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Bachelor Thesis

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**EU Cooperation in the UN General Assembly:
The Development of Common Positions**

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List of Abbreviations

| | |
|------|---|
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| EC | European Community |
| EFP | European Foreign Policy |
| EI | European Integration |
| EP | European Parliament |
| EPC | European Political Cooperation |
| EU | European Union |
| IR | International Relations |
| TEC | Treaty on the Establishing European Community |
| TEU | Treaty on the European Union |
| UN | United Nations |

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1. Introduction

When the Treaty of Maastricht came into force, the European Union (EU) has prominently declared that it seeks ‘to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (art.2 TEU). This is especially important in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly where all EU member states participate, along side others, as sovereign states. As the EU cannot become a member of the UN General Assembly, due to the fact that only states can become an UN member, the EU needs to rely on its member states for representation, which is regulated by the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The member states therefore have a double obligation: First, they remain part of other networks, e.g. regional groups and national allies. Second, there is an expectation on EU member states to coordinate their positions. The basis for this expectation is outlined, next to the provision already highlighted above, in article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union, which states that ‘member states shall coordinate their action’ and ‘shall uphold common positions’ (Kissack, 2007). However, due to the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, cooperation remains dependent on domestic policies and preferences as these are crucial in the formulation of CFSP policies. Accordingly, Member States are not obliged to pursue foreign policy through the EU, but can also fall back on other multilateral, bilateral or unilateral channels they perceive being important with regards to individual external relations (Gross, 2009). Several studies have by now outlined those factors that are assumed to either facilitate or to restrict EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly (see for instance Birnberg, 2009; Frieden, 2006; Smith, 2006).

Next to this, several scholars have outlined that the degree of EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly can be measured by the use of four indicators, namely EU common positions, Resolutions introduced on behalf of the EU, co-sponsored Resolutions introduced by other UN members and voting cohesion. While the former three indicators tend to be frequently ignored (for a partial exception on this see Wouters, 2001), there are several studies analysing the voting patterns of EU member states, thereby giving indications on voting cohesion between the member states of the Union. These studies are manifold in nature, being either quantitative or qualitative, regarding different issue areas and varying time frames. Nevertheless, all scholars investigating in voting cohesion of EU member states agree that the level of “EU cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly varies over time and by issue area” (Birnberg, 2009). Furthermore, the findings indicated that the level of EU

voting cohesion tends to fluctuate over time: In the 1970s there was a first period of vote convergence, which declined in the 1980s due to Greece voting in isolation and increased again with the introduction of the CFSP in the 1990s (Hurwitz, 1976; Holmes, Reese & Whelan, 1992). In addition, recent studies have shown that voting cohesion increasingly differs between issue areas: Voting cohesion on issues such as the middle east conflict and human rights tends to be quite high, whereas member states still seem to disagree especially with regards to international security and decolonialisation issues (Luif, 2003; Luif & Radeva, 2007).

While the findings of voting cohesion can be regarded as an important starting point for the study at hand, this study does not seek to duplicate them. Instead, it is argued that voting cohesion (as well as co-sponsored Resolutions) is merely an inadequate proxy for EU cooperation, due to the fact that member states already tended to vote alike in some issue areas before the formal introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and even before its processor, European Political Cooperation, was established. Thus, voting cohesion is not closely linked with the cooperation process as such (Kissack, 2007). In contrast, EU common positions (as well as Resolutions introduced on behalf of the EU) clearly and directly relate to the cooperation and coordination process as without coordination there could not be an EU common position. Therefore this study seeks to shed light on the recent development of EU cooperation as suggested by the development of EU common positions as a policy tool since its establishment in 1993. In order to evaluate on the development of EU common positions in the UN General Assembly over time as well as throughout issue areas the second section will give a short outline on EU and UN mechanisms as well as on the probable impact of EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly. In the third section the main theories of European Integration and International Relations are consulted with regards to their expectations on the past and future development of EU cooperation over time and throughout issue areas. After these theoretical insights the fourth section will outline the conceptual part and the methodological restrictions of this study. In the fifth part the data of three different years, taken from the UN archives, will be evaluated and subsequently used in order to confront the leading theories outlined in section three. Finally, the sixth section of this study, will review the findings, particularly with the methodological choices made in fourth section.

2. Practical Insights

Regarding the practical nature of EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly first, EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly can be regarded as having two main dimensions: First, EU mechanisms need to be applied and EU rules need to be followed. Second, the relevant UN rules of procedures in the different UN bodies need to be applied. Below, both dimensions will be reviewed, thereby highlighting the implications resulting from this interplay for EU cooperation in the UN (Hoffmeister & Kuijper, 2007).

2.1. UN General Assembly

Starting with the second dimension, the UN General Assembly is composed of member state representatives as only states can become a member of the UN General Assembly. Member states have one vote each. Therefore, the General Assembly is often described as the place where the 'sovereign equality' of states is most visible (Luif & Radeva, 2007). The regular session of the UN General Assembly usually starts on the third Tuesday in September with the General Debate, where the heads of states come to New York in order to make statements on the most important international issues (Luif, 2003). With the closure of the General Debate, the subsequent items on the agenda are allocated to and considered within the six Main Committees. These six Main Committees give a good indication of the vast range of topics that are dealt with in the Plenary: First (Disarmament and International Security) Committee, Second (Economic and Financial) Committee, Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee, Fourth (Special Political and Decolonisation) Committee, Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee, Sixth (Legal) Committee. In the Committees issues are discussed, national approaches harmonized and finally presented in the plenary meetings. Therefore, the UN General Assembly works on issues across the board, ranging from social and economic matters to disarmament and security issues (Paasivirta and Porter, 2007). Actions with regards to the latter issue are, however, restricted to those times where the Security Council fails to act in a case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, due to a lack of unanimity of its permanent members (UN, 2009). In the General Assembly each member state has one vote and votes are either taken by a two thirds-majority on important issues, or are decided by simple majority. However, recently special effort is made to rather achieve consensus than deciding by a formal vote, thereby strengthening the support for decisions taken in the Assembly as the General Assembly can only pass recommendations, not legally binding texts (UN, 2009).

2.2. EU Legal Provisions

After having considered the set-up of the UN General Assembly, a short outline of rules and procedures of EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly will be given, which has been above regarded as first dimension of cooperation. In this regards, it is first of all important to notice that EU cooperation in the General Assembly is part of the Union's CFSP, although some topics might belong to the EU's first pillar. The CFSP was established by the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in order to 'assert its [the Union's] identity in the international scene', with objectives 'covering all areas of foreign and security policy' outlined in art. 11(1) of the same treaty (Eeckhout, 2004). In order to achieve these objectives, the TEU enumerates a number of instruments as for instance common strategies (Art. 13 TEU), joint actions (Art. 14 TEU), common positions (Art. 15 TEU) as well as information and consultation (Art. 16 TEU).

Second, regarding the basic provision governing the behaviour of EU member states in international organizations, these are incorporated in the TEU and additionally fall back on provisions in the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) (Paasivirta and Porter, 2007). The main provision on cooperation mechanisms among EU member states or between EU member states and international organizations, respectively, is located in article 19 TEU, which states:

- (1) Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such forums
In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the member states participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.
- (2) Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), member states represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all member states participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.
Member states which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United nations Charter.

Considering the first part of paragraph one, it becomes obvious that this one directly relates to EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly, while the latter part regards organizations where not all members of the Union are represented as it is for instance the case in the UN Security Council. Regarding the first part of paragraph one, this part of the paragraph looks

rather straightforward although much of its realization is dependent on the understanding of the concept of coordination. The concept of cooperation is a rather flexible concept ranging from weak to strong interpretations and thus the realization of the cooperation mechanisms will depend on the understanding of the concept. In addition, the realization is obviously dependent on the existence of a common position that was formally adopted under CFSP as otherwise the treaty article is not applicable at all (Paasivirta and Porter, 2007).

Third, regarding the procedure that needs to be applied in order to present the common position that was formally adopted under CFSP, it needs to be remembered that the UN General Assembly is composed of nation states only. Thus, the EU must rely on its member states for representing the common position (Hoffmeister & Kuijper, 2007). This representation is regulated by article 18 TEU according to that the Presidency ‘shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organisations’, being assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council exercising the function of the High Representative of the CFSP. The European Commission is fully associated, i.e. included in all aspects of the coordination process. However, there are some instances in that the EU Presidency does not present a common position, either due to failure to reach a common position or due to tradition, as it is for instance the case with the introduction of a Resolution in ‘national capacity’. In any other case, however, the presidency issues statements ‘on behalf of the EU’ and subsequent national statements tend to refer to the EU statement (Farrell, 2006; EU-UN, 2009).

2.3. The Impact of Cooperation

Before now turning to the main part of this study, the impact of the above highlighted cooperation mechanisms need to be highlighted. In this regards, Jupille (1999) has argued that the impact of an EU common position in the UN depends on several factors, namely its location with regards to the status quo and the prevailing decision-making rules in the international organization. In the following, the expected location as well as the expected impact of EU common positions in the UN General Assembly will be highlighted, as based on the practical insights given above. With regards to the former, it needs to be remembered that EU cooperation in the UN is regarded as part of the Union’s and accordingly decisions are taken by unanimity (Luif, 2003). Based on unanimity, voting power lies with those states that are most willing to veto a proposal changing the status quo. Therefore, common positions decided on by the usage of unanimity can be expected to reflect the lowest common denominator position (Jupille, 1999). Next to this, once the common position is agreed on in

the EU, its impact is determined by the decision-making rules of the international organization in question. Based on the findings above, votes in the UN General Assembly are taken by either two-thirds majority, simple majority or recently even by using consensus. In the latter case, the impact of the EU common position, as decided by unanimity, drags international outcomes towards the status quo as the EU may add sufficient bargaining weight to its lowest common denominator position to render it a *de facto* international veto position. In the former cases, international outcomes can also be expected to be dragged towards the status quo as the EU may add sufficient bargaining weight to its lowest common denominator position to render it a *formal* international veto position (Jupille, 1999). Therefore, EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly does help to assert the Union's identity of the international scene, thereby making it a more visible actor, and simultaneously, as based on Jupille's assumptions, is able to increase the Union's bargaining weight, thereby influencing international outcomes.

3. Theoretical Insights

After having regarded those practical insights necessary to understand the interplay of the EU and UN system for EU cooperation as well as the importance of cooperation, first hypothesis on the development of EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly can be developed. In order to do so, several theoretical approaches stemming from European Integration (EI) and International Relations (IR) Theory will be considered. Each of these approaches provide assumptions on the causes of inter-state cooperation and simultaneously raises assumptions on the expected course of cooperation. Below, the most important theories of EI and IR, respectively, will be highlighted in order to provide an first answer to the research question how EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly developed over time and throughout issue areas.

When considering the causes and development of cooperation, it is first of all important to mention that inter-state cooperation can even emerge in the absence of any institutional structure or policy coordination (Smith, 2004). Neorealism, for instance, seeks to explain how inter-state cooperation can emerge under anarchy. The concept of anarchy refers to an international system that has no central world government and where international organizations are only of weak and fluid nature (Posen, 2003). The principle actors in this anarchic system are the sovereign and equal nation states. These nation states are rational actors with a main interest in surviving, which simultaneously displays a prerequisite for other gains. In order to survive, a state is faced with three possibilities, namely imitating successful

organizational behaviour of others, boosting national assets or forming alliances with other states. The latter, cooperation by forming alliances with other states, is extremely difficult in international systems as it is a situation similar to the prisoner's dilemma. In this kind of situations, two actors are kept isolated from one another. While both actors would be better off cooperating, both have the incentive to defect, based on fears of the other's relative gains and probable resulting interdependencies (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Disregarding these incentives to defect, inter-state cooperation under anarchy can occur when a hegemon fosters rules or states are collectively faced by an external threat. However, concerns for relative gains tend to limit cooperation so that inter-state cooperation is likely to be only of temporary nature and remains restricted to the realms of low politics. The concept of low politics, following the traditional realist distinction, refers to those issue areas that are not pivotal for a state's survival. Instead, the concept of low politics refers to those issue areas that are necessary for the preservation of prosperity, referring for instance to the issue area of economics as including trade or the financial system, and welfare, referring for instance to the issue area of social issues as including human rights and the fundamental freedoms. In contrast, the concept of high politics refers to issues that are directly concerned with security matters and a state's sovereignty and thus are pivotal to ensure a state's survival in the international system (Collard-Wexler, 2006; Ripsman, 2004). In this regard, two hypotheses can be derived from neorealism:

Hypothesis 1: Common positions can be expected to emerge only in very rare exceptions, i.e. when a hegemon fosters rules or a common threat is faced.

Hypothesis 2: As cooperation can only exist in the realms of low politics, EU common positions and statements can be expected to emerge only with regards to social and economic issues.

Neorealism can be considered as a predecessor, or starting point, of many other EI and IR Theories. Therefore, while some Neorealist assumptions have been inherited frequently, others have been increasingly criticized. Highlighting these criticisms shortly, they can be considered being mainly twofold: On the one hand, neorealism has been considered as being inadequate to explain the Union, especially European Foreign Policy (EFP). This is the case as, first of all, the development of EFP cannot be understood solely by reference to the global balance of power and secondly, EFP is not only engaged in low politics, but also in the high-politics (Smith, 2004; Collard-Wexler, 2006). On the other hand, neorealism has been increasingly criticized for its assumption that international organizations are fluid and weak in nature and therefore are only ascribed a minimal role in promoting cooperation as

organizations cannot do more than providing means by which states can coordinate their activities and help each other on a case-by-case basis. Although the criticisms are manifold, neorealism can be considered to be an interesting starting point to study the cooperation of EU member states in the UN General Assembly, not at least because several theoretical approaches take neorealism as a starting point and derive contrasting theoretical approaches from its basic assumptions.

One example of theories that adopt basic neorealist assumptions, while simultaneously criticizing its scepticism towards international organizations, are neoliberal approaches. Basic neorealist assumptions that are inherited in neoliberal theories include assumptions on the anarchic international system as well as states rationality and security concern. These assumptions are supplemented by the concepts of interdependence and institutions. Thus, liberal theories suggest that, although the international system is anarchic, states are interdependent from one another, have similar interests and thus want to reap benefits from cooperation. In addition, neoliberalism considers international institutions as being able to foster cooperation by reducing the risks of cooperation by, amongst others, increasing trust, transparency and enhancing the similarity of interests between players (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Therefore, the use of international institutions makes inter-state cooperation more likely, which in turn increases the domestic sensitivity to external issues. Thus, although states remain national actors, cooperation becomes more likely through the use of international institutions over time as cooperation makes issues are more and more entangled with one another so that complete national autonomy becomes harder to sustain. This leads to the assumption that states are, with the progression of cooperation, increasingly likely to act jointly in many situations (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 7-9).

A similar view on the development of cooperation can be derived from neofunctionalism. However, while neorealism as well as both liberal theories highlighted above, assume international institutions being only of static nature and thus assume that power is the most important factor to explain cooperation, neofunctionalism supplements this view with the assumption that institutions can directly impact the development of cooperation (Smith, 2004). In this regards, neofunctionalism argues that integration evolves over time, takes an own dynamic, characterized by multiple, diverse and changing actors. These actors are primarily elite in nature and do not only interact in their domestic political realm, but also across national frontiers. In addition, while actors remain to be rational and self-interested in

nature, they also have the capacity to learn and to change their preferences, for instance by participating in international institutions. On the turn of international institutions, once established, they can live a life of their own, thereby escaping the control of their creators. This is the case as employees of these institutions are primarily concerned with enhancing their own powers, influencing the perceptions of their principles and thereby becoming agents of further cooperation instead. Therefore, preference aggregation is no longer assumed to exclusively take place at the national level, but to expand to the international level. Furthermore it is argued that cooperation often evolves as policy makers are not able to overview all consequences of their decisions. Policymakers are therefore assumed to stumble from one decision to the next, with imperfect knowledge of their consequences and under time pressure (Haas, 1970). Once cooperation emerged, it is difficult to constrain it to some economic sectors as modern economies are highly interconnected in nature. Therefore, cooperation in one sector “begets its own impetus toward extension of the entire economy” (compare Haas, 1958:297 ‘functional spill over’). While cooperating, political actors can be considered to turn their interest towards the intergovernmental body of decision-making, thereby becoming favourable towards integration, making intergovernmental institutions becoming more influential, demanding political control and accountability beyond the nation state (Nugent, 2006). Therefore, once cooperation in the political spheres has been accomplished, political integration might follow (compare Haas, 1958:297 ‘political spill over’). In this regards, neoliberalism and neofunctionalism provide the same view on the course of cooperation over time, while contrasting each other with the cause of cooperation. Therefore, hypothesis three as derived from neoliberalism and neofunctionalism, states:

Hypothesis 3: The degree of Common positions can be expected to increase over time in all of the Committees.

Next to Neoliberalism and Neofunctionalism, there are many more theories of international relations that seek to overcome neorealist limitations. As a result, theories of institutional development have become increasingly complex and diverse over the years (Smith, 2004). A second example of these kind of theories is liberal intergovernmentalism, which is of special importance with regards to European Integration. Liberal intergovernmentalism, as coined by Moravcsik (1993), comprises an intergovernmental approach of inter-state negotiation as well as a liberalist approach of national preference formation. Regarding the latter, it is argued that national interests emerge as a result of state-society relations. These relations are assumed to be principal-agent relations, where societal principals delegate their power to governmental

agents. Hence, societal principals, made up of private individuals and voluntary associations with autonomous interests, interact in civil society, competing for political influence and thereby forming coalitions. However, this interaction is not stable as societal preferences and the distribution of costs and benefits differ between issue areas. Therefore, the leeway that the government is in charge of, depends on the nature of the societal pressure: In cases where societal pressure is ambiguous or divided, governments enjoy relatively broad autonomy, when societal pressure is united, governments are particularly restricted (Moravcsik, 1993:484). Societal pressure can be considered to be united in cases where the society is directly concerned as it is for instance the case with commercial policies. In contrast, societal pressure can be expected to be ambiguous and divided where the costs and benefits of cooperation for the society are diffuse and uncertain as it is the case especially with issues of political or security cooperation (Moravcsik, 1993:494). While in the latter case decisions are primarily left to the governments, the governmental agents in the former case go along with the most influential coalitions in order to constitute national interests and goals. Once the national interest is constituted, it is put forward in inter-state negotiations, that are primarily regarded as a platform for discussion. inter-state negotiations can result in cooperation when policy coordination increases the control of national governments over domestic policy outcomes. This is most often the case when coordination is able to eliminate negative international policy externalities. Negative international policy externalities arise when the policies of one government create costs for societal groups that are politically significant outside the governments own jurisdiction. However, when externalities are positive, insignificant or in cases where unilateral policies bring more benefits, little incentives for cooperation are given. As mentioned above, negative externalities generate an incentive for cooperation. However, policy cooperation is not necessarily supported at equal terms by all governments as the vulnerability of national governments to negative externalities cannot be assumed to be the same for all governments. Thus, only those who are not able to autonomously sustain effective policies are willing to support inter-state cooperation, while those who produce negative externalities of benefit from them have an incentive to rather free-ride on the others domestic policies. Based on this, policy cooperation is only likely in cases where the policies of two or more governments create negative policy externalities and unilateral strategies are less cost-benefit efficient (Moravcsik, 1993:486). In addition, even in cases where policy cooperation is mutually beneficial, conflict can arise on the precise terming of policy cooperation as governments have diverging preferences with regards to the distribution of benefits. The costs and benefits of policy cooperation can be expected to be

unevenly distributed among as well as within nations. Thus, nations and domestic societal groups that experience disadvantages due to policy coordination will oppose it. As has been highlighted above, national governments are constrained by the interests of politically important societal groups, whose interests are composed of the costs and benefits of policies. These costs and benefits are, however, not equally distributed throughout issue areas but different policy areas engender characteristics of costs and benefits for societal groups: While societal actors can be regarded as having a significant role with regards to low politics, they do not play a significant role in negotiations beyond the state as for instance security matters (Moravcsik, 1993; Schimmelfennig, 2004:77). Based on this, liberal intergovernmentalism assumes a similar course of cooperation as is provided for by neorealist approaches highlighted above. However, the latter is convinced that cooperation in general is rather unlikely and arises only under exceptional circumstances and only in the realms of low politics, while it is rather unthinkable in the realms of high politics. In contrast to this, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that cooperation is likely to emerge, especially in areas of low politics. This leads to the assumption that cooperation in the realms of high politics is possible, while the level of cooperation can be regarded as being particularly higher in the realms of low politics. Therefore, the hypothesis that can be derived from liberal intergovernmentalism states:

Hypothesis 4: Common positions can be expected to increase especially in areas where societal pressure is united and governments are more restricted, as it is primarily the case for low politics.

Although there are many other theoretical approaches stemming from the fields of EI and IR, this study is limited to the most established ones as highlighted above. This is the case as this study is limited by its means, namely time and length so that it is only possible to compare findings on common positions with regards to their amount over time and between issue areas. Additional theories provide similar assumptions on the course of cooperation and hence the development of common positions, while differing with regards to the causes of cooperation. These latter assumptions, however, cannot be checked by the means of this study. What this implies for the overall study, will be discussed below. For now it is enough to highlight that, even with the above outlined hypotheses, this study provides only limited insights in the chosen theoretical approaches.

4. Methodology

It has been highlighted above in several instances that this study seeks to assess the development of EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly by making use of the indicator common positions. Common positions 'shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature' and thus directly relate to the cooperation mechanisms outlined in section 2.2 of this study (Art.15 TEU). Before now turning to the empirical part of this study, some clarifications must be given on use of the indicator as well as on the data collection methods.

4.1. Conceptualisation

Focusing on common position as an indicator for EU member state cooperation in UN spheres has several advantages, while also bearing some disadvantages. Considering the advantages first, the most obvious strength relates to the above mentioned concrete linkage between representation and coordination. Thus, the amount of common positions can be assumed to reflect the functioning of the cooperation mechanisms as outlined in section 2.2. Hence, the development of common positions can be expected to give an indication on the overall development of EU cooperation (Kissack, 2007). Next to this primarily quantitative advantage, some qualitative advantages are offered: By using the indicator of common positions it is not only possible to give insights on the development of common positions with regards to their amount, but also with regards to their content, for instance whether they are vaguely or strongly formulated and whether this changed over time. However, this study is limited to the quantitative advantages that the usage of EU common position as an indicator offers. Next to this advantage, using common positions as an indicator also bears a strong disadvantage, namely that the actual level of coordination may be underestimated by solely focusing on one indicator (Kissack, 2007). This may happen for several reasons as for instance, coordination meetings yield no concrete output or data are inaccurately listed, for instance by not recognizing an EU common position as such, but instead as a national statement. Therefore, the indicator of EU common positions, as used in this study, is used in a differentiated, two-fold way: The first dimension refers to the probably more ordinary meaning of EU common positions, regarded as EU (Presidency) statements 'on behalf of the EU' that have been outlined in section 2.2 of this study. EU statements tend to either refer directly to the topic of a Resolution or are given as an explanation of a vote taken on the Resolution. EU statements are listed in the UN database with regards to the Draft Resolutions that they belong to. This makes the process of allocating an EU statement to the corresponding Resolution a relatively easy process as one merely has to consider whether the

Draft Resolution was accepted and is thus listed as a Resolution in the UN Database (UN, 2009c). For instance, in the 50th session of the UN General Assembly Italy, speaking on behalf of the European Union, discussed the Draft Resolution on the Situation in the Middle East. This Draft Resolution was later on adopted as Resolution A/RES/50/22 A-C and thus the EU can be regarded as having a common position on this Resolution. However, by the means of this study, it is not possible to differentiate between the parts of a Resolution that the EU had a common position to, but, as will be shown below, this is possible using the indicator of CFSP statements. Thus, the EU will be regarded as having issued a statement, and thus common position, for all parts of the Resolution. The second dimension refers to CFSP statements that have been made on UN General Assembly issues. CFSP statements are listed on the internet side of the Council of the EU and tend to refer to ‘spot issues’ in the area of security and social issue (Council of the European Union, 2009). CFSP statements to UN General Assembly issues can either directly relate to the exact topic of an UN Resolution or merely relate to the general scope of the UN Resolution. With regards to the former example of the Resolution on the Situation in the Middle East, particularly regarding paragraph 22 B, dealing with the topic of Jerusalem, the EU issued a CFSP statement only with regards to the general scope of the UN Resolution. Therefore, the CFSP statement was broadly addressing the Situation in the Middle East, also with regards to the occupied territories, without referring explicitly to Jerusalem. In later years, the EU issued both, a CFSP statement on the general situation and a CFSP statement directly referring to Jerusalem. CFSP statements are therefore able to clearly indicate the degree to that a CFSP statement and the topic of the Resolution coincide. By including this second dimension of the indicator EU common position, it is sought to collateralise, at least to some extent, against the above mentioned disadvantages of common positions as an indicator. Obviously, however, both dimensions of a common position can befall one Resolution. As this thesis does not weight the two dimensions and does neither weight those Resolutions where both dimensions of EU cooperation can be found, no conclusions on the importance of certain topics can be given. However, in order to draw conclusions on the usage of each indicator, the analysis will also focus on each indicator separately, thereby also regarding the appropriateness of each indicator for the findings of this study.

4.2. Methodological Choices

Next to the conceptual choices that were highlighted above, methodological choices had to be made in order to conduct a study restricted to the available means. The methodological choices primarily refer to the amount of data used during this study. First of all, the study

needs to be restricted to some years only as the tool of common positions was already established in 1993, therefore leaving fourteen years to analyse. While it would be logical to start the analysis in 1993 in order to analyse the development of common positions from the beginning onwards, this was complicated by problems in data availability as CFSP statements were only registered from 1995. Furthermore, due to the Eastern Enlargement of the EU in 2004, the study has been restricted to the timeframe before the 58th session. Including a session after the Eastern Enlargement could seriously bias the study results as Eastern Enlargement can be expected to negatively affect the cooperation process due to the fact that more nation states would need to agree to a common position by unanimity. Thus, the Eastern Enlargement can be regarded as decreasing the amount of common positions. Based on these restrictions, the first year chosen to be analysed during this study is thus 1995/1996, corresponding to the 50th session of the UN General Assembly. The corresponding last year chosen to be analysed 2001/2002, the 56th session of the UN General Assembly. As the third year to be analysed, the intermediate year 1999/2000 has been chosen on an arbitrary basis, which corresponds to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly. Secondly, restrictions were needed with regards to the vast amount of issue areas that are dealt with in the UN General Assembly, as has been shown in section 2.1 above. In order to represent issue areas ranging from low to high politics, as necessary to differentiate among the chosen hypotheses outlined in the third section of this study, three issue areas have been chosen: As highlighted in the theoretical part of this study, social and economic issues will represent the realms of low politics and security issues will represent the realms of high politics. In order to decide to either allocate a Resolution to one issue area only or to leave it out, a strict methodology was needed. In order to facilitate work, this methodology has been based on the agenda of the six main Committees. For instance, issues that have been discussed in the spheres of the first Committee of the UN General Assembly have most of the time been regarded as security issues, those discussed in the second Committee have been most often regarded as economic issues and those of the third Committee as social issues. However, this methodology has been complicated by two main facts: First, some issues have been discussed in more than one Committee as for instance the issue of the Palestinian people. While issues regarding the Palestinian people are mainly placed on the agenda of the first Committee, it has been regarded as a social issue during this study due to the fact that most Resolutions dealt with human rights and humanitarian aid, which were also discussed in the Second Committee. Second, some issues have been discussed in the Plenary without reference to a main Committee. In these cases, the Resolution has been judged on an individual basis in order to

decide whether it can be allocated to one of the issue areas of importance during this study or not. A list of all topics that have been allocated to one of the issue areas can be found in the Appendix.

5. Analysis

The next part deals with the empirical findings of this study and is divided in two main sub-sections: The first sub-sections displays the descriptive statistics, during that the data will be analysed. first on a more general basis by showing the distribution of UN Resolutions per issue area, the overall amount of common positions as well as their general distribution throughout issue areas. Afterwards, the three issues areas that are of importance during this study will be highlighted separately with regards to the number of UN Resolutions and EU common positions. This procedure will be repeated for each individual indicator of EU common positions, namely EU statements as well as general and exact CFSP statements. Afterwards the second sub-section makes use of these findings and applies them with regards to the hypothesis, as derived from the theoretical approaches outlined above in the third section of this study

5.1. Descriptive Statistics

5.1.1. EU Common Positions

In the three years that have been observed during this study 425 Resolutions have been analysed. Table 1 gives some first indications on the overall observed numbers as well as the distribution of UN Resolutions in the UN General Assembly per issue area. Table 1 highlights that of altogether 425 Resolutions 71 (16.7 per cent) refer to an economic issue, 229 (53.9 per cent) belong to a social issue and 125 (29.4 per cent) regard a security issue.

| | Frequency | Percent |
|-----------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid Economics | 71 | 16,7 |
| Social Issues | 229 | 53,9 |
| Security Issues | 125 | 29,4 |
| Total | 425 | 100,0 |

Table 1

| | Frequency | Percent |
|-------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid no CP | 199 | 46,8 |
| CP | 226 | 53,2 |
| Total | 425 | 100,0 |

Table 2

Below, it will be shown that the EU uses the tool of common position rather frequently, while the times of usage are clearly unequally distributed throughout the issue areas and tend to increase over the observed three years. With regards to the frequency by that the tool of common position was used during this study, Table 2 as well as Chart 1 show that the EU

issued a common position, either in the form of an EU statement, CFSP statement or both, in 53.18 per cent of the Resolutions, which equals an EU common positions in 226 out of 425 Resolutions. With regards to the distribution of the EU common positions throughout the three issue areas, Chart 2 highlights that of 226 EU common positions 144 (63.7 per cent) consider social policy issues, 46 (20.4 per cent) regard a security issue and only 36 (15.9 per cent) belong to an economic issue. Thus, the distribution of EU common positions throughout the issue areas more or less equals the distribution of UN Resolutions issued in the UN General Assembly during the years observed.

Amount of EU Common Positions with regards to the number of Resolutions




Chart 1

Common Position by Policy Field




Chart 2

With regards to the percentage amount of times that the EU was able to reach a common position in each issue area, Table A highlights some disparities: The EU had a common position with regards to economic issues in approximately half of the Resolutions, namely in 50.7 per cent of the cases. This was even more often the case with regards to social issues, where the EU had a common position to 62.9 per cent of the Resolutions. However, the amount of times that the EU was able to reach a common position was particularly lower with regards to security issues, where it was only able to present a common position in 36.8 per cent of the Resolutions.

Regarding the amount of EU common positions over time, Table B up to D consider the amount of EU common positions over time, separately for each issue area. Table B focuses on the development of EU common positions on economic issues: Starting in the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, 21 Resolutions were classified with regards to economic issues. From these 21 Resolutions, the EU presented a common position, either through an EU or CFSP statement, in 42.9 per cent of the cases. In the 54th session of the UN General Assembly, 23 Resolutions were classified as regarding an economic issue. The EU presented a common position with regards to 47.8 per cent of the cases. Thus, the percentage amount of

EU common positions with regards to economic issues increased slightly. In the 56th session of the UN General Assembly, 27 Resolutions were classified with regards to economic issues. The EU presented a common position to 59.3 per cent of the Resolutions, which displays an increase to the previous year by almost 12 percent. Regarding social issues next, Table C highlights an even higher level of EU common positions: Starting in the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, 67 Resolutions were classified as social issues. From these 67 Resolutions, the EU presented a common position in 55.2 per cent of the Resolutions. In the 54th sessions, 87 Resolutions were classified as belonging to social policy issues. In this session, the EU presented a common position in 63.2 per cent of the times, which displays an increase to the preceding session of 8 per cent.. In the 56th session, where 75 Resolutions were classified as social issues, the percentage amount of EU common position increased up to 69.3 per cent. Thus, in contrast to the previous session, there was a slight increase of approximately 6 per cent. In contrast, Table D highlights that the amount of common positions increased less steadily over the years: Starting in the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, 45 Resolutions were classified as regarding a security issue. The EU presented a common position to 31.1 per cent of these Resolutions, the lowest percentage amount of EU common positions so far. In the 54th session, 40 Resolutions were classified as security policy issue and the EU presented a common position to 40 per cent of these Resolutions. Thus, the percentage amount of EU common positions increased with regards to the preceding session to nearly 9 per cent. In the 56th session of the UN General Assembly, the data were similar to those of the 54th session: 40 Resolutions were classified as security issues and the EU had a common position to 40 per cent of the Resolutions.

5.1.2. Usage of the Different Indicators

In order to draw conclusions on the appropriateness of each indicator, the analysis of the three individual indicators used during this study will be outlined below, especially with regard to the frequency of usage, their distribution between policy fields and development over the years.

5.1.2.1. EU Statements

Starting with the policy tool of EU statements, this is clearly the instrument used most frequently in order to express a common position.. Therefore., the findings on the distribution of EU statements in the different issue areas as well as the distribution of EU statements over time are rather similar those of the overall level of common positions highlighted above: Thus, the amount of EU common positions increases over time in all issue areas, while the

distribution of common positions over issues areas shows some disparities, as will be discussed below in more detail.

Starting with the overall amount of EU statements and their distribution throughout the studied policy fields, Table 3 and Chart 3 give the following indications: The EU issued an EU statement in slightly below 50 per cent, namely in 47.1 per cent, of all Resolutions and of overall 226 common positions, 88.5 per cent take the form of an EU statement. Regarding the overall percentage amount of times that the EU was able to present an EU statement in each issue area, the EU presented an EU statement with regards to economic issues in 50.7 per cent, with regards to social issues in 52.8 per cent and with regards to security issues in 34.4 per cent of all Resolution (Table E).

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-----|-----------|---------|
| Valid | no | 225 | 52,9 |
| | yes | 200 | 47,1 |
| Total | | 425 | 100,0 |




Table 3

Chart 3

Regarding the usage of the policy tool over time, it has been mentioned before that the amount of common positions increases over time in all three issue areas. Considering this in more detail, Table F gives the following indications for the issue area of economics: In the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, the EU presented an statement to 42.9 per cent of the adopted Resolutions, in the 54th session there was a slight increase up to 47.8 per cent and another increase up to the 56th session to 59.3 per cent. Regarding the percentage amount of EU statements with regards to social issues, Table G highlights that in the 50th session of the UN General Assembly 40.3 per cent of the Resolutions were accompanied by a statement on behalf of the EU, in the 54th session the EU already had a statement to 56.3 per cent of the Resolutions and in the 56th session it increased up to 60 per cent of the Resolutions. And with regards to security issues, Table H highlights that in the 50th session of the General Assembly there was only an EU statement in 24.4 per cent of the Resolutions, this increased to 40 per cent in the 54th session and remained on that level for the 56th session.

5.1.2.2. CFSP Statements

The policy tool of both forms of CFSP statements has been used less often than it was the case for the EU statements. Furthermore, when regarding the distribution of CFSP statements in the UN General Assembly, the pattern tends also to be less clear as the one of EU statements highlighted above, as will be shown below in more detail.

Starting again with the overall amount of CFSP statements during the observed three years, Table 4 highlights that the EU issued an CFSP statement in 23.5 per cent of the cases, referring to 100 CFSP statements in 425 Resolutions. Respectively, Chart 4 shows that from the overall 226 EU common positions, 44.2 per cent take the form of either an general or exact CFSP statement. The 100 CFSP statements made were all of general nature, while only 59 additionally focused on the exact topic of the Resolution. However, to each Resolutions that was ascribed an exact CFSP statement also a general CFSP statement was issued. Regarding the overall distribution of CFSP statements per issue area, it needs to be remembered that CFSP statements are only used with regards to social and security issues. Table I highlights that a CFSP statement was issued in 34.5 per cent with regards to social issues and to 16.8 per cent with regards to security issues. Below, the distribution of general and exact CFSP statements will be highlighted separately, over time as well as throughout issue areas.

| | Frequency | Percent |
|----------|-----------|---------|
| Valid no | 325 | 76.5 |
| yes | 100 | 23.5 |
| Total | 425 | 100,0 |




Table 4

Chart 4

Regarding the general CFSP statements first, their distribution per issue area equals the distribution of the overall CFSP statements as outlined above: A CFSP statement was issued in 34.5 per cent with regards to social issues and to 16.8 per cent with regards to security issues. Considering this distribution over the years next, table J and K in the appendix show

the distribution throughout issue areas per year: Regarding the social issues first (table J), in the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, the EU had a CFSP statement to 23 out of 67 UN Resolutions, corresponding to 34.3 per cent of the Resolutions. In the 54th session, there was a CFSP statement to 31 out of 87 Resolutions, thus an CFSP statement to 35.6 per cent of the Resolutions. In the 56th session, the level decreased to 33.3 per cent, corresponding to 25 CFSP statements out of 75 Resolutions. Regarding the security issues next (table K), in the 50th session there was a CFSP statement with regards to 10 (22.2 per cent), while there was no CFSP to 35 Resolutions. In the 54th session the percentage amount of CFSP statements decreased to 15 per cent (6 out of 40) and in the 56th session it decreased further to 12.5 per cent (5 out of 40).

Regarding the exact CFSP statements next, there was a CFSP statement to social issues in 19.7 per cent and to security issues in 11.2 per cent of the Resolutions (table L). Considering the distribution over the years next, table M and N in the appendix show the distribution throughout issue areas per year. Regarding the social issues first (table N), in the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, the EU had a CFSP statement in 22.4 per cent of the cases (15 out of 67). In the 54th session this decreased to 18.4 per cent, 16 CFSP statements out of 87 Resolution. In the 56th session there was a slight increase up to 18.7 per cent, 14 CFSP statements out of 75 Resolutions. Regarding the security issues next (table M), in the 50th session there were 7 CFSP statements of overall 45 Resolutions, corresponding to 15.6 per cent. This slightly decreased in the 54th session to 15 per cent (6 out of 40) and decreased heavily in the 56th session to only 2.5 per cent (1 out of 40).

In order to provide an explanation for these unsteady patterns the agenda items of the UN General Assembly and the nature of CFSP statements as a policy tool need to be regarded: The EU tends to issue CFSP statements to Resolutions that regard a prevailing situation in a particular country, while CFSP statements emerge to Resolutions on general topics only in exceptional cases. When considering the agenda items of the UN General Assembly over the different session, however, it becomes obvious that the amount of Resolutions that regard a specific case decreases: While in the 50th session 50.9 per cent of the Resolutions regarded a specific case, in the 54th session this amount decreases to 40.2 per cent and in the 56th session only 33.9 per cent regarded a specific case (Table O). Therefore, the unsteady or even decreasing pattern exhibited by CFSP statements is not necessarily related to the cooperation

process of the EU member states, but is instead related to the nature of the used policy tool. This reasoning needs to be remembered when regarding the data interpretation below.

5.2. Data Interpretation

Based on the findings from above, the hypothesis derived from the theoretical approaches that were outlined in the third section of this study will be contrasted, thereby highlighting the suitability of each theoretical approach with regards to the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Common positions can be expected to emerge only in very rare exceptions, i.e. when a hegemon fosters rules or a common threat is faced.

The first hypothesis has been derived from neorealist theory and is primarily based on the assumption that, in the international system where states are the primary actors, states fear cooperation for relative gains probably made by the others, and therefore resulting interdependencies. Regarding the data evaluated on above, it becomes obvious that common positions, either in the form of an EU or CFSP statement, emerge in 53.2 per cent of all Resolutions, which is slightly more than half of all UN General Assembly Resolutions. In addition, also the indicator which is used in the rarest cases, i.e. exact CFSP statements, was issued in 16.7 per cent of the cases. Therefore, common positions do not only emerge in rare expectations so that this part of the hypothesis can be rejected. However, the data evaluated on above do not give any indications on the possibility that either a hegemon was fostering rules or that a common threat was faced so that this study fails to reject the second part of the hypothesis. Thus, further research is necessary on the causes for cooperation in order to be able to indicate whether common positions were issued because of the cooperation mechanisms outlined in section 2.2. or whether common positions were rather due to a hegemon or a common threat.

Hypothesis 2: As cooperation can only exist in the realms of low politics, EU common positions can be expected to emerge only with regards to social and economic issues.

The second hypothesis has also been derived from neorealist assumptions. Indeed the data evaluated on above indicate some differences between the three issue areas that have been observed: Each individual indicator as well as the combination of all indicators have shown that EU common positions tend to be more likely in the realms of low politics, i.e. with regards to social issues and (where applicable) with regards to economics. Thus, common positions are not equally distributed throughout the issue areas. Nevertheless, there is no

evidence that common positions, and thus cooperation, can only exist in the realms of low politics. Therefore, the second hypothesis can be rejected.

Hypothesis 3: The degree of Common positions can be expected to increase over time in all of the Committees.

Hypothesis 4: Common positions can be expected to increase especially in areas where societal pressure is united and governments are more restricted, as it is primarily the case for low politics.

The third hypothesis has been based on neoliberal as well as neofunctional findings, while the fourth hypothesis is based on intergovernmental assumptions. Regarding the data evaluated on above, no clear pattern becomes obvious on the first sight. The amount of EU statements has been steadily increasing over the years throughout the observed issue areas. In contrast to this, the data on the CFSP statements are less significant as they fluctuate over the years and throughout issue areas. In this context it has been argued above that this unsteady pattern can be best explained by highlighting changes in the agenda items of the UN General Assembly, especially with regards to nature of CFSP statements. Therefore, based on the inadequacy of CFSP statements as an indicator for the development of common positions over time, one should rather restrict the focus on the development of EU statements: According to this indicator, as already mentioned above, the amount of EU statements that regarded a social issue increased approximately to 20 per cent, while the percentage amount of EU statements increased around 14 and 15 per cent with regards economic and security issues, respectively. Therefore, the indicator of EU statements provides no evidence that the degree of common positions increases especially in areas where societal pressure is united and governments more restricted, this in areas of low politics. Instead, findings give particularly more evidence for the third hypothesis and thus neoliberal as well as neofunctional findings.

6. Concluding Remarks

When the Treaty of Maastricht came into force, the EU has prominently declared that it seeks to ‘assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy’. As the latter is particularly intergovernmental in nature, this aim is only realizable when the EU member states act united on the international scene as for instance in the UN General Assembly, where all EU member states participate, along side others, as sovereign states. In order to investigate whether the EU was able to meet this aim, this study has evaluated on the development of EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly over time and throughout issue areas by analysing the development of the amount

of EU common positions in the UN General Assembly. It has been argued that EU common positions can be used as an eligible alternative for the prevailing use of voting cohesion as an indicator for EU cooperation as the latter is rather an inadequate proxy for the level of cooperation. Nevertheless, although voting cohesion is not as closely linked to cooperation as it was already prevailing before cooperation mechanisms have been adopted, the findings of those studies were taken as a useful starting point. Indeed, the study at hand confirms some of the earlier findings on voting cohesion. For instance, the three years that have been analysed above, clearly confirm that the amount of EU common positions varies throughout issue areas: Common positions are more likely to occur with regards to economic and social issues than with regards to security issues. In contrast, there is no evidence that these disparities are increasingly deepening, but instead the amount of EU common positions increases similarly in all issue areas. In order to be able to investigate on the past as well as the future development of the policy tool, the findings made in the analytical part of this study have been contrasted with the most common theories of International Relations and European Integration, respectively. Based on the three years analysed in this study, neoliberal and neofunctional approaches, that argue that the degree of common positions increases over time in all issue areas, seem to be most suiting for the development of the policy tool. However, it is not possible to discriminate more strictly between these theories due to that fact that the investigations of this study were limited to quantitative indicators, i.e. the amount of common positions, thereby ignoring more qualitative indicators, such as the content, the topics as well as member states' reasons for cooperation. Thus, further research is necessary in order to gain more specific findings. Next to this, this study is not able to give clear indications on the impact of EU cooperation, but is restricted to those assumptions issued in section 2.3. Furthermore, based on the short time frame that has been used in this study, further research needs to highlighted whether the policy tool develops equally over a different time frame or whether it is rather fluctuating as findings on voting cohesion would suggest. In sum, this study provides a good starting point for future research on the development of EU common positions as a policy tool, while its findings are not yet generalizeable for the development of EU cooperation in the UN General Assembly over time and throughout issue areas.

7. Appendix

7.1. List of Topics as outlined in section 4.2.

Economics: technology, macroeconomics, international trade and development, the financial system and development, debt and development, energy, globalisation, corruption, specific action and needs of landlocked countries, economic empowerment. Hence, primarily topics discussed in the second Committee of the UN General Assembly.

Social issues: social development, women and children, (Palestinian) refugees, fundamental freedoms, racism, self-determination, human rights, public information, governance, education, humanitarian and disaster relief. Hence, primarily topics discussed in the third Committee and partly fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly.

Security: middle east issues, disarmament, international security, mine action, peacekeeping and atomic radiation. Hence, primarily topics discussed in the first Committee of the UN General Assembly

Topics discussed only in the Plenary were only included when they clearly belong to one of the topics highlighted above. Topics discussed in the fourth, fifth and sixth Committee were complete ignored during this study as well as topics that do not clearly belong to the above mentioned issue areas, namely crime and drugs, outer space, any administrative, budgetary and legal issue, decolonialization and environmental issues.

7.2. Tables

7.2.1. Tables regarding section 5.1.1.

Table A Distribution of Common Positions per Issue Area

| | | | Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | Total |
|---------|-------|--|---|---------------|-----------------|--------|
| | | | Economics | Social Issues | Security Issues | |
| Overall | no CP | Count | 35 | 85 | 79 | 199 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 49,3% | 37,1% | 63,2% | 46,8% |
| | CP | Count | 36 | 144 | 46 | 226 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 50,7% | 62,9% | 36,8% | 53,2% |
| Total | | Count | 71 | 229 | 125 | 425 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Table B Common Positions in the Field of Economics over time

| | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|-----------|-------|--|---|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Economics | no CP | Count | 12 | 12 | 11 | 35 |
| | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 57,1% | 52,2% | 40,7% | 49,3% |
| | CP | Count | 9 | 11 | 16 | 36 |
| | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 42,9% | 47,8% | 59,3% | 50,7% |
| Total | | Count | 21 | 23 | 27 | 71 |
| | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Table C Common Positions in the Field of Social Issues over time

| | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|--------|-------|---|---|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Social | no CP | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 30 44,8% | 32 36,8% | 23 30,7% | 85 37,1% |
| | CP | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 37 55,2% | 55 63,2% | 52 69,3% | 144 62,9% |
| Total | | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 67 100,0% | 87 100,0% | 75 100,0% | 229 100,0% |

Table D Common Positions in the Field of Security Issues over time

| | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|----------|-------|---|---|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Security | no CP | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 31 68,9% | 24 60,0% | 24 60,0% | 79 63,2% |
| | CP | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 14 31,1% | 16 40,0% | 16 40,0% | 46 36,8% |
| Total | | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 45 100,0% | 40 100,0% | 40 100,0% | 125 100,0% |

7.2.2. Tables regarding section 5.1.2.1

Table E Number of EU statements per issue area over the years

| | | | Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | Total |
|----------------------------|-----|--|---|---------------|-----------------|--------|
| | | | Economics | Social Issues | Security Issues | |
| Is there an EU statement ? | no | Count | 35 | 108 | 82 | 225 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 49,3% | 47,2% | 65,6% | 52,9% |
| | yes | Count | 36 | 121 | 43 | 200 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 50,7% | 52,8% | 34,4% | 47,1% |
| Total | | Count | 71 | 229 | 125 | 425 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Table F Number of EU statements over the years with regards to economic issues

| Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|---|---|-----|--|---|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Economics | Is there an EU statement with regards to the general topic of the Resolution? | no | Count | 12 | 12 | 11 | 35 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 57,1% | 52,2% | 40,7% | 49,3% |
| | | yes | Count | 9 | 11 | 16 | 36 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 42,9% | 47,8% | 59,3% | 50,7% |
| Total | | | Count | 21 | 23 | 27 | 71 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Table G Number of EU statements over the years with regards to social issues

| Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|---|----------------------------|--|--|---|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Social Issues | Is there an EU statement ? | no | Count | 40 | 38 | 30 | 108 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 59,7% | 43,7% | 40,0% | 47,2% |
| | yes | Count | 27 | 49 | 45 | 121 | |
| | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 40,3% | 56,3% | 60,0% | 52,8% | |
| Total | | | Count | 67 | 87 | 75 | 229 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that was adopted | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Table H Number of EU statements over the years with regards to security issues

| Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|---|----------------------------|--|--|---|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Security Issues | Is there an EU statement ? | no | Count | 34 | 24 | 24 | 82 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 75,6% | 60,0% | 60,0% | 65,6% |
| | yes | Count | 11 | 16 | 16 | 43 | |
| | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 24,4% | 40,0% | 40,0% | 34,4% | |
| Total | | | Count | 45 | 40 | 40 | 125 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

7.2.3. Tables regarding section 5.1.2.2.

Table I Number of overall CFSP statements over the years per issue area

| | | | Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | Total |
|--------------|-----|--|---|---------------|-----------------|--------|
| | | | Economics | Social Issues | Security Issues | |
| Overall CFSP | no | Count | 71 | 150 | 104 | 325 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 100,0% | 65,5% | 83,2% | 76,5% |
| | yes | Count | 0 | 79 | 21 | 100 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | ,0% | 34,5% | 16,8% | 23,5% |
| Total | | Count | 71 | 229 | 125 | 425 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Table J number of general CFSP statements over the years with regards to social issues

| Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|---|--|-----------------|--|---|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Social Issues | Is there a CFSP statement with regards to the general topic of the Resolution? | no | Count | 44 | 56 | 50 | 150 |
| | | common position | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 65,7% | 64,4% | 66,7% | 65,5% |
| | | yes | Count | 23 | 31 | 25 | 79 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 34,3% | 35,6% | 33,3% | 34,5% |
| Total | | | Count | 67 | 87 | 75 | 229 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Table K Number of general CFSP statements over the years with regards to security issues

| Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|---|--|--------------------|--|---|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Security Issues | Is there a CFSP statement with regards to the general topic of the Resolution? | no common position | Count | 35 | 34 | 35 | 104 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 77,8% | 85,0% | 87,5% | 83,2% |
| | | yes | Count | 10 | 6 | 5 | 21 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 22,2% | 15,0% | 12,5% | 16,8% |
| | Total | | Count | 45 | 40 | 40 | 125 |
| | | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Table L Distribution of exact CFSP statements over the years per issue area

| | | | Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | Total |
|--|--------------------|--|---|---------------|-----------------|--------|
| | | | Economics | Social Issues | Security Issues | |
| Is there a CFSP statement with regards to the exact topic of the Resolution? | no common position | Count | 71 | 184 | 111 | 366 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 100,0% | 80,3% | 88,8% | 86,1% |
| | yes | Count | 0 | 45 | 14 | 59 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | ,0% | 19,7% | 11,2% | 13,9% |
| | Total | Count | 71 | 229 | 125 | 425 |
| | | % within Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Table M Number of exact CFSP statements with regards to social issues

| Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|---|--|--------------------|---|---|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Social Issues | Is there a CFSP statement with regards to the exact topic of the Resolution? | no common position | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 52 77,6% | 71 81,6% | 61 81,3% | 184 80,3% |
| | | yes | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 15 22,4% | 16 18,4% | 14 18,7% | 45 19,7% |
| Total | | | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 67 100,0% | 87 100,0% | 75 100,0% | 229 100,0% |

Table N Number of exact CFSP statements with regards to security issues

| Policy field in that the Resolution belongs | | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|---|--|--------------------|---|---|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Security Issues | Is there a CFSP statement with regards to the exact topic of the Resolution? | no common position | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 38 84,4% | 34 85,0% | 39 97,5% | 111 88,8% |
| | | yes | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 7 15,6% | 6 15,0% | 1 2,5% | 14 11,2% |
| Total | | | Count % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 45 100,0% | 40 100,0% | 40 100,0% | 125 100,0% |

Table O CFSP statements and the nature of a Resolutions

| | | | session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | | | Total |
|--|--|--|---|--------|--------|-------|
| | | | 50 | 54 | 56 | |
| Is the topic of relevant nature or concerns one specific case? | specific | Count | 57 | 51 | 39 | 147 |
| | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 50,9% | 40,2% | 33,9% | 41,5% |
| | general | Count | 55 | 76 | 76 | 207 |
| | | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 49,1% | 59,8% | 66,1% | 58,5% |
| Total | Count | 112 | 127 | 115 | 354 | |
| | % within session of the UN GA in that Resolution was adopted | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | |

7.3. List of References

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