

Bachelor Thesis

European Studies

National Identity in Europe

A Critical Discourse Analysis of Identity Representation of Dutch
Political Parties

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Abstract:

As European Integration has progressed after Maastricht people and political parties started fearing assimilation from above that takes away their national identity. This political myth was perpetuated and ultimately led to the rejection of the European Constitution by the Dutch and the French. This thesis deals with the general focus that is put on national identity by Dutch political parties in the context of the 2009 European elections. It uses a critical discourse analysis to find out the different levels of representation by the political parties and relate them to the process of European integration. The outcome is that most political parties represent moderate national identity that sees the limits of Europe. Some parties (namely PVV and SP) however represent a very strong national identity and demand a nationalization of Europe whereas others (GroenLinks and D66) represent a lower national identity and favour integration. With a stronger representation of the national identity further European integration processes may also be endangered.

Keywords:

National Identity, Dutch Parties, Critical Discourse Analysis, European Union

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1) Chapter 1: Introduction

Before and during the last European Parliament elections between the 4th and 7th of June 2009, national and European parties set up their campaigns and prepared the voting. As the race for seats in the European Parliament advanced, one was able to observe various parties with various differing ideas about Europe from the whole spectrum of political affiliation, ranging from extremely Eurosceptic to moderate to extreme pro-integration. Even though European integration is moving ahead and (even though at the moment at temporary halt) has quickly advanced, however “[e]ach member remains a distinct nation-state, especially with respect to the identification of its citizens and the conception of legitimate political actors on the national level” (Rosenberger, 2004, p.22). National identities seem to gain importance, despite or maybe even because of European integration (Rosenberger, 2004). In general it is not remarkable that citizens identify themselves with their nation, because the nation grants citizenship to people, by making them part of the nation and the benefits attached to it. However, national citizenship also means institutional racism that excludes outsiders on the basis of ethnicity or nationality (Turner, 2000). The problem is that national identity in tends to be is exclusive and emphasizes the “us”, or the “we” indicating a homogeneous group, within a nation.

This thesis is concerned with Dutch national identity. The role of the Netherlands in Europe has often been re-negotiated in the last two decades. No just Pim Fortuyn favoured a limited approach towards Europe but also already since Fritz Bolkestein and Gerrit Zalm the limits of Europe were tried to be identified (Harmsen, 2008). The latest developments are the rejection of the constitutional treaty and the overwhelming success of the Dutch Eurosceptic populist Freedom Party (PVV). But what is the relationship between Euroscepticism and national identity? Several reasons let us believe that the fear of losing one’s own national identity can be brought into relation with European integration (Harmsen, 2008). Further national identity is directly related to the acceptance of the European Union (Carey, 2002). Thus a stronger representation of parties that are more Eurosceptic or prefer a limited Europe will more likely represent a stronger national identity.

A stronger national identity focuses on the “us” (the nation) and the “them” (the foreigner), which is needed in order to create an exclusive national identity. The *us* as well as the *them* can be based on several aspects as cultural or ethnic differences that in consequence creates two, in an abstract way, different homogenous groups, also referred to as “in” and “out” groups¹. Severe implications for a multi-cultural society, resulting from this stigmatization of identity, or at least on a strong focus on identity can be observed as it is believed to reinforce xenophobia. As Berezin states: “Since the mid-1980s, xenophobia has become a salient feature of political reality and discourse in the former Western Europe” (2006, p.273). Important in this context is that identity is a re-occurring concept that is on top of the umbrella of nationalism. A strong national identity is believed to be more exclusive towards other identities that in this matter are regarded to be strangers and in consequence as a threat to national culture and identity.

¹ See Merton, R. (1948). The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy. *The Antioch Review*, 8 (2), 193-210.

In this thesis I will analyse representation of national identity by the Dutch political parties that participate in the European elections. To see how far a national identity is represented by political parties, I will analyse in how far political parties represent a national identity in their party programmes, keeping the general Dutch Eurosceptic mood in mind (van Kessel & Crum, 2009). Furthermore I will try to directly relate political parties' ideas of national identity to the European Union, by analysing party programmes for the 2009 European Parliament Elections and the respective national or maybe even European identity representation. The argument of this thesis is that national governments or parties are reproducing national identity in their every day discourse. I want to find out how national identity is reproduced and transmitted to an audience (in this case the citizen) and bring this representation of national identity into the context of the European Union. The research question therefore is:

To what extent do the main political parties of the Netherlands represent a national identity in their party programmes for the 2009 European Parliament elections?

The research question will be addressed by answering several sub questions. The first sub question: *"What are the characteristics of national identities?"* is used in order to establish a theoretical framework that identifies the specific theories of identity and the nation that is necessary to develop a methodological part. The methods are elaborated in the second sub-question: *"How to observe different levels of representation of national identity?"*. It is used to examine the possible units that help to detect national identity. Besides the conceptualization of the theory the operationalization as well as the data collection will be discussed in the methodological framework. The last, pure sub question: *"In how far do the main political parties differ in advocating national identity?"* lays down the analytical framework in which the party programmes will be examined according to the methodological part that has been discussed before. It will analyse the degree of how parties represent a national identity and then judge and compare the parties to another, in order to be able to classify them according to their "national identity representation". The *principle question* of this thesis builds up on a hypothesis created by Sean Carey that emphasizes the link between national identity and the European Union. He states that "higher feelings of national identity decrease support for the European project" (Carey, 2002, p.388). Therefore the *principle question* is: *"What are the implications of different levels national identity for the European Union?"*. Thus if it will be found out that some national parties tend to represent a high level of national identity it is likely that the electorate and the parties position are less in favour of the European Union. These sub-questions provide a solid framework that allows to answer the proposed research question.

How will the research question be answered? I am going to use a critical discourse analysis [CDA] in the tradition, set out by the Vienna School. Primarily, it will be drawn from the book *"The Discursive Construction of National Identity"*, by Wodak et al. from 2009. The authors develop a framework of how to observe and detect the creation of national identity in discourse, by using a critical discourse analysis that helps "to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use" (Wodak et al., 2009, p.8). Following this argument, if political parties do have an agenda of advocating national identity (directly or indirectly through various means as for example inclusion and exclusion) it can be detected with the critical discourse analysis. It tries to discover "linguistic homogenisation or

discriminatory exclusion of human beings, and to heighten the awareness of the rhetorical strategies which are used to impose certain political beliefs, values, and goals” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.9). With this background of the CDA, I will try to develop a framework that includes different means of realization that are used to analyse and categorize the party programmes, by indicating the level of national identity that is represented. I will then categorize the different parties according to their level of national identity representation in their pamphlets, in order to observe in how far they represent a national identity. I chose for the party pamphlets of the main political parties of the Netherlands². Thus: CDA, PvdA, VVD, GroenLinks, SP, ChristenUnie/SGP, D66, PVV. These parties should be representing the majority of Dutch voters because they often collect the highest proportion of the electorate’s votes between them and thus represent the level of national identity accordingly which can be empirically and accurately tested throughout this thesis pertaining to the relative number of voters to party.

I chose for the party programmes for the 2009 European Parliament election because I believe that political parties state their most important issues in the party pamphlets and reinforce their beliefs through the discourse they are using. Further the party programmes correspond with the citizens’ will, at least to a certain extent. As Wodak et al. state “the situational institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and, in turn, discourses influence social and political reality” (2009, p.8), meaning discourse is reciprocal. Additionally the party pamphlets for the European elections create a direct link between the national parties and their representation of national identity and the European Union.

² In this case the ones that hold at least one seat in the European Parliament

2) Chapter 2: Theory

The research question asks to what extent a national identity is represented by parties in their European election programmes. In the theoretical part it is necessary to find concepts that link the concept of nation, identity representation and the European dimension. This requires a focus on theories of identity and the nation that prepare the basis for a methodological framework, helping to observe the representation of national identity, as indicated in the party pamphlets for the 2009 European Parliamentary elections. To answer the question “*what are the characteristics of a national identity*” I will proceed as the following. First the concept of identity will be introduced while also briefly sketching a Europeanization of national identity. It is important to introduce the general concept of identity to fully understand why people develop a national identity. Further I will elaborate on the general concept of the nation to identify what accounts for values of a nation and how a nation is created, which is eventually linked to an identity. Having discussed these two concepts a basis for the general framework of national identity is set out. The question remains however, how they are linked together, which I will discuss in sub-section three, leading to a more elaborated analysis of national identity in sub-section four, based on shared continuity, shared memories, a common destiny and the relational concept of the stranger. As it is now clear what the characteristics are made up from, the ambiguity of the concepts can be briefly discussed. The knowledge about the ambiguity creates a clear link to the methodological framework and the question why to use this particular method of analysis. Finally the sub-question will be answered in the conclusion. The practical use of the theoretical chapter is to identify the characteristics of a national identity in order to be able to elaborate the corresponding dimensions and means (methodological part), necessary for the measuring (analysis) of the representation of identity.

1. The concept of identity

In order to answer the sub-question, “*what are the characteristics of national identity*” it is indispensable to define the complex concept of identity that has been interpreted differently. One form of identity would be the individual identity, a social identity that is shaped by certain characteristics as class, sex and so forth, and refers to the individual level (as distinct to ego-identity that is not how the individual is seen by society, but how it perceives itself [as stated in Wodak et al., 2009, p.13]). Individual identity is created by others and the individual itself, relating to its present situation (Smith, 1992); it therefore is subject to change. A national individual identity is an identity in relation to someone in other nations that classify and are classified differently (Smith, 1992). The social identity theory plays a more important role in understanding why people develop a national identity. If you belong to a nation you are part of a certain social classification, as for example *Dutchness*. It therefore allows an individual to identify itself with its social environment. It “is the perception of oneness with or belongingness to some human aggregate” (Ashford & Meal, 1989, p.21), therefore you are able to say: “I am Dutch”.

Another level of identity is the system related identity; a collective identity not focused on the individual but rather on groups or sub-groups of society (Wodak et al., 2009, p.16). As the individual is shaped by its individual and social identity the nation is shaped and shapes the collective identity of its members. In political discourse the notion of “*identity*” “refers to large communities of people within both

concepts, they represent forms of collective identity” (Lesaar, 2001, p.180). Collective identities are focussing on similarities and common attributes of a group, the “we” (Hardy et al. 2005), and are more persistent (Smith, 1992). As they are more resistant to changes they are more stable (Smith, 1992). One crucial aspect (that will be elaborated in detail later on) of collective identity is a collective memory that shapes the nation and shapes national identity. On a national level, collective identities that share memories, and shape and influence the values of a nation can be summarized as national identities. As Smith notices “no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation” (Smith, 1996, p.383), he continues by stating that only by remembering a common past a collective identity can be created (Smith, 1996). He even states that collective identity is predominant, whereas individual identity is optional (Smith, 1992), although both are crucial for a national identity. Even though common past is a vital concept of identity, it is only one aspect that creates a collective identity which is needed in order to create a homogenous national identity. Of similar importance for the creation and perpetuation, or representation of national identity is also the creation of the stranger, common myths, past, present and future anticipation the national body and other concepts that will be discussed later on in the theoretical framework. A further characteristic of an identity is the process of identification with one’s group and in relation to someone else. You can only identify yourself if a second person is present. Further, a group can identify itself with common values and define its identity in relation to a foreigner or stranger. A stranger, as in the definition of Schütz, is a threat to the collective identity, because he/she endangers the purity of collective values by introducing new ones. The group also strengthens its collective identity when visualizing the collective threat.

In this context one can briefly introduce the concept of European identity. I will not elaborate on characteristics of representation of European identity, as I believe it in particular mirrors the representation of a national identity (Jacobs & Maier, 1998) as similar features are present (Cinpoes, 2008). The European identity, as most people understand it today is more a national identity on a higher level. It has intra-inclusive features as being a borderless society within; on the other hand it creates borders to the outside and perpetuates them through European-national identities, which are created by the same means and the same discourse as national identities.

Having considered individual as well as system related identity in this sub-section it has become clear that identity is a relational concept, meaning that it is constructed either in relation to someone next to you, but more important for national identity in relation to a national self and a foreign other, thus every kind of national collective identity is a bordered identity. An individual or social identity is constantly negotiated within the context of a collective identity, laying down the principle values. It is difficult to see the concept of collective identity as isolated from the nation; therefore it is sensible to continue the theoretical framework by discussing the concept of a nation first, before both concepts will be combined.

2. The concept of the nation

In this section the concept of the nation will be discussed. It appears logical to consider the concept of the nation in the theoretical part as a national identity is based on the nation, as well as the nation is based on the national identity. Thus it appears to be coherent to first outline the concept of the nation

before going into a detailed elaboration on the characteristics of a national identity. For reasons of efficiency I will leave out detailed definitions of the nation, the state, and the country. It is just essential to keep in mind that a nation is not by definition a state, nor a country, but can exist aside and as well as in multiple forms within one of the latter mentioned concepts. As de Beus states:

A nation can be defined as an extensive set of non-relatives who think and feel that they have important things in common and that they differ so much from other large groups, that they constitute a distinctive and self-contained society (group consciousness). Nationals share a certain way of life and attach meaning to it up to the point where it turns into a self-enforcing culture (publicity). They see this society and culture as intermingled with their conceptions of self and appreciate their bounded opportunities so strongly, that they pursue protection by political means and political recognition by other peoples (loyalty) (2001, p. 292).

Reflecting, a nation is created by the people within its territory. It is an entity that incorporates people and gives them something to believe in, as it is also shaped by the belief and the wish of the people. A nation is based on the cultural and the social, as it is a political entity that unites around common myths (Smith, 1992). Even though a homogeneous nation (or better a homogenous nation-state) does not exist, it is the political aspiration (for reasons of legitimacy) to unite at least mentally heterogeneous group for creating a cultural and political community and popular sovereignty (Smith, 1992). According to Smith one can “define a nation as a named human population sharing a historical territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common economy and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the collectivity”(Smith, 1992, p.60).

A nation, in this sense is something that does not exist as a natural being but in the institutionalized mind of the people. Benedict Anderson refers to the Nation as *imagined community*. It is based on shared memories, shared continuity and a shared destiny of the people (Smith, 1992) that have been institutionalised in the narratives of the nation and give a sense of belonging to the people of the nation. People do not know each other but feel connected to each other and their imagined community (see Wodak et al. 2009, p. 21f). Nations in the notion of Anderson are therefore purely imagined and distinguish themselves by different believes of and in the nation by the people. The believed natural state of a nation, people indentify with however is in constant flux and can be negotiated. A nation is never fixed, because values, believes and memories can be re-written. The way they are imagined is determined by the narratives of the nation; however these narratives depend on the discourse of the nation. Thus if you alter the discourse of the nation you can alter the way a nation is imagined and give the imagined community a new destiny. It is important to understand that values can cross borders and unite, or divide nations or multiple nation-states.

Thus a nation is a non-static, mouldable imagined community, binding collective identities together, as it is purely made up and created by its peoples’ belief. The nation is a non-fixed concept and as Anderson already stated, the beliefs of a nation can be altered by the ones who write them. Thus language or the discourse on the narratives of the nation determines the way the imagined community is perceived and the way it perceives the collective identity (see Wodak et al., 2009, p.22). The discourse of the nation introduces the next sub-paragraph that deals with linking the two concepts of identity and nation.

3. What links identity and nation?

As concepts of identity and concepts of the nation have been briefly discussed above it is crucial to understand which measures link both the nation and identity to a national identity. It is an important step to take in order to fully understand that national identity is based on the narrations of the imagined community. The nation is a mental space for collective identity, constructed by the deliberate use of language or discourse, linking nation and identity under the umbrella of the narratives of the nation. "National identity is thus the product of discourse" (Wodak et al. 2009, p.22). An imagined community is made up of what politicians state, what we listen to in the media and what we talk about in every day conversation. "Discursive processes produce collective identities, which lead to various forms of collective action, potentially including effective collaboration" (Hardy et al. 2005, p.61). Thus observing the discourse will tell us something about national identity of the party and in consequence also something about the national identity reflected by society, as they are also shaped by the political discourse. "The discourse of nationalism constructs the 'imagined community' of the nation" (Durrani, 2008, p.596), meaning that particularly through discourse about the national, collective identities are created and the nation as perceived by the people is established. Discourse serves as a transmitter for values the collective identity believes as being natural ones. This shapes the nation but influences the discourse that is created by the nation and transmitted to the citizens forming a national identity. Discourse therefore is constructing imagined communities and collective identities. Identity (collective identity) and nation (imagined community) are mutually influencing each other and communicate through discourse that can alter the course of the nation and its identities and makes it therefore vulnerable to constant flux and manipulation.

As mentioned before, collective identity is stronger and more resistant to change than individual identity. Discourse allows for the perpetuation of collective identity as it creates the imagined community. Thus through the particular use of language a national identity is created and therefore can be observed in the discourse. In the following sub-sections I will try to lay down the most important theoretical aspects that are part of and create a national identity in order to be able to discover strategies and characteristics that help to detect the representation of national identity.

4. Characteristics, forming a national identity

This part deals with the aspects that identify an imagined community and a collective identity as created by discourse. It is the most important part of the theoretical framework as it lays down the characteristics of a national identity, which then can be observed by lexical and semantic units outlined in the methodological part of this thesis. In order to find out to what extent national identity is represented one has to detect the characteristics of a national identity. Therefore one has to look which characteristics are important for a collective identity formation. National identity is based on the "objective", like for example a legal framework, a territory that is institutionalized by the state. Further it incorporates the "subjective", which is loyalty to the social and political community, created by symbolism (Cinpoes, 2008). To create a solid framework I identified four important main dimensions that cluster a national identity. These are: a shared continuity, a shared memory, a common destiny and the relational strategy. The first three are based on a framework provided by Smith (1992), which will be filled by sub-characteristics identified by Wodak et al. (2009), who are borrowing from Hull and

Kolakowski. The relational strategy will be elaborated outside the predominantly time-oriented characteristics, but in relation to the stranger.

The first three aspects can be categorized by the characteristics for a national identity used by Smith plus a fourth dimension:

- a. A shared continuity for a particular generation or unit of the population
- b. A shared memory of common history that one can identify with
- c. A common destiny as a belief of the groups in the imagined community (1992)
- d. A relational strategy from the inside, to the outside.

These are important dimensions that regulate a collective identity within the nation through the particular discourse. In the following sections I will elaborate on them more in detail, by first stating a definition of the particular dimension and then adding sub-dimensions that relate to the above mentioned dimensions. However, it shall be noticed that these dimensions are in no way exclusive and can overlap. In fact the grouping is ought to help identifying different sub-dimensions easier.

First of all however it is important to clarify the link between the characteristics a national identity is created and perpetuated with and the representation of the particular identity. If one can identify different characteristics that account for a national identity, as they create or perpetuate one and can in consequence detect these patterns in the political programmes of the parties, one can observe the extent of identity representation. Therefore the representation is the umbrella of different characteristics that affect national identity in several different ways.

a. *Shared continuity*

Shared continuity refers to the discourse that connects units of a collective identity over time. Smith states that collective cultural³ identity creates a “sense of shared continuity⁴ on the part of successive generations of a given unit of population” (Smith, 1992, p.58). My own interpretation is that discourse that harmonizes, bundles, creates homogeneity and defines common values that are important for society over time belongs to the dimension of shared continuity. I will detect and add sub-categories mentioned by Wodak et al. (2009) as the *narrative of nation*; the *emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition*, and *timelessness*; and the *national body*. These sub-dimensions are borrowed from Hall and Kolakowski and refer to the dimension of a shared continuity.

The *narrative of the nation* is directly related to discourse; Hall defined it as something that is present in everyday discourse of society and “creates a connection between stories, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and national rituals which represent shared experiences and concerns, triumphs and destructive defeats” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.24). Furthermore through the perpetuation of these bundles of national values by every day discourse the bundles of values are strengthened and become part of national identity as they are combined and perpetuated.

³ Culture in this sense as imagined communities are outcomes of the created culture, and are therefore purely cultural and reinforce cultural national identity

⁴ Emphasize deleted

The *emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness* relates to the way of how identity is presented in the national narratives. It is presented as “the original identity which is present in the nature of things but sometimes lies dormant and has to be awakened from the slumber” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.24). This aspect overlaps a bit with the destiny-dimension, however it harmonizes and defines common values, by creating a unified image of “national character as an unchanging, unbroken and uniform being” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.24), and therefore gives continuity to the collective identity.

The last aspect or sub-dimension that contributes to the continuity dimension was discussed by Kolakowski in his work “Über kollektive Identität” and is labelled ‘national body’. As the narrative of the nation the national body is concerned with the “discussion of national territories” but also “landscapes and nature as well as the physical artefacts which shape those elements” (Wodak et al., 2009, 26). It adds the concept of boundaries as limitations and physical artefacts that shape national identity. National body therefore is a geographic and physical dimension that can represent national architecture but also refer to important sportspersons that have competed in international championship (De Cillia et al., 1999).

b. *Shared memory*

The next dimension that is part of a national identity is “shared memories of earlier periods, events and personages in the history of the unit [the group, or nation]” (Smith, 1992, p.58). This part is particularly concerned with the historical developments that have influenced national identity. Shared memories sometimes can also be referred to as common history; however the concept of shared memories is broader, as it also incorporates myths and traditions rooted in history. Shared memories are also harmonizing national identity, but in comparison to shared continuity, memories are exclusively based on past experiences. These memories are deliberately chosen and spread within the national discourse. I identified the following sub-categories of shared memories: *invention of tradition*; *foundational myth or myth of origin*; and a *historical memory*. As a reminder, these dimensions are by far not exclusive, but created to give a practical overview and explanation of the main dimensions.

The invention of traditions can be set in line with the imagined community. Both, community and traditions, forming the community are invented. Wodak et al. (2009), borrowing from Hall, set the invention of tradition in line with the harmonization of historical confusion in order to have a smooth fitting history of society (Wodak et al., 2009, p.24) that eliminates heterogeneous and contradicting images of the nation and therefore creates a strong identity. Hence it creates a collective memory of the past that still shapes national identity.

The foundational myth is a second category that supports shared memories. Smith calls it one of the essential subjective characteristics of a nation that every nation needs to incorporate (Smith, 1996). It often glorifies the birth of a nation at a mysterious time. The birth of a nation is often stated to be in a mysterious time, a historical event that cannot be correctly traced back and is blurred by myths (Wodak et al., 2009). On the one hand it strengthens discursive homogeneity that strengthens national identity formation and on the other hand also gives political legitimacy for the right to lead this one nation on basis of historical facts and myths.

The historical memory, as described by Kolakowski is probably the strongest sub-category as it more or less acts as an umbrella for the latter mentioned shared memories. It is of great value for national identity, even though the historical memory does not have to reflect the truth (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 25). Furthermore important about the historical memory is that “the further into the past the real or imaginary memories reach, the more securely national identity is supported” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.25). Summing up, the historical memory selects historical data that is important for the creation and perpetuation of a national identity, which has stronger impact if it reaches further into the past.

c. *Common destiny*

Smith argues that the third part of his concept of a collective national identity is a common destiny which derives out of the first two components: shared memory and shared continuity (Smith , 1992). It is where the peoples’ destiny lays, the perceptions people believe in. My interpretation for the classification of common destiny is that it incorporates factors that are about the spirit of the people and their fate and position within their imagined community as well as the fate of the nation itself. It is ought to perpetuate a national identity by its discourse of *pure and original people or folk; national spirit or ‘Volksgeist’*; and the *anticipation and future orientation*.

Hall argues that in order to sustain and support a national identity we need the “fictitious idea of a ‘pure, original people⁵’ or ‘folk’” (as cited in Wodak et al., 2009, p.24). It refers to the image of a homogeneous society that only exists in discourse and never in reality. However it is an attachment that directly affects the nation and the citizenship as being unique and special themselves, rather than being part of something special. As Ashford and Meal notice, individuals “only perceive him- or herself as psychologically intertwined with the fate of the group” (1989, p. 21). It gives people a destiny within their imagined community and therefore is a crucial part of the collective identity.

The *national spirit*, as described by Kolakowski can be related to the narrative of the nation, defined by Hall and earlier categorized as a sub-category of shared continuity. However in the notion of Kolakowski it can be very well categorized as destiny of the. The national spirit is the collective expression of behavioural patterns in certain situations and reactions to certain situations, not based on historical experiences but mental concepts of people themselves (Wodak et al., 2009, p.25). Thus it is influenced by the peoples’ perception of their national identity. Behaviour, not conditioned by biological forces but rather by environmental (sociological, cultural, institutional – the family, religion, and so forth) can influence the national spirit, and can vary across and even within nation-states.

Anticipation and future orientation is about the perception of the future and the measures taken to ensure future stability, both, by nation and individual (Wodak et al., 2009, p.25). It is basically about future problems and how to overcome these problems. It is about how to shape one’s own destiny and ensure its success. It is interesting that the nation acts as a personified actor that (in the opinion of Wodak et al.) is also faced with the fate of death, erected by globalization that threatens the uniqueness of national identity (Wodak et al., 2009, p.25).

⁵ Emphasize added

All these different characteristics, aspects or sub-dimensions are part of the discourse on national identity. Some of them may overlap and some of them may be stronger or weaker. They have been sophisticatedly categorized in a solid framework provided by Anthony Smith, dealing with various issues. "The discursive construction of national identity revolves around the three temporal axes of the past, the present and the future" (Wodak et al., 2009, p.26). They incorporate a spatial dimension that sets out values, as outlined in the national body, myths of origin and a common past, continuous traditions and uniqueness. These criteria are important for the discursive construction of national identity and are made visible in order to detect if and to what extent they are represented by political parties.

d. *The relational strategy*

The latter mentioned sub-dimensions just state how identity is defined on a time-oriented dimension and by the nation itself and hardly in relation to others. The relational strategy or dimension is an integral characteristic of the formation and perpetuation of national identity and the discourse of identity. In order to elaborate it, I will try to give a short introduction on Schütz's theory of the stranger and discuss how a discourse that represents a national identity can relate to or be produced by the stranger.

As national society with a strong national identity is, in my definition a local society⁶ (or at least believed to be local in discourse, as a homogenous group), because it is based on national traditions and national culture, and perceives everything that comes to weaken this national identity as a threat. Therefore discourse has to work contra the stranger and increase national identity by clearly stigmatising the collective identity of its own imagined community to the imagined threat, imposed by the stranger to the discursive purity of the nation. A creation of "us" and "them" or in- and out groups seems to be ineluctable. Discourse on the imagined community seeks internal coherence by splitting up the parties into "us" and "them" (Durrani, 2008).

The stranger represented by Schütz is someone from another locality, which in this definition has to be someone from another nation as he, she or the group imposes a threat to the collective identity of the nation. The stranger is someone who does not come as a judge (as in the notion of Simmel) but as an immigrant, a guest or someone who stays, wants to integrate but cannot, because the local lets him know that he is not part of the imagined community and therefore does not have the same identity and thus also does not belong there and never will (Ossewaarde, 2007). The stranger will never be part of the community as he or she is never accepted, and will never completely understand the factors creating a shared continuity, because of not sharing the same memory. Therefore "the stranger is [...] necessarily excluded from the locals' cultural experiences" (Ossewaarde, 2007, p.369).

However, in my definition the stranger does not have to be a specified someone, he can also be a mental image (created by discourse) that is constructed in order to strengthen one's own identity in comparison to the other, the stranger. In this case the stranger has to impose a threat to national identity (Sinclair, 2002), because only a threat to one's own identity can raise incentive to discriminate

⁶ assuming the nation is a macro-locality, or the highest local level possible as the values are bundled at the national level

against another identity. A mental image can only be created by discourse and refer to strangers within the country as well as outside the country, which through the opening of borders can still impose a threat to internal values. Therefore it has to be discriminated against the stranger, by discursively creating a clear distinction between the local and the stranger. Hence national identity is not purely based on temporal dimensions (shared continuity, shared memory and common destiny), but also on a relational dimension, as the discourse on the stranger eventually strengthens the collective national identity of the local, because of being reassessed in contrast to the stranger. Therefore “otherness” of the outsider creates “sameness” and intra-national cohesion of the insider (Jacobs & Maier, 1998). The foreigner can also take the form of something bigger than another nation, let’s say the European Union, which in certain discourse is constantly trying to annihilate the national identity, and is thus imposing a threat. It is important to note, that just the international dimension gives the national an existence, because the national has to have the “other” to define itself to the outside. Thus discourse can represent national identity by defining itself as distinct from other identities which are thought to impose threats to the national one. It is a deliberative excluding action that is aimed at diminishing intra-national differences by creating a common threat to the common identity by means of an outsider.

A national identity is characterized by many different aspects, ranging from a time-oriented perspective with a common memory, common continuity and shared destiny to exclusionary characteristics. These dimensions are part of a national identity by continuously stressing aspects that relate to the construction or the perpetuation of national identity. Therefore they are powerful tools in the negotiation and the revitalization of a national, exclusive identity. These ideas of a nation are transmitted by the discourse; if you then observe the discourse you will be able to detect notions that let guide to strategies of these dimensions. The representation of national identity can be observed by regarding in how far national identity is created or perpetuated in the discourse.

5. Narratives of the nation

This subsection shall serve two purposes. First of all it shall detect the ambiguity of the concepts that have been introduced and secondly, point out the connection between the ambiguity and the narratives of the nation. In general the concepts as for example shared memories are narrative memories, chosen for political reasons by someone. They are therefore deliberately created for a specific reason. In order to spread these memories a discourse has to be created that declares these memories as true and important for society. First some ambiguous concepts will be highlighted and then linked to the methodological part. The logic behind this section is to connect the theory used and the type of method chosen for the analysis.

Concepts as the imagined community are in strong tension with other definitions of the nation. A nationalist would never call his nation an imagined community. That is due to the fact that the nationalist believes in the values and virtues of his own particular society. These values are essentially derived from the shared continuity, shared memory and the common destiny. However these concepts that eventually account for a national identity are also ambivalent. They are based on semi-true if not unreal events and are deliberately chosen to be important for the nation. Nationalism refers to the nation as a natural being, with distinctive characteristics, governed by the collective as a condition for

freedom (Smith, 1971, p.21). The concept of the imagined community however would describe the nation as anything but natural. In the end all of our identity is based on imaginations that do not mirror the real image of our nation but the image someone else has selected. Bhabha states that "the ambivalent, antagonistic perspective of nation as narration will establish the cultural boundaries of the nation so that they may be acknowledged as containing thresholds of meaning that must be crossed, erased, and translated in the process of cultural production" (1990, p.4). Therefore it is the narration that creates the nation and, because we believe in something that does not naturally exist, the concepts, accounting for an imagined community are ultimately ambiguous. The natural culture that we observe is in no way national anymore as it is influenced by various traditions and itself travels around the globe, however our nation's narrative claim the national uniqueness of these artefacts.

As it is shown, the concepts of national identity are ambivalent. But how are these aspects that account for an imagined community created? They are selected for political reasons and put into the discourse of the nation. They are the narratives of the nation deliberately selected to create a nation. They root in our believed history and tell us something about our common fate. National identity therefore is purely narrative and this narration, or discourse of a nation has been chosen on purpose to identify this nation. The discourse chosen by the parties will tell us something about their understanding of national identity and will let us detect the representation of it. Therefore it is inevitable to analyse the discourse and choose a method that can detect the aspects that account for a national identity in the narration.

6. Conclusion

Summing up, the theoretical part has shown that discourse is the main transmitter for the creation or perpetuation of national identity and therefore accounts for the representation. It is manifested through different characteristics that are important for the creation of a national identity, which are triggered by discourse. Discursive practise, as a special form of social practice is used by the state, politics, media, institutions, culture and everyday social interactions, shaping a collective identity (Wodak et al., 2009). The discourse on national identity tries to perpetuate the shared continuity, the shared memories and historical experiences and a collective destiny as well as the demarcation between the national and the identity of the stranger.

I expect that the discourse, observed in the analysis will try to create a national identity, by writing and re-stating the narratives of the nation. That means that political parties refer to existing or create new myths that represent a heroic national identity. Therefore I expect to observe references to myths and destinies of a nation created for political reasons, to either create, neglect or change a certain identity. One should keep in mind that a European identity is sought to have the same characteristics as a national identity and therefore can be detected in the same way. As I have elaborated on the characteristics of a national identity and the way it is transmitted, I can now translate these theoretical concepts into observable units in order to detect in how far a national identity is represented by the political parties of the Netherlands in the party programmes for the 2009 European Parliament elections.

3) Chapter 3: Methodology

In this chapter the methodology will be laid down in detail. It will set the analytical framework that is needed to execute the analysis in order to answer the research question. This particular section will try to answer the question: *“How to observe different levels of representation of national identity”*? It is clearly related to the research question as it lays down the methods and the characteristics that are needed in order to spot the representation of national identity in the party pamphlets for the EP (European Parliament) elections. I will extensively include the theoretical framework and the dimensions that have been discussed, which form characteristics of a national identity to ensure the right characteristics will be detected. The question of how to observe the different levels of representation of national identity will be discussed in two sections. The first section is dealing with the method of data collection, in this case the CDA (critical discourse analysis) as exercised by the Vienna School. It deals with the reasons for choosing this method of data collection as the appropriate one for the observation. Then as the method, so to speak the general framework that will exercise the methodological part is defined, the second part will deal with the method of data analysis, or the operationalization. It approaches the question of how to analyse the findings through the means of the CDA. The latter part will provide a framework that can be applied to the party programmes that will be discussed.

I. Part 1:

To answer how you can observe the different levels of representation of national identity, you have to discuss the method of data collection used, and argue why it is the appropriate method. I chose the critical discourse analysis for various reasons. The first is that, as stated in the theory, national identity is created and also perpetuated, and therefore represented, by discourse. The nation’s narrative has to be observed to find out the level of national identity. A logical step is then to choose an analysis that observes discourse. Thus I chose for the critical discourse analysis. Second, critical discourse analysis helps to interpret discourse, and linking this linguistic analysis to the social context (Richardson, 2007, p.26). This means that analysing the discourse enables the detection of notions of national identity, because the CDA helps to understand linguistic meanings, permitting to conduct a social analysis. Third the CDA is concerned with social problems (Richardson, 2007, p. 26). And fourth CDA helps to interpret the ideology transmitted by discursive patterns and detects the relationship between the text and ideologies and power relations (Richardson, 2007, p.26). The critical discourse analysis is a method that detects notions and hidden power-structures in discourse (Kendall, 2007). It is therefore an indispensable method to detect national identity representation as it is such a multi-faceted concept. Critical in this sense means that it nothing is obvious, it is “opening up complexity, challenging reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies, being self-reflective in my research, and through these processes, making opaque structures of power relations and ideologies manifest”(Kendall, 2007, p.XX).

As there are various different forms of critical discourse analysis, I chose to use the framework of the Vienna School of CDA, mainly because they have already conducted research on national identity (see de Cillia et al., 1999; and Wodak et al. 1999, 2009). Compared to other traditions of CDA, the Vienna School of discourse analysis is less based on the pure linguistic analysis but more about the contextual relation of linguistics and social structures (Wodak et al., 2009, p.9). The Vienna school, founded by Ruth

Wodak is mostly based on argumentation and rhetoric schemes, whereas others, like Fairclough focuses on Functional Systematic Linguistics, others again on grammatical approaches (Kendall, 2007). Another aspect of the Vienna School is the concept of *Triangulation*, borrowing from various different disciplines as linguistic, historical and socio-political approaches (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 9). Furthermore, every school of discourse analysis has a different topic area. The critical historical approach helps create a more sophisticated social research (Kendall, 2007). The Vienna school method is a proven method that focuses on nationalism, racism and the construction of an 'enemy image' (van Dijk, 1998). Thus the critical discourse analysis seems to be the fitting tool in order to detect the representation of national identity in political party programmes. However it has to be pointed that a discourse analysis is based on subjective evaluation that tries to detect notions that cannot be detected through objective means. However through a sophisticated framework and through a reasoned analysis it is hoped to have a sophisticated outcome. Having discussed why the CDA seems to be the appropriate method of data collection it is important to state how this data is collected and analysed.

II. Part 2:

This part deals with the question of how the data is collected and how to analyse this data. As it has become clear, the critical discourse analysis is indispensable for the data collection, it is necessary to translate our theoretical framework into strategies and means. It is just possible to answer the research question if you are certain that you detect the correct notions that refer to your theory. Thus a framework has to be established, measuring the 4 dimensions that are characteristics of national identity and thus state if there is a representation of national identity. These dimensions then will have to be assigned with observable units and then have to be judged in order to categorize the different parties according to their level of representation of national identity. Therefore the operational part will be structured in the following way. First I will discuss the contents, meaning the dimensions that have to be included. They will be addressed by several strategies in the second part. Means of realization, meaning what the strategies and the dimensions need to contain, will be elaborated upon in the third part. The fourth part will briefly discuss the operationalization to detect the means, which are important for the categorization of parties. In the fifth part then I will give a summary of how to observe the representation of national identity and will explain how to rate the different party programmes according to their level of representation of national identity.

1. Contents:

I will use thematic areas in order to create different dimensions that relate to the theoretical framework of how to create national identity. Therefore I will chose the three main characteristics as outlined by Smith (1992) and will add another dimension that has to do with the relational aspects. These four areas are:

- a. The linguistic construction of a shared continuity
- b. The linguistic and narrative construction of a shared memory
- c. The linguistic construction of a common destiny
- d. The linguistic construction of relational aspects

For the construction of shared continuity it is important to regard factors like: symbols and rituals, shared experiences and concerns, traditions and original identities, the unchanging of national character, homogeneity as a group, the national body (artefacts, territories) as well as the focus set on a common culture (language, religion and art).

The shared memory that is as well an important dimension of the national identity is organized by historical facts as the origin of the nation, historical myths, founding myths, the invention of history, collective memory, legends, and historical national political success.

Shared destiny can be identified by emphasizes on a common political future, a collective fate, collective manners, future orientations and the uniqueness of people and culture.

The linguistic creation of relational aspects can be observed by discursively imposed threats (from migration or the outside in general), stigmatisation into different classes as *us* and *them*, supremacy of the own people and collective strength. It refers to one's perception towards the stranger and the impact of the stranger's action to one's own identity.

These four categories shall be examined with a focus on national identity, but also in the light of a reaction towards Europe. I will examine if parties also represent a European identity by examining if they are in favour of cooperation on certain issues, giving away national autonomy, and use the same means of realization as for national identity but then on a higher level. I try to be as precise as possible to detect the national identity represented by the parties, therefore some of the categories may have to be excluded, because they are not directly discussed in the discourse of political parties, as I created a general framework on national identity, perpetuated by media, every day discourse and political and cultural discourse. As the dimensions are clearly stated the strategies that are detected in the discourse of national identity have to be briefly introduced.

2. Strategies

Strategies are an important tool in the CDA, as they are goal oriented actions that are not too precise and detailed (Wodak et al., 2009, p.32) and have the ability to split every thematic area (if applicable) in 5 different strategic categories: construction; perpetuation, justification; transformation; and demontage or dismantling (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 33). These macro-strategies aim to discover the linguistic patterns that influence national identity.

In short *constructive strategies* construct a national identity by means of "unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation" (Wodak et al., 2009, p.33). These aspects are then preserved by *strategies of perpetuation*, reproducing a national identity by supporting and protecting it. *Strategies of Justification* do the same by justifying the status quo. *Strategies of transformation* try to persuade well-established national identities to transform into other identities; one example could be the creation of European identity. However they can also be used to create a transformed identity that rhetorically creates a threat so that national identity eventually is strengthened. *Dismantling strategies* are affecting parts of the existing national identity but can never be not strong enough to provide alternatives (Wodak et al., 2009, p.33).

All these strategies are not exclusive and there is no standardized pattern that can be applied to all discourses in every country, therefore I just presented those strategies that are the most general and will probably be detectable when analysing the party programmes. For reasons of simplicity I will also leave out the argumentation schemes (topoi and fallaces) in the methodology, as they are not too important for the detection of national identity in the analysis. The next paragraph will elaborate means of realization, meaning the linguistic concepts that are employed in the discourse of national identity.

3. Means of Realization:

Means of realization are the smallest unit of the discursive analysis, as they are the most precise units, detecting national identity. They refer to various sub-strategies and the respective main strategies for each dimension. There are various linguistic means and forms involved in a discursive construction of national identity. They are if you want the linguistic key structures that frame a national identity. As this is not a theoretical chapter about the critical discourse analysis I will just briefly outline some of the key factors that have to be explained in order to give an overview of what I will be doing in the analysis. The means of realization are at the smallest level of the analysis as they are concrete notions and wordings, directly related to a precise issue. They mostly belong to one of the three groups of means of realization that “construct unification, unity, sameness, difference, uniqueness, origin, continuity, gradual or abrupt change, autonomy, heteronomy” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.35) and so on. These three tropes are

- a. Personal Reference
- b. Spatial reference
- c. Temporal reference (Wodak et al., 2009, p.35)

Personal reference refers to personal identification through pronouns and quantifiers, spatial references are more related to adverbs of place, but also of persons: “with us, with them” (Wodak et al, 2009. P.35). Temporal reference is then everything that suggests a timeframe or a historical point of time; adverbs of time and words with temporal meaning fall under this category.

Further there are different methods of how to create sameness or difference between people. They can be identified as synecdoche, metonymy and metaphor methods. Synecdoche “replaces the name of a referent by the name of another referent which belongs to the same field of meaning and which is either semantically wider or semantically narrower” (Wodak et al, 2009, p.43). They can be generalising synecdoches, replacing a narrower with a wider expression e.g. “we” instead of “I”. (Wodak et al., 2009, p.44). Metonymy on the other hand “replaces the name of a referent by the name of an entity which is closely associated with it in either concrete or abstract terms” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.43), as for example one can use a place for a person: “Bad news from Brussels”. Personification references are the last categories I will discuss. They “give meaning to the phenomena of the world in humanised, anthropomorphised form” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.44). They shall act to create and represent national unity and homogeneity (Wodak et al., 2009, p.44).

Outside of these three concepts or tropes, there is another integral mean that creates sameness. The idiom of ‘we’ can create linguistic sameness as well as linguistic differences, by including a plurality of

people and excluding outsiders. Inclusion leads to intra-national homogenization and exclusion leads to external stigmatisation. Annex 2 shows the different uses and meanings of the word ‘we’.

The means of realization are the biggest and most detailed group that detect a national identity. They are the most important tools of the observation as they give precise information under which strategy and which dimension national identity is represented; they therefore lay down the basis of how to categorize the different parties. A detailed overview of the means of realization used can be found in Annex 1. As the observation and the means of realization have been discussed, it is now important to elaborate how these units are operationalized and finally rated and then categorized in order to distinguish the level of national identity representation by political parties. Table one provides an overview of the construction of the methodology.




Figure 1 Construction of Methodological Framework

4. Operationalization

The operationalization further specifies the dimensions. The operationalization basically describes the process of how the strategies are directed to the dimensions and which sub-strategies and means of realizations will be used. This part will provide a brief overview of some concepts that will be elaborated upon, however a whole and detailed list of the operationalization can be found in Annex 1. To give an overview I will present the proceedings in this section, by operationalizing the most important strategies.

Shared continuity has several strategies that create such continuity. These strategies, as mentioned above are *justification*, *construction*, *perpetuation* and *transformation*. There are several sub-strategies for every strategy. One that has been frequently used in party pamphlets is for example Positive self/presentation under the perpetuation strategy. It observes how a party perpetuates the positive

image of its nation. Two main means of realization are attached to this strategy, one is a miranda (creating a positive image) and the other one are positive attributes. They would observe lexical argumentations and rhetoric that suggest a positive self presentation may it be in the sense of “we are good”, or “our strength is this and that”. Also part of the perpetuation strategy is the continuation of positive political continuity. They are created by using comparison analogies that suggest need for political continuity in the future, temporal reference to “always” in order to underline the need for the positive political continuity. Further any practises that suggest or construct continuity, normative deontic models (as e.g. “must, “should’ or “it is necessary that”) or lexical units that suggest no continuity on international level belong to the perpetuation strategy of the continuity dimension.

Another example will be drawn from the destruction strategy under the common destiny dimension. Two sub-strategies have been detected; one is Assimilation from outside, reached by assimilative references. This means everything that suggests that something is taken over the national identity will be scored, as it endangers and threatens the destiny of the nation. The second sub-strategy is the Cassandra strategy that uses anti-miranda and pejorative attributions. It warns and creates worse case scenarios how national identity or the fate of the nation can be threatened by something from the outside. An example could be reference to the rise of a European Super-State. A complete overview can be found in Appendix 1, as the limited size of this thesis does not allow a detailed operationalization of all concepts.

5. Categorization

The research question requests a categorization of levels of representation of national identity as it asks “*to what extent*”. Therefore it assumes that different parties have a different degree of representation of national identity. Thus a scaling is needed. Most obvious in this context is to choose an ordinal measurement categorizing the parties into low, medium or high extent of representation of a national identity. However the problem that has to be addressed in this sub-section is how to categorize the representation of national identity with results, gotten by the critical discourse analysis. Especially the categorization causes problems, as it is impossible to conduct any kind of scientific data. However the CDA does not look for statistically valid data but through its subjective analysis finds out particular patterns of social relations. Nevertheless I will try to make it as scientific as possible. Therefore I will analyse every party pamphlet and look at the frequency the lexical and semantic units score on some means of realization. I will give a positive score if the lexical units represent a national identity or a negative score if they represent a European or at least a non-national identity⁷. It can be assumed that parties will score differently according to their level of representation of national identity and then will be able to be categorized within the broad categories of low, medium and high. If parties mainly represent a national identity, meaning that they hardly score on a non-national identity, they will be rated as representing a high level of national identity. Parties with some non-national identity representation but a significantly higher representation of national identity will be rated medium and parties that more represent a non-national identity than a national identity will be rated low.

⁷ Taking into account that a European or non-national identity is represented in the same way as a national identity but then with an other focus.

Additionally rhetoric will be taken into account. If a party uses a lot of populist language in relation to their national identity it will also account to a strong national identity. But again the categorization is based on a subjective evaluation, but by taking a sophisticated framework into account it is ought to be as precise and valid as possible.

Summing up a national identity will be categorized by identifying the different frequencies of scores on a national and a non national identity. Further, lexical units will be analysed on rhetoric that is not covered by the CDA-framework as presented in Annex 1. These two approaches shall help to identify the level of national identity representation of the parties in their party pamphlets. The observations should be precise enough to rank them into the categories low, medium and high.

III. Conclusion

Answering the question of how to detect the representation of national identity in the 2009 party programmes for the European elections, I can state that I will use a critical discourse analysis that is able to detect different notions of the representation of national identity in the text of the party programmes. The means of realization, detecting the representation of national identity are based on the dimensions outlined in the theoretical framework. The detailed framework of analysis that I will use is provided in Annex 1. Table 1 gives an overview of how this mask is derived. To then scale and observe the different levels of national identity that are represented by the different parties I will judge them according to the different frequencies of scoring on the framework. Further I will treat aspects that are creating a non-national identity as a negative score for national identity representation. As it should be clear by now what the characteristics of a national identity are, and how it can be sensed, one can start with the analysis and observe what level of national identity is represented by the different parties.

4) Chapter 4: Analysis

Chapter 4 deals with the analysis, it is ought to give answer to the research question and the sub-question “*In how far do the main political parties differ in advocating national identity*”. It will examine what the narratives of a nation exactly are, by observing the different party pamphlets. It therefore will look at the different strategies that have been used by the parties, indicating the level of representation. In part one the critical discourse analysis will be executed in order to find out the particular narratives of the nation that have been employed by the parties. In a following section the parties will be summarized by their particular level of representation after the narrations of the nation have been clarified. It is a necessary step that provides an answer to the research question, because it classifies the extent of national identity representation of the parties.

1. Part I: The narratives of the nation

The critical discourse analysis as a specific method that is able to detect the notion of representation of national identity necessarily needs to analyse the narratives of the nation. Therefore we will need to discuss the main dimensions, introduced in the theoretical part in order to observe in how far they serve a national identity representation. This in particular means the concepts that were used in order to create a national identity in the discourse. Of course analysing eight different pamphlets in a short analysis is not possible. Therefore I will concentrate on the most important concepts used by the parties that represent a national identity. The other concepts were not neglected in the overall analysis that will be summarized in part two, however will not be mentioned explicitly as this thesis is too limited in size. The most important concepts, which have been used frequently by parties will be analysed: Strategies that create shared continuity, (emphasize on political continuity, national autonomy/sovereignty/independence, positive self-presentation, continuation of positive political continuity,) shared memories, (continuation with regard to founding fathers), a common destiny (singularisation, joint European values, fear of losing uniqueness related to a particular action, assimilation from outside, Cassandra Strategy) and the relation to the “other” (shift of blame and responsibility, internal cohesion, external difference, victimisation, banalisation)

a. Construction of a shared continuity

Political parties try to emphasize on political success over time and the need for the continuation of political success, which emphasizes the need for political autonomy and national sovereignty. They usually refer to their *positive continuity* as part of a particular action and are focusing on particular Dutch values as the power to innovate and adapt to market changes. It clearly represents a miranda. The CDA (Christian Democrats) writes:

(1)“The CDA recognises that the Netherlands took the chances of the past decades and has to keep on taking them in the future. We are also able to do that, because the Netherlands are innovative and entrepreneurially oriented with a strong international orientation. This is the basis of our competitive position in Europe and the world. The Dutch dialogue structure between employees, employers, the government and actively involved civil society organizations is supporting the competitive position. Solidarity and fairness are guaranteed in the Dutch socio-economic model” (CDA, 2009, p.9).

National identity is created by emphasizing Dutch positive political continuity, by having acted in the right way and the statement that this will also be happening in the future. They took the chances and will also take the chances in the future. Furthermore the Dutch positive self-presentation relies on its innovative success and its entrepreneurial orientation, fairness and solidarity. Through deliberate choices they create an argumentation that allows them to create a national identity by the means of showing a unique “story of success”. Furthermore national identity is created through stating that one is autonomous and can take of oneself and has developed structures that help to stay successful. This is in particular to observe in the narratives of European politics which are to some extent declared as unnecessary by some parties.

(2) “That is why we want to decide ourselves who we allow in our country. The veto-right on immigration has to stay our competence. Boss in own home. There is enough Islam in the Netherlands” (PVV, 2009, p.1).

Sources of independence create strong emotions and feelings of pride and strength for the own nation. Discourse on independence thus refers to a positive political continuity of the nation. The spatial reference also indicates a positive continuity of the Netherlands, “our home”. The argumentative structure usually is that through innovation and other positive attributes the Netherlands can to a certain extent continue their positive continuity and therefore are able to independently govern their sovereign country.

(3) “ChristenUnie and SGP support innovation and internationalization within and of (tertiary) education. Every Member State however has to be able to develop these policies on national level. Every Member State has its own, unique identity. European regulation shall not endanger the freedom for education in the Netherlands” (CU/SGP, 2009, p.11).

Here again innovation, which is brand marked as a Dutch virtue, the state autonomy and independence and the positive political continuity that the Netherlands had in education, their “freedom of education” are reflected. Shared continuity is therefore based on positive political continuity and the need for it in the future, positive self presentation especially through the use of innovative references and the national autonomy that constructs shared continuity.

b. Construction of shared memory

A shared memory as a dimension representing national identity is hardly detectable in the party pamphlets of the observed parties. What is observable on the other hand are soft means, suggesting a European identity creation, by reference to the past, the founding fathers and founding myths of the European Union. It is done by indicating achievements the European Union has accomplished and referring to the time before European cooperation as time of war and savageness.

(4) “European anniversary. D66 wants May 9th to be a European celebration day for all Europeans. On this day the whole of Europe has to value the achievements of the European Union for freedom and security and our shared values. Next to it we have to commemorate all the victims that sacrificed their lives for reaching these European ideals” (D66, 2009, p.38).

The quote clearly states the positive impact of the EU on past events and the glorification, by symbolization of the European Union in connection to the past. It also highlights the veneration of the founding fathers that, in an almost war-like scenario died for the Union. It is also emphasizing on the model character of the founding fathers. These rhetoric and lexical units create an argumentation that suggests a European identity and the creation of a European identity. The same would be possible for a national identity if the context was based on a national narrative.

(5) “The ‘*founding fathers*’ had valuable ideas of Europe in mind: peace, freedom, stability and welfare and the endeavour for equality and liberty, justice and solidarity. The Christian-Judaic tradition is the basis of it” (CDA, 2009, 5).

The direct reference to the founding fathers of the Union and the connection of the Union to the Christian-Judaic tradition (a foggy myth that dates back to the time of creation) creates a strong identity, especially due to a positive continuation with regard to the founding fathers. Additionally the myth of freedom and peace and economic stability is a foundation of the European identity. However there are slight notions that disconnect the Netherlands from the European identity as the lexical units let us assume that European integration is a side story and the Netherlands are observing as an outsider, but not as an insider within the process. Furthermore Discontinuation can also emphasize on the difference between now and then:

(6) “[...] old enemies as France and Germany started economic cooperation and encouraged other countries to join, one of them: the Netherlands. The unique European cooperation seemed to be successful for a long time. The Maastricht treaty (1992) however established a new direction, chosen for by mostly conservative and neo-liberal European leaders. [...]. More power for Brussels less power for the Member States” (SP, 2009, p.8).

(7) “Fifty years later, the European Union is marked by less vision, less leadership, another ambition – more focused on tuning the rules and instruments than on the realization of the original goals – and a pace that is felt by the citizen as dictated from the top” (PvdA, 2009, p.6).

By referring to a positive past, where the own country has taken part in, a slight national identity is represented. If then in the argumentation scheme a discontinuity on the international level arises, it breaks the positive past but penetrates the negative break that is due to someone else. This notion also suggests a national identity, due to the historic break. “We were part of something successful and good but now someone else has made it bad for us”. However lexical and semantic units that create identity on the basis of a shared memory are rare in the party programmes. And even if they create an identity it is mostly a European one by referring to the founding fathers and foundation myths as the end of war and “dark ages”.

c. Construction of common destiny

A common destiny is mostly constructed by pointing out the uniqueness of a nation and the fear of losing this uniqueness due to certain actions that are often broadly discussed in strategies that create fear and threats and related to assimilative temptations from the outside. Especially the Cassandra strategy is frequently used by parties to create threatening and destroying scenarios that seek to

devastate the common fate by taking away national uniqueness and that assimilate every form of individualization. It is for example often referred to the European Super-state.

(8) “A federal Europe with a central government in Brussels will not happen and the idea that Europe is developing into a super-state is not on the agenda. The Dutch state and the Dutch identity shall be kept. Europe’s power is its diversity. This doesn’t mean that Member States should not work together, but only if the European citizen benefit from it” (VVD, 2009, p.3f).

This entry clearly marks a Cassandra Strategy that some entity may take over and gain control over the national identity. It is marked by assimilative reference that suggests that if there is too much Europe it will take away the Dutch identity and the Dutch values. The Cassandra strategy warns for a European Super-State and the loss of the distinct national uniqueness. Even though this national uniqueness is not stated in this quote, the existence of it is certain by reference to the particular Dutch identity. Thus a national identity is created by threatening scenarios that may occur. The fear of losing one’s own identity makes the believed will to protect it stronger.

(9) “Cooperation: Yes – Super-State: No” (CU/SGP, 2009, p.3)

The catchphrase of the Christian parties CU and SGP lets assume that there is a threatening tendency that could erode all European nations and the particular national identity of every nation. The rhetoric use of *yes* and *no* also suggests an emphasize on the ‘evil’ that is behind a EU super-state. It is almost a black and white allegory, good in this sense being the independence of the nation, with national values and identities and bad being the assimilation from above.

(10) “By 2050 there will be 100 million Turks. As an EU country they will soon account for the biggest population and maybe run Brussels and thus also the Netherlands. For example on the issue of mass immigration” (PVV, 2009, p.1).

The threatening scenario and the anti-miranda for the *others* cannot be neglected. Other people influencing the course of one’s own country are a direct assimilative threat to one’s own identity and therefore create a strong national identity. This is because the common fate of the nation cannot be determined by the people anymore. This Cassandra strategy is further supported by populist rhetoric that aims at creating threats: mass immigration, 100 million Turks, run Brussels, run the Netherlands. Thus a common destiny is created by pointing out at the uniqueness of one’s own nation and especially to the threat that can be imposed on the nation by predicted assimilative aspirations of other entities. The threat to uniqueness and the actual uniqueness account for national identity representation under a common destiny umbrella.

d. Construction of a relational dimension

The relational strategy is marked by the creation internal sameness and external difference. Parties do most of the time recognize their distinctive and exclusive (civic or ethnic) ‘we’, by explicit references to this exclusive ‘we’ or by explicit reference to the non-inclusive ‘them’. Furthermore parties often use victimisation strategies, manifested by negative impact of someone else’s decision on the nation, and banalisation strategies of other nations’ or entities’ acts.

There are several different forms of “we”, that suggest a low national identity representation, a medium and a high level of national identity representation. An example for a low level is:

(11) “With this alignment parties are threatening millions of fellow Europeans to be left in the cold” (GroenLinks, 2009, p.32).

It suggests a common ‘we’, the fellow European, the brother, someone you belong to yourself as a Dutch, still as it is a fellow European it is not ‘us’. An example for a medium ‘we’ is:

(12) “The EU shall not care so much about what can be done more effective in the Member States, in the Netherlands” (CDA, 2009, p.18).

There is a clear distinction between the Netherlands and the European Union, but it is made clear that the Netherlands are still part of the whole entity. Other notions would suggest that the European Union and the Netherlands are two different entities but work together, for example:

(13) “We also have to continue to invest in innovation and education, so that the Netherlands and the European Union can stay competitive in a globalized world” (CDA, 2009, p.9).

An exclusive ‘we’ suggests a homogeneous nation that incorporates all the important constructs of the nation as a shared memory, shared continuity and a common destiny. Through repetition it creates intra-national sameness. This is especially perpetuated through showing extra-national differences, by focusing on ‘they’, ‘those’, ‘the EU’, or other notions that point out to strangeness.

(14) “The Netherlands are the biggest net-payer. We want our money back. Billions of Euros of Dutch tax incomes are waiting to be used for the Netherlands, not for Brussels. Thus no more billions to lard Polish or French farmers” (PVV, 2009, p.1).

The latter section includes besides a strong national ‘we’ (We, our, Dutch, for the Netherlands) and a strong reference to the ‘other’ (Brussels, Polish, French) and also implements victimisation and banalisation strategies. These victimisation strategies are lexical units and argumentations that victimize the own nation. It is implied that all the money is going to Brussels and to French or Polish farmers and cannot be used for the own, national purposes anymore, even though they should. ‘Our money for our people’. Furthermore the banalisation strategy is ought to discover ridiculous actions by others. It is observable in the analogy of larding French and Polish farmers. These victimisation strategies evoke and display the emotions of the people that fee as being treated unjust in the international context. This leads to a rejection of the international context and a stronger focus on the nation.

(15) “Brussels may however never prevent us to implement a more sustainable environmental policy than the average. It always has to be up to the Netherlands to do more than the European Union dictates” (SP, 2009, p.25).

Besides the obvious miranda, a banalisation strategy that is imposed by ‘them’ on ‘us’ is used. It creates a fictive scenario where someone is dictating a limit, even though the Netherlands would want to do it better and therefore cross the limit. By the glorification of ‘us’, the use of a shared continuity and the

discontinuity that is implemented by the 'other' and the use of a banalisation strategy a national identity is represented in the discourse of the nation.

External difference is also created by using metonymy. They create, depending on the context, a national cohesion or international cohesion. The most frequent use of metonymy is applied by the SP (socialist party), who in particular use "Brussels", instead of the European Union, or the Member States of the European Union in connection with something bad.

(16) "Brussels finally chose for the wrong way of more marked and steadily less protection of public concern" (SP, 2009, p.43)

(17) "Brussels played more and more the boss, also in the Netherlands" (SP, 2009, p.8)

There are many more examples, some of which also create a European identity by stating the need to work together⁸, 'hand in hand'. But most of the times a national identity is created by stating the difference between *us* and *them* which is further supported by victimisation and banalisation strategies.

e. Conclusion

A national identity is created represented by strategies that refer to lexical and semantic units that create, perpetuate, justify etc. national identity. All dimensions, elaborated in the theoretical part are reflected in the analysis of national identity representation. All these factors are important for the narratives of the nation that create myths of uniqueness, and the relations to other nations. The discourse that suggests a representation of national identity influences the emotions of the people and this emotion strengthens the connection to the nation. Now after having observed how a national identity is created in the party programmes we have to categorize the parties in order to understand the question to what extent the different parties create a different national identity representation.

2. Part II: The extent of national identity representation

As discussed earlier the research question aims to answer the extent national parties represent a national identity. The main political parties differ quite tremendously in the representation of national identity in their party programmes. Two parties score low, namely GroenLinks and D66, who both are more or less recognize a national identity but represent a European or a global one. Medium scores were reached by four parties⁹: SGP/CU, CDA, PvdA and VVD. These parties clearly represent a national identity, according to the framework for the critical discourse analysis. They underline European importance and European shared values but do not want to give up national identity and their autonomy because they believe in their own destiny and uniqueness. On a high level we can find the PVV and the SP who use populist rhetoric and mainly threats in order to create a national identity. They score high on various dimensions that represent a national identity. Table 2 summarizes the main findings, indicating the strategies used for a national and a non-national identity, the core dimensions used and the level of national identity representation as an overall outcome.

⁸ For example: "One for all, all for one" (Eén voor allen, allen voor één) (VVD, 2009, p.7)

⁹ SGP/CU are regarded as one party, because they share a party programme.

One can clearly see that the means that represent a national identity vary from party to party. However the parties that can be categorised having a low level of national identity representation have a clear focus on the European dimension. It is interesting to observe that however both, GroenLinks and D66 have a lower level of national identity representation in their party pamphlets, D66 uses more means that let assume a national identity (on a European level) as GroenLinks is more advocating a world or global identity. This is made visible in the attempt by D66 to establish an institutionalized European myth, by celebrating Europe and its successes. GroenLinks on the other hand appears to be more distant to those ideas and stresses a more global concept as the for example refer to spatial tropes as seeing Europe a place in the world and also reject the concept of national identity. Both do not focus on Dutch continuity and destiny but something else is seen more important, which in consequence influences their representation of national identity.

Parties that represent a medium national identity representation, focus to a large extent on the limits of the European Union. They all understand the need for cooperation and see common European values as one of the pillars of the European Union (which on the other hand directly serve as exclusionary notions against non-EU or recent EU members). However, also all understand the differences to the outside and the intra-national cohesion that is often supported by a positive self presentation about Dutch values, as innovative and flexible identity components. Further national autonomy is stressed by most parties, it was observed by notions that suggest independence and the power to deal with problems themselves rather through cooperation.

The parties that scored high on the level of national identity representation hardly promoted a non-national identity and mostly focussed on the external differences, victimization and Cassandra strategies. These strategies result in blaming others for mistakes and provide pragmatic solutions for more complex problems, as for example not paying money to the EU but keeping the money for the Netherlands, especially in times of economic downturn. The argumentation schemes are highly populist utilising warnings and threats that suggest a loss of national identity, leading to a stigmatization of society. The argumentation schemes often appear to the emotions of the citizen and create an emotional attachment to the nation.

Table one, which is presented below, summarizes the findings. It shows the different most important means the different parties used. On the one hand means that suggest a national identity, and on the other means that represent a non-national identity. The table further incorporates the core dimensions that have been identified for every party, meaning the ones that have been indicated mostly. The information on the different means (as represented in the sub-strategies) and the use of dimension enables the classification of the parties, which is also represented in the table.

	Scores representing a national identity (and core sub-strategies)	Scores representing a non-national identity (and core sub-strategies)	Core Dimensions	Level of national identity representation
GroenLinks	51: external differences	96: internal sameness (EU as a whole entity); positive political continuity	Continuity, Relational dimension	LOW
D66	54: Miranda on Dutch destiny and achievements	186:national autonomy; assimilation through Europe (hand in hand); Miranda on EU; joint values	Continuity, Relational dimension	LOW
PvdA	142:National autonomy (continuity); extra-national sameness; external differences	54: Assimilation strategy (hand in hand);Joint European values	Continuity, Destiny, Relational dimension	MEDIUM
CDA	134: cooperation; continuity; need for continuity; positive self-presentation; external differences; internal cohesion	41: Joint European values	Continuity, Destiny, (Relational dimension)	MEDIUM
CU/SGP	130: external differences; national autonomy	47: positive continuity; European values	Continuity, Relational dimension	MEDIUM
VVD	26: Downplaying negative common features; positive political continuity;	7: continuation of positive political continuity	Continuity, Relational dimension	MEDIUM

	national autonomy			
SP	261: External differences; Internal cohesion; banalisation; Cassandra; national autonomy	28: some scores in memory; external differences and assimilation (hand in hand)	Continuity, Destiny, Relational dimension	HIGH
PVV	112: threats; fictive stories; external differences, internal cohesion; victimisation; Cassandra strategy	%	Destiny and Relational dimension	HIGH

Table 1 Representation of national identity for every party

It is interesting to observe that even though the parties differ broadly in their representation of Dutch national identity in their programmes, they do not differ as much in core dimensions they use for their argumentation schemes. All of them (CDA not as strongly) frequently argue on the relational dimension, in terms of a Dutch, or a non-Dutch identity. Then they differ in taking in continuity, or the destiny dimension or both. None of the parties however score high on the memory dimension, suggesting that memory is either not important, not appropriate or not considered in party pamphlets of the political parties for the European elections.

Having executed the critical discourse analysis one can now answer the question *in how far the main political parties differ in representing a national identity*, the answer is that GroenLinks and D66 are representing a European or international identity, and less a national one. CDA, PvdA, CU/SGP, VVD are representing a national identity, but recognizing the importance of the other as a part of one's own identity. PVV and SP are representing the strongest national identity that is based on relational aspects and on threatening scenarios of external danger.

5) Chapter 5: Conclusion

The analysis has provided a categorization of the level of national identity representation by national parties. It has taken into account the different notions that were concentrated in the methodological framework, measuring on four different dimensions: shared continuity, shared memory, common destiny and a relational dimension. These dimensions were ought to cover lexical and semantic units, detecting the level of national identity representation of the political parties. Reflecting on the results one can answer the research question:

To what extent do the main political parties of the Netherlands represent a national identity in their party programmes for the 2009 European Parliament elections?

Considering the analysis it has become clear that the parties could have been categorized in three different levels of national identity representation, low, medium and high. Two parties could have been placed in a low level of national identity representation, namely GroenLinks and D66. This is mainly due to the reason that they do not focus on a Dutch national identity, but rather on a non-national identity. Being more precise, D66 focuses on a “European national identity”, whereas GroenLinks, besides the European dimension, advocates a more inclusive cosmopolitan if not universal identity that neglects the bordered concepts of the nation. However, both D66 and GroenLinks do also represent a Dutch national identity to some extent, but it is clearly subdominant to their European or global ideas.

The medium bloc is formed by the more conservative or established parties of the Netherlands, the centred labour party PvdA, the liberals VVD, the Christian Democrats CDA and the Christian conservatives CU/SGP. As the analysis has shown a Dutch-national identity prevails in their mindset and is regarded as more important, compared to a non-Dutch identity. They use argumentations that are mostly based on the positive self and the need for national autonomy in relation to the EU. Nevertheless, they recognize a European dimension, and its importance. Especially shared European values and political cooperation suggest a slight European identity representation. All parties but the PvdA clearly state the national dimension. The PvdA on the other hand uses more subtle argumentations that suggest a negative image of the “other”, in this case obviously the European Union and tries to avoid direct reference to the Dutch. However, through the use of the critical discourse analysis one was able to detect that, even though not stated directly, the labour party is representing a national identity and therefore also had to be placed within the medium bloc.

A high level of national identity representation has been articulated by the populist right wing party PVV and the socialist party SP. The reason why they have been categorized as representing a high level of national identity is because they are hardly if not at all (in the case of the PVV) representing a non-Dutch identity. Furthermore, when representing the Dutch national identity they are using populist argumentation schemes as threats, external differences and victimization strategies that create strong emotions on the side of the electorate. They are representing a high level of national identity because they focus on the Dutch and see their identity as rather exclusive and something that shall not be threatened by someone from the outside.

Thus D66 and GroenLinks represent a low level of national identity in their party pamphlets, because they do not use so many units that construct, perpetuate, transform or justify a Dutch identity. The centred parties PvdA, CDA, VVD and CU/SGP represent a medium level of national identity as they focus on a strong national identity in their party pamphlets. The populist parties SP and PVV on the other hand represent a high level of national identity in their programmes as they set the nation and national identity – according to the theory and the methodology – central.

The critical discourse analysis seemed to be the most useful tool in analysing national identity in the party programmes. It helped to detect notions and schemes of argumentation that cannot be detected by other methods. It in particular helped to identify the level of national identity representation of the PvdA, which would not have been obvious, using other qualitative methods. It provided the analysis with various means but also left a firm level of flexibility that in consequence helped to categorize the parties.

The theoretical part included, besides the three dimensions pointed out by Anthony Smith a fourth dimension that clearly established a differentiation between the time-oriented feelings of attachment to a nation and the concrete reflection of these three aspects in comparison to the “other”. For the analysis of party programmes, the fourth dimension was of particular importance, as it broadened the framework and took the nation as a bordered concept into account. Of less significance for the analysis of party pamphlets was the shared memory dimension. It can be assumed that this dimension is less often referred to in official documents, which do not have direct connection to the question of identity and also do not clearly ask what the Dutch nation is made of. More striking in this context however is that some parties – especially D66 – still utilise the shared memory dimension but then in order to legitimize the European integration project, pointing at the importance of the historical dimension in order to construct a, in this case, European identity.

National identity is represented by the parties throughout their party pamphlets, but most likely as distinctive from other discourse of the nation. However, the parties reflect the wishes of the majority of the citizens and if the electorate demands a national identity the party will adapt to this wish. On the other hand the party will also influence the beliefs of the electorate through their discourse. Parties with a high level of national identity representation do most likely have an electorate that also has stronger emotions for the nation, and vice versa with parties that have been categorized on a medium or low level of national identity representation.

Taken these results into account one can discuss the principle question that is based on a hypothesis by Sean Carey that the stronger your national identity, the more likely you oppose the European Union (2002). And indeed, parties with a higher level of national identity do have an argumentation that is based on external differences and point at the difficulties that come along with the European Union. In consequence this may have an impact on the citizens and their perception of the European Union that could hinder further integration.

What we have seen is that national identity is heavily based on the four dimensions that have been recognized. The combination of time-oriented and relational dimensions has provided a thorough

framework, enabling the detection of national identity representation by different parties. Through the use of the critical discourse analysis it has become obvious that all parties do represent a certain identity, also variations in strength are obvious. Furthermore the Europeanization of the nation has become visible, especially in the programme of D66, using classical national means to create a European identity. Thus the four dimensions can be transferred to various bordered entities in order to create one nation from within, which is in particular important for the creation of a nation. Further research could be done on other national discourses and their representation of national identity, to get an overall picture of how the Dutch national identity is represented and to what extent. One could for example analyse conversations by Dutch about the Dutch identity, to recognize what the imagined community entails and in a following research one could observe how these values are transmitted in political or medial discourse.

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7) Appendix

Appendix 1

Linguistic construction of shared continuity	
1. Justification Strategies	
Downplaying negative common features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lexical units with levelling semantic components - Co-responsibility “take part in”
Harmonization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fiction scenarios of external threat
Choice of meaning of words	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - E.g. using more positive words (neutralizing instead of kill) - Negation of own nation in negative context
Legitimization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - quotes
2. Constructive Strategies	
Emphasize on positive political continuity (negation on discontinuity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Temporal reference (since, has always been) - Spatial references (here, in this country) - Names related to Dutch descent - Ship allegory (we are all in one boat) - Implicit/explicit comparison (others do it in a bad way, we do it in a good way) - Parallelisms - Non-distanced discourse representations which create continuity
Transportation of sub-national features to national level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “as part of the whole”
National autonomy/sovereignty/independence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Units creating and presupposing autonomy “ we can take care of ourselves”
3. Perpetuation Strategies	
Positive self –presentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Miranda - Positive attributes
Black and white presentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - -“-
Continuation of positive political continuity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparison analogies, need for political continuity in future

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “always” - Practises that construct continuity - Normative deontic models → “must”, “should”, “it is necessary that” - No continuity on international level
4. Transformation	
Warning against heterogenization (extra national dependence; loss of autonomy)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Metaphors - Vagueness - Euphanisms (EU economy, EU legislation...)

Linguistic and narrative construction of shared memory	
1. Justification Strategies	
Downplaying differences of the past and today	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lexical units indicating difference, personifications (history) and metaphors (zero hour)
2. Perpetuation Strategies	
Continuation with regard to founding fathers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adverbs of time and personification
3. Transformation	
Discontinuation → emphasize on difference between then and now	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Either negative on e.g. EU level - Downplaying on national level - Emphasizing if on something negative on international level - Suggestive rhetorical questions
Positive change as declaring something as obsolete/outdated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Negative metaphors for the past
Emphasizing model character of ‘founding fathers’	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aphorisms - Personification (let’s turn the future into our friend) - Crossroad metaphors
4. Destruction	
Heteronormization: dismantling myths from the	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - External forces - Metaphors related to immigration,

outside against one's will	Dutch tolerance, taking away freedoms
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Linguistic construction of common destiny	
1. Constructive Strategies	
Singularization: emphasize on national uniqueness	- Constructing uniqueness, individualization
Joint European values	- E.g. democracy, freedom, peace (as to be rated slightly negative for national identity, though also incorporates national values but they seem to transcend to a European level)
2. Transformation Strategies	
Fear of losing uniqueness related to a particular action	- Procatalepsis: refutation of an opponent's argument - Losing national unique autonomy
Emphasize on necessary difference between now and the future	- Crisis is also a change
3. Destruction Strategies	
Assimilation from outside	- Assimilative references
Cassandra Strategy	- Anti-miranda, pejorative attributions - E.g. <i>EU-Super State</i>

Linguistic construction of the "other"	
1. Justification Strategies	
Shift of blame and responsibility: Difference 'us', 'them'; isolation singularization	- Lexical units with semantic components creation difference - 'yes, but'

and extra national dependence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fictive stories - Analogies and comparison (deliberate negation of countries or entities)
2. Constructive Strategies	
Extra-national sameness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Boat allegory - Personal pronoun “we”
Reduction of supra-national uniqueness	
Unificatory warning against loss of national autonomy and uniqueness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fictive (threatening) scenarios
Exclusion: external differences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Components constructing difference - Exclusion through personal and special reference: ‘they’, ‘those’, ‘them’; foreign or strangers - Low value words for the others - Strengthening we-group
Avoidance: international sameness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nominalization with agent delitiation
Warning: Anglicization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Threat to language - Deliberate use of Anglicism (as rated to be negative to national identity) - Call for protecting language in times of globalization
3. Perpetuation strategy	
National emphasize	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deliberate use of name of nation: “As Dutch, we are obliged...” - Notions that Dutch do have their own distinct identity
Victimisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “We want our money back” - Wording with negative implications about EU bureaucracy and administration on Dutch success
Banalisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Banalisation of the action of others
4. Transformation strategy	
Assimilation (to be rated negative to national identity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lexical units with semantic components creating uniformity: “we, Europeans” - “hand in hand”

Appendix 2:

46 The Discursive Construction of National Identity

Table 2.6: Uses of 'We'

a)	I + you	partially/totally addressee-inclusive
b)	I + he/ I + she	addressee-exclusive
c)	I + you (plural) (= I + n x you)	partially/totally addressee-inclusive
d)	I + they (= I + n x s/he)	addressee-exclusive
e)	I + you + he/ I + you + she	partially/totally addressee-inclusive + ?
f)	I + you (plural) + he I + you + she	partially/totally addressee-inclusive + ?
g)	I + you (plural) + they (= I + n x you + n x s/he)	partially/totally addressee-inclusive + ?

Appendix 3:

Translations:

(1) Het CDA ziet dat Nederland die kansen de afgelopen decennia heeft gepakt en in de toekomst moet blijven benutten. Dat kunnen we ook omdat Nederland innovatief en ondernemend is met een sterke internationale oriëntatie. Dat is de basis van onze concurrentiepositie in Europa en de wereld. De Nederlandse overlegstructuur tussen werknemers, werkgevers, overheid en actieve en betrokken maatschappelijke organisaties, zet zich in voor de concurrentiepositie. Solidariteit en rechtvaardigheid zijn in Nederland gegarandeerd in dit sociale economisch model.

(2) Daarom willen wij zelf uitmaken wie we nog toelaten. Het vetorecht over immigratie moet blijven. Baas in eigen huis. Er is genoeg islam in Nederland.

(3) De ChristenUnie en SGP steunen innovatie en internationalisering in en van het (hoger) onderwijs. Beleid daartoe moeten lidstaten echter op nationaal niveau kunnen bepalen. Elke lidstaat heeft een eigen unieke identiteit. Europese regelgeving mag de vrijheid van onderwijs in Nederland daarom niet in gevaar brengen.

(4) Europese feestdag. D66 wil dat 9 mei een Europese feestdag voor alle Europeanen wordt. Op die dag zou in heel Europa moeten worden stil gestaan bij de verdiensten van de Europese Unie op het gebied van vrede en veiligheid, en bij onze gemeenschappelijk waarden. Daarnaast moeten de slachtoffers worden herdacht die voor het bereiken van deze Europese idealen hun leven gegeven hebben.

(5) De "*founding fathers*" hadden met Europa waardevolle idealen voor ogen: vrede, vrijheid, stabiliteit en welvaart en het streven naar gelijkwaardigheid en vrijheid, rechtvaardigheid en solidariteit. Het is de joods/christelijke traditie, die daaraan ten grondslag ligt.

(6) [...] oude vijanden als Frankrijk en Duitsland gingen economisch samenwerken en betrokken daar ook andere Europese landen in, waaronder Nederland. Die unieke Europese samenwerking bleek lange tijd per saldo succesvol. In het Verdrag van Maastricht (1992) werd echter door voornamelijk conservatieve en neoliberale Europese regeringsleiders gekozen voor een nieuwe koers. [...]. Meer macht voor Brussel, minder macht voor de lidstaten.

(7) Vijftig jaar later wordt de Europese Unie gekenmerkt door minder visie, minder leiderschap, en andere ambitie – meer gericht op de verfijning van de regels en instrumenten dan op de verwezenlijking van het oorspronkelijke doel – en een tempo dat door de burger ervaren wordt als van bovenaf gedicteerd.

(8) Een federaal Europa met een centrale regering in Brussel zal er niet komen en de idee dat Europa zich naar een superstaat ontwikkelt is niet aan de orde. De Nederlandse staat en de Nederlandse identiteit zullen behouden blijven. Europa's kracht ligt in haar verscheidenheid. Dit betekent niet dat de lidstaten geen dingen gezamenlijk mogen doen. Maar alleen als die voor de Europese burgers een meerwaarde hebben.

(9) Samenwerking: Ja – Superstaat: Nee.

(10) In 2050 zijn er 100 miljoen Turken. Die maken straks als EU-land met de grootste bevolking misschien de dienst uit in Brussel en dus in Nederland. Bijvoorbeeld op het gebied van de massa-immigratie.

(11) Met deze opstelling dreigen de partijen miljoenen mede-Europeanen in de kou te laten staan.

(12) De EU moet zich niet teveel bemoeien met wat er in de lidstaten, in Nederland, effectief kan worden aangepakt.

(13) Ook moeten we blijven investeren in onderwijs en innovatie, zodat Nederland en de EU competitief zijn en blijven in de globaliserende wereld.

(14) Nederland is de grootste nettobetaler. Wij willen ons geld terug. Miljarden euro's aan Nederlands belastinggeld willen we weer gebruiken voor Nederland, niet voor Brussel. Dus geen miljarden meer om de boeren in Polen en Frankrijk te spekken

(15) Brussel mag ons echter niet verhinderen om een beter en duurzamer milieubeleid te voeren dan gemiddeld. Het hoort Nederland altijd vrij te staan om meer te doen dan de Europese Unie voorschrijft.

(16) Brussel heeft finaal de verkeerde weg gekozen van steeds meer markt en steeds minder bescherming van publieke zaak.

(17) Brussel ging meer de baas spelen, ook in Nederland.