



SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

MSc in European Studies

Master Thesis

**Research Question: What are the politics of Labour
Mobility between Turkey and the EU and to what
extent do IR theories explain this politics?**

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Abstract

This research was motivated by a long-standing relationship between Turkey and the EU. Due to its huge population and different religion, Turkey is a more controversial candidate than others in the past. Furthermore, labour mobility is a very significant and problematic issue for the Union even if it constitutes one of the fundamental freedoms.

This research has tested three IR theories to find out the politics of labour mobility between Turkey and the EU, focusing positions of member states on the issue of Turkey's accession. The chapter on “free movement of workers” has not been opened yet and it is declared as very hard to adopt.

The difficulty of the topic comes from the lack of previous work on the issue and its prospective nature. This research can have a positive impact when the negotiations come to the end. The chapter on “Free movement of workers” is one of the last to be opened and is expected to generate a lot of discussion and a long transition period for Turkey.

The result of this research - based on the positions of member states, Commission progress reports, Public opinion surveys - indicates that domestic concerns are decisive. The most important concerns are related to the economy, more specifically to the increase of the unemployment among the current EU citizens. At the same time, the Muslim identity of Turkey has also been one of the main causes of the European fear. Testing the theories showed that liberal intergovernmentalism comes closer to an explanation of this situation. Even if member states delegate significant power to the institutions, especially to the Commission, they keep their positions on the basis of their national interests. On the other hand, the interests of member states are mainly, but not totally, determined by perceived economic advantages and disadvantages of conceding the right for labour mobility to Turkish citizens. This argument is not enough to make constructivism unnecessary because of the important role of constructed ideas and identity concerns on the positions of member states. However, it is found that there is no correlation between the commitment to the EU and the support for Turkey's accession.

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List of Abbreviations

EU - European Union

EURES – European Employment Agency

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

IR - International Relations

ISKUR - Turkish Employment Agency

JAP – Joint Assessment of Employment Policy Priorities

OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

UK - the United Kingdom

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Declaration of Authenticity

I hereby declare that this thesis, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc degree in European Studies in the University of Twente, is to the best of my knowledge and belief my own work. All contributions and works of other people have been acknowledged with appropriate use of citations and references. I further confirm that this thesis, in its original and/or similar format, has not previously been submitted to any other institution for any other degree, diploma or qualification.

Merve Aktas

Enschede, August, 2010

Foremost

The complexity and the reality of the topic labour mobility reveals itself more as trying to unravel that complexity because of the fact that the positions of member states are, at some points, untestable. I nonetheless hope that this research contributes to the existing knowledge on and understanding of the relations between Turkey and the EU. I guess it would be impossible for me to complete this time period without the help and support of the people to whom I would like to thank. First of all, I am grateful to Dr. Shawn Donnelly for his supervision, comments, orientation, support and his belief in me. I also would like to tender my thanks to Dr. Andreas Warntjen for his supervision and valuable comments. Besides, I am thankful to my family and Joao Santos for their huge support and confidence in me and for never giving up their trust on me. Finally, I would like to specially thank to Dr. Bahadır Kaleağası, Brussels representative of TUSIAD, for helping me so much and allocating time for my interview.

1. Introduction

This article seeks to find out the politics of labour mobility between the European Union and Turkey while focusing on the positions of the member states. In this respect, the International relations theories - intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, and constructivism - are tested to explain the positions of the EU members in terms of possible membership of Turkey and the fear of its possible labour market consequences. Labour mobility is a very controversial issue and it seems like it can only be dealt with in a stage of full membership and after the opening of many chapters of *acquis communautaire*.

In this thesis, the research question is “what are the politics of labour mobility between the EU and Turkey, and to what extent do IR theories explain this politics”. The politics of labour mobility are made up of viewpoints of both EU member states and Turkey. However, in this research, the position of the EU states will be the focus and is the one which is going to be tested. The politics of labour mobility are going to be explained by comparing the viewpoints, positions, demands, expectations, and official tools between both sides. In this case, the Turkish side is very clear. They want to be a member state and enjoy the freedom of movement for workers like all the other member states. For the EU side, it is significant to focus on member states that are particularly important for making or breaking a deal. For this reason, the dependent variable was chosen as “European position” which consists of the different positions of the member states within it.

Labour mobility is quite an interesting and controversial issue in the domestic politics of the Union and in the enlargement process. Existing research on the issue is based on literature of the IR theories, the official documents or Eurobarometer surveys. Intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism and constructivism are tested thanks to the writings of Moravcsik, Schmitter, Haas, Wendt, Finnemore and Sikkink. While creating the economical theory, the writings of Michael E Porter were the source used.

It should be known that the relationship between the EU and Turkey is much more complicated than that of the Union and any other candidate or potential candidate country. Since the Association Agreement in 1963, the history of this complex relationship has been developing. After this long process, the EU has been trying to find an answer to the ever-during question of “what to do with

Turkey?” (Müftüler-Bac, 1997). Even if free movement of people is one of the fundamental rights of the Union and basic element of EU citizenship, full mobility of labourers stays one of the most eristic issues concerning the accession of new countries. Turkey is a very populated country with almost 75 million people and also its GDP per capita is lower than the average of the EU states (Eurostat, 2007); for these reasons, the accession of Turkey makes the EU little bit afraid. There are also many reasons behind the fear of Turkey's membership, such as religion, identity or cultural issues.

2. Methodology

In this Master thesis, the answer of the research question is reached by using theories, assumptions, laws, sub cases and interviews. In terms of methodology, this research is a single case study. Since the accession of new countries to the Union, “free movement of workers” is one of the most sensitive issues. In this respect, Turkey is chosen as a case country due to the controversial candidate status that has developed over the years. Also, the fear of member states on the issue of potential labour mobility from populous Turkey shapes their positions towards Turkey. A single case study has some advantages such as high internal validity and detail. There is always causal relationship between dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable of this research is the positions of the EU member states towards possible membership of Turkey concerning possible “labour mobility”.

This essay uses theory testing while grounding theory methods to test them whether they can answer the research question or not. If-then connections between theory, facts and empirical generalization are tried to be found and the hypotheses are tested in this theory verification study. At the end, the academic literature related to my topic such as books, journals and interviews took me to a conclusion. The theory verification method aims to test the propositions derived from the theory. This research enlightens the politics of labour mobility with the help of IR theories. With the method of theory testing, it is figured out if the theories of IR are appropriate to this case. Theory testing should end up with theory modification or generation, especially if hypothesis are not confirmed.

This study is both descriptive and explanatory. It should be descriptive because I needed to identify key concepts and what happened in this area in terms of Turkey-EU relations; on the other hand, it should be explanatory to reach the research question by asking the questions “why” and “how”; for instance, it is asked how things were proceeded until today; how things are related to each other; or why some countries do support the accession and some countries do not.

In terms of sampling strategy, the Turkish case can be included in politically significant cases which attract desired attention or avoid taking undesired attention. (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 28)

In terms of data collection strategy, both qualitative and, to a lesser extent quantitative data are used in this research. As a respect of the fact that, in scientific research, data collection plays central role. Generally, this is a qualitative research; that is why, data were collected by reading the documents, journals and books. Eurobarometer and other surveys on public opinion are quantitative part of this research. Additionally, it was combined, by asking and interviewing. The interview was held on 9th of April with the TUSIAD Brussels representative Dr. Bahadir Kaleagasi.

In terms of measurement; firstly, the main assumptions of the theoretical concepts are defined and then, they are related to the topic of “labour mobility”. This process facilitates the understanding of the politics on the free movement of workers. The politics of labour mobility is explained by analysing the positions of the member states towards Turkey's possible membership. Briefly, necessary information was obtained thanks to the method of conducting literature review, official documents, Commission reports, Eurobarometer surveys and interviews.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. Intergovernmentalist & Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach

3.1.1. Introduction

In this chapter, intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are going to be tested while analysing positions of the member states on the issue of Turkey's accession, focusing on the possible labour mobility between Turkey and the EU. The main hypothesis here is that liberal intergovernmentalist framework expects national positions to compete on the basis of power to establish an European position. The interests of those states are determined by clear economic advantages and disadvantages that they perceive in the labour mobility of Turkish citizens. Thus, it makes the constructivist argument unnecessary to test. The other hypothesis is that if intergovernmentalism better explains the politics of labour mobility between Turkey and the EU, then community institutions do not play a key role and this contradicts the theory of neo-functionalism.

In terms of the Turkish interest in securing labour mobility, it is clear that the Turkish government wants to sit on the negotiation table, having an equal treatment to the previous candidates, by the end of the process and opening of many other chapters. It is certain that the chapter of "free movement of people" is going to be one of the last to be opened. At this moment, Turkish government cannot do anything other than carrying out all the reforms demanded by the EU. According to Dr. Kaleağası, the Turkish government is entitled to fully demand "free movement of workers" after some acceptable transition periods. (Interview partner, 08.04.2010) In this chapter, it is going to be argued that even if the negotiations are monitored by the Commission on the basis of the Community interests, the real politics are in the hand of intergovernmental bargaining among member states.

Most importantly, it is better to specify the difference between intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Liberal intergovernmentalism was put forward by Moravcsik as a "more rigorous version of the EC" (Bache and George, 2001: 13) Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a reaction against pure intergovernmentalism which discusses that nation-states will cooperate only when their interests are common or institutions do not have any role compared to the state power. In this chapter, both intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are going to be tested.

3.1.2. Main Assumptions of Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmental theories stay on the assumption that state behaviour mirrors the rational acts of national governments restricted at domestic environment by national societal pressures and out of country by their strategic environment. In terms of labour mobility politics of the EU in the case of Turkey, an understanding of the preferences and power of EU member states is a logical starting point for analysis. (Moravcsik, 1993: 474) Intergovernmentalism analyses the Union in terms of the acts of national governments on the basis of their own interests. Almost all of the important decisions in the history of the EU has been taken or negotiated intergovernmentally. Even if the EU is an unique organization, still most important decisions are taken by the national governments. The theory of interstate bargaining can help to explain this process. (Moravcsik, 1993: 477) In the “who is most in favour and who is most against” part of this chapter, I tried to show the general viewpoints of some member states on Turkey. It is going to be seen whether their concerns towards Turkey are mainly economical or cultural.

Liberal intergovernmentalism has some kind of state-centric view which argues that states are rational and they negotiate according to their national interests in their minds and act towards reaching a result closest to their national interests. It is named as interstate bargaining. Moravcsik explains European politics as a two-level game. National leaders are crucial players who conciliate relations between national preferences and the activities of the international environment. National leaders are restrained by domestic interests and the relative bargaining power. (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 8) At this moment, the national governments engage in a “two-level” game. The first game is all about how countries define their policy preferences within the national environment. The second game refers to the international environment and contains the striking of interstate bargains. The liberal intergovernmentalists tend to use a two-level approach when dealing with major decisions. In the first level, national interests are mainly determined by the restrictions and opportunities imposed by economic interdependence. In the second level, the consequences of intergovernmental bargaining are settled by the relative bargaining power of national governments and the functional incentives for institutionalization made by high transaction costs and the wish to manage national agendas. (Moravcsik, 1993: 517) In the case of labour mobility politics, member states will decide whether they impose transitional periods to Turkish citizens and how long it will take. This would be first level of the negotiations. At this stage, public opinion and domestic situation in the member states would play a very important role while determining these periods. In

the second level, the European Commission will be in the process. Some countries might inform the Commission if they need some additional transitional period. However, the European Commission is responsible to investigate whether it is proper demand or it is kind of discrimination demand.

According to the liberal intergovernmentalism, the institutions may solve problems by proposing some agreements or by providing rules for decision-making or by adjudication of disagreements. Commission will be in the process, for instance, by investigating whether the host country needs some restrictions. The second problem is about the distributional implications of international bargaining. The distribution of expected costs and benefits between European member states determines the choice of a decision or policy. Governments fight for their interests during interstate bargaining. The decision of the member states regarding the length of transitional period will be directly related to their demands on labourers at the time of signing the accession treaty. (Moravcsik, 1993: 497)

Governments have common preferences to collectively select one common policy or to sign an agreement in intergovernmental organizations or institutions. The choices between different decisions have always had significant distributional consequences. Negotiations between the governments in the process of collective choice require the reconciliation of the conflicting interests. (Moravcsik, 1993: 497) Briefly, cooperation between states can be created with a preference convergence. (Abidin, 2006: 40) At the end of the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, it seems like this is going to be a big issue. The interests of member states are very different from each other especially in terms of free mobility of people. I strongly believe if cultural concerns are ignored, I acknowledged that it is quite hard, cost and benefit calculations are going to help member states to find a common point.

If there are no policies which are more attractive alternatives to government's policy, governments usually do not have any tendency to have an agreement. They are named as “outside options, reservation values, concession limits or best alternatives to negotiated agreements (BATNAs).” When the government's policy is more attractive, its preference for agreement is less intense and its bargaining leverage is bigger. (Raiffa, 1982: 252) In this respect, governments with attractive alternatives have no tolerance for inconvenient agreements and they prefer to cooperate, even though those governments have to compromise. Opportunity cost is an important explanation to this

situation. (Haas, 1993: 186) In the case of the viewpoints of France, Germany, Austria or the Netherlands, they have the “privileged partnership” in their minds as an alternative policy which does not contain free movement of people. As long as they have this alternative policy in their minds, it is really hard to have an agreement in this issue.

According to the conventional regime theoretical view, EU institutions function as a contractual environment to improve efficiency in interstate bargaining. The institutions facilitate cooperation for agreements that would not be able to reach in another way. (Buchanan and Tullock, 1992; Keohane, 1984; Levy et al., 1992) When negotiating the most important decisions, the role of the EU institutions can be explained by the transaction cost decreasing set of rules. European institutions provide a negotiating environment to build or develop cooperation with bureaucratic institutions that spread policy ideas and information; a place for political parties, lobby groups, domestic bureaucracies; joint decision making rules; a common political and legal norms; organizations to describe and monitor domestic compliance. More information and predictability decrease the cost of bargaining. (Moravcsik, 1993: 508) In the negotiation process of Turkey, the Commission plays a crucial role by providing progress reports and official monitoring. Even if the views of national governments are more important in the most important decisions, the Commission keeps its place as a supranational network. This view is supported by the liberal intergovernmentalists. Even if international institutions facilitate intergovernmental bargaining, at the last stage of the negotiations, the decisions of single member states will be decisive. In some aspects, liberal intergovernmentalism sharply distinguishes from neo-functionalism; for instance, neo-functionalism focuses on the important role of supranational officials in shaping bargaining consequences, but liberal intergovernmentalism stresses passive institutions and the autonomy of national leaders. (Moravcsik, 1993: 518) “Free movement of people” is very “difficult” chapter to be opened easily in the case of Turkey. The current situation between Turkey and the EU is going to be explained in the case study chapter of this paper. So far, many states were imposed transitional periods before they become full members, but some experts (Andoura, 2005) predict that it is going to be longer for Turkey. Dr. Bahadır Kaleağası, TUSIAD Brussels' representative, argues that transitional periods are tolerable at the end, if they are not exaggerated. (Interview partner, 08.04.2010) In this process, supranational institutions such as the Commission can help but it is very clear that autonomy will belong to national governments. Intergovernmentalism argues so, but there is also a reality emphasizing that member states cannot impose longer transitional periods than

required and this is controlled by the Commission.

According to the Principal Agent Theory (Pollack, 2003), it is possible for the European Commission to act on behalf of the member states in Liberal Intergovernmentalism. The Principal-agent relationship is an arrangement that exists when one agent (the EC) acts on behalf of the principal (the EU). According to this theory, rational actors delegate powers systematically in order to lower the transaction costs of policy-making. The relationship between the EU and the Commission is a “principal-agent relationship. However, it is also going to be tested whether the Commission can act beyond the task the member states have given it without being reined in again. If it can, then that looks more like neo-functionalism. If it shows no signs of doing so, that is more like intergovernmentalism.

3.1.3. Positions of member states in the case of Turkey: Who is most in favour, who is most against in the EU?

The EU governments are deeply divided on the question of Turkey's EU accession. Particularly, supporting or opposing Turkish membership is contingent on whether their point of views base on an utilitarian, identity or post-national perspective. As it is seen from the main assumptions of the intergovernmentalism, states are key actors in the accession negotiations. This is why their various interests are going to be discussed in order to test intergovernmentalist theory. The arguments about the concerns of the possible immigration in the case of free movement of Turkish workers would be under utilitarian-based, weighing up costs and benefits, point of view. However, many scholars argue that the main and most important concerns come from identity and post-national perspectives which are related to EU's democracy and human rights emphasizing principles. According to them, those countries do not want to have free mobility with an identically different country. For instance, they are afraid of increasing Muslim population in Europe which is not any related to economic calculations. Those scholars believe that Turkey's future membership will not depend on cost and benefit calculations. (Euractiv, 2007) In this chapter, the different positions of some key member states are explained to better understand whether they support the Turkish accession and free movement according to their own national interests. If not, intergovernmentalist point of view will be discredited.

Turkey is a very problematic case for the Union; for instance, Turkey applied 8 years before

Bulgaria but the latter entered the Union in 2007. The most important reason of this very slow process is the perception of the majority of the Union's citizens and of many elites on Turkey. (Orendt, 2010: 1) Regarding the candidate status of Turkey, the considerations of both sides are very important. Mostly, the relations between candidate states and the Community are turning around economic issues such as labour migration or subsidies and a problem of European identity, values and safety. The influence of utilitarian considerations on the public opinion is indirect and usually related to the possible immigration. Since 2005, the complicated negotiations are being held between Turkey and the EU. The public opinion of member states is really crucial in this process either in the indirect way of parliamentary support or through directly referendum. (Vreese et al, 2008: 512) Hooghe (2003) perceives cultural and economic threat perceptions as two different things. Culturally, perception of potential threat of immigration can fuel “no” for the accession of Turkey. According to Vreese, people who think that immigration is a big threat for their country are also against the accession of Turkey. (Vreese et al, 2008: 519) Moreover, identity concern is a strong forecaster of anti-immigration sentiments. (Vreese et al, 2008: 520) In this respect, labour mobility politics of the EU in the case of Turkey is related to the feelings of identity and anti-immigration attitudes related to economic concerns.

According to September 2005 reports, 50 percent of Hungarians were in favour of accession of Turkey and 10 percent of Austrians were of the same opinion. Among the EU states, motivations for support of Turkey differ from country to country. The fear of massive migrant flows related to unemployment and some cultural concerns explain it generally. Germany is a great example of this. Their antipathy comes primarily from high unemployment in the public's mind. Many Germans blame the existence of a well-established Turkish minority because of many economic ills. An idea of “privileged partnership”, pronounced by Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats as related to the reaction of public towards Turkey's membership. However, she preferred to honour an EU commitment and continued accession negotiation when she was the President of the Union in the first half of 2007. In the part of intergovernmentalist assumptions of this chapter, it is explained that if countries are having attractive alternative policies, such as “privileged partnership” for the Turkish case, governments do not have any tendency to have an agreement. The member states believe that “privileged partnership” is better for their interests than full membership, will always prefer the attractive alternative. This is one of the answers of why labour mobility has not been forthcoming for Turkey. (Walt, 1998: 37)

Germany is one of the most important member states of the EU with its founding member status and its economic power in the Union. In the case of relations with Turkey, Germans are more in touch with Turks than any other member state. Germany is the most significant economic partner of Turkey in the EU with a 14 billion Euro volume of trade. 14 percent of export of Turkey go to Germany and 17 percent of export of Germany go to Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey is a very popular vacation destination for Germans; for instance, 4.8 million German tourists visited Turkey in 2008. Also, 2.7 million Turks live in Germany and 600.000 of them are already German citizens. For these reasons, Germany has already strong ties with Turkey. (Orendt, 2010) In Germany, the fear of Turkish immigration mostly comes from strong presence of Turks who have not integrated for a long time. It is taken as a threat to their identity. Similarly, member states of the EU with highest percentage of Turkish immigrants are the most opponent ones to Turkey's accession. This situation can evolve due to the lack of integration of previous migrants or the xenophobic attitude of the local people. (Euractiv, 2004)

Germany has a politically divided position towards the membership of Turkey. Angela Merkel and her ruling Christian Democrats are totally against the full membership and they propose, like France, “privileged partnership”. They believe that cultural and religious differences between Europeans and Turks are unbridgeable. On the other hand, Social Democrats are in favour of full membership. According to their point of view, Turkey's accession would contribute to peace and stability and also would help to get rid of Western prejudices to Muslim world. (Euractiv, 2009) It is understandable for the Christian Democrats to be against the membership. It can be related to the Muslim identity of Turkey. For these reasons, identity concerns are as much as important as utilitarian calculations in the case of Germany.

I will argue that most of the Turkish immigrants in Germany or in the Netherlands are not comparable with the possible migrants that would come from Turkey after the opening of the chapter of “freedom of movement for people”. The majority of these people emigrated from the poorest and less developed areas of Turkey. When they arrived to more developed European cities, they had some kind of culture shock and stucked with their traditions and values. Today, there are also many differences between Turkish immigrants living abroad (of course this is only one part of them) and people living in modern and open-minded cities in Turkey. For instance, there are still many Turkish origin people living in Germany that try to restrict education of their daughters. Since 1996, there have been 45 honour killings in Germany. According to European Stability Initiative

(ESI) survey, more than 90 percent in Germany believe that Islam is hostile to women. (Barysch, 2007: 4) The main reason of this situation is that European public is just looking to this little percentage of people living abroad and creating a generalized idea for all the Turkish society. (Interview partner, 08.04.2010)

Recruitment of foreign labour in the EU member states started during 1950s and ended after the first oil crisis in 1973. Between the years 1961 and 1973, Germany demanded guest workers from Turkey. It was planned to be temporary, but many of the guest workers became permanent residents. For this reason, Germany has very restrictive immigration policy since 1973; just allowing family reunifications or immigrations for humanitarian issues. Afterwards, immigration to Germany has decreased because of changing legal conditions for potential migrants. However, a large percentage of Turkish immigration happened after 1973. Experts explain it with network effects. (Geis et al, 2008: 11) After that, the Union had to have more restrictive immigration policies. Germany was the biggest receiver of Turkish immigrants, followed by The Netherlands. Today, there are still many immigrants living there for generations. For this reason, these countries are more afraid from the prospect of large-scale immigration from Turkey in the case of membership especially because of their network in these member states. They believe that potential immigrants might depress wages, boost unemployment and bring social frictions and political upheavals. In this respect, “free movement of people” is not expected to be given to Turkey automatically as a right of full membership. Transition periods will most likely be applied for some period of time. (Flam, 2003: 11)

In the Netherlands and Sweden, the polls show that between 54 percent and 73.4 percent are against the accession of Turkey. In terms of public opinion, Germans or Dutch with the higher level of income and education are not that much against the accession because they feel less in danger by possible inflows of migrants from Turkey. (Servantie, 2010) The Netherlands has many problems with Turkish society inside the country. They are reluctant to integrate to the Dutch culture over the years. Political leaders prefer to support in order to get more votes from Turkish community, however Dutch public has many concerns. (Euractiv, 2004) In Sweden, minorities such as Kurds and Assyrians do not support the accession, but their fear is not any related to possible labour movement from Turkey, but their descents rights in Turkey. (Servantie, 2010) The opposition in the Netherlands and Sweden is also related to the cultural concerns.

In Belgium, political leaders are not against Turkey's accession, however there is a strong opposition coming from public opinion according to the 2006 Eurobarometer survey. Some Flemish nationalist and liberal politicians proposed to have a referendum on the membership of Turkey to have more votes during the elections. (Servantie, 2010) Belgium also consists of many Turkish immigrants. The negative public opinion should not be a surprise. They usually generate Turkish origin immigrants to whole Turkish society. That is why they are so afraid of any possible integration of Turkey and the opening of borders.

In Greece, main political party leaders and politicians expressed their support for accession of Turkey. Especially, the political parties, New Democracy and PASOK, are in favour of Turkish accession to instigate reforms and to solve traditional conflicts; on the contrary, public opinion in Greece is still against Turkey's accession. (Servantie, 2010) Surprisingly, Greece is one of the supporters of the Turkish membership to the Union. Greece can be named as traditional enemy of Turkey; however, they believe that it is much better to have Turkey inside the Union other than outside. (Euractiv, 2009) Indeed, Cyprus issue still stays as a problem between the two countries, but it is completely different issue on membership and is not going to be argued in this paper.

In France, there is a growing opposition towards Turkey. According to the IPSOS data, in May 2000, 49 percent were against and 40 percent were in favour and, in November 2002, 61 percent were against and 39 percent were in favour. According to the survey among young French people, 76 percent were against and 23 percent were in favour of accession of Turkey in December 2006. This opposition is not all about the fear of immigration, there are so many reasons behind it such as economical crisis, “so called” Armenian genocide issue, cultural concerns, etc. (Servantie, 2010) France is in favour of an alternative “Third way” approach to Turkey. Both government and society do not support Turkey's accession. (Euractiv, 2004) French voters agreed on an amendment to French constitution by saying all EU membership issues after 2007 must be decided by referendum. (Pan, 2005) France and Austria are two of the strongest opponents of Turkish membership. French President Nicolas Sarkozy openly declared that “Turkey has no place in Europe”. He even proposed to suspend accession talks with Turkey during his election campaign in 2007. (Euractiv, 2009)

French fears are mostly economical and identity concerns. Other than unemployment, they are worried about the dilution of a “Christian Europe”. (Walt, 1998: 39) The French government promised on a referendum in the case of Turkish accession in order to relief the public and get some

votes. However, opinion polls showed that Turkey was not the important factor in voting trends. Especially Sarkozy is openly against the full membership and he comes with a suggestion of “Mediterranean Union” where Turkey would play a leading role. This suggestion is also related to the belief that EU is a geographical entity. Moreover, France uses Turkey as a proxy scapegoat for many problems inside the country. It is argued that almost all the discussions used to challenge Turkey's compatibility with EU membership were linked to domestic French concerns. (Maxon-Browne and Ustün, 2009) This argument supports directly intergovernmentalist point of view which is based on that nation-states act according to their national interests rather than Community interests.

The opposition to Turkey is both at the governmental and society levels in France. The discussions on the accession of Turkey influence domestic politics in France; for instance, former French President Jacques Chirac opted for a strong back up to Turkish membership, while UMP party led by Sarkozy was strongly against. (Monnet and Penas, 2004: 12)

In Austria, public resistance is in the highest degree and almost 70 percent are against. According to a survey, 74.3 percent of Austrians do not think that Turkey can be an European country. 40 percent of people would still be against even if Turkey met all the criteria and would not migrate to the EU. (Servantie, 2010) Moreover, Austria and France have declared that they are planning to have referenda even if membership talks reach a successful end. (BBC, 2006) In Germany, France and Austria, many people and politicians are against accession of Turkey. According to the FT/Harris poll in 2007, only 16 percent of French voters are in favour of the accession of Turkey. In Germany, it is only 21 percent. (Harris interactive, 2007)

As it is said before, the one of the most opposed country to Turkey's accession is Austria. The current discussions on Austria's contribution to the EU budget, historical and cultural concerns explain this position. Opinion polls show that Austrians are more informed about the disadvantages than advantages of accession of Turkey. In terms of 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds, the case was not that much different from Turkey; in 2005, only 21 percent supported accession of Bulgaria and 17 percent supported accession of Romania. This negative attitude towards enlargement can be mostly related to the fears about the national economy. Austrian voters are very sensitive about unemployment and indirectly about potential immigration. (Walt, 1998: 38)

In Italy and Spain, politicians expressed their willingness for Turkish membership. According to Eurispes' (Institute for Political, Economic and Social Studies) opinion poll in Italy, 34 percent are in favour of the accession and only 23 per cent are against. In Spain, 51 percent were in favour according a poll carried out in May 2004, but 35 percent were against in February 2005. The number of undecided people has increased. (Servantie, 2010) Additionally, 53 percent of Italians believe that Turkey's accession can encourage immigration towards the more developed member states of the European Union. (Eurobarometer-64, 2005)

In terms of enlargement, liberal intergovernmentalism explains the preferences of member states. For instance, for the case of Central and Eastern European states, the member states called as “Drivers” - Austria, Finland and Germany- were in favour of limited enlargement focusing on the central European states. Britain, Denmark and Sweden were the countries which preferred inclusive enlargement. On the other hand, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are called as “Brakemen” and they prefer also limited enlargement; in contrast to France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain that prefer inclusive enlargement. He argues that geographical positions of the member states are really effective in their preferences. Geographical proximity might provide more benefits from trade with closer countries than the more remote ones. On the contrary to the geographical proximity explanation, the less developed member states can be against to enlargement because they are geographically close to that states and they probably specialize in the same products or resource-intensive industries. They might not benefit from trade. (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 89) These arguments of liberal intergovernmentalism do not explain possible “labour mobility” concerns of member states. Geographical proximity does not make member states afraid of free movement of workers because people can emigrate and start to work wherever they want on the basis of Article 39 of the Treaty. Schmimmelfenning argues that the UK is one of the exceptional countries with strategic interests. It is neither geographically close to Turkey nor economically that much gains advantage from Turkey; however, it is the one of the strongest supporters of the accession of Turkey. This preference was explained in the chapter 3.3 of this paper related to the commitment to the EU. The UK is a member state that always preferred more enlargement than integration. According to them, the widening of the Union would prevent the deepening. (Grabbe and Hughes, 1998: 5) The fear of massive inflow of migrants is not the fear for the UK. They are mainly looking at the process as another enlargement round. Additionally, Turkish immigrants in the UK are named as an “invisible population” compared to Indians or Caribbeans. They do not have any problem with Turkish immigrant workers. (Thomson, 2006)

The United Kingdom is the biggest supporter of Ankara on the way to the EU. The former Prime Minister Tony Blair was always expressing to press the possible positive outcomes of the accession of Turkey. However, public opinion is divided on the issue. (Euractiv, 2004) The current British Prime Minister, David Cameron, has also good relations with Turkey. Britain is strongly in favour of Turkish membership because the UK is always strong supporter of further enlargement instead of deepening. It is kind of smart strategic move of the country. They do not want deepening not to lose their national sovereignty. This is totally related to lack of commitment to the Union. Once, the UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband declared that the Community's aim could only be to accept Turkey as a full member state. (Euractiv, 2009)

In the UK, the British government and, to a lesser extent, the public opinion, are in favor of the Turkish accession to the Union. They show second highest support in the EU. According to some observers, British support for Turkish membership is related to anti-federalist intentions of the UK for the Union. (Walt, 1998: 38) For instance, unlike France assertions, the UK argues that last enlargement rounds has already loosened integration of the Union; for this reason it will be easier and more desirable to absorb Turkey. (Walt, 1998: 39)

There are many questions regarding the possible immigration from Turkey in the case of possible membership. The member states which are the most against opening the borders towards Turkey are thinking that Eastern borders of the country are porous and difficult to control. They see Turkey as a transit state to the Union for issues such as managing migration and asylum, terrorism, human trafficking, drugs, arms smuggling and etc. For the current member states, it will be really costly, especially in this crisis environment, and also can bring the problem of burden sharing among the member states to develop asylum system to guarantee solidarity with Turkish Republic. As a result, even if Turkey meets all the criteria and obligations, the EU member states may demand transitional periods to extend borders of Schengen area. All these things need important investment and a close cooperation between the sides. (Andoura, 2005)

The fear of migration from Turkey is not only because of economic concerns. Jimenez believes that religion plays a role. Europeans fear Muslim immigration, not only Turkish people, to their countries because of the perception of cultural differences. According to the Eurobarometer 2005, 85 per cent of European citizens think that Turkey's possible accession will bring more Muslims and cultural differences between Turkey and EU are very important. This shows that European citizens

are immune the debates on the positive economic aspects of the fast growing and youthful Turkey. Additionally, Turkey's economic situation is very impressive since 2001 economic crisis. Only 36 per cent of EU citizens consider economic benefits of Turkey's membership in the future. (Euractiv, 2009) I strongly argue that if Turkey continues its growth and development, public opinion in these countries will be in favour of Turkey even if there are cultural concerns. In the case of richer Turkey, citizens of Europe do not need to be afraid of potential migration flow.

Public opinion of European Citizens in favour of Enlargement




Chart 1 – Standard Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006-2007

The European Union can be named as “enlargement fatigue” right now. Some opposition to the accession of Turkey come from last rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 2007. Europeans economically struggle with the last enlargement. With the enlargement to the East, EU had millions of low-cost workers to its labour market. In 2004, more than 60 percent of old member states' citizens believed that they might lose their jobs because of enlargement. However, it is clear that enlargement fear is also related to a country's economic performance and its unemployment rate. In 2006, European economy started to recover and enlargement fear started to decrease. People in favour of enlargement increased from (Chart-1) 45 percent to 49 percent and people against the enlargement decreased from 42 percent to 39 percent. (Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006–2007) But, today Greek economy is having hard days, Spanish and Portuguese economies are also in trouble and this affects all the Union. In this situation, it cannot be thought European citizens to relax about

further enlargement. In 2005, Eurobarometer surveys show that 31 percent of EU citizens are in favor of accession of Turkey and 55 percent were against. (Standard Eurobarometer 64, June 2006) Couple of months later, it is asked whether they would support if Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the EU. 39 Percent of the citizens said “yes” and 48 percent said “no”. It means that the answers of citizens are changing so quickly and according to the economic and social conditions. If Turkey continues its reform process, European public would re-think. (Barysch, 2007: 6) However, in this research, main focus is not the question of “why Turkey is unwanted” but “the politics of labour mobility”, therefore, the reasons of opposition are explained to better show the positions of member states. When the analysis has deepening, it is more clear that member states have different viewpoints but usually from the same concerns. There is considerable diversity among the positions of the member states in terms of Turkish membership. It is argued that these divergences are connected to national interests and preferences for different outcomes to the European integration process itself. (Walt, 1998: 38) Their positions are mostly intergovernmentalist which means more state oriented and state centred.

Domestic Concerns of Some Member States

| STATE | UNEMPLOYMENT | ECO. SITUATION |
|---------|--------------|----------------|
| AUSTRIA | 57% | 26% |
| FRANCE | 52% | 25% |
| GERMANY | 74% | 43% |
| GREECE | 60% | 42% |
| SWEDEN | 55% | 44% |
| U.K | 9% | 16% |

Table 1 - Standard Eurobarometer 64 / Autumn 2005- National Reports of Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom

Utilitarian concerns do partially influence anti-immigration sentiments; and also, negative economic expectations are related to anti-immigration attitudes. (Vreese et al, 2008: 515) The opposition comes mainly from domestic concerns. Table-1 explains the main domestic concerns of some member states. The main domestic concerns of those countries are mainly unemployment and economic situation. Citizens are afraid to lose their welfare with the accession of such a populated country to the Union. As it is seen from the Table-1; the main national concerns of Austria, France and Germany are unemployment and economic situation and this can be linked to the fact that they are also the most against member states to the membership of Turkey. On the other hand, the fear of the United Kingdom from unemployment and economic crisis is lower than the other ones. This difference between those countries can explain their support or opposition to the accession of Turkey.

Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the EU, would the member states be in favor or not?

Question: QA45. Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be strongly in favour, fairly in favour, fairly opposed or strongly opposed to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?




Chart 2 - Eurobarometer Standard- 69 "The European Union Today and Tomorrow/ Autumn 2008

This chart shows the general opinion about the integration in case that Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the EU. As it is showed in the Chart-3, the member states and the candidate states including Turkey have doubts about the Turkish membership. According to those countries, even if Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the EU, some citizens will still be against the accession. It is not surprising to see that some member states such as Austria, France or Germany have more opposition than others. This issue is explained in the topic of “the positions of member states”. They are, in some points, culturally against. On the other hand, it seems like some countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland are going to change their positions, once Turkey complies with all the conditions.

3.1.4. Conclusion: Why has labour mobility not been forthcoming?

In order to test intergovernmentalism, the main assumptions are explained and the positions of member states are analysed by looking to some specific countries especially the ones which are most in favor and the ones which are most against. European polls, Eurobarometer and some surveys related to the topic have been researched. After this research, it is clear that many assumptions of intergovernmentalism are valid for my case. On the issue of Turkey, member states have different positions according to their national interests. For instance, the United Kingdom supports full membership and thinks that “free movement of workers” is going to be for the benefit of the EU. According to intergovernmentalism, states are primary actors in negotiations. On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism states the importance of the institutions; for example, accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU are continuing even if some states do not desire this way. It makes the case closer to liberal intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism emphasizes the role of national leaders in the process; for instance, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared that during the period that he is in the office, Turkey will not be a member, which shows how national leaders are strong. Intergovernmentalism also discusses that states fight for their own interests during interstate bargaining. This assumption fails to explain the act of Angela Merkel, for instance, even if she does not support Turkey's accession and support “privileged partnership” as a third way, she preferred to honour an EU commitment and continued accession negotiations when she was the President of the Union in the first half of 2007. Intergovernmentalism fails to explain this supranational act. On the other hand,

intergovernmentalists assume that national governments should have common preferences to collectively agree on something, or in my case, to collectively agree on the accession of Turkey or opening of borders towards Turkish labour force. However, as it is seen from the tables on public opinion of countries on the support for further EU enlargement, it would be really hard to have common preferences for them; that is why, labour mobility between Turkey and the EU has not been forthcoming. Accession of a candidate country requires unanimity by all member states. If member states see it for their own benefit, they can vote for accession. After that, they have to open their borders for Turkish workers within seven years. At this point, national preferences of member states can only affect the length of transition period. Bargaining power of Turkish government can help to reduce this time. According to liberal intergovernmentalism, institutions can increase efficiency of bargaining. The European Commission provides official monitoring to help this process; however, the extent of this monitoring makes neo-functionalism more valid than intergovernmentalism, if the Commission or any institution play bigger role than nation-states.

In conclusion, the hypothesis “liberal intergovernmentalism expects that national positions to compete on the basis of power to establish an European position and the interests of those states are determined by clear economic advantages and disadvantages that they perceive in labour mobility for Turkey is not valid totally. Firstly, according to my research, national positions of member states on the issue are mostly related to their domestic concerns such as unemployment, economic situations or fear of immigration and also they can be related to their identity concerns. However, the main concern of member states are economical even if they are not the only concerns because there are EU citizens saying that even if Turkey fulfil all the obligations, they are against their membership. (Chart-3)

On the other hand, the hypothesis “if intergovernmentalism best explains the politics of labour mobility between Turkey and the EU, then Community institutions do not play a key role” is valid. As it is explained, intergovernmental negotiations and the preferences of member states are deterministic in this issue. The Commission plays an important role but not bigger than member states. Membership requires unanimity. Intergovernmentalism analyses the EU in terms of acts of national governments on the basis of their interests. This is clearly explained in the chapter of “positions of member states”. However, I would argue that member states cannot just bargain according to their interests if the Union is an liberal entity, they need to legitimize their preferences on the basis of community ethos. Even if it seems so hard to reach happy end for the Turkish side,

commitment of it to the reforms and Community ethos can force opposition to rethink. Briefly, intergovernmental bargaining will be decisive in the negotiations for Turkey's membership and afterwards opening of borders for the free movement of people. This is two-level game as Moravcsik explained; at the national level and European level. Efficiency and cost and benefit calculations will be also decisive for the member states. However, I will argue that common point can never be found, if cultural concerns are on the table.

It is better to make a distinction between intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism here. The European Commission, as a supranational institution of the Community, monitors the negotiations and publishes “Progress Reports on Turkey” to prepare the country for membership and free mobility. At this point, it is possible for the Commission to act on behalf of member states like in the Principal Agent Theory. (Pollack, 2003) In this case, it is more close to liberal intergovernmentalism rather than pure intergovernmentalism. However, the Commission cannot act beyond the task the member states have given; this is why, that is more like liberal intergovernmentalism rather than neo-functionalism. It can be understood from the positions of strongly oppose member states. The Commission defines the enlargement policy as a win-win situation for all countries concerned. In terms of role of the Commission, a state that demands to join the Union submits an application for membership to the Council, which asks the Commission to assess the applicant's ability to meet the conditions of membership. If the Commission gives a positive reply, and the Council unanimously agrees a negotiating mandate, negotiations are formally opened between the candidate state and all the member states. (Commission, 2010) With progress reports, financial assistance, grants, and projects the Commission aims to prepare candidate countries for future membership. In terms of free movement of workers, the Commission monitors the transition periods as maximum 7 years. The Council regulates the act on free movement of workers. (EEC No: 1612 / 68 of 15 October 1968) Until now, there has been no problem with the member states and new member states in accordance with the procedure for free mobility. Old member states sometimes demanded additional periods, but those periods were not so long. I argue that member states, especially most against ones, will be more involved in the process especially in terms of free mobility between Turkey and the EU. Therefore, the issue here is more close to liberal intergovernmentalism rather than neo-functionalism. The main interest of the member states is economical and free mobility right for the populous Turkey can make them afraid of losing prosperity in job market. It is not the subject of this research whether it is true or not, but we can develop an economic argument on this issue. The three IR theories are partly enough to explain the

politics of labour mobility between Turkey and EU. It would be better to supplement them with an economical theory. This argument will be explained in the last -case study- chapter.

3.2. Neo-functionalist Approach

3.2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, neo-functionalism is going to be tested by looking demands of member states from Turkey in terms of the possible “free movement of workers”. The importance of neo-functionalism lays down its focus on non-state actors. In the chapter of intergovernmentalism, different interests of member states were enlightened; but, here, the progress reports of the European Commission will be examined to figure out the common interests of the Union. At the end, I am going to find out whether the member states or the Commission play the key role. The main hypothesis of this chapter is that even if the Commission defends the interests of the Union and dealing with reform processes of the candidate countries to open accession chapters, the main decisions are determined by the member states in accordance with their national interests, then neo-functionalists' focus on non-state actors can be questioned. The other hypothesis is that the demands of the EU are expressed in the Commission progress reports about the possible labour mobility; if Turkey fulfils all these demands, then labour mobility will come automatically. The sub-hypothesis is also that “if the central concept of neo-functionalism is spill-over from one area of operation to another, then Turkey can have spill-over in the area of 'free movement of workers' while trying to conform other conditions of *acquis* in other areas”

3.2.2. Main Assumptions of Neo-functionalism

Neo-functionalism is a theory which focuses on the role of the non-state actors. In the case of the European Union; the institutions, interest groups, agencies and etc. can be given as examples of non-state actors. However, this does not mean that member states are out of the process. Member states are important actors in the process. They determine the terms of the initial agreement but they do not set the direction and scope of the following change. According to this theory, integration with a regional organization is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process. At the end, domestic environment and citizens will start to shift their expectations in the direction of supranational organizations and the likelihood of spill-overs will increase thanks to the economic and social integration. (Schmitter, 2002)

Haas emphasizes the dynamics of the loyalty change from the domestic level to a bigger regional stage. According to the neo-functionalist point of view, the member states of a supranational integration will bring a mutual supranational sovereignty over national jurisdiction. This kind of supranational sovereignty will act through a supranational organization holding supranational power. According to the neo-functionalism, the supranational organization can take the member states in its orbit of supranational sovereignty. This kind of process occurs not only in one area but in more than one area and it is kind of an automatic process and can be defined by the term of “spill-over”. Neo-functionalists believe that integration in one area especially in an economic sector would spread over to other sectors by setting strong interdependence and wealth. Neo-functionalist approach names this automatic process as “functional spill-over” and considers this concept as very important. (Özen, 1998: 2) Functional spill-over is a term of neo-functionalism literature. Functional spill-overs help neo-functionalists to explain when national governments took the first steps on the way towards integration, the process goes further than they expected. (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 108) Neo-functionalists also believe that once member states integrated one sector of their economies, the connection between that sector and others would pave the way to a spill-over into the other sectors. (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 109) Even if there are some areas that are already integrated, but there is still incomplete integration, it creates pressure for deepening and widening policy coordination. In functional spill-over, state intervention in one sector engenders economic changes elsewhere. (Moravcsik, 1993: 475) When functional spill-over process is emerging, the supranational bodies established on the principle of the delegation of national authority would have new areas to control supranationally. At this point, I will suggest not looking spill-overs as spill-overs between sectors but spill-overs between chapters in the negotiation process. I would argue that the integration of Turkish market to the European market with “free movement of goods” or “free movement of services” would pave the way to spill-over into “free movement of people”. When Turkey reformed itself in conformity with the *acquis* and opened many chapters in the near future, only “free movement of people” would be left. At this point, it is probability that Turkey will be ready for full membership and there will not be massive migrations from Turkey to the EU. This is just an assumption in the case of all reforms are perfectly applied by Turkey.

According to the neo-functionalism, nation-state is not a monolithic entity. On the contrary, it is an union of interests and issue-areas involving of various lobby groups, elites, bureaucratic officials

and political leaders. Additionally, those various groups can have different kind of cooperations and coalitions to enlarge their benefits. At this point, they also communicate with their international partners. (Özen, 1998: 8) For this reason, Haas defines the term of integration founded upon changing coalitions and convergent preferences represented by interest groups, the elites and government officials. (Özen, 1998: 9) Haas also adds that during the process of integration, the preferences of interest groups and elites that form a political community would be redefined in terms of regional level additional to the national level. (Özen, 1998: 10) In this paper, different opinions inside each member state are not going to be explained. General positions of them are defined; however, it is acknowledged that member states contain many interest groups, elites and bureaucratic officials that determine position towards accession of Turkey.

Both functionalists and neo-functionalists emphasize the constraining impacts of cultural factors especially national identity on integration. Mitrany also views that national identity is one of the most important cultural factors. However, according to Schmitter's recent work, the neo-functionalist point of view underestimates the enduring character of national identity and its restricting effect on European integration. (Hooghe and Marks, 2006: 206) The integration efforts between the Union and Turkey can be a case which could not be justified by neo-functionalist assumptions. The two factors which are “environmental factors” and “cultural factors” are missing points in the neo-functionalist integration theory. They require a separate comprehensive study. The environmental factors are the factors of international environment in which the integration has been processing. The cultural factors are also related to identity problems. (Özen, 1998: 11) This paper ignores these two factors and discusses that there can be labour mobility between Turkey and the EU in the future without massive migrations or big problems in the European labour market.

Neofunctionalists (specifically Schmitter, 1969, 1970) also argue that when the integration process proceeds, national governments behave less and less proactive but more and more reactive to changes in the regional organizations to which they belong. (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 7) This assumption also does not suit the case of labour mobility. Member states are very sensitive about labour mobility because it is directly related to welfare and economy. The Commission, as a supranational organization, deals with this issue, but member states are very active in the process.

Europeanization can be assumed as a meta-theory especially in relation between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. (Howell, 2002: 4) Europeanization can be explained

as a way of dealing with some of the criticisms at neo-functionalism in general and spill-over in particular. For example, functional spill-over can be categorized as top-down Europeanization and the explanation of the legislation downloaded by the Union as assumptions (aspects) of intergovernmentalism. This allows an understanding of the difference between integrative legislation by the EU and various national interpretations come from Europeanization. The integration of the countries to the European Union is the consequence of national up-loading to the EU stage through Europeanization and the process of downloading when an agreed compromise has been reached. EU diversity is integrated with the help of up-loading and cultivated spill-over. (Howell, 2002: 19) In the history of the EU, “free movement of workers” does not create any problem for the European market as it had found its own balance in the meantime. This paper argues that in the case of Turkey, even if it has much bigger population than many countries, the outcome of opening of borders will be the same. Turkey is going to have a top-down Europeanization during the reform process. When the time comes for integration, Turkey will be ready for membership just as other countries; otherwise, there would be no accession. It should never be forgotten that any country which is ready for membership and carried all the reforms, is absolutely ready for “free movement”.

3.2.3. What are the main demands and viewpoints of the EU and the Turkish side? How far apart are they and why?

Turkish side demands equal treatment, when compared to other countries, which means that, once all reforms have been applied, the country should enjoy the most basic rights of the union: Free movement of People. According to the Turkish point of view, EU member states receive approximately 35.000 net migrations from Turkey annually. As it is seen, there is still huge migration from Turkey to the EU even if there is no “free movement” between the sides. Turkish people will migrate more if the borders are opened like previous new member states, but it would not have catastrophic consequences. Until the full membership, both sides will develop and neither Turkey nor the EU would profit from an unmanaged and unplanned labour mobility. (Elitok, 2010: 6) The possible outcomes of migration are not the focus of this research, but it is better to touch them upon for the completeness of the research. Additionally, Turkish Republic has always declared that it is committed to the European values and norms; and works on the way to the full membership. The TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen' Association) as one of the

biggest lobby groups of Turkey, works to promote Turkey on a global scale and holds activities for the cultivation of international political, economic, social and cultural relations, communication, representation and cooperation networks in order to support Turkey's EU membership. It holds research, forms opinions, develops projects and organises activities to increase integration with the EU on the way to the membership. (Interview partner, 08.04.2010) This information about the positions of Turkey and the TUSIAD are given to show how interest groups are important for the governments. Additional to TUSIAD, there are many other players in the process. Neo-functionalism fails to explain the strong role of states in the negotiations but the theory is completely valid to explain the role of TUSIAD as non-state actor.

Hereby, it is going to be explained the demands of European side, but the demands of the EU states are declared and monitored by the European Commission. The Progress Reports are especially important as they help Turkey to know what the EU exactly wants. In terms of the theory of neo-functionalism, the supranational status of the Commission in this issue makes the theory valid. Member states will decide at the end whether they accept Turkey to the Community, but the Commission has very strong role during negotiations.

According to the Commission Progress reports on Turkey:

In terms of access to the European labour market, legislation on work permissions for foreigners which include procedures facilitating process and exceptions some specific professionals from holding work permits, consisting people working for international or domestic projects, was vetoed and is still before Parliament. In terms of strengthen the capacity of ISKUR (Turkish Employment Agency), attempts are maintained especially in the IT structure and training programmes to led job-matching services online. Additional efforts are required for joining the EURES (European Employment Services) network. In terms of coordination of social security systems, the work to establish an administrative capacity of the Social Security Institution was maintained. Appointment of medium and high level managers at central and provincial level helped to consolidate of the Social Security Institution. The efforts to establish “one-stop-shop” social security centres in districts are maintaining. Additionally, further efforts are needed to introduce European Health Insurance Card. As a result, there is limited progress; alignment is at an early stage; and the administrative capacity requires to be consolidated more. (Commission, 2008)

As it is showed in the progress reports related to “free movement of workers”, there is a long way to

go in terms of possible labour mobility in the future. Briefly, EU demands many reforms and still Turkey is so slow to implement them. Here, we cannot talk about any demand of Turkey, other than equal treatment, at this stage. First of all, Turkey has to carry out reforms demanded by the EU and then it can demand “free movement of workers”.

3.2.4. Conclusion

In order to test the neo-functionalism, the positions of non-state actors are explained by looking at demands of the Commission explained in the Progress reports on Turkey and the role of TUSIAD as an interest group. It is clear that non-state and supranational actors are really effective in the process. For instance, the European Commission is working for the interests of all Union, but these interests are common interests of the member states. In this respect, neo-functionalist assumption of the focus on non-state actors is partly valid because this research discusses that even if non-state actors play crucial role in the process, “free movement of workers” is a high politics issue and can only be decided by unanimous votes of member states. However, neo-functionalism explains although some countries are strongly against the membership of Turkey, the negotiations are continuing. The explanation can be that the supranational interests of the Community prevail the single interests of member states during the negotiation period. If so, intergovernmentalist theory can be invalid for the negotiation period. However, after this period, member states decide unanimously whether they are going to accept this candidate. At this point, intergovernmentalist view is more valid than neo-functionalism.

Also, according to the neo-functionalist assumptions, “spill-overs” emerge after integration. In the case of “free movement for workers”, I took spill-overs as between the chapters in the accession criteria; for instance, I would argue that opening of many chapters before “free movement for workers” will eventually pave the way to full labour mobility. The previous chapters will force Turkey to reform itself before opening of borders and Turkish citizens will be ready eventually for the full mobility.

On the other hand, neo-functionalist theory fails to explain the role of cultural factors in the case of Turkey. For this reason, the case between Turkey and the EU cannot be justified by neo-functionalist assumptions. For instance, in the previous chapters, some tables about public opinion

have been showed; it is clear that some countries are worried about identity as much as their economy. As it is said before, 40 percent of Austrians say that they would be against even if Turkey met all the criteria. At this point, constructivist theory help to explain the role of norms, values or identity and neo-functionalism clearly fails to explain it.

Additionally, neo-functionalism assumes that nation-state is not a monolithic entity; involves various lobby groups, elites, officials, political leaders with different views. This assumption's validity was illustrated while explaining Turkish demands and the role of TUSIAD. It is clear that TUSIAD supports the membership, but there are also many groups or individuals strongly against the membership. They also do not believe that Turkey will have equal treatment on the issue of “free movement for workers

In conclusion, the main hypothesis, “even if the Commission monitors the interests of the Union and deals with reform processes of the candidate countries to open accession chapters, main decisions are determined by the member states in accordance with their national interests, then neo-functionalists' focus on non-state actors can be contradicted” is valid. As it is explained before, the Commission is the boss of the negotiation process, but at the end of the negotiation process, member states are going to decide unanimously. It is known that the chapter of “free movement of workers” is going to be opened at last and free mobility will come after membership. It shows that the member states will be decisive at the latest point. Also, the hypothesis, “if Turkey fulfils the demands showed by the Progress reports of the Commission, then labour mobility will come automatically” is partly valid. Until today, the full mobility came almost automatically for all new member states after some transition periods. In the case of Turkey, positions of member states are totally different from each other and there is a strong opposition with the fear of immigration. At this point, member states can propose or demand more restrictions for Turkey.

On the other hand, the sub-hypothesis “if the central concept of neo-functionalism is spill-over from one area of operation to another area, then Turkey can have spill-over in the area of 'free movement of workers' while trying to conform other conditions of *acquis* in other areas” is valid. From the previous experiences of the EU, there were no candidate country in the history of the Union fulfilled all the criteria and reformed all the areas but was not ready for mobility of workers. They had some transitional periods, but they were enjoyed this right at the end. According to the fact that Turkey is not a member and has not integrated to the Union yet, spill-overs can be assumed between

the chapters and reforms, but not between different sectors. For this reason, it is argued that reforms in the free movement of goods and services or any others will have spill-over effect on “free movement of people”. After all the reforms and preparations in other areas, such as education, Customs Union, Transport policy and etc., will have spill-over effect on labour mobility. Turkish people will be ready for free movement.

3.3. Constructivist Approach

3.3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, constructivism is going to be tested on the issue of labour mobility. Constructivism focuses on constructed ideas and preferences; in this respect, it is assumed that there is a correlation between member states' support on the accession of Turkey and their commitment to the EU. Additionally, if it is not all about economic concerns, and member states are also carrying cultural views such as identity concerns, constructivism can be tested at that point. The main hypothesis is that if member states have different opinions and interests about Turkey, then their commitment is different to the EU. The other hypothesis is that if the main domestic concerns of member states are unemployment and economic problems, then the issue of free movement of workers for Turkey might be perceived as potential migration inflows by the member states. In this chapter, before testing the theory of constructivism, main assumptions of the theory are going to be identified.

3.3.2. Main assumptions of Constructivism

The other integration theory is constructivism which is epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge and ontologically about the construction of the social reality. According to constructivism, ideas and their institutional support can have some important impact on the interests and preferences of actors. (Guzzini, 2000: 148) Briefly, it can be said that what countries do depends on their interests and identities, which can change. According to Wendt, (1995) the fundamental principles of the constructivist social theory are; “people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them” which means social knowledge; “the meanings in terms of which action is organized arise out of interaction” which means social practice; “identities and interests are produced in and through 'situated activity'” which means social identities. When the positions of member states are explained, constructivist approach can help to understand their viewpoints on the construction of knowledge and social reality. Constructivist point of view discusses that their support or opposition are depend on what their identities and interests are.

Constructivism is a theory that focuses on the role of consciousness of people in social life. It states that human interaction is influenced by ideational factors but not basically material ones. The most significant ideational factors are commonly shared or “inter-subjective beliefs”. These shared beliefs build up the preferences of purposive actors. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 391) Moreover, the constructivist point of view deals with the role of norms, ideas, knowledge, culture, and discussion in politics, emphasizing especially the role of widely shared or “inter-subjective” beliefs and understanding on social life. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 392) In a specific manner, constructivist approach to social analysis affirms some important points; first of all, interaction among people is shaped especially by ideational factors but not only material factors; secondly, the most significant ideational factors are commonly shared or “inter-subjective ideas”; and thirdly, these common ideas construct the preferences and identities of purposive actors. Constructivist analysis also concerns understanding how social facts shift and how they influence politics. In brief, it is a social approach that focuses on the nature of social life and social change. Constructivism does not deal with the content of social structures or the origin (nature) of agents in social life. As a result, constructivism does not produce particular assumptions about political outcomes that are testable in social science research. Constructivist point of view, for this reason, looks like rational choice. Similar to rational choice, it suggests a framework for understanding the nature of social life and human interaction in social life but there are no claims about their particular content. According to a rational choice theory, agents behave rationally to increase utilities, however the substantive specification of actors and utilities stay outside the analysis. Constructivism views agents and structures as mutually constructive which illustrates why political environment is so and not otherwise, however the substantive specification of structures and agents must be brought by some other source. It is also clear that neither rational choice theory nor constructivist approach give substantive explanations or assumptions of political act until joined with a more particular understanding of who the related actors are, what they demand and what the social structures can be. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 393) In this respect, public opinion in member states can be explained by ideational factors additional to the material ones (economic factors). In the case of Turkey, the interaction of Europeans and Turkish immigrants living in the EU shapes public opinion and positions of member states. It was explained at the previous chapter; the positions of countries such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands or France are the most negative ones and those countries have one common point which is Turkish minorities. This chapter also argues that preferences of European citizens on the issue of the accession of Turkey are also shaped by “inter-subjective ideas” mainly focusing on the fear of potential migration flows.

The constructivist point of view, most importantly, argues that state identity shapes state actions and preferences. Identities and interests in international relations are not stable. The important thing is to know how to look at how interests and identities are constructed. (Wendt, 1994) Wendt (1992) and Katzenstein (1996) contributed to place identity problems at the core of constructivist theorizing. Constructivists believe that state identities are constructed inside the national and international social environments. On the other hand, they do not agree on the definitions of identity and the weight of interstate and national environments in constructing state identities. Alexandre Wendt attaches more importance to the influence of the international environment in his systemic constructivism. Some constructivists assumes that identity is primarily a national attribute coming from domestic ideologies of collective uniqueness and aims that in turn constructed country's perceptions of preferences and finally state policy. (Barnett 1996, Berger 1996, Risse-Kappen 1996) (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 399) For constructivists, identity is a catch-all concept that interprets different behaviours, but it does not yet allow the suggestion that countries with specific identities will behave in a specific ways. (Kowert and Legro, 1996) During the time that identity stays unspecified; it will create very specific explanations and interpretations for state behaviour and gives little hope of contingent generalizations about international politics and identity. Wendt believes that identities are fixed in self understandings of an actor which means that they are subjective, but also contingent on whether other actors recognize these identities, that makes then intersubjectively quality. At the end, the interaction of these external and internal ideas constructed the identities. Identity construction is always restricted by the set of possible identities in the international environment at any time, for this reason, the number of possible identities are not unlimited and the term is not idiosyncratic. Wendt assumes that there are two significant types of identities in international relations; role identities and type identities. Type identities are social categories of states which have some common characteristics, as an example of regime types or forms of state. States can have multiple identities, such as capitalist state, democratic state, European state or Islamic state. International social structure is very significant here, because specific kind of identities have a lesser or greater degree international legitimacy. For instance, democratic and capitalist states are legitimate at this time while monarchical states have a lesser degree of legitimacy. Role identities are born as a result of dyadic relationships among states. Countries may be allies, neutral or enemies. Role identities emerge only in relation to others, therefore, they are social. As a result, if a state's perception of its type and role identities is known, it is easier to predict how state will act. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 399) In the chapter of the

commitment of member states to the European Union, constructivist approach will be testable. Their national identities influence their commitment to the Union and their views on the issue of Turkey. Most importantly, the discussions on the potential labour mobility between Turkey and the EU after opening of borders are affected by the identity concern of member states. In terms of type identities, European states have democratic and liberal identity; however, their role identities emerge as a result of interaction with others. This interaction can be thought as interaction between Turkish immigrants and the natives of that country.

'Identities are constructed' means that actors have preferences about identities and may apply rational calculations in constructing their identities. Some scholars who attach importance to the ideas believe that new ideas appear as a response to dramatic policy shocks, crisis, or if previous policies failed to solve problems. It leads to a search for new ideas to base policies. (Odell 1982, Kowert & Legro 1996) This kind of situation emerged from the relationship between crisis, failure and the adaptation of new decisions has been seen in many countries in the history. These crisis can be wars or economic crisis. However, failure argument alone cannot explain the adaptation of new ideas by the countries. Hall's notion of persuasiveness (1989) comes into existence at this point. An idea to be persuasive requires a response for the political and economical problems of the day. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 406) This argument explains why public opinion of Europeans towards Turkey changes from time to time. For instance, during economic crisis, people more tend to blame immigrants because of unemployment. They are not eager to accept Turkey with its high population.

In terms of identity, the community ethos of the Union is contingent upon a liberal-democratic identity as declared in Article 6 (1) of EC: "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law." Therefore, member states cannot just bargain but they need to legitimize their preferences founded upon the community ethos. In this respect, Turkey expressed itself as democratic and liberal country with Kemalist identity. After that, the advocates frame enlargement with the EU identity without cost and benefit calculations or national interests. They blame reluctant member states because of lack of commitment to fundamental values and norms of the EU. The Commission report in Lisbon summit in 1992 entitled "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement" as an example of formal attempt to rhetorically commitment. It was about Eastern enlargement but it is good example to show the diversity of preferences and the positions of the member states at that time. The Commission

declared that the Union has never been a closed club and it cannot reject the historic challenge to know its continental responsibilities”(European Commission, 1992). These discussions are still valid for Turkey. Even if, Turkey declares that it is committed to Western values and ideas, some ideas inside the European Union argue that Turkey doesn’t belong to the EU ideationally.

3.3.3. Do the differences between the positions of member states explain the lack of EU Commitment?

According to the April 2006 Eurobarometer survey, the biggest percentage of European citizens, 52 percent, views the membership of Turkey as a preference of their country itself. Only 20 percent see it as a mutual interest between Turkey and the Community. (Servantie, 2010) This information demonstrates the lack of commitment to the Union clearly. Still, Member states do not possess a common feeling of belonging. Additionally and indirectly, it emphasizes the intergovernmentalist point of view; states have their own positions according to their national interests rather than community interests.

In 2005, voters in France and in the Netherlands, two founder member states, rejected the constitution. This situation created a shock among other EU member states. The decision of the citizens can be explained by social, political and economic shortcomings of the Union. The consequences of the rejected draft constitution had negatively influenced the possible Turkish accession. Furthermore, the rejection of the constitution in the referenda turned enlargement and identity concerns into more sensitive issues. The French government changed its constitution with a provision that any further enlargement will have to be approved by the referendums. This system is demanded to apply by Austria, the Netherlands and the others. (Yılmaz, 2008: 23)

According to the Eurobarometer data, citizens in the member states are completely divided in how much they trust to the European Union. Trust is a concept directly related to the commitment. In total, 41 percent of EU citizens trust the EU and another 41 percent tend to not to trust it. The UK, Sweden and Austria are the extreme countries that do not trust to the EU. In the UK, 55 percent tend not to trust and only 19 percent tend to trust. In Sweden, 65 percent of the citizens tend to not to trust the EU and 29 percent tend to trust the Union. In Austria, 57 percent tend not to trust the Union and 31 percent tend to trust it. In the Netherlands, 47 percent of the citizens tend not to trust

the EU and 38 percent tend to trust it. In Germany, 45 percent of the people tend not to trust the EU and 35 percent tend to trust the EU. In France, 44 percent of the citizens tend not to trust the EU and 42 percent tend to trust the EU. On the other hand, citizens in the member states such as Romania, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, or Italy tend to trust more the Union. (Eurobarometer, 2004: 5) If we relate these data with the perception of member states on the membership of Turkey; the Netherlands, France and Germany relatively trust the Union and against accession of Turkey. They might be afraid to lose their welfare with possible immigration. Austria and Sweden do not trust the Union, but also do not want to see Turkey as a member state. The UK has no commitment to the EU and mostly this is why supports the membership of Turkey. The UK is a member state that always preferred more enlargement than integration. According to them, the widening of the Union would prevent the deepening. (Grabbe and Hughes, 1998: 5) Countries like Portugal, Spain, Hungary or Romania trust more the EU and support the accession of Turkey. In conclusion, I could not find any correlation between the commitment to the EU and the support towards Turkey.

3.3.4. Conclusion

In order to test constructivism, the main assumptions of the theory and the commitment of member states to the EU have been researched. As a result, there has been found that there is no correlation between commitment to the EU and the support for Turkish accession or the fear from potential immigrants. This conclusion comes from the fact that the countries which do not have trust to the EU are against or support Turkey related to other reasons. For instance, both UK and Austria are countries that do not trust the EU but, while Austria does not support the accession of Turkey, the UK has been one of its strongest supporters.

If we test the current position of Turkey in terms of constructivism, we can see that there is a change in ideas and beliefs of Turkey. The chapter including migration-related problems is one of the few chapters that is not formally blocked, but there has been, in any case, very little progress from the Turkish government to harmonize migration policies in its pre-accession endeavours. What can be seen as Turkey's failure to follow this issue, and its pro-active position on visa policy with its non-EU neighbours in general, is the consequence of the overall loss of credibility of the EU accession process among Turkish officials and citizens. The visa-liberalisation policies of the Union towards Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia that allow citizens of these countries to travel freely into the Union caused strong reactions in Turkey. The fact that visa liberalisation was given to

countries not yet negotiating EU membership but is being denied to Turkey, a country that has been an EU candidate for ten years and conducting membership talks for four years, is simply unacceptable to many Turkish citizens. (Devrim D. and Soler, E., 2010)

Constructivism focuses on construction of knowledge and social reality; and also constructivist point of view argues that ideas have important impact on interests and preferences of actors. If we think in a way that ideas are constructed, we can realize that what member states think about the membership of Turkey depends on what their interests and identities are. This is clear in the first chapter “intergovernmentalist approach”. Positions of member states are totally different from each other and build upon their constructed idea on Turkey. Constructivists also argue that these identities and interests can change. If current international and domestic situations such as economic crisis are mostly effective on this identity and interest changes; it can be said that the positions of member states in favour of Turkish accession can change in the meanwhile. For instance, the main domestic concern of countries such as Austria, France, Belgium or France is unemployment. It can be related to the fear of potential migrant flows from Turkey after the accession. As a result, it can be said that, that is why, these countries are against Turkish accession.

Constructivism also focuses on the importance of widely shared and “inter-subjective beliefs”. For instance, EU citizens have some kind of Turkish profile in their minds because of immigrants living in these countries. They look at immigrants and think that all Turks are like this. (Interview partner, 08.04.2010) In this point, if we think that the Turkish immigrants living in these countries are very closed communities, it can create negative widely shared beliefs about all Turks. These common ideas construct preferences and identities of purposive actors, that is why, some citizens are opposed to the membership of Turkey.

Schimmelfening says that many EU member states should have been opposed to membership of the new 12 countries. European countries committed to the rule of law, human rights, democracy, and social market economy. Old members had to take normative obligation towards these countries that share same collective identity. Therefore, these countries are entitled to be member of the EU. Even if they are against to enlargement, rhetorical commitment to community values and norms made member states to accept further enlargement. (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 172)

Briefly, constructivists view that interest and identities of countries are highly formable output of particular historical processes. They give close notice to the predominant discourses in society because discourse illustrates and shapes ideas and preferences, and creates accepted norms of behaviour. (Walt, 1998: 41) In this respect, negotiations between Turkey and the EU can shape the ideas and preferences of member states in the meantime. Constructivist approach helps to understand the positions of member states with the theory's focus on constructed ideas and interests. According to constructivism, human interaction is influenced by the ideational factors but not basically material ones. In this way, public opinion in the EU can be shaped by interactions between Turkish people living in these countries and natives. For constructivists, identity is a catch-all concept that interprets different behaviours but countries with specific identities behave in a specific way. It explains different positions of some member states on the issue of Turkey. The identities of the member states also influence their commitment to the Union. Also, viewpoints on the potential labour mobility between Turkey and the EU after opening of borders are affected by the identity concerns of member states.

In conclusion, the hypothesis “if the main domestic concerns of member states are unemployment and economic problems, then the issue of free movement of workers for Turkey might be perceived as potential immigration inflows by the member states” is valid. As it is explained ideas and interests of states are constructed and these constructed ideas and identities can change according to the current situations and crisis. Economic crisis can be the main indicator of this; during economic crisis or unemployment, member states are tend to be against any new countries to accept the Union. For instance; the main domestic concern of Austria, Sweden or Germany is unemployment and their main interest is to reduce unemployment. During these times, they are more likely to be against the accession of Turkey. Also, the hypothesis “if member states have different opinions and interests about Turkey, than their commitment is different to the EU” is invalid. There have not been found any correlation between the support for Turkey and the commitment to the Union.

4. Case Study: TURKEY and the EU

The freedom of movement for workers is a freedom to guarantee the effective labour mobility within the Union. The regulation is contingent on the general procedure of removing any direct or indirect discrimination based on nationality regarding employment, remuneration and other working conditions, obtaining access to accommodation and labours' right to be joined by their family. It also helps to implement of a system matching job vacancies and applications via specialised services cooperating at European level. Art. 18 (1) EC says “every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect” (EUR-Lex, 2010)

Art. 39 (2) EC says “such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. (EUR-Lex, 2010) The regulation on the free movement of workers primarily entitles all citizens of a member state to be employed on the territory of other member states. The entitlement must be without any discrimination. Recruitment cannot be contingent upon medical, occupational and other conditions which discriminate regarding nationality. They also have the same entitlement to job training. They have the same social and tax advantages as domestic labours. They can be precluded from participation in the management of public law bodies and from obtaining an office managed by public law.

The *acquis* provides for non-discriminatory treatment of labours if they are legally working in a member state other than their home country which is also a member of the Union. The free movement of workers also involves cumulating or transferring social security rights of the European citizens and this needs administrative cooperation among states. The *acquis* includes particular rules regarding mutual recognition of qualifications and diplomas to help the practice of specific professions. Moreover, the freedom of movement for workers is an area that includes the voting and residence rights of people in any other member state. (Europa, 2009) Article 39 of the EC Treaty regulates mobility in the European Union and it is one of the most significant rights of citizens. This right includes the full mobility of workers. Freedom of movement for people was ensured to Union citizens by the Treaty of Rome and was managed by the Regulation 1612/68. There have been many amendments so far to prevent EU citizens to be a burden on the finances of

the host member countries. For this reason, member states have rights to impose public policy restrictions on the freedom of movement for workers such as on the area of public security and public health. (Eurofound, 2009)

Free movement is restricted for labourers from new member states for a period of time. This period is called as “transitional periods”. Free movement of workers is one of the fundamental rights in the Union. For this reason, the restrictions can be continued for a maximum of seven years which means until May 2011 for the ones that got membership status in 2004 and until 2014 for Romania and Bulgaria. Some statistical analyses show that the member states not putting curbs on the new members have had positive economic impact. (Euractiv, 2009) The restricted access to labour market can be 2 plus 2 plus 3 years. Following the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds, some old member states have restricted the access of workers to their labour markets from the new member states because of the complex implications of these new members. For instance, for the 8 member states joined the Community in 2004, only four old member states; Austria, Germany, Belgium and Denmark, decided to continue restrictions more than two years.

As it is declared before, the new member states have transitional periods before holding the right of “freedom of movement for workers”. During this time, the old EU members have a right to restrict labour mobility from the new member states for a transitional time of seven years at most. At the beginning, for two years, the old members of the EU may continue to apply their national law or any mutual agreements with the new members. It means that labours from the new members still require a work permission to obtain access to the labour market. At the end of the two years initial transitional period, the old member states may decide to continue the limitations on the free movement of workers. They must inform the Commission about this. After the period of five years, the old member states will only be able to have a right to extend the limitations for the last two years, if they see a big disruption or a threat on their labour markets. Commission publishes a report about the operation of the transitional restrictions before the first two years period ends. The report of the Commission is provided with factual data to help the old members to decide whether they want to continue limiting the free movement of workers from the new members. In this process, citizens of the new member states working in an old member states during the accession period or transitional period are depending upon particular provisions.

The safeguard clause allows a member state, which has chosen not any more to impose restrictions, to ask the European Commission for authorisation to apply new limitations, if its labour market has difficulties and threats. Then, the EC decides which kind of restrictions or how long they can be imposed. Also, the “standstill clause” declares that old member states cannot make access to their labour markets more restricted than before the date of signing the Accession Treaty. In terms of scope, citizens of new member states can enjoy free movement at the date of accession during the time that they are not employed.

The one of the most important demand of the EU from Turkey is to harmonize with the EURES network before membership. The EURES (the European Employment Services) provides services for the advantage of employees, employers and citizens. It was founded in 1993 as a cooperation network between the Commission and the Public Employment Services of the EEA member states and other organizations. The joint resources of the EURES members and partner organizations provide high quality services for employers and workers. The aim of EURES is to provide information, advise and job-matching services for the advantage of workers, employers or any citizen trying to enjoy the right of “free movement of people”. It has more than 700 advisers helping people across Europe. If workers and employers are having cross-border commuting problems, the EURES helps them. (EURES, 2010) Today, looking for new jobs in the whole Europe is easier for EU citizens thanks to EURES network. Additionally, EURES web-site provides the citizens to search jobs across Europe and to port their own information such as their employment preferences, experience or qualifications. Turkey is not a member yet. The next chapter will explain whether Turkey showed any improvement to participate the EURES network by looking the Progress Reports of the European Commission on Turkey.

4.1. Labour mobility in the EU

Other than all the fears of massive migrations from the new member states after their transitional periods, there is a widespread dissatisfaction about the lack of mobility within the EU to have labour market flexibility to guarantee competitiveness and to allow adjustments within the Eurozone. There are many advantages of migration internally and externally. In 2000, the European Commission published “Communication on a Community Immigration Policy”. This publication

showed that there are changing pressures on the requirement for a new assessment of immigration policy. Primarily, the establishment of the single market with free movement of workers needs a common approach by the member states to immigration over the external borders of the Union. Also, because of high and persistent unemployment, the approaches to immigration and asylum, which were created as areas of Community competence in the Amsterdam Treaty, have been changed. This situation was followed by an agreement at the European Council in Tampere in 1999. (Common Asylum and Immigration Policy) The core of the policy is the recognition that member states cannot carry out their own policies for the admission of third country citizens in a single unified European labour market. On the other hand, there is very important reality; some member states have their own cultural and historical experiences concerning immigration, particularly towards some specific countries. This may influence the possible pattern of demand for immigration from other countries outside of the EU and the capacity of each European state to absorb migrants from third countries. The key principles expressed by the Commission were:

- Setting of an appropriate rate of immigration established on co-operation, exchange of information and reporting. It should both re-evaluate what had happened in earlier period and put indicative targets bound closely to future labour market requirements, but recognising both agreements that are valid at that moment with countries of origin and the need to absorb new migrants.
- Setting a common legal framework for admission established on: rationality and transparency; distinguishing rights according to lengths of stay; clear and simple application and evolution procedures; and improved accessibility of information.
- Working on integration of citizens of the countries outside the EU to guarantee comparable living and working conditions, to fight against discrimination and xenophobia, and to guarantee that this is part of a continuing process.
- Improving information, research and monitoring on migration flows and patterns, particularly concerning the incorporation of information on illegal movements, asylum seeking etc. (Piracha and Vickerman, 2002: 3)

In the European Union, there are huge disparities among the regions. Some regions are incredible rich, developed, and are currently experiencing an autonomous economic growth with high income,

but others are desperately dependent, poor with low growth and low income. On the other hand, the destination places are afraid of an influx of migrants obtaining low-skilled jobs, during the countries of origin afraid of losing higher skilled more dynamic residents; also, it is argued that the movement of workers within the Union is too low to act as sufficient adjustment mechanism to change economic conditions (asymmetric shocks), particularly in terms of monetary union; moreover, the economic gap between the EU-15 and EU-27 is much bigger than in previous enlargement rounds of the Union; additionally, people prefer to migrate for short-period of time with the concern of short-term earnings, usually seasonal. It is estimated that annual migration among member states is 0.75 per cent of the resident population and 0.4 per cent of resident EU nationals. The main obstacles to the labour mobility within the EU is portability of pensions and social security rights, the lack of mutual recognition and qualifications and experiences and sequence of cultural, social and language impediments. (Piracha and Vickerman, 2002: 5)

The problem of the lack of labour mobility has been mentioned by a “High Level Task Force on Skills and Mobility”, which was published in 2001 and the recommendation has been proposed during the Barcelona Council meeting in 2002. The Task Force recommended focusing on the need to develop transparency and information, including the provision of basic skills; for instance, all skill groups can enjoy the advantages of labour mobility. The Action Plan established eleven actions related to occupational mobility and skills development, and eleven actions more concerning geographical mobility and three actions on transparency and information by 2005. The Action Plan makes a connection between the Union's immigration policy and its internal mobility. The membership of the Eastern European Countries is still a question in the European labour market. It can be positive for the future labour supply problems or negative for the persistent unemployment. The EU leaders are also aware of the fact that it is necessary not to lose the potential gains while imposing excessive limits on the labour mobility. It is also necessary to improve information to guarantee that there is better matching of supplies and demands of migrant workers concerning skill, destination, etc. In the migration history, there has been wrong and asymmetric information among countries or regions. (Piracha and Vickerman, 2002: 6) According to the countries of origin, immigration is not really good for them, it deprives their best human resources, also it transfers educational investment from poor states to rich ones and causes exploitation of their labour force. For this reason, it has been almost impossible to empirically say that international migration leads to short-term development in the countries of origin. It is not certain that immigration decreases unemployment levels but it seems like it has a significant role in absorbing labour force growth.

For years, Western European states tried to fill the gap of temporary workers with state-sponsored guest-worker and colonial immigration programmes from peripheral states such as Yugoslavia, Turkey or Morocco and from former colonies such as from India, Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, etc. These migrations have been always under the control of state with so many limited rights. However, many migrants, at the end of their right of stay, were reluctant to return their home countries as planned. The migration waves stopped during 1973-1974. In the case of Turkey, some of them turned back after working a period of time, but most of them stayed there, brought their families or established their own families by integrating. (Favell and Hansen, 2002)

4.2. The history on the way to the “free movement of workers” between Turkey and the EU

According to the European Commission report in 1998, Turkey had put a lot of effort into creating the necessary conditions for the Customs Union to function properly. With the Customs Union agreement, industrial products between the Union and Turkey started to travel freely. However, at that time, there was little alignment of legislation of Turkish Republic with the *acquis communautaire* to remove technical barriers. According to the 1999 and 2000 reports of the Commission, even the free movement of industrial goods was functioning well, efforts to have alignment with the Community technical legislation and strengthen administrative structure were not enough. The 2001 report of the Commission declared that Turkey had showed some progress in terms of alignment with legislation of the *acquis communautaire*. The 2002 report noted that Turkey had made more progress in legislation alignment, especially through the adaptation of horizontal legislation in the area of market surveillance and conformity assessment. In terms of customs, some progress had been made. The progress continued years and years. According to the 2008 report, there had been progress in the free movement of goods; however, Commission noted that alignment is at very early stage in terms of the freedom of movement for workers. The parliamentary bill on foreign labour force making the procedure for holding permits in an easy way has still not been adopted. Positively, the efforts to increase the Public Employment Service's capacity have been continued. More workers have been recruited and training programmes were organized. The coordination of social security schemes were improved, especially respecting improving the administrative capacity

of the Social Security Institution. However, further efforts are required to prepare Turkey for joining the EURES network and for preparation concerning the introduction of the European Health Insurance Card has not yet started. If we look at the progress in the free movement of goods, we can realize that there is huge way to go to align with the *acquis* in respect of the free movement of workers even if there is limited progress. (Europa, 2009) Additionally, Turkey maintains to adopt its international migration and asylum legislation in order to adjust it with the *acquis*. Turkey also should conclude the Law on Asylum and the Law on Aliens till 2012, in order to continue the negotiation process with the EU. (OECD, 2009)

There is also Joint Assessment of Employment Policy Priorities (JAP) to help candidate states to improve their employment systems. The JAP combines national governments, the Commission, trade unions and other social organizations to improve work conditions; to increase employment; to develop labour's skills; to set up a well-functioning labour market; and to guarantee competitiveness and sustained economic development. The JAP demands states to reform their employment policy on the line with EU policies and practices. This preparation of candidate countries helps them to be ready for EU membership and for full application of the European Employment Strategy in conformity with the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. So far, Turkey was involved in the JAP but only Croatia signed onto JAP in 2008 and applying policy requirements in the employment policy area. Periodical conferences and progress reports monitor the process. (Commission, 2010)

Briefly, the current situation is that *Acquis* chapters on “Freedom of Movement for Workers” have not been opened yet. The EC assessment at start was “very hard to adopt” and the screening was completed on December, 2005. However, the chapter was frozen on December 2009. According to the Commission's 2009 Progress report on Turkey, little progress has been made in the area of freedom of movement for workers and alignment is at very early stage. Weak IT infrastructure and electronic job-matching services of the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR) are also really problematic. According to the last Commission reports, further efforts are needed to prepare Turkey for participation in the EURES network. (Commission, 2007)~

4.3. The main fear of the Member states: possible migration inflows from Turkey to the EU

Turkey's current population is around 73 million today. In any case of possible membership, it is going to be second populated country after Germany and according to some scientific research, its population will be around 100 million in 2050. (Euractiv, 2009) This kind of populated country makes Europeans scared especially when they think about potential migrant inflows. However, Turkey is growing and young populated country. For instance, its real GDP growth is % 5.20 in 2010. (Euromonitor, 2010) This paper discusses that possible migration inflows will not damage EU in the future. It is very clear fact that Western Europe has ageing population. (Strielkowski, 2009: 14) I will argue that young Turkish population can be useful to fill the gap in the labour market in the future. There are some evidences showing that the Union will demand future labour from different kind of skills because of economic and demographic factors. It seems like the EU will not be able to supply this demand from domestic labour markets. Additionally, the accession of Eastern and Central European Countries proved that it will not be possible for them to fill the gap in the in the future because of their demographic declines. Some experts argue that even Turkey's accession will not be enough in the long run because of its rapid economic growth. (Castles, 2006: 26)

It is really hard to estimate possible future scenarios of migrations from Turkey to the EU from today. The most widely known problem with the forecast of migrations is the lack of available data. Particularly, historical data about migration stocks and inflows are missing in the both sides. There is a study estimating the migration flows by looking emigration data from EU-18 into Germany to predict possible Turkish migration flows. According to the results of this study, both the network effect and destination country working conditions are main determinants for migration; however, the impact of per capita income is not that much important. As a result, Turkish per capita income does not have any effect on possible migrations. Moreover, the effect of the opening of borders to the Turkish people with “free movement of people” is very low. It would be the time to mention that this study looks into Germany; this is the main reason why network effect and working conditions are key determinants. Turkish labour migration has a long history dating back to the beginning of the 1960s. In 1961, Turkey and West Germany signed an agreement to provide low-skilled temporary labours (Gastarbeiter) to West Germany under mutually beneficial terms. (Strielkowski, 2009: 2) This kind of agreement was also signed with Belgium, Austria, Holland, Sweden and

France at that time. In the meantime, these temporary workers became permanent workers and brought their family member in Turkey. Contrary to the popular belief, many high-skilled workers also emigrated from Turkey. (Strielkowski, 2009: 3) In the recent past and today, migration to the European countries from Turkey has decreased. The evidence of this situation can be decreasing importance of remittances in the Turkish economy. For instance, remittances were at the lowest level in 2004 as \$ 800 million and 0.2 % of GNP since 1975 as \$ 1.3 billion and 2.8 % of GNP. (OECD, 2006) The favourable economic situation in Turkey is one of the main reasons of the decreasing migration towards Europe as opposed to economic stagnation in EU-15. Moreover, accession of the 10 new members caused more competition among immigrants in the EU because of the higher amount of migrants from EU-10 and the substitution impact of it. Economically strong EU countries already have some tradition with Turkish people working and living there. (Strielkowski, 2009: 5)

As it is mentioned, migration from Turkey to the EU member states has established tradition already. Turks form the largest community of third nations legally residing or working today in the EU borders with a population of almost four million people. After the 1980s, the flow of net migration from Turkey is between 40.000 and 60.000 people annually, which accounts for 0.2 per cent of the current labour force. The destination EU states were Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands. With the free movement of workers and the removal of borders in the future, this numbers can increase in some extent but it is difficult to estimate real numbers for that time. As much as the level of the migration after accession, its structure is also important. Some studies provide various estimations about expected migration from Turkey by comparing new member states. If migration flows from Turkey would be like from Central and Eastern Europe's new members, then flows would be around 225.000 annually may be expected. (Andoura, 2005) According to some estimations, the post-accession annual migration inflows to the EU-15 from Turkey would be around 40.000 people. This estimation is made according to the former EU enlargements and economic estimations from both sides. (Strielkowski, 2009: 21)

The most clear thing is that there cannot be any certainty about migrations from Turkey after its transitional period. The estimations on the possible migrations are mostly prepared by using empirical model that illustrates dependence of migration to Germany on income and employment rates and an institutional condition of free movement of workers across the Union. On the other hand, some problems -political crisis in Turkey, possible economic crisis, women rights, Cyprus

issue or abortion of Turkey that can also be related the estimations were left out while the estimations of the possible migrations are made. In anyway, it is quite complicated to make predictions. (Strielkowski, 2009: 22)

4.4. Economical Argument

The inclusion of Turkey in the European Union will provoke an inflow of two kinds of labour: High Skill Labour and Low Skill Labour. The demand for these two kinds of labour is really different among the countries of the Union and relates with the main types of companies that compose them. There are two types of strategies that companies can follow, according to Michael Porter (1980): Overall Cost Leadership and Product Differentiation. These two types of strategies demand for two different types of labour force.

1. An Overall Cost Leadership strategy demands companies to fight over the price of products. Therefore, the costs of labour are one of the key factors to the success for these companies. In the recent past, companies based on countries like China, India or Brazil have enjoyed great success, flooding the European market with cheap products and destroying the EU's economy. Their competitive advantage comes from the fact that the work force in these countries is cheaper and more productive. Trying to fight this phenomenon, numerous European companies have gone bankrupt due to the impossibility to lower the wages of their employees. The unwillingness of the workers to lower their salaries relies on the quality of life in Europe, which is much higher than in developing countries.
2. In order to follow a Product Differentiation strategy, the companies should possess a high skill labour force. In countries such as China and India, companies have much more difficulty in facing European competitors, but this balance of power can also change in the future. Nowadays, Asian countries are flooding Europe, not only with cheap products, but also with low-skilled labour. The effect is the above mentioned bankruptcy of several companies, but also the increase in unemployment of low skill European-based labour force. In a macro economical perspective, this increase in the imports has lead to a severe change in the balance between imports and exports in the Union, creating a big deficit and the consequent economical crisis.

If we test this theory, we can see that it can be valid for the countries that support Turkish accession with mostly economical reasons. Some countries such as Hungary, Portugal, Spain or Italy; they have big economical problems inside their countries but they are not oppose to the membership of Turkey. The inclusion of Turkey in the EU, as mentioned above, will provide both High and Low Skill labour. The difference will be that this immigration will be from inside the Union and, therefore, the benefits will be shared only by EU members. In the past decades, a lot of immigrants from Turkey have come to Europe, especially to countries such as the Netherlands and Germany. The movement of people for countries such as these is expected to remain the same; so the big change will be for the other countries in the EU.

For countries like Portugal, Spain or Greece, the movement of people will mean some changes for the population (work force) and, by extension, to their economies.

1. The low-skill labour force will mainly be driven to companies choosing Overall Cost Leadership. This low-skill labour, with lower wage demand, will help companies to fight with Asian competitors. This decrease in the wages is explained by the economical theory of the free market. With the increase of product offer (product being work force), the price to pay for one unit (wage) will reduce.
2. As these companies will improve their performance, the trend will be that production will increase, imports will reduce, the countries will develop financially and the European Union will also develop as a whole.
3. The improvement in these smaller economies of the EU will reduce one phenomenon that has been deeply affecting their economies: Brain Migration. For most of these countries, the higher skilled labours are increasingly emigrating for countries inside and outside the EU. This creates, not only lack of capacity in the home country, but also increased competition in the host countries. As the home countries will develop, the outflow of high labour work force will reduce, and the companies following a Product Differentiation strategies or working on more attractive markets such as energy, telecommunication or any technological based industry, will prosper.

The member states that are more opposed to Turkish membership are carrying mostly economical concerns. They are afraid of negative impact of cheap labour force and additional unemployment. (Table 1) However, cheap labour force will be needed to have mass production in some sectors to compete in the global stage. The theory was founded on the assumption that current economic crisis

will end in the near future and the EU will demand to get its place in the world economy. At this point, additional to ageing population of Europe, Turkish labour force can be an asset.

5. CONCLUSION

In this research, three IR theories are tested to explain the politics of “free movement for workers” between the Union and Turkey, but in terms of positions of member states towards potential membership of Turkey. The chapter on “free movement for people” has not been opened yet and it is declared as very hard to adopt; for this reason, instead of a developing politics, member states have their own positions. Commission Progress reports help Turkey to improve itself in this area. For instance, participating to the EURES network is one of the main demands of the Union expressed in those reports.

The reason why the three theories were tested is that testing only one or two would not be enough to reach an understanding of the different positions of the EU member states. As a result, it is found that none of the theories (intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism nor neo-functionalism or constructivism) totally enlightens the viewpoints of member states on the Turkish case. However, it is clear that liberal intergovernmentalism is more helpful because of the fact that EU member states act according to their own interests rather than community interests while determining their own positions. It contradicts with the neo-functionalist approach. However, neo-functionalism argues the role of non-state actors on the issue. The importance of the progress reports of the European Commission can be main example of this. Those reports determine the way of negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The member states play the key role but it is not ignored that Community institutions are also very important in the process. Demands of the Union are showed in the Commission progress reports about the possible labour mobility. If Turkey fulfils these demands, then free movement will come automatically is also not certain. It is explained in the third chapter in detail. Also, the main fear of member states is the massive labour migration from populous Turkey. In this respect, they are very reluctant to open borders. There are mainly economic concerns and also identity concerns (increasing Muslim population in the EU) behind this fear. It is explained in the fourth chapter.

The interests of member states are mainly, not totally, determined by clear economic advantages and disadvantages that they perceive in labour mobility for Turkey. This argument is not enough to make constructivism unnecessary because of the important role of constructed ideas and identity concerns on the positions of member states. However, it is found that there is no correlation

between the commitment to the EU and the support for Turkey's accession.

I hope that my thesis will make a contribution to the existing research, which is still very limited. The rich literature of the International Relations theories, official reports of the Commission and Eurobarometer surveys helped me in a great manner. The main limits of my study are the facts that the chapter on "free movement of workers" has not been opened yet and the research on this issue is not deep. The future research direction can be on the economical theory that I tried to create at the end of my research because Turkey and the EU need an understanding on the negotiations to make the process faster or cut it completely. It is clearly explained that one of the main fear of the member states is the fear of migration possibly coming from the "labour mobility" related to the economic concerns.

In conclusion, it is found out that all three IR theories are inadequate to explain the potential labour mobility between Turkey and the EU and positions of member states in this respect. At the end, an economical theory was created to change positions of some countries with the belief that the mobility of Turkish labour force will be catastrophic economically. According to my theory, inclusion of Turkish labour force will make European market more powerful in the global stage. The main assumption of the theory discusses is that there are two types of strategies that companies can follow: Overall Cost Leadership and Product Differentiation. These two types of strategies demand for two different types of labour force and Turkey has those two kinds; low-skilled and high-skilled labour force. The difference will be that this immigration will be from inside the Union and, therefore, the benefits will be shared only by EU members. Additionally, as these companies will improve their performance, the trend will be that production will increase, imports will reduce, the countries will develop financially and the European Union will also develop as a whole. The member states that more opposed to Turkish membership are carrying mostly economical concerns. They are afraid of negative impact of cheap labour force and additional unemployment. However, cheap labour force will be needed to have mass production in some sectors to compete in the global stage. Three IR theories explain the positions of member states, but my theory supplements them especially to explain the positions of supporters.

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Elite Interview

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