European Integration within the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy:

A theory-testing approach on preference formation

Abstract

At the Constitutional Convention some member-states voted in favour of a delegation of competences to the EU, while others wanted the opposite. Do theories exist that are able to explain these preferences over constitutional choices? This study is going to examine delegate preferences towards the CFSP at the Constitutional Convention, in order to offer a better understanding on European unification as well as its conditions and approaches. It will figure out that none of the frequently used theoretical approaches towards European Integration and International Relations, used in this paper, is able to predict delegate preferences well. Nevertheless, the findings show that there seems to exist a difference between voting with regard to policies and general topics, which are generally favoured; or concrete measures. The study also concludes that there is a generally positive attitude towards further European Integration, except for the questions of a single European armed force and the creation of a single European security council. However, it is to say that the sample used might be too small for easily generalising the findings and thus the importance of the theoretical approaches given might be underscored.

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List of Abbreviations

CC	Constitutional Convention
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
СОМ	European Commission
EEI	European Economic Integration
EFP	European Foreign Policy
EI	European Integration
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FPI	Foreign Policy Integration
GNI	Gross National Income
IGCs	Intergovernmental Conferences
IR	International Relations
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
TCE	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
TEU	Treaty on the European Union

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1. Introduction

At the time when the Treaty of Maastricht came into force, the European Union (EU) declared it is seeking 'to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy' (art.2 TEU). About twelve years later the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), in its signed version, went a step further with declaring 'the Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence' (art.I-16.1 TCE). This crucial development, especially considering the short timeframe, is particularly important if one keeps in mind that it is unlikely for governments of independent states to abdicate their probably most important and esteemed policy area and to act within this in coordination and cooperation with EU institutions and other EU memberstates, as they are no longer able to solely act according to national preferences on the international sphere. Another point that stresses interest in this area is that the current time is widely considered as being pressing towards intensifying international interdependence (König-Archibugi, 2004). Agreement exists as well in the opinion that every state's willingness to cooperate in forms of supranational political integration is crucial to solve common problems and to produce beneficial opportunities via cooperation in world affairs. Striking is nevertheless, that the development of such organisations depends on the agreement of the member-states themselves, giving the reason that they still display a rare phenomenon. Especially the US invasion in Iraq and, later on, the intervention of Israel in Lebanon opened the stage for calls towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) once more (Jensen, Slapin & König, 2007). Indeed, as one can see above in the different treaty articles, institutional reforms tried to put the CFSP on the agenda, making it a more important aspect of European Integration (EI). Particularly into focus came it with the TCE, intending to put forward reforms. However, the Constitutional Convention (CC) resulted in only modest reforms, producing disappointment not just among the pro-integrationists, but also the ones that hoped for a greater role of the EU in world politics. Discussions started about the reasons of such a weak CFSP and about how the CC could end up in these disappointing results, expeditiously being followed by centring the interest on conflicts of preferences and the opposition of making changes that undermine the own national interest.

The following study aims to observe different explanations for preferences on the institutional design of the CFSP at the CC, by examining national and institutional preferences on CFSP issues. The focus will be on delegates to the CC and their preferences with regard to the respective national or institutional background. Because if differences between institutional and national preferences, the ones of member-states and accession candidates, or more and less influential EU member-states; exist, they will certainly be strongest in European Foreign Policy (EFP). Thus examining these differences in foreign policy is a critical test to be able to predict possible further political integration in the EU. Giving the vast differences between the EU and other international settings, it will not be part of my argument that it can be easily generalised to other questions of regional political integration.

In order to see the relevance of the study as well as the context to which it belongs, the second chapter will offer a brief overview about the most important literature on the topic. To evaluate on the CC in general as well as preference formation during IGCs, the third chapter will give a short outline about EU integration in EFP, the framework of the Convention and the impact of preferences. The fourth section will give a consultancy of some of the main EI and International Relation (IR) theories and their expectations on cooperation in general as well as EU cooperation in the EFP. The theoretical insights will then be followed by the fifth part, where the conceptualisation as well as the methodological restrictions of the study will be introduced. In the sixth section, the data received via a survey from delegates to the CC will be evaluated and afterwards used to test the expectations derived from the theories outlined in section four. A short extra study about preference consistency in this particular sample will be given thereafter. In the end, some concluding remarks regarding the study analysis will be presented.

2. Existing literature

Scientists differ in their view on what actually affects the position of governments towards EI. Some argue that public support and domestic politics play a crucial role (Anderson, 1998; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998), while others claim that identity displays an important fact (Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004) and even others consider economical reasons to be the most crucial once (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996). However, the most interesting thesis towards EI is given by Jachtenfuchs (2001), who came up with a totally

different approach. Within his study he examined that a European institutional self-interest exists which is trying to increase its own power, thus displaying a totally new approach to the theoretical thinking of EU integration. Giving this, one cannot easily generalise the factors of national and sub-national implications or the international context as being the only ones affecting the position of a certain government. Most of the time, it is even the case that some or many of these factors interrelate. The same is true for the governmental position on treaty changes. Christiansen, Falkner & Jørgensen (2002) analysed in their study that treaty reform is influenced by structure and agency. Thus one cannot just merely focus on interests, but moreover needs to consider the role of ideas and institutions, as these shape the position of governments in a temporal dimension. So to say, they are not fixed and thus also the governmental attitude towards treaty changes might vary over time (Christiansen et al., 2002).

The literature on the CFSP itself is more specific, generally putting the focus on two main topics, namely national and partisan preferences. Hereby the area of national interest is clearly the most elaborative, with many authors focusing on how conflicts in national interest hinder the development of EFP institutions (Smith, 2004; Tonra & Christiansen, 2004; Thym, 2004). In this regard, Frieden (2004) observed the interests of sub-national actors towards the EFP, claiming that these depend on the circumstances given. Other researchers like Aspinwall (2002) brought up the claim that ideology and party position rather than nationality drive member state support for European integration. Evidence was gained when discussing government positions at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, from which the conclusion followed, that indicators via Eurobarometer responses predict preferences better than nationality. Nevertheless one has to keep in mind that this is weakest for the area of foreign policy. The study done by König-Archibugi (2004) focused on various theoretical approaches in order to observe the differences in member-state preferences towards EU Foreign and Security Policy. Within this regard he examined the role of foreign policy interests, domestic multilevel governance, Europeanised identities and relative power capabilities and their influence on preferences of the fifteen EU member-states, to find out that the concepts of power capabilities, domestic regional governance and collective identities influence this variation. Evidence was gained from the main treaty revisions on the CFSP, considered at the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-97, and analysed through multivariate logistic regression as well as the novel method.

In regard to the CC, again no consistent opinion can be found. Authors as Magnette and Nicolaidis (2004) see the primary cleavages to be national instead of partisan oriented and especially existent between smaller and bigger countries, due to the handling of the conventions president. Evidence for this is found from observing the conventional process. Tsebelis and Proksch (2007) observed the CC too, but came to different results. They found evidence, via the observation of excerpts from the Rules of Procedure as well as documents, proposals, sequences and amendments of the presidency; that the conventions framework, giving important powers to the presidency, let to the final constitutional treaty. Furthermore they suggested that there is a big difference between the public and the elite, giving that the TCE was ratified easily within the parliaments, but failed to get ratified by the citizens of some member-states. However, the three most interesting studies in regard to the CC were the ones of König & Slapin (2006), König, Warntjen & Burkhart (2006^b) and Jensen et al. (2007), due to the fact that they observed the same data-set that will be used for this study. Nevertheless, the three studies focused on different approaches. König et al. (2006) put their emphasis on observing what factors influenced the position of actors on convention topics. Via the analysis they concluded that issues as the voting rule play an important role, while ratification constraints only have a small impact and institutional positions even no impact at all. According to König et al. (2006^b), who examined general institutional conflicts at the CC, between large and small, old and new member countries as well as national and supranational actors, there exist significant cleavages influencing reform attempts. The study by Jensen et al. (2007) examined delegate preferences towards the CFSP at the CC and thus displays the most closely related empirical approach to this study. They concluded that the party position of delegates is a better predictor within foreign policy than the government position or the personal preferences. Especially interesting in this regard is the measurement of personal preferences, tested via the approach of party affiliation by examining delegates' personal, professional or party web pages; in contrast to the preferences of the political party.

Seeing the review above, it becomes obvious that little research has been done to explain how theoretical expectations from EI and IR theories can be used, in order to explain further integration in the EFP. Thus the following analysis will follow the idea of König-Archibugi and focus on theoretical expectations to explain CFSP preferences in order to further stuff the gap in the literature.

3. Practical insights

The 'Community Method' is known as a set of institutional practices and rules, ensuring a prominent role for supranational agencies as well as a high level of legalization (König-Archibugi, 2004). It emphasizes the difference between European Economic Integration (EEI) which is governed via this, and integration in EFP and security affairs.

Giving this big difference, the study will give a short description about the difficulties of integration in the EFP in the following. Afterwards a short outline about the peculiarities of the CC will be given. The last part will have a look at the impact of actor preferences on negotiations in general, as well as in the European context.

3.1 Integration in EU Foreign Policy

The institutional course of European integration is mainly decided upon during Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), taking place approximately every five years. Terms decided upon during these conferences are generally received through difficult negotiations and end up to be written into the treaties of the EU. The probably most difficult ones of these negotiations, apart from the ones during the CC, were the ones of the foreign and security provisions within the Treaty of Maastricht at the IGC in 1990-91. They made the disagreement clear about the depth of EFP integration, existing among the different memberstate governments and showed clearly that the CFSP is a 'contested institution' (Gourevitch, 1999:137).

Within the CFSP, supranational actors have generally little power, while the guidelines and obligations given for member-state governments are only really vague. The TCE showed the willingness to change this status via strengthening e.g. the impact of common decisions. Article I-16.2 TCE states that 'member-states shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy in a spite of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely impair its effectiveness'. Nevertheless this considerably feeble Foreign Policy Integration (FPI) is not surprising to most scholars as security policy is seen as pivotal to the sovereignty of states.

3.2 The Convention and its formation and management

The Leaken Declaration was announced as part of the Council presidency report in the end of 2001 and convened the convention. The reason for this was given in order to simplify the structure of EU treaties, to develop more transparent, efficient and democratic institutions and decision-making processes as well as to make the EU as a whole more comprehensible to ordinary citizens. This event was special in the regard that for the first time, a new instrument for constitutional bargaining was offered via setting the agenda at a convention, before the actual IGC. Furthermore the conventions president allowed the convention to produce more ambitious reform proposals, while having removed power from the member-states via the decision of not endorsing formal voting and putting the emphases on consensus rather than unanimity (König et al. 2006).

The convention started its consultations in the beginning of 2002 and came up with the draft constitutional treaty in mid-year 2003. During the process, three phases took place. The first one was called 'listening' phase and dealt with presenting delegate views about the future of the EU (König et al., 2006^b). The second phase was the probably most important, being called 'study' phase. During this phase eleven working groups got established, dealing e.g. with areas as external action and defence. The working group on external action emphasised 'the need to enhance coherence and efficiency between institutions and actors' (Working Group External Action, 2002:1). Furthermore it called in its final report for a single person in the roles of High Representative and Commissioner, for the creation of an External Action Council, for an increased use of qualified majority voting (QMV) and for allowing EU membership in international organisations; while having discussed various other options as well (Working Group External Action, 2002). Also the working group on defence gave various recommendations, e.g. on an expansion of the Petersberg tasks, on enhancing the role of the High Representative in crisis management, on the establishment of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency as well as a strengthening of the existing institutional framework in the European Security and Defence Policy. Several of these received broad support (Working Group Defence, 2002). In the beginning of 2003, the Convention finally came to its third phase, called 'drafting' period which concluded with the adoption of a draft constitutional treaty.

3.3 The impact of preference formation on negotiations

Before coming to the core part of this study, the impact of preference formation shall be highlighted. The main focus of this paper will be on the impact of initial state and institutional conditions, which international negotiation analysis tells us to be crucial in defining the process as well as the outcome of negotiations. Odell (2000) stresses that there exist three basic building blocks, namely parties, issues and objectives, under which fall e.g. domestic politics or possible benefits. All of them play a crucial role in defining the initial position of each actor within negotiations. With regard to the establishment of new treaties, being in the need to be accepted by unanimity, the initial position of each actor respectively member-state government is crucial in defining the final outcome. However, the initial conditions do not weight up to the same, meaning that some conditions are more valuable than others in respect to the issue at hand.

The European Convention as well as other IGCs display a perfect forum to observe preference formation within the EU, due to the fact that they have a view on amending treaties and thus play a major role in the process of EI and hence also integration in the European CFSP. Frieden (2004:262) supports this claim while stating that there exist 'political constraints that the European Union, its member-states, and groups within the member-states face in considering whether in fact it is desirable and feasible to unify Europe's international presence'.

In regard to the convention, the main focus was paid upon the conference composition, assuming conflicts between certain groups with regard to their background. Hix (2002) states e.g. that cleavages between national and supranational actors existed within former European summit negotiations. An example is the Amsterdam summit of 1997, where the EP tried to strengthen its parliamentarian power against the Council (Hix, 2002). Giving this, also towards the CC early criticism developed. In support with this assumption is also that the EP never gave up any of its competences, while continuously trying to gain even more influence, as observed by Wessels (2002). Another scientist, who analysed this conflict earlier on is Wincott (2001), stating that the European Commission (COM) strongly proposed a strengthening and wider use of the 'Community method' in its white paper, which Vaubel (2002) puts as an argument for the strong interest of supranational actors in further EU power delegation and centralization at the European Convention. Interesting in this context is that there exists the theory on institutional self-interest, which might be able to explain these

seemingly big differences. Hence it will be elaborated more extensively in the following chapter.

However, also other cleavages were expected at the CC. Scholars agree that small states are generally to be considered as having a less important voice in IR than big member-states. In this regard, Rodden (2002) states that since the foundation of the European Community in 1951, smaller countries seem to constantly worry about a domination of larger member-states, while one has to keep in mind that small member-states, compared to their population size, are strongly overrepresented in the access to European organizations and the general voting weight. Also Mattila (2004) concluded that cleavages between large and small member-states exist and are even visible in the day to day work of the Council, as big countries e.g. do vote more often against majority decisions than small ones in the Council. Moravcsik (1993) came to the conclusion that smaller EU member-states are the ones that receive more benefits from accessing big markets, thus the possible benefits are different to the ones of big memberstates, leading to the expectation that also their preference and support towards a common institutionalization will differ to the one of larger member-states. Giving this the initial position with regard to power capabilities seems to play a strong role in the EU. In EI and IR theories, realism is the most important theory that deals with power capabilities. Thus it will also receive a closer look in the theoretical part, in order to see whether it can be used adequately to explain preference formation in CFSP.

Cleavages were also considered to exist between accession countries and EU member-states, as proposed by König (2005), giving that candidate country delegates were not allowed to vote at the convention although their countries would already become members of the EU, before the constitution would come into force. Furthermore, while thinking about the fact that most of the accession countries are relatively poor compared to the rich member-states, cleavages seem to arise with regard to constitutional preferences (Rodden, 2002), caused by the different identities and domestic contexts. Thus a gap might be existent between these two groups as predicted by the theory of constructivism, which deals with identities and ideas. Giving this, constructivism will be used as the third theoretical approach that will receive a closer look in the following theoretical part.

4. Theoretical framework

After having examined the practical insights above, dealing with the EU Foreign Policy, the formation and management of the CC as well as the impact of preference formation, one can start to develop hypotheses. In order to do this in an appropriate way, various theoretical approaches coming from IR and EI theory will form the basis. Each of these approaches is going to provide a different assumption on the formation of preferences at the constitutional convention and hence tries to give an answer to the general research question of what explains the different preferences of institutions at the CC towards the CFSP.

Realism is one of the main theories used in international relations and tries to explain how preference formation develops under anarchy. One of the different views belonging to the family of realism is the structural realism or neo-realism on which I will focus in the following. Neo-realism is a structure centred approach, focusing on the absence of international government (Donnelly, 2000), in which international organisations are to be considered of a weak and fluid nature (Posen, 2004). Moreover, it views world politics as a continuing struggle for dominance, advantages and survival, focusing on issues of distribution rather than efficiency (Jervis, 1999). As König-Archibugi (2004) states, realism focuses on the means that states have to obtain to be able to get what they want. Cooperation can nevertheless take place due to e.g. collective external threats. However, concerns about relative gains lean towards only limited cooperation, emphasising the strong interest of neorealism to explain certain behaviour by the distribution of power capabilities. Giving this, the power position seems to be responsible for the interest of the state. An interesting thesis is given by Grieco (1996), stating that especially weaker states will support institutionalisation, because it might be an effective second-best solution to a certain problem, while not being dominated by stronger states. Resulting from this, one could argue that governments of EU countries that already have an effective working foreign policy are not in the need, neither willing to cooperate in the CFSP, while mostly smaller states with less weight in foreign politics will increase their power via cooperation. Additionally, these states can restrict and limit more powerful states within organisational frameworks such as the EU. Wivel (2005) supports this claim while stating that the security problems of smaller states are different from those experienced by great powers, due to the fact that their relative lack of power offers them less influence in international events. Hence smaller states are seen to be the main

beneficiaries of international institutions. In this regard, the following hypothesis can be derived from neo-realism:

Hypothesis 1: Delegates from member-states that are smaller and thus have less power capabilities within international cooperation will be more in favour of integration within the CFSP than delegates from bigger member-states.

The second theory, that will be considered here, is institutional self-interest. The very development of self-interest as a human motive goes back to Hobbes (Schwartz, 1986), while its use to explain a supranational setting is quite new. Downing & Brady (1979) state for example, that the self-interest of individuals being responsible for the development of the legislative framework and the implementation of it, displays an important role in the analysis of policy making. Moreover they conclude that 'self-interest is a very powerful model of public policy formation' (Downing & Brady, 1979:26) and that politicians and bureaucrats display utility maximising individuals. Jachtenfuchs (2001) claims that policy-makers at the centre of an organisation, hence in particular the European Commission, will propose more and more regulatory policies due to their institutional self-interest and in order to increase their power. In support with this are Bache and George (2006), claiming that the European Commission vigorously defended its sole right to propose legislation over the years. Hooghe (1999) even concludes in her study about the preference position of Commission delegates that the Commission's institutional interest is without exception in favour of supranationalism. Eichener (1997:598) claims in his paper that 'supranational actors, particularly the European Commission, have an institutional self-interest in driving integration forward, which may come into conflict with the institutional self-interests of the national bureaucracies emphasized in intergovernmentalist explanations'. This is possible due to the fact that the treaties leave the Commission with quite some room for discretion. Furthermore it is stated that the Commission will seek for additional tasks in order to maximise its own power and resources, after it has fulfilled the main legislative duties of the EU. Indications for this are found increasingly, as e.g. the success to convince the Council towards establishing European agencies for health and safety at work (Eichener, 1997). Additionally to this one can see that the EP increasingly tried to insert itself more effectively into the decision-making process of the European Union. While in the beginning the EP only had a consultative function, it now has the right to e.g. block legislation altogether in most policy areas, due to the increasing use of the co-decision procedure (Bache & George, 2006). Hence it can be considered that people working in a supranational institution will be more knowledgeable and positive about the working and importance of these institutions, giving that they are directly involved with the increase of cooperation resulted via institutions. In accordance with this is a Commissioner interview stating, 'it is not the man that makes the job, but the job that makes the men. So when you are working in this environment, after a certain time, you become pro-communitaire' (Hooghe, 1999:15). Therefore the hypothesis which derives from institutional self-interest states:

Hypothesis 2: Members of the European Commission and the European Parliament will be more in favour of integration than representatives of the national government and national parliamentarians.

Social Constructivism is another approach that is quite new to IR, introduced by Onuf in 1989. As Wendt (1992:394) states: 'Interests of states are created and thus it is the interaction with others that creates and instantiates one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process'. Hence Social Constructivism believes that social interaction and social ideas form concepts as power and interest. Many constructivists emphasise on how values, identities and cultural attitudes of domestic groups affect the behaviour of governments, giving a bottom-up aspect (König-Archibugi, 2004). Important is what Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein (1996:52) state: 'Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affects the national security interests or policies of states'. This then will of course also constitute the international system as e.g. scholars like Hall (1999) claim. In comparison to realism and the theory of institutional selfinterest, constructivism tries to understand states interests and behaviour by analysing the international structure of meaning and social value. State interests are defined in the context of internationally held understanding and norms about what is appropriate and good. Nevertheless these interests are usually not the results of external threats or demands, but rather shaped by shared values and norms. Hence organisations have the role to institutionalise and propagate norms defining social realities, cultural norms, interests and identities for the people inhabiting the organisation (Finnemore, 1996). Keeping this in mind, as a member-state, one should feel a stronger identification with the European common values

as e.g. public pensions, health and long-term care, social protection, education and labour market regulation in the Europe Union (European Commission, 2005). Additionally to this the European Union is propagating norms by maximising its influence in international affairs through its CFSP approach (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999). An example of this was the mediation of the European Council president Sarkozy in 2008, trying to find a ceasefire and peace plan for the conflict between Georgia and Russia, in the name of the EU (Coppieters, 2007). Therefore the hypothesis that can be derived from Social Constructivism claims:

Hypothesis 3: Representatives of the government and parliament of EU member-states will be more in favour of integration than governmental and parliamentarian representatives of accession candidate countries.

Giving that this study is limited, due to its means in time and length, only the above named theories will be highlighted. This is due to the fact that they display, on the first sight, the most interesting ones in regard to preference formation within this sample, although there exist many more within the fields of IR and EI. Other theories might provide similar as well as different assumptions with regard to preference formation in the EU and thus this study only allows for a limited insight in the topic, via the theoretical framework chosen above.

5. Methodology

In the previous parts of this paper it was already highlighted that the study seeks to examine national and institutional preferences on CFSP issues during the CC, by taking theoretical assumptions into account. The indicators used will be displayed by questionnaire answers from individual delegates to the CC. Nevertheless some clarifications must be given, on the use of the indicator and the data collection method, before turning to the empirical analysis of this study.

5.1 Conceptualisation


Due to the fact that different concepts will be used in this study, it is necessary to explain them accurately, avoiding any incomprehensibility.


The main concept of the thesis is whether delegates favour further or less integration within the field of CFSP, displaying the independent variable. Thus 'being more in-favour of further integration' will be defined as the attempt to promote further integration within the area of CFSP and include actors that are in favour of changing the status quo towards an outcome that delegates more competences to the EU. Additionally, as Jacobs and Maier (n.d.) put it, actors aiming for European consciousness and the creation of a European identity are considered as being more in-favour of further European integration. 'Being less in-favour of European integration' will mean actors that prefer to keep the status quo or even try to decrease the European competence within the CFSP towards more member-state competences. Hence they are not in-favour of giving away national competences and try to make the outcome one, that is, if necessary, only a slight move forward to further integration.

Furthermore the concepts used to differentiate between the two dependent variables of each hypothesis need to be explained here. In the first hypothesis, a distinction is made between member-states that are smaller and have less power capabilities and bigger member-states with more influence. However, it is not clear which member-states will be considered as small, having less power capabilities in IR and which will be considered as big, having more power capabilities in IR. In this regard, the study will be based on indicators developed by Mearsheimer. He states that great powers 'invariably have some offensive military capability that they can use against each other' (Mearsheimer, 2001:43). In this regard a distinction is made between potential and actual power. The potential power of a state is based on the population size as well as the level of its wealth. Army, naval and air forces, on the other hand, directly support actual power and thus display the central ingredient of military power¹ (Mearsheimer, 2001). Hence I will make a distinction, consulting these three indicators. The population and Gross National Income² (GNI) statistics will be taken from 2003, as this was the time when the CC was held. The armed forces statistic will be taken from 2004³.

In figure 5.1, it is clearly visible that five countries stand out, displaying more than ³/₄ of the total EU population in the year 2003. Additionally to this, figure 5.2 shows that the same countries also generated about ³/₄ of the GNI of the EU in 2003. Only figure 5.3 shows us slightly different results, with having six countries that have a comparatively vast army. In this statistic also Greece is under the countries that displayed more than ³/₄ of the armed forces in the European Union in 2004. Nevertheless, due to the fact that it is far lacking behind in the other two statistics and had some decades of military dictatorship, not to forget studies that trace the military capacity back to conflicts with Turkey (Kollias, 1996), it will not be considered as a big and influential country. Giving this, the study will take the five countries


that master in the three statistics, namely Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain; as the most potent actors in the EU and hence consider them in this study as being big and influential countries. The other ten countries will then be considered as being rather small and less influential.






Source: OECD, 2009

Source: OECD, 2009





Source: Howorth, 2007

With regard to the second hypothesis, the concept of being a representative of a European or a national institution is used. For this a differentiation is made in which supranational institutions are represented through delegates of the European Parliament and of the European

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Commission. National institutions, on the other hand, are represented by delegates from the national parliaments as well as the heads of state or government of the member-states.

Coming to the third hypothesis, the distinction between member-state governments and accession country delegates is made on the status of 2003. For each of these groups, delegates from the respective national parliaments as well as respective heads of state or government of the member-states are taken into account.

5.2 Methodological choices

Apart from the above named conceptual choices, methodological choices need to be made to conduct a study that stays within its available means. To examine national and institutional preferences on CFSP issues during the CC, the study will use a data set collected by König et al. (2006^b). The data set consists of survey responses, recorded in a standardized questionnaire, and received by delegates of EU institutions, EU member-state, EU accession candidates, the presidency of the Convention as well as observers. All this took place before the adoption of the draft constitution. The Convention itself was staffed with 207 members and 13 additional observers. 13 delegates from accession countries were allowed to participate in the negotiations, but gained no right to vote on the final draft. Giving this, only 66 people had the right to vote in the final documental version, including the Convention president, the two vice presidents, one governmental and two parliamentarian representatives from each EU15 member-state, sixteen members of the EP and two members of the European Commission. The following analysis is going to focus on EU institution delegates, memberstate delegates as well as delegates of accession candidates. The reasons for this can be seen in section four which recognises that some theories make explicit assumptions of e.g. the relationship between member-state delegates and delegates of accession countries. Giving this, the data set will differ for each of the hypothesis given above. Delegates, who did not give an answer to all of the questions recognised, were excluded and thus the total set that will be used covers 105 member positions⁴. The subset testing the first hypothesis will contain the position of 42 delegates, including the responses of representatives of the heads of state or government of the member-states and representatives of the national parliaments. The subset to test the second hypothesis will consist of 60 delegates, including the responses of representatives of the heads of state or government of the member-states, representatives of the national parliaments, representatives of the EP and representatives of the COM. For the third hypothesis the subset will contain 87 delegates, namely representatives of the heads of state or government of the member-states, representatives of the national member-state parliaments, representatives of the governments of the accession candidate countries and representatives of national parliaments of the accession candidate countries.

In total the survey respondents needed to answer questions about 23 key reform topics, addressing the delimitation of competences and thus included the institutional balance, the decision-making system and the CFSP. After the identification of debate topics and alternatives facing Convention consultations, via document analysis of the Leaken European Council Summit, questions were formulated. Giving this fact the examined questions are very likely to represent the whole range of the CFSP. Due to the means of the study we will nevertheless only take seven questions into account, all related to the CFSP and enabling the study to reach a certain level of reliability. A list of the questions can be found in Appendix 8.1. The method of analyses for the data will be coding, giving that within the questionnaire delegates were asked about specific policy areas in which they would support a general empowerment, meaning power being delegated either to the EU or to the member states. Delegating power to the member-states will be coded as 0 while the delegation of power towards EU institutions will be coded as 1. To focus on the answers of delegates to the CC has several clear advantages, while of course also some disadvantages might appear with the sample given. To focus on the former first, strengths of the sample are that 88.9 percent of member-state government responses are included in the sample, 79.5 percent of accession country governments, 50 percent of COM delegate responses and 81.2 percent of the EP positions. Hence the sample can be seen as giving a good indication on the preferences of all relevant actors. Moreover a qualitative advantage is given, due to the fact that questions were formulated after the identification of debate topics, as named above, so they are accurate to the actual topic of debate and direct enough to allow suggestions about preference formation. However, due to the means of the sample and the theoretical expectations developed above, the study in this paper needs to make a trade-off in the sense that the results given might yield a slightly disproportionate representation of a few groups. Nevertheless this is necessary in order to avoid that the total sample gets too small. To draw accurate conclusions in the end, each of the questions used as an indicator will be observed separately, before the whole of them will be applied to the respective hypothesis. Within this regard, also conclusions from each question itself can be received and tested on their appropriateness as an indicator.

6. Analysis

A broad variety of institutional formation and management with regard to the CFSP was observed at the CC, whereby the most relevant questions were addressed towards the voting rule being used in the Council as well as the role of the European Commission (Jensen et al., 2007). The effects of these decisions are vital in understanding the potential of the CFSP, keeping in mind that an increase of the COM role will result in policy decisions at the supranational level and thus away from the member-state governments. Changing the voting-rule in the European Council towards QMV on the other hand will increase the flexibility and facility of the CFSP and thus might display a good choice for small member-states and accession candidates. Nevertheless also more general questions about the delegation of power towards supranational institutions or the member-states were discussed, not to forget topics as in which CFSP areas increased cooperation should take place. Hence also here disagreement lies on the hand, due to the widely varying preferences of the different actors.

Keeping this in mind, the study is going to turn to its empirical findings within this section. First the data analysis towards the theories from chapter four will be done, in which each subset will be analysed separately with its indicators. The second part will consist of a short extra analysis, in which the preference consistency of delegates will be observed.

6.1 Data analysis

In order to be able to come up with conclusions on the appropriateness of my theoretical assumptions, I will analyse the seven different indicators according to their respective sample. Due to the big amount of indicating questions, I will only take into account the first three indicating questions, depending on their respective qualities to generalise for the others. This is due to the fact that they have three to four possible answers and are not solely yes or no questions. Additionally I will consider indicating questions that let to interesting results, while the analysis of all questions for all samples will be given in Appendix 8.3. The first subsection is going to evaluate the findings of the indicators to the sample of influential and less influential member-states, to test the first hypothesis derived from realism. The second subsection will draw conclusions on the indicators applied to the sample of member-state and European Union delegates, testing the hypothesis developed by institutional self-interest,

while the third subsection will analyse the sample of member-states and accession candidates, derived from social constructivism.

6.1.1 Neo-realism hypothesis: Influential and less influential member-states

The 42 delegates that have been observed within this sample consist of 13 representatives of big and more influential and 29 representatives of small and less influential countries.

Figure 6.1 gives some indication on the first indicator about the opinion of delegates on power relegation within the CFSP. Conspicuous in this regard is that both small and big country delegates strongly favoured a relegation of power competences to the European Union. Table A supports this peculiarity via the Pearson's chi-square test⁵ p-value of 0.19, which is not significant at an alpha-level of 0.10 and thus does not claim for a significant difference between the two groups. Giving this also Kendall-Tau-c⁶ is not able to show a difference in preference patterns. Interesting is that there is a negative relation in the absolute value, predicting there would rather be a weak negative association, meaning that small memberstates seem to be less in favour of CFSP power regulation than big ones. But due to the fact that Kendall-Tau-c is not significant, it does not play a major role to question the direction of the hypothesis.





Table A	
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CFSP power relegation								
absolute p- value value								
Pearson's chi- square	3.33	0.19						
Kendall-Tau-c	-0.13	0.21						

Figure 6.2 shows a less clear indication of preferences, while still an overwhelming majority, for both sample groups, is in favour of reassigning CFSP policy regulation on the personal and administrative level to the COM. For small member-states it is furthermore obvious that

also the keeping of jurisdiction within Council and COM is an interesting possibility. With regard to big member-states, the reassignment to the Council receives quite support. The chi-square value, which can be found in Appendix 8.3, tells us that there is no significant difference between the two groups at an alpha level of 0.10. Also Kendall-Tau-C is not significant.



In figure 6.3 one can see a difference between small and big countries. Whereas big countries generally preferred a Common armaments policy, small countries preferred not to have such a policy.



Table B

100% —		
80% —		
60% —		
40% —		_
20% —		
0% —		
0% —	no	yes
0% — small country	no 55,2%	yes 44,8%


Common armaments policy								
absolute p- value value								
Pearson's chi- square	3.73	0.05						
Kendall-Tau-c	-0.27	0.04						

Giving this the chi-square p-value is significant at an alpha level of 0.10 and even a level of 0.05. Thus there is a significant difference in the preferences of small and big countries. Also Kendall-Tau-c shows a significance, while it is conspicuous that the absolute value is

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negative, telling us that big member-states favour a Common armaments policy, instead of small ones as expected by the theoretical outline in chapter four.

Considering the indicating question about a Common European defence policy/ crisis management, it is obviously visible that both, big as well as small countries favoured such a policy; first with 92.31% and later with 68.97%. In table C one can see that the Pearson's chi-square test shows a significant difference between preference patterns of the two groups. Kendall-Tau-c supports this claim, while its absolute value indicates again that there is a negative interrelation, namely between big countries favouring a Common European defence policy and small countries being against such a policy.



Common European defence or peace policy/ crisis management								
absolute p-								
	value	value						
Pearson's chi-	2.70	0.10						
square	2.70	0.10						
Kendall-Tau-c	-0.20	0.05						

Table C

Considering the data sample from above, it becomes obvious that only two indicating questions were able to predict a significant difference in preference patterns between the two parties of the sample. Nevertheless both of them predicted an interrelation that is the other way around than expected in the hypothesis, namely that bigger EU member-states seem to be more in favour of delegating competences to the EU, than smaller ones.⁸ Giving this, the expected theoretical approach, derived from neo-realism, is not able to explain the observed CFSP preferences of CC delegates and the hypothesis needs to be rejected.

6.1.2 Institutional self-interest hypothesis: Member-state and EU delegates

Within this sample 60 delegates were observed. 18 delegates belong to the category of European Union delegates and 42 delegates represent the member-states.

Regarding figure 6.5 one can see the opinion of delegates on power relegation within the CFSP. Generally visible is that both European Union and member-state delegates strongly favoured a relegation of power competences to the European Union. Thus, the Pearson's chi-square does not indicate that there exists a significant difference in the preference pattern of European Union and member-state delegates, which is confirmed by Kendall-Tau-c. Striking is that the absolute value of Tau-c is negative and thus opposite to the theoretical expectation.





Figure 6.6 presents an indication about the possibility of Council voting patterns within the area of CFSP. Eye-catching is that none of the groups favoured the sole use of QMV. For EU institutions, the options for QMV except in areas of security and defence and the usage of only holding some votes in QMV, received most support, both with around 40%. But also autonomous votes received quite support. Considering the delegates of member-states, the results are different. QMV except for areas of security and defence clearly received most of the preferences with around 50%, followed by some votes in QMV. Behind stands the possibility of autonomous votes. The chi-square as well as Kendall-Tau-c test indicates once more that there is no significant difference in the preference patterns of the two groups. The absolute value of Tau-c even predicts that in the case of an existing difference, the interrelation would be negative, meaning to exist between member-states being more in favour for EU delegation than EU institution delegates (see Appendix 8.3).




Having examined the respective samples for this theoretical approach, the study could not find any indicating question, offering statistical evidence for the hypothesis above. Even no pattern could be found as approximately half of the absolute values given are positive and half are negative. Hence it seems to solely dependent on the question, on how the delegates favoured a certain supranational or intergovernmental strengthening. Concluding one can thus remark that the second hypothesis needs to be rejected.

6.1.3 Social constructivism hypothesis: Member-states and accession candidates


Coming to the analysis of EU member-states and accession countries, the sample consists of 87 delegates of which 45 belong to accession countries and 42 to EU member-states.

Looking at figure 6.7 one sees a nearly equal distribution for both groups. Member-states strongly favour the reassignment of personal and administrative power within the CFSP to the COM, while the other three options are all favoured with something between 22% and 7%. For accession countries the regulation by the COM is favoured with around 50%. The other three options all receive far less support, and are quite equal distributed to the preferences of member-states delegates. The chi-square as well as Tau-c test support this claim of quite equal distributions, with not being significant (see Appendix 8.3).





The last indicating question used for this sample is about Council voting patterns, as visible in figure 6.8. The most favoured option, for both sample groups, is to use QMV while excluding areas such as security and defence from this provision. This is then followed in a pyramid way by some votes in QMV and autonomous votes. The option of only using QMV in Council voting is seen as an option by 9% of accession countries, while non of the memberstate delegates considers this to be an option.







Council voting patterns in regard to the Council_3								
absolute p- value value								
Pearson's chi-								
square	6.06	0.11						
Kendall-Tau-c								

Table E shows via the chi square p-value of 0.11, that there is still no significance for claiming that both samples are independent of each other, but nevertheless it is close to measure this at an alpha-level of 0.10. Kendall-Tau-c on the other hand states more clearly that there is no significant difference in preference patterns. Interesting is that the absolute value of Kendall-Tau-c is again negative, claiming that if a relationship would exist, it would

be between accession countries and favouring a delegation towards the EU. Thus it is the other way around than predicted by the theoretical approach of social constructivism.

By observing the respective sample, no statistical evidence could be found for the hypothesis. As five out of seven indicators have a positive absolute value, the direction of the hypothesis seems to be right. But again, we cannot find evidence with the sample given; that the hypothesis is true and need to reject it.

6.2 Preference consistency

Within this small chapter, the study is going to highlight the consistency of preference patterns within a particular hypothesis and towards certain general CFSP questions as well as peculiarities found above. In order to do this properly, we will have a look on how consistent delegates answered towards two of the main questions, dealing with CFSP policy regulation on the personal and administrative levels and Council voting patterns in regard to the CFSP; as well as whether delegates that favoured at least a common armaments policy or a common European defence or peace policy/ crisis management also supported the creation of a single European armed force or the creation of a single European security council.

For the first sample, consisting of small and big member-states, 24.1% of the small countries had a standard deviation⁷ of more than 0.25, and 30.8% of the big countries. Considering the preference patterns in regard of policies⁹ and concrete measures¹⁰, one finds that 28.57% of the delegates were in favour of at least one of the policies and concrete measures, while the value is slightly higher for big countries than for small ones (see Appendix 8.4).

The second sample, composed of European Union delegates and member-state delegates, illustrates that 44.4% of the European Union delegates had a standard deviation from above 0.25, and 26.2% of the member-state delegates. In regard to the second observation about policies and concrete measures, one can see that 26.7% of the whole sample was in favour of at least one policy and one concrete measure, keeping in mind that this value is higher in regard to EU member-state delegates (see Appendix 8.4).

The third sample was composed of member-state delegates and delegates from accession countries. It indicated that 26.2% of the member-states had a standard deviation from above 0.25, and 55.6% of the accession countries. The observation of policies and concrete measures showed that 33.3% of the sample was in favour of at least one of the policies and one of the concrete measures. This value is, however, more than double the high for accession countries, than for EU member-state delegates (see Appendix 8.4).

7. Concluding Remarks

With the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the EU wanted to show the world that this unique body of supranationality is forging a common destiny and not just a simulacrum of independent states in another intergovernmental institution. In this regard the preamble of the TCE states: 'Convinced that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny'. The ambitious aim that 'the Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence' (art.I-16.1 TCE), shows us that even in the highly intergovernmental pillar of the Union, significant changes are going to be made towards the declared goal of unity in diversity.

Of high interest in this regard is what drove preferences towards these common institutional choices. It has been argued that national and partisan preferences play a big role as an indicator for the preference behaviour of delegates towards CFSP issues. However, this study aimed to observe a number of theoretical approaches in order to evaluate on their usefulness to explain preference formation of EU delegates in CFSP matters, which still displays an area of only little research done so far. The hypothetical assumptions are derived from IR and EI theories as well as more modern approaches to this field of study.

Based on the preferences of CC delegates, received via a standardised questionnaire, the approaches derived from neo-realism, institutional self-interest and social constructivism are not able to explain delegate preferences at the CC. Therefore this study cannot confirm the findings of König-Archibugi (2004), who states that power capabilities and collective identities influence preferences of member-state delegates in the area of EFP. What can be concluded is that there exists quite some preference variability, in which accession candidates

show the biggest difference and small member-states the lowest, meaning that these were the less and most constant in regard to the delegation of power towards the EU or the memberstates. Moreover the study finds evidence, that member-states only rarely favour concrete measures, while rather favouring policies that are related to these. Last in this group are, surprisingly, EU institutions that only support concrete measures really scarcely while favouring policies related to it. The highest value in this regard is found for accession candidates. Furthermore it is interesting to see that only questions about policies resulted, at least in one of the samples, namely the one between small and big member-states, to significant results. This means that there really exists a difference between preference patterns in this area, while no difference could be found in regard to indicators dealing with concrete measures as e.g. the creation of a single European armed force. Hence this field might be an interesting research area for further studies on CFSP preferences. Additionally to this, one of the most crucial and general assumptions about the CFSP, namely that member-states are very reluctant to give up competences in FPI as this area is considered to be pivotal to the sovereignty of states (Gordon, 1997), cannot be confirmed because the study findings tell that there is generally a very positive attitude towards further integration in the CFSP. This is due to the fact that five out of seven indicators, above all samples, show a positive pattern in regard of a competence delegation to the EU. Thus we find evidence that the general assumption about member-states being reluctant to give up national competences in foreign policy is not true. Nevertheless, one needs to keep in mind that the two indicators in which a competence delegation to the EU was not favoured dealt with very sensitive and concrete issues, as a single European Security Council and a single European armed force. Furthermore the study shows that preference formation in the CFSP is very different to other areas, due to the fact that the findings do not confirm the results of König et al. (2006^b), who conclude that in regard to reform preferences over all convention topics, significant cleavages exist between delegates from smaller and bigger countries, member-states and accession countries, as well as delegates from institutions and member-states.

Concluding, one has to keep in mind that the study sample is really small and that delegates from certain member-states are not even included in the sample. Additionally, due to the means of the study, not all important IR and EI theories could be taken into consideration. Thus further research is necessary in order to gain more specific findings and to evaluate on whether there is really no theoretical assumption existent that is able to explain delegate preferences. Next to this the size of the sample should be increased, due to the fact that this sample only includes a bit more than 100 delegates. Altogether, this study provides a quite good starting point for future research on the preference formation of delegates towards the CFSP, while the findings were not successful yet, but also not generalisable, so that a bigger sample might establish better results to explain theoretically the development of the CFSP.

8. Appendix

8.1 List of indicator questions

- 1. Would you like to see more power relegated to the EU member-states in the area of European foreign policy?
 - 0 Relegation of jurisdiction to the member-states
 - 0.5 Status quo
 - 1 Relegation of jurisdiction to the EU
- 2. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are a matter of the High Representative of the Council and the Commission of Foreign Relations. How should this policy be regulated on the personal and administrative levels in the future?
 - 0 Combine the functions of the High Representative of the Council and the Commissary of Foreign Relations and reassign them to the Council.
 - 0.25 Keeping jurisdiction of the Council and the Commission while differentiating them and making better use of synergistic effects.
 - 0.75 Double-hatted foreign minister.
 - 1 Combine the functions of the High Representative of the Council and the Commissary of Foreign Relations and reassign them to the Commission.
- 3. In which areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy should the EU member-states show more concerted action?
 - a) Common armaments policy
 - 0 no
 - 1 yes
 - b) Common European defence or peace policy/ crisis management
 - 0 no
 - 1 yes
 - c) Creation of a single European armed force
 - 0 no
 - 1 yes

d) Creation of a single European Security Council

- 0 no
- 1 yes
- 4. How should the Council vote regarding common foreign and security policy?
 - 0 Only autonomous votes may pass.
 - 0.25 Some votes should pass on a qualified majority.
 - 0.75 Votes should pass on a qualified majority except for security and defence matters, where unanimity should continue to be require
 - 1 QMV for all decisions

8.2 Indicators for power capabilities

Country	Population in '000 (2003)	Gross National Income in billion (2003)	Size of Army in personnel (2004)
Austria	8118.245	210.458554	39900
Belgium	10375.98	270.02951	39200
Denmark	5387	135.850254	21180
Finland	5213	122.031814	28300
France	60304	1450.95557	254895
Germany	82502	1988.24905	284500
Greece	11023.53	217.632359	163850
Ireland	3979.9	103.791525	10460
Italy	57478	1311.79435	191875
Luxembourg	450	18.086556	900
Netherlands	16225.3	443.106226	53130
Portugal	10449.3	161.607272	44900
Spain	42005	877.631988	147255
Sweden	8958	237.672334	27600
United Kingdom	59557.34	1605.80594	205890

8.3 Analysis of all indicating questions in regard to the three hypotheses

			Hypothese 1 Hypothese 2			e 2	Hypothese 3				
			small	big	Total	EU	member	Total	accession	member	Total
			countries	countries		institution	state		candidate	state	
	to the member	absolute	1	1	2	2	2	4	3	2	5
	state	(in %)	3,45%	7,69%	4,76%	11,11%	4,76%	6,67%	6,67%	4,76%	5,75%
CFSP power relegation	status quo	absolute	6	0	6	3	6	9	9	6	15
		(in %)	20,69%	0,00%	14,29%	16,67%	14,29%	15,00%	20,00%	14,29%	17,24%
	to the	absolute	22	12	34	13	34	47	33	34	67
	European Union	(in %)	75,86%	92,31%	80,95%	72,22%	80,95%	78,33%	73,33%	80,95%	77,01%
		Total	29	13	42	18	42	60	45	42	87
	reassign to the	absolute	3	3	6	4	6	10	7	6	13
	Council	(in %)	10,34%	23,08%	14,29%	22,22%	14,29%	16,67%	15,56%	14,29%	14,94%
CFSP policy regulation	keep jurisdiction of	absolute	7	2	9	1	9	10	10	9	19
on the personal and	Council and COM	(in %)	24,14%	15,38%	21,43%	5,56%	21,43%	16,67%	22,22%	21,43%	21,84%
administrative levels	double-hatted	absolute	2	1	3	2	3	5	6	3	9
	foreign minister	(in %)	6,90%	7,69%	7,14%	11,11%	7,14%	8,33%	13,33%	7,14%	10,34%
	reassign to the	absolute	17	7	24	11	24	35	22	24	46
	COM	(in %)	58,62%	53,85%	57,14%	61,11%	57,14%	58,33%	48,89%	57,14%	52,87%
		Total	29	13	42	18	42	60	45	42	87
	autonomous	absolute	3	3	6	4	6	10	2	6	8
	votes	(in %)	10,34%	23,08%	14,29%	22,22%	14,29%	16,67%	4,44%	14,29%	9,20%
Council voting patterns	some votes	absolute	10	4	14	7	14	21	16	14	30
in regard to the CFSP	QMV	(in %)	34,48%	30,77%	33,33%	38,89%	33,33%	35,00%	35,56%	33,33%	34,48%
	QMV except	absolute	16	6	22	7	22	29	23	22	45
	security & defence	(in %)	55,17%	46,15%	52,38%	38,89%	52,38%	48,33%	51,11%	52,38%	51,72%
	QMV	absolute	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4
		(in %)	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	8,89%	0,00%	4,60%
		Total	29	13	42	18	42	60	45	42	87

			Hypothese 1		Hypothese 2			Hypothese 3			
			small	big	Total	EU	member	Total	accession	member	Total
_			countries	countries		institution	state		candidate	state	
common armaments	NO	absolute	16	3	19	7	19	26	24	19	43
policy		(in %)	55,17%	23,08%	45,24%	38,89%	45,24%	43,33%	53,33%	45,24%	49,43%
	YES	absolute	13	10	23	11	23	34	21	23	44
		(in %)	44,83%	76,92%	54,76%	61,11%	54,76%	56,67%	46,67%	54,76%	50,57%
_		Total	29	13	42	18	42	60	45	42	87
common European	NO	absolute	9	1	10	5	10	15	13	10	23
defence or		(in %)	31,03%	7,69%	23,81%	27,78%	23,81%	25,00%	28,89%	23,81%	26,44%
peace policy/	YES	absolute	20	12	32	13	32	45	32	32	64
crisis management		(in %)	68,97%	92,31%	76,19%	72,22%	76,19%	75,00%	71,11%	76,19%	73,56%
_		Total	29	13	42	18	42	60	45	42	87
creation of a	NO	absolute	21	10	31	15	31	46	35	31	66
single European		(in %)	72,41%	76,92%	73,81%	83,33%	73,81%	76,67%	77,78%	73,81%	75,86%
armed force	YES	absolute	8	3	11	3	11	14	10	11	21
		(in %)	27,59%	23,08%	26,19%	16,67%	26,19%	23,33%	22,22%	26,19%	24,14%
		Total	29	13	42	18	42	60	45	42	87
creation of a	NO	absolute	24	11	35	15	35	50	33	35	68
single European		(in %)	82,76%	84,62%	83,33%	83,33%	83,33%	83,33%	73,33%	83,33%	78,16%
security council	YES	absolute	5	2	7	3	7	10	12	7	19
		(in %)	17,24%	15,38%	16,67%	16,67%	16,67%	16,67%	26,67%	16,67%	21,84%
_		Total	29	13	42	18	42	60	45	42	87

		Hypothese 1		Hypothe	se 2	Hypothe	se 3
		absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value
	Chi-Quadrat nach	3.33	0.19	0.93	0.63	0.71	0.70
CFSP power relegation	Pearson						
	Kontingenzkoeffizient	0.27	0.19	0.12	0.63	0.09	0.70
	Kendall-Tau-c	-0.13	0.21	-0.08	0.44	0.08	0.40
		absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value
CFSP policy regulation	Chi-Quadrat nach	1.38	0.71	2.65	0.45	1.11	0.77
on the personal and	Pearson						
administrative levels	Kontingenzkoeffizient	0.18	0.71	0.21	0.45	0.11	0.77
	Kendall-Tau-c	0.07	0.63	0.02	0.89	0.06	0.58
-							
		absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value
	Chi-Quadrat nach	1.20	0.55	1.06	0.59	6.06	0.11
Council voting patterns	Pearson						
in regard to the CFSP	Kontingenzkoeffizient	0.17	0.55	0.13	0.59	0.26	0.11
	Kendall-Tau-c	0.12	0.44	-0.13	0.31	-0.16	0.15
		absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value
	Chi-Quadrat nach	3.73	0.05	0.21	0.65	0.57	0.45
common armaments	Pearson						
policy	Kontingenzkoeffizient	0.29	0.05**	0.06	0.65	0.08	0.45
	Kendall-Tau-c	-0.27	0.04**	0.05	0.65	0.08	0.45
		absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value
common European	Chi-Quadrat nach	2.70	0.10	0.11	0.74	0.29	0.59
defence or	Pearson						
peace policy/	Kontingenzkoeffizient	0.25	0.10*	0.04	0.74	0.06	0.59
crisis management	Kendall-Tau-c	-0.20	0.05**	-0.03	0.75	0.05	0.59

		Hypothese 1		Hypothese 2		Hypothese 3	
		absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value
creation of a	Chi-Quadrat nach	0,09	0,76	0,64	0,42	0,19	0,67
single European	Pearson						
armed force	Kontingenzkoeffizient	0,05	0,76	0,10	0,42	0,05	0,67
	Kendall-Tau-c	0,04	0,75	-0,08	0,39	0,04	0,67
		absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value	absolute value	p-value
creation of a	Chi-Quadrat nach	0,02	0,88	0,00	1,00	1,27	0,26
single European	Pearson						
security council	Kontingenzkoeffizient	0,02	0,88	0,00	1,00	0,12	0,26
	Kendall-Tau-c	0,02	0,88	0,00	1,00	-0,10	0,25

Note: *** significant at .01; ** significant at .05; * significant at .10

8.4 Analysis of preference consistency

power relegation, policy regulation and Council voting patterns			
	standard deviation above 0.25	standard deviation of 0 to 0.25	
small countries	24.13%	75.87%	
big countries	30.77%	69.23%	

voting consistent with at least one policy and one concrete measure				
	yes	no		
total sample	28.57%	71.43%		
small countries	27.59%	72.41%		
big countries	30.77%	69.23%		

power relegation, policy regulation and Council voting patterns_2			
	standard deviation above 0.25	standard deviation of 0 to 0.25	
EU institution	44.44%	55.56%]
member-states	26.19%	73.81%	r

voting consistent with at least one policy and one concrete measure_2				
	yes	no		
total sample	26.67%	73.33%		
EU institution	22.22%	77.78%		
member-states	28.57%	71.43%		

power relegation, policy regulation and Council voting patterns_3			
	standard deviation above 0.25	standard deviation of 0 to 0.25	
member-states	26.19%	73.81%	
accession candidate	55.55%	44.45%	

voting consistent with at least one policy and one concrete measure_3				
	yes	no		
total sample	33.33%	66.67%		
member-states	28.57%	71.43%		
accession candidate	37.78%	62.22%		

8.5 Remarks

- ¹ Mearsheimer also considered the number of nuclear warheads as an indicator for a state's actual power. Nevertheless this will be left out in this study due to the fact that only two nuclear powers exist in the European Union.
- ² GNI is considered to be the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) minus net taxes on production and imports, compensation of employees and property income payable to the rest of the world. Furthermore the corresponding items receivable from the rest of the world are not included (OECD, 2003). Mearsheimer used the Gross National Product (GNP) as an indicator for potential power. Due to the fact that the OECD as well as the World Bank do not produce statistics about the GNP any longer and consider the GNP as identical to the GNI (OECD, 2003), these statistics will be taken into account instead of GNP statistics.
- ³ It was not possible to receive reliable information on the number of armed forces from 2003. Thus numbers from 2004 needed to be consulted.
- ⁴ No delegates of Spain are present in the analysis
- ⁵ The Pearson's chi-square test of independence assesses whether paired observations on two variables, expressed in a contingency table, are independent of each other (Plackett, 1983)
- ⁶ The Kendall Tau-c rank coefficient is used to test whether two variables may be regarded as statistically dependent. In comparison to the Pearson's chi-square test, Kendall Tau-c is a non-parametric test statistic, thus not relying on assumptions about the distributions of the variables. The Kendall Tau-c tests the strength of an association within cross tabulations, giving that both variables have an ordinal measurement level. It adjusts for ties and is suitable for rectangular tables. The values of the Kendall Tau-c test range from −1 (perfect inversion) to +1 (perfect agreement). (Prokhorov, 2001)
- ⁷ The analysis was also done in an extended version in which country size was coded, including the accession candidates for the central-eastern enlargement, as the following: big member-states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom), small member-states (Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Malta, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden). But also with this sample the results did not differ, as only slight differences appeared, while the significance or non-significance

stayed the same as with the smaller version of the sample only including to that time member-states.

- ⁸ the standard deviation is considered to be big if it is above 0.25. The average of sample 1 is 0.68, of sample 2 it is 0.67 and in sample 3 it is 0.68.
- ⁹ with policies we consider the questions 3a) about a Common armaments policy and 3b) about a common European defence or peace policy/crisis management
- ¹⁰ with concrete measures question 3c) about the creation of a single European armed force and 3d) about the creation of a single European security council, will be considered

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