

The Comprehensive Approach - International Definitions and a German Case Study

Subject: The Comprehensive Approach -
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Abstract

New security threats since the 1990s have called for a new approach to conflict challenges. The comprehensive approach has become a widely accepted tool in order to approach emerging conflict and crisis situations in the modern world. It combines military involvement and civil measures.

This paper is divided into two parts, whereas the second part weighs more heavily. The first part tries to identify different definitions of the comprehensive approach.

By analysing the different interpretation, different actors might find it easier to understand the partner and cooperate on a different manner. It is found that the comprehensive approach takes place on three different levels, the international, the national and the goal-oriented level. Those levels are closely interconnected but still represent different types of cooperation. Organisations and nation-state also do have different orientations in focusing on internal cooperation (within the organisation) or external cooperation (with other organisation). Some organisations and nation-states will be presented accordingly.

The second part of the paper focuses on the national level and the implementation of the comprehensive approach of the German government. It focuses on the intergovernmental/inter-agency cooperation and on the four involved agencies, Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and Ministry of Interior. Those ministries are forced to work closely together as each one is not able to fulfil the tasks on its own. Hence cooperation needs to take place.

The German cooperation is evaluated on the basis of a proposed research model, which focuses on four reasons for cooperation; common objectives, gains/profit, trust and the existing conditions for cooperation.

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List of Abbreviations

3D	Defence, Diplomacy, Development
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-military Co-operation
CIVPOL	Civilian Police Mission
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Police Mission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organisation
JCS	Joint Commitment Staff
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

1 Introduction

1.1 Problem statement

In autumn 2001 first boots were put on the ground in Afghanistan; nine years later, forces seem to be fighting the same problems. The security situation does not improve, nor does the development and reconstruction of the country show any substantial progress. While more and more soldiers lose their lives in the increasingly turbulent northern region of Afghanistan where Germany holds regional command, the Pakistani border has turned into a safe haven for members of the Taliban. The troops are not able to stop this development; the security risks for the entire mission have increased during the last years, also the northern part the former secure part of Afghanistan has become more insecure. The attacks on Bundeswehr¹ soldiers rose in the last years and became more severe as well as better organized (Refugee Documentation Centre, 2009).

Since the summer 2009 many European countries are discussing their Afghanistan strategies and how to withdraw the troops from the mission area. In the Netherlands this discussion contributed to the collapse of the government in February 2010 (Reuters, 2010). The US government has demanded from Germany to commit more troops to the mission area, causing great discussions within Germany and the support for the mission within the population has dropped significantly (Hartman, 2009). This discussion is also amplified by the fact that the situation in Afghanistan does not improve. In order to counter this problem a new 'Afghanistan strategy' is needed.

This paper will present the proposed strategy of the comprehensive approach and evaluate its implementation in the German case, focusing on one particular part of the comprehensive approach, the inter-governmental cooperation.

After the end of the cold war at the beginning of the 1990s the security situation has changed dramatically; more and different security risks need to be taken into consideration. Dangers do not only emerge from other countries instead threats appear from different groups all over the world. Barry Buzan (1991) describes in 'People, States and Fear', that there are five factors influencing the security of a states after the cold war era; military political, economic, environmental and societal. Those factors are independent from each other all factors need to be kept in mind to sketch a picture of the security situation of a country. Those factors mostly focus on the internal security situation of a country; nowadays the external threats also determine the security of a state. Hall Gardner (2004) mentions, that factors such as organised criminality, drugs traffic, piracy, migration also play an important role in defining the new threats. When planning any military endeavour the factors need to be kept in mind and they call for a strong cooperation between military actors and other organisations. Those threats are all part of the modern conflict which the states are facing, they are mostly characterised by asymmetrical or guerrilla warfare mostly based on ideological dispute (e.g. war in Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq).

They call for a new orientation of the states, during the cold war the enemy was unambiguous, today criminal networks overlap. Terrorists in the Middle East are financed by piracy at the Horn of Africa, communication takes place via the Internet and the media is used for terrorist publicity. In order to be able to fight this interwoven system it has to be tackled by various actors from different angles. In order to ensure the security of a state, a military solution is not appropriate anymore; it needs a

¹ Bundeswehr is the German army, the term will be used frequently during this thesis

comprehensive approach, in which several actors are involved (Gardner, 2004). Also Klos (2009) mentions that those new threats and the international interdependence cannot only be confronted with military means but other measures need to be adapted.

This new struggle becomes especially visible in the current international conflicts such as the mission in Afghanistan, where the military actors rely on development aid from International organisations (IOs) and Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well the support from the governments. According to Hall Gardner (2004) those new threats forced NATO to adapt a new strategy, the comprehensive approach evolved to a new tool in encountering international conflict.

In 2006 the comprehensive approach was put on the international agenda for the very first time and it became an official (NATO) term for the very first time during the Riga Summit in November 2006. It declared that the cooperation between NATO and the international actors (such as UN, EU and OSCE and the involved nations) should be strengthened (NATO, 2007). NATO recognized that the comprehensive approach could be a solution to succeed in asymmetrical warfare, it aims at improving the situation of the population who is not actively involved in the conflict ('hearts and minds operations'), through ensuring security and safety by the military and at the same time rebuilding the state with the help of civil actors as well as fighting the insurgents (NATO, 2007). The civil component can only be fulfilled by the military to a limited extent, as they do not have the appropriate knowledge or capacity. For NATO it is not possible to solve modern conflicts without the incorporation of civilian actors (NATO, 2010). The cooperation between the involved actors needs to be coordinated on the political level.

The focus on the comprehensive approach was renewed during the International Conference on Afghanistan in The Hague and the celebration of the 60th anniversary of NATO in Germany and France in spring 2009. The Afghanistan conference one year later (January 2010) in London increased the focus on civil involvement, preparing troops to withdraw from the mission area. The comprehensive approach has evolved to a commonly phrased concept:

"Today as never before such a comprehensive approach is necessary. We need to combine the anti-terrorist measures with the socio-economic measures to rebuild Afghanistan."

- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrow at the Afghan conference in The Hague, 2009

The comprehensive approach has not only been developed by the NATO also various IOs, NGOs and governments have developed their own comprehensive approach, on how to coordinate efforts and involvement internally as well as on the cooperation with other involved actors (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008).

This thesis will shortly present the international interpretations and definitions of the comprehensive approach in order to sketch a clearer picture (conceptualisation) and will analyse its implementation on the political level within Germany (empirical research).

1.2 Relevance and case selection

This thesis is highly relevant in order to get a common understanding of the comprehensive approach. It is important to acknowledge that the comprehensive approach does not have one clear

definition instead it is a subject to several different interpretations and implementation. This article tries to shortly identify some of the definitions of the comprehensive approach in the context of crisis management and conflict prevention as introduced by some major organisations and governments. The first part is of a high relevance as it can make the concept/term comprehensive approach more accessible and understandable for a greater audience, furthermore it can capture the different definitions. The comprehensive approach as a hollow term, with different definitions of different actors can be filled with clear content so that discussions about the definition can be avoided.

The later research will focus on the German inter-agency cooperation and tries to examine how it is implemented in Germany. It has a political value as it considers the actual mechanisms and implementation of the comprehensive approach within Germany. It might be able to identify gaps and problems of the implementation and could introduce ways to improve it. It furthermore has an important political relevance as it concerns a very important part of the current foreign affairs and how governments are dealing with the 'modern' crisis and conflict management. This will determine to a certain part the security of states as they cannot only rely on military factors.

This paper focuses on the inter-agency cooperation instead of supranational cooperation because the major agenda of the German government is to enhance inter-agency cooperation and not supranational cooperation as part of the comprehensive approach (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006). The German government has defined its comprehensive approach as the inter-agency cooperation (or also called 'Vernetzte Sicherheit'). In the mission in Afghanistan nation states still play the most important role, they orient themselves at the international guidelines, but most of the international guidelines are not binding. This is why the focus should be on the national implementation of the comprehensive approach.

Furthermore inter-agency cooperation can be easily compared to other countries' inter-agency cooperation in a future research. This is more accessible than comparing the broad and complex international cooperation. Unlike other countries Germany does not have a long-standing history in conflict involvement; hence the German case could serve as a long-term case study on the development of conflict management, marked by a clear beginning in the 1990s. Moreover one can evaluate whether other countries have influenced the German comprehensive approach in a follow-up research.

In the case of Afghanistan it is very difficult to analyse the cooperation between other countries and organisations, as there are too many actors involved; it ranges from the cooperation within the regional command, where some countries work together, general cooperation between the NATO nations or between nations who are part of the alliance but not NATO members and of course the host country. Moreover there are IOs and NGOs, some of them very influential, involved in the mission area. Additionally the forces are dealing with a culturally and socially highly divided country with very different belief system. Trying to examine this highly complex network is almost impossible, hence focusing on one form of cooperation, in this case the inter-agency cooperation, is the most approachable manner.

There are hardly any studies on the implementation of the comprehensive approach in Germany. Most of the material used in this thesis has come from recent (newspaper-) articles and conducted interviews.

1.3 Research question and structure

This thesis is divided in two sections: 'Definition of the comprehensive approach' which will answer the first research question '**What is the comprehensive approach?**' this is part of the conceptualisation. And the second section 'The comprehensive approach as a method' which answers the second research question '**How is the comprehensive approach implemented in Germany?**'. The first research question is supposed to define the concept of the comprehensive approach; it is an important part of the later empirical study. This part also describes what is meant by inter-agency cooperation.

In order to explain the term one should review the development of the comprehensive approach as well as the interpretation of international (e.g. the UN or NATO) and national actors. This is an important part of the research in order to make sure that the readers are 'on the same page' when talking about the comprehensive approach and do not have different definitions in mind.

In the 'method' section, which is the core of the thesis, the paper will identify general factors which explain cooperation, with the help of literature on cooperation. In this section the research model to evaluate the inter-agency cooperation in Germany will be presented. The methodological part will explain how the data was retrieved and the last part turns towards the German implementation on the political, inter-agency level with the help of the earlier proposed research model.

The last chapter draws conclusions and proposes solutions to improve cooperation and overcome cooperation gridlock.

2 Definition of the comprehensive approach

This will give an overview on the ideas behind the comprehensive approach and it will conceptualise the term comprehensive approach.

In order to encounter the problems faced in modern conflict management a new approach that stimulates civilian involvement is needed. The comprehensive approach appears to be the all-embracing solution to those problems as it includes the military as well as a civil effort. It moreover involves all kinds of measures to modern conflict management ranging from political, diplomatic, military, police, economic, financial, development, judicial or humanitarian aid measures.

This thesis assumes that a cooperation of all involved actors is the only solution to the new problems faced in modern international conflicts; the 'occupying' forces are left with more responsibility towards the 'occupied' country. Apart from military tasks, the reconstruction and development has become a very important part of the mission as part of the 'hearts and minds'- strategy (Dickinson, 2009) in order to be successful in the mission.

A comprehensive approach needs to be encouraged on the political level (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006). Governments assume that a coherent integration of all actors within the mission area can only be successful if it is effectively transferred from the political level to the operational level. In their opinion the comprehensive approach can appear as a new mechanism to make the political actors interact eventually followed by a closer cooperation on the operation level (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008).

The comprehensive approach (not as a NATO term) is not a new concept tailored for the Afghanistan mission instead similar concepts have been used in conflicts before, without explicitly calling it the comprehensive approach (Rietjens & Bollen, 2008). In previous missions the comprehensive approach was not a strategic plan instead it developed from the need of cooperation in the mission area (bottom-up process). Today the cooperation is encouraged and enforced on a political level (top-down process) (Rietjens & Bollen, 2008)². Within the recent years the comprehensive approach has become more than only applicable to the Afghanistan mission it has become a guideline for general crisis and conflict management (Bundesregierung, 2004).

In order to analyse the comprehensive approach and its mechanisms on the political level it is important to find out how the comprehensive approach is understood and implemented by different international organisations and national governments. According to Rintakoski and Autti (2008) there exists no single strategy in implementing the comprehensive approach. This might make it difficult to cooperate on international conflict management.

The international definition of the comprehensive approach does not give clear guidelines on implementation, thus every actor has implemented a different form of the comprehensive approach. In general the comprehensive approach stands for *"a wide range of agencies, governmental and non-governmental, and regional and international organisations have each developed specialised capacities to manage various aspects of these complex crisis systems, and together they have been able to respond with a broad range of interlinked activities"*. All initiatives have a similar aim: *"to*

² The first form of interaction between actors was noticed in the First World War where soldiers when not cured by the help of hired military doctors but instead by the newly found international organisation, the International Red Cross (British Red Cross, 2010).

achieve greater harmonisation and synchronisation among the activities of the various international and local actors” (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008).

It is important to keep the general definition in mind, when trying to analyse the implementation of the actors. Thus before analysing the German comprehensive approach one needs to understand how other actors have implemented their approach. Afterwards it is possible to examine the German approach.

The broad interpretation of one single term is obviously a target to disadvantages as well as advantages. On the one hand the broad interpretation can cause misunderstanding and confusion about what is meant with the comprehensive approach, how to implement it on the political level and subsequently this has consequences on the implementation in the theatre.

On the other hand this broad definition also leaves space for all actors to work in their own ways and at their own pace. This can give more room for all organisations/nations involved to do their best. Below a short list of different types of interpretations can be found, the concrete policies of the most influential organisations and nations can be found in Annex I.

2.1 Different types of the comprehensive approach (theory)

According to Friis and Jarmyr (2008) the comprehensive approach has three major dimensions; they are visualized in the table below. This table encompasses most of the different definitions of countries and organisations:

Table 1: Cooperation levels (according to Friis & Jarmyr, 2008)

	Cooperation between (international) actors (1 st dimension)	Cooperation within the (national) actors (2 nd dimension)	Local actors	Goal-oriented (3 rd dimension)
Political level	UN	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior	Local authorities	Rule of law, good governance
Economy level	UN, IOs, NGOs, national governments	Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development		Development and reconstruction
Security level	NATO (ISAF), OEF	Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior	ANA, ANP	Secure and Safe environment, no room for growth of terroristic networks

The first dimension (international actors) stands for the cooperation between the international organisations, governments and the host country. This for instance includes the cooperation between NATO and EU forces, IOs and NGOs and the host country on a political, economic and security level.

The second dimension (national actors) refers to an interaction between the responsible ministries such as Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as other involved ministries each on the relevant issue e.g. political, economic or security. But it could also stand for any internal cooperation as it happens within international organisations.

The third dimension stands for a coherent development (goal), a stable and consistent increase of different standards within the mission area, such as reconstruction and development, security, governance and rule of law.

Those three dimensions are all possible interpretations of the comprehensive approach, whereas the 'local actors'- category is hardly considered at all.

It is noticeable that there are two major kinds of cooperation:

1. External cooperation, which concentrates on the cooperation of the organisation or government with other actors, 1st dimension
2. Internal cooperation, which focuses on cooperation within the organisation or government with hardly any links to other organisations, 2nd dimension

But the table should not only be understood in terms of 'vertical cooperation' between organisations or agencies, also a 'horizontal cooperation' needs to take place between the international, national and local actors on all three major fields, political, economic and security. In this sense the UN must cooperate with the responsible ministries as well as the local authorities in order to be able to eventually implement rule of law or good governance.

Thus as mentioned above the comprehensive approach is an all-embracing strategy encompassing several actors and dimensions. Different organisations and nations put their emphasis on one particular dimension.

Some of the actors (organisations and governments) involved in the mission will be analysed according to this scheme.

2.2 The actors

Organisations and governments have published documents on how to deal with modern crisis and conflict management; most of them do see the comprehensive approach as widely defined method and as the best solution in order to deal with modern conflicts. The chapter is not only limited to the comprehensive approach as a term but it also covers conflict and crisis management of organisations and governments, who mostly name the comprehensive approach differently, but in fact it still stands for the cooperation between actors.


There are more than the mentioned organisations which apply a comprehensive approach, but it is apparent that the UN, OSCE, EU and NATO are the most influential ones as they are the largest organisations and have the most links to national governments. Those organisations except for OSCE have their own missions in Afghanistan; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), European Police Mission in Afghanistan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

All those missions have a major impact on the development of the country at the same time they are lead by different organisations, which all advocate the comprehensive approach but do apply different definitions as well as implementations. The rather vague and general international

guidelines leave governments alone with interpreting the comprehensive approach thus every country has its own interpretation as well as its own approach. Furthermore the different projects and policies within the mission area influence the national decision making as well.

The national approach is not only determined by the international guidelines but also by the country structures, such as party systems, federal state systems, accountability and independence of the ministries etc. All of those factors can determine the effective cooperation and how the comprehensive approach is implemented and on which level the government cooperates.

Figure 1: national comprehensive approach



Just like on the international level the comprehensive approach on national level is seemingly a very broad form of cooperation including the IOs and the NGOs as well as the ministries. In most public discussions the comprehensive approach includes all types of organisations (1st dimension), but in fact most governments officially refer to the cooperation of the different involved ministries (2nd dimension).

2.3 Types of the comprehensive approach (in practice) (cf. Annex I for more details)

Returning to the model above (p.10) most actors involved in the mission area fit into the scheme and can be analyzed accordingly.

NATO's definition of the comprehensive approach is remarkably different from other organisations as it is far reaching and trying to embrace all different organisations (1st dimension), whereas the other international organisations mainly concentrate on a coherent strategy within their organisation itself (e.g. the UN 'Integrated Mission' and EU Civil Military Co-ordination) (2nd dimension) and barely focus on other external actors. An obvious reason for this might be that NATO does only comprise military structures and does depend on the civil structures of other organisations, whereas other organisations (the UN and EU) do have (limited) access to a military component, hence they do not depend on others to fulfil this part.

The OSCE on the other hand does not possess military structures they also depend on external actors, hence their approach is also rather broad. Unlike other IOs they are goal oriented (3rd dimension) on three different dimensions which carry equal weight (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008). According to Biscop (2005) the OSCE has developed a successful approach, which is unfortunately not heard by the international community as the membership overlaps with EU and NATO memberships, this lead to the fact that the OSCE has been "*pushed of the stage*" (Biscop, 2005) and other organisations do not contact the OSCE despite the fact they could benefit from their expertise. Additionally the OSCE is hardly involved in the mission in Afghanistan thus it is rather difficult to practise their comprehensive approach in real crisis/war scenario.

So far NATO has been the most influential organisation on national governments, after their call for a comprehensive approach in 2006 most governments have increased their effort in implementing the comprehensive approach (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008), even though many other organisations have implemented a comprehensive approach years before. The influence of NATO might be one of the reasons why the military component still plays an important role if not the most important role in the cooperation (within governments).

Apart from NATO and the OSCE most international organisations share a common view: comprehensive approach means a coherent coordination within their internal structure with possible links to external actors (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008). There is an obvious connection to the national interpretations of the comprehensive approach which also see the comprehensive approach as an internally harmonized effort. This is slightly surprising as NATO did put the comprehensive approach on the international agenda and encouraged nations to implement it.

The participating nations are more similar when it comes to the implementation of the comprehensive approach than the international organisation. The US is mostly goal-oriented (3rd dimension); they leave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of the coordination of humanitarian tasks whereas the Ministry of Defence is clearly responsible for the military tasks (Bush, 2005). All efforts are directed towards the fight against terrorism and other new threats to the States' security (goal); if this demands cooperation between the ministries it will be set up.

The UK tends to be goal oriented too (3rd dimension), but with the UK Stabilisation Unit they try to invoke effective cooperation between the ministries as well (2nd dimension) (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008). They have employed a Conflict Prevention Pool and a Stabilisation Aid Fund to ensure funding of crisis management.

The Dutch approach focuses more on cooperation (2nd dimension); they try to involve all ministries on equal footing. More than other nations they focus on the successful implementation of (short-term) goals (e.g. transfer of the responsibility to the ANA and ANP) (The Royal Netherlands Embassy, 2009). In comparison to other nations they also focus on the other actors involved in the mission area and try to establish successful cooperation with them.

Germany mainly focuses on the internal cooperation (2nd dimension), too. Making the comprehensive approach a common effort between the different ministries, but unlike the UK effort Germany does not possess a common Conflict Prevention Pool to fund and support the cooperation (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008).

This short overview shows that most nations ignore the international dimensions of cooperation and focus on the internal coordination or the achievement of goals. This is also one of the reasons for the later focus on inter-agency cooperation instead of concentrating on the international cooperation.

To sum up; the comprehensive approach has a different meaning for all involved actors, but it basically comes down to cooperation between actors and within the organisation. All actors are aware that conflict prevention and resolution can only be successful if all means of crisis management (e.g. humanitarian aid, economic aid, security and justice etc.) are involved. Hence an overarching structure needs to be implemented, in other words a comprehensive approach needs to be applied.

But the organisations do not agree on one form of cooperation. Whereas some organisations try to improve the internal cooperation (e.g. the UN) of the already existing elements, others emphasis the

cooperation with other involved partners (e.g. NATO). This different view is due to the different structures and capabilities of the organisations, but those differences make a clear definition of the comprehensive approach and its coherent implementation almost impossible. A similar problem is visible within the participating nations; they either focus on the cooperation with the external actors or on a coherent government approach. In the end all actors agree that the comprehensive approach is the only way for successful crisis management but the ways and the actors involved differ.

This part was able to give a short conceptualisation of the types of comprehensive approach as it is used by various nations and organisations. This overview is of high importance in order to receive a universal understanding of the comprehensive approach and to be able to evaluate one of the types in the later research.

The following part of the article deals with the inter-ministerial (or inter-agency) cooperation as advocated in the German approach, thus the internal cooperation, and will ignore the cooperation with the IOs and NGOs even though they do play a very important role in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. In the later the thesis will come back to the German cooperation and an in-depth analysis.

3 The comprehensive approach as a method in Germany

3.1 Cooperation

My own conclusion on why agencies cooperate draws from information based on this part of the study

3.1.1 What is cooperation?

This empirical based part is retrieved from extensive literature study on cooperation. Based on this study own conclusions on why agencies cooperate will be drawn. As mentioned above the comprehensive approach is a cooperation of different actors. Hence on the basis of theory on cooperation conclusions about the comprehensive approach can be drawn. It is highly important to find out why actors and agencies (should) cooperate. And what are the advantages to cooperation, what stimulates cooperation and what are the obstacles to cooperation. Before one needs to give a clear definition of cooperation.

Cooperation *“is the process of joint-decision-making among key stakeholders of a problem domain about the future of that domain. The objective is to enable stakeholders to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the problem at hand and then to act collectively in order to solve it”* (Lotia & Hardy, 2008). This also seems to be a fair definition on how the comprehensive approach should be working. The authors do not make a definite distinction between different kinds of cooperation unlike Dave Pollard. According to him cooperation means working together, but in his opinion there are various levels of cooperation; namely coordination, cooperation and collaboration. Each of those implies a stronger level of working together. He gives a clear interpretation of cooperation and says it implies shared objectives, mutual trust and respect and the acknowledgement of mutual benefit. Cooperation does not only try to avoid gaps and overlap in the ministries’ work but it also tries to share or divide the work load. In comparison to many of his colleagues he makes a clear distinction between cooperation and coordination, where the latter is weaker and involves less structure. But both forms assume that there needs to be a shared objective as well as higher efficiency of the outcomes, through reducing overlap and improving the relation between the actors (Pollard, 2005). To sum up in his opinion cooperation needs to meet at least two preconditions: shared objectives and the acknowledgement of mutual benefits. Apart from those two motivations there are more reasons for cooperation, those are listed below.

John Schermerhorn (1975) mentions that there are three sorts of cooperation among organisations and agencies: *“Organizations will seek out to be receptive to interorganizational cooperation when faced with a situation of resources scarcity or performance”* (1975). In this case agencies are forced to cooperate since there is no other option. The other form of cooperation is characterized by a free will to cooperation: *“Organizations will seek out or be receptive to interorganizational cooperation when ‘cooperation’ per se takes on a positive value”* (1975). The third form of cooperation can be found if *“powerful extra-organizational force demands this activity”* (Schermerhorn, 1975). This cooperation can be demanded from governments or third-party organisation.

Apart from the basic preconditions, agencies (or all kinds of other organisations) have various reasons to cooperate or not cooperate; obviously the consequence of the cooperation should always be in advantage of the agency itself or at least its position should remain in the status quo, while the

outcome for all agencies increase. Cooperation in this case always encounters to a certain degree a prisoner's dilemma³. In most cases cooperation will be of the highest gains, but defection can become a severe problem to cooperation. There are of course various measures to overcome this prisoner's dilemma such as repeated cooperation. Installed institutions can make sure that cooperation is encouraged and stimulated through various means, they can monitor the agencies' behaviour and provide information, they can link different cooperation areas, they can in fact lower the transaction costs or assure the reputations of the agencies (Hasenclever, 1997, p. 34). For inter-agency cooperation an institution can be helpful to overcome deadlock and stimulate cooperation. This institution needs to have sufficient means and say in order to encourage the cooperation.

3.1.2 Reasons for cooperation

After explaining what cooperation means it becomes apparent that there are several advantages to inter-agency cooperation, some of the most considerable advantages are listed in this short overview.

According to Friis and Jarmyr (2008), a couple of other motives can be identified which stimulate a closer cooperation in a military mission:

Efficiency, if resources are combined and shared it will be more beneficial for the agencies.

Consistency, constant cooperation creates a stable environment for the actors involved and it becomes more transparent for outsiders. *Urgency*, a close cooperation can help to tackle urgent problems faster and more efficient. *Security*, while delivering humanitarian aid and economic stabilisation, the security danger which emanates from a failing state decreases. *Politics*, due to outside pressure to end the mission new acceptable strategies have to be developed to stay involved in the mission. *Legitimacy*, the legitimacy of the mission increases, the more actors are involved (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008).

Igno Pröpper (2000) mentions several reasons why organisations would cooperate; he mentions that the cooperation would increase the quick-wittedness of the agencies. Furthermore the agencies are able to learn from each other; they are able to activate passive actors (due to the increased completion between the actors). Cooperation also creates a feeling of 'togetherness' of the agencies, because every actor feels responsible for the common project. An approach from more than one angle can also limit obstacles; possible obstacles can also be a generator for new ideas and solutions since every party contributes to the solution of the problem and each agency has a different approach (Pröpper, 2000). For Friis and Jarmyr (2008) this is an increase of efficiency.

Sarah Gillinson makes clear that groups cooperate *"because [of] our selfish genes dictate that we must cooperate within groups to survive, and because we learn to reciprocate good behaviour ... we cooperate when we passionately believe in a cause, when we believe that others will not cooperate and when we are mobilizing against a collective bad"* (2004). Thus cooperation in her opinion is

³ "A game with a dominant strategy equilibrium that is not pareto optimal – that is, it will end by disadvantaging at least one player. The game is indicative of problems of mistrust in which promises are not credible" (Mesquita, 2006)

mainly of a selfish kind and based on the will for survival. But in her opinion agencies would also cooperate if the benefits from cooperation are outstanding.

According to Sharon S. Dawes (1996) cooperation produces three kinds of benefits: technical, organisational and political. The technical benefit concerns the information infrastructure e.g. one data pool or the same technical standards. Cooperation also increases the organisational benefits, because information is shared and hence problem solving becomes easier. It also increases the political benefits as it supports the concrete domain-level action and improves the public accountability and fosters program and service coordination (Dawes, 1996).

Cynthia Hardy et al (2003) have elaborated how inter-organisational cooperation facilitates sharing of critical resources and knowledge transfer, in their view the cooperation can also lead to the creation of new knowledge. In their opinion one of the major gains to cooperation are the acquisition of resources and the organisations are motivated to cooperate *“in order to acquire resources that they cannot develop internally, but which are needed to survive in a highly competitive environment”* (Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrance, 2003, p. 6).

Huxham and Vangen (2003) established that, apart from the common objectives, *“trust is necessary for successful cooperation”*, in their opinion it is also one of the preconditions for effective cooperation.

It is evident that in respect to the mission in Afghanistan there are several advantages to cooperation. Those advantages for the mission can be divided in advantages for the cooperating agency itself and for the mission area.

For the agencies several advantages are obvious, such as *combining resources* and thus being able to *save expenditure or increased collective influence* within the national government, since more than one agency are represented.

Advantages for the mission area if agencies are cooperating are; if the agencies are more efficient the *effective outcomes* and *consistency* of the mission increase, increased *security* within the mission area and the mission gains more *legitimacy* among the national population as well as the host country (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008).

3.1.3 Reasons for non-cooperation

After analysing the factors stimulating cooperation one also has to turn to the challenges to cooperation. Cooperation is challenged by various factors; one of the main reasons is that agencies mainly act in their own interest and that there are stuck as mentioned above in a so-called prisoner's dilemma and especially between agencies where there is no (strong) organisation coordinating the common efforts. In case cooperation takes place but it results in a loss of incentives (financially, influence, manpower etc.), the agency will eventually not be willing to cooperate. Thus the cooperation between the actors is really fragile.

Friis and Jarmyr (2008) identified challenges to cooperation in mission areas: *Formalities*, means that the possibilities for cooperation are narrowed by the conflicting mandates, as there is no common agreement on cooperation or there are formal and legal barriers to cooperation. *Culture, mindset*

and prejudices, suggests that the different agencies have perceptions or prejudices against each other due to their different mentalities (e.g. tree hugger (Ministry of Development) vs. trigger happy (Ministry of Defence)). *Bureaucratic rigidity* means that different agencies have different ways and possibilities of working together. *Security* implies that cooperation with the military might lead to an infringement of the humanitarian values (neutrality, impartiality and independence) and decrease their own security within the country. Thus humanitarian aid works might become victim of (terror) attacks due to their cooperation with the military forces. *Funding* means that agencies have to compete for the same budget and are not willing to give up funds in advantage of another agency. *Priorities* suggest that the general goal is clear but the means and ways to achieve the goal might be different in every agency. While one ministry focuses on long-term projects, others might engage in short-term projects where success is directly visible. The *resources* are spread unequally between the agencies even though they deliver the same value to the mission; this creates competition and maybe even a feeling of injustice (delivering the same results with less means). *Leadership* asks the essential question of who is in charge of the mission. *Local ownership* are the perceptions about timing and when to hand over the leadership to the local actors and to withdraw from the country, those conceptions are different in every agency.

Pröpper (2000) adds on to the disadvantages of cooperation; cooperation might result in the loss of reaction speed because more people and institutions are involved. Furthermore one is dependent on the weakest actor and due to the 'togetherness' of the agencies they might lose their autonomy. It is also possible that the agencies blame each other for the conflicts and do not take the responsibility for the made mistakes nor will they be willing to engage in efficient solution-finding. According to him cooperation might generate communication-, coordination- and transaction-costs.

Dawes (1996) came to similar conclusions, she mentioned that the barriers to cooperation are the incompatibility of technologies or the data structures are inconsistent and incompatible with each other. According to her the cooperation creates interdependence and might lead to a loss of autonomy of the agency. Dawes mentions that the agencies can also be easily influenced by others and their political power will be limited.

Huxham and Vangen (2003) mention that people are constantly suspicious of each other. This means that agencies do not trust each other at first. Agencies are also not able to choose their cooperating partners; mostly they are imposed on them. Additionally trust between agencies has to be built up very slowly, thus this process consumes much time before the actual cooperation can take off. On the other hand they also assume that the lack of trust does not necessarily lead to a failure of the cooperation (Huxham & Vangen, 2003).

Lotia and Hardy (2008) also mention various problems underlying cooperation. According to them cooperation is hindered by the existence of vested interests, power imbalances and conflict of interests. Cooperation can create an asymmetry between the agencies; in this case one agency might gain more from the cooperation than the other. Lotia and Hardy assume that those outcomes are far more realistic than effective cooperation. In their opinion even if the cooperation is running smoothly difficulties will still persist and it is rather complicated to solve them. Following an argumentation of Ansell and Gash (2007) powerful stakeholders manipulate and dominate the process or the lack of commitment of some agencies.

3.1.4 Provisional conclusion

Combining these ideas four factors can be identified which enable or hinder cooperation. The first very basic condition is that all actors share the **same objective**. Actors involved need to agree on a common goal, this is one of the basic preconditions for cooperation. If there is no common agreement, the actors will question the usefulness of the cooperation. This factor might also include a common agreement on means (or how to reach a certain goal), but it is not essential in the early stages of cooperation.

Second the **profit/gains** need to be high (or at least no losses should be made) for both agencies, thus through rational consideration an agency can figure out whether it can gain something from the cooperation, e.g. in terms of resources, finances, legitimacy for their projects or authority of the agency.

Third there is an **emotional barrier or impetus to cooperation**, this includes trust or prejudices about the other agency. If the trust is high, social contact between the agencies could increase. If cooperation is enforced this emotional barrier superficially ceases to exist, but there is still a subliminal distrust between the actors involved and hence the cooperation might be, because of its forced nature, rather ineffective. In a voluntary cooperation the benefits are rather high, the institutions and organisations which are introduced to monitor the cooperation are set up voluntarily and in accordance with all cooperating agencies (Gillinson, 2004). This means they will have a strong authority. A forced cooperation can to a certain extent replace the necessary trust and trust might develop over time. In fact a cooperation based on trust is mostly determined by personal relationships and networks. According to Jones and George (1998) trust has different values such as loyalty, helpfulness, reliability, honesty, responsibility, integrity, competence, consistency, and openness. Those need to be taken into consideration when evaluating the factor trust. Unlike the other three factors it is not easy to grasp and mostly based on personal impressions.

The fourth factor can be described under the term **general conditions (sufficient framework)**. It asks whether there are enough possibilities in form of common guidelines and rules to cooperate. And can the cooperation take place through official channels; this includes if there are any institutions encouraging cooperation and how influential/powerful those institutions are.

If all four conditions are fulfilled there will be only few reasons why cooperation should not take place or why it should not work. On the other hand it is also possible that one missing factor can hinder the cooperation altogether. Those factors will also serve as a research model in the later thesis. It will make use of these factors to evaluate the German case of inter-agency cooperation. In the following parts it will be ascertained whether the actors do share a common objective, what are the gains (if any) to cooperation. To what extent do the actors trust each other and whether there is a framework available which enables or even encourages cooperation?

3.2 Methodology

This research is of qualitative kind and based on empirical evidence. It tries to describe how the comprehensive approach is interpreted in Germany and explores how it is implemented in Germany. It only exists out of a single case study thus it cannot be compared to the definition or implementation of the comprehensive approach in other countries. In the case of Germany it was assumed that the comprehensive approach stands for the inter-agency cooperation on the political level (how do agencies/ministries work together?). If this is the assumption one can make use of the existing literature on cooperation, because the comprehensive approach in that case is a form of cooperation in order to find out how the cooperation is supposed to work and how it is actually working in Germany. For this matter one has to approach the subject from different angles and make use of different resources.

In May 2009 interviews were conducted with different ministry officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and members of the German parliament (from the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) who are primarily concerned with security and defence policy. Within the ministries two different parties are represented (FDP and Christliche Demokratische Union (CDU)) and the MPs represent two different attitudes towards the Afghanistan mission and the comprehensive approach. It was also possible to conduct a group interview at the Joint Commitment Staff Afghanistan (JCS). In the JCS representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defence were present. Those interviews were semi-structured, thus it had some common questions (cf. Annex III) but also left room to recess an interesting point raised. This way of conducting interviews increases the reliability of the case study as the data collection process can be repeated several times and could produce similar results. The interviews were not only conducted with respondents from the involved ministries, instead people who were able to view the process as an 'involved outsider' (MPs) were also interviewed. This multiple sources of evidence increase the construct validity of the research. Since only few people were interviewed the external validity of the research could be threatened, as the sample group is quite small. On the other hand the most important actors were interviewed, but it could have been possible to interview a larger group of respondents (e.g. different parties, more people from the ministries). Yet in the interviews conducted the variety of people is rather high and it is difficult in interview to receive a representative number of cases.

In order to find out whether the German concept of the comprehensive approach is working one has to be aware that the comprehensive approach in this research is a form of cooperation between the ministries. Thus the efficiency of the comprehensive approach can be assessed by making use of literature on cooperation. This literature is able to make clear how to measure effective cooperation and how to find out whether cooperation is ineffective.

The interviews as well as (newspaper-) articles can contribute to get a picture of the German cooperation. Hence it was possible to receive a broad picture on cooperation through insider-knowledge (through the interviews) as well as the broad public opinion (from both scientific and newspaper articles).

After reviewing the literature on cooperation it will be assumed that there are four basic assumptions which enable cooperation. Those conditions are

- Common objectives (Do the agencies have common objectives?)
- Gains (Do the agencies benefit from the cooperation?)
- Trust (Do the agencies trust each other?)
- General conditions/framework (Is there a (political) framework supporting cooperation?)

With the help of the interviews and the articles it will be evaluated to which extent those basic assumptions are fulfilled. With the use of the literature on cooperation the external validity of the case study is increased as the literature can also be valid for any other inter-agency cooperation in other countries or organisations.

The four variables were measured whether they were frequently repeated during the interviews and whether they have been mentioned in different articles and press releases. If the four conditions are fulfilled the cooperation between the agencies can be considered to exist and to be stable. If only few factors are fulfilled, the cooperation between the agencies must be considered to be weak but expandable. If none of the conditions are fulfilled the cooperation is non-existing and insufficient.

To clarify this; if all agencies have common objectives, gain from the cooperation, trust each other and there is a sufficient framework for cooperation, the cooperation should be considered as stable. If less than the four variables are fulfilled the cooperation is weak, less cooperation takes place but it is expandable. If almost none of the variables are fulfilled hardly any cooperation exists. Those factors can be ordered in an ordinal manner. It is important to bear in mind that it is possible that some variables are only fulfilled to some part; this would reveal a weak form of cooperation. Those assumptions (on stable, weak and non-existing) are supported by the literature review on cooperation, but unfortunately it was not possible as part of the research to measure how the long-term development of the cooperation would be.

In this research it is hence not possible to make a comparison (in time) or to record the differences. Therefore the picture created is a one-time reflection of the cooperation between the ministries in Germany at a given moment in time. The focus was on the descriptive part trying to depict how cooperation in Germany works.

Whether the variables are fulfilled or not is foremost based on personal impressions during the interviews, but also from the public opinion, from (newspaper-) articles. This focus on the personal impressions is a threat to the validity of the research, since the researcher is expecting a certain outcome.

This research can be compared to the cooperation in other European countries. In this sense the part of the thesis plays an important role as it point out the different forms of cooperation. Other countries might have a different form of cooperation and not like the German case which focuses on inter-agency cooperation. Before doing any further research on inter-agency cooperation in other countries the research needs to find out whether that form of cooperation is used at all in the country of interest. Only then it will be possible to compare the cooperation of other (European) countries. Hence a clear distinction between the comprehensive approaches needs to be made right from the start.

3.3 Cooperation in Germany

3.3.1 Comprehensive approach in Germany

Due to the new security situation, a comprehensive approach and all-embracing involvement of different measures seems to be the only solution to modern conflict management. This part will present why and how Germany makes use of the comprehensive approach. Germany does not have a long-standing history in participating in international military missions even though they have been a member of NATO for more than 50 years. The first military involvement since the Second World War was in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 as part of the international peace-keeping mission (Interview_III, 2009). As product of their history Germany was reluctant to any kind of international military participation. This reluctance also means that Germany's comprehensive approach (or the inter-agency cooperation on military deployment) is a part of a development other countries have already gone through and were able to improve through the lessons learned from other mission experience.

In 1999 for the first time since World War II Germany engaged actively (sending troops) in the conflict in Kosovo after complying with the US pressure (Baron, 2009). In the late 1990s those participations became subject to exhaustive discussion but in 1999 this discussion came to a quick end, because the German population saw the need for an involvement in case of humanitarian crisis (e.g. genocide) and the German Bundestag allowed the deployment of German troops. This development from 'Nie wieder Krieg' (never again war) to 'Nie wieder Auschwitz' (never again Auschwitz) called for a major change in the German constitutional system as well as a change in the German population, which was not accustomed to a German participation in war or conflict nor German soldiers being killed in combat.

This shift to military involvement in case of humanitarian crisis and also the new security threats demanded a new strategic concept in conflict. A couple of years later Germany started to implement the comprehensive approach, a new tool for modern conflict and crisis management. The agencies involved keep their own responsibilities on the assigned matter but are urged to work closely together. The German comprehensive approach has a very broad interpretation as it could theoretically include the cooperation of ministries, IOs, NGOs and local actors, but this article focuses on the cooperation between the ministries. In the following part the implementation of the comprehensive approach in Germany will be described.

In the mission area the different objectives of for instance increasing security, reconstruction, establishing rule of law or building up security forces are obviously closely connected to different ministries. The Ministry of Defence being responsible for security, Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development for development and reconstruction and the Ministry of Interior is in charge of the introduction rule of law and in the case of Afghanistan; Germany is contributing to the training of the Afghan National Police. The Department of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the establishment of diplomatic strings with the Afghan government and other international actors or NGOs and they also finance reconstruction projects. Those different tasks are overlapping and hence the efforts of the ministries need to be coordinated and in the end should lead to the same objective: a functioning autonomous Afghan state. Without security (from the ANA and ANP and the international forces)

economic development is hard to achieve and without development and reconstruction the insecurity rises.

German police can only train in a safe environment and the cultural and political expertise of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is often crucial for the good relations with the Afghan officials and the population. Hence the knowledge of all ministries is irreplaceable.

Apart from those major ministries others are also involved like the Ministry of Justice on the establishment of rule of law. Those are most of the actors included in the case study. This thesis refrains from including more actors (such as IOs and NGOs) as it focuses on the inter-agency cooperation. An efficient implementation of the comprehensive approach demands a horizontal as well as vertical coordination of all efforts; thus between the ministries (horizontal) and from the ministries in Berlin to the set goal in the mission area (vertical).

The comprehensive approach in Germany is translated to the term ‘Vernetzte Sicherheit’, but both terms are in fact used simultaneously. It stands for an all-embracing security approach, which includes all civil and military possibilities in order to maintain national and international security and to find solutions to conflict and crisis (Klos, 2009). Various guidelines have been published which are concerned with the comprehensive approach: the ‘Action Plan on Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building’ (Bundesregierung, 2004) and the ‘White Book on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr’ (2006) are two basic frameworks. Both aim at strengthening the inter-agency cooperation and encourage more communication between the ministries.

The Action Plan implemented in 2004 demands a common approach requiring “*clear-cut decision-making structures and unambiguous definitions of responsibilities*” (2004). The Action Plan can be a sound tool in order to coordinate inter-agency cooperation. It proposes a UK-like Conflict Prevention Pool (cf. Annex I) to coordinate resources; however, until now it has not been fully implemented. This Action Plan proposed an Interministerial Steering Group which is supposed to “*ensure a continuous interministerial exchange of information and experience and see to it that all Ministries are equally well-informed on issues relation to crisis prevention*” (Bundesregierung, 2004). Above all it calls for the incorporation of third actors such as NGOs or the private sector, through the development of transparent mechanisms. The Action Plan has been a promising tool for a successful inter-agency cooperation, but has so far been disappointing and ineffective. This is also mentioned in the two evaluations of the Action Plan which were published in 2006 and 2008. Especially the latter had a very critical view on the implementation.

The White Book (Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr) published in 2006 stressed the following issues as highly important for German security policies:

- The German security policies are trying to make use of a wide range of instruments, the military should just make up a small part of it, or parts are taken by the diplomatic forces or development agencies
- Close cooperation of all players involved, especially focusing on the agencies (Vernetzte Sicherheit)
- (International/European) Collective security policies
- Focus on conflict prevention (Baron, 2009)

The White Book states that one central task of the military is the internal security and national defence. It makes clear that national and international security are closely connected, but only limited structures have been established which can ensure this security (Klos, 2009).

The White Book mostly focuses on the external cooperation of the German security policies and pays little attention to the internal/inter-agency coherence, whereas the Action Plan concentrates on the internal functioning.

Germany is an interesting case study, because it has one of the biggest military involvements within Afghanistan at the same time its military engagement in conflict is rather recent, hence the development of a comprehensive approach is rather new. In this sense one will be able to follow the development over the coming years.

3.3.2 Evaluation of the cooperation in Germany

In order to make a cumulative analysis of the comprehensive approach in Germany it is helpful to use of the proposed research model above (3.1.4), and find out which peculiarities are striking in the German cooperation. It is again important to keep in mind that the evaluation is focusing on the inter-agency cooperation of the German ministries; no attention is paid to the cooperation with NGOs, IOs etc or the cooperation within the mission area.

The factors analysed are; whether the agencies share common objectives, if they have gains from cooperating (economically as well as in a broad sense, such as more legitimacy), if they do trust each other and whether there are stable preconditions (framework) for cooperation. Additionally there is also room for other observations which are not able to be classified in one of the categories. Most factors are overlapping and cannot be defined with just one of the factors. For example if the gains are unevenly spread trust between the agencies might also be absent.

3.3.2.1 Common Objectives

The common objective is in fact well defined by the government and also seems to be clear for the ministries, the goal is to *“fight against terrorism, national reconstruction, and economic and social development in the region”* (Bundesregierung, 2010), but the detailed common objectives (e.g. what is more important fight against terrorism or reconstruction and the implementation is rather blurry. The ministries have different ideas of what they expect from the engagement, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development wants to rebuild a new Afghanistan no matter how long the involvement, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tries to implement strategies which enable an exit from the mission area and wants to ensure that Afghanistan will not become a new safe haven for terrorists (Interview_I, 2009). Both agencies can make use of similar means in order to achieve their goals, but if they cannot agree on a common goal, the use of the available tools will be very different and might even contradict itself.

Apart from the misunderstanding on the timeframe of the involvement all ministries have different perceptions about the strategies for a successful comprehensive approach, but they all agree that the comprehensive approach is the only strategy which can improve the situation in Afghanistan. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumes that short-term projects are more successful and better-suited for the mission, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development pledges for

long-term projects (Interview_I, 2009). Because of the different ideas on the mission itself the ministries are not able to agree on a strategy. The Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development is aware that the mission will be a long-term commitment, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are more concerned about the short-term successes and the quick disengagement from the area.

This also raises questions about the financial involvement, responsibilities and duration of a project. One interviewee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interview_I, 2009) says unambiguously that the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development sets wrong priorities, which are mainly education, medical care and gender equality, while the focus should in fact be on justice, police, customs or state-building. It is clear that both issues are very important elements in reconstruction, first aid in terms of medical care is a basic condition, simultaneously long-term projects need to be established in order to ensure a steady development. Thus none of the two priorities is right or wrong, but both are very important in rebuilding the Afghan state.

The ministries compete to some extent for the better and more successful strategy instead of focusing on possible compromises. Friis and Jarmyr (2008) explain that the different objectives are due to the different mindset of the agencies, as they both follow different goals which are deeply rooted within the agencies. Lotia and Hardy (2008) would explain this with the different vested interests and an existing conflict of interest of the agencies.

Unlike the Dutch approach, where clear sub-goals are set the German comprehensive approach does not set clear goals which need to be fulfilled (e.g. transferring the responsibilities to the local troops by a certain date), the goal set is mainly to increase and improve cooperation between the ministries, which is very difficult to achieve. With a common small and short-term goal in mind cooperation might be more successful.

A basic agreement on the goals of the mission does exist within Germany; unfortunately the ideas on effective implementation differ within the ministries, leading to misunderstandings and little agreement on a common strategy.

3.3.2.2 Gains

As mentioned above the gains do not only include the economical gains (such as more funding or more personnel), but also gains in a broader sense (e.g. legitimacy of the mission and more authority for the agency). According to the evaluation of the Action Plan (2008) the cooperation is not successfully implemented by the ministries because the resorts have different perceptions about each other and very different approaches to conflict solving (cf. 3.3.2.1). Agencies are not willing to give up their own approaches in advantage to another one. According to the evaluation of the Action Plan (2008) this results from the fear of losing influence and means if they cooperate.

Also the financial means of each involved ministry are significant different⁴. This can lead to completion between the agencies for more resources (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008) and it is also possible that one agency dominates the other (Ansell & Gash, 2007). A respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned that his ministry feels responsible to be in charge of 'organizing a comprehensive approach' (Interview_I, 2009) but he says that their (financial) resources are too scarce in order to be in charge. The Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development on the other hand feels dominated by Foreign Affairs and that they should not be in charge instead they should cooperate on equal footing (Interview_II, 2009). Thus cooperation is also limited by the subliminal discussion about leadership and authority which is also one of the gains of cooperation. According to Friis and Jarmyr (2008) this discussion is one of the reasons why cooperation fails. Especially the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development needs to proof its right for existence; there were several plans of incorporating the ministry within the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rinke, 2009), this would lead to a loss of sovereignty of the ministry and probably also to a huge cut-back of personnel.

The gains are also very limited within the political sphere. Foreign Policy, Defence and in particular Afghanistan do not lend themselves for domestic political campaigns in Germany. Officials are very well aware of that (Interview_I, 2009). If the mission is successful, voters will hardly notice it (as it has happened with the mission in Kosovo (dpa, 2010)), but if it fails most voters turn their back on the party in favour of the mission. Thus politically there is not much to win with the mission but much to lose (Interview_I, 2009). The political parties are aware that there is hardly any political pay-off of the mission, but ISAF has a very important part in fulfilling the international obligations. Hence political debate about the mission is tried to be kept at a minimum, leading to some discussion about an exit strategy but very little discussion about the current strategy and how to improve the situation. Even though this has changed in the last year considerably⁵, still the basic debate revolves around the exit date and strategy, the kind of conflict the Bundeswehr is participating in or who is responsible for failures, but hardly around the necessity of improving the strategies and cooperation. This superficial discussion does not give the agencies any incentives to improve or alter the current ways of cooperating. If the political surrounding would force them to develop better cooperation, the agencies might be more willing to do so.

The competition between the ministries also emerges from the political competition which is transferred to the ministries (Interview_III, 2009). The ministries are headed by different parties of the coalition. They want to receive approval and claim the right to exist, as they can do the 'job' better than any other agency (also in the name of the party). In other words there exists fertile ground for bureau-politics. This competition thought also limits the feeling of responsibility for the entire mission (and the 'grand strategy') since every with its own domain and their own success. The problem is also amplified by the political loss for the parties if they actively support the mission and introduce new ideas. As mentioned above the political pay-off in foreign politics is far too small for a

⁴ The Ministry of Defense has 31,1 billion € at its disposal, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2,93 billion €, the Ministry of Interior 5,626 billion € and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 5,813 billion €. Those are the total numbers of the budget from 2009, they are not for the mission in Afghanistan (Bundshaushaltsschuss, 2009).

⁵ The new discussions were triggered by the air strike against a lorry in the region of Kunduz in September 2009 and the London conference in January 2010; those events unquestionably put the Afghanistan issue back on the agenda.

party to be actively involved. Thus uniting the efforts is hindered by the political and party completion and a lack of commitment.

On the other hand, uniting all efforts might be unfavourable too, since agencies have expert knowledge on one certain issue. It is difficult to maintain this knowledge in one huge organisation. This knowledge is not only specialized but it also concerns very different fields. In order to maintain his very broad knowledge a balance needs to be found between merging and dividing tasks without losing the expertise knowledge (Interview_V, 2009). Pröpper (2000) also mentioned that close cooperation might not only result in a loss of expertise but might also create a loss of reaction speed if too many agencies are involved.

An important factor which is neglected at times is that ministries also face a measurement problem (Interview_I, 2009); successful cooperation is hardly to be measured within the mission area. Hence agencies do not see any results from engaging in cooperation and they will not (and cannot) be rewarded for their efforts and might wonder whether it is worth the endeavour. They are also not able to measure which strategy is the most effective, thus disagreement on the proper strategy cannot be settled easily and will be a persistent problem between the ministries.

3.3.2.3 Trust

Trust is in fact rather difficult to measure, but few things have become apparent during the interviews the lack of trust became visible during the interviews with the different ministry officials through the ways they were talking about each other, but the conclusions drawn are rather personal and to some extent biased.

It is apparent that trust can be build through constant communication and cooperation. In support of the arguments is the fact that within the JCS Afghanistan, where all ministries are represented and constantly meet each other, the mutual trust seemed to be high. They were discussing on a very personal level with lots of insight from each ministry. This is also approved by the interviewees (Interview_III, 2009). They also mentioned that most networks are based on personal relations and hardly have any official channels to cooperate (cf. 3.3.2.4). Unfortunately the JCS is a rather small unit with little influence and is mainly used for the operational planning of Bundeswehr deployments.

In the other two ministries it seemed that they were prejudiced against each other (*“Development is setting the wrong priorities”* (Interview_I, 2009)). Mostly the lack of trust can be based on the insufficient framework for cooperation and the lack of frequent consultation between the ministries. Furthermore the communication lines change constantly due to political changes, hence a stable trust relationship is difficult to build as he political changes infringe on the consistency, which is an important factor to trust (Jones & George, 1998). As Vangen and Huxham have established, trust can be an important factor to enhance cooperation but it can also be replaced by the existence of sufficient networks in which actors are encouraged to cooperate (Huxham & Vangen, 2003). According to one interviewee trust very much depends on personal networks and little on the cooperation framework (Interview_III, 2009).

3.3.2.4 General conditions (framework)

Of all the problems to cooperation, the most prevailing and simple one measure are framework problems - those can be found in the international community as well as on the national level. As already mentioned earlier the comprehensive approach does not have a clear international definition, this makes it more difficult for nations to implement it coherently. Furthermore it seems that the comprehensive approach has been introduced too late, not only at the national level but also internationally. The comprehensive approach only became a common strategy after the mission in Afghanistan was launched. By then many structures within Afghanistan e.g. between NGOs, IOs and other nations but also between the cooperating agencies have already been consolidated (Interview_I, 2009). It is difficult to change existing multinational structures after they have been established. Hence it is also rather difficult for the ministries to establish new ties within the host country, but also between the agencies. Ad hoc cooperation in the mission area and between the agencies is more common than it should be.

The fact that Germany does not have a long-standing history of conflict involvement contributes to the problems; they did not know how to implement a comprehensive approach and how ministries who hardly work together such as Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and Ministry of Defence are suddenly supposed to cooperate, unlike other states who have a longer history of conflict management (e.g. UK during the Colonial Wars (Rietjens & Bollen, 2008)).

The national framework is also limited; the Action Plan (2004) leaves space for criticism. Mölling mentions some basic problems concerning the Action Plan: *"In states such as Germany, efforts at harmonization are often limited solely to the civilian sphere. The government's Action Plan on Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peace building does not integrate the armed forces as relevant actors. Moreover, within the Action Plan, considerations related to development policy outweigh aspects such as human rights or political institutions, thereby introducing a further imbalance."* (2008). This shows that, despite the fact that the Action Plan is highly ambitious; it is still missing certain aspects such as a clear incorporation of the military actors, which is an essential part of the comprehensive approach. At the same time the White Book Mainly focuses on the future threats to security within Germany and needs to adapt the new demands including development. Its focus is more directed towards the external actors and little on the internal cooperation and ways on how to effectively implement the inter-agency cooperation.

The strong ambitions of the Action Plan but the failure to implement also become visible in the second evaluation of the Action Plan in 2008, which mentioned that the Interministerial Steering Group is still no political institution. Thus the Group is not able to take any action or stimulate cooperation; instead it is just monitoring the Action Plan, but it has no power to act. Contributing to this problem is the fact that cooperation between the ministries is voluntary, there are no mechanisms being able to coerce them to work together, instead agencies need to acknowledge themselves that the cooperation would get them closer to the prospective goals. Germany does not have one single fund bundled resources and jurisdiction in a so-called Conflict Prevention Pool (UK example); this generates more problems as the agencies which are willing to cooperate will fight over resources and even contribution.

Apart from the above mentioned limited chances for political success of the mission; Germany's electoral system is another disadvantage to a successful comprehensive approach. Germany is always governed by coalition governments and all coalition members have to agree on certain proposals. Eventually most ideas end in compromise, which appears difficult to implement. Policies and new bodies, such as the Interministerial Steering Group cannot be implemented properly or its implementation is time consuming.

Implementation is not only hindered by the coalition governments, but also by the 'Bundesrat'⁶, which is representing the 'Bundesländer'⁷ government, which also has to agree on the proposed policies (Scharpf, 1999). In some instances the coalition government does not have the majority in the 'Bundesrat' in order to enforce a certain policy. For Friis and Jarmyr those are problems of *formalities* (2008).

Another *formalities* problem arises due to the federal state system in Germany, the Bundesländer do not only have to agree on new legislatives within the Bundesrat, but they also need to participate actively in the comprehensive approach e.g. by committing policemen to the mission. Until June 2007 Germany was the lead nation in building the ANP. Afterwards the EU took over the responsibilities in form of the EUPOL Afghanistan mission. Currently there are 245 international staff members deployed among 16 different provinces in Afghanistan (European Security and Defence Policy, 2009). Also Germany needs to contribute policemen to the mission. Most of them volunteer for the deployment, but it is highly difficult to find volunteers for a dangerous mission like Afghanistan and considering the fact that many policemen are already deployed in Kosovo. The federal government or the responsible Ministry of Interior does not have any incentives to encourage them to go, because it is the responsibility of the Bundesländer (Baach, 2008). All police matters in Germany are a subject of the Bundesländer government, and each has its own jurisdiction on its police force. They have to agree and volunteer to send policemen; obviously most of them are not willing to work with fewer officers (Interview_III, 2009).

According to Bernhard Gertz there were no more than 40 policemen at a time in Afghanistan training the ANP, in his opinion that is far too little in order to build up an effective police (2008). The German government decided to increase the number of policemen officially from 143 to 200, but this does not represent the real numbers of policemen who are actually committed. This is another example where German government has failed to implement the comprehensive approach by failing to coordinate the efforts of the different Bundesländer governments, the Ministry of Interior and the national government.

Two problems become visible in the German federal framework; that the Bundesländer and the German government have hardly any kind of agreement on how to cooperate. Furthermore they have become a victim to the bureaucratic rigidity as the Bundesländer have different ways of working together and coordinating their efforts.

The German cooperation framework is very rudimental. First of all, the international framework does not support an efficient development of a coherent international comprehensive approach, due to its vague guidelines. Second, the German institutions in charge of a comprehensive approach hardly have any authority or means. Their weak position is thus not able to solve basic communication

⁶ Federal Council of Germany

⁷ Federal States of Germany

problems as well as leadership questions. And third, the German political system does not encourage a successful cooperation.

3.3.2.5 Other observations

Contributing to those very basic framework problems are the different mindsets and that the ministries use different 'languages'. Whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is rather diplomatic, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development seems to me more straight forward (Interview_III, 2009). This can create confusion about demands and promises within the mission area but also between the agencies. Those language differences and differences in attitudes can be found between all ministries, but they seem to be the most apparent between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Interview_I, 2009). The JCS Afghanistan agrees that there is a persisting language barrier between the ministries but this can be reduced by repeated interaction and in-depth explanations (Interview_III, 2009). Also Friis and Jarmyr (2008) agree that the diplomatic agency is very different from the development agency.

Germany's cooperation is also confronted with a leadership question (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008). In the Interministerial Steering Group the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the leading agency. But within the mission area the Ministry of Defence is clearly the strongest actor with the most resources and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is hardly represented. When it comes to reconstruction the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development should be in charge, as they have the most experience but they hardly have any resources to effectively steer the cooperation (Interview_III, 2009).

The German inter-agency cooperation is obviously still at a very basic level; the former Minister of Defence, Franz-Josef Jung mentioned in January 2007 that the cooperation of the different resorts (agencies) is still developing, he considered the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a successful cooperation. However the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, one of the most important ministries within the comprehensive approach, was not involved right from the start in the work of the PRTs, thus important knowledge on reconstruction and development was left out (Frey, 2007). In comparison to the American PRTs, where all efforts are embedded as part of the military approach, each German ministry involved in the PRTs has its own activities as part of an overall aim. Coordination takes place on the ground but not within the agency and every ministry is responsible for the success of their activities.

However, the coordination has been improved, but the PRTs are still perceived as a purely military effort, due to the overrepresentation of the military (in 2008: 570 German soldiers and ten civilian employees (mainly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior)) (VENRO, 2009). This is again part of the above mentioned problem of few international guidelines. The national cooperation finds its limits within the international cooperation, which hardly exists. The fact that there is no common concept of the PRTs shows that governments are left alone with interpreting the NATO guidelines. Every nation applies their model of the PRT, this makes cooperation and exchange of best-practices between the PRTs very difficult. But just like the definition of the comprehensive approach the interpretation of the PRT is very broad and open to variations. As mentioned earlier this open definition can be an advantage to the mission because of two reasons. First every country can make use of their means in the best way possible and second the regions and their security in Afghanistan vary a lot and every region might need a different approach (Interview_IV, 2009). On the

other hand the broad interpretation can again lead to exhaustive discussion about the 'right' concept. Those coordination problems do not only exist on the international ground but are also persistent in the national sphere.

A good example for the limited coordination between the ministries was the nomination of Bernd Mützelburg as the special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2009. The other ministries very not involved in the decision-making and only got to know on late notice that this special envoy was nominated (Wiegold, 2009). This nomination was well intended from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following an example of the US and the UK, but it did not work out successfully. According to the JCS Afghanistan the nomination was a good example of the poor communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries. The insufficient networks between the ministries can be a reason for this unfortunate miscommunication.

3.4 Results

To sum up Germany encounters various problems when it comes to the cooperation between the ministries. First of all, the common objective is quite clearly defined but the implementations of the goals are very different in each ministry. Especially between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development misunderstandings about the right strategy are prevailing. But they do in fact both share the common objective to create a safe environment within Afghanistan and to reconstruct. Hence they do agree on the common objective but the means are not harmonised. Thus the first condition for cooperation is fulfilled, but only to a limited extent. When it comes to the gains the cooperation is even more hindered, the ministries fear a loss of incentives (funding and personnel), political power and influence if they do cooperate and this problem is amplified by the fact that the results of successful cooperation cannot be measured. Thus if the agencies are not able to see the results of the cooperation they will most likely not cooperate, especially if that cooperation might result in a loss of incentives.

It is furthermore very difficult to build up trust if there is hardly any repeated interaction between the ministries. But as mentioned above it is very difficult to measure trust. It is at last a very personal notion and can hardly be judged by a researcher.

The framework on the other hand can easily put to evaluation. It seems that for the German case, the government was willing to establish a framework (e.g. the Interministerial Steering Group), but it was never implemented successfully. The institutions have hardly any political weight or financial resources to stimulate cooperation. Apart from the problems on the federal level the cooperation is impeded by the state system of Germany. It being a federal state and having a coalition government makes decision-making more difficult.

Next to the problems which hinder cooperation, the German agencies suffer from a very basic communication problem ('the agencies speak different languages'), this infringes on the trust between the agencies but also on the effective gains. There is also a persistent question of who is in charge of organising a comprehensive approach and foremost the entire mission.

It seems that none of the conditions for successful cooperation is fulfilled but at the same time some of them show signs of starting to be fulfilled. The general objective is clear but there is no agreement

on the means, the gains are visible, but those mainly concern the mission area, but hardly the gains for the agency itself. Trust has been built up on a personal level but is still at a very basic level. Furthermore a common framework exists but is hardly effective. It can be concluded that the cooperation between the agencies is weak but expandable.

4 Conclusion & Recommendations

Analysing what the consequence might there be for mission if the cooperation is not sufficient would go far beyond one paper. But little cooperation could harm the success of the mission; this was also testified during the conducted interviews. Efforts of the different agencies might overlap and lead to an unnecessary waste of resources. Hence development within the mission area might not be constant, because every agency is concerned with own projects. This does not only create confusion for the committed agencies but also for the population of the host country and the involved other nations, NGOs and IOs.

As no single agency is responsible for the mission, ministries can put the blame on each other for problems, instead of solving them. If no single agency is responsible, the other nations, the host country, the IOs and NGOs do not have one point of contact. This increases bureaucracy and limits quick decision-making.

It has become apparent in the recent years that projects within the mission area are not coordinated between the actors. The Bundeswehr does not consult the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development about the social and environmental consequences of a project, nor does the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and especially the delegated NGOs and IOs consult the Ministry of Defence whether an area is safe to set up a project (Interview_V, 2009). This raises questions about justification and sustainability of the projects.

This paper tried to identify the different interpretations of countries and international organisations of the comprehensive approach. It became apparent that the definitions are very different which eventually also influences the implementation of the comprehensive approach. Those diverse implementations can lead to communication problems between the countries and organisations involved and foremost the nation states are left alone with fulfilling a unique and new term. Every country tries to fulfil the term within the national possibilities or limits and at the same time complying with the demands of NATO. It is far too complex to show that the definition problem actually becomes a problem for the nation states, but it can be assumed that they might have problems giving meaning to such a vague term without clear guideline.

This paper was able to define the most common definition and put them into a scheme which can also be used for further research. In order to be able to proceed with the analysis of the implementation the concepts needed to be clarified first.

Furthermore was this paper able to point out the basic problem of the cooperation within the German government; it was feasible to evaluate the cooperation with the help of extensive literature on cooperation. On the basis of this it will be possible to make some basic recommendation which could help to improve the cooperation.

During the interviews all the respondents agreed that the comprehensive approach could represent a successful solution to the problems faced in Afghanistan. Even though everybody is aware of this fact, the comprehensive approach is hardly implemented. A respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned that *“the more difficult the security situation, the more challenging the implementation of the comprehensive approach but the more necessary”* (Interview_I, 2009).

Better implementation of the comprehensive approach can be achieved through various measures.

First of all the comprehensive approach needs a clear definition in the international sphere as well as nationally. This would help to clarify the concept and the strategy. Therewith politicians will not be able to call for an all-embracing concept, which does not possess a clear implementation (plan). The hollow term needs to be filled with a clear meaning. If necessary, other terms should also be defined describing other forms of cooperation. This way politicians and policy-makers will be hold accountable for their action in case they have to implement a clearly define term.

Second, the reasons for the Afghanistan mission need to be properly communicated to the population in order to reduce the political resistance. And the mission has to be put back on the agenda, with in-depth discussion about the proper strategy and not only about the exit strategy. This way would the ministries be rewarded for their effort of cooperating and they would feel responsible for creating a common strategy as well as for the success of the mission, which is even acknowledged by the public. This could increase the political reward for a successful mission, even if the actual outcomes are difficult to measure.

Another solution would be to set clear sub-goals (e.g. setting up committees, creating information exchange networks), which can enhance the cooperation as actors can slowly work toward the bigger target, but at the same time achieving something collectively.

Third, Germany is still struggling with the basic cooperation; the installation of an Interministerial Steering Group was promising but ended in talk due to the lack of personnel and means. In 2008 the JCS was set up as part of the Ministry of Defence; it integrates the military and civilian tasks; this seems to be a good start, but needs to be improved. The JCS is little heard by the other ministries and the government, even though it seems to be a very promising initiative, where representatives of most involved ministries are present and communicate openly about the mission in constant consultation with their ministry. But this JCS mostly serves the purpose of the Ministry of Defence and hardly reports back to the other ministries. Thus the Steering Group and the JCS should receive a greater political importance and more means; then they can be a good example for cooperation and could work more efficiently.

The German comprehensive approach also misses effective communication between the ministries and the technical possibilities to exchange information hardly exists. Every ministry makes use of its own information and databases. A good initiative could be a combination of relevant information in a form of a common Afghanistan information centre, where all involved ministries should provide their information and ideas. Also ministries which are hardly involved in the mission could contribute and retrieve information (e.g. Ministry of Justice on establishing rule of law in Afghanistan).

Furthermore the federal government needs to make clear that the Bundeswehr is only in Afghanistan in order to create security and train Afghan security forces and not for reconstruction. The reconstruction mission should be in the hands of other actors only. Currently the military seems to take over the civil tasks as well. This is in fact not desired by the Ministry of Defence and especially not by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and the involved IOs and NGOs (Böhm & Ladurner, 2010). The responsibilities should be clearly divided among the competent ministries; this would limit the competition and overlap. But this would demand a properly functioning information network.

Interministerial meetings have to take place at a high political level, so that it is possible to take decisions and not just talk about the possibilities and forward them to senior officials.

On the other hand those meetings might result in a loss of knowledge within the high level working groups and not every agency contributes at its best to a solution. Thus a balance needs to be found between handing over tasks and at the same time not losing expertise knowledge.

Another solution in order to implement the comprehensive approach would be that cooperation would be uncoupled from the ministries. Instead working groups would be established which concern the goals of the mission e.g. reconstruction, education or establishing rule of law. Those working groups would be composed out of experts from all different ministries. This way one can assure that expertise is not lost after all and at the same time the necessary trust can be ensured since the working groups meet frequently.

Those working groups need to meet at a high bureaucratic level and should have decisive powers if possible even have their own budget. This way competition for funding and resources between the ministries can be decreased. A similar cooperation has been established with the JCS but as mentioned it mainly concerns the operational part of the deployment and defence issues. But this idea is highly progressive and will hardly ever be implemented due to bureaucratic constraints.

In order to overcome the prisoner's dilemma of cooperation, one has to ensure that the cooperation is constantly repeated; also on higher levels, one needs to ensure that agencies do not have the possibilities of free-riding. Through the introduction of a common effective institution those problems could be solved. Unlike the current Interministerial Steering Group, this institution should effectively monitor each agency's behaviour and link very different topics in order to find a compromise. Most importantly this institution can provide information to all ministries. The Interministerial Steering Group has until now proven to be an inefficient tool to ensure cooperation, but it could be improved through various measures.

Citha Maaß has also recommended installing a common national Afghanistan coordinator, who needs to coordinate the actions of the ministries, informs the legislative, improves transparency, informs the German public and is able to gain public support for the commitment in Afghanistan. He should also evaluate and monitor the current cooperation. In her opinion he should also be representing Germany in the international community on Afghanistan matters (Maaß, 2009).

The research was not able to propose the perfect term for the comprehensive approach; it still stands for an all-embracing solution to the problems faced in a mission area. None of the definitions from the international organisations and countries are the perfect solution. They are all in line with their possibilities and means.

A future research could be able to assess which strategy is the most successful in terms of outcomes in Afghanistan. It needs to be a cross-country/international organisations case study. But it could also compare the internal cooperation, uncoupled from the results in Afghanistan but focusing on the cooperation within the organisation or country.

As mentioned above this thesis is not able to find out what implications the implementation of the comprehensive approach has on the mission, this needs to be a subject for further studies.

Additionally it is not able to follow the long-term development of the cooperation, because it is a one-time-picture of cooperation within Germany. A similar research should be conducted in several years from now to see to what extent the cooperation has developed.

Even though cooperation has improved in the recent years the situation in Afghanistan has still not improved. It is doubtful whether a successful cooperation also leads to an improvement within the mission area. Due to the evident measurement problem, cooperation should not be measured in terms of success in Afghanistan, instead agencies could focus on results within their agency such as saving resources, better information access, increased influence on the government or more legitimacy of the mission within the home country.

The comprehensive approach seems to be a valid solution to modern conflict and especially to the problems Germany is facing in Afghanistan. Many things need to be improved in order to implement a successful cooperation. Internationally the comprehensive approach needs a definition with clear guidelines. Those can help nations to implement the comprehensive approach more successfully. On the national level an effective cooperating body needs to be installed, which has sufficient personnel and resources. Furthermore it has to be able to take decisions and implement those. The agencies have to be less reluctant to cooperation and willing to give up some of their competences. Trust between the agencies can be established through constant communication and repeated interaction. The agencies should also accept the different strategies of other agencies, and maybe even willing to adapt those.

To be blunt; if Germany is not able to comply with those basic demands, the comprehensive approach will fail, also leaving the Afghanistan mission to a questionable future. Of course success or failure does not only depend on the successful implementation of the German comprehensive approach, but it contributes to some extent to the success and coherence of the mission.

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Annex I Comprehensive approach of various actors

International actors

The United Nations

The United Nations 'Integrated Mission' mainly calls for cooperation within the UN itself thus the cooperation between the different UN agencies but also between other international actors on the field, including the host governments. A Report of 2005 defines the *"integrated Mission as an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework."* (Eide, 2005). This new strategy can also be found in Cluster approach (UNOCHA, 2006).

The UN employs a strategy which focuses on the long-term involvement in the mission area. This implies that different means have to be available and also providing a stable environment even after the military has left.

The European Union

The European Union terms its approach the EU Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO), mainly concerned with internal coordination of EU agencies but also including the external actors involved. This includes the coherent cooperation of the Commission and the second pillar of the EU (European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)). In the Document 14457/03 it says that *"Civil Military Co-ordination in the context of CFSP/ESDP addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the action of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU'S response to the crisis"* (Council of the European Union, 2003). This is a substantially different from other organisations who call for a international cooperation, the EU only focuses on its internal coherence.

The OSCE

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) works with three dimensions of security: a politico-military, the economic-environmental and the human dimension. The political-military dimension includes arms control, border management, combat terrorism, conflict prevention, military reform and policing. At the same time the focus also lies on economic as well as environmental activist this should be in support of establishing safety and security. The Human dimension involves anti-trafficking, democratization, education, elections, gender equality, human rights, media freedom, minority rights, rule of law and tolerance and non-discrimination (OSCE, 2010). The OSCE sees all those factors as *"integral and interdependent components of security for States and individuals"* (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008). The *"three dimensions carry equal weight and are embedded in all activities of the Organization's institutions and Field operations and are substantial part of the political dialogue among its participating states"* (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008).

NATO

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is mainly a military alliance it explains that its comprehensive approach is mainly based on making use of all civil capabilities within the NATO structure as well as including various external organisations. In order to incorporate the comprehensive approach as a strategy in the NATO they do have to rely on their external partners at

the same time they can contribute the military force to the comprehensive approach. The NATO as a military organisation is not able to fulfil the civil tasks.

After the Riga Summit in 2006 the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 renewed and pressed forward the basic framework of the NATO's comprehensive approach:

"The international community needs to work more closely together and take a comprehensive approach to address successfully the security challenges of today and tomorrow. Effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, including that of Non Governmental Organisations and relevant local bodies. To this end, it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates. We have endorsed an Action Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals aim to improve the coherent application of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach. These proposals aim to improve the coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilisation and reconstruction. They relate to areas such as planning and conduct of operations; training and education; enhancing cooperation with external actors." (NATO, 2008).

Noticeable this provision is rather vague and does not necessarily give proper guideline to the governments and International organisations. It basically refers to the fact that a common effort has to be made including all actors involved, at the same time not giving clear directions about responsibilities of each resort.

Furthermore it was established that

"there can be no lasting security without development and no development without security. Success requires a comprehensive approach across security, governance and development efforts and between local and international partners in support of the Afghan Government. We will intensify our contribution to such a comprehensive approach" (NATO, 2008).

According to the strategic vision this includes a sharpening of the UN Security Council Resolutions, an expansion of the UNAMA, a more active role of the Afghan government and strengthening the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

National actors

USA

In the United States' vision the goal of the comprehensive approach is basically the fight against terrorism and other new threats to the States' security. This means that all initiatives are directed to fight the terroristic network and to prevent any terroristic attack on their territory, whilst most continental European countries do see a major goal in the reconstruction and development (at the same time creating a safe and secure environment) of the mission area. In this case the Afghan terroristic networks will eventually be annihilated. This difference leads to a basic question; whether security comes first or the reconstruction. This also shows that the continental European approaches are very complex and ask a lot of agencies to participate on equal footing. In the US on the other hand the responsibilities are clearly divided, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for the military action and the Ministry of Development which is a subordinate to the Secretary of State (Bush, 2005) is responsible for the development.

The Secretary of State is hence responsible for coordinating reconstruction and stabilization operations; together with the Secretary of Defence she should coordinate the civil military part. Thus one coordinating body can be found in the US strategy, which has clearly defined responsibilities.

The can be found in the presidential Directive 44 which asks all agencies to cooperate but leaves the coordinating power with the Secretary of State:

“NSPD-44 makes the Secretary of State responsible for integrating U.S. effort to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilisation operations, and calls on the Secretaries of State and Defence to harmonize civilian and military efforts so that civilian are planning and operating with the military before and during the start up of any operation” (Bush, 2005).

UK

The UK broadly interprets the comprehensive approach as an effort to bring together government departments and other stakeholders in international crisis management to:

“promote a shared understanding and common aims and objectives – especially when military action is foreseen; develop structures and processes to help align planning and implementation; and establish relationships and cultural understanding through common training, exercising, analysis and planning” (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008).

The UK has introduced a Stabilisation Aid Fund and the Conflict Prevention Pool; that pool ensures the funding of crisis management abroad and involves all related agencies.

In the Afghanistan mission the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development provides an *“overarching structure”* (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008) which coordinates the cooperation of the different departments. The horizontal structure between the departments is supported by the UK’s Stabilisation Unit which coordinates the cross-government working. This structure is not only between the ministries but also on a vertical level close connected to the operational level via close connection with embassies in the mission area and the units deployed. The cooperation is not only limited to one system but it is constantly developed and adapted to the current mission.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands interpret the comprehensive approach as the 3-D approach (3D benadering), consistent out of diplomacy, defence and development. Those three are supposed to interlock with each other including a combined effort of the involved agencies. Their focus is not on the inter-agency cooperation solely but also concerns the cooperation within the mission area with the IOs, NGOs and Afghan government. There is no common coordinating agency created and all agencies they have to cooperate through own initiative as there is no single framework.

In their view the 3-D approach is the only way in order to achieve lasting peace, security and sustainable development. They stress *“reconstruction where possible, military action when necessary”* (The Royal Netherlands Embassy, 2009). The mission’s goal is two-folded; it should support the reconstruction efforts by the Afghan government and the IOs and NGOs as well as training and monitoring the Afghan army and policy. Their main target is to transfer the responsibilities of the NATO troops to the Afghans. The Dutch approach seems to answer a clear purpose whereas the other approaches are general guidelines to improve the situation but are not clearly aiming at one single goal.

Germany

Just like the Dutch approach each agency keeps its responsibility on its assigned matter but is urged to work closely together through an ‘Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention’. In 2004 the Action Plan on ‘Civil Crisis prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building’ was adopted in order to encourage closer cooperation of the ministries and the international partners.

The German Ministry of Defence translates the comprehensive approach into the term ‘Vernetzte Sicherheit’ but even Franz-Josef Jung, the former German Minister of Defence, publicly changed the definition of the comprehensive approach (or ‘Vernetzte Sicherheit’). In some cases he mentions it as good cooperation between the agencies in other cases it is the civil military cooperation and the coherent establishment of security and development. This becomes clear in various speeches he gave.⁸

The German government recognizes that *“no single actor has all the strategies and instruments for crisis prevention in his toolbox”* (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008). But at the same time there is no single actor coordinating the all efforts.

The cooperation is framed by the Action Plan ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and post-Conflict Peace Building’ from May 2004 and the ‘White Paper on German Security and Future of the Bundeswehr’ from 2006.

⁸ Two examples of his speeches can be found under this [link](#), which deals with the comprehensive approach as an increased civil effort and another [speech](#), which encourages ministries to cooperate.

Annex II Interviewee List (confidential)

Annex III Interview questions

The interview was conducted through semi-structured questions, this left room for an extensive exchange of thoughts and at the same time most interviewees were asked similar questions. Attached there is a list of the common questions.

The questions were posed in German and the order may vary.

What do you understand as the comprehensive approach?

What is the difference between the comprehensive approach and Vernetzte Sicherheit?

On which level does the cooperation take place?

What effects does the comprehensive approach have on the mission in Afghanistan?

How does your ministry implement the comprehensive approach (for the ministries)?

How do you experience the comprehensive approach within the ministries (for the Members of Parliament)?

Can you name examples for positive/negative forms of cooperation?

How can you explain the limited cooperation?

How can the comprehensive approach be improved?