESDP actors	This mission contributes to the accomplishment of the goal, as it is a long-term mission which has also been in place during the time when military missions (like EUFOR ALTHEA) were conducted in Bosnia&Herzegovina.	This mission does not contribute to the implementation of this goal.	This mission contributed to the accomplishment of the goal as it followed on military efforts taken by the EU. Thus, a short term interaction in order to exchange experiences between the military and civilian side had taken place.
Synergies with third-pillar actors	As it is a policing-mission, it is dependent on experts of the third pillar actors (experts of the Police) from the EU MS.	As it is a policing-mission, it is dependent on experts of the third pillar actors (experts of the Police) from the EU MS.	As it has been a policing-mission, it has been dependent on experts of the third pillar actors (experts of the Police) from the EU MS.
synergies	This mission contributes	Apart from several MS of	This mission contributed to

| with other actors in civilian crisis management | to the accomplishment of the goal as it followed on efforts taken by the UN. And also nowadays several other actors, apart from the EU, are involved in the mission (Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine). | the EU also Norway and Canada contribute to this project. Thus, the mission contributes to the accomplishment of the goal. | the accomplishment of the goal as next to personnel from a number of EU MS also the Congolese National Police's Integrated Police Unit has been integrated actively in the process. The Congolese authorities asked for this mission. |

(Source: European Council, 2007 & Council of the European Union, 2009)

Annex 4: The Impact of the EU Civil/Military Missions on the Implementation of the Civil/Military HGs 2010

Civil/Military HGs	EUSEC RD Congo, since 2005, Mission strength:60 (ongoing)	EU SSR Guinea Bissau, since 2008, Mission strength: 30 (ongoing)
the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS (in 2004)	This mission is a civil/military mission, meaning it is specifically constructed to integrate both aspects. Thus it fully contributes to the implementation of this goal.	This mission is a civil/military mission, meaning it is specifically constructed to integrate both aspects. Thus it fully contributes to the implementation of this goal.
to be able to rapidly set-up an operation centre	This mission has a learning effect for how to set-up an operation center solely by the EU. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of the goal.	This mission has a learning effect for how to set-up an operation center solely by the EU. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of the goal.
to establish an agency in the field of defence capability development	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And that the interaction between various kinds of domains will be fundamental to future missions. Thus, the interaction should already start in the planning process. Therefore the mission contributes to the strengthening of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And that the interaction between various kinds of domains will be fundamental to future missions. Thus, the interaction should already start in the planning process. Therefore the mission contributes to the strengthening of this goal, which strengthens integration.
to implement by 2005 the creation of an EU strategic lift joint	The mission contributes to the strengthening of the goal in so far as clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.	The mission contributes to the strengthening of the goal in so far as clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.

coordination		
to develop an European Airlift command by 2010	The mission contributes to the strengthening of the goal in so far as clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.	The mission contributes to the strengthening of the goal in so far as clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. And therefore certain military requirements are needed.
to complete by 2007 the establishment of the Battle-Groups	The mission contributes to the implementation and further development of this goal, as it serves as example how interaction between European armies works out.	The mission contributes to the implementation and further development of this goal, as it could serve as example how interaction between European armies works out.
to acquire the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008	The mission does not contribute to the implementation of this goal.	The mission does not contribute to the implementation of this goal.
to improve the communications compatibility by 2010	As the mission included the interaction of a number of EU MSs, as well as the interaction of the civilian and the military domain, it definitely shows that the enhancement of the communication compatibility (including technologies and processes) is a vital step in order to increase the success of future missions.	As the mission included the interaction of a number of EU MSs, as well as the interaction of the civilian and the military domain, it definitely shows that the enhancement of the communication compatibility (including technologies and processes) is a vital step in order to increase the success of future missions.
to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria for national forces	No significant information	No significant information
a robust and systematic lessons-learned process	As the mission is going on for a pretty long-term it does contribute to the accomplishment of this goal. It represents a good possibility to experience various phases through which missions could come. This adds up to the structure of a possible lessons-learned process.	Due to a variance in timeframe, place and mandate every ESDP mission has its lessons that the EU can learn from it. And although no robust and systematic lessons-learned process has been established by now, this mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. Once, when a process is in place it will be based on all experiences from former missions.
new	Within the last decade it as been	Within the last decade it as been realized

missions = define new concepts and/or procedures accordingly	realized that for each new mission also concepts and procedures have to be redefined. Thus, through their variety, each mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. This mission shows already the first achievements, as it has been noticed that some issues have to be tackled by a mix of civilian and military personnel.	that for each new mission also concepts and procedures have to be redefined. Thus, through their variety, each mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. This mission shows already the first achievements, as it has been noticed that some issues have to be tackled by a mix of civilian and military personnel.
improved arrangements for timely and accurate support to missions	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.
Improving field security, including intelligence where relevant	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.
further development of the interface between Police and the wider Rule of Law sector	This mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. It is based on the interaction between civilian and military personnel and therefore also triggers the recognition of how important interaction of all domains involved in security policy is.	This mission contributes to the implementation of the goal. It is based on the interaction between civilian and military personnel and therefore also triggers the recognition of how important interaction of all domains involved in security policy is.
further development of rapidly deployable police elements, notably IPU and FPU	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.
concrete steps to evaluate, improve and the complete the Civilian Response Teams (CRT)	Due to the fact that future cooperation in the European security sector has been conceivable, the mission did contribute to the establishment of the CRT. However, as no further concrete steps have been taken to complete the CRT, the mission does not contribute to the implementation of this goal.	Due to the fact that future cooperation in the European security sector has been conceivable, the mission did contribute to the establishment of the CRT. However, as no further concrete steps have been taken to complete the CRT, the mission does not contribute to the implementation of this goal.
mainstreaming of	This mission contributed to the implementation of the goal, as human	This mission contributed to the implementation of the goal, as human

Human Rights and gender issues into concepts and conduct of the CHG 2010 process	rights and gender issues are fundamental to the EU's guidelines, and their protection is also part of the EU treaties. Therefore, within every action the EU takes, it sets itself the goal to stick to its perception of the human rights and gender issues and to integrate this from the beginning on into the mission.	rights and gender issues are fundamental to the EU's guidelines, and their protection is also part of the EU treaties. Therefore, within every action the EU takes, it sets itself the goal to stick to its perception of the human rights and gender issues and to integrate this from the beginning on into the mission.
The targeting of training efforts to operational needs	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation of this goal, which strengthens integration.
Developing tools to facilitate the MS's review of their potential availability to contribute to ESDP missions	no significant information	no significant information
updated relevant information on civilian ESDP	The mission underlines the importance and success of civilian missions, as well as the importance of integrating civilian and military measures. This also triggers the interest in updated relevant information.	The mission underlines the importance and success of civilian missions, as well as the importance of integrating civilian and military measures This also triggers the interest in updated relevant information.
the raising of secondable civilian personnel for ESDP	As the raise of secondable civilian personnel for the ESDP is a matter of the EU MS, this goal depends on the interest of the actors involved in the mission. The more any MS is involved in a mission the more personnel will be raised by it. Thus, no mission can said to be groundbreaking in this context.	As the raise of secondable civilian personnel for the ESDP is a matter of the EU MS, this goal depends on the interest of the actors involved in the mission. The more any MS is involved in a mission the more personnel will be raised by it. Thus, no mission can said to be groundbreaking in this context.
Practical/ technological applications for improvement of planning and conducting	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation and strengthening of this goal, which in turn strengthens integration.	The mission clarifies that more cooperation in the security sector will take place in the future. Therefore it contributes to the implementation and strengthening of this goal, which in turn strengthens integration.

missions		
accomplishing the Civilian Capability Management Tool	No significant information	No significant information
Information Exchange Requirements	No significant information	No significant information
Improving mission security	As mentioned in the analysis of the HGs, this goal is rather a side effect which is somehow integrated as much as possible in the planning of every mission. Still this mission contributes to the implementation of this goal, as it is tried to keep the security as high as possible.	As mentioned in the analysis of the HGs, this goal is rather a side effect which is somehow integrated as much as possible in the planning of every mission. Still this mission contributes to the implementation of this goal, as it is tried to keep the security as high as possible.
Synergies between civilian and military ESDP actors	This mission contributes to the accomplishment of the goal, as it is based on the interaction between civilian personnel and military personnel.	This mission contributes to the accomplishment of the goal, as it is based on the interaction between civilian personnel and military personnel.
Synergies with third-pillar actors	The fundamental aspect of the mission includes experts and actors from every domain of the EU, thus also from the third pillar.	The fundamental aspect of the mission includes experts and actors from every domain of the EU, thus also from the third pillar.
synergies with other actors in civilian crisis management	This mission contributes to the accomplishment of the goal as it is based on cooperation between the EU and Congolese authorities and personnel.	This mission contributes to the accomplishment of the goal as it is based on cooperation between the EU and Guinea-Bissau authorities and personnel.

(Sources: European Council, 2004; European Council, 2007 & Council of the European Union, 2009)

7 Affirmative Covenant

This is to solemnly declare that I have produced this paper all by myself. Ideas taken directly or indirectly from other sources are marked as such. This paper has not been shown to any other board of examiners so far and has not been published yet. I am fully aware of the legal consequences of making a false declaration.

(Student's Signature)   (Place and Date)