

Master thesis

Public Administration; track: Environment and Sustainability

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# Comparing governance approaches for the realization of the EHS.

*A comparative case-study to measure network effectiveness.*

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## Summary:

This thesis focuses on the effectiveness of different governance approaches for realization of the Ecological Main Structure (EHS) in Overijssel. The thesis shows that various approaches can be effective, although differentially.

To measure policy network effectiveness two cases were selected. One Northeast-Twente case network was under the influence of a large network of area-oriented policy, a provincial initiative from 1993 onwards. The other one, located in the Vecht area near Dalfsen was outside this influence and was a different governance set-up by area actors themselves, with the Province steering at a distance. Both cases were found to contribute to realization of the Provincial Ecological Main Structure (PEHS), although this contribution was not the major project goal in both cases. One case network was not found to be more PEHS-effective than the other in a quantitative sense.

PEHS-quality nevertheless may be better protected and developed by nature specialists as the private nature conservancy organizations or State Forest Management. PEHS-land ownership by these organizations will possibly create larger entities of nature with a more natural development. This was the major concept behind the Ecological Main Structure of the Nature Policy Plan (NBP) in 1990.

But for areas like Northeast-Twente, where land mobility is low and land prices are high, making PEHS-purchases difficult, area brokers working for the Province might help to initiate future PEHS-projects. This will be especially the case when sectoral nature subsidy schemes are integrated in their toolbox. These area brokers were found to be able to influence actor core characteristics of the target group. In the thesis power to act/ capacity was introduced as a fourth core characteristic to explain PEHS-interactions. This variable proved to be an essential theoretical factor to understand interactions in PEHS policy in the two cases.

The 2004 provincial choice to use the area-oriented policy set-up for the total Overijssel area will only be legitimate from a PEHS-policy perspective, if these broker activities are stimulated. Both cases finally showed that PEHS-policy will be more successful if coupling with strong interests as recreation or water is realized.

## Chapter 1: Introduction and background.

For decades nature policy mainly focused on protecting what was left. This 'flowerpot'-strategy, conserving isolated nature areas, was the basic defensive value underlying both public policy and policies of non-governmental actors, like Natuurmonumenten and the provincial nature conservancy organizations. Under the influence of the 'Island theory' from biology, predicting a higher biodiversity on islands closer to the mainland, and the spatial fragmentation problem, mentioned as 'versnippering' in the National Environmental Plan NMP (VROM, 1989), the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries (LNV) formulated a completely new policy strategy.

The Nature Policy Plan (NBP, 1990) presented the realization of an Ecological Main Structure (EHS) as the main new sectoral policy strategy for the thirty years to come. By most EHS-policy actors 2018 is seen as the envisioned end-date for EHS-realization, although definitions about what realization means may vary. EHS-realization has at least the following implementation layers: EHS-delimitation, acquirement of new EHS-terrains, (new) arrangement and management of these terrains in correspondence with set nature quality targets and realization of EHS-environmental quality.

The national nature network consists of core areas, mainly already existing nature areas, corridor zones and nature development areas, in which Dutch nature can be preserved and developed in a more sustainable way and where more species will find a safe haven. Corridor zones must mainly be realized on agricultural lands and will connect isolated core areas and newly developed nature areas.

In the NBP the provinces mainly hold a complementary position towards central government regarding EHS-realization. Central government defines the sectoral nature policy goals and is responsible for policy implementation. The provinces support central government in the application of sector instruments (Balduk, 2003). The lower governmental levels then cooperate (e.g. by delimitation of a 'net-EHS') to realize central government policy goals, a situation that can be typified as a more or less traditional form of government, because policy is being implemented in a top-down, hierarchical way.

In 1995 the Structure scheme Green Space (SGR), a LNV long-term strategic plan for the rural area, states: 'there will be more room for decision-making at the regional level' (LNV, 1995). At this regional level the provinces will have a primary role in policy formulation regarding their own tasks and the implementation of central government policies. Central government and the provinces succeedingly agree that the provinces will deal with the

further delimitation of EHS-areas, the acquirement of new EHS-lands, the arrangement of these terrains and agricultural nature management. The Provinces are supported in these activities by DLG (Dienst Landelijk Gebied), an executive agency of LNV. This process is called the Decentralization Impulse (DI-1995). The Provinces also became responsible for the execution of the Nature Conservancy Law. Regarding EHS-policy the steering role of the provinces for nature network realization was strongly enlarged.

This regional approach as discussed in the SGR and the policy document 'Prioriteitennota Dynamiek en Vernieuwing', with close links to the so-called ROM (Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu)-areas of the Ministry of VROM, has been typified as integrated area-oriented policy (GGB, gebiedsgericht beleid). Following Boonstra (2004) the SGR is one of the policy documents standing at the cradle of this new steering philosophy. Policy goals of GGB are described by Boonstra (2004, p.56) as :

- 1. the regional adjustment and integration of policy efforts between various policy sectors (e.g. agriculture, water, nature and landscape, recreation and tourism).
- 2. the creation of such a level of acceptance (support) among relevant regional actors, which makes the chosen policy successful also in its executive stages.

Other policy area categories (first generation GGB-policy initiatives) that exist in 1995 are the ROM-areas of the Ministry of VROM (since 1989), WCL's (precious cultural landscapes) and SGP's (strategic green projects) originating from SGR 1992 (LNV, 1992). In the beginning of the nineties the provinces also initiate various ROM-like projects in their own rural areas. As a consequence rural areas are covered by diverse policy categories that sometimes strongly overlap. Beugeling et al. (1995) state that in some rural parts of the country four to twelve area-oriented policy categories co-exist at the same moment.

The sectoral nature policy plan (BNLO, 1993) of the province of Overijssel presents the area-oriented approach for Northeast-Twente as the preferred governmental set-up for EHS-realization in this part of the province. This Overijssel policy choice must be seen against the wider GGB-context described above.

The BNLO (Beleidsplan Natuur en Landschap Overijssel) is the provincial (adapted) translation of the NBP and focuses on the development of a provincial network of connected nature areas (Provinciale Ecologische Hoofdstructuur, PEHS), that has to be realized within 25 years. Important parts of the PEHS have to be realized on the high sandy soils in the eastern parts of the province. Brooks, brook valleys, spring areas, moorlands, forests and land estates make up for important PEHS-parts here. The small-scale landscape of the Northeast-Twente area, with a strong pattern-like interweaving of spatial functions,

makes an integral policy approach necessary. As a consequence the 1993 BNLO-plan does not elaborate the PEHS in Northeast-Twente into more detail.

For Northeast-Twente a specific area-oriented policy was elaborated by the Province, starting in February 1993 with the signing of a Plan van Aanpak by the relevant regional partners and the Province together (gebiedsgericht beleid Noordoost-Twente, ggb-NOT). At that time the Province already implements an area-oriented environmental policy addressing the area, linking up with the ROM-approach mentioned above (Gebiedsgericht milieubeleid). In the ggb-NOT the realization of the PEHS was one of the public goals to be pursued. Main purpose of cooperation was the overall sustainable development of the area and its functions. This brings the topic at the very heart of the master track Environment and Sustainability.

Interesting research topic after fifteen years of cooperative effort seems to be, whether ggb-NOT made a measurable difference for PEHS-realization as compared to areas where this integrated area-oriented set-up was applied only from 2004 onwards. In this year the area-oriented approach was adopted for almost the complete province of Overijssel under the term 'gebiedsgericht werken', which makes a comparative analysis between individual areas more difficult. Did the ggb-NOT-policy effort make a difference for the realization of the PEHS and did this governance concept, where various regional partners work together to reach commonly agreed (Plan van Aanpak) policy goals, fit the chosen nature objectives in a better way? Was the policy effort more PEHS-effective compared to areas where this (steering) policy effort did not exist? These questions seem important for future EHS-policy implementation efforts: Ligthart (2006) describes the critique on the currently strong area-oriented organization of EHS-policy efforts in the Netherlands. Opponents claim ineffectiveness and inefficiency regarding these policy efforts. In their opinion the EHS might better be realized as a national project, steered by one central, national EHS-project agency. The recent parliamentary decision to consider EHS-realization as a large national project ('Groot Project-EHS') seems to point in the same direction (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2009).

Making the effectiveness assessment will be done in this thesis by the research method of a comparative, qualitative case-study of two PEHS-related projects. The research strategy will consist of document analysis as well as secondary analysis of published interviews to provide necessary data. One of the projects ('Hoeve Springendal') contributed to PEHS-realization in Northeast-Twente, by realizing new nature within PEHS-boundaries and was under the influence of the larger ggb-NOT policy network. The large ggb-NOT policy network then is seen as the project network context. Following Bressers, Hanegraaff and Lulofs (2008) this large network is the structural context of the project network and consists

of the elements of public governance, that were not specifically developed for the project processes studied.

The other case, 'nature development area Emmertochtsloot', was undertaken in close connection to 'Integral Water Project Dalfsen' (IWPD, realized in May 2002) and was outside the influence of the ggb-NOT policy set-up. Both projects were undertaken before 2004, so they are suitable to make the comparative effectiveness assessment of the different governance approaches. As argued above the area-oriented policy set-up was extended to the whole provincial area in 2004. In both projects new nature is being developed in areas characterized by a similar and strong interweaving of spatial functions. In both projects water plays a crucial role.

The assessment of ggb-NOT effectiveness for PEHS-realization, as a community-set policy goal, will be undertaken from the perspective of a comparison of the policy network of the two projects. One project network is part of a larger ggb-NOT network, which is seen as the structural context. In the policy network various PEHS-policy actors are interconnected and mutually dependent. PEHS-realization is seen as a policy network *outcome*, a network-network outcome relationship which is dialectical (Marsh and Smith, 2000).

The *problem statement* of this thesis then is expressed in the following question:

Did the governance structure of ggb-NOT create a more effective project network with better PEHS-outcomes from the perspective of the Province, as compared to areas where this policy effort did not exist?

Purpose of the research is to make governmental recommendations for future PEHS-policy in other parts of the province. Is the provincial policy choice to extend the area-oriented approach to the whole province in 2004 a legitimate one, because ggb-NOT proved to create a more effective policy-network from the provincial PEHS-perspective? The study then can be typified as an ex-post evaluation of a provincial form of (green) network-steering over the time period 1993-2004.

In chapter 2 the research questions will be formulated. The problem statement has already been mentioned above.

Chapter 3 will present the theoretical framework that will be used to map the interactions of the wider ggb-NOT policy network as well as the interactions of the two project networks. The conceptual model that is created provides the lense for the analysis of the policy networks. To explain underlying motivations or explaining factors for specific actor behavior within the typified policy networks, core variables of Contextual Interaction Theory (CIT), being actor *motivation*, *cognition* and *power over* other actors or power balance, will be

used. A fourth variable that will be used is actor *capacity* or *power to act*, mainly in the form of available actor resources. This creates an extended version of CIT-theory, which is used in the thesis to explain actor behaviour. Participation in the policy network and changes in underlying motivations might present a dynamic picture of network evolution. In the introduction chapter the ggb-NOT policy effort was placed against the background of area-oriented policy in the Netherlands in general.

Chapter 4 elaborates this area-oriented way of policy progress into more detail. The new steering philosophy of the Investment Budget Rural areas (ILG) will form a point of departure. The area-oriented concept will be placed on the dichotomy between government and governance, theoretical notions that are recently much discussed in Public Administration studies.

Chapter 5 describes the large policy network of ggb-NOT in general. This analysis of the large network functions as a background for the analysis of the 'Hoeve Springendal'-project, which is a specific integral ggb-NOT project. A network analysis of the governance approach of the project will be given on the basis of the theoretical framework.

Chapter 6 focuses on 'nature development area Emmertochtsloot' within the context of 'Integral Water Project Dalfsen'. How can the (area) PEHS-policy network be typified in this project and which explaining factors can be found for network participation?

Chapter 7 will compare the individual case-study results. Which differences can be seen and why is this the case? How do possible network differences explain possible differences in network outcomes in terms of nature network realization? Which network was more effective for reaching the community-set PEHS policy goal from the perspective of the Province? What is the role of the Province in the two policy networks and could it be improved? This chapter will lead the thesis to some policy recommendations, which could be used to steer the PEHS-network more effectively. The insights will prove to be valuable, certainly in the ILG-era where the province commits itself, together with regional partners, to pre-specified, quantifiable policy results (Selnes&Van der Wielen, 2008). Having an effective PEHS implementation network then is of highest importance, because nature funds (mainly EHS) make up for 67% of total ILG-budgets.

## Chapter 2: Research questions.

To structure the thesis research this chapter will present the research questions. In the introduction chapter *the problem statement* was formulated as follows:

Did the governance structure of ggb-NOT create a more effective policy network with better PEHS-outcomes, as compared to areas where this policy effort did not exist?

As described in chapter 1 area-oriented policy approaches have been adopted as a governmental set-up for rural area policies on environment, nature and landscape since the beginning of the nineties, finally resulting in ILG-steered area processes. The first research question aims to position ggb-NOT against this wider background:

R1: Which area-oriented policies have been addressing the rural area on the policy themes environment, nature and landscape in the Netherlands since the nineties? Which steering philosophy can be seen underlying these governmental set-ups? How can these steering philosophies be typified by using the theoretical concepts of governance and government?

Research question 1 will be answered in chapter 4. Research question 2 below addresses the theoretical part of the thesis. The theoretical framework will be elaborated in chapter 3.

To explain (changes in) actor agency on a more specific networking (Hay&Richards, 2000) level the core variables of Contextual Interaction Theory (Bressers, 1996), being actor motivation, cognition and power balance between basically two policy actors, will be used. Actor capacity or power to act is used as an extra explanatory variable (Maarse, 1984) for actor behavior.

R2: How can the core variables of Contextual Interaction Theory, as well as the variable actor capacity or power to act, be used to explain interactions of actors and changes in these actions as a result of possible changes in the values of these variables?

After the theoretical chapter 3 the ggb-NOT policy network will be explored in chapter 5, resulting in the following research question:

R3: Which properties does the large ggb-NOT policy network have? How did this large network, functioning as the structural context for the specific 'Hoeve Springendal' project network, evolve over time?

The other case has not been addressed by a larger policy network and is analyzed as a bottom-up area initiative on itself. In this case there is only the individual project network.

External influences on the project networks are not taken into account. This links up with the 'ceteris-paribus'-assumption, isolating the impact of the ggb-NOT initiative for the Northeast-Twente case as the only external influence on the project network. Other external influences might be present, but within the context of this thesis are supposed to be equal for both cases.

Research question 3 not only tries to map the policy network on a fixed moment in time, but also aims to describe network changes over time, leading to changes in network structural characteristics. Research question 3 will be answered in chapter 5 section 5.1 to section 5.4. After analysis of the large network the two individual projects will be presented. The project networks will be mapped by using the theoretical framework. Research question then is:

R4: Which characteristics does the PEHS-policy network have in the two case-study projects and which differences can be found in terms of network effectiveness? How did the project network evolve over project time?

The first case study 'Hoeve Springendal' will be presented in chapter 5, section 5.5. The second case-study will be explored in chapter 6. The results of the comparison of the two project networks are used to answer the final research question in the concluding chapter 7. The aim is to give a policy-advice to provincial policy-makers and their area partners to improve future policy network effectiveness in the field of nature network construction.

R5: Which governance lessons can be learned from this comparative case-study and how can these lessons lead to recommendations for governmental design in other PEHS-implementation areas? Is the level of network steering of ggb-NOT a more effective governance design for PEHS-projects and should it be more widely adopted?

Chapter 3 below will present the theoretical framework for mapping (developments in) the PEHS-policy networks, at the level of the projects as well as ggb-NOT in general. The theoretical factors to explain actors' networking practices will be presented.

## Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

### 3.1. Introduction

An important role is given by NBP and BNLO to various actors to realize the (P)EHS by a common effort. The long list of consulted actors illustrates this point: the (P)EHS policy process is a multi-actor and multi-level policy process. Following Glasbergen (1990) a *policy network* was established around the implementation of the (P)EHS. Hufen and Ringeling (1990) define a policy network as a *social system*, in which actors develop comparatively durable patterns of interaction and communication, aimed at specific policy programs or policy problems. This definition implies that the identification of a concrete network must be preceded by demarcation of a specific policy problem or policy programme, which is the PEHS-policy programme in this context. The structural properties of this social system are both medium and outcome of the network practices PEHS-actors organize, which points to structuration theory and the concept of the duality of structure, where social systems are produced and reproduced in interaction (Sydow&Windeler, 1998). Although the relationship between the structure of the policy network and network policy processes, being social interaction processes, is a dialectical one, as visualized in figure 1, the structural properties will not be analyzed into further detail in this thesis. The analysis then focuses primarily on the left side of the figure.




Figure 1: the dialectical relationship between the structure of the policy network and network policy processes.

Policy processes on the left side of figure 1 are social interaction processes between individual actors, either being people or parts of organizations. Many factors might have an influence on their activities and interactions, but *only* because and in as far as they change relevant *core characteristics* of the involved actors. These characteristics (Bressers, 2004) are: their motives (driving their actions), their cognitions (information held to be true) and their power balance. In the theoretical model of the thesis actor capacity or power to act is introduced as a fourth

variable (Maarse, 1984) to explain actor behaviour. For an individual actor this way of reasoning is visualized in the upper box of figure 2 below:




Figure 2: Conceptual model of the thesis and the focus of the network effectiveness assessment.

Double arrows are used because the four actor characteristics can influence each other. An example might be the amount of available resources (capacity) influencing motivation for a specific (interaction) activity: an actor having limited resources might be less inclined to perform a specific activity in interaction with another actor, than if he possessed a larger set of resources. Network interaction processes in time period 1 in turn might directly influence actor characteristics, which then might be changed in time period 2; so this model has a temporal dimension. For the smooth course of the interaction process it might help when motivations and cognitions are sufficiently coherent: overlapping or compatible. Combined resources of individual actors for an interaction must be sufficient. When motivations are incoherent it helps when the resource dependency and subjectively attributed powers are on the side of the

proponents of the intended action. As explained in section 3.4 below, resource-rich (ggb-NOT-large network) proponents of an action might be found outside the specific project network. The assessment of network effectiveness focuses on the (project) network interactions. Let us now elaborate actor characteristics into more depth:

1. Actor *motivation* (1) might relate to own goals as well as to external pressure, influencing actors' motivation for a specific action.
2. *Capacity or power to act* (2) mainly relates to available and accessible resources.
3. *Cognition* (3) connects to the observations actors make regarding (project) reality. Their frames of reference structure their interpretations of reality.
4. *The power over other actors/power balance element* (4) relates to the power that is attributed to an individual actor by others, creating a power balance between them. This might lead to a situation where an actor performs an activity in interaction, that he would otherwise not undertake, if the power balance was different.

In order to make a sound comparison between the projects of the case studies, these core actor characteristics are converted into variables with a descriptive value. Following values were chosen: high(+), moderate or neutral (0) and low (-). Figure 3 presents a cross-matrix, showing that theoretically twelve value combinations of actor characteristics might be found. These combinations result in different types of theoretically expected interaction processes, which will be elaborated into further detail in section 3.2.

Core characteristics/value	high (+)	moderate (0)	low (-)
motivation			
capacity/ power to			
cognition			
power over/balance			

Figure 3: Cross-matrix with possible value combinations of actor characteristics

Regarding the actor characteristic power over other actors/power balance it must be stated that this characteristic depends on the relationship between two specific actors as well. The power balance might be different in another relationship.

### 3.2 Types of interaction processes

Various kinds of interaction might be the result of various value combinations of actor characteristics. Following Bressers (1996) four types of interaction might occur: cooperation (active, passive and forced), opposition, joint learning and obstruction. *Active cooperation* (1) occurs when both highly motivated parties share a common goal. *Passive cooperation* (2) occurs when one of the actors adopts a relatively passive stance towards the specific action, which hinders nor stimulates the activity. *Forced cooperation* (3) is a form of passive cooperation that is imposed by a dominant (power balance) actor. *Opposition* (4) occurs when one of the actors tries to prevent the intended action. *Joint learning* (5) occurs when only a lack of information (the cognition variable) blocks the intended action. If other variables block the interaction *obstruction* (6) might be expected. The interactions occurring in the subsequent sub-projects of the case-projects will be typified by these six categories. Let us now turn to the scheme in figure 4 below, where CIT-theory provides an overview of the circumstances in the application of a policy instrument and predicts the type of interaction to be expected. Note that in this scheme the fourth variable power to act/capacity is not yet introduced.

Mi	Mt	I+	Pi	Sit	Outcome	Process
+	+/0	+		<u>1</u>	++	Cooperation (type 1 or 2)
+	+/0	-		<u>2</u>	--	Joint learning towards Sit. 1 (type 5)
+	-	+	+	<u>3</u>	++	Forced cooperation (type 3)
+	-	+	0	<u>4</u>	+/-	Opposition (type 4)
+	-	+	-	<u>5</u>	--	Obstruction (type 6)
+	-	-		<u>6</u>	--	None/ Joint learning to Sit.3 (type 5)
0	+	+		<u>7</u>	++	Cooperation (type 1 or 2)
0	+	-		<u>8</u>	--	Joint learning (type 5) to Sit 7
0	0/-			<u>9</u>	--	None
-	+	+	+	<u>10</u>	--	Obstruction (type 6)
-	+	+	0	<u>11</u>	+/-	Opposition (type 4)
-	+	+	-	<u>12</u>	++	Forced cooperation (type 3)

-	+	-	<u>13</u>	--	None/ Joint learning to Sit 12
-	0/-		<u>14</u>	--	None

Mi = Motivation implementer viz. application

Mt = Motivation target group viz. application

I+ = Information with implementer

Pi = Balance of power viewed from the position of implementer

Figure 4: The likelihood of application of a policy instrument under CIT theory

Each situation in this scheme creates a configurational hypothesis, which might be tested in practice to verify theory. Situation 1 for example can be interpreted as follows. If the application of the policy instrument is perceived as positive by the implementer; and the target group is either neutral or positive; and if the information of the implementer is sufficient, the predicted outcome is cooperation (type 1 or type 2). The variable power balance has no influence in this situation. In situation 3 the implementer has a positive motivation, but the target group is basically negative; the information with the implementer is sufficient; the implementer is dominant in the power balance with the target group, outweighing the negative Mt-score. Now forced cooperation (type 3) is expected.

This CIT-theory way of reasoning must be modified to make it useful for this thesis. The difference between an implementer and a target group is modified into actor 1 and actor 2, who might have a hierarchical relationship, although this is not necessary. These two actors have a combined score for the variable information; the score is for their average level of information regarding the interaction. The power balance is viewed from the perspective of actor 1. If the individual or combined resources of actor 1 and 2 are not sufficient for the intended interaction, the interaction is blocked as a result of a negative score for the variable power to act/capacity. The CIT-concept of the application of a policy instrument is widened into interaction between basically two actors. This way of reasoning results in a modified CIT-scheme, which is presented below.

M1	M2	I(1&2)	P1	P/C(1+2)	Sit	Outcome	Interaction type
+	+/0	+		+	<u>1</u>	++	Cooperation (type 1 or 2)
+	+/0	+		-	<u>2</u>	--	Obstruction (type 6)
+	+/0	-		+	<u>3</u>	--	Joint learning (5) to Sit. 1
+	+/0	-		-	<u>4</u>	--	None
+	-	+	+	+	<u>5</u>	++	Forced cooperation (type 3)
+	-	-	+	+	<u>6</u>	--	Joint learning (5) to Sit. 5
+	-	-	+	-	<u>7</u>	--	Obstruction (type 6)
0	+	+		+	<u>8</u>	++	Cooperation (type 1 or 2)
0	+	-		+	<u>9</u>	--	Joint learning (5) towards 8
0	-	-/0		-	<u>10</u>	--	Obstruction (type 6)
0	0			+/-	<u>11</u>	--	None
-	+	+	+	+	<u>12</u>	--	Obstruction (type 6)
-	+	+	+	-	<u>13</u>	--	None
-	+	+	0	+	<u>14</u>	+/-	Opposition (type 4)
-	+	+	0	-	<u>15</u>	--	Obstruction (type 6)
-	+	+	-	+	<u>16</u>	++	Forced cooperation (type 3)
-	+	+/0	-	-	<u>17</u>	--	Obstruction (type 6)

M1 = Motivation actor 1

M2 = Motivation actor 2

I(1&2) = Average level of information of the two actors

P1 = Power balance from the perspective of actor 1

P/C(1+2) = Combined resources of the two actors

Figure 5: type of interaction under a modified version of CIT-theory.

Adding the variable power to act/capacity into the scheme of figure 4 leads to other configurational hypotheses. Situation 2 for example can now be interpreted as follows: If the interaction is interpreted as positive by both actors, with actor 2 possibly holding a neutral motivation; and if the information score is positive, a lack of combined resources will obstruct the interaction and the outcome is negative. In situation 12 of figure 4 the negative score for the Pi-variable compensates for the negative motivation of the implementer, leading to forced cooperation and a positive outcome. In the modified version of figure 5 available and accessible combined resources might block this forced cooperation (situation 17) and change the interaction into obstruction. The fourth variable is hence expected to have a considerable explanatory power for the predicted interaction type in the theoretical framework of this thesis.

In CIT-theory interactions between basically two actors are analyzed, with variable scores for two actors, linking up with a theoretical two-actor model. More than two interacting actors might be found in the (sub-processes of) the two case networks. Values for actor characteristics are then given for every actor individually in a cross-matrix and the type of interaction between the actors will be a result of the aggregation of their individual scores. When two individual actors are predicted to cooperate actively in interaction they are interpreted as one theoretical actor group.

### 3.3. Indicators for governmental progress or network effectiveness:

Let us now turn to indicators to monitor the effectiveness of the network interactions. The assessment of effectiveness focuses on network outcomes (Marsh&Smith, 2000). Network outcomes are the interactions or policy processes of figure 2 above. Following Provan and Milward (2001) network effectiveness can be assessed at three different levels: the community, network and participant level. The community level of the Province is considered as the most important level for the thesis. Not one optimal network design exists and many network designs seem to be effective (Sydow&Windeler, 1998), with network effectiveness being a social construction of the relevant stakeholders. Possible network failure is hence a matter of perception (Hay&Richards, 2000).

Provan and Milward(2001) relate community to the local area, served by the network. In the context of this thesis the local area is the province of Overijssel. Not all community level stakeholders (e.g. provincial representatives of PS) might agree on the criteria for evaluating PEHS-network goals. Nevertheless, the provincial policy goal for PEHS-realization has been a democratic decision and is as such not being disputed here. If the case-network (outcomes) contributes to the PEHS-policy goal, as formulated at the level of the Province, the network

must be considered as effective on this community level. Individual network contribution to the provincial goal might nevertheless vary, determining the degree of network effectiveness from the community-level perspective. Following a provincial PEHS-policy evaluation report (Commissie Beleidsevaluatie, Lysias B.V., 2005) the provincial focus is mainly on *hectares of new PEHS(1)-land* as a policy goal, which is not surprising, because ILG-convenants between the Province and LNV focus on quantitative targets as well. Hectares of realized new PEHS-land is a first effectiveness criterium at the community level. Sectoral provincial nature plans (BNLO, Natuurgebiedsplan) claim *PEHS-quality* to be important as well. This qualitative element is hence considered as a second effectiveness criterium(2) at the community level.

At the network level Provan and Milward(2001) mention various criteria, which might be used to measure network effectiveness. Criteria they use to make the effectiveness assessment are: in-out ratio of network members(1), expansion of activities or tasks(2), multiplexity of network ties(3), presence of a Network Administrative Organization (NAO)(4), costs of networking(5) and the commitment to community-set network goals(6). Because criteria 1-4 address structural network properties, which are outside the scope of this thesis, only criteria 5 and 6 will be used to measure network effectiveness at the network level. These criteria focus more strongly on individual network actors. Figure 4 presents these criteria in a matrix:

Commitment to goals/costs of networking at the network level	high costs of networking at the network level	low costs of networking at the network level
low commitment to goals		
high commitment to goals		

Figure 4: Matrix with criteria to assess network effectiveness at the network level

A network then characterized by a high commitment to community-set PEHS-goals, with relatively low costs of networking at the network level must be considered as an effective one at this level of the effectiveness assessment.

At the participant level Provan and Milward measure network effectiveness by the following criteria: enhancement of network participants' legitimacy(1), resource acquisition(2), access to state funds through NAO-affiliation(3) and enhanced clients' outcomes through integrated services(4). Regarding these criteria network outcomes might either score high or low as shown in figure 5. Access to state funds is integrated in the second criterium of resource acquisition.

Effectiveness criteria at the participant level/value	low	high
legitimacy enhancement		
resource acquisition		
better outcomes for clients		

Figure 5: Matrix with effectiveness criteria-value combinations to assess network effectiveness at the participant level.

Many scores in the right part of the matrix makes the network into an effective one at the participants' level. The effectiveness assessment by the participant might be done regarding the whole project or project sub-processes. Legitimacy enhancement might relate to the actor characteristic of motivation as well: external pressure on an actor might change as a result of enhanced legitimacy. Resource acquisition and access to state funds will mainly relate to the actor characteristic capacity or power to. For a private nature conservancy organization clients might be their members or the intrinsic value of the plants and animals they want to protect.

### 3.4. Relationship of the large ggb-NOT-network and the project network:

Network analysis focuses on the two case-networks. The large ggb-NOT-network is seen as the structural context of the project network of 'Hoeve Springendal'. The large network influences the project network in one way in the theoretical model and possibly manipulates the scores for the actor variables. The large network might e.g. provide resources to the project network, influencing the actor characteristic capacity or power to act; resource-dependency might apply here. Resources then are a variable within the structural context, influencing a project network variable, which is one of the model actor characteristics. Figure 2 above demonstrates the relationship between the large network and the project network.

### 3.5 Operationalization and research methodology:

For the research two projects were selected, where PEHS-realization has been one of the project goals. One project is located in Northeast-Twente, within the area addressed by ggb-NOT policy. The other one is located outside this area. Both projects were completed before 2004, the year of extension of area-oriented policy to the complete provincial area. The 'Hoeve

Springendal' project concerns one farm, the Dalfsen case three farms. Although this creates a size difference between the case projects, adding 10 hectares of new nature in Northeast-Twente makes the case relatively large here (Bremer, 2001).

Main research methodology has been the analysis of documents. For the analysis of the large ggb-NOT network, information was obtained from WCL-evaluation reports (Kranendonk 1996, Kranendonk et al. 2000). In addition area newspapers and year reports of ggb-NOT Programmaburo were studied. For the cases document analysis has been important as well, but secondary analysis of interviews provided extra information. Both cases were visited by the author in order to get a direct visual impression of the completed projects.

The theoretical framework was then used to structure and analyze this information. Let us now turn to chapter 4 where research question 1 will be answered.

## Chapter 4: Area-oriented policy for nature: from ROM-areas to the Investment Budget Rural Areas (ILG): background of ggb-NOT.

In this chapter research question one will be answered, which functions as a policy background for understanding the ggb-NOT policy effort. The steering philosophy of the area-oriented way of policy-making for the rural area will be addressed and be typified by using the twin concepts of *government* and *governance*. Government relates to the classical image of the state as the top-down steering actor, with an emphasis on central government as 'the undisputed locus of power and control' (Pierre and Peters, 2000). In the governance perspective central government is one of the steering actors among other public and private actors, who cooperate in policy making and implementation. In governance policy set-ups, strategies as participation, negotiation and consultation are more important than top-down control of central government only.

In the introduction chapter some first generation area-oriented policy categories, e.g. ROM-areas, WCL-and SGR-areas were discussed as rural area policy categories. When the province of Overijssel initiated the ggb-NOT policy in 1993, it already implemented an area-oriented sectoral environmental policy, GMB or 'gebiedsgericht milieubeleid' for Northeast-Twente, from 1991 onwards. This corresponds with the national pattern of provinces initiating their own ROM-like policy initiatives in rural areas, as an indirect result of the National Environmental Plan (VROM, 1989). While analyzing the ggb-NOT initiative as the structural context of case 1, it is important for the network analysis to mention that the environmental area-oriented policy effort has the longest history.

Since these rural area policy initiatives of the early nineties, the total number and types of area-oriented policy processes have steadily increased (Selnes, 2003). At the end of the decade the relevant governmental players perceive the vast number of rural area initiatives as increasingly problematic. This leads to the project 'Ontstapelen en Ontschotten' by the Ministries of VROM and LNV (VROM&LNV, 1997). Following Boonstra (2004) the 'Subsidieregeling Gebiedsgericht Beleid' (SGB2000, second generation) and the 'Reconstructie concentratiegebieden' (from 1999 onwards), both integrating various rural area subsidies, are the main result of the attempt to reduce the number of area categories and to integrate various segregated subsidy flows.

The policy document 'Natuur voor mensen, Mensen voor natuur' (NVM, MVN. LNV, 2000) continues this development: the role of the provinces for the implementation of nature policy increases further, with policies ever more being implemented in integral projects. Decisions on main lines on the task division between central government and the provinces are laid down in the 'Sturingsmodel Landelijk Gebied' (LNV, 2000). Main model element is a yearly made

covenant between central government and the combined (IPO) provinces for a period of four years; areas are roughly indicated in these covenants. For these areas, provinces make a yearly implementation programme together with relevant municipalities, waterboards and other civil society organizations. On the basis of the programme the area partners establish area contracts with their provincial government. DLG (Dienst Landelijk Gebied), a LNV executive agency, supports the provinces with the evaluation of separate area project proposals. Central governments' involvement in specific projects decreases. The (network) relationship between central government and the provinces is mainly dominated by a relationship of financial accountability, with a strong central government involvement in the setting of operational rural area targets. As a consequence of 'Sturingsmodel Landelijk Gebied' and the Reconstruction Law, provinces together with regional area partners commit themselves to pre-specified, quantified results or *output* for which they are accountable towards central government.

In some area-oriented projects there seems to be a tension between an open policy-making approach, where area actors learn to create their own problem definitions and solution tracks (regional maatwerk) for the area and the Sturingsmodel policy set-up with its focus on output measurement. Following Boonstra (2004, p.60) GGB was not only adopted for reasons of policy integration, but can also be explained from the perspective of a power struggle over the rural area between the various governmental actors. Boonstra cites Van Tatenhove (1993, 1996) who depicts GGB as a resource in the power struggle between the Ministries of VROM and LNV over decision-making power in the rural area. Following Driessen (2000), Boonstra (2004, p.60) states that provinces also consider GGB, their own or that of central government, as an excellent opportunity to position themselves in this governmental power play. The role of the supra-national level, the European Union, as a promoter of area-oriented-policy is also increasing. Following Ray (1997) the European Commission uses the area-oriented integral policy set-up to enforce its position in the rural area. Examples are: the POP-programme, NATURA2000 and LEADER.

Following Frouws and Leroy (2003), who evaluate the results of GGB-projects, an adequate operationalization of policy goals is often lacking in GGB and an effective evaluation of GGB-projects is difficult to perform as a consequence. In general projects aimed at the improvement of economic production contexts were found to perform better than GGB-projects focusing on the improvement of the quality of environment and nature. Their research seems important for this thesis, because the GBB-project 'Hoeve Springendal' combines both elements.

Van Ark & Van den Brink (2002), discussing GGB, mention the tension between deliberative, negotiated democracy and constitutional democracy. GGB in their opinion does not guarantee that consensus decisions of a Plan van Aanpak will politically always be feasible. Government should make it possible to exchange policy achievements in one policy sector in an area with

degrees of decision-making freedom in another sector. This would demand a more flexible use of generic rules. Unsatisfactory GGB-results are not caused by GGB itself, but by factors in the institutional environment of GGB-policy (Frouws&Leroy, 2003). This might point to the effectiveness of the policy network, the central issue of the thesis.

GGB (2000) can be seen as an evolutionary stage towards the current ILG: the Investment Budget Rural Area, in which the steering philosophy of Sturingsmodel Landelijk Gebied (2000) can strongly be recognized. The provinces (IPO) and four Ministries have negotiated ILG budgets for the rural area for the period 2007-2013, with a mid-term review in 2010; 67% of ILG-budgets are allocated for nature targets (with a substantial part for EHS-realization). In the succeeding implementation of ILG large differences can be seen between the various provinces (Kamphorst&Selnes, 2007); some provinces take up a strong steering role, while others choose for further decentralization of budgets and responsibilities to lower levels. In general provinces get more decisional freedom to opt for specific allocation of ILG-budgets and forms of cooperation with various area (governance) partners.

The Province of Overijssel chose to cooperate with municipalities and waterboards only in the further elaboration of ILG-contracts. Compared to other provinces the number of area actors in Overijssel area commissions is hence rather small. Civil society actors are consulted for the construction of 7-year area plans, but are no formal (governance) partner or co-producers in the area contracts. Municipalities and waterboards are hence accountable to the province for ILG-contracts, but civil society actors (e.g. nature conservancy organizations) are not; their participation in policy-making seems limited to a consultative role as well as a role in the executive stages of specific area plan projects. The ILG-scheme has major consequences for the roles provincial government plays in the rural area and demands other competencies with provincial bureaucrats (Sollart&Van den Bosch, 2006). Bureaucrats in Overijssel now become (sectoral) performance-owners, who have the task to acquire area projects (Kamphorst&Selnes, 2007). The importance of executive area bureaucrats increases, as does the tension between front-office and back-office within provincial government. Internal steering focuses more strongly on performance now, which may lead to internal tensions between those who are 'project-minded' and 'vision-makers'. Regarding the provincial roles in the rural area new, more developing roles emerge: (project) partner, process manager and entrepreneur. Because area development demands a provincial role of entrepreneur as well as a traditional, public role, specific requirements are made regarding the internal provincial organizational structure. Finally provinces become more active on the land market themselves, commissioning DLG directly, which is important regarding PEHS-realization.

De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1994, p.83), discussing ILG as a steering philosophy on the dichotomy government-governance, state: 'by making ILG-contracts a hierarchically

superimposed central government does not exist anymore, but an acknowledgement can be seen of a mutual dependency for cooperation of actors that must also be steered. Following the authors ILG can thus be typified as government (cooperation with central government policy goals) as well as governance (making policy together with area-partners). Both theoretical concepts to describe governmental set-ups then seem to apply regarding this most recent (ILG) form of area-oriented policy.

## Chapter 5: Ggb-NOT and 'Hoeve Springendal'-project:

### 5.1. Introduction:

Northeast-Twente is characterized by a small-scale pattern-like landscape, where the various spatial functions are strongly interwoven. Main functions of the area are agriculture, recreation and nature. Nature areas are relatively small and spatially fragmented (Sanders&Lammers, 2005), although the policy goal of the PEHS is to connect these areas in order to create larger entities (Provincie Overijssel, 2008). This community level goal creates severe tensions with agriculture. To improve economic viability, farmers in the area, already using 80% of the land, have to enlarge their farms. In combination with the large PEHS-land claim this leads to a situation of high land pressure, a problem which is aggravated by the growth of villages and infrastructure in the area. To reduce high environmental pressures from intensive agriculture, causing desiccation, acidification and eutrophication, the Province implemented an area-oriented environmental policy, gebiedsgericht milieubeleid (GMB), since 1991 by using VROM-budgets. Against this background the Province integrated PEHS-implementation in a new area-oriented policy in 1993: ggb-NOT. A policy document 'Plan van Aanpak' is signed in 1993 by the new steering committee. First the organizational structure of the 1993 set up will be discussed, as well as changes in the ggb-NOT network structure. Analyzing the ggb-NOT policy network acts as background for the analysis of the project network of 'Hoeve Springendal'.

### 5.2. Ggb-NOT network actors and large network analysis:

- Central in the organizational set-up is the provincial *Programmaburo ggb-NOT*, responsible for the (daily) implementation of the ggb-NOT policy program within the provincial apparatus. At the Programmaburo the ggb-NOT manager is responsible for the programme and is supported by two bureaucrats. The manager holds a double programme position: he is also responsible for GMB-implementation, based on VROM-budgets (BGM-subsidies). The task of Programmaburo is to prepare ggb-NOT deliberations, to produce yearly programme evaluations, to release area newspapers and organize (area) information meetings on a regular basis to inform actors in the area. This task connects to the concept of a Network Administrative Organization (NAO) as described by Provan and Milward (2001). Programmaburo objectives are to manage the programme efficiently and to give a financial account over the programme progress within the set time limits. This is mainly an internal provincial process, relating to the yearly budgetary cycle. Management proved not to be optimal (Pleijte et al., 2000), leading to substitution of all personnel in February

- 1999 (Kranendonk et al., 2000). Then a new programme manager from outside the Province takes over, who is more oriented towards the execution of projects. The year programme 1999 is characterized by a stronger coupling of area policy goals and project goals, which seems to connect to developments described in chapter 4 regarding 'Sturingsmodel Landelijk Gebied', with its focus on *output measurement*. As a consequence the programme becomes more easy to monitor. Bureaucrats are made responsible for project realization, which connects to the notion of bureaucrats as ILG-'performance owners' as described in chapter 4. Not many network links exist to provide the Programmaburo with information about developments in the area as a consequence of ggb-NOT policy. Stimuland is an exception in this respect, which will be returned to below. Resources in the form of project subsidies mainly come from LNV, on average 40% over the period 1993-1998. When ggb-NOT projects are combined with GMB-projects, BGM-(Ministry of VROM) subsidies are also used, although available BGM-subsidies are on a far lower level than those provided by LNV (WCL)-budgets. Resource-dependency then seems to play an important role in the dyad Programmaburo-LNV. The total amount of available GMB/WCL budgets is nevertheless restricted to 2-3 million guilders. Until 1995 projects are easily approved by LNV, but after 1995 LNV-control on project approval becomes tighter, which at first sight contrasts with Decentralisation Impulse 1995. Area municipalities contribute to a lesser extent, but own provincial resources make up for an average 13% of total amount of programme resources. Personnel capacity of Programmaburo seems relatively low, when the size of the ggb-NOT area and the vast amount of Plan van Aanpak measures is considered. Programmaburo is supported by sectoral provincial bureaucrats if necessary, so interconnectedness within the provincial apparatus seems relatively high. Programmaburo is not well interconnected to area actors. In 1998 an Information centre was established for ggb-NOT in Weerselo: 't Hoickinck. Deliberations of Steering group, Kernteam and individual projectgroups were now organized here, although representatives of the Province were not in the Information centre on a regular basis. As a consequence, network geographical fragmentation was not reduced in practice. In the context of the construction of the Area Perspective Northeast-Twente (ggb-NOT project N) there were deliberations (huiskamerbijeekomsten), where this interconnectedness element temporarily increased; for a certain time period more reciprocal ties were established, but these network links were not continued after the Area Perspective had been completed.
- In the *Steering group* the Province, area municipalities represented by aldermen, the Regional Inspection for the Environment (RIMO), waterboard Regge and Dinkel (WRD) and LNV are represented. In the beginning of ggb-NOT area municipalities are

represented by Tubbergen and Losser only, who give informal feedback on meetings' results to the other municipalities; later the other municipalities also participate (e.g. Oldenzaal in 1995). In general municipalities are only limited involved in ggb-NOT policy. In network terms, density is rather low in this (municipal) network segment in the beginning, but increased later. A municipal reorganization reduces the number of participating municipal actors to four. The agricultural organization GLTO, having been a peripheral (randpartner) network actor until 1995, due to tensions regarding ammoniac as well as the environmental organization NMO (Natuur en Milieu Overijssel) get involved later. In 1997 the water company WMO (renamed Vitens) also participates in the Steering group. The task of these group of actors is to take decisions over project proposals, which were prepared in the Kernteam before. In this sense it has the power over the approval of individual projects, that are then sent to LNV-East for further subsidy approval. Actor objectives mainly focus on the reduction of negative environmental impacts from agriculture, which will be returned to in the discussion of cluster projects below. Objectives between Steering group and GLTO were conflicting in 1994 due to the provincial Ammoniac Reduction Plans. Conflicts mainly focused on the applicable emission numbers, leading to a LNV-led research to map the future economic position of agriculture in Northeast-Twente. Due to a *motivation* change with area farmers, after an area deliberation led by a governor with an agricultural background, stressing the importance of farmers' cooperation to ggb-NOT for their own economic viability, objectives became more congruent. Consequently GLTO became ggb-NOT partner and participated (cooperation) in the Steering group, which as a group also acknowledges its dependence on GLTO and area farmers for future ggb-NOT success. When area farmers organize meetings, representatives from nature organizations and recreation firms are now invited to attend as listeners (NRLO,1999a). Project information mainly comes from Kernteam, with cooperation of Programmaburo, which prepares Steering group deliberations. Intensity of interaction is relatively low with three annual meetings, although individual actors are well interconnected to their respective organizations, whom they represent in Steering group deliberations. Although governmental actors and interest organizations participate strongly in the decision-making body, area actors are not represented, making overall organization hence strongly *bureaucratic*. This links up with the theoretical concept of *government* as discussed in chapter 4.

- *Kernteam* organizes three deliberations yearly to make decisions over individual projects. The Province, the relevant municipalities, at first only represented by Losser and Tubbergen, the waterboard WRD, GLTO, WMO and NMO as area representatives, have the task to consider individual project proposals; sometimes

- two meetings are needed to make a decision over a project proposal and before the project plan can be transferred to Programmaburo, where it will be prepared for Steering group meetings. Speed of the project decision-making process is hence rather low, which may have undermined area partners' or project brokers' (e.g. Stimuland) motivation to initiate new projects. Sometimes subsidies are requested for project ideas which succeedingly prove difficult to execute, leaving allocated subsidies unused. Project initiators have the power over Kernteam agenda-setting, by (not) bringing in new project proposals in a bottom-up process. Area actors (e.g. Regio Twente) or network brokers as Stimuland generally inform Kernteam on promising projects. Individual area actors as farmers or local nature conservancy groups did not bring project ideas to Kernteam-doors in general (Pleijte et al., 2000). This might be a result of whole network fragmentation.
- LNV task is to fund (40%) the ggb-NOT network and can be characterized as the network principal (Provan&Milward, 2001), funding (creating resource-dependency) and monitoring the network, until Decentralization Impulse 1995 enforced the steering (principal) network position of the provinces itself. Overijssel provincial funding is relatively high (13%) in comparison with other provinces. In the network dyad LNV-Province, bureaucrats on both sides have to adapt themselves to these changing roles (Pleijte et al., 2000). To a lesser extent VROM holds the same network position, by providing and monitoring (RIMO; Steering group) BGM-subsidies, which are sometimes also used for ggb-NOT purposes. By providing subsidies they hold power over the Province/ Programmaburo, who must give an annual financial account on LNV-subsidy allocation. A difference can be seen between the role of LNV at the national level and the regional LNV-departments, who actually participate in area processes; compared to other regional departments LNV-East participates stronger. Although financial control on individual ggb-NOT projects increases after 1995, pointing to hierarchy, overall (regional) LNV network participation, pointing to governance, diminishes; this process leads to a network relationship of LNV-steering on a distance. The internal LNV-support group for ggb-NOT disappeared and LNV-involvement with individual projects diminished after 1995: no LNV-personnel participated any longer in individual projects, which might have reduced their information. In network terms their position becomes more peripheral because the number of reciprocal ties between LNV-East and network (project) actors diminishes. Despite the changed steering strategy, LNV-objectives remain the development of area-oriented initiatives, that surpass sectoral boundaries.
  - Stimuland is a common initiative of the Province and GLTO, which task is to give advice to individual farmers and recreation firms. Stimuland receives provincial subsidies for this task, so resource-dependency might apply. Stimuland holds

information on available ggb-NOT subsidy schemes due to its networks contacts with Programmaburo; objectives are to take this information (cognition variable) to individual farmers for environmental projects on their farms and, as a consequence of network evolution, also to the doors of recreational firms in the area. Stimuland and Recron/Overijssel Agency for Tourism establish new, reciprocal ggb-NOT network ties. This network evolution element will prove to be important for the 'Hoeve Springendal' analysis, which follows below in section 5.5. Stimuland area coordinators hold many, mainly informal links with individual area farmers, increasing network density as well as the power to act in this dyad; its contacts with area farmers are an important resource. Although farmers' motivation for an environmental audit in general is not very high, Stimuland initiates many successful ggb-NOT environmental projects with farms. Stimuland seems able to influence individual farmers' (changing) motivation, which is an actor core characteristic in the theoretical model. As a result of Stimuland networking some recreational firms also adopt environmental measures by using ggb-NOT subsidies.

The 1993 project organization is divided into fifteen project groups, with an additional projectgroup N for implementation of WCL-policy and the elaboration of the Area Perspective Northeast-Twente. In 1998 the various project groups are clustered to reduce institutional fragmentation. Project group K, focusing on the management of small landscape elements, remains active. The clusters act as a bridge to the area actors; their (institutional) task is an intermediary one (Kranendonk et al., 2000).

- The cluster *recreation and tourism* (1) has the following (very diverse) network players: the Province as a cluster coordinator, Recron/ Overijssels Bureau voor Toerisme, Regio Twente, local tourist agencies (VVV), area municipalities, OPG (private land owners) and Stimuland. Its task is to elaborate targets from the Area Perspective into specific projects. Especially Regio Twente initiates various recreational projects, e.g. cycle- and hiking routes in the rural area. Five annual meetings are held on various recreational enterprises in the area, where the goals of the cluster are still being discussed. The network structure seems to connect to the concept of an *issue network*, typified by an open access for actors from different worlds, holding different values and competing for (mainly subsidy) resources. The network position of Stimuland, cooperating with the Overijssel agency for Tourism/ Recron, proves to surpass agricultural cluster (2) boundaries, which is important for the 'Hoeve Springendal'-project. *Motivation* with Recron in the beginning of ggb-NOT is basically negative (low score), since objectives aiming at agricultural diversification conflict with sectoral interests, whom Recron represents. In a later

stage Recrons' motivation changes (leading to a moderate score), because mutual interests are seen, leading to some cooperative, new network links with farmers, who want to diversify their firms with recreation and tourism. This Recron motivation shift will be discussed into further detail in the 'Hoeve Springendal' case of section 5.5.

- The *agricultural cluster* (2) has the task to implement environmental measures with individual farms. The area coordinator of Stimuland, GLTO Northeast-Twente and (agricultural) area representatives from the sector, together with the Province, are the network actors in this cluster. Because all actors, except maybe the Province, hold an agricultural background, the network concept of a *policy community* might apply, where actors have shared visions, exchange available resources and trust each other in consensus. Cluster actors are far less diversified as those of cluster 1. As a consequence of a shared (agricultural) vision many projects are initiated and executed, with Stimuland as a network broker between Steering group/ Kernteam and individual farmers in the area. As mentioned above, the area coordinator has many personal and informal relationships with area farmers, which can be typified as a network context of strong reciprocal ties. He is an informed network broker, who takes environmental initiatives to the farmers' kitchen table. Farmers consequently become more *motivated* to take environmental measures, because they get suitable subsidy *information* (cognition) by these Stimuland activities. Here the actor variables motivation and cognition of the theoretical model are manipulated or influenced. Applying environmental measures with a subsidy might then become a rational choice, because eventually farmers will have to conform to tighter, cost raising environmental rules in the future. The cluster can be typified as a succesfull one (Kranendonk et al., 2000). GLTO basic attitude or *motivation* in the beginning of ggb-NOT was a defensive one: GLTO mainly used a defensive strategy, defending sectoral agricultural interests. As a consequence ggb-NOT policy only reached the agricultural forerunners. One result of the area-oriented policy approach is the diversification of GLTO-strategies, leading to internal organizational change with new project agencies (e.g. study club on diversification). Diversification with recreation, tourism or nature is now seen by GLTO as a serious economic option for area farmers, with possible future EHS-results. PEHS future gains are hence mainly relating to raised levels of support, which is more difficult to measure directly in nature network terms (e.g. hectares of realized PEHS-lands). In Ootmarssum one new nature organization for agricultural nature management develops as a new cooperative network segment (network evolution), where all network members possibly hold reciprocal ties. This new cooperative initiative cannot be characterised as mature. Together with area municipalities, DLG and

Landschap Overijssel, Programma beheer-SAN contracts are prepared. SAN-contracts are generally addressing light management measures; more difficult measures are not adopted, which might be a consequence of late consensus on PEHS-limits. Regarding PEHS-realization, this network development can be characterised as a new governance setting on a small scale. From the perspective of the whole area nevertheless few (Overijssel Buiten, nr.8) reciprocal network ties exist or develop between farmers and private nature conservancy organizations. This contrasts with the 'Hoeve Springendal'-project. General motivation with area farmers to diversify their agricultural practices did not change substantially as a result of ggb-NOT policy efforts.

- Project cluster *nature, landscape and water* (3), has a low frequency of interaction and mainly functions as a platform for policy adjustment between the Province and the Waterboard WRD. As a result of internal reorganizations with the waterboard as well as the Province, the cluster executes few projects. Area municipalities co-finance some projects in this cluster. Compared to the network broker role of Stimuland, the environmental organisation NMO has no area coordinator to initiate ggb-NOT (cluster 3) project ideas with local nature and environmental groups. This may be a consequence of limited institutional resources, reducing the power to act in the construction of effective nature-oriented project proposals, which is negative for successful PEHS-realization. This links up with the research results described in the GGB-study performed by Frouws and Leroy (2003), mentioned in chapter 4. In ggb-NOT network terms the dyad NMO-local environmental groups is weak, making the network segment fragmented. To reduce network fragmentation NMO organises an area meeting day to discuss farm diversification with recreational and nature elements. Environmental and nature organizations, as well as estate owners are informed twice yearly in cluster meetings. They do not co-produce cluster 3 project proposals. Land estate owners become more interconnected, establishing more reciprocal network ties, as a direct consequence of ggb-NOT policy, although within this cluster few land estate-projects are executed, mainly as a consequence of a lack of available budgets.

Cluster projects are mutually adjusted within cluster coordinative deliberations, where individual cluster leaders meet. In oktober 1998 the Information center ggb-NOT ('t Hoickinck) is established in Weerselo to reduce institutional distances. Many of the ggb-NOT network activities are taking place in the Zwolle Provinciehuis, creating geographical network fragmentation with the Northeast-Twente area, the broker activities of Stimuland being an exception in this respect. The Province, municipalities, WRD and LNV co-finance the Information centre together for a period of two years. Deliberations regarding ggb-NOT

are planned here and area municipalities get more involved in ggb-NOT policy as a consequence of these deliberations. Intensity of information centre-deliberations remains nevertheless rather low, so its effectiveness for the reduction of geographical network fragmentation might be low as well. Since the end of 1998 the area broker works from the centre and tries to establish network links between potential project actors. He combines ideas for projects and assists in integral project development. In this process he makes use of his former (rural) network contacts, established in his DLG-working period with Land Arrangement.

### 5.3 Project N: Construction of the Area Perspective for Northeast-Twente:

Implementation of EHS-policy is taken up in the creation of the Area Perspective, a policy effort originating from WCL-policy. The project N policy goal is to create a common, broadly supported, Area Perspective on the future development of agriculture, nature and landscape and recreation/ tourism. Creation of support for the realization of the PEHS is one of the objectives, initially focusing on the PEHS-delimitation process as a first realization stage. As a consequence of high tensions between the individual sectors, the Steering group establishes three separate sectoral working groups, with involvement of the same cluster actors as mentioned above. The working groups establish sub-visions based on consensus within their own sector. Regarding PEHS-delimitation the sub-vision is hence formulated in a sectoral way. The network as a whole seems to be rather fragmented in the policy process of Area Perspective development, with many reciprocal links between individual sector members, but few inter-working group relationships. Integration of the three sectoral sub-visions into one Area Perspective is undertaken by means of approximately 60 'living room meetings' (huiskamerbijeenkomsten) in the area, where ideas are registered for the Area Perspective implementation programme . Because consensus between the individual sectors proves to be impossible, the terminology of the new Area Perspective remains rather abstract. Painful decisions are avoided and few operational targets are formulated. Goals for the sub-areas have been translated into specific projects; implementation of these projects proved to be more difficult. Few meetings are organized by ggb-NOT on the executive (project) level, reducing idea generation with area actors. Municipalities might play a stimulating role here (Kranendonk et al., 2000).

Within the context of the Area Perspective implementation-programme many WCL/BGM projects are Steering group approved, but remain unapproved by LNV and VROM in a later stage. This is mainly a result of a lack of given project information or information about proposed project co-financing constructs. In network terms this might be the result of network fragmentation, blocking adequate channeling of information from the area project

initiators to Programmaburo and LNV/VROM. Another bottleneck is the modification of the municipal spatial plan (bestemmingsplan-buitengebied), needed for successful project realization, which remains a hierarchical bureaucratic process, where mindsetting with municipal bureaucrats focuses on control. This links up with the concept of government of chapter 4. Projects in general do not focus on solutions, which surpass sectoral boundaries and combine functions. An exception in this respect is the 'Hoeve Springendal' project.

#### 5.4 The large ggb-NOT network and the theoretical model

In the analysis above the organizational structure of ggb-NOT has been found strongly bureaucratic with a low policy participation of area municipalities. This points to the theoretical concept of government as described in chapter 4. A limited number of network links between the Zwolle and the Northeast-Twente area segment of the network were established. Few PEHS-oriented project proposals were initiated by area actors (e.g. farmers or private nature conservancy organizations), linking up with the findings of Leroy and Frouws (2003) as mentioned in chapter 4. The construction of the Area Perspective mainly aimed at the creation of a higher level of acceptance for provincially set PEHS-limits. In this respect ggb-NOT was effective, although delimitation is only a first PEHS-policy implementation layer. Stimuland and in a later stage Recron developed into network brokers, reaching a group of agricultural forerunners in the area, of which the Hoeve Springendal farmer was one. Stimuland already was an environmental (GMB) project broker before 1993. Information regarding available ggb-NOT subsidies reached these forerunners in this way and changed the values for the variable cognition and succeeding motivation (core characteristics influence each other, section 3.1) in a PEHS-positive direction. The reorganization of ggb-NOT in 1999 and the establishment of the Weerselo Information Centre contributed to this development. The large group of area farmers and other land owners has nevertheless not been reached at all. Their actor characteristics were hence not influenced by ggb-NOT policy. There is no influence of the large network. The total amount of available ggb-NOT subsidies was restricted and not able to change the value of the variable capacity/power to of potential project initiators substantially. High land prices in the area block this value change as well. As a consequence even agricultural forerunners will be opponents of a conversion of high-productive agricultural land into low-productive PEHS-new nature, if ggb-NOT subsidies would be the only available budgets to do so. As private land owners they cannot be forced to cooperate and hold strong power over actual land use. Participation to EHS-policy is regarded as a voluntarily (free actor) choice by provincial government in Overijssel. Only to a limited extent was the large ggb-NOT network able to change area actor characteristics in a PEHS-positive direction. Effectiveness in terms

of new hectares PEHS as a result of ggb-NOT policy has to be considered as low. Successful cluster 1 environmental measures implemented by a larger group of area farmers, with Stimuland as network broker, may nevertheless contribute indirectly to future PEHS-quality.

## 5.5. Hoeve Springendal.

### 5.5.1 Introduction:

Springendal, located north of Ootmarssum, is designated as a PEHS-core area in the current provincial Natuurgebiedsplan 2008. Springendal is a Natura-2000 area as well as a Reconstruction extensification area, where individual farmers have very limited expansion possibilities. The sectoral (nature and landscape) Area Perspective sub-vision, described in section 5.3, has been used for Natuurgebiedsplan construction. In the area many small brooks are to be restored and water retention has to be realized. In 1996 State Forest Management (SBB) purchased the area 'De Strengen' (10 hectare). In consensus with neighbouring farmers, SBB raised the groundwater level in 'De Strengen', but created separate water drains for these farmers. Additional management measures are the removal of nutrient-rich top soil layers and the morfological reconstruction of the main brook in the area, Springendalse beek, in order to retain more water within the area. In network terms SBB is an important (terrain-managing) actor in this part of Springendal, also holding a small information office in the area ; in the western parts Stichting Landschap Overijssel (SLO) owns properties (e.g. Dal van de Mosbeek-area), including an area information centre in an old water mill. In network terms a *geographical clustering* of private nature conservancy organizations can be seen, who own a relatively large part of the total rural area. In 1996 the farmer Brunninkhuis initiated the integral project 'Hoeve Springendal' as a private initiative to realize multiple goals regarding nature, recreation and agriculture. Project goals link up with the combined policy goals from the three ggb-NOT clusters described above. The project covers a total area of 26 hectare, with 10 hectares as new nature and 10 hectares of now extensively farmed land, contributing to provincial PEHS-policy targets. On the remaining hectares recreational facilities were enlarged. The project was finished in August 2002.

### 5.5.2 Hoeve Springendal: evolution of the policy network:

The project of Hoeve Springendal is divided into five succeeding project-stages to make analysis more transparent. These project-stages are: project pre-stage before 1996, project

vision-building before project plan commission, project plan construction, subsidy and permits requests and finally the stage of project realization and present situation.

Pre-stage 1 : the period until 1996.

Central network actor (a) is the farmer Brunninkhuis, owner of the project land, whose family farmed the Springendal lands for generations. The recreational part of their farm exists for about 40 years in 1996. Earlier plans to enlarge recreational facilities faced protests from neighbouring farmers and were not executed. These recreational expansion plans from before 1996 show that Brunninkhuis was motivated (refers to own goals, section 3.1) to improve farm viability by diversification of activities. In PEHS-terms his task is to convert intensively used agricultural land into low productive (in an agricultural sense) new nature or adopt nature management measures on his agricultural lands. Main objective of the farmer is to continue his farm on this location and improve its economic viability. He already manages a small camping site in the project area, giving room to 50 users, which makes him a recreational entrepreneur. His prior experience with recreation partly reinforces the value for the cognition variable. On the other hand is his cognition regarding another possible (nature) land use considered to be low in this pre-stage. Other *motivational* factors, which could have changed over time, are his passion for traditional agricultural practices, limited expansion possibilities (milk production quatum small, in the middle of valuable nature) and a positive attitude towards nature values in general. Leneman et al. (2007) found this last factor to determine farmers' motivation to convert their agricultural land into new nature in a major way. Compared to other farmers in the area his own motivation corresponds to that of an agricultural fore-runner, a group of farmers implementing many cluster 1 projects in general. Although land ownership gives the farmer a certain *power to* act in project terms, this land ownership does not provide him with the full capacity to act; his set of resources is not complete at this first project stage of vision-building. The value for the variable *power to/capacity* is low in this stage. He has the full *power over* a conversion of land use, but this change would make the farm economically inviable. His motivation to opt for a conversion into new nature is considered as low. In a potential interaction with another actor 2, who is motivated (+), has the information (leading to a combined 0-score) and a dominant position in the power balance with the farmer (-), obstruction (situation 17) is predicted and found in the project. Theoretical interaction corresponds to a potential project interaction.

Stage 2: Vision-building before project plan commission.

As a recreational entrepreneur the farmer holds reciprocal network links with Stimuland (b), a dyad which makes integral project vision-building possible. Stimuland provides the farmer with information on possible ggb-NOT (WCL)-subsidies. The farmer is learning in interaction

(interaction type 5) and the variable cognition of the farmer is influenced. This network dyad corresponds to the ggb-NOT network structure and the network evolution regarding Stimuland described in section 5.2. He also has informal (learning) contacts with a Recron adviser (c) regarding future firm strategy, which again links up with the cognition variable. Possible project solutions are sought in an integration of the wishes of the entrepreneur, local circumstances and the creation of new market-product combinations (ggb-NOT cluster 2). New information on available ggb-NOT and sectoral nature subsidies reinforces the low stage 1 values for the variables *motivation* and *cognition*. Area meetings regarding the construction of the Area Perspective reinforce his cognition of the farm being located within the future PEHS and the severely restricted agricultural expansion possibilities at the Springendal location as well. The value for the variable *power over* remains unchanged high: the farmer keeps his own full decision-making power over land use on the farm. The current municipal spatial plan does not prohibit agricultural nature management as another land use for instance. Although the farmer has the information about available project subsidies now as a resource, these subsidies are not yet available in stage 2, making the farmer resource-dependent; the value for the variable *power to/capacity* is low. Pre-dicted possible interaction type in this stage with another actor will be *obstruction* (situation 2 of figure 5) to conversion of land use into PEHS-nature, as a result of these values for the farmers' actor characteristics. Active cooperation for project plan development is nevertheless predicted, if he can find a pre-financing construct for such a project plan. In this stage his motivation to invest private funds for project plan construction develops, reinforcing the value for the variable *motivation*. A 'green' bank is willing to pre-finance the project plan development. Situation 1 of figure 5 develops regarding project plan development. The farmer takes the corporate risk and the project enters stage 3.

### Stage 3: Project plan construction.

To elaborate his initial plans the farmer contacts the private consultancy firm Oranjewoud (d), who develops the project plan and acts as a process facilitator. The farmers' action can be characterized as a form of self-governance. In network terms Oranjewoud is an external ggb-NOT network actor, whose motivation in this project might be profit-based. For Oranjewoud another objective might have been project learning (situation 3 of figure 5), regarding the development of a new general methodology for these relatively new integral projects (NRLO, 1999a). The project plan is based on a study focusing on an optimal firm management, combining elements of agricultural extensification, agricultural nature management, development of additional recreational facilities and the restauration of a brook valley on the project land. Project segments reinforce and support each other: e.g. nature-minded camping visitors might assist in managing the new nature terrain on the modified, more traditional farm. Although Oranjewoud makes the project plan, their focus

is mainly on the recreational component. Project information on biological agriculture is given by Nieuwland consultancy (e), another out-network actor, bringing in project resources in the form of specific knowledge. Knowledge concerning nature and the local hydrological situation mainly comes from the Province. In this respect SBB(f) is important as well, with its area manager holding informal reciprocal ties with the farmer as a neighbour as well as specific area information concerning nature development, because of its involvement with comparable activities in 'De Strengen' area, as described above. Although SBB and the province meet in cluster 3 ggb-NOT deliberations, the informal farmer-SBB links are established outside the ggb-NOT policy network. Important nature information is provided to the farmer by nature volunteers(g) who point to possible, relatively simple nature measures, which will create a high degree of biodiversity in the project area. The dyad farmer-nature volunteers is an out-network dyad, which is important for initial project vision-building, raising the farmers' level of information in a bottom-up way. Provincial nature information, available in the Zwolle library, is available to project actors (Oranjewoud), but is not used. Information on comparable integral projects in other areas also remains unused, because using it is considered as a time consuming activity, mainly raising project costs. The integral project proposal can be divided into three components:

1. Extensification of former intensive agriculture and reintroduction of traditional agricultural practices.
2. Enlargement of recreational facilities, mainly aiming at nature-loving clients (construction of holiday cottages on the existing mini-camping).
3. Restoration of a brook valley and creation of 10 hectare of new nature.

This division is important for further network analysis, since project subsidy acquisition follows various tracks, bringing in different groups of network actors. On the one hand ggb-NOT subsidies are used for component 1 and 2 realization, bringing in the ggb-NOT network actors of section 5.2. On the other hand sectoral nature subsidies for realization of project component 1 and 3 bring in other actors partly from outside the large ggb-NOT network.

#### Stage 4: Subsidy and permits requests:

The project plan and the subsidy request regarding project component 1 and 3, as developed by Oranjewoud for the farmer, are sent to Dienst Regelingen (DR, h), an executive agency of LNV, for administrative subsidy request approval. Within ten months Dienst Regelingen makes a project subsidy decision, which is then sent to the farmer. Dienst Regelingen holds *power over* (high value) the farmers' Programma Beheer-SN-f/SAN (Subsidieregeling Natuurbeheer, Subsidieregeling Agrarisch Natuurbeheer) subsidy request. Sectoral LNV-*information* is used to make a judgement if project goals correspond to LNV-objectives. The project plan could have been sent by the farmer to DLG (Dienst Landelijk

Gebied) first, in order to pre-test it, but this was not done. In this sense the farmer holds power over the temporal sequence of the administrative procedure. Dienst Regelingen sends the subsidy request and the project plan to DLG(g), where it is controlled on its contents. DLG project plan judgment (*power over*, high value) is based on the project plan itself and an additional area visit by DLG-personnel. DLG determines the value of the farmers' new nature lands, which might contrast with the price the farmer expects to get. Following Leneman et al. (2007) this is a blocking factor for some SN-f projects in general. Network links described above, having a strong 'power over'-element, can be typified as hierarchical relationships and the theoretical concept of government as described in chapter 4 applies. Participants in the SN-f subsidy scheme consider (Leneman et al., 2007) following SN-f subsidy programme elements as bottlenecks: the long time period between the initial subsidy request and its final approval, a lack of knowledge on their side with bureaucratic procedures as well as the low quality of information provided by DR/DLG. These factors did also put stress on the value for the variable motivation of the farmer, which is considered as turning into moderate (0) in this stage. This has nevertheless no consequences for the type of (on-going) interaction: active cooperation by the farmer to the subsidy procedure (situation 8 of figure 5).

After combined DR/DLG subsidy approval, the farmer has to contact the Province (GS) within 12 months for the signing of a contract with the state, the so-called 'qualitative obligation'. The contract is a legal obligation to create and manage the new nature area in correspondence with Natuurgebiedsplan objectives by the farmer and possible future property owners. The contract makes future agricultural use impossible. Task of GS then is to evaluate the project plan against the policy goals as formulated in the Natuurgebiedsplan, stating provincial nature policy objectives, as well as other provincial (e.g. water) plans. Nature targets as formulated in the Natuurgebiedsplan (2004, 2008) are compatible with project goals. Provincial targets focus on restoration of area brook valleys and wet grassland development adjacent to these brooks as well. By making a contract, GS holds the *power over* possible plan modifications, if important differences would be present. Targets as formulated in the ggb-NOT Area Perspective (project N) might be used in the provincial project evaluation. In this stage coupling with project elements 1 and 2 takes place and Programmaburo(i) is consulted. Provincial motivation for project progress might be high, since not many integral ggb-NOT projects are realized. The chance of plan modification, after initial DR/DLG subsidy approval seems relatively limited. DR/DLG bureaucrats consult provincial sectoral bureaucrats for mutual adjustment of decisions regarding nature subsidy requests. Sometimes DR/DLG information reaches the Province rather slow (Provincie Overijssel, 2007). No pre-fixed information exchange procedures exist between DR/DLG and the Province (Commissie Beleidsevaluatie, Lysias, 2005). Provincial involvement with Programma Beheer is intensifying, with the programme possibly becoming another

provincial, decentralised nature task in 2009/2010. As long as Programma Beheer(DR) remains a LNV-agency there is a possible direct steering role of central government (LNV). This possibility links up with the intensified ggb-NOT project control after Decentralisation Impulse-1995, as discussed in section 5.2. The network role of the Province is a traditional, evaluative one (toetser), which again links up with the theoretical notions of government and hierarchy. Hierarchically steered provincial nature policy then mainly facilitates the project subsidy requests of farmer Brunninkhuis, who acts as a self-governing actor.

Together with the nature subsidy request the farmer/Oranjewoud contacts the municipality (9) in order to get the permits needed for project realization; this implies a change in the municipal spatial plan (bestemmingsplan-buitengebied) and a permit 'Aanlegvergunning'. Following Leneman et al. (2007) spatial plan modification is not always possible, which forms an explanatory factor for blocking of some SN-f project processes in general. The Province might get involved for a permit 'Ontgrondingenvergunning' and the waterboard WRD for a permit 'keurvergunning'. These individual actors hold *power over* individual permit requests, and might possibly block or slow down project progress. In the project this was not the case and all relevant public actors (the waterboard WRD, the municipality of Tubbergen, the Province) *cooperated actively* or *passively* (situations 1 and 2 of figure 5) in the project interactions. This was not analyzed into further detail in this thesis.

#### Stage 5: Project realization and present situation:

Realization of the nature element of the project plan was performed by the farmer himself and a contractor with special expertise in the field. Specified bills were then sent to DR who controlled the bills and had the *power over* (high value) final subsidy approval, which was given. Ggb-NOT and SN-f/SAN subsidies provided the (full set of) resources to the farmer to perform the project; situation 1 of figure 5 applies. This resulted in the conversion of high-productive agricultural land into traditionally farmed low productive land as well as 10 hectares of new PEHS nature. The recreational part of the farm was enlarged and now provides extra income to the farmer and his family. Without SN-f subsidy the change of land use would not have been possible. Nature quality of the new PEHS-land is monitored on a regular basis and develops into the desired direction compared with provincial nature quality targets. Spatial segregation of the nature and recreational parts of the reorganized farm is limited. Farmer Brunninkhuis experienced a tragical accident while working with his traditional working horses on the reorganized farm and died some years ago. His family keeps on running the firm which seems to be economically viable for the decades to come. New PEHS-lands are protected against a change of future land use by the legal obligation to the state Brunninkhuis made.

### 5.5.3 Network effectiveness at the community level:

The 'Hoeve Springendal' project added 10 hectares of new nature to the PEHS nature network. In Twente this amount of hectares is considerable. Most new nature areas in the area are smaller in size over the time period 1985-2000 (Bremer, 2001). The new nature area, the restored brook valley of the Brunninkhuisbeek in now extensively farmed agricultural land, connects already existing PEHS core nature terrains in Springendal. New nature hectares are located on the right place in this sense. When sectoral LNV-budgets are considered, the new hectares are realized at relatively low costs: LNV-norm prices (SN-f subsidy) are far lower than the actual (agricultural) land prices in this part of Twente. Because available EHS-funds are limited this is more attractive than land purchases for the EHS on the regular land market. Because land mobility is low in Twente, it has been difficult to acquire new hectares within PEHS-boundaries in general. A self-governing area farmer adding hectares of new nature, which are located on the preferred spot within PEHS-boundaries, is a positive and promising development for PEHS-construction. Another 10 hectares of the farm are now in extensive agricultural use, with a very limited use of pesticides, manure and modern agricultural equipment. This contributes to the provincial nature management target (SAN) and must be seen as effective. The project network outcomes of 'Hoeve Springendal' may be considered as effective in a *quantitative* sense at the community level.

Regarding the other effectiveness criterium, PEHS-*quality*, some remarks have already been made above. The new nature area is still in development: newly arrived species are found every year now. Recreational co-use puts nevertheless stresses on the future development of the newly created nature. The (enlarged) recreational part of the farm is close to the new nature area, which has been made accessible by footpaths as a consequence of its recent status as a Nature Conservancy Law land estate. Present visual appearance of the terrain is that of a parkland or golf course-like landscape, with relatively intensive land management to keep a rough, spontaneous natural development under control. This might be different when the hectares were acquired and managed by a private nature conservancy organization: a more natural development with a more strict zoning of recreational activities might be expected then, enforcing PEHS-quality. Enlargement of recreational facilities finally puts stresses on PEHS-quality of already existing and surrounding Springendal nature terrains, which is a negative factor. Restoration of the brook valley nevertheless is considered as positive for these surrounding PEHS-lands, because it reduces area desiccation. Effectiveness at the community level for PEHS-quality is considered as moderate as a result of these developments together.

#### 5.5.4 Network effectiveness at the network level:

When the farmer initiates the project and is in the vision-building stage 2, two ggb-NOT network actors have a network relationship with the farmer, Stimuland and Recron, who mainly provide information on farm diversification with tourism. Although SBB is consulted twice yearly on cluster 3 projects, SBB does not provide the farmer with nature development information within this governmental ggb-NOT setting. SBB then might be considered as a network member from outside the large ggb-NOT network, together with the information-providing nature-volunteers. By consulting Oranjewoud and Nieuwland another two external actors participate in the new 'Hoeve Springendal'-network. These developments point to a high in-out ratio and a relatively new whole network. The recreation element of the Oranjewoud project plan brings in the other ggb-NOT network actors. No new actors enter this ggb-NOT segment of the project network. The nature development component of the project brings in the sectoral actors DR, DLG and the sectoral provincial bureaucrats. These sectoral actors have their own mature sectoral policy network, in which the individual subsidy request is only one of their activities. From the project network perspective these actors have to be considered as new. On the provincial level sectoral bureaucrats then are interconnected to Programmaburo and ggb-NOT.

The whole project network does not expand its activities over time. All activities relate to the specific project plan as developed by Oranjewoud. No additional project extensions are made, after completion of the 'Hoeve Springendal'-project. Neighbouring farmers are not motivated to adopt the project initiative for their own farms. Geographical spin-off, with possible extension of the nature network, is not generated. Once the project is finished the new network is terminated. This is not a consequence of network failure (Hay&Richards, 2000), because the central network actor, being farmer Brunninkhuis, does not perceive a discrepancy between network goals and network outcomes. In general he is satisfied with the completed project.

##### 1: Costs of networking:

The Province/ Programmaburo makes few additional costs while providing available ggb-NOT subsidies to the farmer. Their role in the project is being a project facilitator. Adding a new project subsidy request is part of regular activity. This is also the case for DR and DLG. The farmer makes costs, which could have been a drawback, by commissioning Oranjewoud for project plan construction. The benefits of a succesful project, increasing both farmers' economic viability and satisfaction in general, are not apparent when he does so. Because the values for the variables motivation and cognition became high in project stage 2, he accepted the possible initial drawbacks as a private risk.

## 2: Commitment to community-set network goals:

The project network goals are not set by the community, e.g. the Province, but by the farmers choice for the Oranjewoud plan, and the combined project goals as formulated in this plan. His goals regarding new nature do nevertheless correspond to community-set goals of PEHS-construction in a major way, but not intentionally. The Province is still delimiting the PEHS in the Northeast-Twente area, when the farmer decides to initiate the project in 1996. Provincial and farmers' motivations strongly overlap.

As a result of low-moderate costs of networking at the network level, combined with a moderate-high commitment to community-set PEHS goals, although not intentionally integrated in the project objectives, the network has to be considered as effective at the network level.

### 5.5.5 Network effectiveness at the participant level:

Considering this participant level of network effectiveness only two network actors will be considered: the Province and farmer Brunninkhuis. An analysis for every network participant is outside the scope of the thesis.

#### 1: Enhancement of participants' legitimacy:

As a farmer, Brunninkhuis does not improve his legitimacy in the Springendal area among other neighbouring farmers. They hold a neutral position towards the project, not changing their own agricultural practices. Area farmers are no entrepreneurs in the wide sense: most ggb-NOT projects link up with current farm management strategies (Kranendonk et al. 2000). In general Northeast-Twente farmers are not motivated to convert their agricultural land into new nature. Following Leneman et al. (2007) underlying factors for this low *motivation* relate to other land uses offering more profitability, the resistance to the conversion of high-productive agricultural land into low productive nature as well as a lack of congruence with existing firm strategies. This contrasts to some extent with the research findings of Leneman et al. (2007), who found more Northeast-Twente research respondents considering future SN-f participation, as compared to Overijssel respondents in general. By developing a diversified, sustainable farm Brunninkhuis nevertheless enforces his legitimacy as an area entrepreneur, who managed to create a profitable and sustainable enterprise in an area where agricultural expansion is not possible. He anticipates on later policy developments regarding 'Reconstructie concentratiegebieden', which turned the Springendal area into an extensification zone with no agricultural expansion possibilities at

all. As a farmer Brunninkhuis is not effective by raising his legitimacy among other farmers, but as an entrepreneur in the Springendal area he is effective and enhances his legitimacy.

For the Province legitimacy for ggb-NOT policy was considerably raised. The project is mentioned in various area papers, year accounts etc. as a succesfull example of an integral area-oriented project. This is especially important since not many integral projects, surpassing sectoral policy boundaries were actually initiated and completed. Considering the initial ggb-NOT objective of an integral area-oriented policy for Northeast-Twente, the project has become a demonstration project for succesfull implementatation of integral area-oriented policy. Self-governance by the farmer nevertheless was an essential element. The project may be considered as effective because legitimacy of provincial ggb-NOT policy was reinforced.

## 2: Resource acquisition:

Loss of productive value of agricultural land converted into low productive PEHS-nature, creates a considerable loss of income for the farmer. Without subsidies the loss of income would have made the farm economically inviable. To compensate this loss the farmer acquires subsidies from the above described two policy programmes. Subsidies are partly reinvested in enlargement of recreational facilities. In order to do so he creates a project network, by means of self-governing agency, providing him with the network relationships to acquire the available subsidies. In these network relationships Stimuland and Recron are essential players. By enlarging recreational facilities he draws resources from nature-loving holiday visitors as well as other visitors interested in the completed project. Because he makes it possible for his guests to cooperate on the new traditional farm, these (labour) activities are an extra resource. 6 permanent camping guests perform regular nature management tasks on the farm. A new farmer-SBB plan exists to develop a foundation to organize future cooperative nature efforts of temporal camping guests. Because the succesfull project is now mentioned more often on various websites and recreational information leaflets, this side-effect reinforces the firms' market position in the specific market segment. The project network can be considered as effective because Brunninkhuis was able to acquire resources to finance his farm diversification. Making use of the network gave Brunninkhuis access to state funds from the Province as well as the LNV-Ministry. The Province in turn acquires LNV/ central government budgets by cooperation in this completed project. An enlarged PEHS finally might also been seen as a community resource.

## 3: Better outcomes for clients:

The new nature area and the now extensively farmed land provide 'Hoeve Springendal' recreational guests, the farmers' clients, with a more attractive surrounding. The farmer is

effective in the realization of a more attractive land estate, which might provide him with growing numbers of new future guests. An enlarged PEHS in Springendal might be experienced as positive by Overijssel citizens, which from the provincial perspective might be seen as clients as well.

## Chapter 6: Integral Water Project Dalfsen (IWPD) and nature development area Emmertochtsloot.

### 6.1. Introduction:

The Integral Water Project Dalfsen was completed and officially taken into use by Secretary of State G. Faber of Nature management (LNV) in May 2002. The integral project south of the river Vecht near the town of Dalfsen, covering 2000 hectares of land, had various project goals: production of drinking water, creation of water retention areas, water management for agricultural purposes and development of new wet nature. New nature areas were created by removing nutrient-rich top soil layers of former agricultural lands. A segregated water system was constructed with the possibility of additional inlet of water from the Vecht river. The water system is divided into two parts. One sub-system has high water levels with area-specific, high quality water in the zone of the land estates and nature areas. The other one for the agricultural zone has deeper groundwater levels with a moderate water quality, but offering the possibility of additional water inlet from the Vecht river. The new water system retains more water within the area, reducing rapid water run-off and flooding risks in the downstream Zwolle watersystem. The combination of various goals into one single project makes it an integral one. The integral character corresponds with the 'Hoeve Springendal' project, which also combined various sectoral policy goals. The new nature area 'Emmertochtsloot' is located within the project area and is considerably larger than the Northeast-Twente project with a size of 40 hectares of new nature. In general Overijssel new nature areas are larger in the West of the province, as compared to those located in Twente (Bremer, 2001).

### 6.2. Integral Water Project Dalfsen (IWPD):

#### 6.2.1. Land Rearrangement Marshoek-Hoonhorst:

In the area Marshoek-Hoonhorst, south of Dalfsen and the Vecht river a Land Rearrangement process was being executed. Although the new Law on Land Rearrangement had not yet been adopted (WILG, 2007), enforcing provincial tasks, the Province was the steering network actor in the rearrangement of the rural area of Marshoek-Hoonhorst. The Province installed the Land Rearrangement Committee to manage this process; it holds *power over* Committee set-up and provides resources to the Committee, which enables them to perform this task. Hierarchical elements of government dominate in this governmental set-up; the Province steers directly. The Committee is supported in the process by DLG (Dienst Landelijk Gebied), an executive LNV-

agency. Final approval of the Land Rearrangement plan is given by the Province under supervision of the LNV-Minister. Area farmers and various land owners as Stichting Landschap Overijssel (SLO) and land estate owners (e.g. Den Berg estate) are other actors in the Land Rearrangement policy network. The municipality of Dalfsen is involved, because it is responsible for the municipal spatial plan of their rural area. The waterboard 'Bezuiden de Vecht' (now waterboard Groot Salland), responsible for the area water system is involved as well. Land Rearrangement has major implications for the area water system. Modifications of the water system are a waterboard task. The Province is *motivated* (value is high) to improve general agricultural structure in the area, to realize new PEHS-terrains based on the sectoral nature plans as well as to provide space for drinking water production. An economically viable agriculture, the production of drinking water and the realization of the PEHS are important community-set policy goals. The Province may experience external, mainly central government pressure regarding these own goals. Structural properties of the policy network in this stage of regular Land Rearrangement are a high number of network participants, with tasks being concentrated. DLG and the Committee have multiple network tasks. The Committee is specifically created by provincial mandate and on members request (area farmers) to oversee the network. The origins of the later IWPD-project are to be found in this Land Rearrangement policy network setting. To analyze the IWPD-project network and its outcomes in a transparent way, analysis of various sub-processes, partly from before IWPD, is performed below. Four sub-processes in the analysis are: change of ownership rights of the area Vechterweerd, transfer of agricultural lands south of 'De Horte' land estate to a private nature conservancy organization, construction of an Environmental Impact Assessment Report (MER) for Vechterweerd and finally IWPD project plan development and project realization.

#### 6.2.2 Sub-process 1: Vechterweerd ownership rights transferred to WMO (pre-IWPD stage 1)

- Actor Characteristics:

Farmers: The agricultural lands in the Vechterweerd area, just south of the river Vecht are owned by farmers. In their *cognition* (value for the variable is high) they observe these lands as less productive, mainly suitable for cattle grazing. Their lands are geographically isolated from the major agricultural zone in Marshoek-Hoonhorst and surrounding nature terrains block future agricultural expansion. Farmers then are *motivated* (moderate-high) to sell these lands, if they can get a reasonable price; there might be variation among them. Land prices in the Vechterweerd area are moderate as a result of the factors mentioned. Although area farmers own the land as a resource (power to is considered as high), their individual power over land prices is limited. Farmers have no power over the presence of potential buyers of their Vechterweerd lands. As land owners they have the full power over a transfer of their lands, but

only in a market process with potential buyers having the resources to do so. The combined value for the power over variable seems moderate.

WMO (Waterleiding Maatschappij Overijssel), renamed Vitens: own goals focus on the production of drinking water at relatively low (societal) costs. Their *motivation* to buy a suitable area for a new production site to do so was high. An area close to the river Vecht was observed and interpreted (*cognition*, high value) as an optimal location for a future production site. A 1990 preliminary study considered Vechterweerd as best location for drinking water production. WMO has water production knowledge as a resource, as well as the financial budgets to buy new lands for drinking water production. The value of the variable *power to* will either be moderate or high. WMO *power over* a change of ownership rights is considered as low: it is a free choice of the present land owners, who cannot be forced to sell.

DLG: supports the transferral of agricultural lands, after buying them from (individual) area farmers, a regular Land Rearrangement activity. Motivation to do so seems moderate. DLG holds a neutral *motivation* regarding land ownership and is more process-oriented. Motivation relates to the smooth course of the general Land Rearrangement process. DLG *cognition* regarding a change of ownership rights has a moderate value as well. In their frame of reference Vechterweerd lands might be used for agriculture, but for other purposes as well. DLG does not hold specific knowledge regarding production of drinking water. DLG receives budgets for its broker activities, so available and accessible resources are sufficient (*power to* act as a broker has a high score) to perform the activity. The *power over* element scores low, because present landowners and future owners must be willing to sell and buy by themselves. DLG is only a land broker.

- Interaction in stage 1:

As a result of the interaction process agricultural lands are voluntarily sold by area farmers to DLG, which transfers them to the new land owner WMO. WMO initiates the active cooperation interaction, by acting as an interested buyer, offering a good price for the land. On the basis of the scores on the variables motivation, cognition and power to act of farmers and WMO, situation 1 of figure 5 applies; DLG would theoretically not have been needed to perform the interaction. Nevertheless DLG binds the area farmers together into one actor group within the Land Rearrangement setting. It would have been more difficult for WMO to interact with individual farmers, possibly having different individual scores for the motivation variable. Farmers are relocated elsewhere in the Marshoek-Hoonhorst area in the main agricultural zone.




Figure 6: Actor constellation in sub-process 1

In one direction of the arrows lands are transferred, in the other direction money is transferred backwards. In this sub-process private actors govern themselves. It is basically a market process between two private actors, but within a Land Rearrangement setting. The Land Rearrangement committee/DLG is a coordinating actor, who is specifically created by provincial mandate (and on land owners' request) to oversee the network. Governance mode of this sub-process is hence a hybrid of self-governance and NAO-governance, with two (groups of) participating actors. On the one hand Vechterweerd farmers and DLG as members of the Land Rearrangement policy network. On the other hand WMO/Vitens as an out-network actor, who becomes a Dalfsen area actor by new land ownership. With WMO as new land owner within the area, geographical fragmentation of the IWPDP-network, discussed below, is reduced. General consensus on the (sub-process) network level regarding the change of ownership right in this stage seems moderate to high, if individual motivation scores are added.

- Effectiveness

In this pre-IWPDP project stage only land ownership changes. Spatial function of the Vechterweerd area in the municipal spatial plan remains an agricultural one for the time being. PEHS-policy goals do not play a major role in the interaction process, although being located in the planned PEHS makes future agricultural use in Vechterweerd less attractive for area farmers. Commitment to PEHS-goals is hence rather low. Costs of networking at the network level seem relatively low as well. As a consequence of high consensus on actor goals, transfer of lands was performed relatively easy and not resulting in high extra costs at the network level. By new land ownership WMO/Vitens enlarges its set of resources with an important element, improving future (IWPDP) power to act. In this pre-stage 1 WMO/Vitens has nevertheless no certainty regarding the needed drinking water production permit. For obtaining such a permit an environmental assessment procedure (m.e.r.) must be followed. This will be analyzed in sub-process 3.

### 6.2.3. Sub-process 2, agricultural lands south of 'the Horte' land estate transferred (pre-IWPD stage 2)

- Actor characteristics

Farmers: Main goals of farmers owning lands south of 'the Horte' land estate focus on optimal agricultural production. As a consequence of proximity to valuable nature areas and tight environmental legislation, their *cognition* regarding limited future agricultural expansion possibilities is on a high level. As a result area farmers are highly *motivated* to sell their lands, although there might be variation among them, resulting in a moderate-high value of this variable. External pressure might influence their motivation: blocking the Land Rearrangement process might damage their individual reputation. Farmers own the land as a resource and can sell their lands by free choice (*power over* is high) on the land market. Their individual *power over* land prices and potential buyers is nevertheless low (-). The average value of the variable is considered to be on a moderate level. If an interested buyer appears, then this moderate (0) score would turn into high (+). The Land Rearrangement process provides them with the possibility of getting a reasonable price for their lands. Land prices offered by DLG are mainly determined by LNV-budgets and LNV-prices.

Stichting Landschap Overijssel (SLO): Main goals of SLO focus on the protection of valuable nature. SLO headquarters is located on 'De Horte' land estate. Land ownership has been a major SLO-strategy in nature conservation for decades. *Motivation* to enlarge their land estate 'De Horte' with new lands and to reduce negative environmental impacts on these (core) nature areas, by converting surrounding agricultural lands into new nature must be considered as high. SLO holds the (high) *cognition* that a larger nature area, with less negative environmental impacts from neighbouring farmers is good for realization of nature targets. This links up with the concept of the EHS in general as mentioned in chapter 1: large, interconnected nature areas will create a higher biodiversity. SLO nevertheless does not have the budgets to buy the agricultural lands on their own, resulting in a low *capacity/power to act*. SLO *power over* area farmers to make them sell their private lands is low as well. SLO is not able to act on itself in this sub-process, although they are motivated and hold sufficient information to do so. A lack of resources will block the interaction farmers-SLO (type 6, situation 2 of figure 5). SLO can be typified as an actor being dependent on external resources, which must be provided by other actors. Resource-dependency applies.

Land Rearrangement Committee (LRC): Main goals of LRC focus on the optimalization of the agricultural structure in the Marshoek-Hoonhorst area. LRC knows the PEHS is one of the provincial objectives, which have to be realized as part of their general commission. Main focus is nevertheless on the improvement of agricultural structure. Because the agricultural lands south of 'the Horte' land estate have been appointed and delimited as new nature in provincial

nature plans (BNLO, Natuurgebiedsplan), LRC *motivation* to designate these lands as such in the Land Rearrangement plan, has to be considered as high. Limited agricultural expansion possibilities in this part of the total plan area are observed by LRC and coupled with their frame of reference, in which PEHS-realization plays its role. The value for the actor variable *cognition* has a high value as a consequence. LRC does not have the resources to buy the agricultural lands itself (*power to* is low). LRC *power over* individual farmers to sell their lands is low as well. Change of ownership and land exchanges are voluntarily processes, although farmers blocking the general process might damage their individual reputation, as mentioned above.

DLG: DLG is the land broker in the sub-process and has the task to acquire new lands for the PEHS, for which it receives combined LNV-Province of Overijssel funds. Although PEHS-budgets create a high capacity to act (*power to* is high) in the sub-process, DLG *power over* individual area farmers to make them sell their lands is low. As a land broker their *cognition* regarding farmers willing to sell in the total plan area might be high. Because DLG receives PEHS-funds external pressure (LNV/ the Province) to allocate these budgets might be high, although their own goals are more process-oriented and neutral regarding various ways of land use. The value of the variable *motivation* has to be considered as high: DLG will be motivated to allocate PEHS-budgets in general.

Municipality of Dalfsen: is considered as a moderately *motivated* actor to change its existing municipal spatial plan correspondingly. Because the municipality is involved in the LRC, municipal *cognition* on the LRC-plan is high. The municipality holds *power over* (high) changes in their own spatial plan, although resources to do so might be a problem (*power to* is moderate). Changing the municipal plan might take considerable time as a consequence.

- Interaction in this stage 2:

With DLG providing external resources to the network in this stage the negative scores of SLO and LRC are outweighed for the variable *power to* act. These actors are resource-dependent and will now actively cooperate (situation 1 of figure 5) with the transfer. Without external resources they would have blocked this interaction (situation 2 of figure 5). Although the individual actors score low on the variable *power over*, with the exception of the municipality of Dalfsen, the broker role of DLG will compensate for these low scores. DLG interconnects the individual actors in the transfer in a combined role of broker and buyer. DLG is motivated to do so because of its PEHS-commission. The DLG role links up with the general Land Rearrangement setting. Figure 7 on the next page presents the actor constellation in this stage in a graph:




Figure 7: Actor constellation in sub-process 2

The number of participants is larger now compared to the first sub-process. DLG performs multiple network tasks. This is not only the network task of land broker and process-manager in the Land Rearrangement context, but the task of acquirement of new nature areas for PEHS-realization as well. This PEHS-task is considerably larger than the specific sub-process task only and covers the complete province. The (sub-process) network governance mode is NAO-governance. LRC is the coordinating actor, created by provincial mandate on area land owners' (mainly farmers') request, with the design-Land Rearrangement plan as coordinating document. Regarding consensus on the network level the individual values for the variable actor motivation point to a high degree of network consensus in this specific sub-process.

- Effectiveness:

Adding 40 hectares of agricultural land to the PEHS makes the network an effective one at the community level in a quantitative sense. Transferred agricultural lands contribute to the quantitative provincial PEHS-performance. Nevertheless provincial PEHS-quality targets are not reached by this transaction only: the agricultural lands must be reorganized in a later stage and environmental conditions must be improved. New nature terrains were desiccated, intensively used agricultural lands at the moment SLO became new land owner.

At the network level LRC, DLG and SLO share a high commitment to community-set PEHS-goals. Individual actor goals are overlapping. Regarding costs of networking at the network level SLO makes few additional networking costs. The same is true for LRC and to a lesser extent for the municipality of Dalfsen, because it receives no additional budgets for spatial plan modification. DLG makes transaction costs but receives provincial/LNV-budgets to perform the activities. So transaction costs are no additional costs from the DLG perspective. The network then has to be

considered as effective, because a high commitment to PEHS-goals is combined with a relatively low amount of networking costs at the network level.

At the participant level of network effectiveness DLG, already having access to state PEHS-funds, enhances its legitimacy as a PEHS-realizer as well as an effective Land Rearrangement process manager. SLO acquires new nature areas, which enlarges their set of resources and their capacity to act in the IWPD-project. This results in a change of the SLO-value for the variable power to act in the IWPD-project below. SLO receives state funds for future management of these new nature terrains. An organization having a larger area of nature areas might improve its legitimacy as a private nature conservancy organization. Farmers acquire money in this sub-process for lands with limited agricultural expansion possibilities. Relatively low, LNV-set land prices offered by DLG, might nevertheless not be sufficient to buy new lands of comparable quality elsewhere in the Marshoek-Hoonhorst area. Farmers' set of resources remains either equal or diminishes and effectiveness at the participant level for farmers has to be considered as rather low.

#### 6.2.4. Sub-process 3: Environmental Impact Assessment (MER) for Vechterweerd drinking water production (Pre-IWPD stage 3)

In 1990 a preliminary location study found Vechterweerd to be the best location for a future drinking water production site. The location was integrated in the provincial spatial plan (Streekplan-Overijssel). This provincial spatial policy choice demonstrates the provincial motivation to realize a future drinking water production site on this prioritized location. In 1995 an Environmental Impact Assessment-report was prepared by Grontmij bv, with the Waterboard Bezuiden de Vecht and WMO as common initiators.

- Actor characteristics:

WMO is highly *motivated* to produce drinking water on this location. Own goals focus on production at low costs. Reducing negative impacts on the area watersystem as a consequence of future activities is another actor goal. *Cognition* (high) mainly relates to the 1990 study, which found the Vechterweerd area most appropriate for a future water production site in the Dalfsen area. Anticipating on their drinking water production permit, WMO buys Vechterweerd, with a size of 55 hectares in the Marshoek-Hoonhorst Land Rearrangement process, as analyzed in sub-process 1 above. Although WMO now owns Vechterweerd as a resource, it needs a provincial permit for groundwater extraction as well as a municipal building permit for new production facilities. Because future groundwater extraction will have major environmental impacts, an environmental impact assessment (m.e.r).-procedure must be

followed. WMO is a free actor in commissioning Grontmij bv to make a MER-report, which turns the value for *power over* into high. Although WMO has the resources to pay for this MER-report, sharing costs with another actor might be attractive. The value of *power to act* then is considered as moderate.

Task of Waterboard Bezuiden de Vecht is management of the area water system. *Motivation* for this general water management task is on a high level. This task relates to management of (ground) water levels and water quality. Motivation to initiate a m.e.r.-procedure and commission a MER-report for future production of drinking water does not relate to own goals directly. External pressure (e.g. by the Province) might have played a role, because drinking water production is a broad societal interest. Motivation to combat general area desiccation is considered as high. Value of the variable motivation is hence moderate-high. The waterboard interprets (*cognition*, high) a future Vechterweerd groundwater extraction as a major impact on its area water system, causing desiccation for area water users, being their clients. Among these users are farmers, nature organization SLO and private land estate owners. The waterboard observes project reality and a possible new future task: letting Vechtwater in the area to combat present area desiccation, which will be aggravated by large future groundwater extractions. Letting in nutrient-rich Vecht water will have major environmental impacts. The waterboard is a free actor in a MER-commission for a new activity, which turns the value for the variable *power over* such a commission into high. Combining resources with another actor might be more attractive and raises the individual *power to act*. The value of the actor variable *power to* is hence considered as moderate.

Grontmij is highly *motivated* to get this new commission. The organization is profit-based. Their *cognition* relates to their observation of being an informed, competent advisor and consultant in this m.e.r.-procedure: producing MER-reports is part of regular activity. Grontmij has the knowledge to produce the MER-report as a resource, although specific project information is needed from the MER-initiators. A high *capacity/power to act* is created by two clients paying for the commission together. Grontmij is a free actor, having the *power over* plan construction, if commissioned to do so (value is high). The produced MER-report will underpin the later IWPD-plan, which is a further elaboration of the prioritized MER-alternative (most positive alternative for the environment) in this report.

- Interaction in this stage 3:

Active cooperation (type 1) of WMO and the waterboard applies to give a shared commission to Grontmij bv, in order to produce a MER-report funded by combined resources. Combining resources compensates for the moderate individual scores for the variable *power to* and creates situation 1 of figure 5. The larger part of the funding is provided by main initiator WMO, who possibly gets the larger part of future benefits of the intended production site as well.

Grontmij bv gets a commission for assessing the environmental impacts of two combined activities: extraction of groundwater in Vechterweerd and additional inlet of Vecht river water in the area water system




Figure 8: Actor constellation in sub-process 3

Network tasks are divided evenly over a low number of network actors. Private actors govern themselves in MER-construction. In later stages of the m.e.r.-procedure the municipality of Dalfsen as well as the Province become additional network members; the Province might turn into a lead organization by then, organizing democratic procedures. The network development in the dyad WMO-waterboard will prove to be important for IWPD. Both actors combine their individual resources to assess the environmental impacts of a new water system, focusing on the (aggravated) desiccation problem. Consensus on network level goals, production of a high quality MER-report, is high in sub-process 3.

- Effectiveness:

MER-construction does not focus on PEHS community-set goals directly, although the m.e.r.-procedure might protect PEHS-quality indirectly. Commitment to PEHS-goals at the network level is not the focus in this sub-process, although indirectly it is taken into account by Grontmij bv. WMO and the waterboard share costs for plan preparation by active cooperation in MER-commission. An effectiveness assessment from the PEHS perspective cannot be made, since these goals do not play a major role here. At the participant level of effectiveness participants might enhance their legitimacy as an organization, although the assessment is obligatory for the intended activity. By cooperation both individual actors acquire additional resources to act. An approved MER-report enlarges the set resources in following IWPD-project stages for WMO as well as the waterboard. The MER-report presented a prioritized water system alternative,

which was coupled with the existing Land Rearrangement plan. This resulted in a Land Rearrangement plan change, resulting in a delay of plan approval by provincial government of approximately 18 months.

#### 6.2.5. Sub-process 4: IWPD-plan development and implementation

- Actor characteristics:

1. Waterboard Groot Salland is the successor of Waterboard Bezuiden De Vecht in the area. The waterboard is responsible for the adequate management of the water system in the Dalfsen area, guided by area water plans, a task for which *motivation* is high. Motivation relates to own goals in this respect. As a result of new insights regarding integral water management these goals do not focus only on water management for agricultural purposes, as was done in the past. The (new) water system plan must now satisfy all area water users and integrate multiple, traditional and new water goals. Representatives of area water users (e.g. farmers, nature organizations, land estate owners) have the right to vote in the waterboards' decision-making process. The intended WMO-activity in Vechterweerd will cause severe desiccation in the area, with negative effects on nature areas as well as on agricultural productivity. The intended WMO-activity might create external pressure on the waterboard, which manipulates the value of the actor variable motivation. Creating a new water plan for the area, following the prioritised MER-alternative, groundwater extraction in combination with water inlet from the Vecht river, might be observed (value for *cognitionis* high) as an optimal new water plan solution. Another actor goal is retention of water in the area, reducing flooding risks in Zwolle. The waterboard has the power over the construction and internal approval of a new area water plan, but final (external) approval of the new water plan has to be given by the Province. The value for *power over* is hence considered as moderate-high. The waterboard makes new water management plans on a regular basis and has the accessible resources to do so. This capacity to act only relates to regular water plan construction. The waterboard receives Land Rearrangement budgets for water measures in this setting. These budgets contribute significantly to total IWPD-resources. For part of the new IWPD-plan, 'water conservation plan Emmertochtsloot', extra resources are obtained from the EU-IRMA programme, not only for Emmertochtsloot plan development but for the total sub-project of IWPD. IRMA-subsidies make up for 40% of total costs of this sub-plan. Additional GEBEVE-subsidies are provided by DLG to the waterboard, which will be returned to below. As a result of the MER-interaction of the sub-process above the approved MER-document is a resource now, influencing the value for the variable capacity/power to in this stage. The value for *power to/capacity* is considered as moderate-high. Among the missing elements in the set of resources of the waterboard is e.g. the (water inlet) area just south of the river Vecht: Vechterweerd.

2. WMO/Vitens is *motivated* to produce drinking water in Vechterweerd at relatively low production costs. Motivation to extract groundwater from a new side channel south of the Vecht river, where Vechtwater already has been pre-purified in the soil is high, because purification costs will be lower. Only incidentally water from the Vecht river will reach the new side channel directly. A new side-channel is observed (*cognition*) as a necessary project element in the interpretation of project reality made by WMO/Vitens. From the new side-channel new water pumps will bring the water into the river winterbed and the rest of the area south of the Vecht river. Another actor goal focuses on reduction of negative side-effects of future drinking water production causing aggravated desiccation. This might relate to enhanced legitimacy for the planned activity. WMO/Vitens is owner of the Vechterweerd area and obtains subsidies from provincial government to develop new nature on lands which primarily will be used for production of drinking water. The area is grazed by Galloway cattle and recreational co-use is permitted. Creating new nature in Vechterweerd by self-governance within PEHS-boundaries contributes to provincial PEHS-goals. Integrating secondary goals in the Vechterweerd management plan might again enhance WMO-legitimacy. Resources to create a new side channel in the area are available and as a land owner construction can be commissioned (power to act is moderate), but without additional water inlet groundwater supply would rapidly be exhausted. WMO holds an approved MER-document as a result of previous sub-process 3 interaction. Management of the area water system and water inlet are waterboard tasks, which turns the value for the WMO variable *power over* a new area watersystem into low.

3. Stichting Landschap Overijssel (SLO): is highly *motivated* to improve the quality of its nature terrains. Bosgroep Twente-Salland, exploiting forests for timber in the area, is located in the same building on 'the Horte' land estate and actor characteristics are congruent with those of SLO. Timber production will be higher if more groundwater is available. Water quality is less important for the Bosgroep. Regarding SLO targets, biodiversity will be higher in areas with high groundwater levels as well as a high water quality. Nature terrains are now strongly desiccated as a result of old agricultural dewatering measures; the nature areas used to be relatively wet. Letting in water with high-nutrient loads from the Vecht river is considered as a threat to aquatic biodiversity, although terrestrial biodiversity (and timber production) will improve following the MER-Vechterweerd report. Rainwater and water from nature areas itself is interpreted as more valuable for existing nature as well as new nature (Emmertochtsloot: south of 'the Horte'). The value for *cognition* regarding the desired water system is considered as moderate in the beginning of the IWPD-project, turning into high in subsequent stages by the provision of better project information by the waterboard. Actor *power over* water management plans and measures must be considered as rather low. Only limited water measures, based on their own area management plans, are taken on the terrains itself by SLO, with general water management being a task of the waterboard. Available resources to

perform large water measures are limited and available provincial management subsidies are limited as well. New nature areas acquired by SLO in sub-process 2, where a future water retention can be realized, are an important resource now. This resource changes the value for the variable *capacity/power* to act from low into moderate in this sub-process.

4. DLG is a relevant actor because of its role in the implementation of GEBEVE, an anti-desiccation policy programme of three Ministries (LNV, VROM and V&W). DLG is *motivated* to allocate these subsidies with promising projects, which focus on water conservation and water retention. DLG is a central actor in the Land Rearrangement Marshoek-Hoonhorst and interprets the desiccation problem (*cognition*) as an opportunity to allocate available GEBEVE-subsidies, if promising projects (Water conservation plan Emmertochtsloot) are initiated by others. GEBEVE-subsidies are accessible and available resources, over which DLG holds some power, although a financial account must be given on individual projects to the relevant Ministries. DLG has specific area knowledge regarding the area desiccation problem as an additional resource. DLG does not have the full capacity to act on itself, since GEBEVE-subsidies only partly cover total project costs. These subsidies were transmitted to the waterboard for the project. The value of the actor characteristic *power to act* is low-moderate. DLG has no *power over* the construction of a new area water system and the value for the variable is considered as low as well.

5. Area farmers are *motivated* to realize optimal groundwater levels in order to increase agricultural production. Water levels in the winter period are considered as optimal, but in summertime water levels are observed (*cognition*) as too low. This lack of water reduces agricultural production. The farmers problem was confirmed in the MER-Vechterweerd report. Farmers are proponents of a new water system, which stabilizes groundwater levels in Winter, but offers the possibility of additional water inlet in Summer. In dry periods irrigation of lands from the surface water is seen as an attractive additional option. In the beginning of the IWPD-project the value for the variable *cognition* is considered as moderate; in later stages the value turns into high, because of specific project information given to the farmers by the waterboard. Farmers hold some *power over* (value low-moderate) new water plans, because they are well represented in the waterboard decision-making process. Available resources to co-finance a new water system are limited, as a result of moderate agricultural profitability. The value of the variable *capacity/power to* is low.

6. Land estate owners (e.g. Den Berg land estate) face desiccation as a problem for biodiversity and agricultural production on their properties. In general water levels in estate ponds and channels are too low. The value for *cognition* regarding a modified water system is considered as moderate in the beginning of the IWPD-project, turning into high in later stages by provision of specific project information by the waterboard. They are *motivated* (high) to combat the

water problem, but do not have the resources (*power to act* is low) in order to do so. *Power over* the general water system in the area has to be considered as low.

7. The Province is (moderate-high) *motivated* to implement the provincial anti-desiccation policy programme (Plan van Aanpak Verdroging). Although the Province did not designate the Dalfsen area as a TOP-list area, listing highly prioritized anti-desiccation areas, the general policy programme supports measures to combat area desiccation, which is observed (*cognition* is high) as a provincial environmental problem. The Province holds *power over* approval of the new waterboard area water plan, although in cooperation with the waterboard (value is moderate), as well as the allocation of provincial anti-desiccation funds. These funds are relatively small. Budgets for Land Rearrangement measures in general are considerably larger and are provided to the Province by the LNV-Ministry. Value for actor characteristic *capacity/power to* is hence low-moderate.

- Interaction in this stage 4:

First the values are presented in the matrix on the page below to improve transparency for the analysis of the interactions in this stage.

Actors/variables	motivation	cognition	power to	power over
WGS waterboard	+	+	0/+	0/+
WMO/ Vitens	+	+	0	-
SLO	+	0 towards +	0	-
DLG	+	0/+	-/0	-
Area farmers	+	0 towards +	-	-/0
Estate owners	+	0 towards +	-	-
Province	+	+	-/0	0

Figure 9: Values for actor core characteristics of the actors in sub-process 4

All relevant actors have high scores for the variable *motivation*. This points to a high degree of consensus in the network regarding the need for a new water system project. Every actor sees a chance to realize own goals in the project. On the basis of this variable only situations 1 to 4 are expected as theoretical interactions. Nevertheless their individual *power to* realize such a new water system is rather limited, which theoretically lead to situation 2 and obstruction. Regarding this variable three groups of actors can be seen: those with a moderate or moderate to high power to act, those with a moderate-low power to act and a group with a low capacity to act. The differences mainly relate to available resources (e.g. available land, subsidy budgets etc.). No individual actor has a complete set of resources to perform the project individually.

The waterboard has the largest set of resources: ownership of the area water system, GEBEVE and IRMA subsidies and the approved MER-report of sub-process 3. WMO/Vitens owns the Vechterweerd area (sub-process 1), essential for water inlet, and the approved MER-report (sub-process 3). SLO is new owner of PEHS-land (sub-process 2), which now is a project resource that can be used for water conservation. The Province has anti-desiccation funds as an additional resources. Combining individual resources results in active cooperation (type 1) to realize the project together. Situation 1 of figure 5 applies. Actors are mutually dependent for the creation of a full set of project resources, turning the value for the variable power to act into +. Some actors are more dependent than others. The actor with the largest set of resources, the waterboard WGS initiates the project. Other actors follow this first initiative, which theoretically might be considered as a form of more passive cooperation (situation 1 of figure 5; type 2). Regarding the variable power over other actors the analysis shows that individual actors also lack the full power over an individual action regarding the new water system. The waterboard holds a dominant position. This points to a project initiator/ coordinator role for the waterboard as well. In situation 1 of figure 5 this power balance has nevertheless no explanatory power to predict the interaction type. SLO, area farmers and the estate owners lacked some specific water system information in the first project stages. This might point to situation 3 of figure 5, joint learning towards cooperation, in these early IWPD-project stages. The adjustment problems between the waterboard and these actors in the beginning of the project can now be understood. Figure 10 presents the actor constellation in this sub-process.




Figure 10: Actor constellation graph IWPD-plan development and implementation

DLG provides IRMA-EU subsidies as well as GEBEVE subsidies to the waterboard and is involved in IWPD plan development, which links up with their task of Land Rearrangement plan development. Waterboard and DLG have multiplex ties regarding implementation of water measures in the context of Land Rearrangement Marshoek-Hoonhorst and in this specific water project. WMO and the waterboard combine resources for IWPD-plan development. These actors have networked before in the MER-report Vechterweerd sub-process. The Province must approve the new area water plan, which is presented to them by the waterboard. Additional anti-desiccation subsidies are provided to the waterboard by the Province. The new design-water plan is input for a consultation process with area farmers, SLO and land estate owners, who decide to cooperate actively now, but after a process of joint learning. Consultation by the waterboard with area land owners created some adjustment problems in the stage of initial plan development, as mentioned above. The new spatial function of Emmertochtsloot lands provides the waterboard with the opportunity to conserve water here and obtain GEBEVE and IRMA-subsidies. Without the change of ownership rights from farmers to SLO this would not have been possible. LRC/DLG provides additional Land Rearrangement budgets to the new water plan, that is coupled with the existing design-Land Rearrangement plan.

- Effectiveness:

The IWPD-project does not focus on PEHS-community set goals directly, but indirectly improves PEHS-quality by reducing desiccation of nature terrains. Higher groundwater levels are realized in the zone of nature areas and land estates. Area-specific water is retained within nature areas now and is of a higher quality. Preliminary project results are not completely positive, following interview results provided by SLO. In general SLO is nevertheless satisfied with project results. Water levels on 'Den Berg' land estate are on a higher level now, as a result of additional water inlet from the Vecht river. Vechterweerd extraction of groundwater by WMO is not on its maximum level yet, so impact assessments are preliminary. The MER Vechterweerd-report, realized in an earlier sub-process, has been an important building stone for IWPD-plan development. No completely new plan had to be constructed in this stage. Members do not make high additional costs of networking, because area actors have cooperated before in the MER and Land Rearrangement arenas and know each other. Low costs of networking combined with a relatively high commitment to PEHS-policy goals, although maybe not taken into account intentionally by project actors, turns the network into an effective one at the network level.

At the participants level the *waterboard* enhances its legitimacy with a new, integral water plan satisfying all area water users (better client outcomes), following most recent water management insights regarding water retention and flood prevention. By taking anti-desiccation measures the waterboard acquires state resources (GEBEVE, provincial anti-

desiccation subsidies), EU-resources (IRMA) as well as private WMO-resources. For the waterboard the new integral water plan must be considered as effective.

*WMO* enhances its legitimacy in the area, because cooperation to the new water plan reduces negative impacts of water production activities. By creating new nature on Vechterweerd *WMO* enhances this legitimacy as well, because a public goal is coupled with a private initiative. The new water system brings additional groundwater supply, which is a most important resource for *WMO* production possibilities. Because the new water system pre-purifies Vecht water in the soil, production costs might be lower, possibly leading to better client outcomes, mainly lower drinking water costs.

The new water system brings more water to *SLO* (new) nature areas and retains area-specific water within these areas. Water with high nutrient loads does not penetrate *SLO*-nature areas any longer. For 'Den Berg' land estate this situation is different, because here nutrient-rich Vecht water directly enters the ponds and channels, only improving terrestrial biodiversity. For aquatic biodiversity nevertheless high-quality groundwater supply is an essential resource. The new water system then brings in important resources for effective *SLO*-nature management at low *SLO*-costs. An organization owning nature terrains with a higher biodiversity produces better client outcomes. These clients can either be *SLO*-members or the plants and animals *SLO* wants to protect. Client outcomes then focus on intrinsic values of area species. Although *SLO* is not yet completely satisfied with the results of the new water system for their terrains, the network outcomes are considered as effective by the organization.

*Area farmers* will get more water of a moderate quality in the Summer period. Agricultural production will improve as a result. In Winter their lands will have deep groundwater levels, which was also the case in the old water system. Without making additional costs compared to the Land Rearrangement process, farmers obtain an important production resource. A higher level of production might be interpreted as better client outcomes. For the farmers the network outcomes are considered as effective.

*DLG* enhances its legitimacy by allocating available state and EU-subsidies with a successful project. This might enforce its role as a policy implementing agency and future, new public budgets being provided more easily to *DLG*.

*The Province* allocates anti-desiccation subsidies with a promising water project. Benefits of the project mainly relate to set provincial policy goals in the policy sectors nature and water. Effectiveness on the participant level is congruent with effectiveness at the community level.

*LRC* is able to realize a better, modified Land Rearrangement plan as a result of coupling with the *IWPD*-project, which satisfies more area land owners (farmers, *SLO*, land estate owners). Because provincial policy goals (water, nature) are now realized to a higher extent, the new

plan will be more satisfactory for the Province, who might be seen as a LRC client. The modified Land Rearrangement plan makes the network effective from the LRC-participant perspective.

## Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this chapter the two case studies and the project networks will be compared in order to answer the main research question: did the governance structure of ggb-NOT create a more effective policy network, with better PEHS-outcomes?

The analysis of the 'Hoeve Springendal' project network showed that the network was created by means of a private initiative of a self-governing private actor. In this sense provincial ggb-NOT policy did not initiate the project and its network. In the newly created PEHS-policy network hierarchical relationships in the various subsidy requests play an important role as well, which links up with the idea of government. The created policy network then can be typified as a mix of self-governance and top-down government. Network links between the project network and the large ggb-NOT network were established by network brokers as Stimuland and Recron, giving information to the farmer. The values for the variables motivation and cognition of the farmer were influenced. Stimuland was already a network broker for environmental area projects before 1993; ggb-NOT policy only reinforced this role. Although in this case the large network brokers were effective, the large ggb-NOT network only reached a limited number of area actors. Few PEHS-related projects were initiated and in this sense ggb-NOT policy was not effective to steer the policy network for PEHS-construction effectively. By construction of the Area Perspective the policy nevertheless was effective, by creating some acceptance in the area for provincial PEHS-delimitation; This is nevertheless only the first PEHS-implementation layer. Effects are not measurable yet in hectares or PEHS-quality. In chapter 1 this acceptance among area actors was mentioned as a policy goal for area-oriented policy by Boonstra (2004). A higher level of acceptance for PEHS-boundaries might have positive future PEHS-results. Ggb-NOT subsidies alone would not have been sufficient to facilitate the 'Hoeve Springendal' project. Area-oriented policy subsidies were far too limited to make a conversion of land use possible. Sectoral nature funds provided the major stimulus for the farmer to reorganize 'Hoeve Springendal'. Nevertheless ggb-NOT-subsidies provided an extra facility for successful project realization, partly influencing the value for the variable power to act. For explaining actor behavior the additional variable power to act proved to be essential in this case. As a result of a full set of resources, land and subsidies, the farmers' value for motivation to reorganize his farm changed in a positive direction. Theoretically this development is interpreted as a shift from situation 13 into situation 1 of figure 5.

The PEHS was enlarged considerably in the Springendal area, which possibly would have been more difficult by using only sectoral nature policy instruments. Low land mobility and high land prices are major external reasons which make (sectoral) PEHS-construction difficult in Northeast-Twente in general.

Regarding effectiveness of the project network for PEHS-quality, some critical remarks have been made. Monitoring by government will be needed in the future to control if the developments in the new nature area stay in line with provincial PEHS nature quality objectives and the qualitative obligation made by Brunninkhuis to the state. This again is in line with the theoretical concept of government and hierarchical, top-down steering as mentioned in chapter 4.

The other IWPD project network in the Dalfsen area can be seen as a more pure form of (area) governance, where public and private area actors develop a common project initiative in a bottom-up way, enforcing PEHS-quality. PEHS-quality was one of the networks' unintentional and secondary goals. The network nevertheless was effective because future PEHS-quality will be reinforced by the newly constructed water system. New hectares of PEHS-lands were realized in the Land Rearrangement setting, where sectoral PEHS-policy is coupled with sectoral agricultural structure policy. In this process the Province remains the dominant steering actor, by installing LRC, approving the LRC-plan and directly commissioning DLG to acquire new lands for the PEHS to realize quantitative PEHS-targets. The IWPD-project did not contribute directly to these quantitative PEHS-targets. Land rearrangement proves to be an effective instrument for the Province to realize quantitative PEHS-policy goals in a hierarchical, top-down way. In general these newly acquired PEHS-lands are transferred by DLG in a later stage to a private nature conservancy organization (stage 2 of the case-study) or SBB. SBB, nature organizations and the Province adjust their individual nature targets, with the organizations being consulted on a regular basis. This might be positive for future PEHS-quality. In the Dalfsen case SLO creates a larger, interconnected nature area, which makes an adequate future management and a more natural, spontaneous development of the area easier. This was one of the original ideas behind EHS-construction in the 1990 Nature Policy Plan. SLO possibly holds more specific nature knowledge regarding these activities, compared to the 'Hoeve Springendal' farmer who after all manages a profit-based enterprise.

Both projects networks are effective because they contribute to PEHS-realization. Nevertheless their contribution is different. The 'Hoeve Springendal' project focuses on quantitative PEHS-targets and is an example of self-governance. The IWPD-project contributes to the realization of qualitative PEHS-targets, by coupling these targets with water targets of area actors. New hectares are realized in a Land Rearrangement setting, where the Province steers DLG directly.

The final answer to the main research question is that in the 'Hoeve Springendal' case the large ggb-NOT network did contribute to PEHS-realization, as a result of the successful network brokers Stimuland and Recron, but not in a major way. It only partly facilitated the project and in general did not initiate other PEHS-related projects in the Northeast-Twente area. PEHS-realization remains a strong sectoral activity, where sectoral nature policy instruments as SN-f

and SAN dominate. The Dalfsen case showed this as well, where quantitative sectoral PEHS-targets were coupled with agricultural structure policy by the Province directly. Here a common bottom-up water project by area actors contributed to PEHS-realization, but in a qualitative way.

The level of network steering of ggb-NOT did not prove to be a more effective governance design for PEHS-implementation. The policy created some acceptance in the area for PEHS-delimitation, with possibly positive future effects for PEHS-realization. Various governance designs, in the Dalfsen case with the Province (hierarchically) governing at a distance, seem to be PEHS-effective. Nevertheless the successful broker activities of Stimuland and Recron show that they might play an important (ILG) role for the Province to initiate private PEHS-projects in the rural area, especially in those areas with a low land mobility and high land prices. The possibility to acquire new hectares here are only limited. With Programma Beheer becoming a provincial task in 2009/2010 the possibility to *integrate* sectoral nature policy instruments with their broker activities seems to be promising for effective PEHS-realization. Stimulating NMO to develop into such a broker role towards local nature groups might present another option. This NMO integration was in the view of the author the missing element in ggb-NOT policy as an effective, but complementary governance approach for PEHS-realization. Self-governance by private actors, who remain land owner of newly created PEHS-nature and support the degree of PEHS-acceptance by their presence in the area itself, might be further stimulated by area brokers working from the Zwolle Provinciehuis. These area brokers are bridging the gap with area actors, reinforce the policy network and are able to influence the area actors' core characteristics, the cognition variable in the first place. Changed actor core characteristics might then influence each other in succeeding stages, as has been demonstrated in the theoretical model. This is what the 'Hoeve Springendal' case most clearly demonstrated. The effects on the expected interaction type might then be considerable; although available nature budgets remain to play a dominant role. Adding the fourth variable of power to/capacity into CIT-theory has therefore been crucial to explain interactions in Overijssel PEHS policy.

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## List of abbreviations:

BGM	Bijdrageregeling Gebiedsgericht Milieubeleid
BNLO	Beleidsplan Natuur en Landschap Overijssel 1993
DI	Decentralisatie Impuls 1995
DLG	Dienst Landelijk Gebied
DR	Dienst Regelingen, onderdeel van het Ministerie van LNV
EHS	Ecologische Hoofdstructuur
GGB	Gebieds Gericht Beleid
Ggb-NOT	Gebiedsgericht Beleid Noordoost-Twente
GLTO	Gewestelijke Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie
GMB	Gebiedsgericht Milieubeleid
GS	Gedeputeerde Staten
ILG	Investeringsbudget Landelijk Gebied
IPO	Inter Provinciaal Overleg
IWPD	Integraal Water Project Dalfsen
LNV	Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Voedselkwaliteit
NAO	Netwerk Administratieve Organisatie
NBP	Natuurbeleidsplan 1990
NMO	Natuur en Milieu Overijssel
NMP	Nationaal Milieubeleids Plan 1989
NVM, MVN	Natuur Voor Mensen, Mensen voor Natuur
PEHS	Provinciale Ecologische Hoofdstructuur
ROM	Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu
SAN	Subsidieregeling Agrarisch Natuurbeheer
SBB	Staatsbosbeheer
SGB	Subsidieregeling Gebiedsgericht beleid

SGP	Strategische Groen Projecten
SGR	Structuurschema Groene Ruimte
SLO	Stichting Landschap Overijssel
SN-f	Subsidieregeling Natuurbeheer-functieverandering
VROM	Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu
WCL	Waardevolle Cultuur Landschappen
WMO	Waterleiding Maatschappij Overijssel
WRD	Waterschap Regge en Dinkel