Impact of EU measures on key events in border conflicts

Bachelor Thesis for a BA in European Studies

University of Twente

Program: European Studies BA
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Completed: 18-08-2010
Colloquium: 26-08-2010, 13:00 hrs, Ravelijn 2237

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Abstract

In this article I explore the research question "what are the effects of European Union measures on key events in border conflicts?" A theoretical part proposes a research design including uni- and multidirectional, direct, indirect and normative variables. In a three-fold empirical part I examine the Ireland, Cyprus and Israel-Palestine border conflicts. Within each conflict, two key events are selected and compared. The basic conclusions revolve around the perception that the EU has fairly limited tools to impact a border conflict. Outcomes rely on a large amount of independent factors that have to be taken into account to achieve successful reconciliation. Especially the normative image of the EU plays a large role in this, and the fact that often it is not an important peace-building actor in comparison to the roles of the United Nations or the United States. Moreover, cases where conflict actors are not considering EU membership or are not eligible to join provide little opportunities for positive impact.

1. Introduction

Throughout the history of the European Communities, overcoming border conflicts has been a prime motivation for integration. The necessary diffusion of the century-long Franco-German conflict certainly was among the prime reasons that inspired the creation of the European Union. This notion of the EU as a force for good and of reconciliatory nature is still frequently used to justify European integration today. Thus, assessing the EU's actual influence on border conflicts, evaluating the tools it can use to affect them and analyzing the outcomes is an interesting, and important study topic. In this article I focus on a comparison of key events that critically shaped the evolution of border conflicts.

Since there are many factors that influence the outcome of a border conflict, the real influence of the EU is often rather shady. As Diez, Albert & Stetter (2008) write, conflict resolution may have both intended and unintended consequences, of which some may be rather harming than helping. There are various pathways the EU may take to desecuritize a conflict, some of which are direct while others are rather indirect and are aimed at society. On the other hand, normative values also play a crucial role since they determine whether the EU is accepted as an arbitrator or not. Furthermore, factors like the state of affairs between the conflict parties need to be analyzed, i.e. whether they accept a certain type of communication and interaction or not. It is indeed a complex matter that requires an equally extensive research design for analysis.

As of now, the single most sophisticated attempt at an analytical framework came from Diez, Albert & Stetter (2008), who assembled a combination of direct and indirect effects of EU actions and combined this with five empirical case studies to provide a first test of their hypotheses. Parallel to this, Rumelili (2007) developed important theories on how to assess the openness of borders, and how this affects communication between parties of a conflict and what it implies for the outcomes thereof. Rumelili thus explores a multidirectional framework, i.e. she takes into account the EU's action, but also the domestic actors' perceptions and activities. Moreover, Christou (2010) suggested that to gain a more complex understanding of the perception of the EU as a normative 'force for good', we have to analyze precisely how conflict parties interpret the EU by judging its bordering practices. Each of these theories uses different dimensions to contribute to the

debate. I have constructed a research design that takes these variables and some additional ones into account.

For my empirical analysis selected three case studies, of which I will select two key events each to provide me with a cross section of examples of EU intervention. First, I will take a look at the Ireland conflict, which in the interpretation of Hayward & Wiener (2008) was a border conflict between British unionists and Irish nationalists and has since 1998 been successfully diffused (i.e. desecuritized). It is also one where both of the opposing parties have been members of the EU for the better part of the dispute. Second, the Cyprus conflict, which has largely experienced a stalemate since the UN plan for reunification of the island failed to be ratified by the Greek Cypriots in 2004. This is a conflict, where only one of the opposing parties has become a full member of the EU. Finally, the Israel-Palestine conflict, which revolves around two countries that as of now have no possibility to enter the EU as a member and which has failed to desecuritize at all.

My contribution to this field of study is a two-level comparison of case studies: The first level is a qualitative comparative analysis of key events within a border conflict to test my hypotheses, while the second level is a tentative comparison of the EU's performance in all three conflicts to generate some hypotheses and approach a better understanding of its impact. This is operationalized by an analysis of secondary accounts from scientific articles and a reassessment of their findings by coding them into my own theoretical framework.

The article is structured as follows: The second part will explain the theoretical background, the third part will outline the research design, the fourth part contains the empirical analysis of the three case studies and the fifth and last section provides a conclusion with some policy recommendations.

2. Theoretical Part

Much has been written on theories to explain the EU's influence on border conflict transformation. Within this field, the main focus has been on European integration and how enlargement can affect the desecuritization of disputes. For instance, how can the EU attract countries and force them to transform conflicting stances (Christou, 2002, 2004).

Democratic conditionality may be the most studied component of that relationship in relation to the EU. It refers to a strategy that can be used by one actor to change the behavior of another. For instance, the EU uses it to affect the democratic principles and the human rights situation in countries that seek to become candidates for accession to the EU or are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It is generally identified as the EU's main tool in bringing about change in neighbouring countries. According to Schimmelfennig et al. (Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2003, p. 496), it may be divided into three sub-strategies: Reinforcement by reward, reinforcement by and reinforcement by support. The EU primarily makes use of reinforcement by reward, which is implemented by offering technical or financial assistance towards building a modern market-based economy or establishing institutional ties such as trade agreements or even full membership (idem, p. 496). This 'carrots and sticks' approach is used to resolve conflicts as well. However, it has its limits as without complete integration the rewards of the ENP for a "developing" country are much less promising than for one on par with the average EU country (Dodini & Fantini,

2006, p. 512). This suggests that there is a large difference of EU influence in member states, candidate countries and neighboring countries. The democratic conditionality effect has been incorporated into the four pathways approach, which I will make use of. The following section is dedicated to explaining it.

2.1. The four pathways (unidirectional)

Diez, Stetter & Albert formally put forth their theory on the transformative power of integration in 2006, providing a basis for much of the case studies after that. Their approach consists of four variables, or pathways, of how the EU can influence the transformation of border conflicts: ***Compulsory*** (path 1) and ***connective*** (path 3) impact along a direct actor-driven dimension, and ***enabling*** (path 2) and ***constructive*** (path 4) impact, along an indirect integration dimension (see figure 1 below). *Compulsory* implies EU policies relying on 'carrots and sticks', such as demands for restructuring after promising a country entry into the Union. This corresponds to the democratic conditionality effect described by Schimmelfennig, et al. (2003). *Enabling* impact relies on conflict parties to link their political agendas with the EU's, e.g. the provision of technical expertise to solve policy problems. *Connective* impact means the connection of conflict parties, providing of platforms for discussion or encouraging communication. Finally, *constructive* impact implies the persuasion of an identity change in conflict actors. This last one is the most difficult to achieve of all pathways, but at the same time the most effective as it aims to build grassroots, bottom-up change (Diez, Stetter & Albert, 2006, pp. 572-574).

Target of impact		Approach by EU	
		Actor-driven	Integration process
	Policy	(1) compulsory impact	(2) enabling impact
	Society	(3) connective impact	(4) constructive impact

Figure 1: The Four Pathways as explained by Diez, Stetter & Albert (2006)

In their book from 2008, Diez, Stetter & Albert present a large theoretical chapter, which links their four pathways with a model that assesses the different stages of a conflict (Messmer, 2003) and defines the concepts of ***conflict episodes***, ***issue conflicts***, ***identity conflicts*** and ***subordination conflicts***. This responds to the theory that one has to identify the level of aggression, cross-border communication, violence, and thus seriousness of a conflict to be able to react to it adequately. Conflict episodes are isolated incidents without a connection to a larger, long-term threat. Issue conflicts are related to various incidents that may be connected to one matter of contention. Identity conflicts are directly concerned with the identity of the opponents and usually have a higher level of securitization. Subordination conflicts are the most serious ones, and thus usually the most violent stage and imply situations where the two sides feel an existential threat by the mere presence of the other (Diez, Stetter & Albert, 2008, pp. 17-19). The identification of a conflict stage helps me categorize the seriousness of an incident.

Pace (2008) wrote on the EU's influence as a normative 'force for good'. Through this, she focuses on the motivation of EU actors as they strive to

transform border conflicts (Pace, 2007, Diez & Pace, 2007). However, the use of these terms is a mainly unidirectional approach, i.e. the focus lies on the direct actions of the EU and its various institutions and how its indirect presence affects conflict actors. It falls short in fully explaining the response of the conflict actors, which make up the other side of the correspondence and have their own views that influence the way the EU affects the conflict they are involved in (Christou, 2010, p. 5). I deem this perception of the EU as a force for good by the conflict parties to be at least equally important and explain it in the subsequent section.

Rumelili (2007) proposes an additional framework to sort the EU's outer borders into a spectrum that ranges from *hard border* to *open frontiers*. According to her, a hard border keeps the EU from connecting with institutions on the other side and from developing transnational ties with non-governmental actors. The types of hard borders described by Rumelili range across three dimensions: Institutional (demarcating institutional benefits), physical (restricted movement of goods, people and services) and identity (demarcating self from other). This would restrict the direct and indirect impact the EU may have across the border. I will pick up on these terms, however, under a different definition implying any border between conflict parties. I will make use of four dimensions: Physical borders, identity borders, level of communication between the sides and level of violence. A **hard border** involves restricted movement of goods, people and services, a demarcation of self from other, a low communication and a high level of violence. An **open border** thus means a fairly easy movement of goods, people and services, no demarcation of self from other, high level of communication and a low level of violence. These two will determine my level of securitization, which I use here as the seriousness of a conflict or incident therein.

2.2. Normative impact (multidirectional)

On the fusion of multidirectional and normative EU impact on border conflicts, Parker (2008) came up with three concepts: ***Manifest emulation***, ***manifest manipulation*** and ***manifest rejection***. The first implies that a conflict party identifies with the normative image of the EU as a force for good, thus making EU policies more effective. The second implies three scenarios where the conflict parties either accept the EU as a force for good and reject EU norms, or they accept the EU as a force for good and manipulate EU norms to enhance the conflict towards their preference, or, finally, they agree with EU norms but don't accept the EU as a force for good. The third concept, *manifest rejection*, implies the complete incompatibility with the EU, i.e. both the rejection of its norms and its normative impact as a force for good. This last stage means that the EU is practically powerless and has little chance of affecting the transformation of the border.

Figure 2 (see below) shows how the direct/indirect influences from the four pathways are related to the normative impact and to the level of securitization. Point A implies a case of a hard border and manifest rejection, which provides very limited possibility for the EU to influence the conflict. Point B illustrates the opposite, where the EU has a good chance of making a difference. However, the variables of manifest rejection/manifest emulation and hard border/open frontier are not necessarily related. Conflict actors may see the EU as a force for good, but a hard border may still restrict the EU's abilities to connect the conflict parties and

achieve successful intervention. In the following part I will explain what I expect to find in my empirical analysis.

EU direct and indirect impact weak/negative		EU direct and indirect impact strong/positive	

Point A hard border / **Point B** open frontier

Conflict parties (inside/outside/incoming)				
Manifest rejection	**Manifest manipulation**			**Manifest emulation**
EU construction as 'force for good' not shared by conflict parties **Rejection of the EU as a force for good and all EU norms. The EU is 'powerless' to transform conflict situations through direct or indirect means**	EU construction as a 'force for good' is shared by the conflict parties, but EU norms are not	EU construction shared by some conflict parties, but at least one conflict party uses EU norms to enhance conflict	EU construction as a 'force for good' is shared by some conflict parties	EU construction as 'force for good' shared by all conflict parties **Conflict parties identify with the EU as a force for good and all the EU norms that underpin this. Maximizes EU opportunity to transform conflict directly and indirectly**
	These scenarios limit EU opportunity to influence transformation of conflicts directly and indirectly			

Figure 2: The complete analytical framework by Christou (2010), who fused Rumelili (2007), Diez & Pace (2007) and Parker (2008)

2.3. Theoretical presumptions and hypotheses

The theory underlying my analytical framework consists in large part of Diez, Stetter & Albert's (2006) framework of the four pathways, for which they provide an excellent overview over the constitution and quality of EU interventions. Their direct and indirect analysis makes use of the following basic presumptions:

1. The EU affects a conflict both by communications from its own institutions/actors and by structural qualities of the integration or association framework.
2. Perturbation may happen bottom-up or top-down.
3. Actors within the conflict setting can affect it both positively and negatively.
4. Perturbation at times addresses the problem in a conflict directly, other times it is only aimed at indirectly.
5. Both the EU and conflict parties are no homogeneous actors, they may disagree internally or not come to a general conclusion about an issue. Furthermore, the interpretation of the conflict by the EU and the conflict parties affects the outcome of the conflict as well as the interpretation of the EU by the conflict parties.

6. All actors involved in the conflict affect the outcome, including third parties and outside forces like the constellation of the international society, which may enhance or reduce EU impact on the conflict. (Diez, Stetter & Albert, 2008, pp. 31-32)

These presumptions are understood by taking successful perturbation as a destabilization of the conflict by the EU, thus provoking a "conflict with the conflict" (Diez, Stetter & Albert, 2008, p. 24). This can be achieved through various steps covered by the four pathways. The following hypotheses take this into account and connect it with the multidirectional approach:

In terms of unidirectional impact, I expect to find that *the most powerful tool the EU has in influencing a border conflict is the 'carrots and sticks' approach of the compulsory impact* (hypothesis 1). I also expect to find that *the EU has the strongest impact where membership can be offered to a country* (hypothesis 2). Moreover, *EU impact will be highest where it is the only or principal peace-building force* as opposed to cases where other actors like the UN lead the reconciliatory efforts (hypothesis 3). In terms of the normative dimension, *EU impact will most likely be more positive where it is recognized as both a force for good and where its norms and values are accepted* (hypothesis 4). Finally, *the EU has a greater possibility to impact a border conflict if it revolves around an open frontier rather than a hard border* (hypothesis 5).

3. Research Design and Methodology

My main research question reads as follows: **What are the effects of European Union measures on key events in border conflicts?** To answer this appropriately, I have to define key events and measure a multitude of variables that I have formulated into seven sub questions:

- What incidents in a border conflict can be identified as key events with measurable EU influence? (Q1)
- What direct/indirect pathways has the EU used to influence these events? (Q2)
- What normative factors have shaped the outcome of these disputes? (Q3)
- What role does the EU have in the peace-building effort in relation to other actors? (Q4)
- What possibilities do conflict parties have of integrating into the EU? (Q5)
- What is the level of securitization before the key event? (Q6)
- How does the level of securitization change after the key event? (Q7)

Q1 makes me choose two key events per conflict that were crucial to the outcome of the conflict, display notable EU involvement and that should provide for a change in independent variables to be able to measure a difference. Q2 regards the **impact through the unidirectional "four pathways"** (independent variable), which is measured through the attributes *compulsory*, *constructive*, *connective* and *enabling*. They are partly overlapping and cannot be completely separated from each other, but one is always able to identify whether a EU measure was predominantly based on one of them. For instance, the Commission reacted to the IRA ceasefire in 1994 by increasing its contribution to the International Fund for

Ireland (CAIN) by a third (Hayward & Wiener, 2008), thus it is an actor-driven policy, or in other words a *compulsory* impact on the conflict. Second, I will test the **normative multidirectional impact** (independent variable, Q3), which consists of the attributes *manifest emulation*, *manifest manipulation* or *manifest rejection* (see figure 2). For instance, the reconciliatory process in Cyprus has on both sides experienced an atmosphere of manifest manipulation as the south interprets EU concessions and values differently from the north. In fact, both sides have actively manipulated the normative projection of the EU towards their citizens (Christou, 2010). It is not always easy to find enough evidence to pin point the situation into these attributes, but I will at least provide tendencies. Third, the **role of the EU in the peace-building effort** (independent variable, Q4) is important for the interpretation of the outcome and is split into three attributes: *The EU as the principal peace-building actor* (it is not significantly "rivalled" by another third actor in the perturbation process), the *EU as one among equally important peace-building actors* (e.g. EU and US are equally involved) and *the EU as a minor actor in peace-building* (its efforts are not significant in comparison to other third actors). For example, if I examine EU impact on the Cyprus conflict in 2004, I have to take into account the UN's role as an arbitrator as well since it negotiated the reunification goal through its Annan Plan at the same time as the EU tried to ease the conflict by integrating the Republic of Cyprus as a member state (Demetriou, 2008). In that case, I would roughly assume them to be of equal importance (second attribute). As a fifth factor, I have to identify the **possibility of EU membership of a conflict party** (independent variable, Q5), since it determines, for instance, the power of the compulsory and enabling impacts the EU may use to influence a conflict party to act. Lastly, the **level of securitization at the border before the key event** (independent variable, Q6) determines whether the conflict revolves around a *hard border*, an *open frontier* or *neither hard nor open frontier*. These are complex concepts as I measure them across four dimensions (physical- and identity borders, communication and violence). For a hard border I must make a convincing case by identifying little movement across the border, an ongoing *identity conflict* or *subordination conflict* (Messmer, 2003), low communication and at least a threat of violence. For example, the Israel-Palestine conflict in Gaza is still operating on a highly securitized level, which means that violence is frequent, movement across the border is very restricted, communication between the conflict parties is very low and there is a deep identity rift between the two sides. This would suggest a hard border (Yacobi & Newman, 2008). An open frontier would mean the exact opposite. Anything in between is identified as neither hard nor open frontier. Finally, I will identify the outcome by the **development of securitization in the border conflict after the key event** (dependent variable, Q7), which will be measured either in an *increase* or a *decrease in securitization*. That is, if there is a significant change for better or worse in any of the four dimensions involved in my level of securitization variable, I will use that to judge whether perturbation in the case was successful or not. Combined with the role of the EU, I will make arguments what implications its impact had.

To gather data in the empirical part I will rely on a qualitative meta-analysis (see Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002, p. 426-455). This approach involves conducting a narrative literature review of all the scientific articles relevant to my research question. I will code the findings of those studies into my own variables. This leads to several threats to validity, which I will have to minimize. For instance,

data sets from primary studies may simply be unreliable. Moreover, I cannot randomize the selection of studies. The only way I can avoid these two threats is by collecting as many accounts of one historical incidence as possible, point to the disparities between them and make an argument why I deem one to be more fitting than another. In addition, seemingly identical constructs from different studies may in fact be measured differently and lead to false conclusions. To counter this I must inspect the methodology of authors very closely. Furthermore, examining only publicized articles may lead to a bias. I will have to try and find as many articles and online research papers as possible. Finally, the main threat in a secondary analysis like this is that researchers collect data for a purpose, which will most likely be slightly different from my own, thus there is no assurance that their findings will be appropriate for my own study (Babbie, 2007, p. 280). I must make my arguments according to the historical accounts given in the primary literature and not predominantly base them on variables constructed by their authors, except, of course, if I use the exact same ones (see Diez, Stetter & Albert, 2006, 2008).

For my empirical part I have chosen three crucial examples for their radically different relationship to the EU: The Irish conflict became an inner conflict with the accession of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1973, the Cyprus conflict revolves around an outer border since the Republic of Cyprus' accession in 2004, and the Israel-Palestine conflict is fought by two neighboring countries to the EU. This provides a certain variety, but the cases are almost incomparable, as the independent variables tend to differ dramatically. This led me to split each conflict into two key events, which will allow for a "controlled comparison" in terms of "before" and "after" each and another comparison between them. Thus differences are isolated more clearly (cf. George & Bennett, 2004, p. 81). My units for this first level of analysis are thus these key events, accumulating in a deductive approach that focuses on internal validity (cf. Muno, 2009, pp. 120-127).

Conducting a qualitative comparison between the three conflicts for the second level of analysis, however, produces questionable results: Even though I am using the same five independent variables the variety of possible paths for causal inference is too complex and the number of cases on that level provide too little variety to come to a proper conclusion. There are too many "logical remainders" of causal interplay between the variables that I will not observe to be able to externally generalize my findings as much as my research question demands (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, p. 10). Therefore, I will only tentatively compare EU performance and point to tendencies that I suspect to be important. The sheer complexity of the matter would burst the format of this article if I were to argue beyond that. To further test these theories, follow-up in-depth qualitative comparative analyses of case studies are needed.

What the following empirical part exhibits, then, is the combination of three cross-case studies comparing key events in each conflict for the purpose of approaching an understanding of the larger units of border conflicts (Gerring, 2007, p. 37). I will be able to test my hypotheses on the level of the key events, but will take to a hypotheses-generating approach in the final comparison of the EU's 'performance' in the three conflicts.

4. Empirical Part

4.1. Ireland Conflict

The Ireland border conflict essentially revolves around the split of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which were separated in the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. Especially during the so-called "Troubles", a period from the late 1960s until the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, the violence escalated and evolved into the longest standing conflict inside the European Community/European Union. The focus of this study is on the actual border, as one may identify various conflicts of religious, ethnic or socio-economic nature. The next section will then provide a brief summary of the relevant events, which will lead to the selection of certain key events that provide the focus for the subsequent analysis.

4.1.1. Brief overview over conflict history

Initially, the island of Ireland was separated as a response to the strong opposition between the north (Ulster), which was traditionally protestant and unionist in regard to the relationship with the United Kingdom, and the south, which was catholic and nationalist. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 institutionalized these separatist efforts by creating the Irish Free State (also Republic of Ireland), which corresponded to the nationalist counties. A provisional border was drawn between the Republic and Northern Ireland, which eventually was to be abolished through the work of the Council of Ireland, an institution set up to enhance communication between the two sides. However, this Council was soon suspended, as the opponents did not allow for compromises. The result was that Northern Ireland became the fourth country of the United Kingdom, with its own regional government.

Cross-border cooperation was slow to develop. The 1965 Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement was a cautious restart of the economic relationship between the two sides. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1960s the nationalists around the underground Irish Republican Army (IRA) were quickly turning to violence to force a reunification of the island. Moreover, in 1969 the Irish government sent troops to the southern side of the border as a response to growing tensions. This increase in securitization can be interpreted as a change from an *issue conflict* to a *subordination conflict* (Hayward & Wiener, 2008, p. 35). That point in time also corresponds to the beginning of the Troubles. In 1973, the year that both the UK and the Republic of Ireland joined the European Economic Community (EEC), the conflict escalated and the two sides considered redrawing the border to deal with violence between certain communities. The short-lived Sunningdale Agreement of the same year was an attempt to recreate the Council of Ireland to cope with these increasing tensions, but it wasn't taken serious and was already out of effect in 1974. In 1985, however, the United Kingdom stepped in and helped negotiate the Anglo-Irish Agreement. This brought the governments of the Republic and the north together and gave the former an advisory role in the latter's domestic affairs. Moreover, the constitution of Northern Ireland, which established the North as a separate country, was confirmed in its legitimacy and could subsequently only be refuted by a public referendum. Although tensions remained high and violence was

continued, this was an important step in strengthening and institutionalizing communication between the opposing sides (O'Leary, 1987, p. 6).

Nonetheless, the Troubles continued until the 1998 Belfast Agreement (also Good Friday Agreement), which finally brought peace. It established the North-South Ministerial Council, which is responsible for finding peaceful solutions to cross-border problems. The periodical Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (originated in 1986) was complemented with the British-Irish Council, which was to further the communication between the north and the south under the supervision of the UK government (Ruane & Todd, 2001). Even though the treaty achieved far-reaching integration and largely a desecuritization of the border conflict, social crises were still recurring in its aftermath and the north-south relationship is not without political hiccups until today (Frankland, 2006, pp. 150-151).

4.1.2. Identification of key events & EU's role at the time

Two important events in regards to the European Union's role in the Ireland conflict are the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Even though the EU had little direct impact on both treaties, its indirect influence cannot be denied. The difference between the two agreements from 1985 and 1998 regarding the role of the EEC/EU is roughly thirteen years of European integration.

Leading up to 1985, the EEC was mainly an *enabling* actor in the conflict. There were no European representatives present in the actual intergovernmental conference that produced the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Its influence was felt mostly in a normatively inspiring way and through slight political pressure from continental European countries to resolve the violence (Hayward & Wiener, 2008, p. 48). Thus, for this event the EU was a *minor actor in peace building*. The main third actor involved in making the agreement was the UK government behind Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Hennessey, 2001, pp. 67-71). Further political support came from US president Ronald Reagan, who wanted to help Thatcher maintain the British influence on Irish politics (O'Leary, 1987, p. 10). Indeed, in hindsight even Tony Blair admitted that generally, the British motivation to push for reconciliation in the Ireland conflict was dominated by concerns over 'world opinion' of the UK and its political actions (Smith, 1999, p. 80). There is little mention of a direct role of the EEC.

In the 1998 conference that led to the Good Friday Agreement the main actors remained largely the same. The Irish government, the UK government, and all major political parties of Northern Ireland except for the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) signed the treaty. A referendum of the people of Northern Ireland confirmed the large support for the agreement. The EU was largely passive and continued its role as a *minor actor in peace building*. The opposing sides had to reach a common position on their own and the EU could only help create a process and support an agreement after it was negotiated (Hayward & Wiener, 2008, p. 57). Nonetheless, in the following sections I will argue that it did have an important indirect impact.

4.1.3. Four pathways

For this part I will mostly rely on Hayward & Wiener's analysis. They found that the *compulsory* impact of the EEC/EU was very limited. Only on a few occasions did the Commission, for instance, respond actively to the situation on the island. One notable attempt was the increase of development funds for the Republic of Ireland after the 1994 IRA ceasefire (Hayward & Wiener, 2008, p. 47). Important compulsory impact in relation to the two key events I selected cannot be identified.

Connective impact was much more important to the Ireland conflict in general, as local actors and companies recognized the potential of the emerging Single European Market and EU regional development funds. The Commission recognized this openness for economic growth and supported regional endeavours through programmes like Interreg (interregional cooperation). Opposing communities were thus brought together by economic but also social projects like youth clubs (Hayward & Wiener, 2008, p. 53). Furthermore, the European Parliament grew in its role as a platform of communication between MEPs from various conflict regions. Open confrontations, at times outright furious such as Northern Irish MEP Ian Paisley's (Democratic Unionist Party) frequent interruptions of speeches by his opponent John Hume, became the norm and ensured that communication did not stall (idem, p. 54). The economic boom in Ireland in the second half of the 90s is certainly the product of successful cooperation between the various regions on the island and thus in part a result of the *connective* impact of the EU. In regard to the two key events, we may recognize an increase of communication between the conflict parties that may have helped them to gather political support for the Good Friday Agreement, which was much more successful than its 1985 predecessor.

The *enabling* impact has notably increased from the first key event to the second. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was made in part to increase co-operation between the Republic of Ireland and the UK on the level of the EEC. For instance, political phrases regarding the relationship of the islands highlighted the 'unique relationship' among the two. This political discourse, which approved of a certain type of integration, was the new norm among the majority of the Irish parties (O'Leary, 1987, p. 16). It can be regarded as a direct result of European integration. But the actual cautious steps taken in the Anglo-Irish Agreement do not reflect the same attitude. The core actors that signed the Good Friday Agreement assimilated structural characteristics of the EU to achieve long-term and deeper integration: In a speech from 2001, John Hume, the second leader of the Northern Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party at the time of the Good Friday Agreement, directly acknowledges the major influence of the EU on the creation of the north-south Irish Council, which was to deal with the implementation of European programmes for cross-border integration (Hayward & Wiener, 2008, p. 48).

Finally, the *constructive* impact is apparent in the creation of institutions such as the North West Region Cross Border Group (NWRCBG) and the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB), which both exclusively deal with the connection of regions such as Donegal (Republic of Ireland), Derry, Limavady, Strabane and Magherafelt (Northern Ireland). They ensure that the north-south connection becomes a reality in people's lives and not just a political phenomenon among the elites (idem, p. 55). Actual identity change is hard to measure, but the EU would be the only actor that may have achieved such a thing. John Hume apparently decided to redefine the battlefield as Europe (Todd, 2001), which affected the way that the

conflict was framed and, similarly to the *connective* impact, showed the average people that co-operation rather than violence was the only way of achieving any victory.

Specifically for the two key events, the *enabling* impact is the most important one, while the *connective* impact has been increasing especially since the introduction of the Single European Market. The EU did helped as a passive actor linking the agendas of the conflict parties. The Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Good Friday Agreement were both influenced by that, the latter naturally more so than the former due to an increasing importance of the European institutions over the years.

4.1.4. Normative impact

As all actors involved in the Ireland conflict have been part of the EU since 1973, the normative impact of the EU is very strong. Already in 1972, representatives from both sides voiced their hope that the European integration would eventually do away with the border and render it meaningless (Hayward & Wiener, 2008, p. 49). The impression is that the EU's norms and values were completely embraced then and that this has not changed significantly to this day. In their research on the reaction to the Good Friday Agreement, Ruane & Todd (2001) find that the majority of the big political parties in the north and the south place much hope for complete conflict reconciliation in the long term under European integration, which empowers the transnational and supranational levels. Various important politicians like John Hume, Bríd Rodgers and Mo Mowlam have called the EU a strong inspiration to overcome boundaries (Hayward & Wiener, 2008, p. 50). All of this leaves no doubt that both sides of the Irish border welcome the EU's normative influence, which suggests a process of *manifest emulation* at both times of interest (i.e. 1985 and 1998).

4.1.5. Level of securitization

The Ireland conflict inflicted a death toll of 3,600 in the period from 1969 to 2000. The escalation in 1969 with military presence on both sides of the border, the collapse of communication, the ongoing subordination conflict and the restricted movement suggests a *hard border*. Throughout the 70s, border crossings remained difficult and communication between the two sides was limited (McGarry & O'Leary, 2004, pp. 194-215). However, in part through increasing economic cooperation initiated by European integration via the EEC, communication increased once again and the overall securitization decreased. Political murder equally decreased from about 300 deaths a year from 1970 to 1977 to about 100 a year from 1978 to 1985. Thus, at the time of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the situation had already acquired a lower level of urgency, suggesting *neither a hard nor open frontier*. This trend continued until the paramilitary/terrorist threat mainly stopped in 1994 with the IRA ceasefire (Tonge, 2002). In 1998 and during the years before the Good Friday Agreement, the border was increasingly becoming more open (Pruitt, 2007, p. 1524), but for the persisting identity conflict and the limited movement I refrain from changing the attribute here.

4.1.6. Outcome

The Anglo-Irish Agreement did not produce the results it was envisioned to. Its most important achievement was the institutionalization of the British-Irish relationship. But it did not directly account for an actual *decrease* in securitization. The only immediate positive result was the signing of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism by the government of the Republic of Ireland, which is to be understood as a political statement rather than a practical success in the fight against terrorism (O'Leary, 1987, p. 19).

	Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985	Good Friday Agreement 1998
EU indirect/ direct impact	Mostly enabling, also connective	Mostly enabling, also connective
Normative impact	Manifest emulation (on both sides)	Manifest emulation (on both sides)
Role of EU at time	Minor actor	Minor actor
Possibility of EU membership	Both sides already member	Both sides already member
Level of securitization before event	Neither hard nor open frontier	Neither hard nor open frontier
Level of securitization after event	No significant change	Decrease in securitization

Table 1: The Ireland Conflict

The Good Friday Agreement, on the other hand, was indeed a turning point in that in hindsight it constituted the end of the Troubles. One can clearly identify a *decrease in securitization* institutionalized by the three strands of agreement. By defining the border, granting the Northern Irish government more autonomy, institutionalizing cross-border cooperation and ironing out some contradictions in the constitutions of the two Irish states, some important issues were actually solved. Despite this growing stability, the identity conflict still continues on the level of communities while the actual border has been desecuritized (Hayward & Wiener, 2008, p. 40). The violence stopped, but political turmoil ensues as internal disputes make life hard for the government in Northern Ireland (Gallagher, 2004, p. 639).

Table 1 sums up the findings above. What is striking is that there is no significant change in the independent variables, which in conjunction with the EU's minor role in the conflict restricts clear testing of hypotheses. No *compulsory* policies were used in relation to the key events, but as the *enabling* and *connective* influence grew over the years with the increasing institutional spillover of the EEC and the EU, impact has most likely been positive. Meanwhile, the EU was apparently an inspiration for key actors to discuss reconciliatory measures, thus confirming my fourth hypothesis regarding the normative impact. According to

Hayward & Wiener (2008), the Good Friday Agreement might not have happened without the underlying dynamics of European integration.

4.2. The Cyprus Conflict

The Cyprus conflict is certainly the most studied example of EU intervention in border conflicts. It was welcomed as a EU candidate country with the premise of reunification, but even now that it is a member state this goal has not yet been achieved. The EU's influence on the conflict has at times been rather critical and its role is condemned by some authors as prolonging the dispute rather than desecuritizing it. The following section will discuss the background of the conflict.

4.2.1. Brief overview over conflict history

At the beginning of the 20th century, the island of Cyprus was under British rule. It officially became a colony of the United Kingdom in 1925. However, growing unrest among the population signalled the desire to become independent: *Enosis* was the ambition of the Greek Cypriots to join the 'motherland' Greece, whereas TMT (*Türk Mukavemet Teskilati*) was the idea of partitioning the island according to Turkish Cypriot interests (Demetriou, 2008, p. 67). During World War II these tensions quieted down, but were soon reinitiated in a more violent manner. Following the Zürich Agreement of 1960, the UK finally handed over sovereignty to a Cypriot government in the capital city Nicosia, uniting the island's two ethnic communities with a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president. Yet following an eruption of communal violence in 1963 the United Nations deployed the UNFICYP force in 1964 (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus).

When the military junta government of Greece in 1974 openly announced it supported *enosis* as a solution it inspired a coup d'état spearheaded by Greek nationalist Nikos Sampson, replacing the bicommunal government. Turkey reacted by sending troops and heavy fighting ensued in which the Turkish army gained control of about one third of the island (Papadakis, Peristianis & Welz, 2006, pp. 3-4). The previous *issue conflicts* turned into a full-fledged *subordination conflict* (Demetriou, 2008, p. 67). In a 1975 referendum, the Turkish population of the north voted for independence and constituted its own government under the name Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). As of now, only Turkey has recognized it as a country. While the Turkish army staid at the newly drawn border, the UNFICYP forces created a buffer zone (Green Line) between the two sides to prevent a war. This line also divides the capital city of Nicosia (Frankland, 2006, pp. 84-87).

Since then communication between the conflict parties increased, violence ceased, but cross-border movement is still restricted. After various meetings contact has been re-institutionalized. The Greek Republic of Cyprus (RoC) applied for EU membership in 1990, claiming that membership would work as a catalyst for the conflict. The Commission accepted the application in 1993. At the European Council in Luxembourg in 1997 negotiations officially started. Two years later in Helsinki the European Council stated that a solution to the conflict was a necessity for accession. The same meeting saw Turkey become a candidate country for conditional EU membership as well (i.e. open-ended negotiations), which was to counterbalance the RoC negotiations. At the same time, the UN appointed a Special

Adviser on Cyprus, who started organizing formal bilateral meetings. In 2002, two technical committees were created to deal with common state laws and treaties. At the 2003 European Council in Athens the RoC signed the Accession Treaty without having found a solution to the conflict. Meanwhile, the TRNC opened up two checkpoints at the Green Line, effectively increasing movement and communication (Demetriou, 2004, pp. 7-10).

In 2004 the UN presented the Annan Plan, which proposed a new framework for a reunified, federal government for Cyprus. In a historical referendum the two communities were able to decide whether they would be reunited. On April 24th in 2004, the Turkish Cypriots accepted, but the people of the Greek south rejected it. Nonetheless, on May 1st the Republic of Cyprus became a member state of the European Union (Eralp & Beriker, 2005, pp. 186-187).

4.2.2. Identification of key events & EU's role at the time

For this analysis I will focus on two events: The Helsinki European Council of 1999 and the 2004 accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU. The strategy of the EU changed immensely between those two events as in 1999 conflict reconciliation was favoured to be completed before membership and in 2004 this had to be changed to a post-accession reunification strategy.

The role of the EU at the time of the Helsinki meeting was already that of a secondary conflict actor. It did not become a classic mediator as it could not stay entirely neutral with member states like the UK (former colonial power) and Greece (another conflict actor). This was rather left to the UN (Diez & Pace, 2007, p. 8). Nonetheless, by linking the solution of the border conflict to membership, the EU was suddenly directly involved in the conflict. Its use of political conditionality stresses this as it began to make use of its role by demanding an increase of communication and co-operation. Thus, I define the EU as *one among equally important peace-building actors.*

This would not change until the actual accession of the RoC in 2004, which is when the EU became a primary conflict actor. Any hostilities towards the Greek Cypriot government were now also hostilities against the EU itself. Only for the prevailing importance of the UNFICYP presence did the EU not become the *principal peace-building actor*.

4.2.3. Four pathways

The *compulsory* impact at the Helsinki conference was fairly strong. The EU defined the membership negotiations by pointing out that "a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union", but that "if no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition" (Demetriou, 2004, p. 13). This had two immediate effects: First, the RoC felt confident that whatever happens, it would be backed by the EU and eventually become a member state. Second, the TRNC was not involved, as it demanded to be recognized as a country before showing up for negotiation talks. This in turn conflicted with the RoC's constitution, which proclaims to be the sovereign government of the whole island. Thus, in essence with this compulsory statement the EU rewarded the Greek community and punished the Turkish side

(Eralp & Beriker, 2005, p. 184; Talmon, 2006, p. 583). On the other hand, promising membership to the RoC was a powerful 'carrot' that provided incentives for positive negotiations. For there was another *compulsory* linking of issues at the Helsinki meeting, namely the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate member state. The previous Council in Luxembourg had rejected this, which led to a higher securitization at the Cyprus border as the TRNC closed down border crossings and refused to continue cross-border cooperation. The TRNC's reaction to Helsinki was then positive and reversed these developments. In fact, the negotiation round that followed the Helsinki meeting was very productive and enabled the UN to continue the ongoing reconciliation talks in New York (Fisher, 2001, p. 317). This ultimately led to the reunification proposal of the Annan Plan, to which the governments of both communities agreed (Demetriou, 2008, p. 76).

The situation in 2004 turned out to be quite different from the general expectations of EU diplomats. For instance, the Commission always issued statements referencing the 'Cyprus' accession' as a whole, never even considering a failure of reunification talks (Diez, 2002, p. 3). It was to much surprise in Brussels that even though the negotiation process was perceived as a success, co-operation had increased and the EU had increasingly provided development funds to stimulate support on both sides, the Annan Plan was rejected by the population of the RoC on April 24th, 2004 (Eralp & Beriker, 2005, p. 187). Nationalist propaganda had denounced the plan as favouring the Turkish stance and effectively hindered its implementation. With the subsequent entry of Greek Cyprus into the EU on May 1st most of the *compulsory* 'carrots and sticks' approaches had reached their limit. The last program of that kind immediately before the RoC's accession was the Green Line Regulation, which eased border crossings and allowed for non-Cypriots to enter the EU via the TRNC. The north perceived this as a failure as it was not implemented well by the south and did not provide for an increase in trade, which is what it was designed for (Demetriou, 2008, p. 78).

The *connective* impact of the EU on these events is fairly limited. Cross-border communal programmes have included the Leonardo da Vinci vocational education and training initiative and the Socrates programme (now Lifelong Learning Programme) for movement of students in higher education (Demetriou, 2008, p. 81). Moreover, neither of the specific key events I selected qualify directly as *enabling* impact.

A large demonstration organized by the Turkish-Cypriot opposition that signalled the rising wish of the population for a solution to the conflict can be considered as a positive *constructive* impact by the EU (Demetriou, 2004, p. 18, 2008, p. 79). It encouraged those on the Greek side that are hoping for a solution to the conflict and brought the two communities together despite the animosity that their governments display. A survey from 2007 showed that, in fact, the vast majority of the people of Cyprus (i.e. from both sides of the border) are ready for reunification and demand from their leaders to make it a reality, which despite lower securitization has not happened to this day (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p. 363). Media discussions in Cyprus have revolved around topics like common 'European values', which shows the hope that people have in coming together under the umbrella of the EU (Demetriou, 2008, p. 82).

Generally, the Helsinki European Council and the 2004 accession of the RoC into the EU were *compulsory* impacts, which sought to bring about change through

'carrots and sticks' strategies like withdrawing or promising membership status or providing financial assistance as rewards (Eralp & Beriker, 2005, p. 188).

4.2.4. Normative impact

The Helsinki Council is an interesting starting point to look at the very different perception of the EU in Greece and Turkey. Greece has a long history of using negative conditionality from inside the EU to portray Turkey as the 'non-European other'. In that sense, for the Greek governments leading up to 1999, the EU was seen as a 'force for good' as it helped strengthen the Greek position. Turkey, on the other hand, opposed this by seeing the EU as an agent of Greece and its 'hostile agenda' (Christou, 2010, pp. 62-63). When it thus came to the linking of candidacy of Turkey and Cyprus, Greece only accepted the former with the exchange for an uncompromising accession of the latter without taking conflict reconciliation as a precondition for membership. To the Turkish Cypriot side this in turn sent the message that the EU favoured a version of '*enosis* through the back door', as the RoC was treated as the legitimate government of Cyprus whereas the TRNC was not recognized at all (Diez & Pace, 2007, p. 9). As the normative basis for the EU is in part its faithfulness to international law, the Greek point was underlined by the illegitimacy of the Northern Cypriot government. This strong normative support for the Greek position enabled the RoC to a certain 'misuse' of European norms and values for an opportunistic political agenda (Demetriou, 2008, p. 72, 84).

However, the time leading up to the 2004 accession of Cyprus to the EU was indeed promising as more moderate leaders took over in Turkey and the TRNC. As a prospective member state, Turkey was able to see beyond the perception of the EU as an agent of Greece and early *manifest rejection* policies of its nationalist government were replaced by more friendly views under Prime Minister Erdogan, who came into power in 2002 (Talmon, 2006, p. 37). Communication increased with the opening of the Green Line in 2003 and the communities began to increase cross-border co-operation. Still the question remains why the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, given a historic chance for reunification with the referendum of the Annan Plan, opposed it and thus prolonged the stalemate. It may be explained by the election of RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos of the right-wing DIKO party, who as opposed to the positive development of his predecessor's government imposed a much more conservative view and promoted a critical stance of the Annan Plan (Christou, 2010, p. 65). He deployed a *manifest manipulation* position in relation to EU matters and warped its normative promises to better suit his position.

4.2.5. Level of securitization

The hostile situation between the two conflict parties prior to the Helsinki European Council of 1999 suggests a *hard border*. Even though the threat of violence had ended, communication was very low, cross-border movement was almost non-existent and the subordination conflict ensued (Eralp & Beriker, 2005, p. 183; Anastasiou, 2002, Kazan, 2002, p. 60).

Prior to the 2004 accession of the RoC, the border had experienced a moderate level of desecuritization through the opening of certain checkpoints by the TRNC and the Green Line Regulation of 2003. Although the Green Line Regulation was

hardly implemented and trade or cross-border movement did not increase significantly, communication was institutionalized by the accession negotiations, the threat of violence decreased and public demonstrations suggest a less intense demarcation of self versus other (Demetriou, 2008, pp. 76-77), thus I choose the *neither a hard nor open frontier* option.

4.2.6. Outcome

The Helsinki European Council can be seen as a fairly positive intervention. By promising membership to the Republic of Cyprus and accepting Turkey as a candidate state, the EU properly started its attempts at helping conflict reconciliation. The peak of this positive development was the 2002 Copenhagen Council, which produced a statement by all conflict actors to aim for a solution to the dispute in February 2003 (Eralp & Beriker, 2005, p. 185). It also enabled and stimulated the UN negotiations, which produced the promising Annan Plan. There was a clear increase in communication and at least a promise for one in cross-border co-operation (thus a *decrease* in securitization). However, the turning point came in 2003, when the deadline for a conflict resolution was repeatedly postponed. With the changing government on the Greek side, the odds for a successful reunification dropped significantly without a proper response by the EU.

	Helsinki European Council 1999	Accession of the RoC 2004
EU indirect/ direct impact	Compulsory	Compulsory
Normative impact	Manifest manipulation (RoC), manifest rejection (TRNC)	Manifest manipulation (both sides)
Role of EU at time	One among equally important peace-building actors	One among equally important peace-building actors
Possibility of EU membership	RoC candidate state, TRNC only through reunification (Annan Plan)	RoC becomes member state, TRNC not
Level of securitization before event	Hard border	Neither hard nor open frontier
Level of securitization after event	Decrease	No significant change

Table 2: The Cyprus Conflict

2004 then provided the results of this development with the failed Annan Plan and an accession of the Republic of Cyprus. This effectively brought a complicated border conflict right into the middle of the European Union, whose hands are now tied. Without significant progress in the accession talks of Turkey very little can be

done as the two issues are now as connected as ever (Talmon, 2006, p. 615). Even though communication and cross-border co-operation have *not* actually *decreased* since 2004, further steps towards reconciliation are hard to find. The only real progress can be measured in the growing disparities between civil society and the governments on both sides of the border (Hadjipavlou, 2007; Demetriou, 2008, p. 92; Christou, 2010, p. 72).

Table 2 sums up the findings above. My first hypothesis is in part confirmed in that the EU's compulsory endeavours did have a profound effect on the situation. My second hypothesis is equally reinforced, as the EU only became an important actor once membership was offered to the RoC. Regarding my third hypothesis, the EU's impact could have been different had it had the UN's responsibilities as well (i.e. had it been the principal peace-building force), but it was unable to for some of its member states were principal conflict actors at different times (the UK and Greece). It is reasonable to blame the failure of the Annan Plan in part on the *manifest manipulation* of the RoC's government, which also negatively affected the EU's impact and thus underlines my fourth hypothesis. Finally, the fairly high level of securitization in 1999 did restrict the EU's ability to impact as can be observed, for instance, by the RoC's reluctance to implement the opening of the Green Line in 2003, but it remains unclear to what extent. As a concluding remark, the crucial variable in the failure to reunite the communities in 2004 was most likely the manipulation of the EU's and the UN's normative impact on the Greek side that ultimately prevented the ratification of the Annan Plan.

4.3. Israel-Palestine Conflict

The Israel-Palestine conflict is quite different from the previously mentioned cases in various ways. First of all, it is certainly among the most serious and complicated violent conflicts worldwide and has implications for the whole Middle Eastern region. Moreover, the European Union is engaged mainly as a "civilian power", promoting an economic agenda and underlining the importance of international law in the conflict. This is opposed by the powerful influence of the United States, which has traditionally been Israel's greatest supporter. The EU has thus only limited influence as neither of the primary conflict actors is considered a possible candidate for membership in the union (Yacobi & Newman, 2008, p. 185). It is a useful case to study the impact the EU may have as a *minor actor* in a border conflict.

4.3.1. Brief overview over conflict history

The conflict between Israel and Palestine has a very long history, which has been discussed and analyzed sufficiently in the literature (see Tessler, 1994; Yacobi & Newman, 2004a, 2008). For this very brief summary, I will start in 1967, when the Egyptian army entered the Sinai Peninsula and the Six Day War started. In a few days Israel successfully conquered Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the whole West Bank, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. Efforts were made to colonize the new territory through the placement of Israeli settlers. Both sides constantly feared for their existence, which are signs of a *subordination conflict.* In 1973, Syria and Egypt started another offensive, which was equally unsuccessful and the UN stepped in to impose a ceasefire. The first multilateral agreement was mediated by the United

States at the Camp David Accords of 1978. It constituted a retreat of the Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula and drew a border that gave Israel the Negev Desert and access to the Red Sea in the south, while Gaza remained under its control (Yacobi & Newman, 2004a, pp. 10-12).

The next important step were the Oslo accords of 1993, which ended in an agreement that promised a gradual retreat of Israeli settlers from Gaza and the West Bank and a restraint from further Palestinian violence (Tessler, 1994, p. 754). This was supported by a second agreement in 1995 officially granting the Palestinian Authority (PA) self-rule in various important cities such as Bethlehem, Ramallah and Nablus. However, *de facto* most of the authority remained with Isreael (Finkelstein, 1995, p. 181). 1999 saw the election of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in part over the promise of the continuation of peace talks. The aim was to reach a final peace agreement in September 2000. This was accompanied by the 'Road Map', a combination of deadlines and progress benchmarks supervised by the "Quartet", which consisted of the USA, the EU, the UN and Russia (Yacobi & Newman, 2004a, pp. 14-15). Since at this point the *subordination conflict* seemed to have been dissolved to some extent, the underlying *identity conflict* became the target of these peace negotiations.

However positive these developments were on paper, the actual violence did not cease. The Israeli government reacted by starting the construction of a "security fence" that divides the Gaza strip and the West Bank from Israeli territory. It did not follow the official Green Line though as about 80% of the fence was built inside Palestinian territory, supposedly to keep Israeli settlers safe who live there. This new *de facto* border separated about 12,000 Palestinians from their communities and was unanimously condemned by the international community as it clearly violated the rights established by the Geneva Convention (Yacobi & Newman, 2004a, p. 17). In September 2000, a new wave of violence from both sides began, with increased Palestinian suicide attacks (*Intifada*) and heavy Israeli retaliation. In 2004, Prime Minister Sharon declared the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, which was backed by US President Bush and eventually implemented (Yacobi & Newman, 2008, p. 178).

As of today, the conflict has not evolved much further. Israel has withdrawn from Gaza, but not from the West Bank. The humanitarian situation in the Gaza strip has worsened and access for foreigners is very limited. The political situation escalated in 2010, when Israel violently stopped a large fleet of international humanitarian activists that were trying to breach the blockade around Gaza (Spiegel Online, 2010a). This prompted a negative reaction all over Europe and inspired the EU to start negotiations with Israel over how to allow passage for such convoys.

4.3.2. Identification of key events & EU's role at the time

To analyze the role of the EU in the Israel-Palestine conflict, I selected two key events that were somewhat crucial to its development: First, the drawing of the 'Road Map' agreements at the Camp David Summit in 2000, brokered by the Quartet (US, UN, EU, Russia) and with support from the Arab League, and second, Ariel Sharon's Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2004, which was supported by the US and initially criticized by the EU (Yacobi & Newman, 2004b, pp. 5-7).

The Camp David Summit of 2000 was essentially a product of the Oslo Accords and promised to be quite an important step in bringing the conflicting sides together. As a part of the Quartet, the European Union was at least officially on par with the United States and sought to be recognized as a crucial actor. In fact, the period from 1998 to 2000 may be identified as the peak in EU involvement in the Middle East as it filled its complimentary role next to the US (Dannreuther, 2004, p. 161). Nonetheless, President Clinton and his staff dominated the negotiations. Despite the wish of the Palestinian Authority for the EU to further increase its involvement, at this event it turned out to be a *minor actor in peace building* (Yacobi & Newman, 2008, p. 180).

With the sudden increase of violence in September 2000, the slightly enhanced role of the EU deteriorated again to its initial state (Dannreuther, 2004, p. 161). Furthermore, with the US mostly stepping aside after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the EU lost the diplomatic basis it was manoeuvring on (Hill, 2004, p. 155). Thus, the time around 2004 and the Gaza Disengagement Plan displayed a more or less helpless EU. The following sections will provide proper explanations for this.

4.3.3. Four pathways

The EU has indeed very few options in effectively impacting the Israel-Palestine conflict. Its influence is mainly felt as the prime economic partner for Israel and the most important provider of development aid to the Palestinian territories. Cooperation is institutionalized via the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). As of now, the possibilities for EU membership of either Israel or the Palestinian Authority are very low and there seems to be little desire for accession within these conflict parties (Yacobi & Newman, 2008, p. 185). Thus, the EU's *compulsory impact* is very limited and a classic 'carrots and sticks' approach via political conditionality cannot be used. In fact, the possibilities of using conditionality in this conflict do not seem to be discussed at all in Brussels (Perthes, 2004, p. 87).

In terms of a *connective impact* in the Middle East, the EU promotes and finances NGOs on both sides of the Green Line. This is meant to foster cross-border dialogue and help peace movements from both camps share ideas for solutions (Yacobi & Newman, 2008, p. 192). Moreover, through the economic negotiations of the EMP and the ENP, the conflict actors are brought together and thus have to get used to each other's presence. Unfortunately, the discussions deal strictly with trade and investment matters. Therefore, the *connective impact* regarding the two key events is limited to the EU's involvement in the Camp David Summit of 2000, which equally brought the conflict parties together and may be interpreted as a *connective* platform for reconciliation.

The EU's *enabling impact* is different for each side: Whereas the EU and Israel have a strong economic relationship that is based on imports and exports, the EU and the Palestinian territories do not share this. However, the Palestinian Authority relies heavily on European development aid. This comes in form of humanitarian financial help, support for regional development and even simple provisions for the PA's general budget. Without the transfer of billions of Euros the Palestinian Authority might not have survived for simple economic reasons (Yacobi & Newman, 2008, p. 189). This helps explain why the Palestinians favour

the EU over the US and demanded that it expanded its role in the Camp David Summit of 2000.

Due to the lack of security and stability in the Middle East, a *constructive impact* of the EU is almost non-existent. In sum, I point to the failure of the EU to have a significant direct or indirect impact on the two key events I have selected.

4.3.4. Normative impact

The normative dimension may be the key to explaining the little influence of the EU on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Yacobi and Newman (2008) point to the contradicting feelings that Israelis have for Europe: For one, many Jews see the EU as the place where the Holocaust happened. These aversions have carried on into the 21st century and especially Germany, a prime force behind the EU, has felt the Israeli uproar whenever it criticizes Israel. The same goes for Britain, which stood against the creation of the Israeli state between 1945 and 1948 (idem, p. 181; Pace, 2007, p. 1054). Furthermore, European countries were much quicker than the United States to accept the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the official authority of the Palestinian territory. Israelis perceived it as a Terrorist organization. Finally, the EU's position as a defender of international law, which the Israeli government effectively ignored several times displayed the confrontational relationship with Europe. Therefore, Israel's ruling elite generally rejects the EU as a 'force for good'. While its norms and values may be mirrored by Israeli culture, which after all is of European heritage, this combination suggests a case of *manifest manipulation* or possibly even *manifest rejection* (Pace, 2007, pp. 1050-1056).

As for the Palestinians, the high amount of the EU's financial aid and its generally friendly position towards the Arab world has certainly increased its influence. Despite the bad memories connected with the colonial rule of the Palestine territory by the British, the EU is most likely perceived as a 'force for good' in the conflict (Yacobi & Newman, 2008, p. 191). However, rooting in the ethical and religious differences and the historical animosity between the Arab world and Europe, it is unlikely that the EU's norms and values are supported by the majority of the Palestinians, let alone its ruling elite. Therefore, the normative dimension on the Palestinian side suggests a case of *manifest manipulation*.

I can conclude that with such bold normative differences the theoretical possibilities for effective perturbation are very low and rather point to an almost "powerless" position for impact (see figure 2 in theoretical part). The EU is almost bound to stay a *minor actor in peace building*, as can be observed in both the key events.

4.3.5. Level of securitization

Prior to the Camp David Summit in 2000, the conflict had experienced a positive development. With the Oslo Accords of 1993 and "Oslo II" in 1995, communication had increased substantially (as it was almost non-existent previously). Cross-border cooperation stayed essentially the same, as the Accords were merely frameworks for future collaboration. The identity conflict had not been overcome and though violence had momentarily stopped the situation clearly revolved around a *hard border.*

The Gaza Disengagement Plan was made during the time of terrorist violence and the construction of the separation wall, which is a classic embodiment of a *hard border*.

4.3.6. Outcome

The Camp David Summit of 2000 produced promising results and despite the lack of an agreement one was to be made soon. However, the beginning of the second *Intifada* in September 2000 broke with this trend and clearly was a devolution of the conflict. Communication, cross-border movement and cooperation decreased substantially, rendering the 'Road Map' drawn at Camp David a complete failure and suggesting an *increase* in securitization (Dieckhoff, 2004, pp. 52-53).

	Camp David Summit 2000	Gaza Disengagement Plan 2005
EU indirect/ direct impact	Connective, enabling (for PA)	Connective, enabling (for PA)
Normative impact	Manifest manipulation (PA), manifest rejection (Israel)	Manifest manipulation
Role of EU at time	Minor actor	Minor actor
Possibility of EU membership	No possibility	No possibility
Level of securitization before event	Hard border	Hard border
Level of securitization after event	Increase	Increase

Table 3: The Israel-Palestine Conflict

Similarly, the Gaza Disengagement Plan did not produce positive results for any members of the conflicting communities. While the Israeli settlers did not want to be resettled, the inhabitants of Gaza feared a complete loss of communication with the rest of the region (Alpher, 2005, p. 2). The literal 'sealing' of the Gaza Strip prompted many to compare it to a giant prison (Spiegel Online, 2010b). The situation at the border thus worsened as there is now even less movement and fewer people are allowed to enter or leave Gaza (Yacobi & Newman, 2008, p. 202). Ideas growing in momentum among political commentators propose that the current government of Israel is in fact not looking for a solution to the problem at the moment and actually prefers the status quo to the emergence of a Palestinian state (Chomsky, 2003; Finkelstein, 1995). The future looks grim for the population on all sides of the borders.

Table 3 sums up my findings. Similar to the Ireland case, measurement of the EU's influence in the Israel-Palestine conflict is heavily restricted by the fact that it did not have much of an impact. This would support my second hypothesis, namely that a case where membership cannot be offered limits EU impact. Similarly, the

little impact it did have may not have been very effective as its norms and values were largely rejected or manipulated on both sides. The powerful role of the US as the main mediator and third party cannot be rivalled by a EU that is, as of now, not capable of coming up with a strong consensus for compulsory measures that might require an equally convincing political support.

5. Conclusion

To summarize the first level of analysis I can point to the following conclusions: The Ireland conflict showed positive, yet limited EU impact through mostly enabling and connective pathways. This was supported by the emulating normative stance of the conflict actors. The cease-fires and the end of the violence during the 90s provided a fertile ground for European dialogue and through the increasing correspondence the border was largely desecuritized. The Cyprus conflict demonstrated the power the compulsory pathway may have if the recipient has the status of a candidate member state (in this case the RoC). But it also showcases the importance of understanding and reacting to the way the conflict actors interpret and manipulate these endeavours. The Israel-Palestine conflict mainly offered the insight that the EU has very little impact on a standoff where both sides have no intention or no possibility of integrating into the EU and where the use of violence is often preferred to cooperative discourse.

Comparing the performance of the EU in these three distinct cases to point to general trends is, as mentioned earlier, problematic. Nonetheless, I will provide the following cautious observations: The tendency seems to be that the impact of EU measures on border conflicts is very limited and depends on a large and often ambiguous amount of independent factors. Moreover, in some cases, as for instance in the Cyprus conflict, it may be rather critical and possibly even prolonging the dispute. Crucial to evaluating the EU's impact is its normative image (Christou, 2010; Diez, Stetter & Albert, 2008, p. 236). This has been shown in a large number of studies and has very important implications for the future of the EU's role in border conflicts. In official rhetoric, the EU's portrayal as a 'force for good' has become a central trademark. I argue that this needs to be handled with more care and further studies need to show how to project the EU's image in a way that inspires emulation rather than manipulation or rejection.

I can use these mainly descriptive results and come up with these interesting hypotheses that could be tested in follow-up case studies: *The manipulation of the EU's norms and values by primary actors in border conflicts is related to the failure of some of its measures aimed at reconciliation*. Furthermore, *the success of the EU's impact on border conflicts requires a low level of securitization*. Finally, *the EU is only an important actor in border conflicts where prospective membership is a goal for at least one side*.

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