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Master Thesis

Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)

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Does it matter within the policy-making process of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union?

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List of abbreviations

CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CDI	Commitment to Development Index
CONCORD	Confederation for Coordination of Relief and Development NGOs
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DG	Directorate-General
EPP	European People's Party
EU	European Union
IA	Impact Assessment
INTA	(EP Committee on) International Trade
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEP	Member of European Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (former EC Treaty)
UN	United Nations

1. Introduction

“Within the broad context of EU policy making coherence is a multidimensional commitment which needs to take place within the overall framework of the EU sustainable development strategy. Non-development policies should respect development policy objectives and development cooperation should, where possible, also contribute to reaching the objectives of other EU policies.”¹

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) an estimated 75 percent of the world’s poor are living in rural areas and about 86 % of this group “depend[s], directly or indirectly, on agriculture for their livelihoods”². Correspondingly, the European Commission explains that “agricultural and rural development are fundamental to the European Union’s objectives of reducing poverty, increasing food security and protecting natural resources”³. The total amount of official development assistance (ODA) from OECD members was \$ 104 billion in 2006.⁴ OECD farmers received support equivalent to about \$ 268 billion in 2006, while less than 10 percent of the OECD population depend on agriculture as a source of income.⁵ This also holds for the European Union where annual spending of \$ 68 billion for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) outnumbers ODA (collective contribution of the EU was around \$ 62 billion in 2008⁶) and absorbs around 45 percent of EU budget.⁷ Polemically

¹ Commission of the European Communities (2005b), *Policy Coherence for Development, Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals*, COM (2005) 134 final, Brussels, p. 3.

² OECD (2009d), *Building Blocks for Policy Coherence for Development*, Paris, p. 16.

³ Commission of the European Communities (2009a), *Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Report from the Commission to the Council, EU 2009 Report on Policy Coherence for Development*, COM(2009) 461 final, Brussels, p. 76.

⁴ See OECD (2009d), p. 16; see OECD (2008b), *Synthesis Report on Policy Coherence for Development*, Development Co-operation Directorate, Paris, p. 10; however, this is not necessarily a new development as “the cost of support to the agricultural industry of the OECD countries was 250 per cent higher than the same countries’ aid to the developing countries in the 1980s”, see Andreosso-O’Callaghan, Bernadette (2003), *The Economics of European Agriculture*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 111.

⁵ NB: “Although aid to rich-country farmers is copious, the \$300 billion “fact” is wrong, so phrased. Rather, OECD farmers and food buyers receive support by virtue of government policy that is equivalent to more than \$300 billion in subsidies”; Roodman, David (2009), *The Commitment to Development Index: 2009 Edition*, Center for Global Development, Washington D.C., p. 18.

⁶ This figure includes ODA dispersed by the European Commission and Member States; see Engel, Paul et al. (2010), *New Challenges, New Beginnings. Next Steps in European Development Cooperation*, European Think-Tanks Group, ODI/DIE/FRIDE/ECDPM, p. xiv.

⁷ See OECD (2008b), p. 10; see ICTSD (2010), ‘EU Farm Subsidies More Skewed than Ever: Report’, in: *Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest*, Vol. 14 (17), 12 May.

speaking, “each European Union cow gets US\$ 2.50 a day in subsidies, more than what a billion people, many of them Africans, each have to live on every day”⁸.

A recurrent critique is that CAP market access barriers, domestic support and export subsidies impact on farmers in developing countries and affect rural poverty.⁹ European sugar, grain or dairy products exported to developing countries are said to have distorting effects for local farmers whose products cannot compete with cheap European imports.¹⁰ One very recent example of how development countries and the efforts of EU’s development aid are affected by the CAP is the reintroduction of export subsidies for dairy products on 20 February 2009.¹¹ In order to address the “structural surplus of milk”¹² and to close the gap between domestic and world prices, the EU restarted subsidizing dairy exports up to 50 percent.¹³ Consequently, European producers are able to export dairy products at profit although prices held within the EU are higher than world market prices.¹⁴ This return to subsidies on dairy products after its overall cancellation in 2007 has induced some negative feedback from developed countries (e.g. Australia, New Zealand) and developing countries from Latin America, Africa and the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁵ Also, non-governmental development organizations such as Oxfam¹⁶ or CONCORD have criticized export subsidies as the “most blatant form of dumping in third countries”¹⁷.

⁸ Moyo, Dambisa (2009), *Dead Aid, Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa*, London, p. 115.

⁹ See Grant, Wyn (2009), ‘Agricultural Policy and Protectionism’, in: Rumford, Chris (ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of European Studies*, Los Angeles/London, p. 272; Carbone, Maurizio (2008), ‘Mission Impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence for Development’, in: *European Integration*, Vol. 30 (3), p. 337.

¹⁰ See Oldenbruch, Günther and Knocks, Stefanie (2008), *Die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Europäischen Kommission*, SID Chapter Bonn, p. 21.

¹¹ See Commission of the European Communities (2009c), ‘Fixing the export refunds in milk and milk products’, Commission Regulation No. 140/2009, in: *Official Journal of the European Union*, 20.2.2009, p. L 49/3.

¹² See Grant, Wyn (2009), p. 266.

¹³ See ICTSD (2009b), ‘EU Dairy Export Subsidies Draw Fire from Cairns Group’, in: *Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest*, Vol. 13 (3), 28 January 2009, p. 9, http://ictsd.net/downloads/bridges_weekly/bridgesweekly13-3.pdf.

¹⁴ See Andreosso-O’Callaghan, Bernadette (2003), p. 95.

¹⁵ See ICTSD (2009b), p. 9; see N.N. (2009), *EU reintroduces subsidies on dairy products*, Evert Vermeer Foundation (EVF), 03.02.2009 <http://www.eucoherence.org/renderer.do/clearState/false/menuId/313375/returnPage/313371/itemId/562633/instanceId/313389/pageId/313375/>

¹⁶ See OXFAM (2009), *Hintergrundinfos EU Milch-Politik*, http://www.oxfam.de/download/hintergrundinfos_eu_milch_politik.pdf [27.07.2009]

¹⁷ CONCORD (2009), *Spotlight on Policy Coherence Report 2009*, Brussels, p. 19.

The 'European Consensus on Development' (2005) addresses this policy incoherence (i.e. in general disjoint or conflictive policies, and in particular policies undermining developmental considerations) by stating that "the EU will substantially reduce the level of trade distortion related to its support measures to the agricultural sector, and facilitate developing countries' agricultural development"¹⁸. Moreover, the EU has declared to *eliminate all export subsidies by 2013*.¹⁹ Despite domestic justifications (increasing agricultural productivity, fair standard of living for the agricultural community, and stabilizing markets according to Article 33 TEU) of upholding agricultural subsidies, the costs to bear for the development policy of the EU, European taxpayers and the developing world remain high.

This tension between developmental goals and agricultural policy exemplifies the conflictive relationship that could occur among different policy areas of the same polity. While this is probably not a new occurrence, the relatively novel concept of policy coherence attempts to shed fresh light on the impacts that different policy areas might have on each other.²⁰ It has gained a lot of popularity within political science, and development studies have particularly been focusing on policy coherence *for development* (PCD) – i.e. other policy areas such as agriculture are not to undermine developmental goals but are – ideally – to be supportive of it.²¹ Referring to the broader picture, PCD is embedded in the so called *Aid Effectiveness Agenda* which aims at reaching the *Millennium Development Goals* (e.g. cutting poverty in half by 2015) and stresses the obligation of donor countries to spend 0.7 percent of GNP on official development assistance by 2015.²² The debate gained further impetus by the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005) and the *Accra Agenda for Action* (2008) which point out common and mutual responsibility of donors and developing countries to enhance aid effectiveness.²³ The rationale of PCD within the debate is that the effectiveness of development policy cannot exclusively be ensured by development

¹⁸ Commission of the European Communities (2005c), *The European Consensus on Development*, DE129, June 2006, Brussels, para 36 – 14820/05.

¹⁹ See Commission of the European Communities (2007b), *EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development*, COM (2007) 545 final, Brussels, p. 6.

²⁰ „Politikkohärenz sollte Maßgabe für Regierungshandeln sein“; see Kevenhörster, Paul and van den Boom, Dirk (2009), *Entwicklungspolitik*, Wiesbaden, p. 37.

²¹ See OECD (2008b), p. 5.

²² See United Nations General Assembly (2000), *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/ares552e.pdf>, [11.07.2009]; *Monterrey Consensus* (2002), <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/aconf198-11.pdf>, [11.07.2009].

²³ See 2nd High Level Forum (2005), *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, Paris; see also 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2008), *Accra Agenda for Action*, Accra.

cooperation but depends on necessary contributions by other policies.²⁴ Though quality of and commitment to it differ considerably, PCD has generally been recognized on national, EU and UN level. Despite its declaratory importance the actual role of policy coherence often remains opaque and further researching this “unsolved core problem of development cooperation”²⁵ is of central importance.²⁶ In concreto, a more accurate analysis of the interaction between different policies that affect developing countries remains crucial in order to finally arrive at conclusions about how to deal with the institutional differentiation as well as the fragmented policy-processes of the EU from a PCD perspective, and how to integrate policy coherence for development into the formulation and implementation of other policies.²⁷ While the European Commission (2005) has originally identified twelve policy areas in order to “consider the challenge of how non-aid policies can assist developing countries in attaining the MDGs”²⁸, this thesis intends to concentrate on the interface of agriculture and development. This is not only necessary to reasonably limit the scope of this research, but the CAP is frequently considered to affect developing countries and particularly those 75 percent of the world’s poor living in rural areas who are also among the main recipients of development aid.²⁹

²⁴ Ashoff, Guido (2009), *Politikkohärenz: eine zusätzliche Voraussetzung und wesentlich Aufgabe wirksamer Entwicklungspolitik*, in: Bonn, p. 1.

²⁵ „ungelöstes Kernproblem der Entwicklungspolitik“, Nuscheler, Franz (2008), p. 32.

²⁶ See for example Vanhoonacker, Sophie (2005), ‘Institutions’, in: Hill, Christopher and Smith, Michael (eds.) *International Relations and the European Union*, 4th edition, p. 76. She warns not to overestimate the leverage of the declared coherence and argues that poverty reduction may be less central and become subservient to the realization of foreign policy objectives.

²⁷ See Ashoff, Guido (2005), *Enhancing Policy Coherence for Development: Justification, Recognition and Approaches to Achievement*, German Development Institute, DIE Studies 11, Bonn, p. 40.

²⁸ Commission of the European Communities (2005b), p. 4; the so called “priority areas” are: trade; environment; security; agriculture; fisheries; social dimensions of globalization; migration; research and innovation; information society; transport; energy (p. 5).

²⁹ See Diao, Xinshen and Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio and Robinson, Sherman (2003), *How much does it hurt? The Impact of Agricultural trade Policies on Developing Countries*, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington; see Green, Duncan and Griffith Matthew (2002), *Dumping on the Poor: The Common Agricultural Policy, the WTO and International Development*, CAFOD, London; see Norberg, Johann (2003), ‘American and European Protectionism is Killing Poor Countries’, in: *Investor’s Business Daily*, 25 August 2003, added to www.cato.org on September 4, 2003; see Paasch, Armin (2010), ‘Exportvorwand Hunger’, in: *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit / Development and Cooperation*, Vol. 51 (5), p. 214; see Wolpold-Bosien, Martin (1999), *Die andere Eroberung, US-amerikanische und europäische Agrarexportpolitik und ihre Folgen für den Hunger im Süden der Welt*, FIAN/AbL, Herne.

Since a recent study concludes that “development interests are poorly presented”³⁰ within the CAP, it is crucial to take into account and analyze those decisions by the Commission that might affect the situation of developing countries.³¹ The recent reintroduction of export subsidies on dairy products in February 2009 serves as an example of how the CAP might affect farmers in the developing world. It appears to be sensible to ask why policies contradict each other and what instruments are at hand in order to make them (more) consistent. Therefore, this paper investigates the justifications, implementation, and limitations of policy coherence for development within the policy-processes of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU. The central research question reads:

Does Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) matter within the policy-making process of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU?

In order to arrive at valuable conclusions the following sub-questions (SQ) need to be addressed:

SQ1: How can policy coherence (for development) be defined?

SQ2: What are the theoretical limitations of perfect policy coherence?

SQ3: What are the justifications of policy coherence *for* development?

SQ4: How is PCD institutionalized and implemented within the EU polity?

SQ5: How does the decision-making process of the Common Agricultural Policy work?

SQ6: Why do incoherences for development result from decision-making processes of the Common Agricultural Policy?

Outline of the thesis

Based on a section on the state of the art on PCD, a theoretical framework is set out for the following three purposes: it offers a definition of PCD (SQ1) conducive to narrow the scope of research. Secondly, theoretical limitations of perfect policy coherence (SQ2) are discerned by referring to the Arrow paradox which implies that it is impossible to derive an explicit preference of a group by referring to the individual preferences of its members. In this sense an aggregated social welfare function cannot

³⁰ Hudson, Alan (2006), ‘Case Study on the Reform of the EU’s Sugar Regime’, in: Egenhofer, Christian (Project Leader) *Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council*, Strategies for the Way Forward, Centre for European Policy Studies, Bruxelles, p. 117.

³¹ Correspondingly the OECD recommends that “Commission and Member States should examine improved ways of bringing policy coherence issues effectively to the decision-making level”; see OECD (2008b), p. 47.

be totally consistent with what is desirable in individual policy areas.³² Thirdly, justifications of policy coherence *for development* (SQ3) are addressed as it is crucial to understand why one could indeed look at policy coherence from a development perspective. Based on these assumptions the theoretical concept of the policy coherence cycle is introduced as it helps conceptualizing the role of policy coherence in the policy-making processes of the EU.³³ The subsequent chapter discusses the methodological foundations of this research. It is mainly concerned with problems of measuring PCD, the operationalisation of the policy coherence cycle and opportunities of deriving generalizations from the findings. The core part of this thesis focuses on PCD and its role vis-à-vis another policy area: the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. Commitment as well as mechanisms to enhance PCD (SQ4) are analysed in order to understand how PCD is actually implemented within the decision-making processes of the CAP (SQ5). Despite its solid legal basis and declaratory importance PCD faces various obstacles that the analysis is to expose (SQ6). Finally, it is possible to present findings about the role of PCD within the decision-making process of CAP as well as the recognition and the effectiveness of the mechanisms in place.

2. The state of the art on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)

The primary legal basis of *coherence* or *consistency*³⁴, and of the development cooperation of the EU in general was originally formulated by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (Articles 177 to 181 EC Treaty)^{35,36} Article 3 Treaty on European Union (TEU) urged the Union to guarantee “consistency of its external activities as a whole in the areas of its external relations, security, economic and development policies”. While the general goal of policy coherence in Art. 3 TEU did prioritize no policy area, Article 178

³² See Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963), *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2nd ed., New Haven and London, Yale University Press, p. 51; see Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 35; see Kevenhörster, Paul (2008), *Politikwissenschaft, Band 1: Entscheidungen und Strukturen der Politik*, 3rd edition, Wiesbaden, p. 267.

³³ See OECD (2009d), p. 19.

³⁴ *Coherence* and *consistency* are used synonymously throughout this paper. Both words have the same connotation for the EU: While consistency is the preferred term of Anglo-Saxon literature, coherence is more popular in other languages. Interestingly, the term *coherence* cannot be found in the treaties.

³⁵ For the legal references in this section see European Union (2006), *Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community*.

³⁶ “If we see - we can't call it so - the Maastricht Treaty as a constitution, then it is probably the only constitution which has a set of articles on development cooperation including one which is forcing the European Institutions towards policy coherence for development”; Annex 1: *Interview with Paul Hoebink*.

EC Treaty narrowly defined that the “Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 177 in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”. Despite this hidden tension between Article 3 TEU and Article 178 EC Treaty, it can be assumed that development cooperation is articulated as one of the general objectives of community policy.³⁷ In other words “the definition of objectives of that external action has a distinct development slant”³⁸.

Despite the legal basis of PCD, neither the formal EU institutions nor the Member States did actively promote policy coherence.³⁹ Also, there was some uncertainty about the implications of these articles. Thus, in 1991, the Dutch presidency of the European Council asked the former National Advisory Council for Development Cooperation to dwell on the meaning of the development paragraphs.⁴⁰ As a result a first substantive paper on PCD was published by Paul Hoebink in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty.⁴¹ This deliberation process on the nature of coherence has parallelly been accompanied by European NGOs spotlighting concrete incoherences. One of the most prominent cases was the European Commission’s decision to reduce beef export subsidies of May 1994. A campaign by European NGOs in 1993 revealed that EU subsidies on exported beef to West Africa not only had a distorting effect on the local beef market, but considerably undermined livestock development programmes financed through the European Development Fund^{42,43}. As a consequence the EU admitted the existing policy incoherence and reduced the subsidies in question. Correspondingly, a Commission Paper (1994) on Coherence in Community Policies stated that “[it] is therefore necessary to take measures to end the serious incoherence

³⁷ See Aschoff, Dirk-Jan (2007), *Nahrungsmittelhilfe und Kohärenz, EU-Politik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Idealen und Interessen*, Saarbrücken, p. 18.

³⁸ Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 31.

³⁹ “[T]here was a huge reluctance in the Commission itself to take up policy coherence issues, [...] and the head of the Dutch delegation at that time – our later minister of foreign affairs – even said to us at the end of the day, ‘you should not force me to pull a dead horse’”; Annex 1: *Interview with Paul Hoebink*.

⁴⁰ See Annex 1: *Interview with Paul Hoebink*.

⁴¹ See Hoebink, Paul (1999), ‘Coherence and development policy: The case of the European Union’, in: Forster, Jacques and Stokke, Olav (eds.), *Policy coherence in development cooperation*, EADI Book Series 22, London, pp. 323-345.

⁴² The European Development Fund (EDF) exists as a multi-annual fund outside the EU budget consisting of voluntary contributions by the different Member States. It is mainly used to implement the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 and revised in March 2010; see Nuscheler, Franz (2004), p. 528.

⁴³ See Herzfeld, Thomas (2003), ‘Die Ausfuhrerstattungen der Europäischen Union und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklungsländer: Das Beispiel der Rindfleischexporte nach Afrika’, in: *Wie steuerbar ist die Landwirtschaft? Erfordernisse, Potentiale und Instrumente zur Ökologisierung der Landwirtschaft*, Graz, Austria, 27 - 28 September; see Carbone, Maurizio (2008), p. 331.

that exists between the agricultural policy and development policy of the Community. Such measures are all the more urgent because this harmonization is a duty imposed by the Treaty on European Union".⁴⁴

To structure the intensifying debate on policy coherence within academia (e.g. universities), applied science (i.e. OECD), and international organisations (e.g. EU), the following three threads could be perceived:⁴⁵ The first one is focusing on concrete incoherences occurring between development policy and other policy areas such as fisheries or migration.⁴⁶ It is mainly concerned with the content of incoherences and took off immediately after the Maastricht Treaty.⁴⁷ Another part of the debate deals with processes or institutionalised approaches to enhance policy coherence.⁴⁸ The OECD has triggered the debate within the last ten years by conducting several conferences and workshops, or publishing analyses to broaden knowledge on political and institutional preconditions for PCD.⁴⁹ Particularly, the OECD Peer Review System of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been a driving force to establish PCD as a "part of the good governance debate on aid management and effectiveness"⁵⁰. The third line of the debate approaches PCD more methodologically. It attempts at

⁴⁴ For the campaign on subsidized exported beef to West Africa and the activities as well as statements of the Commission see OECD (2002b), *Development Cooperation Review, European Community*, Development Assistance Committee, Paris, p. I-65.

⁴⁵ See Annex 2: *Interview with Dr. Guido Ashoff*, German Development Institute, Bonn.

⁴⁶ For example see Hardus, Sarah (2010), *Ghana's Traders, Lumberjacks and Fortune Hunters, PCD in practice: the impact of European policies on development in Ghana*, Evert Vermeer Foundation, Amsterdam; see Hudson, Alan (2006); see Herzfeld, Thomas (2003).

⁴⁷ See Annex 1: *Interview with Paul Hoebink*, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen; see also OECD (2006a), *Fishing for Coherence. Fisheries and Development Policies*, Paris; see OECD (2006b), *The Development Dimension, Trade, Agriculture and Development, Policies working together*, Paris; OECD (2008a), *Agriculture: Improving Policy Coherence for Development*, Policy Brief April 2008, Paris.

⁴⁸ For example Kevenhörster, Paul (2002), 'Kohärenzfalle – die Suche nach einem Ausweg', in: *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit/Development and Cooperation*, No. 6, pp. 185-186; see Hack, Bernhard et al. (2008), *Politikkohärenz im Interesse der Entwicklung, Ein Leitfadens zu Policy Coherence for Development*, Parlamentarischer Nord-Süd Dialog (ed.), Wien.

⁴⁹ See OECD (1996), *Building Policy Coherence. Tools and Tensions*, Public Management Occasional Paper, No. 12, Paris; OECD (2000), *Strategic Governance and Policymaking: Building Policy Coherence*. Paris; OECD (2003), *Policy coherence: Vital for global development*, Policy Brief, Paris. (http://www.oecd.org/publications/Pol_brief); OECD (2005), *Agriculture and Development, The Case for Policy Coherence*, Paris; OECD (2008b); OECD (2009c), *Progress Report on OECD's Work on Policy Coherence for Development*, Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level, 24-25 June 2009; OECD (2009d).

⁵⁰ ECDPM/ICEI/Particip GmbH (2007), *Evaluation Study on the EU Institutions & Member States' Mechanisms for Promoting Policy Coherence for Development*, Triple C Evaluations, Studies in European Development Co-Operation Evaluation No. 7, Maastricht, p. 47.

measuring policy coherence and the impacts of incoherences.⁵¹ This thesis is located within the second dimension of the debate as it analyses the decision-making processes of the EU with regard to PCD. However, this research is also informed by the other two threads of the debate. Not only does it take into account studies that researched the impact on agricultural subsidies, but also refers to concrete incoherences between development policy and agriculture policy.

Reviewing the state of the art on the discourse on PCD indicates a gradual recognition of the concept, and a “more practical and operationally focused”⁵² literature with a concern for questions of effectiveness of development cooperation.⁵³ However, critical voices annotate that the literature of PCD remains as vague and imprecise as decision makers themselves when it comes to elaborate on how to translate the concept into practice.⁵⁴ Bearing in mind that PCD is first of all normative, the unyielding significance of PCD in academia and development policy cannot be generalized but furthering PCD remains a challenging management task as tentatively summarized in table 1.⁵⁵

Table 1: PCD as a complex management task⁵⁶

Task	Requirement
Political	Mobilizing support for and inducing commitment to PCD
Conceptional	Need for a target system to define and demand coherence from other policies
Analytical	Identifying and investigating incoherences
Structural	Fair distribution of competences within inter-service consultation
Processual	Furthering a culture of cooperation in working relations between staff of different resorts
Administrative	Creating capacities and incentives that pursue PCD

⁵¹ For example see Roodman, David (2005), *Rich Countries Tariffs and Subsidies: Let's Do the Numbers*, Center for Global Development, Washington, <http://www.cgdev.com>. [Accessed: 11-29-09]; see also Roodman, David (2009); Tokarick, Stephen (2003), *Measuring the Impact of Distortions in Agricultural Trade in Partial and General Equilibrium*, IMF Working Paper; see Diao, Xinshen and Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio and Robinson, Sherman (2003).

⁵² See ECDPM/ICEI/Particip GmbH (2007), p. 40.

⁵³ E.g. McLean Hilker, Lyndsay (2004), *A comparative analysis of institutional mechanisms to promote policy coherence for development. Case study synthesis: The European Community, United States and Japan*, paper prepared for the OECD policy workshop “Institutional Approaches to Policy Coherence for Development”, 18–19 May; see Picciotto, Robert (2004), *Policy coherence and development tevaluation. Concepts, issues and possible approaches*, Paper presented at the OECD policy workshop “Institutional Approaches to Policy Coherence for Development”, OECD, Paris; Ashoff, Guido (2005).

⁵⁴ See ECDPM/ICEI/Particip GmbH (2007), p. 47.

⁵⁵ See Annex 2: *Interview with Dr. Guido Ashoff*, German Development Institute, Bonn

⁵⁶ Based on Ashoff, Guido (2009), p. 26.

3. Theoretical framework

This section conceptualises policy coherence and PCD. First of all, different concepts of policy coherence and PCD are put forward. Subsequently, justifications as well as limitations of policy coherence are discussed in order to arrive at a sensible understanding of coherence. Finally, the policy coherence cycle is introduced as a theory to analyse the role of PCD within the decision-making processes of the CAP.

3.1. Concepts of policy coherence

Although a commonly agreed definition of coherence⁵⁷ is lacking, dictionaries describe coherence or its synonym consistency as “being free from self-contradiction”⁵⁸. Policy coherence as a relatively novel concept of political science and development studies can broadly be categorized in two different ways – a simple and a more sophisticated one. The simple approach considers coherence merely as the absence of incoherencies. In this sense, Hoebink (2005) defines policy coherence as the “the non-occurrence of policies or the results of policies that are contrary to the objectives of a given policy”⁵⁹. With respect to PCD, the OECD correspondingly defines *incoherences* as “actions that reduce current income and growth prospects in developing countries and thus run counter to aid policies that work to develop their competitiveness, i.e. their capacity to capture the benefits of globalization”⁶⁰.

Apart from this concise and narrow approach based on an economic rationale, coherence can also be defined in more sophisticated and somewhat ambitious terms. This implies the “interaction of policies with a view [...] to the achievement of overriding development objectives”⁶¹. Instead of merely recognizing that other policies might intentionally or coincidentally impair development policy goals, Ashoff (2005) demands “greater development orientation of all relevant policies”⁶² and thus

⁵⁷ *Coherence* or to cohere are related to the Latin verb ‘*cohaerere*’, which means to be associated, to fit together, to adhere (literal German translation: *zusammenhängen*).

⁵⁸ Wordsworth Concise Dictionary

⁵⁹ Hoebink, Paul (2005), *The Coherence of EU Politics: Perspectives from the North and the South, European Union’s Poverty Reduction Effectiveness Programme*, Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen / Brussels, p. 3.


⁶⁰ OECD (2003), p. 2.

⁶¹ Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 1.

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 12.

prioritizes development policy over other policies – a point to be returned in section 3.3.⁶³

The development policy of the EU has to take into account at least the following three forms of coherence which are illustrated by Figure 1.



As far as *internal coherence* is concerned reference is to be made to the development policy as a policy area at EU-level and the relevant policies explicitly mentioned as part of the Union’s external relations (i.e. security and trade policy). While it initially seems to be misleading to talk about internal coherence when it comes to external relations, it is crucial to bear in mind that development policy is part of the external relations of the EU. A second perspective looks at potential incoherence between the EU and its Member States in the area of development policy (*vertical coherence*). Additionally, the interaction between the European Union and other donor countries or multilateral organisations delivering development aid is to be recognized.⁶⁴ This thesis focuses on the third perspective which is concerned with the impact of other policy areas of the EU on the development cooperation of the Union. The underlying rationale of this so called *external coherence* is that development policy itself is not able to ensure a gradual and

⁶³ Nuttall agrees by stating that “all these policies can have significant impact for the world outside of the EU”; see Nuttall, Simon (2005), ‘Coherence’, in: Hill, Christopher and Smith, Michael (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union*, 4th edition, p. 104.

⁶⁴ See Hoebink (2006), ‘Coherence and Development Policy: An Autopsy with some European Examples’, in: European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes, *EADI Newsletter 1-2006*, pp. 4-5.

lasting development as long as other policy areas undermine developmental objectives. Instead, negative consequences are to be avoided and positive or coherent elements of other policy areas are to be enhanced.⁶⁵ Before concentrating on this particular form of coherence, the limitations of perfect coherence are to be addressed.

3.2. Limitations of perfect policy coherence

To begin with, *perfect* policy coherence cannot be achieved in a democratic and pluralistic polity (e.g. EU). Being characterised by a “multidimensional distribution of divergent interests”⁶⁶, a democratic and pluralistic polity is required to transfer individual preferences into collective decisions. The *Concordet paradox* indicates that a collective welfare function is difficult to determine if collective decisions are not based on binary choice (option ‘x’ vs. option ‘y’).⁶⁷ Suppose three actors (A, B, C) express their preferences for three policy options (d, e, f) in the following manner: A (d, e, f)⁶⁸; B (e, f, d); C (f, d, e). The majorities for the policy options (e, f, g) are cyclic or shifting: d is preferred to e by actors A and C; e is preferred to f by A and B; f is preferred to d by B and C. In other words, the different interests could not be reconciled by majority rule and deriving a consistent as well as collective preference function is impossible despite explicit individual preferences.⁶⁹ Similarly, the *Arrow paradox* implies that a consistent social welfare function could not be aggregated by referring to single preferences based on different assessment criteria.⁷⁰ Transferred to problems of incoherences between different EU policy areas, it is likely to expect that a perfectly consistent welfare function of different consistent European *interests* can not be established.

Apart from this more holistic view, it is necessary to address limitations of policy coherence *for* development (table 2). Although poverty reduction as embraced by MDG 1 is the core objective of development policy, other policies are also responsible for enhancing this goal. Thus, development policy cannot autonomously prescribe certain

⁶⁵ See Oldenbruch, Günther and Knocks, Stefanie (2008), p. 20.

⁶⁶ Kevenhörster, Paul (2008), p. 265.

⁶⁷ See de Concordet, Jean A. (1785), *Essai sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité de Voix*, Paris.

⁶⁸ This means that A prefers ‘d’ to ‘e’ to ‘f’.

⁶⁹ See Kevenhörster, Paul (2008), p. 266.

⁷⁰ See Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963), p. 51; see Kevenhörster, Paul (2006), *Politikwissenschaft, Band 2: Ergebnisse und Wirkungen von Politik*, Wiesbaden, p. 45; see Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 35.

policies but has to partly cooperate with other policy areas to design consistent policy solutions.⁷¹

Table 2: Causes of incoherence⁷²

Cause	Explanation
Societal and political norms of a country	Democratic pluralistic society
Political decision-making	Difficult political will formation due to divergent interests
Policy formulation and coordination	Structure and process of coordination; deficient information
Conceptual level	Opaque impacts of policies; development as a complex issue;

Moreover, policy coherence is not per se the core value rendering other competing and conflicting societal norms and interests redundant. Although it might foster efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy of government activities, the Public Management Service (PUMA) of the OECD recognises other societal and political norms such as “public participation, rights to local decision-making, moral beliefs, diversity, representation, competition etc.”⁷³. These are not necessarily congruent with coherence. Additionally, the presupposition of policy coherence as an overriding objective also contradicts the concept of pluralist society where different interests struggle for a political majority through substantive persuasion and negotiation. Instead of striving for perfect policy coherence, it is recommendable to expect some degree of structural incoherence. As other policy areas are also committed towards specific goals or guiding principles, it remains questionable why the overriding principles of development policy are to dominate societal and political norms, policy conceptualization and formulation as well as decision-making in other policy areas.⁷⁴ In other words, policy coherence remains crucial but it cannot automatically claim superiority over other equally important norms.

⁷¹ See Ashoff, Guido (2009), p. 13.

⁷² Ibid., pp. 34-40.

⁷³ See OECD (1996), p. 30.

⁷⁴ See Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 25.

3.3. Justifications of policy coherence for development

Nuttall (2005) argues that demands for coherence may very well be a “codeword for the supremacy” of a particular policy area.⁷⁵ Since *Policy Coherence for Development* obviously epitomises such a notion, it is crucial to address justifications of PCD.

From a strictly logical point of view, policy makers should favor coherence as it ideally implies that different policies do not impair each other. In other words, coherence prevents governments from acting ineffectively. Moreover, coherence avoids inefficiencies as scarce resources are not wasted by spending them on a policy distorted by activities in another policy area. Most importantly, a coherent policy can be expected to contribute to credibility and ultimately legitimacy which is crucial for any government or political system.⁷⁶ To put it rather bluntly, policy coherence is to be mainstreamed as “a general objective in all action taken by government”⁷⁷. Arguing from a logical point of view may sound appealing since it anticipates inconsistency as the exclusive and less promising alternative. Nuttall (2005) labels this the “emotional baggage”⁷⁸ of demands for increased policy coherence since it is difficult to find a strong (logical) point against avoiding inconsistency. Nevertheless, a fruitful approach about how to actually enhance policy coherence cannot be developed by merely referring to inconsistency as a consequence of dismissing coherence.

Hence, the basic question about justifying the call for greater policy coherence for development remains. At least three justifications can be put forward to explain why policy coherence for development is to be the rationale of EU’s policies.

Firstly, OECD (2003) explicitly refers to the economic rationale of policy coherence. Since developing and developed countries are mutually dependent on each other in a globalizing world economy, the wealth of OECD countries is to a certain degree based on the economic situation in developing countries.⁷⁹ For example, about one third of export sales and one half of OECD countries’ oil supply comes from developing countries.⁸⁰ Moreover, economic growth in developing countries can mainly be

⁷⁵ Nuttall, Simon (2005), p. 95.

⁷⁶ See Hoebink, Paul (2005), p. 13; see Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 11.

⁷⁷ Hoebink, Paul (2005), p. 13.

⁷⁸ Nuttall, Simon (2005), p. 93.

⁷⁹ See OECD (2003), p. 4.

⁸⁰ See Picciotto, Robert (2005b), ‘The Evaluation of Policy Coherence for Development’, in: *Evaluation*, No. 11., p. 313.

beneficial for developed countries: cheaper exports benefit consumers in the north; pro-poor growth in developing countries creates new markets for higher value exports. Hence, the OECD requests a dynamic economic development and competition instead of expensive protectionism which not only hampers development cooperation.⁸¹

A second reason is a negative justification for policy coherence for development based on two observations: Since development policy is either obscured (e.g. aid allocation influenced by security concerns) or directly distorted (e.g. agricultural export subsidies) by other policies, the efficiency and effectiveness of development cooperation can no longer be ensured autonomously by this policy area.⁸² For example, the implications of agricultural export subsidies could be twofold: on the one hand, development programs that aim at enhancing productivity of a particular agricultural sector could be impaired by subsidised imports of the same produce from donor countries (specific incoherence). On the other hand, export subsidies could artificially keep market prices at a lower level and distort the world agriculture market (general incoherence).⁸³

Thirdly, there are normative objectives that can legitimately request contributions by various policy areas to enhance PCD. Since all policy areas have an increasingly international dimension, policy coherence could be considered to be an appropriate answer to the challenges of globalization and a necessary precondition of global governance.⁸⁴ In order to be able to shape globalization, the different policies of a country cannot afford to continuously contradict each other but need to be more coherent for strategic reasons.⁸⁵ This “substantive-programmatic justification” by Ashoff (2005) emphasizes sustainable development as the “supreme guiding principle of global governance”⁸⁶. It evolved during the world conferences of the 1990s (Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the World Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1995, the World Social Summit in Copenhagen in 1995) and is epitomised by the United Nations Millennium Declaration adopted by 189 heads of state and government at the UN Millennium Summit in

⁸¹ See OECD (2003), p. 4.

⁸² Development policy is described as „Nebenaußenpolitik“ (second order foreign policy); Nuscheler, Franz (2008), p. 14.

⁸³ See Ashoff, Guido (2009), p. 3.

⁸⁴ See Aschoff, Dirk-Jan (2007), p. 19.

⁸⁵ See Ashoff, Guido (2009), pp. 4-5.

⁸⁶ Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 18.

September 2000.⁸⁷ In this sense the overriding objective of a global structural policy is “safeguarding the global future and ensuring sustainable development as a task for global governance”⁸⁸. This policy goal is not limited to development policy but does also hold for other policy areas such as security policy, trade policy, environment policy, migration policy and agriculture policy. By looking at the different policy areas from this particular target system, it is apparent that development policy as one element of global structural policy has its “place at the same level as the other policies”⁸⁹. A reciprocal relationship between the relevant policy areas can be identified and thus poverty reduction has to be considered as a shared responsibility.⁹⁰ In brief, the objectives of development cooperation are not some vested interests but can be derived from overriding goals of global structural policy. However, it is vital to emphasize that the thesis is an academic paper and not necessarily a passionate plea for PCD. This would imply to address further questions of who defines “safeguarding the global future and ensuring sustainable development” and who has the conceptual competence to determine the necessary degree of coherence other policy areas have to fulfill. Instead, the previous justifications for enhancing PCD are offered for functional reasons that facilitate finding an adequate answer to research questions.

3.4. The policy coherence cycle

Owing it to the complexity of the development process and the resulting difficulties in data collection, it remains difficult to arrive at more “than partial findings on the links between cause and effects”⁹¹. Since this might also hold for the agriculture-development nexus addressed by the central research question (‘Does PCD matter within the policy-making process of the CAP?’), it is crucial to apply a theoretical model that gives a plausible and probable account of the research problem. One way to approach the role of PCD within the decision-making processes is to apply and adjust

⁸⁷ Particularly, Millennium Development Goal 8 “Develop a global partnership for development” and Target 12: “Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading [...] system”; see United Nations General Assembly (2000), United Nations Millennium Declaration, <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/ares552e.pdf> [11.07.2009].

⁸⁸ Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 20.

⁸⁹ Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 21.

⁹⁰ This does not only mean that development policy heavily relies on other policy areas to support the objective of poverty reduction. Also, positive effects resulting from poverty reduction spill over to other policy areas such as security; see also Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 21.

⁹¹ Ashoff, Guido (2005), p. 40.

the 'policy coherence cycle' as it models the progress of the EU towards PCD.⁹² It helps to analyse the issue-specific role of PCD (i.e. within the CAP) particularly in those studies that are not primarily concerned with policy outputs, outcomes or impacts. While knowledge about the aforementioned is certainly important to inform the policy process, it was beyond the scope and reach of this thesis to investigate impacts of European export subsidies. Rather, earlier studies are used to understand the basic effects that this measure could have on developing countries.⁹³ Furthermore, limiting the scope of this research in this particular manner is also reasonable because the OECD (2009) explains that "a focus on policy processes may at the current time be a sensible and politically way forward"⁹⁴.

The policy coherence cycle is considered to be a viable theoretical tool to discern commitment, implementation and limitations of PCD within a specific policy area (e.g. CAP). The 'policy coherence cycle' (figure 2) contains three different phases that provide a more concise picture of the role of PCD. The first phase looks at incompatibilities and commonalities between policy objectives of development policy and agriculture policy by referring to explicit policy statements.⁹⁵ The second phase concentrates on formal and informal policy co-ordination mechanisms within the EU polity. It helps to expose the procedural input from development policy into CAP procedures and to identify conflicts resulting from PCD.⁹⁶ The third phase investigates the mechanisms in place for monitoring, analysing and reporting.⁹⁷

⁹² See OECD (2008), p. 14.

⁹³ See De Meza, David (1989), 'Not even strategic trade theory justifies export subsidies', in: *Oxford Economic Papers* 41, pp. 720-736; see Diao, Xinshen and Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio and Robinson, Sherman (2003); see Ferrer, Jorge Núñez (2006), 'Fiche on EU Agricultural Policy', in: Egenhofer, Christian (Project Leader), *Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council, Strategies for the Way Forward*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, pp. 104-112; see Green, Duncan and Griffith Matthew (2002); see Hemme, Torsten and Uddin, Mohammed (2009), *Dairy Case Study: Bangladesh vs. the EU*, International Farm Comparison Network, Kiel; see Roodman, David (2005); see Tokarick, Stephen (2003).


⁹⁴ OECD (2009d), p. 41.

⁹⁵ Building Block A: *Political commitment and policy statements*: Engaging the public; public commitments to PCD; time-bound action agendas for a more development-friendly CAP

⁹⁶ Building Block B: *Coordination mechanisms*: Informal working practices to support effective communication between policy areas; formal mechanisms for enhancing PCD and policy arbitration; role of development agency in discussion about policy coordination

⁹⁷ Building Block C: *Systems for monitoring, analysis and reporting*: Impact assessment of CAP on development countries; resources devoted to monitoring and use of external expertise; transparency and availability about progress of PCD; for a more elaborate description of this model see OECD (2008), p. 13-25.

Figure 2: The Policy Coherence Cycle




The basic and admittedly simple rationale of the policy coherence cycle is that the quality of PCD as the *dependent variable* can be systematically and procedurally be explained by analysing each of the three phases as the *independent variables* (political commitment and policy statements; coordination mechanisms; systems for monitoring, analysing and reporting).

Since external coherence (e.g. coherence between development policy and other policy areas) stresses the importance of PCD within policy processes of other policy areas, referring to the policy coherence cycle in itself remains insufficient. Thus, this cycle is to be embedded in the analysed policy process. A promising way to accomplish this is merging the policy coherence cycle and the *policy cycle* originally drafted by Lasswell (1956) and continuously refined by others to analyse policy processes (figure 3).⁹⁸ This policy cycle fosters a “differentiated understanding of internal dynamics, characteristics, and causes of specific and complex processes of policy making”⁹⁹ (e.g. reintroduction of export subsidies for dairy products), while the role of PCD can simultaneously be observed. In this sense, premium attention is paid to the policy coherence cycle that is embedded in the complementary policy cycle.

⁹⁸ See Lasswell, Harold D. (1956), *The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis*, College Park; see Jann, Werner and Wegrich, Kai (2009), ‘Phasenmodelle und Politikprozesse: Der Policy Cycle’, in: Schubert, Klaus and Bandelow, Nils C. (eds.), *Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse 2.0*, 2nd ed., Munich, pp. 75-113.

⁹⁹ Jann, Werner and Wegrich, Kai (2009), p. 104.

Figure 3: The Policy Cycle



4. Research Methodology

This section presents and discusses the methodology that has been applied in order to sufficiently answer the central research question. It is demonstrated to what extent the methods are able to ensure conformity with the quality criteria of research. Also, this section examines opportunities of deriving generalizations from the findings and it explains why focusing on one policy process is of valuable merit.

Since this paper explores the role of PCD within EU policy-making processes, it ‘measures’ institutional and procedural approaches that might enhance PCD.¹⁰⁰ In this sense the concrete content of incoherences (e.g. export subsidies for dairy products) and impacts of incoherences (effects of export subsidies on developing countries) inform this research but are not of primary concern. Before turning to the operationalisation of the policy coherence cycle, it is important to elaborate on how these two threads of the PCD debate (i.e. (i) content of incoherences; (ii) measurement of incoherences and impacts of incoherences)) can be utilized to contribute to solid findings (Chapter 2).

¹⁰⁰ Premium sources of this category are the OECD/DAC Peer Reviews as well as the biennial PCD reports published by the European Commission (e.g. OECD (2002b); OECD (2007), *Development Cooperation Review, European Community*, Development Assistance Committee, Paris; Commission of the European Communities (2007b); Commission of the European Communities (2009a).

Regarding the content of the incoherence (i), it is crucial to understand the policy process that resulted in the reintroduction of dairy products in early 2009. As stated in the previous section, the policy cycle is used to structure this policy process. The necessary data is for the most part derived from official documents of the EU and articles published in newspapers or scientific journals and by European NGOs. In order to back up the analysis of the policy process by findings about possible impacts of incoherences (ii), three steps can be taken¹⁰¹: A *static* measurement quantitatively suggests to compare agricultural subsidies to aid disbursed by the European Commission. A *dynamic* measurement provides information on incoherences over time. One example is the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) which measures the contribution of seven policy areas of donor countries to a more coherent policy vis-à-vis the developing world.¹⁰² It allows to analyse coherence of a particular policy area over time and to compare contributions to PCD internationally.¹⁰³ Not being assessed as one unit, it is possible for the EU to merge the values of those Member States who are part of the CDI because of the common agriculture and trade policies.¹⁰⁴ Among the seven categories, *trade* is assessed in terms of subsidies for domestic farmers and tariffs on imports as barriers to international trade.¹⁰⁵ Thus, a broad assessment of the performance of the EU allows for first conclusions about the role of PCD. Finally, statements about *impacts* of incoherence (effects of export subsidies on developing countries) are derived from and based on earlier studies that appear to be numerous but not always scientifically sound.

Since the operationalisation of the policy coherence cycle is mainly based on qualitative data it is necessary to address the implications of qualitative research. While quantitative research uses large sets of numerical data to quantify broader predictions, qualitative research aims at “depth rather than breadth”¹⁰⁶. According to Brockington

¹⁰¹ A concise overview on measuring incoherence as well as impacts of incoherence is provided by Ashoff, Guido (2009), p. 10.

¹⁰² See Roodman, David (2009).

¹⁰³ “For components that measure “goods” (aid, investment, migration, security, and technology), zero should map to zero. That is, if a country gives no aid (more precisely, if its aid program is deemed valueless after adjusting for quality), its final aid score should be 0—not -2 or +2. For components that measure “bads” (environment and trade, which mainly assess environmental harm and trade barriers) a perfect absence of the thing assessed should translate into an intuitive maximum score, such as 10”; See Roodman, David (2009), p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ “In general, because EU nations share common trade and agriculture policies, they score essentially the same on trade”, http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/.

¹⁰⁵ See Roodman, David (2009), p. 17.

¹⁰⁶ Harrison, Lisa (2001), *Political Research. An Introduction*, London, p. 74.

and Sullivan (2003) qualitative research tries to “understand the world” by collecting data and interpreting actions and perceptions of the relevant actors. It does not test theory in practice but works inductively to arrive at assumptions or even theories through empirical observation and exploration.¹⁰⁷ Instead of strong emphasis on measuring concepts to describe an external reality, qualitative research asks questions of ‘why’ and ‘how’.¹⁰⁸

The main instrument to determine the role of PCD within policy processes were semi-structured expert interviews designed to gather information from EU actors about the phases of the policy coherence cycle (political commitment and policy statements; coordination mechanisms; systems for monitoring, analysis and reporting). A deeper understanding of the overall debate on PCD was gained by carrying out interviews with two PCD experts.¹⁰⁹

By directly talking to those dealing with PCD it was not only possible to draw a precise picture of justifications, implementation and limitations of PCD within the policy making processes of the EU. Also, the interviews were crucial to better understand the different roles of the various actors (e.g. European Parliament, Commission, civil society) within the process of enhancing PCD in other policy areas. Most importantly, the interviews provided precious information on working relations and interlinkages between the actors of different institutions.

Nevertheless, semi-structured interviews have a downside apart from efforts to conduct and subscribe the interview. Although the thematic areas remained the same throughout all interviews, the interviewer adjusted the questions to the different settings. This is not free of risk as the researcher might ask questions in a completely different way or fake answers afterwards.¹¹⁰ In contrast to that, semi-standardized interviews were chosen as they offer various advantages: the open atmosphere of an interview and sufficient time for reflection could encourage more profound and professional answers as the interviewee does not simply deliver data. The personal contact certainly increases the motivation and acceptance of questions. In contrast to a

¹⁰⁷ See Brockington, Dan and Sullivan (2003), ‘Qualitative Research’, in: Scheyvens, Regina and Storey, Donovan (eds.), *Development Fieldwork, A Practical Guide*, p. 57.

¹⁰⁸ See Kruse, Jan (2009), *Reader: Einführung in die qualitative Interviewforschung*, Freiburg.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews could be conducted with the following persons: Prof. Dr. Paul Hoebink, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen; Dr. Guido Ashoff, German Development Institute, Bonn; Franziska Keller, MEP; Civil servant working in the PCD Unit, DG Development, European Commission; Suzan Cornelissen, Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation.

¹¹⁰ See Soll, Armin (2003), *Die Befragung*, Konstanz, pp. 39-41.

fully standardized questionnaire, the researcher can also restate unclear or unanswered questions. Of course, the interviewer needs to be eloquent and very familiar with the content of the questions in order to receive valuable and relevant information.¹¹¹

These advantages and disadvantages are to be taken into consideration in order to ensure conformity with the quality criteria of qualitative research¹¹²: *Transparency* can only be achieved if a complete documentation of the interviews is available. Therefore, the transcripts of the interviews can be found in the annex to this thesis.¹¹³ As a second criterion of qualitative research the need for *consistency* is emphasized. This corresponds with reliability as a main criterion of quantitative research and suggests that a finding is consistent if it can be derived from various actors offering comparable answers to similar questions. The case study offers two ways to comply with this criterion. Consistent findings can be achieved if interviewees make corresponding statements. Additionally, congruence between the problem perceptions indicates consistency. Besides, analyses of official documents, evaluation reports, and especially the biennial PCD reports offered additional opportunities to increase consistency. However, Soll (2003) reminds us to not exclude occurring inconsistencies between interviewees from the analysis but to understand and explain them.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, it was crucial to determine consistency when subsequently analyzing the transcript. Finally, findings demand a certain degree of *communicability* which corresponds with validity as the other main criterion of quantitative research. While validity demands that theoretical accounts have to be measurable, the findings of qualitative research need to be communicated. Thus, sufficient references and direct quotations have to be provided in order to demonstrate how the findings were derived.¹¹⁵

At its core, this thesis consists of a case study about the role of PCD with the policy process that led to the reintroduction of export subsidies for dairy products. Although case studies could be applied to explore a particular phenomenon in detail and under certain circumstances, it would be insufficient to consider exclusive assumptions about one specific case as an end in itself and dismiss any form of generalization. Instead Van

¹¹¹ See *ibid.* pp. 39-41.

¹¹² See Soll, Armin (2003), p. 28. (Transparency, Consistency, Coherence, Communicability)

¹¹³ Transcription of the conducted interviews has mainly been done word by word, while a few expressions have been adjusted to ensure readability; for a more detailed and critical discussion see Kruse, Jan (2009), p. 132.

¹¹⁴ See Soll, Armin (2003), p. 29.

¹¹⁵ See *ibid.*, p 29.

Evera (1997) urges us to ask “of what more general phenomena are these specific causes and effects examples?”¹¹⁶. Thus, a case study is to be designed to allow for generalizations, while it also offers in-depth analysis of actions and perceptions of the research subjects.¹¹⁷ However, the selected case initially seems to constrain broader statements about PCD as it deals with one decision in a particular policy area. The main reason for choosing this particular case is that export subsidies have always been one of the most prominent examples of policy incoherence of EU policies.¹¹⁸ While this standard case appears to be very resilient and of ongoing importance, the recent reintroduction of export subsidies for dairy products is worth researching as it occurred after many substantive changes in the PCD architecture of the EU have taken place. Thus, it is a valuable case to test the current role of PCD.

5. Data and Analysis: PCD and the CAP

5.1. Reintroduction of export subsidies on dairy products in February 2009

To set the scene for an analysis of the role of PCD within the CAP, this section briefly applies the policy cycle (problem definition, agenda-setting, policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation) to model the policy process that has led to the reintroduction of export subsidies for dairy products in early 2009.¹¹⁹ To understand the *problem definition* of this policy process it is worth recalling that the CAP pursues increasing agricultural productivity, fair standard of living for the agricultural community, and stabilizing markets according to Article 33 TEU. In order to pursue these objectives within the dairy sector, the EU has the following instruments at its disposal: a system of milk quotas to control milk supply, tariffs for milk products to steer the level of imports entering the EU, and export subsidies to enhance the competitiveness of European dairy products on the world market.¹²⁰ Since a record high milk price in December 2007, a continuous fall of the world market price for milk can be observed (figure 4). The sharp decline from August 2008 onwards can partly be explained by a mismatch of lower demand induced by the financial crisis and a strong

¹¹⁶ Van Evera, Stephen (1997), *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, Cornell University Press, London, p. 68.

¹¹⁷ See Harrison, Lisa (2001), p. 79.


¹¹⁸ “Export subsidies have long been one of the most controversial trade-distorting measures used by rich countries”; see See ICTSD (2009b), p. 9.

¹¹⁹ See Jann, Werner and Wegrich, Kai (2009), p. 101

¹²⁰ See Hemme, Torsten and Uddin, Mohammed (2009), p. 1.

milk supply growth.¹²¹ While world market prices fell by 40 percent, the reduction was 28 percent within the EU.¹²²

Figure 4: Export subsidies of the EU in relation to the world dairy market¹²³



Due to political pressure from the agricultural community the situation of European dairy farmers was perceived as a problem by the political system and therefore *set on the agenda*.¹²⁴ In this sense, the former EU's Agriculture Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel stated that "exporters are no longer able to compete"¹²⁵ due to the declining world market price for milk. During the phase of policy formulation export subsidies for dairy products quickly occurred as a viable solution in accordance with the objectives of the CAP, and as a "response to a dramatic 60 percent decrease in world market prices,

¹²¹ See *ibid.*, p. 2.

¹²² "Um 40 Prozent ist der Milchpreis mit dem – allerdings sehr hohen Niveau Ende 2007 in Deutschland gefallen. 28 Prozent betrug der Rückgang in der EU. Ein Bauer in Deutschland erhält damit gerade einmal 22 Cent je Liter"; see Kafsack, Hendrik (2009b), *Hilfloses Ringen um die Milchquote*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Online, <http://www.faz.net>. [Accessed 09-03-09]

¹²³ Hemme, Torsten and Uddin, Mohammed (2009), Annex 3.

¹²⁴ Observers claim that decisions within the Council of agriculture ministers are "less of reflection of the interests of the society at large and more of a compromise between divergent interests of farmers or groups of farmers in the Community"; see Koester, Ulrich and El-Agraa, Ali (2007), 'The Common Agricultural Policy', in: *ibid.* (ed.), *The European Union, Economics and Policies*, 7th ed., Cambridge, p. 383.

¹²⁵ Quoted by ICTSD (2009b), p. 9.

resulting from shrinking demand and the impact on farmers' revenues."¹²⁶ Based on Commission Regulation No. 140/2009 these "export refunds on milk and milk products" were reintroduced in February 2009 after "export refunds were set at zero on 16 June 2006 for skimmed milk powder, on 26 January 2007 for concentrated milk and whole milk powder and on 16 June 2007 for butter and cheeses"^{127,128} Regarding the *implementation* of this decision (or more correctly regulation), the Commission stated that the EU "will continue to provide export refunds on an objective basis for as long as needed bearing in mind ongoing international negotiations".¹²⁹ Generally speaking, the EU provides export subsidies for dairy products to bridge the gap between production costs and world market price.¹³⁰ More precisely, until September 2009, € 296 million have been spent on export subsidies for milk products. This means that 5 percent of overall European dairy produce or t 1.12 of milk products have been subsidised. Relating it to the world market for milk, a share of 16.73 percent consisted of subsidised exports from Europe.¹³¹ Without already elaborating too much on PCD in this section, it is worth noting that about 70 percent of these exports were imported by developing countries at prices that would only cover half of the production costs in Europe.¹³² First estimations project about € 600 million in subsidies for dairy products in 2010.¹³³ In order to *evaluate* the impacts and outcomes of this policy process as the fifth phase of the policy cycle, it is helpful to refer to the European Court of Auditors (2009) which assessed the instruments applied to the dairy market in terms of goal attainment. According to the Court, export refunds for dairy products had been reintroduced at the beginning of 2009 due to a "fall in world prices together with the fall of the dollar against the euro" and "the problem of European producers'

¹²⁶ Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p. 82.

¹²⁷ European Court of Auditors (2009), *Have the management instruments applied to the market in milk and milk products have achieved their main objectives?*, Special Report, No, 14, Luxembourg, p. 22.

¹²⁸ See Commission of the European Communities (2009c). Compared to other legislation the EP is less involved in agricultural policy decisions. It has to be informed and can express its opinion; see Koester, Ulrich and El-Agraa, Ali (2007), p. 382.

¹²⁹ Commission of the European Communities (2009b), *Communication from the Commission to the Council, Dairy market situation 2009*, COM(2009) 385 final, Brussels, p. 7.

¹³⁰ See ICTSD (2009c), 'EU Ministers to Meet over Milk Crisis', in: *Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest*, Vol. 13 (33), 30 September, p.7.

¹³¹ See Wiggerthale, Marita (2009), *EU-Milchexportsubventionen (WTO-Notifizierungen)*, Oxfam Deutschland, Berlin, based on Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtsstelle GmbH/Central market and price reporting office as of October 15, Bonn.

¹³² See Paasch, Armin (2010), p. 214.

¹³³ See Kafsack, Hendrik (2009a), *Milchquote in der EU, Aigners Vorstoß abermals gescheitert*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Online, <http://www.faz.net>. [Accessed 09-03-09]

competitiveness”¹³⁴. Furthermore, the cessation of all export subsidies until 2007 did not result from a structural decline of the European surpluses of milk products. Rather, a sudden increase in world market prices at the end of 2006 and in 2007 together with a strong demand for cheese rendered export subsidies and other measures temporarily superfluous.¹³⁵ Also, export refunds are considered to be only available in the medium term because of upcoming world trade agreements that would ultimately demand the elimination of these trade measures.¹³⁶ Based on these findings the Court of Auditors carefully recommends to focus on the demands of the European market since basic milk products such as butter and milk (powder) were “only competitive when world prices were high”¹³⁷. In this sense, dairy products of high added value such as cheese are considered to be those exports that can be beneficial without budgetary assistance.¹³⁸

The application of the policy cycle has helped to structure the policy process that resulted in the reintroduction of export subsidies for dairy products. As a next step, the analysis can now focus on the complementary role of PCD within this policy-process by adding the policy coherence cycle as an additional layer.

5.2. Political commitment and policy statements

The first phase of the policy coherence cycle involves specifying political commitment and policy statements that foster PCD.¹³⁹

An overall assessment (also compared to other OECD members) of this phase occurs to be positive as the EU has been progressing “in making PCD a central plank of policy across the whole of government”¹⁴⁰. This results to a large extent from the fact that PCD continues to have a solid primary legal basis reaffirmed by the Lisbon Treaty.¹⁴¹ Art. 3

¹³⁴ See European Court of Auditors (2009), p. 39.

¹³⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 23. “[In] times of crisis, always there will be a fallback. And of course, that's what's happening now. Important steps have been made to change the CAP, but as you indicated yourself, there is a new push now for export subsidies”; Annex 1: *Interview with Prof. Dr. Paul Hoebink*, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen.

¹³⁶ See European Court of Auditors (2009), p. 48.

¹³⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 44.

¹³⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 48.

¹³⁹ See OECD (2009d), p. 19.

¹⁴⁰ OECD (2009d), p. 25; see OECD (2007), p. 31.

¹⁴¹ “[...] weil es im Lissabonvertrag so drinsteht im Artikel 208. Da wird Politikkohärenz so definiert, dass es für Entwicklung ist. Das ist für uns auch total wichtig, dass man immer mit dem Artikel, mit den Paragraphen wedeln kann. Leider interessiert das hier nicht allzu viele

TEU replaced by Art. 21 III of a consolidated version of the TEU also reads that the “Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies“. Furthermore, Art. 178 EC Treaty is replaced by Art. 208 I Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, former EC Treaty) which demands that “the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.¹⁴² Additionally, the newly established High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Catherine Ashton) “shall ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action” according to Art. 18 IV TEU.

This primary legal basis has repeatedly been confirmed and reemphasised by the Council of Ministers, the EP and the European Commission who furthermore agreed on publishing a biennial progress report.¹⁴³ This first ‘EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development’ (2007) was already considered to be a success in itself, although it remained superficial and found that “PCD is not institutionalised well enough in the decision-making process”¹⁴⁴. The evaluation of the implementation of PCD identified twelve priority policy areas as challenges to PCD – among them being agriculture. The report of 2007 rightfully proclaims that “since 2003, export subsidies and trade-distorting-domestic subsidies have been reduced drastically”¹⁴⁵. Interestingly, the second PCD report of September 2009 also announces that “progress has been made on reducing export subsidies”¹⁴⁶, while export refunds for dairy products had been reintroduced in January of the same year. Compared to the first report, the second report shows considerable improvement in depth and analytical capacity.¹⁴⁷ At the same time it is criticised for lacking clear indicators to measure progress and for largely

Leute. Aber im Prinzip haben wir die vertraglich Grundlage dafür“; Annex 3: *Interview with Franziska Keller*, MEP.

¹⁴² Art. 208 TFEU is described as “the anchor” of policy coherence; Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant*, PCD Unit, DG Development, European Commission.

¹⁴³ See Commission of the European Communities (2005b); see Council of the European Union (2006), *Orientation Debate on Policy Coherence for Development and the Effectiveness of EU external action*, Brussels, 13735/06, 9 October 2006; see Council of the European Union (2009), *Council conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)*, 2974th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 17 November 2009; see European Parliament (2010), *Report on the EU Policy Coherence for Development and the ‘Official Development plus’ concept*, Committee on Development, Rapporteur: Franziska Keller, Brussels.

¹⁴⁴ See Commission of the European Communities (2007b), p. 3. “The first one stated the whole set of issues but sort of didn’t go very deep. The second one of last year is a bit better but also sort of rather superficial still”; Annex 1: *Interview with Prof. Dr. Paul Hoebink*, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen.

¹⁴⁵ Commission of the European Communities (2007b), p. 6.

¹⁴⁶ Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p. 85.

¹⁴⁷ See OECD (2008), p. 43.

ignoring concerns of the EP expressed in a parliamentary PCD report.¹⁴⁸ However, the report repeats that the “the EU remains committed to phasing out export subsidies in the framework of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda”¹⁴⁹. The same commitment is made by the ‘Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010- 2013’.¹⁵⁰ Also, the EP pursues reaching “full coherence with the objectives of the EU's development policy, such as the rapid phasing out of all trade-distorting subsidies”¹⁵¹. Apparently, these policy statements are not in line with what has been voiced during the phase of policy formulation as solutions to the dairy market situation. Consequently, individual MEPs have submitted amendments and questions to raise their concern. For example, Christa Klass (EPP) during a debate on farm subsidies on November 30th 2009, inquired whether the Commission can “prevent EU subsidies for European farmers obstructing the development of agricultural structures in the poorer countries?”¹⁵². Similarly, Yannick Jadot (Greens/EFA) amended an Opinion on PCD by the Committee on International Trade (INTA) by criticising export subsidies for dairy products to counter development efforts and increase dependency of dairy producers in developing countries on Europe.¹⁵³

Among the strongest policy statements is the ‘European Consensus on Development’ (2005) as a “specific commitment to PCD”¹⁵⁴. It embraces PCD as a core element of the

¹⁴⁸ “Generell gibt es kaum Indikatoren, an denen wir Sachen messen können. Es gibt selten so etwas von wegen 'wir haben einen Erfolg, wenn...die Exportsubventionen auf null zusammengestrichen werden'. Das bleibt sehr vage. [...]Auch der PCD-Bericht der Kommission muss, glaube ich, einfach mehr mit in Betracht gezogen werden, was der letzte PCD-Bericht des Parlaments gemacht hat.”; Annex 3: *Interview with Franziska Keller, MEP*.

¹⁴⁹ Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p. 82.

¹⁵⁰ “the eventual elimination of export subsidies, subject to the parallel discipline on other export supporting measures by other developed countries. [...] to eliminate all export subsidies by 2013, provided that similar disciplines are agreed upon for equivalent measures”; see European Commission (2010), *Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013 accompanying 'A twelve-point EU action plan in support of the Millennium Development Goals'*, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2010) 421 final, Brussels, p. 6, 21.

¹⁵¹ European Parliament (2008), *Report on the Treaty of Lisbon (2007/2286(INI))*, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rapporteurs: Richard Corbett and Iñigo Méndez de Vigo, p. 80.

¹⁵² Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation (2009), *ACP-EU JPA Question by MEP Klass on Subsidies*, http://www.fairpolitics.nl/europa/cases/policy_coherence_in_general/2009_12_18_acp_eu_jpa_qu_estion_by_mep_klass_on_subsidies?term=klass&p=1. [Accessed: 12-18-2009]

¹⁵³ See Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation (2010), *MEPs Submit Amendments to INTA Opinion on PCD*, http://www.fairpolitics.nl/europa/cases/policy_coherence_in_general/2010_03_09_meps_submit_amendments_to_inta_opinion_on_pcd?term=yannick%20jadot&p=1. [Accessed: 03-09-2010]

¹⁵⁴ See OECD (2009d), p. 25.

“EU vision of development”¹⁵⁵ by stating that “the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources and share best practice to further these aims.”¹⁵⁶ Explicitely, the ‘European Consensus on Development’ also refers to incoherences resulting from the CAP by asserting that “the EU will substantially reduce the level of trade distortion related to its support measures to the agricultural sector, and facilitate developing countries’ agricultural development”¹⁵⁷.

Overall, policy statements are numerous, and political commitment seems to be high – in broader PCD matters and particularly in relation to the CAP and export subsidies respectively. Consequently, Hoebink (2006) concludes that the „most advanced deliberations in this matter can be located within the European Union“¹⁵⁸. While this occurs to be a valuable observation in relation to other donor countries, it remains to be seen how these deliberations are ultimately transformed into political action. For example, the former Art. 178 EC Treaty was considered to provide a relatively progressive legal basis, but it nevertheless did not prescribe a certain course of action to be taken by the EU. Rather, it mainly made active coordination of policy planning and implementation increasingly necessary.¹⁵⁹ Similarly, the legal and political implications of the newly introduced Art. 208 TFEU cannot yet be fully anticipated. One possible way to utilise this article might be to invoke it at the European Court of Justice and determine if it is legally enforceable.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ Commission of the European Communities (2005c), p. 2.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁵⁷ European Consensus on Development, December 2005, para 36 – 14820/05.

¹⁵⁸ Hoebink, Paul (2006), p. 4.

¹⁵⁹ “Die von Art. 178 EGV geforderte Kohärenz legt die EG nicht auf eine konkrete Handlungsweise fest, da Kohärenz eine Frage der politischen Abwägung von miteinander kollidierenden Zielsetzungen bleibt. Die EG ist demgegenüber angehalten ständig Planung und Durchführung ihrer Politiken aktiv zu koordinieren“; Trumm, Silke (1999), *Das Prinzip des Weltfreihandels und der europäische Agraraußenhandel: am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Marktordnungen für Getreide, Zucker und Bananen*, Berlin, p. 249.

¹⁶⁰ “[...] wenn da jetzt ganz krass Entwicklung anderen Interessen untergeordnet wird, kann man dann nicht vielleicht vor den Europäischen Gerichtshof gehen z.B. und sagen, hier wird der Vertrag verletzt. Das ist ja auch nicht ohne, wenn das da im Vertrag steht. Das ist kein unverbindliches Schriftstück, sondern ein Vertrag. Und wir werden uns noch mal angucken müssen, was da alles noch mit möglich ist“; Annex 3: *Interview with Franziska Keller*, MEP.

5.3. Coordination mechanisms

The second phase of the policy coherence cycle concentrates on coordination mechanisms that are designed to “maximise synergies and minimise incoherence”¹⁶¹. More precisely, attention is paid to structures and processes that might be conducive in furthering PCD. Ideally, this implies awareness of development objectives in “all relevant parts of EU institutions”¹⁶², and high priority is to be given to PCD as a crucial factor to meet these objectives.¹⁶³

The promotion of PCD within the European institutions could be seen in the launch of an informal network of policy coherence for development at EU level in 2003 in order to identify potential synergies between development policy goals and other policy areas.¹⁶⁴ The findings of this network were substantially backed by the aforementioned European Consensus on Development (2005), which also prepared ground for the ‘rolling work programme on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)’ in 2006.¹⁶⁵ This work programme should function as a policy framework to identify “the potential of non-ODA financial flows for development and increasing their development value both at Community and at Member States level”¹⁶⁶.

As the most important instrument for coordination, a PCD unit was installed in DG Development to consult with civil society, meet with experts and involve representatives from other DGs. The unit consists of two civil servants who are in close contact with the thematic units within DG Development (i.e counterparts of the line DGs such as trade, fisheries, agriculture etc.) and other DGs of the Commission.¹⁶⁷ The overall mandate is a “catalysing, advising and coaching role for PCD”¹⁶⁸. *Ideally*, this implies that the unit identifies conflicts of interest, which are then solved by a “cooperative solution”¹⁶⁹. Alternatively, the incoherent policy is adjusted or the

¹⁶¹ OECD (2009d), p. 19.

¹⁶² Council of the European Union (2009), p. 5.

¹⁶³ See European Parliament (2008), p. 80.

¹⁶⁴ See Egenhofer, Christian (2006), *Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council, Strategies for the Way Forward*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, p. 8.

¹⁶⁵ See Oldenbruch (2008), p. 20.

¹⁶⁶ Commission of the European Communities (2009f), *Policy Coherence for Development – Establishing the policy framework for a whole-of-the-Union approach*, COM(2009) 458 final, Brussels, p. 10.

¹⁶⁷ See Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

¹⁶⁸ Commission of the European Communities (2009a).

¹⁶⁹ Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

concerned developing country receives support in meeting the impacts of a EU policy.¹⁷⁰

The usual mechanism to promote PCD between relevant DGs is inter-service consultation (ISC) introduced in 2008 and improved according to the EU report on PCD in 2009.¹⁷¹ Consultations take place at a technical level and allow for comments and also negative opinions in case of disagreement with a proposal. If these disagreements persist, the Commissioners have to solve them at the political level.¹⁷² Even though ISC would require a fair distribution of competences and a culture of cooperation between staff of different resorts, the working relations between the different DGs are characterised as “antagonistic cooperation”¹⁷³ by a civil servant of the Commission. Identifying policies of other DGs that might undermine development objective demands a critical perception that could result in conflictive relations. This seems to be one reason why the PCD unit was not always calling itself a coherence unit during the inception phase according to Hoebink.¹⁷⁴ Additionally, the analytical capacity of the PCD unit is limited also because DG Development in itself does not have the human resources who can provide a profound analysis of the CAP.¹⁷⁵ Combined with the fact that DG Development “does not have substantial power in this context”¹⁷⁶, it becomes apparent that a consensual mode of discussion and permanent exchange is critical for the PCD unit.¹⁷⁷ While the PCD unit is not necessarily able to influence every policy proposal, the inter-service consultation nevertheless ensures that proposals by any DG are as a minimum screened for possible incoherence if the general secretariat is of the

¹⁷⁰ “[P]olicy impact approach or cooperative solution approach”; Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

¹⁷¹ See Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p. 12.

¹⁷² See ECDPM/ICEI/Particip GmbH (2007), p. 31.

¹⁷³ Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

¹⁷⁴ See Annex 1: *Interview with Prof. Dr. Paul Hoebink*, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen.

¹⁷⁵ See Annex 1: *Interview with Prof. Dr. Paul Hoebink*, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen. “As far as I can see now, they are really trying to get involved as much as they can in internal discussion within the European Commission. Of course, their resources are limited and there're just a couple of people working there. [...] You can't expect people working within DG Development to be knowledgeable about so many technical issues and also so many different policy fields. It is a way easier the other way around. If you put people who are aware of development cooperation and developing countries and the issues that these countries are dealing with, let them work within the different DGs and that you sort of be a watchdog”; Annex 5: *Interview with Suzan Cornelissen*, Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation.

¹⁷⁶ Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

¹⁷⁷ “We have to be permanently in liaison with other DGs ensuring that the PCD agenda is pushed forward. [...] At the end of the day, you need to have a consensus”; Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

opinion that DG Development is concerned.¹⁷⁸ Clearly, this is an institutional advantage of the EU for example compared to Germany, where this principle is not pursued for policy proposals.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, inter-service consultation appears to be a processual opportunity to clear different interests at a central level (College of Commissioners) before decision-making in the Council takes place “through nine sectorally-divided ministerial formations and numerous subordinate bodies”¹⁸⁰. However, inter-service consultation remains partly intransparent to the EP and by the end of the day it comes down to the question whether this coordination mechanism has any impact on policy outcomes.¹⁸¹ The decision to finally reintroduce export subsidies for dairy products indicates developmental concerns could not withstand the strong political pressure to support European dairy farmers.¹⁸² Consequently, demands to enhance inter-service co-ordination as well as communication between the relevant DGs, and a stronger focus on whole-of-government approaches to PCD remain valid.¹⁸³

Before turning to similar observations regarding systems of monitoring, analysis and reporting, it is worth referring to the Cotonou agreement renewed in 2002 as another possible coordination mechanism. The agreement is not to be considered to merely be a policy statement but a legally binding treaty among the EU and 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Art. 12 is of particular magnitude as it grants ACP countries the right to hold consultations with the Commission before a measure considered to be potentially incoherent is finally taken by the EU.¹⁸⁴ However, it has only been invoked once upon request by ACP countries in February 2009 to discuss five

¹⁷⁸ “The arbitrage which is done by the general secretariat is very wide, wide interpretation of who is concerned. It means that particularly DG DEVE is concerned”; Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

¹⁷⁹ See *Interview with Dr. Guido Ashoff*, German Development Institute, Bonn.

¹⁸⁰ ECDPM/ICEI/Particip GmbH (2007), p. 45. “The Commission is a place where the mediation has to be done”; Annex 1: *Interview with Prof. Dr. Paul Hoebink*, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen.

¹⁸¹ “Es gibt auch solche inter-DG Arbeitsgruppen, die sich öfters mal zusammensetzen, aber wie das da genau aussieht, wissen wir halt auch nicht”; Annex 3: *Interview with Franziska Keller*, MEP; see also Annex 2: *Interview with Dr. Guido Ashoff*, German Development Institute, Bonn.

¹⁸² “But [by] the end of the day, between some African farmers 4000 km from here and people here coming with cows and milk on the Robert Schumanplain, the decision is done relatively fast”; Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

¹⁸³ See OECD (2009d), p. 66.

¹⁸⁴ “The parties are committed to addressing policy coherence for development in a targeted, strategic and partnership oriented way. [...] At their request, consultations shall be held promptly so that account may be taken of their concerns as to the impact of those measures before any final decision is made”; Art. 12, *Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement*, agreed consolidated text, 11 March 2002, Brussels.

policy initiatives by DG Trade.¹⁸⁵ So far, the reintroduction of export refunds for milk products has not been considered to be subject to this article.

5.4. Systems for monitoring, analysis and reporting

The final phase of the policy coherence cycle refers to how evidence about development impacts is collected and analysed. These systems for monitoring, analysis and reporting are crucial to hold policy-makers accountable. Moreover, mechanisms to properly feeding findings back into the policy process are necessary in order to re-prioritise instruments and objectives.¹⁸⁶ Thus, this phase could also be considered as the initial phase of a successive round of the cycle. This section first addresses possible impacts of export subsidies itself before analysing the impact assessment system of the EU.

In order to approach possible development impacts of the CAP, it is helpful to refer to a dynamic measurement as undertaken by the Commitment to Development Index (Ch. 4). The index ranges from 0 (i.e. incoherent policy performance) to 10 (i.e. coherent policy performance) and also evaluates 'trade' of donor countries in terms of subsidies for domestic farmers and tariffs on imports as barriers to international trade.¹⁸⁷ While it does not exclusively address export subsidies, it indicates how *committed* the EU is to development in this policy area. The performance in trade is mediocre both in comparison to other donors and with respect to the index figure (Figure 3). Countries such as New Zealand, Australia, United States, and Canada permanently received better results than the EU. For 2009, the EU ranges around 5.8 points, while the aforementioned countries scored 6.8 or higher. At the same time, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, and South Korea basically stayed below 2 points for upholding rather restrictive trade measures¹⁸⁸. Despite slight improvements, the EU is frequently criticised by the author of the index (Center for Global Development) for maintaining high agricultural subsidies next to high tariffs on agricultural products.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ See Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p. 17; "I think it would be really interesting if there is more ACP countries aware of this PCD framework which has become more important on the European level and they could start working with it as well"; Annex 5: *Interview with Suzan Cornelissen*, Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation.


¹⁸⁶ See OECD (2009d), 20.

¹⁸⁷ See Roodman, David (2009), p. 17.

¹⁸⁸ Switzerland scored 3.0 (2004) and 2.9 (2005). Japan arrived at 2.0 in 2009.

¹⁸⁹ See Roodman, David (2009), p. 19.

Figure 5: Performance in trade (Commitment to Development Index 2004-2009)¹⁹⁰



Apart from this somewhat holistic glance at the EU’s commitment to development as measured by the CDI, it more sophisticated and difficult to arrive at conclusions about impacts of incoherences.¹⁹¹ As stated earlier, the critique of export subsidies is voiced loudly and frequently: Having reintroduced export subsidies in 2009, the EU “accelerates the rapid downward trend of international dairy prices and increases the danger of import surges. [...]”¹⁹². Thus, distortions in the world dairy market negatively affect the situation of farmers in developing countries, “which cannot afford to engage in subsidy wars”¹⁹³.

¹⁹⁰ “For components that measure “goods” (aid, investment, migration, security, and technology), zero should map to zero. That is, if a country gives no aid (more precisely, if its aid program is deemed valueless after adjusting for quality), its final aid score should be 0—not -2 or +2. For components that measure “bads” (environment and trade, which mainly assess environmental harm and trade barriers) a perfect absence of the thing assessed should translate into an intuitive maximum score, such as 10”; See Roodman, David (2009), p. 4.

¹⁹¹ “Wenn es aber um möglichst konkrete Auswirkungen geht, führt kein Weg an detaillierten Fallstudien vorbei“, Ashoff, Guido (2009), p. 9.

¹⁹² Falk, Gertrud (2008), *The Right to Food of Milk and Maize Farmers, Report of an investigative mission to Uganda, African smallholders in focus – a voice in EU trade policy*, FIAN, Heidelberg, p. 32.

¹⁹³ ICTSD (2009b), p. 9. According to Australia’s WTO ambassador Peter Grey, “they [subsidies] punish those trying to compete without the help of subsidies, and particularly damage unsubsidised farmers in developing countries, jeopardising their agricultural production,

In order to understand the general nature of impacts of export subsidies, it is worth referring to earlier case studies.¹⁹⁴ For example, Jamaica had abolished subsidies for farmers and reduced import tariffs on milk powder as a result of conditions attached to a World Bank loan in 2002. Consequently, imports of cheap milk powder increased and drove Jamaican fresh milk producers – many of them smaller farmers based in rural areas – out of the market.¹⁹⁵ Similarly, subsidized EU milk powder imported to the Dominican Republic was 25 percent cheaper than local fresh milk in 2002. Consequently, Oxfam estimates that “around 10,000 farmers are thought to have been forced out of business on the past two decades”¹⁹⁶.

More recently, dairy farmers in Cameroon could no longer compete with milk powder from Europe as they were unable to cover the production costs.¹⁹⁷ In 2009, about 4,000 tonnes of European milk powder were imported to Cameroon. This corresponds with 136 million litres of milk and 40 percent of the Cameroonian milk supply. Thus, European exports play a dominant role within the milk market of Cameroon and the dumping of subsidised products not only decreases the price of milk. Also, investments in the local dairy farms induced through high import prices of 2008 became less likely. Moreover, rural development supported by several development programs is undermined, and local dairy farmers do not benefit from an increasing urban demand for milk.¹⁹⁸ However, impacts of export subsidies must not always be as straightforward and unambiguous as in these examples. It is pivotal to take into account the particular economic, political and social context of the importing country since a policy measure might affect different development countries differently.¹⁹⁹ India, for example, managed quite well to satisfy the domestic demand by domestic supply despite declining world

food security and their most competitive export sectors”; ICTSD (2009a), ‘Dairy Subsidies Raise Storm of Protest’, in: *Bridges Monthly*, Vol. 13 (2), May–June 2009, p. 8.

¹⁹⁴ See Tokarick, Stephen (2003); see Diao, Xinshen and Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio and Robinson, Sherman (2003).

¹⁹⁵ See Green, Duncan and Griffith Matthew (2002), *Dumping on the Poor: The Common Agricultural Policy, the WTO and International Development*, CAFOD, p. 272; for Jamaica see also Höhmann-Hempler, Gesine (2000), ‘Auswirkungen von subventionierten Milchexporten aus der Europäischen Union auf die Milchwirtschaft am Beispiel von Jamaika’, in: BUKO Agrar Koordination (ed.), *Milch*, Dossier 23, Hamburg, pp. 69-71.

¹⁹⁶ Oxfam (2002), p. 19.

¹⁹⁷ See Kafsack, Hendrik (2009a).

¹⁹⁸ See Mari, Francisco (2009), ‘Kaum Chancen für Milchbauern in Kamerun, Dumpingmilch aus Europa senkt Preise und verhindert Investitionen’, in Germanwatch (2009), *Weitblick, Zeitung für eine globale gerechte zukunftsfähige Politik*, 3/2009, p. 4; see Thomsen, Berit (2010), *Für eine internationale verantwortliche Milchpolitik*, Konferenzklärung „Die Milch macht’s – Weltweite Agrarpolitik und Ernährungssouveränität“ vom 13. Januar 2010.

¹⁹⁹ “A differentiated approach is needed to take into account different developing countries’ concerns”; Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p. 85.

market prices. The government directly supported small scale dairy farmers and basically closed the national market to foreign dairy products.²⁰⁰ Similarly, Kenya introduced subsidies and tariffs that helped to meet domestic and regional demand by local dairy production.²⁰¹

The Commission's impact assessment system was introduced in 2003 as an "aid to political decision-making, not a substitute for it"²⁰². The IA guidelines were revised in January 2009 and clearly possess an outward perspective and annexes containing procedural steps to evaluate impacts on developing countries.²⁰³ Overall, IA is to be used to "ensure consistency with Treaty objectives"²⁰⁴ which would also include PCD as foreseen by Art. 208 TFEU.²⁰⁵ In this sense reference is made to *international impacts* including impacts on developing countries which are to be analysed "for their coherence with the objectives of the EU development policy"²⁰⁶. The guidelines list several key questions as orientation for evaluations of policy initiatives. A brief glance at these questions reveals that PCD is embraced by the guidelines. Economic impacts are determined by the following key questions (among others): "Does it affect EU foreign policy and EU/EC development policy? [...] Does the option impose adjustment costs on developing countries? Does the option affect goods or services that are produced or consumed by developing countries?"²⁰⁷ Social impacts are discerned by the following questions (among others): "Does the option have a social impact on third countries that would be relevant for overarching EU policies, such as development policy? Does it affect international obligations and commitments of the EU arising from the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement or the Millennium Development Goals? Does it increase poverty in developing countries or have an impact on income of the poorest populations?"²⁰⁸ In other words, the key questions of these IA guidelines address very relevant aspects of PCD: the nexus between development policy and policy measures of

²⁰⁰ See Thomsen, Berit (2010); see Annex 2: *Interview with Dr. Guido Ashoff*, German Development institute, Bonn

²⁰¹ See Thomsen, Berit (2010); see Kerkow, Uwe (2005), *Die überschätzte Gefahr. Subventionierte Milch(pulver)exporte: Probleme von Milcheerzeugern und -konsumenten in Entwicklungsländern*, Studie im Auftrag der Deutschen Welthungerhilfe, Königswinter.

²⁰² Commission of the European Communities (2009e), p. 4.

²⁰³ See Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p. 11; see Commission of the European Communities (2009e), p. 31.

²⁰⁴ Commission of the European Communities (2009e), p. 6.

²⁰⁵ However, the OECD (2007) demands that "policy coherence actions should be increasingly integrated into Commission results monitoring and reporting"; see OECD (2007), p. 35.

²⁰⁶ Commission of the European Communities (2009e), p. 42.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁰⁸ Commission of the European Communities (2009e), p. 36.

other policy areas; adjustment costs for developing countries; impact on goods (e.g. dairy products) generated by the economy of the developing country; compliance with international commitments. Especially, the latter refers to substantial parts of the EU target system for PCD as it recalls the MDGs and the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement that expresses the opportunity of consultations in case of incoherence. From a PCD perspective, all of this sounds laudable, but despite 190 IAs conducted by the end of 2006, an evaluation of the impact assessment system concludes that the “IA system is still in an early stage of its evolution”²⁰⁹. Furthermore, the objectivity and thoroughness of the analytical value of IA are doubted by some political decision-makers.²¹⁰ Nevertheless, an overall improvement of procedures was recognised, but the impact of these IA guidelines on PCD was not in the center of this evaluations.

The interviews demonstrate the IA did not play a crucial role, when export subsidies for dairy products were reintroduced in 2009. The focus was not on PCD but on the interests of European dairy farmers.²¹¹ One of the reasons for this was that IA cannot be conducted for every policy proposals especially if it is an ad hoc decision in times of economic crisis such as the export subsidies.²¹² Also, planning and timing of IAs occurs to be another general difficulty. As long as a policy is not carried out, it is methodologically challenging to predict the effects of this policy. At the same time, it is difficult to structure a policy in a coherent way without proper knowledge on possible impacts.²¹³ This was also criticised by the aforementioned evaluation which finds that

²⁰⁹ Watson, John P. et al. (2007), *Evaluation of the Commission's Impact Assessment System. Final Report*, The Evaluation Partnership Limited (TEP), Contract Number SG-02/2006, Richmond, p. 2

²¹⁰ See Watson, John P. et al. (2007), p. 6.

²¹¹ „Es wird geschaut welche Auswirkungen hat das für Bäuerinnen und Bauern, aber auch nur kurzfristig und nicht langfristig, und außerhalb der Grenze schaut so schnell niemand nach. [...]Also, ich wüsste nicht, dass irgendeiner von diesen Mechanismen, und vor allem Impact Assessment, irgendwo angewendet wurde, als das beschlossen wurde. Ich glaube, der Blick lag wirklich ausschließlich auf den einheimischen Bäuerinnen und Bauern und es ging überhaupt nicht über Grenzen hinweg“; Annex 3: *Interview with Franziska Keller, MEP*.

²¹² “[T]hey can't be conducted for every policy that is there. Of course, we would like to see these impact assessments conducted far more often and we are requesting that as well, but it seems to be really difficult“; Annex 5: *Interview with Suzan Cornelissen*, Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation.

²¹³ “Conduct them before you start structuring a policy. I mean what is the sense of doing an impact assessment if you are already working on the policy, if you are already in the final stage. Why not see the results of the impact assessment and then think about the way you would like to construct the particular policy?“; Annex 5: *Interview with Suzan Cornelissen*, Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation. “Also, wir wollen das natürlich, müsste auch eigentlich völlig logisch sein, dass man erstmal schaut, was für Auswirkungen das hat. Manchmal gibt es auch Impact Assessments, die erst erstellt werden, wenn das Projekt schon am Laufen ist, was natürlich völlig sinnfrei ist“; Annex 3: *Interview with Franziska Keller, MEP*.

IAs are often initiated “after key decisions on the nature of the proposed intervention including the preferred option have already been taken internally”²¹⁴. Taking this into account, it seems to be complicated to systematically address the key questions that should guide IAs. Another problem is the accessibility and visibility of IAs. Apparently, the reports are not always easy to find since they do not have a prominent place on the Commission’s website.²¹⁵ Thus, Evert Vermeer Foundation suggests to increase the visibility of conducted IAs by publishing a press release or reporting to the EP.²¹⁶

Although the export subsidies as such have not been scrutinised through an IA, the current reform of the agricultural reform is expected to be accompanied by an IA.²¹⁷ Based on the key questions of IA, it remains nevertheless challenging to operationalize these questions and determine causality between policy measures of the EU and processes within diverse agricultural systems of different developing countries.²¹⁸ The initial idea is to refer to income of small farmers as the key variable and compare it to the degree of subsidised products entering the market of a developing country.²¹⁹ While the some methodological refinement will be necessary, the planned IA implies that the overall applicability of IA – also with respect to PCD – is more likely when it

²¹⁴ Watson, John P. et al. (2007), p. 10.

²¹⁵ “The other thing is then, when you look for impact assessments on the website of the European Commission, they are often impossible to trace”; Annex 5: *Interview with Suzan Cornelissen*, Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation.

²¹⁶ “What I think that should be done, is that every time an impact study is being conducted, then the European Commission whatever DG is responsible for this impact assessment, should really report upon the findings. [...] They should either launch it with a press release or some sort of interview because I have the feeling that many of these impact assessments are really kept silent. [...] So, I would suggest whenever a major impact assessment has been conducted, report upon it in the parliament. Go to one of these committee hearings and report upon the findings, make these impact assessments more visible”; Annex 5: *Interview with Suzan Cornelissen*, Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation.

²¹⁷ “If we look at the agricultural policy, which will be reformed, it's obvious that the way I will try to push it is doing an impact assessment on the agricultural policy, on the reform of the agricultural policy. [...] I will try that this is one of the exemplary impact assessments because DG AGRI is prepared that I presume to do it. It's an opportunity to make good work”; Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

²¹⁸ “In some cases, the agricultural systems are so disconnected one from the other that there is no effect of what we do here. [...]. The fact that the income in the country X will not increase doesn't mean that the reason is agricultural policy conducted here. It may be the way the policy in the countries itself”; Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

²¹⁹ See Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

comes to policy proposals of a broader and more structural scope such as the ongoing CAP reform.²²⁰

5.5. Conclusion: Prospects of PCD

The way for policy coherence has already been paved by Max Weber in 1919, who demanded politicians to not only be determined by conviction but by responsibility.²²¹ If ideologies, beliefs or good intentions are the exclusive driving forces of political decisions, errors, failures, and mistakes are likely. Instead, a politician has to take into consideration as many relevant factors as possible before a decision is taken.²²² In this sense rationality and conscience are of central importance for every politician despite differing convictions that are also crucial character traits of a politician. Only then, far reaching decisions can be taken thoroughly and compromise becomes a probable policy option. This is also the rationale of PCD as “only by combining its significant efforts in foreign aid with non-aid policies will the EU be able to make an indent in bridging the widening gap between the rich and the poor”²²³.

We are all inclined to favor coherence meaning to be free from self-contradiction. While it immediately seems to be desirable to act coherently, this thesis demonstrated that in a democratic polity perfect policy coherence is possible neither in theory nor in practice. The European Union is legally committed to PCD and applies more sophisticated instruments and mechanisms to enhance PCD than most of its Member States and any other multilateral donor organisation.²²⁴ For example, the DAC Peer Review (2007) highlights the PCD rolling work programme, biennial PCD progress reports, and the establishment of the PCD unit.²²⁵ However, the EU is also required to “examine ways of bringing issues effectively to the decision-making level”²²⁶. Therefore, this thesis intended to analyse the role of PCD within the policy-process of the CAP that led to the reintroduction of export subsidies for dairy products. Export subsidies are

²²⁰ Moreover it is crucial to have “a combination of external pressure and the work inside the house including DG DEVE which has to mobilise then knowledge in the countries themselves to prove that it is damageable”; Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit, DG Development, European Commission.*

²²¹ See Weber, Max (1919), *Politik als Beruf*, München, Ducker & Humboldt.

²²² Weber calls this the tension between *Gesinnungsethik* (ethic of conviction) and *Verantwortungsethik* (ethic of responsibility).

²²³ Carbone, Maurizio (2008), p. 340.

²²⁴ See Egenhofer, Christian (2006), p. 8.

²²⁵ See OECD (2007), pp. 30-35.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

considered as one of the most prominent examples of incoherence, since subsidised exports have the potential to distort local markets of developing countries and drive local producers out of business.²²⁷ In this sense they also counter developmental efforts directed to improving the situation of rural people.

The EU target system consisting of treaty obligations and international commitments such as the MDGs serves as a firm justification to generally pursue PCD. More concretely, the EU has explained to phase out export subsidies in the framework of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda.²²⁸ However, this pledge depends on parallel commitments by other developed countries such as “a substantial opening of the developed countries' markets”²²⁹. Moreover, the decision to reintroduce export subsidies for dairy products implies that implementing PCD within the CAP is limited. As shown the policy process was accompanied by requests of the EP Committee on Development to eliminate “trade-distorting subsidies”²³⁰, protests by NGOs, and a surprisingly critical assessment by the European Court of Auditors. Mechanisms for coordination (PCD unit, ISC), and systems of reporting, analysis and monitoring (IA) were in place, but the political pressure to address the problems of European dairy farmers suffering from a dramatic drop in the world market price for milk finally determined the outcome of the policy process.²³¹ As a central problem the lack of commitment to PCD at the highest political level prevails.²³²

If this was the simple answer to the central research question, one may wonder if agriculture and development are irreconcilable. Apparently and legitimately, CAP policy makers regard themselves as defenders of agricultural interests and respond to political imperatives originating from their constituencies.²³³ Also, the increased competition on the world market forces less competitive European farmers to request

²²⁷ See Matthews, Alan (2008), ‘The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy and Developing Countries: the Struggle for Coherence’, in: *European Integration*, Vol. 30 (3), p. 382.

²²⁸ See Commission of the European Communities (2009a), p. 82

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

²³⁰ European Parliament (2008), p. 80.

²³¹ “Another point, of course, there is, that people defending internal European policies etc. are in principle the voters of our European MPs or our national MPs. Their electoral weight weighs also over the decisions that are taken”; Annex 1: *Interview with Paul Hoebink*, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen.

²³² See Carbone, Maurizio (2008), p. 340; see Annex 2: *Interview with Dr. Guido Ashoff*, German Development Institute, Bonn; see Annex 1: *Interview with Paul Hoebink*, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen.

²³³ See Brooks, Jonathan (2005), ‘Why is Agricultural Policy *Still* so Difficult to Reform?’, in: OECD (ed.), *Agriculture and Development. The Case for Policy Coherence*, Paris, p. 100.

government support.²³⁴ Once a measure such as export subsidies is taken, politicians also “have a stake in ensuring that the public is convinced of the agrarian worth of their policy actions”²³⁵. In this sense, decisions within the CAP have to be seen as predominantly political.²³⁶ In such a case, the leverage of PCD seems to be constrained, since the interplay of political powers prescribes a political rationale that overruns the institutional rationale of PCD. The more conceptual debate of PCD helps to clearly identify incoherence but it is less successful in putting PCD into political practice.²³⁷

Nonetheless, it would be too simple and conceptually wrong to negate any role of PCD within policy processes of the EU. Rather, a “plea for a realistic understanding of coherence”²³⁸ is necessary. It is crucial to take into consideration the processual evolution of PCD. Since it took more than a decade for the articles of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) to result in a first PCD report (2007), progress on PCD cannot be expected to happen fast. The DAC Peer Reviews acknowledge the continuous progress on PCD made by the EU and recognises the contributions to “the growing international consensus on policy coherence”²³⁹. Implementing PCD within the EU framework exceeds wishful thinking, although PCD is not and will not be the rationale of the community policy. The EU is no unitary actor but contains conflicting interests that *only* allow for second-best solutions.²⁴⁰ Therefore, future research has to figure out if the evolution of PCD within the policy processes of the EU could actually be considered to be “a political non-stop”²⁴¹.

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²³⁴ See Brooks, Jonathan (2005), p. 101.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 102.

²³⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 102.

²³⁷ “We need to have an ownership of the...they have to integrate in their work what we want, not the contrary”; Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

²³⁸ Ashoff; Guido (2005), p. 34.

²³⁹ OECD (2007), p. 30.

²⁴⁰ See Hoebink, Paul (2005), p. 80.

²⁴¹ See Annex 4: *Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit*, DG Development, European Commission.

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7. Annex

7.1. **Annex 1:** Interview with Prof. Dr. Paul Hoebink, Center for International Development Studies Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen

Interviewer: Paul Hoebink, you were involved from the very beginning in shaping the debate on policy coherence. It was the subsidized beef exports in 1993 that triggered the debate. Could you please elaborate on the academic debate? When did it start? Who was involved?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : You can look at it in two ways. First of all the discussion on the Common Agricultural Policy is of course very, very old and it started already in the end of the sixties. And this was more a social debate or debate in society than an academic debate although some academic publications particularly by Chris Stevens were already made in that period. And of course, the sugar case was famous. And it started more or less here in the Netherlands with discussions if we should consume beet sugar or cane sugar and that discussion of course was also translated into action in which for example Wereldwinkels world shops are selling cane sugar as sort of protest

against European agriculture policies. So, that for one, but that, of course, was not labelled discussing policy coherence for development. The real discussion started after the Maastricht Treaty. Let's say first that it was due to the fact that on the development paragraphs of the Maastricht Treaty, the Luxemburg presidency was quite unsure. And they then asked the Dutch who would become president of the Union after Luxemburg, they asked the Dutch to help them with the development paragraphs. That's the way that the coherence article more or less slipped in. Here in the Netherlands, I think, we were among the first to write about it and that was of course more or less by Jan Plonk, who at the moment that the Treaty of Maastricht was adopted, asked the National Advisory Council for Development Cooperation, which was then still existing, for an advice on what the paragraphs for development cooperation in the Treaty of Maastricht meant for Dutch as well as for European development cooperation. This meant that a small working group was formed in which I participated at that moment, too, and, I think, later, again a small working group was formed and then I chaired it. The Chair of the National Advisory Council asked me to write a substantive paper about policy coherence. As far as I know, this was the first. I presented it in the EADI general conference in Paris and this more or less fostered a new initiative by Olav Stokke and Jean Jaques Forster to organize an EADI special seminar in Geneva. My paper that was presented already at the EADI conference - and it was presented, of course, before in the National Advisory Council - was circulated there, commented there and it was published as a semi official paper of the Dutch National Advisory Council for Development Cooperation. My paper more or less was sent to all the participants before. So, you will see in nearly all the papers of that book references to my paper which Göran Hydén in that conference called a seminal paper being the seed for what followed in the discussion. Parallel, of course, you had the activities of European NGOs, international NGOs and Oxfam Novib was at that time very, very active on the European scene, in particular on the beef exports case, of course. So I was in close contact with them because I was - at that time - chair of that commission. So, we really triangulated more or less: the international discussion, the scientific discussion that popped up and the actions of international NGOs. You have to understand that at that time when I was interviewing Commission officials, there was a huge reluctance in the Commission itself to take up policy coherence issues, even in the delegations in Brussels. I remember that we had a day of interviews with several delegations, that at that time only the Danish person inside the Danish delegation responsible for development cooperation really sort of had an active attitude and the head of the Dutch delegation at that time - our

later minister of foreign affairs - even said to us at the end of the day, "you should not force me to pull a dead horse ". So, although the Minister for Development Cooperation really instructed us to push the issue and send the word around, the head of our delegation in Brussels was very, very reluctant to do anything. You might probably understand that the heads of delegations in Brussels are top-ranking diplomats. I think every European Member State places his best diplomats in Brussels because there are a lot of things to decide. While the scientific debate more or less started and while the debate among international NGOs was much older, they now sort of had an instrument in the Maastricht Treaty. The Commission had to bow down with the beef export case and this was really - as you have seen in my article - the first instance in which the Commission sort of showed what the article in the Treaty of Maastricht meant and how they would explain it and use it in later policies.

Interviewer: When you look the debate now, would you say that it has lost some velocity that it had in the very beginning? Also, if you compare it to the political practise, do you think that the academic debate is exaggerating the importance of policy coherence for development or is it more or less going hand in hand?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : What of course happened and that of course might have taken some momentum out of international actions on policy coherence for development, is that the Commission itself forced by the Council and to a lesser extent by parliament had to publish a biannual report on policy coherence for development as you know. The first one stated the whole set of issues but sort of didn't go very deep. The second one of last year is a bit better but also sort of rather superficial still. But at least it addresses the main issues. Maybe this has been taken out some of the wind out of the international NGO debate but you better talk with the people of the Evert Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation to see if that's true. I mean, they are in that respect closer to Brussels than I am. They have an office in Brussels. The second point here might be that some of the most powerful international NGOs like the Oxfams are addressing other issues and of course also under the umbrella of policy coherence. They have been focusing in recent years much more on the whole EPA discussion and of course there is also a policy coherence point at stake. But many times, it is not discussed under the label of policy coherence for development. I think that in scientific circles the debate has lost quite some momentum. Maybe that is because that on the very concrete cases that you could study, how would I formulate it, the case studies that you could do are in general studied as far as I can see it under different angles. There is

of course a lot of discussion on migration policies and fortress Europe etc. but that is not studied from a policy coherence for development angle. The Common Agricultural Policy, the discussion about the CAP sort of revives from time to time for example now in the negotiations with MERCOSUR, and then you see some news clippings etc. addressing PCD issues, but there seem to be a lack of interest among academics to really study it again and see what is happening etc. Indeed, I think that the scientific discussion has quite lost some momentum. In these terms, the Stokke/Forster book was more or less among the latest. You see still some interest within independent research bureaus like FRIDE in Spain and GDI in Germany, but that's more or less it. I don't see any other actions.

Interviewer: I'm sometimes thinking that and that's what I've also heard in the Parliament that they have a lot of interest in this topic and I'm also somehow interested as you see but it's interesting that somehow the academic debate has slowed down a little but, even though there might be new issues coming with the Lisbon Treaty that are worth researching. However, I would like to go one step back coming to a more elemental question of policy coherence. Policy coherence understood as the general objective of all action taking by government has become this policy coherence *for* development. Some people talk about the risk of dressing up developmental issues within this policy coherence for development. I am wondering how would you explain that policy coherence can be very well understood as policy coherence for development without going into the direction of disguising developmental issues. There is this critique that it could be a codeword for supremacy. How can it be justified also vis-à-vis other policy areas since we talk about policy coherence for development?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : Let's say there might be conflicting policies and that's sort of what you always would have to see etc. If food security is important for Europe, there might be a conflict there with policy coherence for development. Of course, there is a danger from the one side as well as from the other side that you label things in such a way that the conflicting goals and objectives of the one sort are put in a supreme position over the other. In general, what we have seen if you look at it from that angle, is that internal European or national policies always have been preferred over development cooperation. If you look at the Common Agricultural Policy, you could say what the suggestion most of the times is that particular southern European states are defending the CAP against for example imports from developing countries. But in the final end if you also look at this country, which is one of the biggest agricultural

exporters as you know, also in this country we very often in the final end defend our agricultural sector against so called interests of farmers from developing countries. The supremacy issue, I don't see so much from a PCD perspective. It has always been there from internal European or national policies and there is a logic behind it because pressure groups here in Europe are always closer to the kitchen than pressure groups from developing countries or organizations representing these pressure groups. Oxfams etc. are always speaking out for farmers or fishermen from developing countries. Only occasionally, when there are sort of brought in by the Oxfams, then these fishermen or farmers can come themselves to Brussels or to The Hague or whatever. Another point, of course, there is, that people defending internal European policies etc. are in principle the voters of our European MPs or our national MPs. Their electoral weight weighs also over the decisions that are taken. Lastly, what you'll see is that pressure groups that have very old roots still have a lot of influence although the people supporting them or being their members is not a very important social force anymore. The farmers in this country and many European countries - in terms of percentage of the working population - have of course decreased very fast over the years, but in terms of political power and in terms of economic power they are still very, very strong meaning that in national delegations negotiating as well as the influence in Brussels itself on the Commission is very, very strong and big.

Interviewer: What we can read from time to time is that in order to enforce or enhance coherence we need political leadership. Very often it stops here: people say we need political leadership and I am wondering how would you imagine this kind of political leadership? Someone who is really pushing development interests or someone who is more or less trying to mediate between different interest? How would this political leadership that is enhancing PCD basically have to look like?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : In principle it starts with pressure from outside and also directly from our ministers for development cooperation. As you might know, our ministers of development cooperation - if they are cabinet ministers - they are most of the time not the strongest in government, although there have been in the past very strong persons like Clare Short or in this country Jan Pronk or Eveline Herfkens and Koenders, too. It starts, if they are able to convince their own cabinet. The second step is: are they able to convince in the Council of Ministers, also the ministers of foreign affairs, and can the Foreign Council influence also the Commission, and other ministers (economic, finance etc.)? Can the Foreign Council also convince other councils to

undertake a certain set of measures? The mediating role is mostly in hands of the Commission. The Commission is a place where the mediation has to be done. There of course, it depends again on partly the pressure that comes onto the Commission from the Council as well as from outside, but also in the final hand on the person who is leading DG DEVE, the development commissioner, also of course a new situation, the commissioner of DG RELEX. That sort of depends: Michel was maybe a stronger person than Bolsen and now we have Piebalgs. We still have to see what he can reach. It also depends on the person of the Commissioner, if he is able to bring things on the table that are important from a PCD perspective. But the mediation role is in principle much more within the Commission than within the Council. What we have seen in the past is of course that the Council is able, but also external forces are able to push the Commission in a certain direction.

Interviewer: I read once that you were talking about deliberations at EU level in a very positive way. You said that one of the most advanced deliberations in this matter are located within the EU although you were critical about political leadership in the EU at the same time. I would like to know where do you see the advantages within the EU for policy coherence for development also in contrast to Member States? Is it the legal basis that is very strong or is it also the whole polity of the EU that is conducive?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : It's both, I think. We have the Treaty of Maastricht and now with the Lisbon Treaty we have the legal basis at hand and that is an important change. I once stated that if we see - we can't call it so - the Maastricht Treaty as a constitution, then it is probably the only constitution which has a set of articles on development cooperation including one which is forcing the European Institutions towards policy coherence for development. So, the legal basis is very, very important. Secondly, of course, by its nature, the European Council and the Commission are internationally organized. That means that the focus by nature is international. It's easier, I don't say it's very easy, but it's easier to overrun national interests at a European level than it is at national level. There are two points here, I think, there is an advantage of negotiating policy coherence for development at a European scale and not at a national scale.

Interviewer: Well, one of the events that more or less triggered my interest in this PCD topic was the reintroduction of export subsidies for dairy products in February 2009. And in this 2005 study on Senegal and Morocco there was talk about 'dumping leftovers of a spoilt market in Africa' and there are of course different views on it but this could of course happen again. And when you look at export subsidies as part of the

CAP, how would you judge the prospect of furthering PCD within a highly politicized area like the CAP?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : CAP and fisheries are the most difficult areas. Of course, this has to do with interest of European producers fostered and promoted also very much by their national governments. Look for example at Zapatero government: it has made huge progress in its development cooperation policies. They shifting for example Spanish aid away towards Africa, raising the volume of development assistance very much although now some cuts are announced. But the whole issue of policy coherence has been sort of - as one Spanish official once said to me - moved to the second Zapatero legislature. Meaning that the country which has sort of most interest at stake in the Common Fisheries Policy is Spain. It has the biggest fishing fleet. At moment of the integration of Spain, Portugal and Greece in the European Union the European fishing fleet doubled, so you can imagine how huge it is. Spain has done very, very little on modernization and also on cutting back its fishing capacity. Of course, fish consumption in Spain itself is huge: in Madrid they want fresh fish on the table every day. It is very, very difficult for Spanish government to operate in a coherent way in this field. It might be better than under the Aznar government where they were really rough in fishery agreement negotiations. But even if you look at the other side, going up north, if you look at Sweden: Sweden up to two or three years ago didn't have any fishing at all on PCD. So there is a donor, which is seen by many as an example donor but Swedish development cooperation policy is nearly alone; aid policies, not sort of the wider scope is absent there. And only recently, it was recognized that that sort of data are a bit myopic in this sense. It was at a presentation of the 3-C evaluations, I was invited there, and I'm always telling out loud what I find, what my opinion is. So I told them: look, what are you doing in this dossier? You're absent, you're not in the discussion and they acknowledged that and are only now changing this. On the very, very hot issues and that is of course CFSP, immigration, and the CAP, it's extremely difficult to make changes and secondly, in times of crisis, always there will be a fallback. And of course, that's what's happening now. Important steps have been made to change the CAP, but as you indicated yourself, there is a new push now for export subsidies.

Interviewer: If I try to categorize these export subsidies in the categories that you also suggested, I would label it as an 'intended incoherence'. There were a few measures that were suggested: impact studies, better weighing of interests, compensation, or simply accepting this incoherence. When you look at the export subsidies for dairy

products, also having in mind that they might be terminated in 2013, what would you expect or suggest. Do you see some movement that could maybe change this?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : At the moment you can only look for signs what kind of protest there might come or arrive from developing countries and where they are spoiling the markets. As I indicated in several articles, the world market for most agricultural products is a dumping market. Because of the very large part of what is produced is consumed on national markets or in our case also in European markets. The leftovers are then thrown on the international or on the global market. The type of effects it has is dumping and dumping always means that it is sort of exported below price for most of these products. You can only make sort of real income when it's subsidized or when leftovers are paid by the things that are consumed normally. This is sort of the chicken leg discussion: If we pay more for our chicken breasts, then of course in the winter season, we don't eat these chicken legs at our barbecues. Our producers, our chicken factories can throw it on the world market and dump it at very low prices. You see in West Africa that there are no regulations, there are no dates of when it was produced or when it might be spoiled. We have to wait till signs arrive that these new export subsidies are against spoiling markets. You might hope that NGOs try to see where the milk powder might arrive. The whole point of course is, that governments in developing countries - most of the time - don't dare to resist against these exports. There are, of course, two things here: First for urban producers it might be very attractive to have cheap milk products, if it's cheap. The voice of the producers is then often not heard. Second, governments of developing countries don't have the means or are very often also fearful of using the anti-dumping articles that WTO gives them. They could easily say: "this is dumping, we don't want this chicken legs or we don't want this milk powder".

Interviewer: How would this work in practise? Is it really possible to reject these dumping products?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : They can refuse imports and say this goes against markets. For example, what they at least could do is raise high tariffs on them. The anti-dumping regulation in WTO gives you right to do that. What for example, under George Bush, the Bush administration has done with European steel. They said that it was dumping etc. etc. Then you got the whole conflict with the European Commission. The European Commission won at the WTO. Then the European Commission had he right to retaliate the USA. The European Commission at that time chose a line of projects on which they

would raise high tariffs which all were coming from American states in which the support for the Republicans was very, very high. Then the Americans backed off and took the tariffs away. So you can take anti-dumping measures and it takes some time, of course, then the other party can protest etc. At the moment at the European Community is subsidizing these exports, it has very little stand in WTO. Also New Zealand could protest.

Interviewer: They were not really pleased.

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : No, I would directly advice them to go to WTO and the European Union would be in problems there.

Interviewer: I also realized that it is self-reinforcing so to say. Someone raises export subsidies and another industrialized nation - if I may call it that way - react on that, too, and...

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : When they have the money! And we still have too much money in the Common Agricultural Policy which is, of course, also very often crazily distributed because it is not sort of going to the poor farmers.

Interviewer: I went through a lot of proposals that have been made to improve policy coherence for development and I believe some of the recommendations that you also gave might have been incorporated into the current mechanisms - for example the PCD unit, impact assessment, inter-service consultation, also Country Strategy Papers. When you look at the mechanisms, the still new mechanisms, how would you judge these mechanisms. Did anything change within the results or processes?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : I must say, I didn't really compare the PCD report of last September with the former one. Of course, the PCD report in itself was already a big step forward. First of all, the issues addressed in that PCD report were very important. Of course, it was written in a very bureaucratic way etc., but let's say the issues were important and the Commission really did an effort in an inter-directorate kind of negotiations and discussions to address the issues. I didn't compare the two PCD reports. I should do that in the next week because I have to speak in Bonn on policy coherence again. So, I will do it then and see if I can sort of have an assessment if progress has been made between the first and the second. The first generation of Country Strategy Papers was really disappointing. For example in all the Pacific Country Strategy Papers, the paragraphs on PCD were copied and - if you really look at

the main issues - were very, very disappointing. Let me say that in one or two Country Strategy Papers the coherence paragraphs were addressed well. And of course, it is very often depending on the delegation leader. For many delegation leaders, the whole PCD concept is far beyond their vision and reach. They're also very much focused on dispersing aid and of course you know that there has been a lot of pressure on them to disperse more and quicker and to show results. But again there, I haven't seen all the second generation Country Strategy Papers to see if there are shifts there. The Coherence Unit, of course, did quite some work on the two reports, but it has a very strange position. There was a Dutch man working there and he was more or less internally called 'Mr Coherence' because he sort of did in DG DEVE most of the writing etc. of coherence papers. And he was very much afraid that would hang on to him, you know, because if you have such a unit or such a person, then you are in confrontation most of the times with your colleagues of the other DGs. DG DEVE in itself doesn't have much staff who really have a deep analysis of the CAP etc. So you have to work on these issues with a small unit mostly in confrontation but you should not be in confrontation. You should be in an exchange of ideas and more negotiating type of discussions with them. What you could see is that the Coherence Unit was not calling itself a coherence unit many times, you know, although the coherence is in the title of the unit. And I've seen Françoise Moreau heading that unit for some time but I don't know if after the second PCD report she is more proud on what she and her colleagues are doing. In principle, creating such a unit as in the Dutch case is very, very important and we were very, very lucky to have a person there who was very able, who had been working in the Geneva delegation in the Netherlands, so he knew a lot about international trade negotiations. We were very lucky to have a knowledgeable person and also good staff. One of the persons, is second I think in that bureau at that time, was involved in the meat campaign of Oxfam Novib, so he came from Oxfam Novib to the Ministry and knew the whole discussion. So, we had a very strong unit. So in principle, to organize it in such a way, that's also one of the recommendations of the DAC and I think they are right. You need a sort of bureau or unit somewhere in your ministry of foreign affairs where threads come together, that has certain status, that the head of the unit can go to directors' meetings and can address the minister personally. What you have seen in the Netherlands is that the last minister sort of had regular sessions with the head of that unit. For example, in preparation of Council meetings in Brussels, there were always sort of discussions with that unit. If some hot issues popped up, then the head of the unit could directly go to the minister. And you need analytical capacity which was also

very present in our unit. Apart from the people working there, also they were able to contract. For example, there was this famous case of peanuts and aflatoxins on peanuts and the European standards were far higher than the Codex Alimentarius of the WHO and the FAO. These were just prohibiting West African peanut producers to export to the European markets, because some of the regulations were too strict. And then they could sort of commission a study to show what was happening because of this regulation as an example that you by studying etc. you can try to solve coherence issues.

Interviewer: It was already in 1999 that Gören Hydén put it in a way there is maybe also risk of 'internal coherence' meaning that by focussing very strongly the mechanisms that are working within the European Union, one might forget about a little bit about what is happening outside. We just tend to look at decision-making processes. We need communication, we need analytical skills but at the same time, we put too much effort onto looking in the inside or having this inward perspective. Do you see this also as a risk?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : Most of the time, these type of units are informed by processes that are happening in developing countries. Why look at aflatoxins on peanuts if there are no protests coming from a developing country? Why discussing European cotton subsidies if there are no protests coming from the Malis and Burkina Faso? I don't say that the alarm system is good. I think that alarm system really needs some more bells and ringing tones. And I think that our embassies and delegations should always have it in their mind and be very attentive to raise issues. There is a lot of room for improvement there, but in principle, let's say all the issues that might raise come from outside. Of course, you have internal policy coherence: aid tying was always the most important one. Several of these have been solved and the discussion now is much more on complementarity and on fragmentation and task division and division of labour etc. than on real coherence issues meaning that the emphasis is very much on external coherence and then meaning directly also on Brussels.

Interviewer: Thanks so far for your insightful answers. I'm basically coming to the last question and I hope that is fine with your timing of the rest of the day. Talking about the future of coherence, also about the Lisbon Treaty: If I understood it correctly, the legal basis remained as solid as it was before. However, how would you judge the future of coherence especially when having two things in mind: the European External Action Service, might it contribute to coherence? And also Ashton, as the High

Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, will she enhance policy coherence for development or do you also see a tendency - because this is what I was thinking when I read of publications on the Lisbon Treaty: there is focus on coherence in terms of coherence of foreign policy. Do you see that this could be a shift so to say, the own fault of bringing this whole coherence issue into the policy process and now maybe losing ground because of it?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : The External Action Service, of course, we have to wait, but I'm not the only one saying that there are important dangers here, the danger of professionalism. If we are going to appoint only diplomats in that service and the diplomats are circulated between the North and the South and on a very short term, then we know that it might have huge effects on European development policies in general and policy coherence for development secondly. We have to wait. I hope that our ministers in the Council will force Ashton to have two layers or two pillars so that you have a North department and a South department and that the diplomats can choose if they want to stay in development cooperation. They also have their own hierarchy and promotion possibilities. I hope that goes in that direction so that we can sort of enhance professionalization. Also now you see the delegation people that don't know anything about development cooperation, that come from DGs who want to be stationed one time for four years in an external delegation and don't have any affection or whatever you would call it with development cooperation.

Interviewer: Is it also the workload in the delegation or do they just not know about it?

Prof. dr. Paul Hoebink : They just don't know. You see the same in Dutch development cooperation because we have a diplomatic service where you choose in principle for a diplomatic career. Many of these diplomats choose for a career in which they prefer to be in London or Paris or New York than posts in Africa which are often seen as hardship posts. And of course, we have a sort of committed group of diplomats and civil servants for development cooperation but they are still a minority. In general, you could say, that our ambassadors in most Sub-Saharan African states are really development-oriented with maybe one or two exceptions, but our head of development cooperation [?] aren't. There are good examples but also very, very bad examples. And this might happen to European Union and it has happened in the past also in the European delegations in developing countries. I met people, "what are you doing here? You don't know anything". Even for example, in principle the Country Strategy Papers have to be written by the delegation itself collaborating with local actors, local

government etc. I've seen examples of a head of delegation hiring an consultant from the UK to write it which totally forbidden officially. But he himself didn't have the capability to do it or to really look at it. But ok, that's one and second, the second point of your question, it depends also very much on the personal relations in the Commission. And then is Piebalgs strong enough to defend development against Ashton? We have seen that before and it has always been the RELEX Commissioner, further the Development Commissioner: can they work together or is a constant struggle? We'll wait. I'll see Piebalgs in Bucharest end of June.

Interviewer: This will be interesting. Maybe you'll have some opportunity to encourage him or provide him with some advice. Thank you very much, Paul Hoebink.

7.2. **Annex 2:** Interview with Dr. Guido Ashoff, German Development Institute, Bonn

Interviewer: Dr. Ashoff, welche Tendenzen können Sie als langjähriger Beobachter und Gestalter der Kohärenzdebatte feststellen? Aus welchen Gründen hat die Intensität der akademischen Debatte ggf. abgenommen?

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Zunächst muss man klären, was unter akademischer Debatte verstanden wird. Wenn damit die wissenschaftliche Debatte gemeint ist, die in wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften, Büchern, Sammelwerken geführt wird, dann bin ich mir nicht sicher, ob die Debatte zu- oder abgenommen hat. Das müsste man messen. Wichtig ist aber, dass die Debatte über den entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzanspruch nicht allein, vielleicht auch noch nicht einmal vornehmlich in der reinen akademischen Wissenschaft geführt wurde und wird, sondern sehr stark in der angewandten Wissenschaft bis hin zu der Debatte, wie sie in internationalen Organisationen geführt wird. Also beispielsweise hat die OECD viel zum entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzanspruch analysiert und auch veröffentlicht, wobei ich eben die OECD da nicht unbedingt eins zu eins der akademischen Debatte zurechnen würde. Die Frage ist, ob dieses Stichwort akademisch hier entscheidend ist. Wenn ich mal die breitere Debatte, wie sie also auch von der OECD, in der OECD, von Seiten der EU, Stichwort Kohärenzbericht der EU usw. geführt wird, dann würde ich schlicht mal sagen: die Debatte hat nicht abgenommen, sondern eher die hat zugenommen. Ich sehe in der Kohärenzdebatte drei Stränge. Das haben Sie wahrscheinlich auch gesehen in dem Papier, dass Herr Kevenhörster Ihnen gegeben hat. Der eine Strang ist der inhaltliche

Strang, der bezieht sich auf die Analyse von konkreten Inkohärenzen zwischen Entwicklungspolitik oder Entwicklung auf der einen Seite und anderen Politiken auf der anderen Seite. Das sind die ganzen Analysen zur Agrarpolitik, zur Fischereipolitik, zu den Auswirkungen von Einwanderungspolitik, also Migrationspolitik, auf die Entwicklung der Partnerländer und auf die globale Entwicklung. Die Analysen haben eigentlich in den letzten zehn Jahren deutlich zugenommen. Die OECD hat da eine ganze Menge produziert zum Thema Landwirtschaft und Entwicklung, Fischerei und Entwicklung, da gibt es ein schönes Buch "Fishing for Development", zur Migration, Klimawandel, ausländische Direktinvestitionen. Dann gibt es andere Untersuchungen, die Sie auch in meinem Aufsatz zitiert finden. Das ist sozusagen die inhaltliche Diskussion, die mal intensiver, mal weniger intensiv geführt wird, aber ich würde nicht sagen, dass die abgenommen hat, die hat eher zugenommen. Der zweite Strang bezieht sich auf institutionelle verfahrensmäßige Ansätze zur Herstellung von mehr Politikkohärenz. Da hat die Diskussion in den letzten sechs, sieben Jahren deutlich zugenommen maßgeblich auf Betreiben der OECD. Da hat es eine ganze Reihe von Konferenzen, Workshops gegeben, auch mit Veröffentlichungen, die sind auch in meinem Aufsatz zitiert. Das sind wir inzwischen wesentlich weiter im Verständnis was eigentlich politisch-administrative, institutionelle Voraussetzungen sind, um Kohärenzfortschritte zu erzielen. Die Debatte hat zugenommen. Der dritte Strang ist der Methodische: wie kann man Inkohärenzen messen? Und dieser Strang hat eigentlich auch zugenommen. Da spielt der Commitment to Development Index des Center for Global Development in Washington eine wesentliche Rolle. Aber es gibt auch zahlreiche andere Indices. Sie finden dazu in meinem Aufsatz ein Kapitel, das Kapitel: Kann man Kohärenz messen? Das sind die drei Stränge und da hat die Debatte zugenommen und nicht abgenommen.

Interviewer: Wird die Bedeutung des entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzanspruches für den politischen Alltag in der aktuellen akademischen Debatte überbewertet?

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Sie haben natürlich eine Debatte über die Notwendigkeit verbesserter Politikkohärenz. Dass es da noch viele Baustellen gibt, dass es da viele Inkohärenzen gibt, an denen gearbeitet werden muss, das liegt auf der Hand und die Verbesserung von Kohärenz ist oft ein mühsames Geschäft. Es gibt natürlich inzwischen den in der Wissenschaft und auch in der entwicklungspolitischen Diskussion verfochtenen Kohärenzanspruch auf der einen Seite und die Realität auf der anderen Seite, weil der Kohärenzanspruch natürlich eine normative Angelegenheit ist.

Interviewer: Ich habe das in den Gesprächen mit den Mitarbeitern der Kommission und auch im Parlament eben gemerkt, dass die das in ihrer Arbeit verinnerlicht haben, aber wenn sie dann auf Mitglieder der Generaldirektion Landwirtschaft treffen oder mit Mitgliedern aus anderen Ausschüssen im Parlament reden, dass da natürlich die Kenntnisse über Politikkohärenz nicht unbedingt vorhanden sind.

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Das ist aber häufig so. Die Kluft zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit.

Interviewer: Im Vergleich zu den Verfassungen vieler Mitgliedsstaaten stellt Art. 208 des Lissabonvertrages eine solide Berufungsgrundlage zur Durchsetzung des entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzanspruches dar. Gibt es auf EU-Ebene weitere institutionelle, strategische oder systemische Vorteile, die Politikkohärenz begünstigen?

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Da wäre ich vorsichtig. Die Frage ist, wie Sie das messen würden. Es gibt leider noch kein Messverfahren, das die EU einbezieht. Der Commitment to Development Index, der weist inzwischen Ergebnisse für 23 Länder aus, aber für die EU als EU eben nicht, also wie kohärent die EU-Politiken sind. Das hängt damit zusammen, dass eben nur einige Politiken in die Zuständigkeit der EU fallen, andere aber eben nach wie vor in nationaler Zuständigkeit sind. Ich wäre da vorsichtig mit so einer vollmundigen Aussage: die EU ist da am weitesten. Was die EU hat, ist Art. 208 des Lissabonvertrags, was sie hat, sind sozusagen politische Dokumente, in denen der Kohärenzanspruch bekräftigt wurde: das ist der Europäische Konsens, sehen Sie aber alles in dem Papier, das ich Ihnen schicke, das sind eine Reihe von Ministerratsresolutionen zugunsten von Kohärenz, die sind nochmal in meinem Papier zitiert. Was die EU ebenfalls hat, sie hat in ihrem Gesetzgebungsverfahren die Entwicklungsverträglichkeitsprüfung eingebaut, was Deutschland beispielsweise nicht hat. Jeder Gesetzesakt muss von der Kommission, bevor er an die gesetzgebende Instanz der EU - nämlich Ministerrat und Parlament - geht, muss von der EU Kommission mit einer Beurteilung der Auswirkungen auf Entwicklungsländer und die globale Entwicklung versehen werden. Das ist ein institutioneller Vorteil. Sie hat aber bestimmte Nachteile und die resultieren aus dem supranationalen Charakter der EU. Die EU hat zwar eine Zuständigkeit für bestimmte Politiken, wo sie alleine letztendlich Kompetenz hat, das sind Handelspolitik, Agrarpolitik und einige andere, aber entscheiden tun es die Minister im Ministerrat im Einvernehmen mit dem Parlament. Das heißt die Willensbildung ist sehr, sehr kompliziert auf EU-Ebene. Also Deutschland

kann beispielsweise sagen, so steht es im Koalitionsvertrag der jetzigen Bundesregierung: wir wollen uns für einen raschen Abbau der Agrarsubventionen einsetzen, das steht so im entwicklungspolitischen Kapitel des Koalitionsvertrages, aber das kann Deutschland nicht alleine durchsetzen, sondern da muss Deutschland sich mit 26 anderen Mitgliedsländern zusammensetzen. Das ist sehr kompliziert, das heißt systemisch betrachtet hat die EU einen strukturellen Nachteil, wenn es darum geht, Kohärenz tatsächlich zu verbessern. Also die Antwort auf Frage zwei fällt eben differenziert aus. Auf der Plusseite steht der Artikel des Lissabonvertrages, es gibt übrigens noch einige weitere Artikel im Lissabonvertrag, die Sie da berücksichtigen müssen, das sehen Sie aber in meinem Papier. Auf der Plusseite steht die Bekräftigung des entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzanspruches im Europäischen Konsens von 2005 und in einer Reihe von Ministerratsresolutionen. Auf der Plusseite steht die Entwicklungsverträglichkeitsprüfung vor Richtlinien und Verordnungen, das sind ja die beiden hauptsächlichen Gesetzesakte der EU. Auf der negativen Seite oder auf der erschwerenden Seite steht eben die Tatsache, dass die Willensbildung in der EU viel, viel komplexer ist als auf nationaler Ebene.

Interviewer: Paul Hoebink hat das insgesamt etwas positiver gesehen in dem Sinne, dass er gesagt hat, man könne auf internationaler Ebene eher über nationale Befindlichkeiten hinwegsehen und da eher Sachen durchsetzen als auf nationaler Ebene.

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Vorsicht. Da muss man einfach gucken, welche Entscheidungen unterliegen der Einstimmigkeit und welche unterliegen der qualifizierten Mehrheit. Das ist ja im Lissabonvertrag genau geregelt. Es gibt nach wie vor Bereiche, wo Einstimmigkeit erforderlich ist und da wir es sehr, sehr schwer. In den Bereichen, wo qualifizierte Mehrheit erforderlich ist, da kann es sein, dass es einfacher wird, einzelne nationale Belange zu überstimmen, aber selbst da ist eine qualifizierte Mehrheit notwendig, also 60% der Bevölkerung und 60% der Stimmen. Das ist allemal komplizierter selbst wenn es darum geht, nur in einem einzigen Land, in Deutschland, eine bessere Kohärenz herzustellen zwischen unserem Steuerrecht und Entwicklungspolitik. Also, das ist auf der EU-Ebene tendenziell komplizierter, weil an der Willensbildung eben 27 Mitglieder beteiligt sind.

Interviewer: Sie hatten gerade die Agrarpolitik und die Exportsubventionen angesprochen. Wie schätzen Sie Möglichkeiten und Grenzen zur Förderung bzw. Durchsetzung des entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzgebotes im Rahmen der

Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik ein? Konkretes Beispiel: Wird der entwicklungspolitische Kohärenzgedanke im weiteren Umgang mit den 2009 wiedereingeführten Exportsubventionen für Milchprodukte Berücksichtigung finden oder sind Exportsubventionen im Rahmen eines „realistischen Kohärenzverständnisses“ hinzunehmen?

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Meine These vom realistischen Kohärenzverständnis bezieht sich auf verschiedene Ebenen. Einmal die erkenntnistheoretische Ebene: hundert Prozent Kohärenz ist theoretisch nicht möglich, ist auch praktisch nicht möglich. Nehmen Sie das Beispiel der Bananenmarktordnung der EU, die die Produzenten von Bananen in den AKP-Staaten begünstigt und die Produzenten in Nicht-AKP-Staaten, aber in Entwicklungsländern benachteiligt. Das heißt gegenüber Produzenten wie Ecuador, die keine AKP-Länder sind, ist diese Bananenordnung entwicklungspolitisch inkohärent. Wenn die jetzt abgeschafft wird, wird das kohärent gegenüber den Entwicklungsinteressen von Ecuador, Kolumbien und anderen Nicht-AKP-Ländern, während die AKP-Länder aufgrund von Wettbewerbsnachteilen dadurch erstmal geschädigt werden. Wie schätzen Sie jetzt die Kohärenz ein? Ist die Abschaffung der Bananenordnung kohärent oder nicht kohärent? Das heißt, da kommen Sie in sehr schwierige Bewertungsfragen. Auch deswegen gibt es keine hundertprozentige Kohärenz, weil sich die einzelnen Politiken auch nicht auf alle Entwicklungsländer gleich auswirken, sondern auf unterschiedliche Entwicklungsländer unterschiedlich. Realistisches Kohärenzverständnis: Ich habe auch einen Hinweis gegeben, was heute als kohärent erscheinen mag, kann morgen als inkohärent erscheinen und umgekehrt. Das hängt vom Zielsystem ab, das sich ja ändern. Es gibt ja keine naturgesetzlichen Kohärenzgedanken. Das sind nämlich sehr grundsätzliche Überlegungen. Und dann natürlich auch: ist es politisch unrealistisch, jemals in pluralistisch verfassten Staatswesen, dass sich eine Politik komplett gegenüber den anderen durchsetzt. Aber jetzt konkret zu den Milchprodukten: als erstes müsste analysiert werden, ob diese Subventionen tatsächlich nachteilige Effekte für Entwicklungsländer haben. Ich vermute das, aber es muss bewiesen werden und zwar sehr sorgfältig. Wenn das bewiesen wird, dann kann man politisch anprangern, dann kann man Kampagnen starten, dann könnten die Entwicklungsministerien eine Argumentationslinie aufbauen, woraufhin nämlich diese Milchsubventionen entwicklungspolitisch problematisch sind und was man tun kann, um diese abzubauen. Das wäre eine adäquate Strategie. Das heißt, Exportsubventionen für Milchprodukte sind nicht a priori hinzunehmen oder auch a priori zu verdammen, sondern es hängt davon ab, wie sie sich auswirken. Wenn

ganz klar gezeigt werden kann, die haben negative Effekte für Entwicklungsländer oder für die globale Entwicklung, dann sind sie anzuprangern. Was heißt denn hinnehmen, da muss das entwicklungspolitisch angeprangert werden. Ob Entwicklungspolitik dann obsiegt, ist eine völlig andere Frage. Es kann aber auch sein, dass irgendeine Inkohärenz kaum Auswirkungen hat, dann bewegt man sich so in den Bereich der Glaubwürdigkeit, wo aber massive Effekte nicht unbedingt zu erwarten sind. Konkretes Beispiel: Deutschland hat die Antikorruptionsresolution der Vereinten Nationen unterschrieben. Es gibt eine Antikorruptionsresolution und das ist sehr wünschenswert und das entspricht auch unserer Entwicklungspolitik, die von den Partnerländern verlangt, dass Korruption, schlechte Regierungsführung abgestellt werden. Das kleine Problem ist, Deutschland hat diese Antikorruptionsresolution der Vereinten Nationen aber noch nicht ratifiziert, weil der Bundestag das machen müsste, und er hat es bisher nicht gemacht. Warum, weil dazu der Tatbestand der Abgeordnetenbestechungen in unserem Strafrecht verschärft werden müsste. Das hat der Bundestag bisher nicht gemacht. Das heißt, Deutschland leistet sich eine Inkohärenz in dem Sinne, dass die deutsche Entwicklungspolitik von den Partnerländern verlangt: Liebe Leute, baut eure Korruption ab, werdet korruptionsfrei, sorgt für gute Regierungsführung, und dasselbe Deutschland kriegt es nicht hin, die Antikorruptionsregelung der Vereinten Nationen zu ratifizieren. Das ist ein Widerspruch, inkohärent. Aber die konkreten Auswirkungen, die sind damit also nicht benannt. Die Tatsache, dass Deutschland das noch nicht ratifiziert hat, schmälert die Glaubwürdigkeit. Also, wenn Deutschland jetzt in Regierungsverhandlungen mit einem Entwicklungsland darauf hinweist, dass der Kampf gegen Korruption in dem Entwicklungsland konsequent geführt werden muss, dann könnte das Entwicklungsland sagen, dass ist zwar sehr schön, was ihr da erzählt, ihr Deutschen, aber ihr seid doch selbst inkohärent. Ratifiziert erstmal bei euch die Antikorruptionsresolution der Vereinten Nationen. Da haben wir ein Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem. Das ist eine ganz klare Inkohärenz, führt zu Glaubwürdigkeitsverlust der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik, aber da jetzt die Auswirkungen, die schädlichen Auswirkungen auf Entwicklungsländer zu ermessen, das dürfte sehr schwer sein. Zurück zu Ihren Milchsubventionen: die sind weder a priori hinzunehmen noch a priori zu verdammen, sondern notwendig ist eine Analyse ihrer Auswirkungen. Wenn sich herausstellt, die haben tatsächlich nachteilige Effekte auf Milchbauern in Indien, das war nämlich in den 90er Jahren mal das Problem, dann ist das inkohärent und dann muss das angeprangert werden.

Interviewer: Für die jetzt wiedereingeführten Milchsubventionen könnte man sich auf frühere Studien berufen, aber was diese jetzt eigentlich konkret auswirken, das ist eben noch nicht ganz klar. Offensichtlich wird es im Parlament angeprangert, aber wenn man mit der PCD Unit spricht, dann können die eben noch keine Aussagen machen. Und auch aus Entwicklungsländern ist noch kein Protest wahrzunehmen.

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Gut, aber dann muss diese Analyse gemacht werden.

Interviewer: Wie beurteilen Sie die gegenwärtigen Mechanismen der EU bzw. der Kommission (z.B. Impact Assessment; Interservice Consultation; PCD Unit in DG DEVE; Integration von PCD in Country Strategy Papers) zur Umsetzung des entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzgedankens? Tragen diese Ihren Vorschlägen eines genaueren Verständnisses von Wechselwirkungen unterschiedlicher Politikfelder und einer stärkeren Berücksichtigung des Kohärenzgedankens bei der Politikformulierung hinreichend Rechnung?

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Hier ist meine Antwort wie folgt: Grundsätzlich sind das sinnvolle Ansätze, sinnvolle Mechanismen. Das Impact Assessment, die Interservice Consultation, das ist bei uns die Ressortabstimmung, dann die PCD Unit, das ist sicher sinnvoll, Integration von PCD ist sinnvoll. Ob das hinreichend ist, das kann ich nicht beurteilen. Dazu müsste man diese Mechanismen evaluieren. Ich habe das nicht getan. Ich weiß auch nicht, ob es solche Evaluierungen gibt. Sicherlich sinnvoll, auch im Lichte der Synthese der Kohärenzverfahren der Mitgliedsländer, die finden Sie in meinem Aufsatz, den ich Ihnen schicke, zitiert. Ob hinreichend, weiß ich nicht. Das hängt nämlich davon, welcher Gebrauch von diesen Mechanismen gemacht wird und ob die Mechanismen sich für sich genommen in der Praxis tatsächlich als wirksam erwiesen haben, aber im Prinzip ist das erstmal positiv zu beurteilen.

Interviewer: Politischer Wille bzw. politische Führung wird als eine wichtige Voraussetzung für kohärente Politik verstanden. Wie müsste „political leadership“ auf EU-Ebene konkret ausgestaltet werden, um entwicklungspolitische Kohärenz zu fördern?

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Also ganz einfach: einfach in dem Sinne, dass ich die Punkte benenne, die Umsetzung ist dann unter Umständen sehr kompliziert. Die EU braucht einen inhaltlichen Referenzrahmen und den hat sie mit den Europäischen Konsens von 2005, den hat sie auch mit einer Reihe von entwicklungspolitischen Resolutionen des

Ministerrates, in denen auf die Millenniumdeclaration, die MDGs, Bezug genommen wird, in denen die Notwendigkeit verbesserter Politikkohärenz betont wird. Das ist vorhanden, das muss genutzt werden. Dazu brauchen wir einen Entwicklungskommissar, der mit diesem Referenzrahmen ausgestattet nun mehr Kohärenz einfordert und das dann in den Interservice Consultations betreibt, der bestimmte Inkohärenzen zum Thema macht, dazu Analysen erstellen lässt, die Ergebnisse dann einbringt und Druck macht, der Bündnisgenossen sucht im Europäischen Parlament, im Entwicklungsausschusses des Parlamentes, aber auch bei der Wissenschaft, bei Nichtregierungsorganisationen. Man braucht also ein Engagement zugunsten von Kohärenz seitens des für Entwicklung zuständigen Kommissars, aber nicht nur des Entwicklungskommissars, sondern auch des Außenkommissars und am besten auch durch den Kommissionspräsidenten.

Interviewer: Neben politischer Interessendivergenz (z.B. zwischen der politisch starken Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik und einer eher schwachen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit) nennen Sie „unterlassene Gegenmaßnahmen der Partnerländer“ als weitere Ursache für Politikinkohärenz. Abgeordnete des Europäischen Parlaments bestätigen, dass es wegen der Exportsubventionen für Milchprodukte hauptsächlich Proteste aus den Reihen der europäischen Zivilgesellschaft und kaum aus Entwicklungsländern gäbe. Spräche dies für die These „unterlassener Gegenmaßnahmen der Partnerländer“ oder können Wirkungen von Politik (in diesem Fall durch subventionierte Milhexporte) nicht vorschnell und generell in kohärent oder inkohärent eingeteilt werden?

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Das ist ein wichtiger Punkt. Nehmen wir Ihre subventionierten Milhexporte oder Milchpulverexporte: Mir ist der Fall bekannt, dass in Indien die Milchwirtschaft in bestimmten Regionen dadurch geschädigt wurde. Aber wo steht denn geschrieben, dass Indien gezwungen ist, subventioniertes Milchpulver bei der EU einzukaufen? Und wenn das einzelne Milchimporteure tun, das kann ja sein, Indien ist ja keine Staatswirtschaft, dann könnte aber der indische Staat sagen, ok, dann erheben wir einen Ausgleichszoll, um sozusagen den Subventionseffekt zu neutralisieren. Das haben nämlich westafrikanische Länder, also ein westafrikanisches Land gemacht, der Fall ist auch bei mir zitiert, um einfach die lokale Milchwirtschaft zu schützen. Das kann ein Entwicklungsland machen, das ist auch WTO-konform, wenn nämlich der Tatbestand des Dumping vorliegt. Dann sind wir aber bei dem Punkt: welche Interessen vertritt die indische Regierung? Hat sie die Konsumenteninteressen im

Blick, die billiges Milchpulver kriegen sollen, oder hat sie die Interessen der Milchbauern im Blick. So, das ist eine politische Abwägung.

Interviewer: Ist es auch eine politische Abwägung, ob man sich gegen die EU "aufbäumt", da Gegenmaßnahmen an anderer Stellen zu befürchten sind?

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Wenn die EU Exporte von Milchprodukten subventioniert, dann tut sie das ja nicht nur gegenüber einem bestimmten Land wie Indien, sondern das ist eine agrarpolitische Maßnahme. Es gibt dann Milchpulverüberschüsse, die sollen abgesetzt werden auf dem Weltmarkt, da das europäische Milchpulver zu teuer ist, wird es eben runtersubventioniert. Und von diesen subventionierten Exporten machen eine ganze Reihe von Importländern, darunter Indien, Gebrauch. Die sagen, hervorragend, da gibt es verbilligtes Milchpulver, das kaufen wir. Und nicht ein Land, sondern konkrete Importeure, Milchpulverimporteure, jedenfalls in Ländern, die nicht planwirtschaftlich verfasst sind. Da könnte aber die indische Regierung hingehen und sagen, langsam Freunde, das machen wir nicht, weil nämlich dadurch unsere Milchbauern in der Provinz X oder Y geschädigt werden. Wir erheben einen Ausgleichszoll. Das wäre mit einer Gegenmaßnahme eines Empfängerlandes gemeint.

Interviewer: Ist der entwicklungspolitische Kohärenzanspruch theoriefähig oder handelt es sich vor allem um ein sinnvolles Konzept, mit dessen Hilfe ein Kernproblem der Entwicklungspolitik (u.a. Abhängigkeit von und Zusammenwirken mit anderen Politik-bereichen) systematisch erfasst werden kann?

Dr. Guido Ashoff: Der ist natürlich theoriefähig. Man kann das Thema Politikkohärenz durchaus politikwissenschaftlich konzeptualisieren. Und da werden Sie auch Hinweise in meinem Aufsatz finden. Da werden Sie nämlich sehen, dass hundertprozentige Kohärenz schon deshalb nicht möglich ist, weil es eben solche Dinge wie das Condorcet-Paradoxon gibt, das Arrow-Paradoxon. Das haben Sie wahrscheinlich bei Kevenhörster alles gelernt, das steht auch in seinem Lehrbuch zur Politikwissenschaft drin, da habe ich auch drauf Bezug genommen. Aber für Kohärenz spricht, dass nämlich Inkohärenzen die Glaubwürdigkeit, die Effizienz und Wirksamkeit von Politiken beeinträchtigen kann. Wenn man jetzt von der gesellschaftlichen Wohlfahrtsfunktion ausgeht, dann wäre eigentlich kohärentes Regierungshandeln wünschenswert, und das durch Inkohärenz gemindert wird, dann ist das kritisch zu sehen. Kurz: diese Kohärenzdebatte, die ist sehr wohl theoriefähig, wobei die Theorie dann einerseits zeigt, dass vollständige Kohärenz nicht möglich ist, dass andererseits aber Kohärenz,

soweit sie sich herstellen lässt, wünschenswert ist für eben die Glaubwürdigkeit, die Effizienz, die Effektivität von Regierungshandeln. Das ganze wird aber wiederum erschwert in demokratisch-pluralistisch verfassten Staatswesen wegen der komplizierten Willensbildung, es wird erschwert in föderal strukturierten Staatswesen, weil nämlich da verschiedene Staatsebenen eine Rolle spielen. Das ist viel einfacher in einem Zentralstaat, wo nämlich nur eine Regierungsebene entscheidet, nämlich die zentrale Regierung. Wenn aber noch Bundesländer, wie in Deutschland, mitreden, dann kann es sehr, sehr kompliziert werden. Es gibt zahlreiche Bezüge zu politologischen Regierungslehre.

Interviewer: Dr. Ashoff, vielen, vielen Dank dafür, dass dieses Interview so spontan geklappt hat und weiterhin einen schönen Abend.

7.3. **Annex 3:** Interview with Franziska Keller, MEP

Interviewer: Auf welche Art und Weise kann das Europäische Parlament die Umsetzung des entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzanspruchs unterstützen?

Franziska Keller MEP: Da wir an der Gesetzgebung beteiligt sind in den allermeisten Gebieten mittlerweile, können wir sozusagen den Kohärenzanspruch unterstützen, indem wir kohärente Politik beschließen. Das ist natürlich nicht immer so einfach, weil wir im Fischereiausschuss zum Beispiel Leute haben, die europäische Fischereinteressen auch unterstützen; nicht alle von denen, doch eine starke Lobby. Also, das kann man zum Beispiel machen. Man kann einfach kohärente Politik machen. Man kann aber genauso der Kommission immer wieder auf die Finger klopfen und schauen, wie implementieren die die Politik eigentlich. Also, angenommen, wir würden als Parlament kohärente Politik machen, wie wird das eigentlich umgesetzt? Wie ist das in Bereichen, wo wir nicht mitzubestimmen haben? Wie werden die Entwicklungsmittel eingesetzt? Ich glaube, da kann man als Parlament schon recht viel machen. Das Ding ist halt auch, dass das Parlament kein homogenes Wesen ist, sondern aus ganz vielen unterschiedlichen Parteien besteht, die auch unterschiedliche Ansprüche haben und nicht für alle Leute, für alle Parteien ist Entwicklung ist das, wo sich andere Interessen unterordnen muss.

Interviewer: Der kürzlich verabschiedete Bericht [EU Policy Coherence for Development and the 'Official Development Assistance plus concept'] wurde gegen die Stimmen der EVP verabschiedet. Wenn man nun auf das Parlament schaut, kann man

eine Trennlinie ziehen, wer jetzt PCD, wenn ich das mal so einfach abkürzen darf, voranbringt und wer bremst oder dem Konzept skeptisch gegenüber steht?

Franziska Keller MEP: Prinzipiell würden vermutlich alle sagen, ja, das ist total toll. Aber dann muss man sehen, dass es von der EVP - das ist ein generelles Problem, das betrifft aber auch nicht alle Abgeordneten der EVP, aber dummerweise eben die Mehrheit, die große Mehrheit, und auch bei den Sozialdemokraten gibt es viele Abgeordnete, denen sind eben die Interessen der Fischer oder der Bauern in Europa wichtiger als die Interessen der Fischer und Bauern anderswo. Also, das gibt sozusagen über die Lager weg. Und bei den Liberalen hat man ja auch die Zweiteilung: einerseits diejenigen, die Wirtschaftsliberalisierung wollen. Andererseits...zum Beispiel bei Freihandel und so weiter, das muss ja nicht unbedingt was Gutes bedeuten für Entwicklungspolitik. Da gibt es also auch Widersprüche. Es hängt immer von Thema ab.

Interviewer: Könnte man sagen, dass das Thema PCD generell im Parlament angekommen ist oder ist es so, wenn man in andere Ausschüsse neben dem DEVE geht, dass denen das teilweise völlig fremd ist oder sie es nicht beachten bzw. nicht mit in ihre Überlegungen einfließen lassen?

Franziska Keller MEP: Ja, das ist schon ein Problem, da es das Bewusstsein nicht so wirklich gibt auch dahinzuschauen, was die Politik, die man beschließt, eigentlich anderswo anrichten kann - das ist definitiv ein Problem. Da haben wir ja auch versucht, das Thema mit internen Parlaments-Hearings usw. ins Bewusstsein zu bringen. Das ist auch nicht so einfach, aber selbst dann, wenn die Leute davon wissen, heißt es noch lange nicht, dass sie sich auf die eine Seite stellen. Also, es gibt halt eine Konfliktlinien, nicht nur win-win-situations, sondern es gibt eben Konflikte und da sind viele der Meinung, dass europäische Interessen vorgehen, was auch immer, wer auch immer europäische Interessen definiert.

Interviewer: Die zweite grob skizzierte Frage, geht in etwa in diese Richtung: Wie lässt der entwicklungspolitische Kohärenzanspruch (Policy Coherence for Development) gegenüber andern Politikbereichen rechtfertigen (Kritik „codeword for supremacy“)?

Franziska Keller MEP: Das ist relativ einfach, weil es im Lissabonvertrag so drinsteht im Artikel 208. Da wird Politikkohärenz so definiert, dass es für Entwicklung ist. Das ist für uns auch total wichtig, dass man immer mit dem Artikel, mit den Paragraphen wedeln kann. Leider interessiert das hier nicht allzu viele Leute. Aber im Prinzip haben

wir die vertraglich Grundlage dafür.

Interviewer: Wie kann denn konkret von diesem Artikel Gebrauch gemacht werden?

Franziska Keller MEP: Das ist schon eine interessante Sache und das müssen wir auch noch rausfinden, weil der Lissabonvertrag ja relativ frisch ist. Wenn es jetzt zum Beispiel darum geht, dem External Action Service, also den auswärtigen Dienst einzurichten, dann ist schon die Frage, wenn da jetzt ganz krass Entwicklung anderen Interessen untergeordnet wird, kann man dann nicht vielleicht vor den Europäischen Gerichtshof gehen z.B. und sagen, hier wird der Vertrag verletzt. Das ist ja auch nicht ohne, wenn das da im Vertrag steht. Das ist kein unverbindliches Schriftstück, sondern ein Vertrag. Und wir werden uns noch mal angucken müssen, was da alles noch mit möglich ist.

Interviewer: Wie können mögliche Fortschritte und Rückschritte im letzten PCD-Report (2009) beurteilt werden?

Franziska Keller MEP: Im Prinzip ist es gut, dass es den Bericht gibt. Aber es gibt auch Schwachstellen, wo Sachen wie Agrofuels, also Biosprit, positiv bewertet werden; da steht dann drin, dass ist eine große Möglichkeit für Entwicklungsländer damit Geld zu verdienen, während wir das skeptischer sehen, weil es zum Beispiel schlecht für Biodiversität ist, zu Nahrungsmittelknappheit führt, mehr Landflächen verbraucht werden etc. und gar nicht so viel CO₂ eingespart wird, wie man immer dachte. Also, da haben wir zum Beispiel unterschiedliche Bewertungen und wenn die Kommission zu dem Schluss kommt, Biosprit ist total toll für Entwicklungsländer, dann wird sie das weiter fördern, wobei wir das anders sehen. Ein anderer Punkt ist, dass der Bericht sehr vage ist und nicht sehr konkret und sagt auch nicht, woran Fortschritt festgemacht wird. Generell gibt es kaum Indikatoren, an denen wir Sachen messen können. Es gibt selten so etwas von wegen 'wir haben einen Erfolg, wenn...die Exportsubventionen auf null zusammengestrichen werden'. Das bleibt sehr vage.

Interviewer: Welche Konsequenzen hat die Konzentration auf fünf „broad policy areas“ anstatt der zwölf ursprünglichen Politikbereiche? Könnte es sein, dass Landwirtschaft dadurch etwas verwischt wird?

Franziska Keller MEP: Also wir sind damit auch nicht glücklich mit den fünf neuen Bereichen, schon deswegen, weil die zwölf Bereiche nicht schon zwanzig Jahre oder so evaluiert werden, sondern das gibt es erst seit zwei Jahren oder so, dass es diese zwölf

Bereiche gegeben hat und jetzt werden die plötzlich über den Haufen geworfen und es werden fünf neue Bereiche aufgemacht. Uns wird immer gesagt von der Kommission, „naja, alle alten Bereiche sind irgendwie mit drin in den fünf“. Das ist ja schön und gut, aber warum hat man dann fünf neue gebraucht? Allein dadurch, dass es zwei Schwerpunkte gibt, einer ist Migration, ein anderer Sicherheit, rückt das schon in eine andere Ecke. Es ist zwar gut, dass zum Beispiel Finanzen drin sind beim Handel, das war vorher nicht der Fall, aber wir finden das schon sehr komisch. Und Landwirtschaft kommt zwar, klar, immer mal indirekt mit vor, aber nicht so richtig.

Interviewer: Eben wurde es bereits kurz angesprochen, wie (eng) gestaltet sich das Verhältnis des Europäischen Parlaments bzw. des DEVE-Ausschusses zur Kommission im politischen Alltag?

Franziska Keller MEP: Also zum Beispiel haben wir uns mit den Leuten, die den PCD-Bericht geschrieben haben von der Kommission, mehrmals getroffen - also wir haben da Kontakt. Wir können da auch ganz viel anrufen und sagen, „hey, was plant ihr jetzt gerade?“ Das läuft relativ gut, aber wir sind nicht immer einer Meinung. Und dann ist auch klar, dass man unsere Meinung mal nicht in Betracht gezogen wird. Im Prinzip, der Kontakt ist nicht so das Problem. Was natürlich so ein strukturelles Problem ist in der EU, ist, dass man ganz viele Dialoge mit der Zivilgesellschaft macht. Es gibt den Stakeholder Dialogue, NGO Consultation, was auch total toll ist. Nur oft wird mit NGOs mehr konsultiert als mit dem Parlament, was immer dazu führt, dass wir unsere Infos etc. immer von NGOs uns ziehen müssen, die für uns Parlamentarier noch streng geheim sind, was ein kleines Missverhältnis ist. Aber gut, solange es die NGOs bekommen, gut für uns, aber ich glaube, da könnte das Parlament noch mehr in Vorbereitungen einbezogen werden. Auch der PCD-Bericht der Kommission muss, glaube ich, einfach mehr mit in Betracht gezogen werden, was der letzte PCD-Bericht des Parlaments gemacht hat. Zum Beispiel der Parlamentsbericht von 2007, der wurde überhaupt nicht miteinbezogen in den Kommissionsbericht und dann schreibt man den für den Papierkorb.

Interviewer: Gibt es auch Kontakt zur PCD Unit in der Kommission und wie lässt sich deren Arbeit beurteilen?

Franziska Keller MEP: Wie gesagt, mit den Leuten, die für Kohärenz arbeiten, haben wir auch wirklich guten Kontakt, aber wieviel Einfluss die auf andere DGs haben, ist schwierig zu sagen und das werden die uns ja auch nicht so erzählen von wegen „jaja,

wir haben da überhaupt keinen Einfluss oder so“. Aber es ist natürlich nicht so ganz einfach, aber es bringt schon viel: es gibt ja auch dieses PCD Work Programme von der Kommission, wo auch für jeden Politikbereich PCD-Schwerpunkte gesetzt werden. Das ist auch schon mal ein guter Fortschritt. Es gibt auch solche inter-DG Arbeitsgruppen, die sich öfters mal zusammensetzen, aber wie das da genau aussieht, wissen wir halt auch nicht.

Interviewer: Wie ist der neue Kommissar für Entwicklung Piebalgs einzuschätzen auch vis-à-vis anderen - vermeintlich wichtigeren - Kommissaren. Das ist natürlich eine Frage, die die Kommission betrifft, doch mich würde eine Einschätzung aus dem Parlament interessieren.

Franziska Keller MEP: Ich glaube schon, dass Piebalgs auf dem richtigen Weg ist. Er hat auch in der Anhörung, die wir mit allen Kommissaren gemacht haben, betont, dass PCD einer seiner Hauptschwerpunkte ist. Allerdings hat er uns jetzt auch einen Brief geschrieben, in dem er seine Schwerpunkte für dieses Jahr aufgeführt hat und da war von PCD nicht mehr die Rede. Aber in seiner mündlichen Erklärung hat er das nach wie vor genannt. Also, wir sehen ihn da schon auf einem richtigen Weg, dummerweise war er vorher Energiekommissar und deswegen auch noch sehr positiv was Biosprit angeht. Das ist schwierig, aber er hat zum Beispiel auch neue Themen wie die Steuerfrage, Steueroasen und so weiter - auch auf Druck des Parlaments, möchte ich behaupten, obwohl es nicht so einfach ist, dies nachzuweisen - aufgenommen in seine Kommunikation. Also, im Prinzip schon auf dem richtigen Wege, aber es fehlt noch ein bisschen an konkreten Vorhaben wie man das jetzt legislativ umsetzt. Weil nur zu sagen, wir würden jetzt gerne etwas gegen die Steueroasen tun ohne es zu tun, ist eine nette Absicht, aber passiert ist noch nicht viel.

Interviewer: Ich würde jetzt gerne zur Wiedereinführung von Exportsubventionen für Milchprodukte im letzten Jahr kommen. Wie reagiert das Parlament auf diese Exportsubventionen?

Franziska Keller MEP: Vor allem von der EVP werden Exportsubventionen immer unterstützt. Das heißt auch da sieht man, wie problematisch das ist: uns wird immer erzählt, „aber wir lassen die Exportsubventionen doch jetzt auslaufen“, aber jetzt kommen halt wieder neue und hier hat das Parlament nicht wirklich etwas mitzureden. Und das ist schon ein Problem, das das immer unterstützt wird.

Interviewer: Könnte das Parlament durch das Budgetrecht nutzen, um auf die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik Einfluss zu nehmen?

Franziska Keller MEP: Das ist eine gute Frage. Im Prinzip müsste es ja möglich sein, aber ich glaube, diese neuen Milchresolutionen wurde ja auch völlig ohne Mithilfe des Parlaments beschlossen. Deswegen bin ich mir da nicht komplett sicher, inwieweit wir da eine Handhabe haben. Das müssen wir nochmal mit den Leuten aus dem AGRI-Ausschuss checken, die da dransitzen am konkreten Prozedere. Es ist auch nicht so einfach zu sagen, aus welchen Töpfen diese Subventionen kommen.

Interviewer: Wurden einige der PCD-Mechanismen (Impact Assessment, PCD Einheit, Inter-Service Consultation, Country Strategy Papers) eingesetzt, um zu schauen, was da eigentlich passiert oder gibt es hauptsächlich Kritik an den Exportsubventionen?

Franziska Keller MEP: Also, ich wüsste nicht, dass irgendeiner von diesen Mechanismen, und vor allem Impact Assessment, irgendwo angewendet wurde, als das beschlossen wurde. Ich glaube, der Blick lag wirklich ausschließlich auf den einheimischen Bäuerinnen und Bauern und es ging überhaupt nicht über Grenzen hinweg. Es kann sein, dass ich da etwas einfach nicht weiß, aber den Eindruck habe ich nicht, dass davon irgendetwas mal genutzt wurde.

Interviewer: Gibt es Anstrengungen, z.B. Impact Assessment früher einzusetzen, um zu schauen, was mit den Exportsubventionen passiert?

Franziska Keller MEP: Also, wir wollen das natürlich, müsste auch eigentlich völlig logisch sein, dass man erstmal schaut, was für Auswirkungen das hat. Manchmal gibt es auch Impact Assessments, die erst erstellt werden, wenn das Projekt schon am Laufen ist, was natürlich völlig sinnfrei ist. Aber, ob das jetzt bald kommt, mal gucken. Wir fordern's.

Interviewer: Die Mechanismen werden also in der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik nicht wirklich eingesetzt oder ist das falsch?

Franziska Keller MEP: Nein, so würde ich das auf jeden Fall unterstützen, also ich würde es nicht unterstützen, aber unterschreiben. Es wird geschaut welche Auswirkungen hat das für Bäuerinnen und Bauern, aber auch nur kurzfristig und nicht langfristig, und außerhalb der Grenze schaut so schnell niemand nach.

Interviewer: Gab es, vielleicht auch an das Parlament herangetragen, irgendeine Art von Protest aus Entwicklungsländern, dass man auf Auswirkungen hingewiesen hat?

Franziska Keller MEP: Bei den jetzigen Milchsubventionen habe ich nichts von derartigen Protesten gehört. NGOs haben natürlich gesagt, dass sie das aufgrund der Auswirkungen schlecht finden, aber es gab keine Massenproteste, nichts, was wirklich sichtbar wurde aus Entwicklungsländern.

Interviewer: Auf welchen Erkenntnissen basiert die Kritik an Exportsubventionen?

Franziska Keller MEP: Es gibt zum Beispiel von CONCORD diesen Spotlight Report, wo sie auch zehn Inkohärenzen aufzählen, z.B. Exportsubventionen, Fischerei, Migration, und wie es vor Ort aussieht. Das Problem ist, dass man das selten so ganz genau nachweisen kann. Es gab einmal diesen Fall in Kamerun mit den gefrorenen Geflügelteilen, wo man das relativ genau nachweisen konnte, dass das die lokalen Märkte zerstört. Und daraufhin gab's dann auch keine Subventionen mehr dafür, aber das war einer dieser wenigen Fälle, wo man es genau nachweisen konnte. Aber es gibt schon sehr viele Studien zu Inkohärenzen.

Interviewer: Gibt es genaue Kennzahlen über subventionierte Exporte von Milchprodukten in Entwicklungsländer und wird das Parlament ausreichend darüber informiert?

Franziska Keller MEP: Zumindest nicht wir im Entwicklungsausschuss. Eigentlich gibt es für alle Agrarsubventionen...kann man das einsehen. Das ist zwar immer verspätet, aber man kann das eine Weile nach der Auszahlung einsehen. Es muss öffentlich gemacht werden. Aber ich weiß nicht, ob es jetzt schon zu diesen neuen Exportsubventionen schon irgendwelche Zahlen gibt. Es kamen gerade erst die Zahlen für die Agrarsubventionen vom letzten oder vorletzten Jahr vor ein paar Wochen. Das heißt, es dauert immer ein bisschen. Wir haben auch einen Abgeordneten im AGRI-Ausschuss, Martin Häusling und der ist einer unserer Milchexperten.

Interviewer: Ist der dann sozusagen allein auf weiter Flur, wenn er dann mit Politikkohärenz im AGRI-Ausschuss arbeitet?

Franziska Keller MEP: Es kommt ganz drauf an. Wir Grüne sind schon sehr stark auf Kohärenz fokussiert, aber in anderen Parteien sieht das natürlich anders aus. Und wir haben leider nicht die Mehrheit, aber wir haben schon ein paar Grüne in den jeweiligen

Ausschüssen und die werden sich schon dafür stark machen, ganz klar.

Interviewer: Wie ist die zukünftige Entwicklung der Exportsubventionen einzuschätzen. Werden die 2013, wie angekündigt, auslaufen oder gibt es Anzeichen, dass sich da vorher noch etwas tut?

Franziska Keller MEP: Also, ich glaube nicht, dass es schneller wird. Ich kann mir höchstens vorstellen, dass es langsamer wird und natürlich ist es auch das ganze Problem, dass die Subventionen, die nicht Exportsubventionen heißen, aber letztendlich Exportsubventionen sind, indem sie die Produktion billiger machen etc....das sind versteckte Exportsubventionen, die darf man auch nicht vergessen. Bis die weg sind, glaube ich, wird es noch eine Weile dauern, oder zumindest ausgeglichen werden können. Es gibt ja da alle möglichen Überlegungen. Aber ich glaube, dass dauert noch eine Weile bis die weg sind.

Interviewer: Welchen Chancen und Risiken ergeben sich aus dem Lissabon Vertrag für den entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzanspruch? Was ist von der Reformvorschlägen der GAP Ende des Jahres zu erwarten?

Franziska Keller MEP: Es ist gerade eine total wichtige Phase, weil dieser External Action Service genau determinieren wird, wie Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Zukunft aussehen wird. Und das läuft momentan nicht ganz so gut, weil es danach aussieht, als ob Ashton mehr bei der Strategie und Planung zu sagen bekommt als Piebalgs. Und das kann eine Riesengefahr sein, dass Kohärenz so ausgelegt wird, dass Entwicklungspolitik kohärent mit der Außenpolitik sein muss und nicht andersrum wie es eigentlich der Vertrag vorschreibt. Riesiges Problem, ja.

Interviewer: Das könnte bedeuten, dass es eher zum Nachteil wird, den Kohärenzgedanken überhaupt aufgebracht zu haben. Das ist natürlich etwas zugespitzt formuliert, aber könnte man dies aus dem Lissabonvertrag rauslesen?

Franziska Keller MEP: Ich finde, der Lissabonvertrag ist da sehr, sehr klar. Ich finde, die Leute, die nur die Außenpolitik kohärenter machen, die verschlucken immer den zweiten Teil des Satzes. Ich sehe da eigentlich keine andere Interpretationsmöglichkeit, aber die Gefahr ist natürlich trotzdem da. Ich meine, die Außenleute waren schon immer stärker als die Entwicklungslobby...aber wir geben uns Mühe.

Interviewer: Welche Erwartungen oder Befürchtungen gibt es im Hinblick auf die

Reformvorschläge für die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik, die Ende des Jahres gemacht werden sollen?

Franziska Keller MEP: Wir sind da gerade in der Vorbereitung dazu, auch was unsere Position zur GAP sein soll und natürlich ist ein ganz wichtiger Punkt einfach die Agrarsubventionen. Wo sollen die hingehen? Soll es die noch geben? Wir sagen, ja wenn Agrarsubventionen, dann nach Qualifikation, nicht mehr nach Masse von Land, sondern eher zum Beispiel nach 'wie bio sind die Bauern?', und wieviel Leute haben die eingestellt und so weiter. Also, das wird, glaube ich, einfach der Hauptknackpunkt: die Finanzierung.

Interviewer: Vielen Dank für die interessanten Antworten, die sich aus der politischen Praxis ergeben.

7.4. **Annex 4:** Interview with a civil servant, PCD Unit, DG Development, European Commission²⁴²

Interviewer: The PCD Report of 2009 states that the PCD unit has a “catalysing, advising, and coaching role for PCD”. Could you please elaborate on the mandate and general competence of the PCD unit?

Civil Servant: Das Mandat ist genau das: das heißt, wir haben im Wesentlichen eine Koordinierungsrolle und eine konzeptionelle Rolle, weil PCD ist nicht evident weder für Leute in anderen Generaldirektionen, denen man erklären muss, dass Rechnungstragen von Entwicklungszielen notwendig ist, die aber daran gewöhnt sind, an ihre eigene Ziele zu denken. Auch für Entwicklungsleute ist es manchmal schwierig, das umzukehren, zu sagen, es ist nicht nur Hilfe, also Assistenz, es ist auch, was EU-Politik macht, was für Effekte die auf die...ich werde jetzt ins Englische übergehen. As I said, we have a coordinating role and, indeed a coordinating role, and at the same time advising in the sense that we have to explain what we mean with Policy Coherence for Development. This is not necessary usual for other DG who are not used to take into account other objectives than the objectives they are mandated for. And even for development people they too think in terms of how can we help the country or which policy is good for the country. But our development policies they are not used to think in terms of non-development policies. Another point is that people have to understand

²⁴² The interviewee begins in German but quickly decided to turn to English.

what this is. The mandate in concrete terms it means that we have inter-service coordination mostly in the preparation of the report, in the preparation of the work programmes and so on. We have to be permanently in liaison with other DGs ensuring that the PCD agenda is pushed forward.

Interviewer: Could you please describe the relations to other DGs or staff of other DGs? How does the relation look like when you do for example inter-service consultation?

Civil Servant: We have either meetings or written consultations. There are two ways: The first one, each proposal by any DG has to come into an inter-service consultation. So you have a proposal by the Commission, either policy orientation or in form of a communication, or even before white book or green book. And then the communication, all the DGs have this proposal before it comes to the Commission for adoption, it goes into the so called inter-service consultation. All relevant DGs have to give their approval, all concerned DGs. And the definition of a concerned DG is very broad, so any DG who thinks it is concerned is concerned. The arbitrage which is done by the general secretariat is very wide, wide interpretation of who is concerned. It means that particularly DG DEVE is concerned. It can look in the context of this kind of inter-service consultation. It can look from point of view of policy coherence for development. This is one way. So we are consulted on proposals by others. Then we have to make a specific work on coherence for development which is report, communication, adoption of a work programme and so on, where we have the lead, and where we have to consult obviously in the preparation and formerly the other simply because we rely on them. We are a small unit, we are a coordinating unit, but we are not a very substantial unit for all the domains. We don't replicate everything. Even within DG DEVE, we have thematic units which are working on trade, which are working on rural development and agricultural support and on which we have to rely as a PCD unit, too. I'm not a specialist from everything. We need to have an ownership of the...they have to integrate in their work what we want, not the contrary.

Interviewer: I imagine this to be not a very easy task...

Civil Servant: No.

Interviewer: Speaking of the PCD Unit, how huge is this unit?

Civil Servant: It's very small. There is only two persons working on PCD but as I said,

we rely on thematic units within DG DEVE and obviously on the other DGs. The DEVE part we rely on also on other issues. If you look at the organigram of DG DEVE, you can see the directorate B, which is mainly concerned, which are my interlocutors. They cover trade, agriculture, fisheries and so on. They are the usual counterpart of the line DGs. But I have to explain permanently, to revitalize the idea of PCD which they said is not evident.

Interviewer: At what level does the exchange or involvement take place?

Civil Servant: For me, it's working relationships. But PCD also gains a political dimension more and more. There is a political level, too, but in political terms. If you are political scientist you have to permanently see PCD from point of view of the representation and from point of view of the effectiveness to defend things.

Interviewer: And what role is the PCD Unit concerned with?

Civil Servant: I am concerned about the substance. All the DGs, we tend to do presentations and they say our own policy is coherent with development objectives. Questioning this...the work is to question this. At the end of the day, the whole presentation is, has to be positive.

Interviewer: How would you describe the working relationships? Is it of a mediating or conflicting nature?

Civil Servant: Antagonistic cooperation, I describe it. At the end of the day, you need to have a consensus. I cannot send my commissioner for fighting on this in the Commission, obviously, because it's something...as you know, we are in a consensual mode of decision. But that means if there something, which is not directly in the interest of my Commissioner, he will fight for it. On the other side and that the reason why the representation is enormously important, because it provides pressure from outside. External pressure is enormously important to change bills, to change policies or behaviour. Inside, DG DEVE does not have substantial power in this context. So, it means I'm forced to be consensual at some stage. There are issues at which there is I do it and which of much bluff and of much antagonism, I prepare to go. And when I say I, I is the hierarchy abort. So, this is relatively antagonistic, obviously. I don't want to instrumentalise it, on the other side, it is necessary to come to some consensus. Sometimes, it's conflicting, sometimes it's the last minute, but it becomes agreed before it goes to the Commission level. We never have a conflict on this in the Commission -

impossible. You can reflect as a political scientist why it is impossible. But there is also leverage: European parliament. That's the reason why we walk very much with the civil society and cooperate also in formal places with the European Parliament to empower.

Interviewer: So when you...

Civil Servant: Not so often.

Interviewer: In the parliament I heard that sometimes information is first passed to civil society and then via NGOs to the parliament. Thus, information does not go directly from the Commission to parliament.

Civil Servant: That's interesting. Indeed, it's strange, it's strange. I presume that NGOs are probably more active in requesting information than the parliamentary assistants. This depends a little bit on the kind of the...because when we provide information to the parliament, there is a formal way and the informal way. I mean the parliament is a European institution, so obviously there are ways to communicate which are the formal ones and certainly where the Commission will not provide information where a political gain will play a role, if it can be returned against you or the Commission or you need an overall consensus among all the Commissioners to provide a certain information or certain assessment. So, it's more difficult. Then, but if an assistant of a parliamentarian or the parliamentarian will call me and ask me what it is about this and this, maybe I will be a little bit more prudent. You never know how it is politicized afterwards. But with NGOs, it's also dependent of the relation of trust you have with them. I presume, it's not systematic that. What you said is a bit strange, but it's good to know.

Interviewer: If you use the term policy coherence for development, would you say that the staff of other DGs are in general familiar with this term or are they sometimes reluctant to work with it?

Civil Servant: In general, they know that this exists. If you ask those people who are concerned with a definition, we may ask for one definition by each person, including those with absolutely reverse logic, it means that policy coherence for development is coherence of development policy with our own goals, and to some extent it can also be a two-way thing. I don't know which kind of definition you have in mind but it is something which needs to be looked at from different perspectives. For me, the dominant issue is the contribution of other policies to development goals. It's not the

contrary. Sometimes there are policies which are non-negotiable, then we have to all reflect how to establish policy coherence.

Interviewer: What policies would these be?

Civil Servant: Phytosanitary standards is my standard example. It is about the safety of food in the European Union, I don't believe we will be very much, that there will be a margin of manoeuvre for negotiating lower standards because some exporters in Africa will suffer under it. In this case, you have non-negotiable things, I presume that globally not case by case migration policies is something that is very much dominated by internal criteria despite rhetoric about it. Still we have some bilateral agreements but the dominant decision criteria are internal ones. They probably going to be themselves incoherent between labour consideration, between integration consideration. The point of coherence is to re-establish coherence, to find cooperative solutions.

Interviewer: The parliament refers to article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty to push coherence. In what way would you approach the coherence issue?

Civil Servant: I believe first of all, the anchor is in 208. The issues is the political operationalisation of this one, which is more tricky. Indeed, as I said, everybody has different definitions of PCD. One way is to define it as looking at the positive or negative spill-over effects on development goals of the EU policies. This is the way we have the twelve policy areas which have been defined, you know this. So this is one way. The inconvenient thing is that it becomes a very bureaucratic and mechanic exercise on the one side. On the other side, it has very low political visibility and legitimacy. And so, it's become difficult. So we have then the five challenges, which is the global challenges where we look at different policies in order to meet a common goal, global goal. And this increases the political visibility and it makes things to some extent more operational. And it increases the political legitimacy. However, when you have a policy, let's say migration, where indeed the internal factors are dominating the decisions, then you can have small adjustments of policies of partial policies. Or phytosanitary standards, the same: you can say, what can I do to re-establish some coherence? You have to look what are the costs for the country and shall development assistance help the country to adjust or not. Then it has become indeed something. At the end of the day, we have both approaches, this is only another way to look at it. But we have permanently floating around both approaches so policy impact approach or cooperative solution approach. So, it's not contradictory to 208 because at the end of

the day, development objectives are broader than only poverty eradication. So, it depends on the subject, you have to look more...on climate change, it's all good, it will be also good in migration in long term thinking because there is a global link between development and migration. Only the short run is much more bound by internal policies. The first point is to identify where you have conflict of interest, then you see how you solve out this conflict of interest and then indeed you can say, either you adjust the policy, help the country to adjust or we find a cooperative solution. The issue is to find a conflict of interest because of distributive effects, because of asymmetry of economic power or whatever. We have now an objective which is to support small farmers in Africa. That's the declared objective of the development policy. If we look at the agricultural policy, which will be reformed, it's obvious that the way I will try to push it is doing an impact assessment on the agricultural policy, on the reform of the agricultural policy. I am asked what is for you the criterion, why do you want? And I will simply say, the income of small farmers in Africa.

Interviewer: As an indicator?

Civil Servant: As the key variable, to simplify, to reduce. Then I will have imagine what are the transmission mechanisms. Do we have real causality between both issues? In some cases the agricultural systems are so disconnected one from the other that there is no effect of what we do here. But then we can say, ok, in a dynamic way, can they access their own market, but the key variable should be still the income. I dislike the word indicator because this income will also depend on a country by country basis on the quality of the policies which should be implemented to support the small farmers. The fact that the income in the country X will not increase doesn't mean that the reason is agricultural policy conducted here. It may be the way the policy in the countries itself. So you cannot have this kind of outcome indicators. On the other side, for me, an indicator will be the degree of subsidy compared to the market income of agriculture here. If they are permanently subsidised over long time, all we see is overproduction. This kind of reasoning we need to have.

Interviewer: To make some reference to the often criticized export subsidies, can you take them into consideration or - as you said - is it very difficult to attribute the impact to the subsidies?

Civil Servant: With the story with the impact of the export subsidies, you can have as an economist the theoretical reasoning that it is bad because it will create distortion.

And this distortion obviously is a distributive advantage of agriculture in Europe. And it creates on top of this a wrong incentive for the allocation of resources, also against the interests of African farmers. You can have this theoretical stance. The problem is that in terms of political economy, it becomes more complex because then you have to take into account the situation of each country. And in some country it is the trade minister, corrupt or not, who is asking pushed by some importers to have these export subsidies, because it lowers the price for and also increases the margin for the import of some product, which will help the poor. And then you can say, true or not, to help the poor urbans. There are then distributive effects within the countries and between the countries, between the developing countries, which make things more complex to assess. This being said we are still committed to abolish the export subsidies, they are nonsense. But in some country, there the government itself asking for the export subsidy. And if you subsidise export to a country which is not producer of agricultural products, the subsidy is a form of development assistance, humanitarian assistance because then you subsidise some food in the country. How far this is kept up by the ministers of trade, by the importers, and by the final consumers is another issue.

Interviewer: Did your unit deal with the export subsidies for dairy products reintroduced in 2009? Was any of the PCD mechanisms applied? How do you see the future development of export subsidies on dairy products?

Civil Servant: It's not the unit per se which can block this. What counts is a combination of external pressure and the work inside the house including DG DEVE which has to mobilise then knowledge in the countries themselves to prove that it is damageable. But the end of the day, between some African farmers 4000 km from here and people here coming with cows and milk on the Robert Schumanplain, the decision is done relatively fast. Again, it's an issue which is not all black and white. On top of this, PCD can be instrumentalised by people inside the European Union who are against export subsidies. This exists. One of the countries which is pushing for PCD in this domain is UK. It's a political game.

Interviewer: Speaking of future prospect of PCD within the CAP, what developments do you expect? Are you planning on applying mechanisms such as impact assessment?

Civil Servant: Absolutely, I will try that this is one of the exemplary impact assessments because DG AGRI is prepared that I presume to do it. It's an opportunity to make good work. We go through impact assessments since three years and look how

far development has been taken into account. Also, all the impact assessments are public but it's not particularly substantial and it has to be much more.

Interviewer: How would you look at the overall development of PCD within the EU?

Civil Servant: In Europe it is a political a priori, a political non-stop. But taking into account other people's interest which has no electoral weight, and in times of crisis, I believe progress is being made. The real challenge now is to - I was near to say to instrumentalise it or to use it, but that's not what I have in mind indeed - use this PCD concept to give new ideas on why we need development aid. Because using this in the terms of global challenge indeed. We need to have stable and relatively well developed countries to help to solve global problems. This is one way to rebuild some cooperation in the international system. The other dimension where we need to make progress is - we have to be prudent as interviewees - that we have it at international level because if you don't do this at G-20 level, it will not fly. The reason why it is difficult to fly is that it is not yet sufficiently anchored at international fora such as the G-20. Let's take an example: you know the Ghana doctors which are recruited by the UK, so brain drain. If this Ghana doctor is not allowed to come to London or Paris or whatever, he will go to Toronto, Washington, or if it is still not allowed in Toronto or Washington, he will go to Brasilia or to China meaning that if we don't - and particular for old domains - if you don't have this agreed at international level on some code of conduct or whatever. Opportunistic and competitive behaviour including from the European Union are sure. Sure, because we are in a competing world. The Union is not particularly strong for the moment but this is for me the risk and also opportunity to have this at the G-20. And then if you have this at the international level, we have again new pressures on internal constituencies here. It's obvious that our relations to developing countries we need to focus on this one. These are the next steps, but you are more on the past. And you will see that the Union will adopt Council conclusions in a few days, the Council conclusions of June, you will see that the Union will consider that high level event prepared in international fora is important in this respect. We need to have it at all the levels.

Interviewer: Can you foresee any changes for the work of the PCD Unit resulting from the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty?

Civil Servant: We will stay in the Commission and we will not go to the External Service. This is one point. Impact of Lisbon Treaty on PCD and then the management of the administrative structure is something I actually don't know. But I believe that the

most important thing is that European Parliament on two policies have gained power, this is on trade and migration. It has gained power on others, too, but on these two is particularly relevant for PCD. This change the mode.

Interviewer: Do you think that the parliament could also affect the CAP by fully exploiting its strengthened budgetary power?

Civil Servant: I am not sure if they are able to change something. We'll see, it will be interesting. The issue will be up to you to reflect. What is interesting is that the European parliament has some strange majorities which can be situated between the left side of the parliament together with some Nordic countries and then they get an absolute majority. This is more left than the parliament looks like. It should be checked in detail, it's my suspicion. Particularly, the Keller report, which has been adopted, there were some votes which were interesting. I would have expected that by some majority some things have not been voted but apparently some Nordic countries voted together with left. So auch beim Schutz persönlicher Daten. Da haben Sie oft diese Art von Mehrheit im Parlament. Die nordischen Länder, auch die Konservativen sind sehr stark für den Schutz persönlicher Daten und weniger Sicherheitsargumenten zugänglich wie Rechte aus Südländern. Wenn die linke Minderheit versucht, solche zivilen Freiheiten zu verteidigen, kriegen sie dann auch die Stimmen der Konservativen der nordischen Länder. Das ist das, was ich vermute, das müsste im einzelnen gecheckt werden, aber ich habe den Eindruck, dass ist manchmal passiert. Meiner Ansicht nach gilt dies auch für Policy Coherence for Development. Aber die Tatsache, dass die Transparenz und dass auf EU-Ebene die Migration hochgekommen ist, und zweitens, dass die Transparenz der Außenhandelspolitik größer sein wird, das wird Sachen ändern.

Interviewer: Haben Sie vielen Dank für die Beantwortung meiner Fragen.

Civil Servant: Sie müssen ein bisschen aufpassen, das war schon ein bisschen mehr Reflexion als ich im Haus durchsetzen kann.

7.5. **Annex 5:** Interview with Suzan Cornelissen, Evert

Vermeer Stichting / Evert Vermeer Foundation

Interviewer: Could you please describe what Evert Vermeer Stichting does to promote PCD in Brussels?

Suzan Cornelissen: One of the main tasks is really to look at new policies but also existing policies that are found to be incoherent. We will either hear it from other NGOs that are talking about it, we develop case studies which are basically policy analyses of the policy at stake in which we explain what this policy is about and why we think it's incoherent to the EU development policy. So, we will put the policy at stake next to the EU's development policy and precisely explain why these two are incoherent to each other. Then we will come up with policy recommendations that should make the policy at stake more coherent, to solve the incoherencies. Once a case study is conducted, we will start a lobbying strategy around it. So far, since the beginning of the EU coherence programme, which is now the Fair Politics programme, I think it's about twelve case studies that have been established. It's impossible of course for me to keep them all updated, but I try to keep the once updated that have political momentum. The ones that I know that there is going to be new proposals coming up, like right now there is the reform of the Common Fisheries coming up in December. Right now, I am working on updating this case study and see what is going to happen in the future and where can we organise an expert meeting, for instance in the parliament to fuel the discussion, and talk to the right people within the Commission, and talk to other organisations who are working on it and see whether we can join forces. And then there is of course this monitoring system that we are using, which is a system that looks all of the reports that are being written within the European Parliament in relation to one of our case studies. It's really an encouragement for Members of the European Parliament to work on Policy Coherence for Development. Whenever they include amendments or ask a question like a parliamentary question in relations to our case studies and mentioning incoherence, they can earn a point on in our monitoring system. Every year we count these points and then we'll have the fair politician of the year awards, which is in a couple of weeks. I think it's really a funny sort of way to encourage MEPs to know about coherence, to work with this. And it is especially for MEPs that are not working or that are not a member of the development committee in the parliament, but also MEPs who work in the agricultural committee or the fisheries committee, they should also be aware that the work they are doing and the topics that are being discussed within their committees also have an influence on development, the situation in developing countries.

Interviewer: On your website, I found some comments made by MEPs on agriculture. Where do you get your information from and how would you describe the availability of the information that you could get on PCD?

Suzan Cornelissen: There are meetings in the European Parliament to that we go to. These meetings are open to the public. You just go there and listen to what is being said by MEPs, also by officials of the European Commission. Of course, after those meetings there is always the chance that you walk up to someone and you discuss the topic, to present your own views, and to also ask questions of course. Many of these topics are quite complicated and it takes a while to figure out what a policy is really about and which parts are contentious. It's just sharing information and I don't have the feeling that anyone uses anyone. I think it's just a matter of different views that people from different institutions or civil society have on a topic and you just share each other's views and see what one can mean for the other. It's this way informal meetings take place and information is shared, but I think all with cause to come up with a good situation for everyone.

Interviewer: A lot of changes have occurred recently with respect to PCD. For example, the twelve 'traditional' policy areas identified in the beginning have been merged to five broader areas. How would you describe this shift?

Suzan Cornelissen: I think all the twelve areas are still there within the five priorities that have now been stated. I am quite positive about these five priorities although there has been a lot of criticism because other NGOs or people in the parliament say that the European Commission and the Council is limiting its PCD agenda but with these five priorities you can actually show the inter-linkages because it is not always between either trade or development policy but between three of four different policy areas that are incoherent and interlinked with one another. I think with these five priorities you can far better show these inter-linkages and you don't have to mention these kind of topics in five out of these twelve chapters that published within the previous European Commission Report. On the other hand, if you want to put more focus on PCD and you want people working in other policy areas to work on PCD, it's far better to come up with five priorities that you can explain to them. It's better than these twelve frequented policy areas that used to be the twelve priorities. I am quite positive and we still have to see, of course, how things go and how the next report will look like, the report will come out in 2011. Because of the work programme, which was just published about a month ago, showed that the different five priorities were documented in a completely different way. For instance, the migration chapter is really detailed and I am quite positive about the indicators that are being established. But when you look at the food security part of this work programme, it is really vague. We

still have to see how things are going within the next year.

Interviewer: If we look at the existing mechanisms to promote PCD, how would you judge or impact assessment?

Suzan Cornelissen: From my understanding, these impact assessments can only be conducted when either new policies are being constructed or when there is a huge policy reform coming up, but they can't be conducted for every policy that is there. Of course, we would like to see these impact assessments conducted far more often and we are requesting that as well but it seems to be really difficult. The other thing is then, when you look for impact assessments on the website of the European Commission, they are often impossible to trace. I've heard that it's often better to google them than to look on the Commission's website. What I think that should be done, is that every time an impact study is being conducted, then the European Commission whatever DG is responsible for this impact assessment, should really report upon the findings. They should either launch it with a press release or some sort of interview because I have the feeling that many of these impact assessments are really kept silent. What we also noticed is that there is a lot of parliamentary questions being raised by MEPs requesting these impact studies like where are they, we haven't seen them yet. So, I would suggest whenever a major impact assessment has been conducted, report upon it in the parliament. Go to one of these committee hearings and report upon the findings, make these impact assessments more visible, and conduct them at a very early stage, don't wait for other DGs to request impact assessments. Conduct them before you start structuring a policy. I mean what is the sense of doing an impact assessment if you are already working on the policy, if you are already in the final stage. Why not see the results of the impact assessment and then think about the way you would like to construct the particular policy?

Interviewer: Are you aware of any impact assessments in the CAP except from the case studies that you have done?

Suzan Cornelissen: For instance on cotton that we have a case study about, I know that there has been an impact study after this decoupling has taken place, but don't ask me exactly on the findings. I must say that in my daily work, I don't get any sort of good information out of these impact assessments. Right now, they are not of any use.

Interviewer: If you look at the PCD unit located within DG DEVE, how would you see

their work?

Suzan Cornelissen: I must say, I've only been around for a year, and I guess it takes time to figure out how things work within the European Commission. As far as I can see now, they are really trying to get involved as much as they can in internal discussion within the European Commission. Of course, their resources are limited and there're just a couple of people working there. I have the feeling that there it is very political in the sense that they can't just discuss anything within or request information within other DGs. That's almost always the feeling that I have with this ODA plus concept, I don't know if you're familiar with it, but that was also included within the whole discussion that came out when the whole-of-the-Union Communication was published. This communication actually requested that non-ODA financial flows should also be taken into account when we talk about PCD. I think this way that the mandate of the PCD unit would be enlarged. They would have the right to actually also talk about topics like fisheries partnership agreements, I mean, this is non-ODA money. The amount the Commission spends on paying ACP governments so that European vessels are allowed to fish in these waters, this money that is being paid is not considered ODA. Because of that, the DG DEVE and the PCD unit does not have the mandate to actually take a closer look at whether this is incoherent. I think they are just trying to broaden their mandate and their mandate is just very limited. It's obviously impossible for a small amount of people to know what is going on within the Commission and what sort of policies are constructed where, and when, and how.

Interviewer: For PCD you need a solid knowledge of other policy areas as well. How much expertise do you find in DG DEVE when it comes to other policy areas? Could this also be a problem?

Suzan Cornelissen: I think, that's a huge problem. How much can you possibly know? For instance, in this new case study that we established on the raw materials initiative. Something like this, it's not very obvious to have an impact on development and it is very technical again. You can't expect people working within DG Development to be knowledgeable about so many technical issues and also so many different policy fields. It is a way easier the other way around. If you put people who are aware of development cooperation and developing countries and the issues that these countries are dealing with, let them work within the different DGs and that you sort of be a watchdog.

Interviewer: When you do advocacy work or lobbying for PCD, how much do people from other committees in the parliament or other DGs actually know about the concept? From your everyday experience, how would you describe the overall knowledge about PCD within the EU?

Suzan Cornelissen: When you talk about the parliament, the knowledge of MEPs in the development committee and also in the fisheries committee is great because they combine their work. For us, they are really useful, it can also make the MEPs within the fisheries committee aware of the developmental impacts because they know of these developmental impacts as it is also an area of their interest. Also, to a large extent MEPs of the Greens and the Left, leftwing political groups within the parliament are far better aware of developmental aspects than righter wing political groups within the European parliament because they are more focused on the European issues, so it seems often. I must say, there is quite some difference in that as well because for instance the ALDE political group, if you talk to the lib. dems., the British part of the ALDE political group, they are again very well aware of the developmental issues. There is difference between nationalities, political groups, and also the different committees that MEPs are involved in. I would request, that is what we are trying to do, the other committees to write as many opinions as they can. If a report is being written within the agricultural committee, the development committee should request to write an opinion on this report. This is also not done, also because of capacity problems, but also because of people working in the secretariat of the European Parliament. I think, they have a huge guiding role there as well and they don't always play this right. Concerning the knowledge of PCD within other DGs of the European Commission, I think it has gotten better as far as I can see it, of course, it has gotten a little bit better, but still there is no ownership. There is no PCD ownership within other DGs, well in DG Trade more and more because they have received a lot of criticism in relation to the EPAs or the TRIPs. But in other DGs, for instance, DG energy trade enterprise, they have no idea.

Interviewer: How about DG AGRI? What role does PCD play within the CAP?

Suzan Cornelissen: I must admit that during this last year I haven't really focused on agricultural policies. I am not really familiar with DG Agriculture. I haven't been in touch with them or worked with them closely throughout the last year.

Interviewer: Looking at the Lisbon Treaty, what role will it play after the implementation of the new treaty?

Suzan Cornelissen: Well, I am not a legal expert. What I've heard is that the case is stronger now within the Lisbon Treaty. I think article 208 is within the functioning of the European Union part of the Treaty. There is now a stronger case for PCD because it has received a more prominent place within the treaty and not what is used to be within the Treaty of Maastricht. That sounds promising but this will mean in practise I don't know. The co-decision, which is also in the Lisbon Treaty, that is quite promising because you can work with the parliament much closer.

Interviewer: I would be glad if you could give an outlook on your future work. Where will the areas of interest that will focus? Do you see new inroad for promoting PCD?

Suzan Cornelissen: What I find really interesting and where I think will be huge need is involving ACP countries. We talk about PCD but what does PCD really mean? How do we measure the impact of European policies and to what extent is it the European Union's responsibility when we implement particular policies? What we came across, when we conducted an impact study, was that great parts of European policies are incoherent because of the ways they are being implemented. But then the implementation is often the responsibility of local governments. Where does the responsibility of the European Union end? What are we talking about? I mean it is so technical. Do you think that this might have a particular impact because...? I mean what are we really talking about? The discussion really needs to become more concrete and we need to let ACP countries join these debates. There is this opportunity for ACP countries to consult the European Commission, to start a dialogue. Article 12 of Cotonou, this article has only been use once since 2000 in the last ten years, I believe, because there is no awareness of this article. I think it would be really interesting if there is more ACP countries aware of this PCD framework which has become more important on the European level and they could start working with it as well. Together you could come up with far better solutions, think.

Interviewer: Do you also think that the delegations of the Commission could play a more active role at a lower level of government?

Suzan Cornelissen: They could play a far better role. They find the information, they are able to talk to people on the ground and policy-makers. They should play a fare greater role in identifying incoherencies and also watching the way policies are being implemented and monitoring and reporting findings back to the Commission. This is also a point that we noticed during our impact study in Ghana: while we talked to

people from the delegation about PCD, they actually started talking about the coherence between money being spent on different developmental projects. I mean, of course, that is coherence as well and important, but that is something completely different than the policy coherence for development concept that we are discussing in Brussels or on the European level. I think we need to, these people should be aware of the concept as well and they could a great role.

7.6. Annex 6: Performance in trade CDI 2004-2009

Annex 6: Performance in trade (CDI 2004-2009)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Australia	6,1	6,2	7,1	7,0	7,0	7,4
Canada	5,9	6,2	6,1	6,7	6,5	6,8
Japan	1,4	1,1	1,1	1,6	1,8	2,0
New Zealand	7,6	7,5	6,5	7,1	7,3	7,3
Norway	0,4	0,5	0,9	1,0	0,9	1,2
South Korea ²⁴³	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0,1	0,7
Switzerland	3,0	2,9	0,3	0,5	0,6	0,7
United States	6,0	6,6	6,7	6,9	7,0	7,0
EU ²⁴⁴	4,5	5,1	4,9	5,4	5,7	5,8

²⁴³ South Korea's performance was first measured for the CDI Edition 2008.

²⁴⁴ EU Member States assessed by the CDI: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain.