

UNIVERSITEIT TWENTE

The Reproduction of Islamophobia in German and Dutch Newspaper Article Discourse

An analysis from a Critical Discourse Analytical
Perspective

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to research the influence of the use of language in newspaper articles from the Netherlands and Germany on the reproduction of social inequalities regarding Muslims and Islamophobia. The study focuses on articles published in 2010 in the newspapers FAZ, Bild, NRC and Telegraaf. The analysis of the language in the articles is conducted from a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective and is done for each country separately. The analysis of German articles, on the one hand, delivers evidence of strong framing and the construction of a moral panic. In the Dutch articles, on the other hand, not enough evidence is found for claiming that Islamophobia has been reproduced in terms of moral panics. The study concludes with an account of the similarities and differences of the two discourses and the language used.

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1. Introduction

“Multiculturalism is dead, it could not be more dead”, Horst Seehofer, leader of the German Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) stated at a party conference on October 2, 2010 (Stern, 2010) and Chancellor Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) confirmed “This [multicultural] approach has failed, totally failed” (nq-online, 2010).

Ever since the publication of Thilo Sarrazin’s book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (August 2010) statements like these have dominated the German public and political debate on integration. The discussion mainly focuses on the ideology of Islam and the alleged reluctance and incapability of Muslim immigrants to integrate into German society. From the beginning, the discussion included anti-Islamic statements and after all even a new, anti-Islamic party- Die Freiheit- has formed. The expressed points of view and the portrayal of Muslims in the media are increasingly undifferentiated and suggestive. Subjects such as the global financial crisis or climate change seem to have become less important matters. All in all, current developments can be interpreted in terms of a moral panic- Islamophobia.

As pointed out, the current discussion was triggered by the statements and book of former member of board of directors of the German Federal Bank, Thilo Sarrazin. He predicts the stultification of the German people and demise of German culture caused by the high birth rate of Muslim immigrants who are supposedly less intelligent based on their DNA. This bestseller has been discussed intensively and has earned the support of right-wing parties as well as conservative politicians and great parts of the population. Along with the high media coverage and some politicians’ apocalyptic rhetoric, it has been called for the restriction of immigration from certain culture areas and even for constraining the right to practice the Islamic religion even though this right is protected by the German constitutional law, article four paragraph one (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010). The fact that the impact of the discussion has also reached the public is indicated by a study of the German Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (FES). Its results confirm that alongside an increase of xenophobic and rightist points of view, hostility towards Islam has become more common in the German population (Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung, 2010). Thus, according to the study, 53,7% of the respondents in West Germany and 75,7% of those in East Germany agree that religious practices should be constrained for Muslims in Germany (ibid. 2010:134).

Furthermore, indicating the significance of this moral panic is the foundation of the anti-Islamic party ‘Die Freiheit’. Its leader, René Stadtkewitz, was excluded from the faction of the governing CDU for his extreme opinions and for inviting the Dutch politician and right-wing populist, Geert Wilders (PVV), to speak in Berlin. Stadtkewitz states that in Germany there are only problems with immigrants from Islamic countries and that the Islamisation of Europe is about to abolish our freedom of opinion. In addition, he affirms that Islam is a political ideology that prevents integration (Stadtkewitz, 2010) and supports the attitude of Eliezer Cohen, Israeli politician, that “political correctness and multiculturalism is the foundation of non-reparable

damage” (Cohen E. , 2010). When Geert Wilders spoke in Berlin he was received as friend and role model for ‘Die Freiheit’-members.

Up to the publication of Sarrazin’s book, statements like those cited above would have been seen as politically incorrect and with that unacceptable. Now, leading politicians of the CDU/CSU warn of false tolerance regarding those people who do not respect the German cultural values which are supposedly based on ‘Christian-Judaic traditions’ and attack the Federal President Christian Wulff for declaring that ‘the Islam’ was part of the German culture (Bundespräsidialamt, 2010).

All in all, within a very short period of time, old taboos were abolished and those who caution about undifferentiated discussions and discrimination are frequently marked as naïve, leftist or multicultural. The constructed fear to lose the German culture and to be victims of Islamism is omnipresent in most reports covering integration of Muslims.

Whereas, in its extreme manner, this rapid development is new to present Germany, it already came up ten years ago in the Netherlands and therefore is much more established than in Germany.

Parallels can be drawn from the discussions starting in 2000 in the Netherlands and those in Germany in 2010. Hence, in 2000, sociologist Paul Scheffer argued that the ‘house of cards of the multicultural society’ in the Netherlands was breaking down (Scheffer, 2000:2). He criticized in his paper *Het multiculturele Drama* that especially immigrants with Islamic background had organized into parallel societies. He continued that there was a subliminal clash of cultures and that cosmopolitanism was merely an illusion.

This is very similar to what German politicians such as Seehofer and Merkel or Sarrazin have stated. In both countries the main problem with integration is supposedly caused by Muslims who are said to refuse to integrate and instead live in parallel societies.

This brief summary of recent events in Germany and the parallels that can be drawn to events in the Netherlands, point to a high political and scientific relevance.

This thesis mainly focuses on the influence of the language used in internet newspaper articles on the (re)production of Islamophobia. Accordingly, the following research question has been formulated:

How has Islamophobia been (re)produced by the use of language in internet newspaper articles in Germany and the Netherlands in 2010 and what are the similarities and differences of the two discourses?

Regarding the concept of language it is held that it is a social action that causes as well as results from cognitive models inherent in values, attitudes and ideology that are communicated in forms of talk and text. That means that through language, identities and values are projected as well as how the writer/speaker would like to be seen or in case of a journalist how the message of the text is supposed to be understood. Accordingly, language is also active and thus the purpose of used language is significant. Hence, it is not merely a method of communication but

also a “system(s) of classification and conceptualization” (The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology, 2006). Moreover, the context in which something is said or written is considered to have a great influence and language is understood as reproducing social reality. In sum, this means that language can be used in order to exert dominance over the listener/reader since often the ways in which ideology, values and attitudes are communicated are subtle and not recognized as such by the recipient. When analyzing language, it has to be paid attention to different aspects such as among others topics, style and rhetoric (van Dijk, 1993). Therefore the concept will be further defined in the following chapter.

Language is also next to context the main focus in the analysis of the written discourse in the newspaper articles that will be discussed. Important for the definition of discourse is that it is not merely a debate that reflects social reality, but that it also plays an active role in the reproduction of the reality. Thus, discourse is defined as reproducing and creating social realities and with that the understandings, beliefs and attitudes of the audience. This means that it has not only a descriptive function but may also be used in order to exert power over the audience (van Dijk, 1993). In this thesis, the topic of the discourse of interest is the debate in the chosen newspaper articles on Islam and Muslims. Hence, it shall be looked at how language has been used in the written discourse to influence the readers. Therefore, for the discourse analysis an analysis of the linguistic as well as the context-related aspects of the articles has to be conducted in order to be able to assess whether the written discourse has contributed to the reproduction of Islamophobia in both countries. The similarities and differences of the discourses in the two countries are derived from the research results of the different specific elements of the discourse analysis that are introduced in chapter three.

The analysis has been limited to the period of one year due to the great amount of information available. In total, 68 articles have been chosen from all four newspapers. In detail, 29 articles have been selected from the FAZ, 16 from the Bild, 14 from the NRC and 9 from the Telegraaf.

The following chapter discusses the theoretical approach that has been chosen as the foundation for the analysis. It is elaborated on Islamophobia as a social construction and as a moral panic. Moreover, as discourse and the use of language in discourse have been described as defining social realities, these concepts are further explained in relation to Islamophobia as in terms of the research question they are expected to be determining factors.

Afterwards, in the third chapter, the focus lies on the operationalisation of these concepts. This is done from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA aims at describing, explaining and criticizing how ideologies, attitudes and shared knowledge are influenced by discourses (van Dijk, 1993). Hence, it can also be used for explaining how Islamophobia has been reproduced by the discourse of newspaper articles which relates to the research question. In order to do this, a textual as well as contextual method of analysis has to be conducted (Richardson, 2007). Based on this approach, chapter three further explains the data sources, methods of data collection as well as the methods of data analysis.

In chapter four, the established theoretical framework as well as the described methods are applied in the analysis. In the concluding discussion, the found insights and suggestions for further research are addressed.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Islamophobia

As the research question indicates, Islamophobia is the key concept of this thesis. Therefore, before turning to other theories it is important to further define the concept of Islamophobia itself.

Islamophobia is the sentiment of “unreasonable fear of Islam and Muslims” (Zimmermann, 2008:454). It is a recent concept that developed in the late 20th century responding to geopolitics and the increasing immigration of Muslims to European countries (Bunzl, 2005) even though the phenomenon is said to have already existed for centuries (United Nations, 2004). Islamophobia results from intolerance, defamation, discrimination and racism (United Nations, 2004, Schiffer & Wagner, 2011). According to Schiffer and Wagner (2011), it is a new form of racism as the target of discrimination is not a race but a group that is perceived as religious community. Therefore, they describe Islamophobia by using the term ‘cultural racism’ (ibid., 2011:79). This entails the presupposition that Islam is a monolith. Hence, stereotypes have developed that include the positioning of all Muslims as one community that is opposed to and the opposite of ‘the West’, the equalization of Muslims and Islamists and the identification of the world of Islam as the Arab world. These stereotypes result in increasing suspicion and alienation and may eventually lead to physical racial violence (United Nations, 2004, Schiffer & Wagner, 2011).

Islamophobia is part of the anti-immigration discourse that takes place in many European countries as also in the Netherlands and Germany and is communicated by negative portrayals of Muslims that cause demonization and the *Feindbild* Muslim (ibid., 2011). Hence, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan, criticizes taking tenets of Islam out of context and the claim that Islam is incompatible with democracy because of being hostile to modernity and gender equality. Especially, the use of Islamophobia and the support of Islamophobe stereotypes for political purposes are condemned (United Nations, 2004:2).

The use of Islamophobia for political purposes also includes the reproduction of social inequalities supporting the fear of the ‘Other’ and stressing the existence of different and separate groups in society. This can be done by the use of language and is part of the Islamophobe discourse which takes place in different settings such as for example parliamentary debates or local communities. These discourses that at parliamentary level might deal with a proposal for a ban of headscarves and at local level might discuss the construction of a new mosque, reaches the widest audience through media reproduction. In fact, Sabine Schiffer demonstrates this among others in her article for the Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Schiffer, 2007). In this article, she illustrates how media reporting is used in order to construct a negative Muslim

identity. This is done for example by combining reports about terrorism with pictures of women wearing a headscarf which leads to the understanding of Muslims with headscarves in Western countries as aiming at the Islamisation of ‘the West’ (Schiffer, 2007:13). Moreover, reporting methods have resulted in the interpretation of matters such as gender inequality, backlog demands as well as an inclination towards violence as ‘Islamic’ (ibid., 2007:12). Consequently, these associations and definitions cause an increased and “unreasonable fear of Islam and Muslims” (Zimmermann, 2008:454) - Islamophobia.

Following from this reasoning it could be argued that Islamophobia is a social construction. Therefore, in the following, the theory social constructionism is used to theoretically outline the construction of Islamophobia as a social problem.

2.2. Islamophobia as a social construction

The theory of social constructionism compliments the definition of discourse that has been given above since it deals with the construction of social problems that are perceived as problematic but are not real. Recall that the definition of discourse included that it reflects as well as constructs a social reality. Hence, discourse by among others the use of language also communicates social problems.

More specifically, the constructionist view holds that social problems are constructed and therefore do only exist in the human mind. Thus, social conditions are defined as a problem by “collective definition” (Goode & Ben- Yehuda, 1994:151). For this, the headscarf example used above is applicable again since the collective definition of women wearing headscarves as aiming at islamising ‘the West’ is a threat that is constructed by the association of women wearing a headscarf with Islamism. Accordingly, the headscarf is defined as part of a social problem that could be defined as ‘the spread of fundamentalist Islam’ and generalisation leads to a problematization of the whole Muslim population.

Hence, there does not have to be a harmful condition in order to create a social problem and not every harmful condition turns into a social problem. It only becomes such if one or more persons claim a grievance. These assertions can be expressed among others by a person’s attitudes as well as by activism or participation in social movements but also through discourses in newspaper articles. As the analysis will point out there are numerous examples of newspaper articles in which problems with Muslims and ‘their culture’ are discussed.

A society faces a social problem if in any case some of the following characteristics are present:

- (i) at least part of the society engages in collective and organized actions that try to motivate others to react to a given condition, *e.g.* demonstrations against the construction of a new mosque or voting for an anti-Islam party,
- (ii) there is a legislative response, *e.g.* the proposal for a ban of headscarves or the restriction of immigration for Muslims

- (iii) the social problem is regarded as the most serious national problem, *e.g.* as expressed in public opinion polls or stated by public figures as for example Thilo Sarrazin or Geert Wilders,
- (iv) the matter is discussed in various kinds of media, *e.g.* in newspaper articles.
(*ibid.* 1994: 152)

It often occurs that the condition that is perceived as a social problem is significantly less serious than another, graver problem. Anyway, a social problem is always constructed with the help of an enterprise which is put forward by so-called moral entrepreneurs, *i.e.* persons who aim at activating others for or against a given condition. In the case of Islamophobia as probably with most other social problems, there are different actors involved. In this paper, the moral entrepreneurs that are going to be examined are the newspapers and their online representations that are actively involved in shaping the readers' opinions about *e.g.* how society's values are allegedly endangered by Muslims because of the impending Islamisation of Europe. The interpretation of this role of the mass media, and here particularly of the newspapers, as being engaged in creating or reinforcing social problems (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995), is also informed by the definition of discourse as having a constructing influence on the social reality as perceived by the reader.

However, it can be argued that Islamophobia has developed into something more than a social problem. Studies such as from the FES (2010) or the recent election results from the Netherlands in which the Islam-hostile Party for Freedom (PVV) became the third largest party show that the people are more than concerned about Islam and Muslims. Recalling the assumption made earlier that Islamophobia can be interpreted as moral panics it can be referred to Stanley Cohen who explains that with the mass media as moral entrepreneur social problems are noisily constructed which is the kind of construction that most frequently results in moral panics (S. Cohen, 2002: xxiii).

2.3. Islamophobia as a Moral Panic

The term *moral panic* was coined in the 1960s. Stanley Cohen (1972) defined the concept as a condition in which certain people or circumstances are understood as a threat to the values and interests of a society (*ibid.* 2002: 1). As also part of the definition of Islamophobia, in moral panics the fear and resulting hostility is also unreasonable.

2.3.1. Islamophobia as a Moral Panic: Criteria

The concept of moral panics consists of five elements. The first criterion is *concern*. Accordingly, the population has to be increasingly concerned about the behaviour of Muslims or a condition that is understood as being caused by Muslims or Islam and the impact this group or their religion and culture might have on society. Media coverage, social movements and public opinion polls are some ways to measure concern.

Secondly, the level of *hostility* towards Muslims and their religion has to have increased. Muslims and Islam are perceived as a threat to the society's values, lifestyle and interests. A

dichotomization creating the label of ‘them’ and ‘us’ takes place and through stereotyping ‘folk devils’ are created (Goode & Ben- Yehuda, 1994: 157).

The third criterion is *consensus*. There has to be a consensus that Muslims pose a real threat to society and that something needs to be done against it. Moreover, though the consensus does not have to exist in the whole society, it should be supported by the majority of the elite, the mass media and some interest groups.

Next, the concept of moral panics assumes that the concern is *disproportional*. The moral entrepreneurs present figures which are mostly not correct but exaggerated. There has been critique towards this criterion since it is difficult to tell whether a reaction is disproportionate or not. The researcher has neither the quantitative, objective criteria to state that a reaction is disproportionate nor are there universal moral standards with the help of which the proportionality of a reaction can be estimated (Cohen, 2002).

For this Goode and Ben-Yehuda offer four indicators for disproportionality which simplify the assessment. First, the exaggeration of figures is a sign of the criterion of disproportionality. Secondly, if evidence indicates that the alleged threat posed by Muslims and Islam is nonexistent, the reaction is disproportionate. Third, in case this threat gains more attention than another condition or group which is just as or even more threatening than the first, the criterion of disproportionality has been met. Lastly, in order to be classified as disproportional, the ‘Muslim-threat’ has to get considerably more attention at a point in time than at any earlier or later stage (1994: 158). These indicators will be used at a later point to assess this criterion of a moral panic in terms of Islamophobia in the newspaper articles that are selected for the analysis.

The last characteristic of a moral panic is *volatility*. This means that a moral panic vanishes as suddenly again as it erupted. Thus, Islamophobia as a moral panic may have existed subliminally for a long time before the eruption and even may have already appeared in the past. Besides, though moral panics are mainly short-lived, some also become institutionalized and leave a cultural or institutional legacy. However, the level of concern and hostility is mostly temporarily limited (Goode & Ben- Yehuda: 1994).

Now that the basic characteristics of moral panics have been explained, in the next paragraph attention is turned towards the question of *how* moral panics such as Islamophobia develop.

2.3.2. Islamophobia as a Moral Panic: evolution

According to Cohen the process of the evolution of a moral panic starts with a “condition episode, person or group of person” perceived as a threat to the values and interests of society (2002:1). This anxiety can be created by different actors but as McRobbie and Thornton (1995) stress, the role of the mass media must not be underestimated since it identifies and shapes social problems and is able to raise the awareness of a certain ‘threat’. This relates to the research question which presents the discourse in newspaper articles on Islamophobia as an important factor of reproduction for the perception of Muslims and Islam as threat. Moreover, the authors’

view of the importance of the role of the mass media also supports the definition of discourse and thus also language that was introduced above.

In the beginning of a moral panic there has to be a severe or very dramatic case which causes a “cognitive shift from ‘how could it happen in a place like this?’ to ‘it could happen anywhere’” (Cohen, 2002: xii).

However, not every dramatic case develops into a moral panic. Hence, as Cohen states, the basic question of moral panic research is “Why (...) does rate X of condition Y generate a moral panic in one country but not in another with the same condition?” (Cohen, 2002: xxii, emphasis added). In this thesis, however, the focus lies rather on how the moral panic of Islamophobia has been (re)produced by newspaper article language and to which extent these methods are similar or different in the two countries. Thus, it is also not suggested that the same conditions prevail in the two countries. It is rather assumed that it can be attempted to explain the differences in the discursive reproduction by among others considering differing circumstances.

Cohen explains that three elements are necessary for something to become a moral panic. First of all, a suitable enemy has to exist. The denunciation of the enemy has to be easy and as Cohen adds the enemy should have no access to “the battlefields of cultural politics” (2002: xi) which means for this research that the enemy, *i.e.* ‘the Muslim’, must not have direct or indirect access to the newspaper discourse. That means that it is reported about Muslims but not by Muslims or by Muslim representatives.

Secondly, a suitable victim is needed. The population has to be able to identify with the victim because someday everyone could be in this victim’s situation. In the case of Islamophobia, the victim that is frequently named is the ‘Western’ woman who is about to lose the right to self-determination or even the whole ‘Western’ culture that is endangered by the impending Islamisation. Obviously, the identification with these victims is high.

Thirdly, there has to be a high level of agreement that the observed case was not insulated but that the threat has already infiltrated the whole society. The widespread association of Islam with fanaticism and the resulting rejection of the building of new mosques can serve as an example.¹ Hence, the insulated case of violent prone Islamists in Western European mosques who indeed took part in a terroristic act is generalized in the public opinion to the association of the religion in general with fanaticism which leads to mosques in Western cities being regarded as hosts for this ideology.

As stressed above, during the creation of a moral panic the mass media plays a significant role. By contributing to the discourse in specific ways, different actors such as experts and politicians can defend a moral stance. Then, experts start to discuss the problem and offer solutions and after all the panic’s importance either increases or it vanishes.

According to McRobbie and Thornton (1995) this classical concept of moral panics needs thorough revisiting. As already mentioned above, they stress the role of the mass media. Next to that, they also contradict Cohen’s vision of the suitable enemy that has no “access to the battlefields of cultural politics” (2002: xi). They argue that the mass media have a far broader

¹ See Annex B

range nowadays and that the audience has become an active player in shaping and creating the media. Therefore, they conclude that the folk devil is able to and mostly also does fight back. Considering the influence of the media on every part of society, everyone is able to draw attention to one's message. Whether a moral panic is able to develop hence strongly depends on the perspective important players as the elite, journalists and experts choose to support. If they are able to gain the approval of the population, the folk devil's point of view might be left fairly unheard by the majority.

McRobbie's and Thornton's addition to the classical concept is very valuable. It is agreed that the audience has become an active player being able to determine the content of the media output up to a certain degree. As Richardson (2007) explains, journalists for instance are very aware of their audiences and accordingly provide them with information of a particular kind or in a certain style.

Besides, it is also held that the 'folk devil' is able to make his point of view public in some manner. However, to what extent Muslims have access to the discourse of newspapers has to be followed from the analysis. As pointed out, the stance taken by prominent people is rather important for the spread of an attitude or belief. Thus, even though Muslims ought to have the possibility to express their points of view, they may still be denied equal access to important means of communication such as newspapers with high circulation. This can also be demonstrated by disproportional reporting about negative characteristics or events of Muslims.

2.3.3. Islamophobia as a Moral Panic: Actors

This directs the attention to the actors who initiate and shape moral panics and who, thus, might also play an important role in the reproduction of Islamophobia. Goode and Ben-Yehuda distinguish two dimensions combined with three different models. The first dimension is morality versus interests and the second one is elitism versus grassroots (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994: 159). The first dimension deals with the motivation for the participation in developing a moral panic while the second one is concerned with by whom a panic is constructed and the number of actors involved.

The three models that are described are the grassroots, the elite-engineered and the interest group model. Grassroots theorists argue that concern about the specific group or condition has been latent before the eruption of the moral panic and that it is inherent in the general public. No special actor is needed to create this concern and politicians and media merely use the public's anxiety for their means. However, it anyway needs some kind of vehicle to become a full moral panic. This role is often taken by middle-level interest groups who express the population's concern publicly. In this model, the public's concern is genuine and therefore based on morality.

Interpreting this model in relation to Islamophobia, this means that in the German as well as in the Dutch population the model assumes that there has already been a latent concern about the Muslim Other. Hence, in the Netherlands this concern would have already existed before 2000 whereas in Germany it had its peak in 2010. To give an example, it can be referred to politicians such as Pim Fortuyn or also Geert Wilders both of which are known for their hostile

exclamations about Islam. Considering the success of these politicians and their parties, it can be followed that there must be an underlying public concern regarding Muslims and their religion that has effectively been used by politicians. Turning towards Germany, the selling numbers of the book of Thilo Sarrazin characterize the former politician and former member of the board of the German Federal Bank as one vehicle of the population's concern. After the beginning of the debate in August 2010, different German politicians started to engage in the public discussion as well.

On the contrary to the grassroots model, the elite-engineered model argues that small and powerful groups deliberately try to create fear in the population in order to distract from other, more important problems of the society which might, if attention was drawn to them, have a negative impact on the elite's interests. Elite-engineered moral panics may also be used in order to legitimize policies such as more extensive controls of personal data at airports. In this kind of moral panics, the elites use ideology to protect its interests. However, it is regarded unlikely that a moral panic of any kind can be created if previously no underlying concern in the population existed (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994).

The last model is the one that is used most with respect to moral panics. The interest group theory holds that not the elites control the content and the timing of a moral panic but that interests groups such as the media, educational or professional organizations or religious groupings do. In this case, Goode and Ben-Yehuda state that the actors' motivation cannot clearly be distinguished into morality- or interests-driven. Accordingly, a group might act on the basis of its moral convictions but likewise also aim at fostering its social status and material aims (ibid., 1994:166). Therefore, the authors claim that it is more likely that both factors are influential and that in a given moral panic one weighs more than the other.

Considering that in this thesis the role of newspaper discourse in the reproduction of Islamophobia is analyzed, this last model seems most fitting. More specifically, it is assumed that the interest group theory combined with the grassroots model is applicable for the examined situations. As Cohen (Cohen S. , 2002) and also Goode and Ben-Yehuda (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994) acknowledge, initial concern of a population about a certain group of people or a situation is crucial for the construction of a moral panic. Therefore and because of the assumed impact of the newspaper discourses, a combination of both models seems more applicable than any other model.

2.4. Islamophobia: The concepts of discourse and language

The theoretical framework that has been established so far attributes a strong, influencing role to the discourse in newspaper articles and the language used in those texts in reproducing the social construction Islamophobia. Therefore, and because the analysis examines discourse and language on Muslims and Islam, it is regarded necessary to further elaborate on these two concepts. How can moral panics such as Islamophobia be created through the use of discourse and language? Thus, which aspects of an article are important for the analysis of discourse and language?

Analyzing the concepts of discourse and language entails to examine the contextual as well as the textual properties of a text (van Dijk, 1993). The concept of language is part of both properties whereas all three of the aspects constitute the discourse that is held to have a reflecting as well as shaping influence on the perception of reality. For the analysis of the contextual elements the following aspects have to be considered:

- (i) Access: Here, it should be examined whether Muslims have the same access to the newspaper discourse as the rest of the population has. For this analysis, unequal access could be indicated by how many Muslim experts are granted the opportunity to explain their point of view in newspaper articles. Moreover, also ‘insight’ stories from the point of view of Muslim people would manifest their access to the discourse. If the analysis shows that there is unequal access to the newspaper discourse on Muslims and Islam, this would support the assumption that the newspaper discourse has had an impact on Islamophobia.
- (ii) Setting: This aspect is concerned with where and in which atmosphere statements are given. Hence, an interview with a Muslim at his workplace will deliver a more positive image than an interview with the same person in a problematic district of a city.
- (iii) Genre: In this thesis, the genre are the news media and in particular newspaper articles that are (also) published in the online versions of the newspapers. As it will be seen in the next section, there is an even more explicit distinction of genre regarding the type of newspapers. Muslims are entitled to engage in this genre; however, it seems unlikely that the distribution of religious denomination in the population is equally represented by the journalists.
- (iv) Communicative acts and social meanings: In a text social meanings such as (un)equal levels of two parties can be indicated, *e.g.* by the modes of address. Moreover, by referring to common enemies the proportions of a debate can be increased when in an argumentation dimensions such as Muslim vs. non-Muslim are extended to right-wing vs. left-wing politician or even democrat vs. fundamentalist.
- (v) Participant positions and roles: For the analysis here, the identities of the newspapers have to be considered. Thus, for example, if they support a rather conservative political point of view, it is more likely that they will report negatively about Muslims and attack left-wing politicians.
- (vi) Speech acts: By referring to prominent people or experts in an article the effectiveness and credibility of information can be increased. Hence, when quoting influential and popular politicians in order to justify an assertion, this claim is likely to be accepted by the audience. Thereby a certain vision of reality can be communicated.

Regarding textual properties attention lies on:

- (i) **Macrosemantics:** In macrosemantics topics and the definition of topics are discussed. Hence, the topic of the school performance of Muslim children can be discussed in terms of an inferior intelligence and culture as it is done by, among others, Sarrazin, or it can be discussed in terms of deficits of the educational system. The definition of a topic is also held to have socio-political implications since the manner in which a topic is presented communicates values and norms.
- (ii) **Superstructures of text schemata:** This part of the analysis focuses on the argumentation, the arguments' structure and whether the points made are true. Argumentation can be used for legitimizing certain practices or for marginalizing a group.
- (iii) **Local meanings and coherence:** Considering this aspect of analysis of language, the level of specificity is examined since exaggerated specificity, on the one hand, might be used in order to marginalize a group by stressing many different negative aspects whereas a low level of specificity, on the other hand, might be used in order to conceal negative characteristics of the own group. Moreover, it is important to know which perspective the author chooses as well as the implicit opinions and sets of beliefs on which the arguments are based.
- (iv) **Style:** This element refers to the lexical, syntactic and deictic style. This means that in an analysis of language, the choice of words, the positioning of words in a sentence and the use of deictic expressions such as 'our' are important for analyzing the influence of the article on the reader. Differences in the lexical style will probably occur when discussing articles from tabloid and quality newspapers, whereas it is expected that the words used in the quality newspapers are more moderate. By choosing certain syntactic styles, emphasis can be created and by using deictic expressions such as 'our' group identities are underlined.
- (v) **Rhetoric:** Finally, also the rhetoric of an article can have an impact on the creation of social inequalities. Most prominent are rhetorical tropes such as metaphors, hyperboles and rhetorical questions. Moreover, framing is an important manner of marginalizing a group of people such as Muslims by stressing the positive characteristics of 'us' and the negative ones of 'them'.
(van Dijk, 1993: 270ff.)

By using these aspects, it can be pointed to important mechanisms and strategies that are applied in an article. Hence, focusing on the textual and contextual properties of a text is a way to analyze the language used in a discourse as well as the contextual circumstances and the influence these two can have on the reader.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter has delivered a description of the theoretical concepts. The main concept, in terms of which the others have been explained, is Islamophobia which is defined as an "unreasonable fear of Islam and Muslims" (Zimmermann, 2008:454). It has been argued that this fear was socially constructed by different actors such as politicians and the media who made use

of an initial, underlying concern of the populations regarding Muslims and Islam. Thus, it is assumed that a combination of the interest group theory and the grassroots model is applicable.

Moreover, by explaining the concepts of discourse and language in terms of the elements that can be used in order to support constructions such as Islamophobia, the relevance of the relation between social constructions as moral panics and discursive and linguistic strategies has been shown.

Based on the theoretical approach that has been elaborated above, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

Islamophobia is a social construction and a moral panic that has been reproduced by the language used in newspaper articles.

In order to test this hypothesis, the analysis has to be based upon the theoretical concepts of social constructionism and moral panics. These theoretical approaches have to be applied to the newspaper articles in which it should be paid attention to the aspects that characterize the context of a discourse and the language used.

The following chapter describes the methods of analysis more thoroughly.

3. Methodology

As it has been pointed out before, the study is conducted from a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective. Before turning towards the application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) a brief introduction has to be given. So first a short definition is presented in which also the relation between the research questions, the theoretical framework and CDA is explained. Afterwards, the application of CDA becomes the matter of discussion.

3.1. CDA: Definition

In CDA social inequality is studied by “focusing on the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance” (van Dijk, 1993:249). Dominance is defined as “exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality” (van Dijk, 1993:249f.).

CDA assumes that the media are a means between politicians and people that can be used for the reproduction of racism and thus racial inequality. This is done by the presentation of ‘ethnic models’ supporting inequality and justifying and legitimizing discriminatory acts (van Dijk, 1993:268f.). This relates to the key concept of Islamophobia which has been defined as a product of cultural racism and to the hypothesis that suggests an important role of the print media discourse in the reproduction of Islamophobe attitudes and beliefs.

CDA analyzes *how* language is used by individuals and institutions and focuses on social problems (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). Specifically, the relation between “discourse, power, dominance (and) social inequality” (van Dijk, 1993:249) are of interest. According to van Dijk

(1993) CDA has to focus on how discourse structures influence mental processes. This is what he calls cognitive structures. Considering that Islamophobia is defined as a constructed, unreasonable fear, the analysis of cognitive models and how discourse can influence or even create those models is significant.

Thus, for the analysis van Dijk defines two important dimensions of CDA: production and reception. The former is concerned with how dominance is created and legitimized through structures of text and talk and the latter focuses on the consequences of the structures regarding the minds of the recipients. Hence, in both dimensions the relation between discourse and cognition for the enactment of power is important.

In CDA, the unit of analysis is the text. For this analysis, it means that the unit of analysis are the online version of the newspapers whereas the units of observation are the internet newspaper articles. Hence, it is assumed that the newspaper articles ideologically (re)produce social inequality regarding Muslims in Germany and the Netherlands which is promoted by certain actors such as interest groups and political elites.

What makes Discourse Analysis critical is the connection between the textual and discursive insights and the socio-cultural context. As Richardson puts it, it is the subjection of “discourse to ethical and political critique, challenging the features that contribute to the perpetuation of structured inequalities” (Richardson, 2007: 42). Frequently, these ideological underlying attitudes that are communicated in text and talk and promote inequalities have become naturalized so that they may seem like a common belief. By being *critical*, Discourse Analysts try to reveal those naturalized ‘common beliefs’ and point towards the effects of discourse. This is also why CDA is so valuable for this study. It has not merely a descriptive character but also includes a strong explanatory element which helps to interpret and to explain how discourse shapes and is shaped.

It is held that Islamophobia has been communicated by the use of language and that the discourse in newspaper articles should be analyzed in terms of the textual and contextual elements of the texts. Thereby it can be pointed to the strategies that are used for the reproduction of Islamophobia. Thus, it is necessary to include the critical element of Discourse Analysis.

Considerably contributing to the eruption of a moral panic about one group of society can certainly be regarded as power abuse consequently leading to social inequality and racism. Note that with power, social power is meant and in this thesis, especially cognitive power is most important as it aims at changing the mind of people through strategies used in texts in order to achieve own aims.

In the beginning of CDA, the identification of a social problem takes place. From the perspective of those who suffer the most, those in power, the ones who are responsible and also those who would be able to solve the problem are critically analyzed (van Dijk, 1996 referred to in Richardson, 2007). As CDA aims at “empowering the powerless, giving voices to the voiceless, exposing power abuse, and mobilizing people to remedy social wrongs” (Blommaert

& Bulcaen, 2000:450) the policy advice in the end provides for this commitment to social change.

For CDA a social theory has to be used in order to inform and position the analysis of the structure of texts and to clarify the ideas and social practices as a whole (ibid.). As it has been noted before, the theories that will be used here are social constructionism and the concept of moral panics. Both of these theories combine very well with Critical Discourse Analysis. The identification of a social problem that has been created is one way in which cognitive power can be indicated. The exaggeration up to a moral panic would hence be the ultimate power abuse and dominance of minds.

In the following, it is looked at how the data for this analysis will be collected and which strategies and methods will be analyzed in order to show the abuse of power.

3.2. CDA: Application

3.2.1. CDA: Method of Data Collection

The hypothesis established above suggests that Islamophobia has at least to some extent been (re)produced by the language used in newspaper articles. In order to examine whether cognitive power has truly been exerted by the means of newspaper articles, a method of data collection has to be developed.

First of all, with the intention of decreasing the amount of research material, some choices have to be made. Primarily, a time frame helps to narrow down the scope of the research. Therefore, it will only be looked at articles published in 2010. Moreover, due to the fact that the developments in Germany have only become this obvious in the second half of 2010, this time frame seems applicable as well.

Besides, it has to be decided which sources will be used. Due to convenience and also the increased use of these sources, the online versions of newspaper articles will be examined. The articles will be selected from four different newspapers. In order to achieve some degree of compatibility, the newspapers from the Netherlands and Germany should hold comparable political stances, address the same kind of audience and belong to the same category of journalism. Anyhow, a diversified choice of newspapers is also desirable since by that different political spectra and their influence on different societal groups are addressed by the analysis.


Therefore, two different kinds of papers were selected from both countries. Since the discussion has been most extensive in the more conservative political spectrum one quality paper has been chosen from each country that represents this political point of view. From Germany, this is the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)* which has the second biggest spread of all German daily quality newspapers and is as all other newspapers discussed here, distributed nationally. From the Netherlands, articles of the *NRC Handelsblad* will be scrutinized. This daily quality newspaper also has a liberal-conservative position and is one of the biggest supra-regional papers. Both papers address well-educated readers.

Besides in these quality papers, the discussion on Islam and multiculturalism has also been extensive in tabloid newspapers. In the Netherlands and in Germany both of the selected

papers have the biggest spread and the target audience is similar (cf. Bild.de, 2010) (cf. Landelijke Media, 2010). The two papers chosen are from Germany *Bild* and from the Netherlands *De Telegraaf*.

The selection of newspaper articles as unit of analysis relates to the criteria of CDA. Newspapers express a point of view by choosing manner and frequency of reporting on a specific topic and can as a result influence debates. This means that newspapers editors can decide to publish more negative articles about Muslims and to grant extensive access to Islam critics rather than having a balanced manner of reporting and access. Therefore, it can be argued that newspaper articles are a means for (re)producing discrimination towards Muslims. By analyzing the articles textually as well as contextually, it can be researched if the use of language in newspaper articles has had an impact on the spread of Islamophobia. Thus, the analysis and interpretation point to how it is contributed to inequalities which is the main focus of CDA.

However, not all articles dealing with Islam can be examined. Therefore the articles will be selected with the help of keywords searched for in titles and bodies of articles. These keywords are based on the theoretical concepts and with that on the research questions. The following scheme illustrates the choice of keywords.



The scheme begins with the theoretical construction of this thesis. Hence, at the top the main concept of the research question, Islamophobia, can be found. Afterwards, the definition of Islamophobia by Zimmermann (2008) is followed by the classification of Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism that is expressed in anti-immigration discourse. As it has been explained at an earlier stage, this discourse has helped to produce certain stereotypes. It is expected that these stereotypes can be found in newspaper articles when using CDA as method of analysis since CDA's aim is to reveal these social inequalities that have been reproduced by elites by the exertion of power.

Based on the definition of Islamophobia and the resulting stereotypes and next to this, the generalising character of moral panic language, 'Islamism' has been selected as one keyword. It will allow having a closer look at which connections are made between the fundamentalist ideology and the moderate cultures of Islamic communities.

Moreover, Islamophobia interpreted as a moral panic, positions Muslims and their cultures as threat to the values and interests of society. Derived from this, 'Islamisation' is one of the keywords as it addresses the fear of losing the own culture to the foreign one and have frequently been used in both countries. This also relates to the stereotype 'Muslims vs. 'the West'.

It could be argued that by using these two keywords, the selection will be biased because of their implied negativity about Islam. However, it is important to look at exactly those articles because in these it can be seen how it is tried to manipulate the mind of the reader by using common stereotypes. Moreover, it is precisely this kind of words moral entrepreneurs will use in order to exert cognitive power.

Next to these two keywords, the combined keyword 'Integration Islam' will be used. This is also founded on the theoretical concepts, since, as it has been pointed out above, Islamophobia is frequently part of the anti-immigration discourse in which Islam is described as monolith. Hence, in these articles it should be seen how immigration of Muslims is described as undesirable and with that how social inequality is further promoted.

It is expected that by using these keywords, relevant articles can be found that will help to answer the research question.

In order to collect the data, it will be searched for the keywords in the online editions of the four papers regarding the year 2010. Then, the results found have to be sorted out. Only relevant articles and only those that deal with a matter in the boundaries of the respective country will be selected.

In sum: What makes the data CDA data? CDA data looks at how social inequalities are constructed in discourse by dominance. Hence, discourse is the medium that influences the relations between social groups. The data that is going to be collected is made CDA data as it will be looked at how social power is (re)produced in the articles. The exertion of social power shows itself through certain methods. These will be described in the following section.

3.3.2. CDA: Execution

On the basis of the collected data, CDA can be executed. In order to answer the research question, it will be looked at how words represent people and how clauses are used to represent actions, developments and happenings (Richardson, 2007).

In the preceding chapter several elements of contextual and textual analysis were introduced. The analysis of an article should thus begin with the examination of the properties of the context such as access, setting and participants. Afterwards, it can be looked at the textual elements, *i.e.* topics, style, local meanings, rhetoric and argumentation (van Dijk, 1993:270). However, since a great number of examples has been chosen the analysis of textual and

contextual elements cannot be separated. Otherwise, in many cases the same example would have to be discussed several times. Therefore, as many textual and contextual elements as applicable are discussed at the same time for each example. By doing this consistently it can still be granted that results are delivered by using CDA. During the analysis of the examples, the results must also be related to the dimensions of production and reception. Hence, it has to be pointed to how a certain element of an example shows how dominance is expressed or legitimated in the text and which consequences this might have on the mind of the readers.

Special attention is given to the following linguistic and rhetoric strategies. With each article, it is looked at the choice and meaning of words and whether framing is taking place resulting in a 'them' versus 'us' distinction. Framing is one method that can be used to influence the thinking of the members of one group in order to exert cognitive power and cause marginalization. This dichotomization is also one of the criteria of moral panics since it is one of the ways to fuel a hostile attitude towards a certain group and therefore analyzing framing strategies will help to show how Islamophobia has been reproduced by the language of newspaper articles.

Moreover, the same effects have predication strategies which are ways to assign qualities to a group or person. This takes place in form of attributes, choice and transitivity of verbs, assumptions and rhetorical patterns. Again, by looking at these strategies dominance and manipulation can be pointed to.

Next to that, it is also focused on whether a few specific rhetorical figures are applied in the articles. To begin with, it is expected that hyperboles are frequently used. This figure is used for exaggeration and is often part of sensationalist journalism and is also frequently used when reporting about minorities and trying to stress group memberships (Richardson, 2007).

Next, metaphors might be used in order to create the feeling of a threat. For example, the phrase 'the flood of immigrants' suggests that the native citizens encounter an unstoppable force. Besides this, also Seehofer's claim that multiculturalism was dead is a metaphor which presents the multicultural society as a lost concept beyond repair and thus creates a feeling of hopelessness and results in increasing dichotomization as it becomes clear that a peaceful coexistence of different cultural groups is impossible and that thus, social inequality is legitimate since it is inevitable.

Last, it is looked for neologisms in the articles. As it is frequently referred to the 'Christian-Judaic values' of societies as opposed to Islamic traditions, it is obvious that this trope can also create feelings of otherness and threat concerning a society's values which reproduces group identities.

Overall, the analysis is divided into two parts in which respectively the discourse from one country is discussed. Moreover, these parts are sub-divided into the criteria of social constructionism and moral panics. Hence, first evidence for Islamophobia in newspaper articles as a social construction is discussed and then Islamophobia in the newspaper articles is analyzed in terms of the characteristics of moral panics. The analysis of Islamophobia as social construction and as a moral panic is done in terms of CDA as explained above. By analyzing the

examples in terms of these properties and with the background of social constructionism and moral panics theory it can be pointed to how the language in the discourse which is represented by the newspaper articles is used in order to reproduce the cultural racism of Islamophobia.

3.4. Conclusion

To sum up, the first thing to start the analysis is to search for relevant articles for answering the research question with the help of the keywords ‘Islamisation’, ‘Islamism’ and ‘Integration Islam’. The selected articles then have to be analyzed with a close look at the properties of context and text. The different properties are applied to each example if they are applicable.

Moreover, the five characteristics of moral panics have to be included in the interpretation of the analyzed language. This is combined with the analysis of the articles since the choice of words, the way it is quoted, the rhetorical tropes *etc.* can be used to raise concern, create hostile attitudes or suggest that there is a consensus about the threat in society. For all of these matters, disproportionality might be used to support the statements. Afterwards, the study shortly turns towards the differences and similarities of the discourse of the two countries. Different practices might explain the differences in the discourses.

The structure of the analysis helps to evaluate the different aspects of the hypothesis. Hence, the paragraph focusing on Islamophobia in terms of social constructionism is going to help with the assessment of Islamophobia in the language of newspaper articles as a social construction. Next, by analyzing the language elements in terms of the theory of moral panics, it is turned towards the second aspect of the hypothesis. Hence, if in the end it has been proven that the language in the analyzed articles has helped to support Islamophobia which has then been proven to be a social construction and a moral panic, the hypothesis is confirmed.

In the following chapter it is first focused on the analysis of the German newspaper articles. These are analyzed according to the overall structure of the theoretical concepts of social constructionism and moral panics. After a conclusion of the most important findings of the analysis of German newspaper articles, it is proceeded along the same lines with the analysis of the Dutch newspaper articles.

4. Analysis

The analysis of Islamophobia as a social problem is not only done by using examples from newspaper articles but also by relating the elements that point to a social problem to facts and recent developments. Hence, this first part of the analysis rather focuses on the societal and political contexts that point to Islamophobia. Next to the great number of facts that indicate that a social problem has been defined regarding Muslims and Islam, this is also done in order to avoid overlap with the subsequent analysis along the lines of the moral panics model. However, the most important argument for this deviance from the practice of CDA is the greater applicability of relating the elements to facts and developments because of the character of the elements

themselves. Hence, introduction of legislative bills for example can be better measured in terms of reality than in terms of newspaper discourse.

4.1. Islamophobia in Germany: reproduction in newspaper article discourse

4.1.1. Is there a social problem regarding Muslim immigrants and their religion in Germany?

As established above, social problems are constructed by collective definition. Moreover, four different ways of manifesting a social problem were introduced. It was held that at least some of these factors had to be present for proving the existence of a social problem. In the case of Germany, it can be argued that all of the four factors are present up to a certain degree.

To begin with, it was pointed out that in case of organized and collective actions of at least part of the society in order to (not) change or attract attention to a matter, it can be spoken of a social problem. This first aspect is only partly present in Germany. There are groups such as the newly founded party 'Die Freiheit' or the internet blog 'Politically Incorrect' of which both warn of the Islamisation of Europe and 'the ideology of multiculturalism' which are supposed to be responsible for the loss of basic rights and freedoms in Germany (Politically Incorrect, 2011). However, these groups do not have significant political influence so far and are thus in terms of elites reproducing Islamophobia, rather marginal. There are other individuals and party members who support this way of thinking. Nevertheless, they do not organize collective actions. Instead, they rather express their points of view by *e.g.* giving interviews. Of course, this is also a way of exerting cognitive power. However, since this is not done in an organized manner and since it can also not be spoken of collective actions, this criterion is only partly fulfilled.

Secondly, it was explained that if a condition has resulted in the introduction of legislative bills for dealing with or criminalizing the behaviour of a group which is allegedly responsible for a condition, it can also be referred to this situation as a social problem (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). A recent example for this is the discussion dealing with a ban of burqas in public spaces. In the Federal State Hessen this discussion has now resulted in a legislative response. A female employee of the city of Frankfurt wanted to wear a burqa at work which the city forbade her. In order to justify this decision, Hessen's Minister of the Interior has announced that he will introduce an edict forbidding the veil that is considered to be a political statement underlining the denial of all 'Western' values. As it has already been indicated above, the presentation of the burqa is one of the stereotypes that have resulted and characterize Islamophobia. Thus, since this discussion is embedded in the wider debate on Muslim immigrants and integration, this legislative reaction can be seen as one way to point to a social problem regarding Muslims in Germany.

The third way in which a social problem can be manifested is if a condition or a matter is regarded as one of the most pressing problems of a country. This has been proclaimed in form of the numerous statements that relied on the Christian-Judaic values of society and the German *Leitkultur* of which both are supposedly endangered by integration-unwilling migrants. Moreover, also the statement of the canonist Heinig who published an article in the FAZ

supports the assumption that this criterion is fulfilled. In this article the canonist emphasized that ‘the integration of Muslims in Germany is a key question of our society’ (FAZ, 30 March 2010). With this definition power is exerted over the minds of the reader as Heinig presupposes that there is a problem with integration and determines that this ‘key question’ concerns the whole society. Thus, the problem’s proportions are defined as very large. Hence, this definition is spread and this criterion can be regarded as fulfilled.

The last characteristic of social problems requires the matter in question to be discussed in various kinds of media. Regarding this, it can be referred to the speech of Federal President Wulff at the German Unification Day when he said that Germany had a Christian-Judaic culture but that nowadays also ‘the Islam’ was part of society (Bundespräsidialamt, 2010). This can be interpreted as an attempt to counteract the increasing problematization of Muslims and Islam after the publication of Sarrazin’s book. However, as a response to this speech, newspapers and television shows discussed the ‘Islam-speech’ by Wulff of which only this one sentence was kept in mind (Bild, 05 October 2010). Following this, a study was conducted on behalf of the tabloid paper Bild, asking whether the German population agreed with “Wulff’s Islam-theses” (Bild, 04 October 2010). It was widely concluded that he had been wrong and that this alleged attempt to equalize the three religions was unjustified (Bild, 05 October 2010). This is only one of many examples that illustrate how the social problem of Muslims and their religion is widely discussed in different kinds of media.

In conclusion, it can be pointed to different actors, thus the elites that have defined the integration of Muslim migrants as a social problem. For once, there are so-called experts. One of these is Necla Kelek who has written several books on the Islamic religion and culture and frequently publishes articles in newspapers or takes part in television shows. Since she grew up as a Muslim, she has the position of an expert when proclaiming the incapability of Muslims to integrate due to different elements of ‘the’ Islam such as intolerance. This means that she has a high credibility and in case she writes an article her points of views are easily accepted by the reader because of her authority.

Next to that, there are politicians. Merkel’s proclamation that multiculturalism had failed is only one of the many statements. Another example which is more connected to the religion of Muslims, are the two studies which the German Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth Schröder presented. With these studies she intended to analyze whether adolescents with a migration background had an increased inclination towards violence. More specifically, it was tested whether Muslim adolescents were more likely to be violent than other young people. Though both studies were not able to prove that there was a significant relationship, the Minister concluded that there seemed to be a relation between increased Islamic religiosity and a perception of manhood that legitimates violence (FAZ, 26 November 2010). This indirect formulation of a social problem is one example of how the social problem of Muslim migrants is presented by politicians.

Lastly, the public is also a very important actor. A study by Prof. Dr. Pollack from the cluster of excellence of the University of Münster has shown that Germans have a comparatively

negative attitude towards Muslims. Hence, about 58% of the West Germans and 62% of the East Germans think negatively about Muslims and only a little more than 20% of all Germans think that the Islamic religion and culture are compatible with the ‘Western’ world. Most importantly, 42% of the West Germans and about 55% of the East Germans believe that practising the Islamic religion should be strongly constricted in Germany (Pollack, 2010)². These figures explain how religious and cultural diversity in relation to Islam and Muslims is perceived as a problem by non-Muslim German people.

All of these concerns and claims are reproduced by various kinds of media. In newspapers this is done for example by issuing articles that define Muslims as folk devils as it is done in the following quote:

“Und nun wird endlich bekannt, was längst jeder weiß, der nicht an weltanschaulich konnotierten Wahrnehmungsstörungen leidet: Es geht hier nicht um die Söhne polnischer, kasachischer oder italienischer Einwanderer, sondern um junge Muslime.” (FAZ, 04 October 2010)

In this article dealing with violence at schools, national origin and religious affiliation are contrasted as if they have the same status and young Muslims are defined as folk devils. With this definition the importance of religion is increased up to a defining characteristic. Muslims are thus not Turkish, Iranian or German but they are first and foremost Muslims. With this argumentation, one religious group is marginalized even though another is not. Therefore the importance of this one religion is stressed which in a negative context such as in the example can be used for legitimizing the marginalization of Muslims.

Considering the diversity of actors and the support of the developments in the population, it can be referred to the earlier theory that the moral entrepreneurs, the elites, consist of members of interest groups and that a basic concern did already exist in parts of the population. It seems as if this is true for the social problem of Muslims in Germany.

Moreover, since all of the criteria have been fulfilled up to certain extents it can be said that the German non-Muslim population perceives the Muslim fellow citizens and immigrants as constituting a social problem.

In the following, attention now turns towards how the social problem of Muslims, *i.e.* the social construction Islamophobia has become moral panic. For this, Critical Discourse Analysis methods are used in order to analyze articles of the Bild and the FAZ. This part of the analysis is structured along the lines of the moral panic concept.

4.1.2. Islamophobia in Germany: reproduction in newspaper article discourse

In Germany, evidence has been found for how the newspapers have contributed to the appearance and manifestation of Islamophobia in the population. Though in both newspapers there were also articles that were rather stressing similarities and compatibilities of the different

² See figures in Annex A

groups, these articles were the exception. Moreover, often even those articles used nominal presuppositions such as the Islam and the Muslims which suggest one common interpretation of the Islamic religion and culture and one homogenous community. In general, it can be said that the language used in the quality paper's articles has been far less involved in the construction of Islamophobia than the language in the tabloid paper articles has. All in all, the topics in both papers were mainly focused on language problems, gender inequality, juvenile violence and Islamism.

Concern about Muslims and Islam in newspaper article language in Germany

Concern is the fear or anxiety about something. Islamophobe concern, thus, is characterised by fear and anxiety regarding actions and values of Muslims. Topics which are used in order to increase concern are education problems, Islam as threat to German values, Islamism and Islam's alleged ambiguity towards Islam and the supposed failure of integration. Concern, as the first criterion of moral panics, is expected to be manifested rather implicitly in the newspaper articles' language, whereas hostility is assumed to be more open.

FAZ: discouraging concern towards Muslims and Islam- Muslims as part of the German society

There are several ways in which concern has been created. First, however, attention is paid to the few articles that have tried to either show how concern is created or have concentrated on similarities between Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany. For this section, only articles published by the FAZ are relevant.

Beginning with an article about a talk show to which a woman of Turkish origin was invited, this woman is quoted when defending her parents' generations' low education (FAZ, 02 September 2010). It is stressed that though nowadays the focus lies on education and integration, this was not expected of the 'Gastarbeiter' who were supposed to leave again. This is a rarely noted aspect in the discussion of integration of immigrants. Moreover, the article is quite critical of Sarrazin's hypotheses and alleges that in the spirit of Islamism Sarrazin wants to see the end of civilization. The use of modality here indicates that the author does not agree with Sarrazin and that he does not foresee the demise of the occident caused by a fundamentalist Islam. All in all, this article is putting concern about Muslims more into perspective. This is done by granting Muslims access to the debate and by referring to a woman of Turkish origin the speech act has a high credibility. Moreover, the use of modality when commenting on Sarrazin's hypotheses is used in order to create a social meaning in which Sarrazin is inferior to the woman in the talk show and the reader. The modality can also be interpreted in terms of the argumentative scheme which means that Sarrazin's hypotheses are delegitimized. Thus, no concern regarding Muslims and Islam is supported.

This can also be observed in another article dealing with the visit of Dutch politician Geert Wilders in Berlin (FAZ, 03 October 2010). In this article, Wilders is called 'a dubious character' and people like him are said to be not helpful for the integration of 'our Muslim fellow citizens' (emphasis added). The article goes on by quoting the German justice minister who said:

“Rechtspopulistische Angriffe auf Teile unserer Bevölkerung spalten dagegen unsere Gesellschaft”. (emphasis added)

This is a referential strategy as well as a deictic expression by which Muslims are given the status of being part of the German society and the right-wing demagogic attacks are experienced as offence to the whole society. At this point, Muslims are not only defined according to their religion but also according to their citizenship. Hence, concern is created with regard to demagogues not Muslims.

A third example uses a similar strategy in order to stress that concern does not necessarily have to be directed towards Muslims. It deals with terrorists and the prejudice that most terrorists are Islamists and in any case not German. It is pointed out that also people from ‘Western’ cultures have died for their God or leader and that this is not a specific characteristic of Muslims. Here, the contrary of framing is thus applied and inclusion instead of marginalization of Muslims takes place. Next to that, the author stresses that everyone holding the German citizenship is German. Therefore, with this referential strategy, he concludes that most terrorists threatening Germany are Germans themselves and that therefore increasing border controls will not decrease the danger (FAZ, 24 January 2010). This means that the equal status of Muslims and non-Muslims is emphasized which relates to the contextual element of communicative acts and social meanings.

Lastly, there is an article that is interesting for this section as it might indicate how public pressure influences the media. Hence, after Wulff’s speech at the German Unification Day the FAZ published an article that quite positively confirmed the President’s statement that the Muslims’ religion was welcome in Germany (FAZ, 04 October 2010). Since the day after, as will be seen in the following analysis, the paper’s articles were far more critical of this matter than when there had not yet been so many negative reactions of politicians as well as the public. Consequently, it seems obvious that the FAZ has been influenced by the public opinion and adjusted its reporting to it. This confirms the definition of discourse that says that discourse reproduces as well as creates social realities. Moreover, it also relates to the property of contextual analysis, namely access since it is granted immense access to critics of Wulff’s statement but not to representatives of Islam or individual Muslims. However, these matters have to be discussed in the subsequent section.

FAZ: supporting concern towards Muslims and Islam- “Der Islam und die westliche Gesellschaft, passt das zusammen?” (FAZ, 31 August 2010)

Despite these examples, there has been a much greater number of articles that have contributed to the concern of the German people regarding Muslims. In this process of exerting cognitive power different actors have been involved and thus, as also for the other moral panics’ criteria, the articles make extensive use of statements of politicians as well as comments of Muslim feminist Necla Kelek or feminist Alice Schwarzer.

Neologisms and labelling

Frequently concern is created by the use of neologisms. This is a form of rhetoric which is one of the steps of CDA that have been announced above. As the analysis below shows it is a very effective means for framing and thus marginalizing Muslims.

Hence, in an article in the FAZ the *Integrationsfähigkeit* of Muslims is discussed which implies the scepticism towards the ability of all people to integrate similarly well as other groups of immigrants (FAZ, 16 October 2010). In the context of this, *Integrationsverweigerung* is also a frequently applied concept which goes even further than the first as it implies not only the possible disability of Muslims to integrate but also their unwillingness (FAZ, 14 October 2010). This indicates that in FAZ newspaper articles a rhetoric is used that stresses the negative characteristics of ‘them’.

Moreover, also the permanent labelling of people as migrants and migrant-children (“Migrantenkinder”) has a framing impact. In a conversation of the FAZ with German Minister of the Interior, de Maizière, the journalist stated that while the German population was declining, the numbers of young migrants was increasing. The Minister criticized the use of the word ‘migrant’ and wanted to know when someone would become a full member of the German population. He answered his own question in a remarkable way by giving the example of a girl of Turkish origin who is working very hard on her education at school. He points out that any problems in that class at school would thus not be a ‘migrant-problem’. Hence, it follows that the definition of the concept ‘migrant’ is related to the occurrence of problems and thus implies a negative connotation (FAZ, 07 March 2010). Furthermore, the elites that are exerting power in this example are the journalist, which means the representative of the FAZ, and the German Minister of the Interior. Thus, both try to influence the cognitive models the reader has regarding the understanding of migrants in a way which in the future can be used to legitimize actions against the ‘bad migrant’ who is defined as the one causing any kind of problem.

This discussion relates to the principle of *ius sanguinis*. The principle of *ius sanguinis* holds that nationality is based on ancestry and that naturalisation is connected to high barriers. Only quite recently a limited *ius soli* was introduced (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2010). Thus, nowadays it is somewhat easier to acquire the German citizenship by following integration courses and fulfilling certain criteria as for example length of stay. However, as also illustrated by the example above, the tradition of *ius sanguinis* still shows itself in the definition of people as migrants and their children as migrant-children even though both frequently have been granted the German citizenship.

It can be concluded from this paragraph that neologisms and labelling are important textual means for reproducing Islamophobia. Moreover, it has been shown that in Germany it is difficult to be perceived and accepted as citizen when one has a background of migration. Thus, acceptance in the group of Germans is not easily gained.

Islamism and Islam’s ambiguity towards violence

As it can also be followed from the choice of keywords, Islamism is a concept that is frequently part of the argumentation. Even in case it is not directly referred to Islamism, it is

claimed that Islam has an unfortunate inclination towards violence or that it has at least a very ambiguous relation to it. Referring to Islamism and violence in relation to Islam might result in a cognitive model dominated by fear and incomprehension.

In general, the leading question of most articles seems to be

“Der Islam und die westliche Gesellschaft, passt das zusammen?” (FAZ, 31 August 2010)

In line with this question, which is as such already contrasting two concepts as if they were homogenous and the opposite of each other on the same level, the matter of core societal values is frequently discussed. Hence, in an interview a representative of the Catholic Church in Germany has expressed his concern regarding an ambiguity of Islam when it comes to violence. This is a frequently mentioned aspect as it is put that though Christianity also has a violent history and violent texts, it can be self-critical and is therefore committed to peace. As Islam is held not to be self-reflecting, it is thus also understood as unable to distance itself from violence. The clergy man also said:

“Ich glaube, dass die Wirksamkeit des Grundgesetzes von der Präsenz überzeugter Christen und des Glaubens in der Gesellschaft abhängig ist.” (FAZ, 14 November 2010)

With this, and with reference to his earlier statements concerning the Islamic religion in the article, he indirectly raises concern by framing. In the quoted statement, he points out that he believes that the German constitution needs Christians and that in case there were no Christians anymore, the federal constitution and the basic values would be lost. This is also a predication strategy since the representative clearly assigns qualities to different groups: whereas Christianity and Christians are characterized as supportive of the constitution and thus law, order and democracy and moreover as peaceful and self-reflecting, Islam and Muslims are distinguished as not self-critical, having an ambiguous relation to violence and not cherishing the core values and the constitution enough for it to be upheld. This strategy strongly supports public concern and can also be used in order to legitimize any restrictions of Muslims rights on grounds of their negative and threatening characteristics.

Additionally, it is requested that Muslims find out what they want in the formerly so-called occident. The author of this article provides ‘the Muslims’ with two opportunities: either they plan to spread their way of life which is strongly influenced by their religion or they want to modernize and adjust to the way of life of their new neighbours and fellow citizens (FAZ, 25 September 2010). Hence, again concern is created as every reader must now imagine the introvert Muslim neighbours or also every woman wearing a headscarf as planning to ‘islamise’ society.

In sum, the articles have used predication strategies as well as argumentative schemes that connect Muslims with Islamists and thereby the image of violence as a central concept of Islam is created.

Endangered German values

Next to these two focuses of FAZ articles in creating concern, this also done in relation to the core values of society which are apparently endangered. Referring to this threat is the most frequent way of supporting concern in the population. Statements such as the following are hence quite frequent.

“Es gilt das Grundgesetz, und nicht die Scharia” (FAZ, 06 October 2010)

This quote is taken from one of the many articles dealing with Wulff’s speech in which he said that ‘the Islam was also a part of Germany’. Here, the impression is created that the German constitution would be endangered of being replaced by the Sharia in case the Islamic religion and culture were a part of Germany. Moreover, the same article goes on with a predication strategy as it requests that to Wulff’s declaration it would have to be added that ‘the Islam’ could only be part of the German culture if the religion was practiced within the limits of the constitution. This argumentative scheme suggests that now there is a significant number of Muslims who infringe the law while practicing their religion and this creates concern about Muslims as a group. Another request that is added in this article is that Wulff should have included explicitly that Muslim parents have to raise their children in line with the values of human dignity, freedom of opinion and equal rights. Hence, this is an allusion that suggests that most Muslim parents would need this reminder as they would otherwise educate their children without these values. Framing in form of referring to the humanitarian values that are supposedly supported by the own group but not by the other is frequently used in the reproduction of social inequalities (van Dijk, 1993). It adds to the concern created above that Muslims when practicing their religion do not abide to the law as it stresses even more explicitly that they do not support the same values and that they raise their children to be the same as they are. Hence, the threat posed by this group is maximized as it is apparently growing in population numbers.

So far, the examples have mainly shown how concern regarding Muslims’ willingness to abide to the law and support the basic values of the German society is supported by the language used in the FAZ. The following quote, from an interview with the head of the free voters’ party, emphasizes how the concern also applies to the complete value system of the republic.

“Wir haben bestimmte Werte, denen andere Werteordnungen, etwa die von Muslimen, zuwiderlaufen. Es muss eine bestimmte kulturelle Homogenität geben. Sonst fällt die Gesellschaft auseinander, und die vorherrschende Kultur wird durch eine andere ersetzt, die sich als stärker erweist.” (FAZ, 15 September 2010)

In this quote, it is pointed out that the values of Muslims are contrary to the values of the German society. The politician declares that there is a necessity of cultural homogeneity and foresees the downfall of society and the rise of another dominating culture, if the cultural homogeneity is not given. With this argumentative scheme and the link to the concept of culture, he defines Islam not only as religion that can be one part of life without necessarily influencing

another part, but as culture that influences the cultural values and identity and indirectly warns that if Muslims do not integrate better, the German society as it exists now will cease to be. Moreover, Muslims are addressed as one homogenous religious group which underlines the definition of Islamophobia as cultural racism. Next to that, the proportion of the debate on the integration of Muslims is extended since the politician does not merely use the argumentation dimension of ‘good vs. bad integration’ but rather ‘preservation of German society vs. downfall of the German culture’.

Adding to this is Foreign Minister Westerwelle’s warning of the “multikulturelle Wertebeliebigkeit” (FAZ, 11 October 2010). This neologism does not only imply opposing values but also arbitrariness and hence unpredictability. The use of the verb *warn* already implies that multiculturalism is a threat in form of the loss of all basic values.

Also Turkish-German feminist Necla Kelek warns of the political ideology of Islam that is not compatible with democracy and declares that

“Scharia und Umma, Einheit von Staat und Religion, Apartheid von Mann und Frau dürfen nicht Teil Deutschlands werden” (FAZ, 24 October 2010)

The attribution of Islamic law texts, gender inequality and theocracies with Islam segregates Muslims from German society and labels them clearly a threatening group for the German state, the society’s values and legal system. Thus, the relation to the textual element of superstructures of text schemata can be made since the argumentation has the function of marginalizing Muslim people from the German society.

All in all, it can briefly be concluded that the FAZ has made most extensive use of predication strategies, argumentative schemes and framing in order to legitimize any actions or critical statements concerning Muslims and Islam. Thereby, it has been contributed to the cognitive model that regards Islam as a religion and culture that has a worrying inclination towards violence. Moreover, concern regarding the core values of society is evoked as the own group is positioned as their protector whereas Muslims are presented as the offenders. Thus, suspicion towards Muslims is increased and the German people are motivated to not accept Muslims as full members of society due to the apparent incompatibility and the threat they pose.

The actors whose statements have been reproduced in the articles and who are thus the power exerting elites are politicians such as the Interior Minister (CDU), the foreign minister (FDP) as well as the head of a free voters’ party. Next to that, Necla Kelek and a clergy man have contributed to the creation of concern by the use of language.

Anyhow, there have also been articles that have tried to put concern towards Muslims more into perspective. These have made use of modality to delegitimize negative statements about Muslims and Islam and the deictic expression of ‘our’ in order to indicate that the differences are not insuperable and that instead Muslims are part of German society.

Here, the contributing actors were a woman of Turkish origin and the justice minister of the liberal party (FDP).

Despite these articles in which Islamophobia has not been reproduced, the amount of examples that support the hypothesis is much greater.

Bild: supporting concern towards Muslims and Islam - failed integration and Turkish schools

Also the Bild has played an important role in supporting public concern regarding Muslims in Germany. Actually, no examples have been found for articles that have not engaged in the reproduction of Islamophobia. Two examples were selected to show how concern towards Muslims and Islam is supported.

Failure of Integration

First, the Bild published an interview with former chancellor Helmut Schmidt with the title:

“Was läuft bei der Migration schief, Helmut Schmidt?” (Bild, 23 November 2010)

With reference to the element of local meanings and coherence, it can be pointed to the implicitness of this question. It presupposes that there is indeed something wrong and hence, alerts the reader. Moreover, the participant position (see contextual properties) of the interview partner, Helmut Schmidt, is important for the impact and credibility of his assertions. He gives this interview in his role as former chancellor and prestigious politician and thus as highly respected member of the German society. Moreover, he speaks in his role of a non-Muslim. His position entitles him to give opinions and advice on the presumed failed integration of migrants and the authority of his assertions is great.

In the course of the interview the discussion turns towards EU-Turkey relations and here the former chancellor reproduces concern by predicting that if Turkey became a member of the EU, millions of Muslims would ‘flood our labour markets and welfare systems’. He continues that if Turkey was allowed to become a member state, this status might as well be granted to Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon or Syria and that the conflicts of these countries, *e.g.* between Kurdish and Turkish people, would then take place in German cities. This hyperbole in the argumentative scheme thus consists of the following claims:

1. Turkish citizens will flood the labour markets and exploit the welfare markets.
(1.1. If Turkey becomes a member there is nothing that can stop this exploitation.)
2. This would mean that any other Muslim country could also be allowed to enter the EU.
3. ‘Their’ conflicts would take place in German cities.
(3.1. The Germany ‘we’ know would not exist anymore.)
(3.2. Turkey must not become a member; otherwise the situation in Germany will be hopeless)

Especially, the lexical style, *i.e.* the use of the expression ‘to flood’ contributes the impression of a hopeless situation since it creates the image of a force that, once unleashed, is unstoppable and destroying. Moreover, by referring to those four other Muslim countries, negative attitude towards Turkey’s entry to the EU is intensified since the reader would not want these conflict-riddled, non-European countries to be part of the EU. Thus, by naming them at the same level as Turkey, the readers’ impression of these other countries is also passed on to Turkey.

Summing up, it can be pointed to the methods of using a hyperbole in the argumentative scheme and to using a lexical style that results in the impression of a great threat. Combining this with the identity of the interview partner, Helmut Schmidt, and the roles he represents leads to high credibility and authority of the assertions.

Turkish schools in Germany

Secondly, the establishment of Turkish schools, proposed by Erdoğan, has been an important matter of discussion in Germany. In the following example the superstructure of the text schemata, *i.e.* the argumentation and especially the structure of argumentation and the truth of the claims are of interest (Bild, 03 March 2010). The article begins with elaborating shortly on the question whether there should be Turkish gymnasia in Germany and emphasizes the significance of mastering the German language in order to have a successful future. Then interestingly, the author starts comparing the proposed Turkish schools with already an existing French one in Berlin and underlines that Turkish schools would not necessarily have to lead to the demise of the occident since also the French school has not caused the appearance of a ‘little Paris’. Then it is added in bold print that **‘However, this school is of course subordinate to the German laws for schools’** and that it acts according to the tradition of humanism and not French national politics. This framing clearly implies that the respect for humanistic traditions and for the rule of law is not to be expected of any Turkish school. Furthermore, it is emphasized later on that integration cannot be successful if parallel societies are tolerated ‘in which besides the Turkish language, the Turkish curriculum applies.’ That there already are Turkish schools in Germany in which both the language of instruction is German and the curriculum is not different from the curriculum of German schools is disregarded by the author. He focuses on the worst-case scenario and thereby paints a quite disturbing picture for the reader which might result in concern towards Muslims who supposedly want to organize in schools in which no laws are respected and where they can stay as separated as possible from the rest of society. His claim is thus not true, or at least exaggerated. However, any reader who has not yet met students from Turkish schools or is not an expert in this field will consider the author’s claims as true. Hence, with this article the Bild negatively influences the cognitive model on Turkish schools and any parents who would support this kind of institution.

In sum, in this example the argumentative scheme is most important as well as the framing applying humanitarian norms in order to argue against ‘them’, the Muslims.

All in all, the language of the Bild articles that has mostly contributed to the reproduction of Islamophobe concern is characterized by the use of framing regarding value and by applying an argumentative scheme that supports exaggerated claims. Moreover, the rhetorical figure of a hyperbole has been used in order to support the arguments against the accession of Turkey to the EU and a very prestigious and famous person has been chosen for an interview. All of these strategies can be used in order to legitimize further marginalization of Muslims.

The actors involved in the reproduction of concern are the journalist himself in the article on Turkish schools in Germany and Helmut Schmidt (SPD) in the article on problems of migration. In contrast to the actors that have been involved in the relevant FAZ articles, this is the first actor with a social democratic background. This indicates the dimensions of the debate.

Concern towards Muslims and Islam: Conclusion for both newspapers

Whereas in the FAZ strategies have been used that are more implicit such as predication strategies and might therefore not always be recognized by the reader, the Bild's methods are much more obvious. Hence, the title of one of the articles of the tabloid paper already includes a presupposition and both examples include strong exaggerations. This indicates the difference between the two kinds of reporting. However, only the FAZ has included statements from a Muslim woman in which she was able to defend the deficits in education that are apparent in her parents' generation. This has been done in one article and next to that no other articles have included statements of Muslims besides by Necla Kelek who herself is contributing to the strengthening of Islamophobia. Hence, at least for this characteristic of moral panics it can be said that apparently Muslims' access to the discourse has been limited.

In conclusion, since the Bild is the newspaper having the biggest spread in Germany and also the FAZ is read by many people, their strategies, seemingly naturalized or obvious, have a strong influence on the reader. Therefore, even though there have also been examples that indicate the opposite, it can be summarized that both newspapers have contributed to the reproduction of concern through the language used in the published articles.

Hostility towards Muslims and Islam expressed by newspaper article language in Germany

Hostility in terms of moral panics and Islamophobia means that Muslims are understood as threat to the values and interests as well as the existence of society. Framing is a very common method applied in order to create and support stereotypes and to marginalize a group.

FAZ: emphasizing similarities between Islam and Christianity and defining democracy as a common good

There are only very few articles of the FAZ that aim at underlining the similarities between Muslims and non-Muslims to discourage hostility. These articles present the Islamic religion as not so different from Christianity and democracy as a common good. Once again, there have been no articles by the Bild to support this point of view.

Similarities of Islam and Christianity

To start with, one of the articles emphasizing similarities instead of creating hostility focuses on criticising the Islam critics Broder, Kelek and Schwarzer. The article discusses terrorism; however, instead of referring to Islamist terrorism, it refers to terrorism in general and thus, also includes Christian terrorism. This relates to the textual property of macrosemantics since the author chooses a different kind of definition of a frequently discussed topic.

Accordingly, the article sets off by transferring the criticism that is nowadays often directed at Muslims to Christians and shows hereby that the same criticism can be applied when speaking of groups as the IRA in Ireland. With this the author criticizes the appeal towards 'moderate' Muslims that has been formulated by feminists, politicians and experts to publicly announce their rejection of terrorism. With the use of irony which can be regarded as belonging to the textual property 'rhetoric', the article demonstrates that it is first of all not the task of the great majority to distance themselves from a small group who claim to be motivated by the same religion and that this is also not regarded necessary when it comes to Christians and groups such as the IRA. The article also compares the Jihad with Christian crusades and colonialism (FAZ, 10 January 2010). With this argumentation, responsibility is distributed more evenly.

Thus, this article has applied an argumentative scheme that transfers the alleged actions and characteristics of the folk devil to the dominant group. Thereby, any hostile accusations and demands towards Muslims are delegitimized.

Democracy as a common good

Next to this also the matter of mosques and minarets is frequently discussed in Germany. It was a representative of the Catholic Church who organized an evening for discussing about the building of a minaret in the city and who said:

„Wenn wir stolz auf die Demokratie sind, müssen wir sie auch teilen.“ (FAZ, 17 January 2010)

With this argument it is implied that allowing the construction of a minaret is part of cherishing democratic values. However, his message was not heard by the attendees who doubted that the Muslim commune would keep its word to not have a call for prayer. The citizens' argumentation was that based on the Bible everyone is an antichrist if he denies the Son of God and therefore must not be trusted. Here, the argument on which hostility towards Muslims is often based, namely that they do not respect nonbelievers and that they desire to proselytise them, is used on the basis of the Bible instead of the Koran and by a Christian and not a Muslim. This ambiguity of argumentation shows that even articles that tend to counteract hostility towards Muslims include hostility-reproducing elements.

Notice that above a statement of a representative of the Catholic Church has been quoted that could be interpreted as supporting concern. In this example, however, a clergy man acts in favour of Muslims which shows that it cannot be pointed to one group as generally

discriminative of Muslims. Moreover, in this article the clergy man has indirectly criticized that even though it is constantly referred to the basic democratic values on which German society is based those are not granted to Muslims.

German Muslims and the term 'Christian-Judaic Leitkultur'

Another important topic has been Wulff's claim that 'the Islam' was a part of Germany. Especially conservative and liberal politicians have announced their disagreement while opposition politicians rather support Wulff by declaring that 'the Islam' is part of the German cultural reality as there is an increasing number of 'German Muslims' (FAZ, 12 October 2010). Here, the possibility of multiple group membership is granted and therefore inclusion instead exclusion takes place. This is done by applying the opposite of framing.

One last example is an article that deals with the reaction of the Central Consistory of Jews to Wulff's speech. The discussion in the political arena is called 'almost hysterical' and 'propagandistic' by the representative and he stresses that the repeated claims that Germany has a 'Christian-Judaic *Leitkultur*' is only used to position Judaism in Germany against Islam. Anyhow, also this article ends with the reminder of a politician that some values of 'the Islam' as for example concerning the status of women are not acceptable and that the 'Christian-Judaic and the Muslim traditions in Germany cannot be regarded to be on the same level' (FAZ, 07 October 2010). Indeed, the reference to Christian-Judaic values and traditions as opposed to Islamic values and traditions is a form a framing and dichotomization in the process of folk devil creation.

It can be seen that even the articles that have factors which stress similarities and present Muslims as part of the German society include dichotomizing aspects and therefore support hostility towards Muslims. Hence, attention is now turned towards the other articles that have openly supported this criterion of moral panics.

FAZ: supporting hostility towards Muslims and Islam- the problem of Muslim integration

For this sequence many examples are available. Especially by stressing a relation between Islam and Islamism great fear towards Muslims can be created. How this and other methods have been used in order to reproduce hostile attitudes towards Muslims can be seen below.

The integration of Muslims

To begin with, in an article in the FAZ Necla Kelek criticizes her critics by accusing them of not knowing 'the culture of the Islam' which is a 'heterogeneous and completely disparate community' (FAZ, 22 January 2010, emphasis added). These nominal presuppositions and the framing inherent in the latter quote result in dichotomization. Furthermore, she enhances the feeling of threat posed by Muslims and their 'community' when she calls it the 'framework Islam' ("System Islam") and encourages modernization which is, however, claimed not to be

possible in ‘the Islamic world’. A clear separation is made between ‘the Western world’ and ‘the Islamic world’ which is allegedly disparate and hence any further integration efforts are needless. This contrast is a very typical stereotype that is part of the concept of Islamophobia as it has already been presented in chapter two. Adding to this is her accusation that her critics try to ‘bury the topic Islam just as the swine influenza’ since all persons responsible already know that integration of Islam is not possible because of the political and ideological character that it has next to the spiritual one. Here, there are two noticeable aspects. Firstly, the comparison of the debate about the Islamic religion with the discussion about the swine influenza adds to the dichotomization pointed out above since it suggests an epidemic and infiltrating character of the religion and thereby increases hostility. This is underlined and justified by the claim that all persons responsible already know beyond doubt that integration will not be possible. This argumentation denies any reasons for further discussions about integration.

The comparison between the debates about Islam and the swine influenza is used in a modified way in the headline of another article which reads:

„Das Gift der muslimischen Intoleranz” (FAZ, 04 October 2010)

This metaphor describing ‘Muslim intolerance’ as poison denotes that this observed phenomenon is spreading in the body of the state, represented in this case by schools. The relation made to sickness and poison, results in the image of a contagious and dangerous development that is a threat to society. Hostility towards Muslims and their intolerance or simply ‘the poison’ is the consequence. Referring to the intolerance of the Other is also a known method used by power elites in order to legitimize the dominance of the own group (van Dijk, 1993).

Considering these examples, the reader would have to conclude that Islam is a sickness and that all Muslims lack the ability to integrate into German society because of this poisonous religion which is not able to modernize because of its political and ideological character. This impression inevitably leads to a hostile attitude towards Muslims.

Blurring of boundaries between Islam and Islamism

Also feminist Alice Schwarzer took part in increasing the level of hostility towards Muslims when she wrote an article about burqas and declared:

“Seither ist das Kopftuch die Flagge des politisierten Islam und der Ganzkörperschleier sein totaler Sieg.” (FAZ, 22 July 2010)

First of all, referring to Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism by calling it ‘politicised Islam’ contributes to blurring the boundaries between Islamism and Islam. Secondly, the notion “totaler Sieg” is in German associated with war, or more specifically fascism. This is an allusion that has been made by different persons, also Schwarzer herself. Hence, by manipulating the

mind of the reader like this, he eventually connects the threat of fascism with Islam and projects the fear and hostility regarding fascism on Islam.

This blurring of Islam and Islamism is also done by authors of the FAZ by, for instance, the following statement:

„Ein Teil des Islams ist der radikale Islam, der Islamismus. (...) Auch junge Deutsche wenden sich ihm als Konvertiten zu.” (FAZ, 07 March 2010)

The definition that is presented here stresses that Islamism is a part of Islam what means that it is a religious movement and suggests that every Muslim might easily become an Islamist. Moreover, the addition that also young Germans convert to Islamism, again divides between religion and nationality. This framing indicates that Muslims are generally not defined as Germans and vice versa, even though there live up to 2 million Muslims with German citizenship which are 45% of the whole Muslim population in Germany (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2010). Contrasting nationality and religion by framing is a frequently used rhetorical method. It shows that Muslims are likely to stay outsiders in German society as multiple group membership is denied. It could be assumed that this happens in relation to the *ius sanguinis* principle which has been explained above. Together with the definition of Islam as the foundation of Islamism, the perception of a threat posed by Muslims as a group that can never be part of the German society is increased and consequently hostility emerges.

Interior Minister de Maizière's appeal to Muslims in Germany to find and draw a clear border between 'the peaceful Islam' and 'the violent Islamism' is relating to the definition of Islamism as being an integral part of Islam (FAZ, 31 January 2010). Therefore, it is presented as the Muslim communities' task to explain themselves and the fundamentalists who claim to base their aims on the religion. However, logically, it should be the minority, the fundamentalists, who have to explain themselves and not the wide majority. This appeal, in any case, indicates that Muslims and Islamists are regarded to originate from the same group. Moreover, by associating the negative characteristics of Islamists with Muslims also contributes to Islamophobe hostility since Muslims are thus understood as threat.

This hostility based on the suggested close connection between Islam and Islamism shows for example in the assumption of the representative of the free voters' party in Frankfurt (FAZ, 15 September 2010). Regarding problems with radical imams he claims that communes of mosques only dissociate themselves from these imams when they have a strategic motive such as aiming at being granted the building licence for a new mosque. This argumentation that includes a predication strategy suggests that in reality, there is no distinction to be made between radical and moderate Muslims as the latter ones merely try to disguise their radicalism.

In sum, it has been shown that there is a lack of differentiation between Muslims and Islamists. In the articles that have been used as examples Islamism is presented as integral part of Islam. Since Islamophobe hostility is based on the perception of a threat posed by a group, this definition does have a significant impact on Islamophobia.

Neologisms and Leitkultur

Further supporting this hostility is the frequent use of neologisms such as *Integrationsverweigerer*, in which the transitivity of the word ‘to refuse’ points towards a conscious unwillingness and an active rejection of an offer of integration (FAZ, 14 October 2010). Necla Kelek defines the representatives of Islamic associations as ‘proselytising functionaries’ (“missionierenden Funktionären”) and calls her opponents “Kulturrelativisten” and Naivlinge(n)”. Moreover, because of his speech, Wulff has become an “Islamfreund” (FAZ, 10 October 2010). This lexical style which is a feature of textual properties of discourse, is quite aggressive as is indicated by the choice of the words ‘proselytising’ and ‘functionaries’ and by the disparagement of everyone who disagrees by using negative neologisms. Thus, Kelek signals her power as expert concerning Islam. In this position she has considerable authority and credibility and accordingly influences the reader.

In order to increase hostility it is also often referred to the *Leitkultur* concept and the explicit description of the threat faced by society’s values.

Especially since Wulff’s speech at the German Unification Day politicians tend to refer to the Christian-Judaic tradition on which the German constitution rests. Hence, CSU-leader Seehofer stated:

„Integration heie ,nicht nebeneinander, sondern miteinander leben auf dem gemeinsamen Fundament der Werteordnung unseres Grundgesetzes und unserer deutschen Leitkultur, die von den christlich-jdischen Wurzeln und von Christentum, Humanismus und Aufklrung geprgt ist. “ (FAZ, 16 October 2010)

He went on stressing that Germany must not become the social services department of the whole world and that his party stands up for the German *Leitkultur* and against multiculturalism. These statements have been made referring to Muslim migrants and increase hostility in several ways. First of all, there is a strong framing aspect in the above quoted declaration. The argumentation which is one form of text schema is interesting in this quote. Seehofer chooses to stress the ‘Christian-Judaic roots’ of the German *Leitkultur* which is not only historically very disputable but also mobilizes the two of the biggest religions in Germany against the Islamic religion. It could be argued that the majority of the German readers might not realize the framing aspect of the notion ‘Christian-Judaic values’. This naturalization could be caused by the Germans’ wish for reconciliation with Jews so that they would easily accept the term. Thus, marginalization of Muslims can be performed without the reader noticing. Moreover, emphasizing the reluctance to become the social services department of the world suggests implicitly that the Muslim migrants rely in great parts on German social services. In addition, Seehofer contrasts the *Leitkultur* and multiculturalism as if these concepts were mutually exclusive. Hence, it is implied that in case of a multicultural society Germany would lose the basic values. In sum, the argumentation and the use of framing and excluding concepts have a

dichotomizing effect and therefore result in an increased level of hostility. Next to that, it could be argued that the majority of the German readers might not realize the framing aspect of the notion 'Christian-Judaic values'. This naturalization could be caused by the Germans wish for reconciliation with Jews so that they would easily accept the term.

Concluding from all examples above, it can be said that the most frequently used methods for reproducing Islamophobia were the use of an aggressive lexical style, an argumentative text schema that blurs the boundaries between Islam and Islamism and framing. The articles mostly focused on an alleged impossibility of integration of Muslims, the strong connection between Islam and Islamism and the importance of a German *Leitkultur* that is based on Christian-Judaic values and that is threatened by Islam.

The actors that have been involved are the journalists themselves and politicians from the CDU and CSU, De Maizière and Seehofer, as well as one from the free voters' party. Moreover, Alice Schwarzer and especially Necla Kelek have contributed to Islamophobe hostility reproduction.

As before, there have been some examples that have challenged hostility towards Muslims. In these articles it was stressed that the traditions and rights that are so frequently called upon have to be shared with everyone, thus also Muslims. Moreover, terrorism was defined as not necessarily Islamist and the framing and excluding nature of the term 'Christian-Judaic values' was pointed to. Here, a clergy man, a journalist of the FAZ and a representative of the Central Consistory of Jews have been the actors.

However, again, far less examples in which Muslims are not discriminated have been found. Instead, the examples in which the threat posed by Muslims is underlined are numerous. It has thus been found out that regarding this criterion of moral panics it can be stated that the language of the FAZ articles has contributed considerably to the preservation of the social inequalities caused by Islamophobia. Moreover, having a look at the actors has shown that as Muslim again only Necla Kelek has been involved in the discourse. Hence, once again it can be said that the participation and the representation of Muslims in the discourse is largely unequal and that this could be due to limited access. That points to a domination of the discourse by power elites that consist of journalists (the media), so-called experts and politicians.

Bild: supporting hostility towards Muslims and Islam- 'How much Islam is in line with the constitution?' (Bild, 02 November 2010)

After this analysis of power reproduction of the dominant group leading to hostility by the FAZ, attention is turned towards how this has been done by the Bild. While in FAZ articles, hostility has been supported rather by the implicit meaning of words and the context of arguments, the Bild uses quite obvious methods.

Islam at schools

Hence, multiculturalism is characterised as ‘daily insanity’ (Bild, 11 October 2010) and the presupposing leading question of another article is

“Wie deutschenfeindlich geht es an unseren Schulen wirklich zu?” (Bild, 11 October 2010)

The presupposition of this question with which the article sets of is implied in the word ‘wirklich’ since it indicates that the situation has thus been far worse than anticipated.

Besides this leading question, it can be looked at the titles of the articles. Articles of the Bild often use a headline above the actual title and capital letters for accentuation. Hence, the following example:

Headline: “PRÜGEL! ISLAMISMUS! MOBBING! HASS AUF DEUTSCHE SCHÜLER!”
Title: “Der tägliche Wahnsinn in Essens Horror-Schule“
Subtitle: “LESEN SIE, WIE HILFLOS SCHULLEITUNG, ELTERN UND LEHRER SIND
An dieser Schule haben deutsche Kinder Angst. Vor Schlägen. Vor Mobbing. Vor ihren Mitschülern. Gemeint ist die Hauptschule Karnap – eine echte Horror-Schule in Essen (NRW)!” (Bild, 21 July 2010)

The headline of this article, written in capital letters, is an enumeration that includes a climax which identifies the offenders as Islamists and the victims as German students. Without any further analysis or description in the body of the text, the Muslim students are depicted as Islamists from the beginning. Thus, a common enemy is created.

The aggressive lexical style of headline, title and subtitle can have a very instigating influence on the reader. First of all, attention and horror is created by the headline, then the title explains that this is a daily problem and afterwards, the subtitle concludes that all attempts to solve the problems with ‘the Islamist students’ are hopeless. The following sequence of (half-) sentences in the subtitle which constitute another climax, once again stresses the aggressiveness of the non-German students. This combination of titles generates a very convincing folk devil which is characterised as invincible at least for the headmaster, parents, teachers and students. This folk devil is further defined in the article when the headmistress explains that students from the Lebanon are the most violent and the Bild adds: “Aber auch vor Türken haben die Deutschen Angst.” The article further focuses solely on the Turkish offenders before it turns to generalising them as ‘the Muslim students’. Thus, it is pointed out that the German Muslim folk devil is Turkish.

Another example is the presupposition included in the following title of an article dealing with the same matter as the one analyzed before:

Title: „So werden deutsche Schüler von Ausländern terrorisiert“
Subtitle: „Sie werden verprügelt, beleidigt, bedroht und als ‚Nazis‘ beschimpft. Weil sie Deutsche sind – an einer Schule in Deutschland...“ (Bild, 22 July 2010)

The presupposition in the title of the article leaves no doubt that German students are ‘terrorized’. The choice of the word ‘terrorized’ is also to be interpreted as an aggressive lexical style since it is usually spoken of bullying when it comes to fights between students at school. By using ‘terrorize’ with ‘Ausländer’ as subjects, a relation is made between both. The subtitle again uses a climax resulting in the worst possible scenario in which German students are insulted as ‘Nazis’. Together the title and subtitle function as an implicit argumentation against foreigners. This schema has a strong dichotomizing effect in which ‘they’ are terrorizing foreigners who deal with a very sensitive part of history in a very insulting way. As a consequence to the framing, hostility towards the foreigners is reproduced. More specifically, hostility towards Muslims is generated as the foreigners are further defined as belonging to this religious group when the author explains that the students experience

“Einen Alltag voller Brutalität, eine finstere Parallelwelt, in der Deutsche terrorisiert werden und der Islam das Denken bestimmt.” (Bild, 22 July 2010)

Here the article clarifies that the cause for all violence at this school is ‘the Islam’ which adds to Islamophobia as once again it is held that Islam is the reason for terrorism. Since terrorism is perceived as the ultimate threat to society, the definition of young Muslims as terrorizing German students can but result in the perception of a threat to the existence of society itself which thus reproduces the moral panic of Islamophobia.

In conclusion, on the examples above hostility has been reproduced by using several different strategies. First of all, the use of capital letters combined with an aggressive lexical style is used in order to claim the attention of the reader and underline the negative characteristics of Muslims. Moreover, frequently enumerations with included climaxes are used in the headlines which relates to the textual property of rhetoric as also the resulting framing does. Lastly, the questions and statements that are issued in the Bild are dominated by presuppositions which belong to the textual property of Local meanings and coherence.

Islam in Germany

One last example with reference to the titles of articles in the Bild is the following quote of a title which shows very well how framing is used:

„DAS wollen Muslime alles vor Gericht einklagen” (Bild, 14 October 2010)

The capital letters of the first word is enough to cause a framing effect and a marginalization of Muslims since it already implies that whatever the matters are they are

shocking and wrong. Moreover, it constitutes a very strong underlining of Muslims as belonging to a different group in society.

Furthermore, Islamism is frequently exemplified by pointing to the suppression of women and the wearing of headscarves. Besides school and language problems, gender inequality is a very important issue in German media. This is for instance supported by an article that claims in the title that there have to be more severe limits for Islamists and demands in the sub-title a ban of headscarves from schools (Bild, 20 September 2010). With this argumentation a connection is made between Islamism and headscarves and women with headscarves are perceived as not only victims of gender inequality but also as potential Islamists.

Additional to the support of hostility in the title of articles, this can also be found in the body of the texts. Two examples are most relevant. The first one is an interview with a Turkish-German TV-moderator and here the questions asked are most interesting as they point to the attitude and the expectations of the interviewer. Among others it was asked:

“Wurden Sie streng erzogen?”

“Gab’s denn auch mal Schläge?”

“Mussten Sie nie ein Kopftuch tragen?”

“Sollten Kopftücher verboten werden?”

“Bundespräsident Wulff sagt, der Islam gehöre zu Deutschland. Wie viel Islam verträgt unser Land?”

“Was fühlen Sie, wenn Sie hören, dass Frauen zwangsverheiratet werden?”

“Gibt es Dinge, die Ihnen Ihr Glaube verbietet?” (Bild, 14 October 2010)

The picture of the Islamic religion and culture that is presented here suggests a strict, violent, traditional, authoritarian and controlling way of living in which women are suppressed and forced marriages have a causal relation to the religion. Moreover, the question how much Islam Germany can bear, includes the suggestion that there is a limit and that if it is exceeded German society will thus collapse under the weight of Islam. It can hence be followed, that Islam is a burden and that it is bad for German society. With these questions the author projects his point of view and what he expects his readers to want to know. Thus, it can be said that the author expects his readers to wonder about these issues and since the questions imply a negative vision of Islam, he also expects them to have a negative and hostile attitude towards it.

Again, in the examples discussed in this paragraph capital letters have been used in order to increase the framing effect of the statements. Next to that, the interview questions include many implications which are part of the characteristic of implicitness of Local meanings and coherence (textual properties).

Attitudes of young Muslims

The last example to discuss for this criterion is an interview with Kristina Schröder (CDU), Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (Bild, 02

November 2010). The text starts with a short introduction which says that the Minister is concerned:

“Anlass ihrer Sorge: die grundsätzlich feindliche Einstellung muslimischer Jugendlicher vor allem gegen Deutsche und Christen.”

This predication strategy is used in order to assign young Muslims in general a fundamentally hostile attitude towards the majority of German society and results with its generalising and framing aspects in a legitimization of the marginalization of this group that obviously does not even want to be part of German society.

In the questions of the interview the ‘fundamentally hostile attitude of Muslims adolescents’ becomes ‘hatred’ before the question arises

“Wie viel Islam ist überhaupt verfassungskonform?”

With this question it is once again presupposed that if there were too much of ‘the’ Islam it would be in breach with the constitution. This relates to the textual element of local meaning and coherence since implicitly the journalist communicates his sets of beliefs through this question.

The answer of the minister is related to gender inequality which must not be accepted in Germany. This macrosemantic definition of what is understood of Islam again indicates that there is no clear definition of what ‘Islam’ entails. Due to this lack of definition, hostility towards Muslims can be fostered easily as there is no difference made between ‘the’ Islam in which women are suppressed or ‘the’ Islam which is almost not noticed because it is practised by fully integrated and therefore unnoticeable people. Therefore, it is easy for the authors of this article to raise the question whether ‘the wrong migrants’ have been let into the country in the past. With its generalising character the article hence suggests that there are good and bad migrants. Muslims are clearly seen as belonging to the latter group as it has already been established that Muslim adolescents are ‘fundamentally hostile towards Germans and Christians’ and that there is doubt concerning the constitutionality of Islam. The interviewers go as far as suggesting a ‘migrant-quota’ for schools in order to reduce the number of problems. Hence migrants are defined as Muslims. For this article, this last policy suggestion is the climax of dichotomization as all problems at schools are by this described to be caused by Muslim migrants.

In conclusion of this last example, the strategies can be briefly summarized again. As with the other examples, a lexical style has been applied which results in a generalisation of negative characteristics of Muslims. Exemplary for this was the description of Muslims’ negative attitudes towards Germans as “grundsätzlich”. Moreover, also framing took place which has led to the distinction of good and bad migrants.

Taking all the different examples of the Bild into account, the following can be summarized. The articles have been most concerned with problems between Muslim and non-Muslim students at school and by the alleged hostile attitude of Muslims towards Germans and Christians. Moreover, the articles were concerned with gender inequality in Islam and the question whether Islam was in line with the German constitution.

The authors of the Bild have made extensive use of presuppositions and implications as well as a very aggressive lexical style. All of these methods have a framing effect which thus simplifies and legitimizes marginalization of Muslims. Moreover, Muslims were depicted as hostile towards Germans and the definitions that were implicitly given of Islam painted a very negative picture of Islam and Muslims. Hence, the Bild has effectively taken part in creating a Muslim folk devil.

The actors involved are a German-Turkish TV moderator, politician Schröder (CDU) and most importantly the journalists themselves.

Hostility towards Muslims and Islam: Conclusion for both newspapers

There are several differences that have been noticed. First of all, the methods of the FAZ have been more implicit and less aggressive. However, in both papers the boundaries between Islam and Islamism have been blurred whereby the definition of the former is paired with aspects of the latter. This results in framing and thus in legitimized marginalization.

Both papers have made use of presuppositions and implications whereas the Bild was far more aggressive as indicated not only by the lexical style but also by the use of capital letters and enumerations of short sentences that point to negative characteristics and actions of Muslims.

The topics of the articles have been quite different. Thus, the Bild has not stressed the German *Leitkultur* or the Christian-Judaic traditions and values and concerning this criterion of moral panics it has also not proclaimed the impossibility of Muslim integration. However, it has repeatedly indicated that the German society can only deal with Islam up to a certain extent. In line with this, it is doubted that too much Islam would be in line with the constitution. This implies the negative interpretation of Islam as generally the constitution grants religious freedom and there could only be too much if the religion would be in breach of other laws.

Again, there have only been a few examples from the FAZ in which it has been tried to stress a common ground but even in these articles there have been aspects that have contributed to Islamophobe hostility.

Concerning the actors there is a very obvious difference between the two countries. In the FAZ, on the one hand, the journalists issued their opinions less obviously and rather drew on politicians' as well as activists' statements such as from Kelek and Schwarzer in order to reproduce the dominance of the non-Muslims group. The Bild, on the other hand, only used one interview with minister of family affairs, Schröder, and one with a prominent German-Turkish moderator. The other articles from which the examples have been extracted are only influenced by the author's perspective. This can be explained by the difference in genre.

Hence, all in all, the two newspapers have both contributed significantly to the reproduction of social inequalities, *i.e.* the cultural racism of Islamophobia. In relation to the research question and the hypothesis this shows that at least for this as also for the preceding criterion of moral panics it can be said that Islamophobia in Germany has been reproduced by the language used in the articles of both newspapers.

Consensus about the threat posed by Muslims and Islam

That there is a consensus regarding Muslims as threat to society's values has been confirmed by different studies.³ Moreover, this is also pointed to by the institutional legacy of the debate which is represented among others by three centres of Islam studies at German universities which are supposed to educate future imams and were granted financial support by the federal state in 2010. It is often argued that an important motivation for establishing these centres is that the imams who are educated in Germany are expected to be less inclined to fundamentalism and more helpful for the integration of Muslims. However, since in this paper a CDA of newspaper articles is supposed to be conducted, it will be looked at how the idea of a consensus in society is spread by the means of language. Mostly, this is done by presenting positions as if they are shared by a great part of society and by delegitimizing all other points of view.

FAZ: underlining consensus about the threat posed by Muslims and Islam

To start with, in an article of the FAZ which quotes a poll of the Bild, the argumentation, *i.e.* the text schema, is most interesting because of the positioning of the results of the poll (FAZ, 10 October 2010). After explaining the points of view of different politicians who criticized Wulff's statement about the role of Islam in Germany and after quoting Horst Seehofer with his opinion that Turkish and Arabic people have a lower ability to integrate into society, the author chose to insert a short section of contra arguments. Afterwards, the results of the poll of the Bild are presented which say that 68% of the respondents doubt that immigrants from Islamic countries will learn to speak German in a short period of time and that 59% think that the majority of Muslims are not willing to accept the constitution. Following this, statements of the Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, Schröder, are quoted in which she describes a situation in which she had been insulted by Muslims as "Deutsche Schlampe" which is used as an exemplification of Muslim hostility towards Germans.

This argumentative scheme in which contra-hostility arguments are placed in between pro-hostility arguments diminishes the legitimacy of the first and especially by calling upon the research results of the Bild after these contra-hostility arguments, refutation of all contra-arguments is achieved. Through focusing on the quotes of politicians that are against the statement of Wulff, the impression of overall consensus in society about the threat of Muslims is created.

Besides the use of text schema in order to construct consensus, this is also achieved by stating alleged facts or by debasing opponents. The latter is also done in the following quote:

³ See for example figures Annex A

„Und offen wird nun endlich benannt, was längst jeder weiß, der nicht an weltanschaulich konnotierten Wahrnehmungsstörungen leidet (...)“ (FAZ, 04 October 2010)

In this comment it is suggested that everyone who has a healthy state of mind has to agree with the claim made and that everyone else is suffering from psychological problems. This is a predication strategy that is used in order to create a sense of consensus. Moreover, the words ‘finally’ (“endlich”) and ‘long since’ (“längst”) add to this by implying that it is already a long established truth that young Muslims are troubleshooters. This last point relates to the element of lexical style.

A similar strategy is also used in the following example. Here, multiculturalism is contrasted with integration and the necessity of a *Leitkultur*. They are presented as mutually exclusive concepts.

„Welcher ihrer (of the CDU) ernstzunehmenden Gegner wünscht heute noch Multikulti statt Integration? Die Notwendigkeit einer Leitkultur wird nur noch selten bestritten, auch wenn die CDU selbst kaum noch davon zu sprechen wagt.“ (FAZ, 18 January 2010)

Again, all opponents are defined as not to be taken serious and integration by means of a German *Leitkultur* is claimed to be a necessity that has been accepted by anyone. Therefore, anyone advocating for multiculturalism is supposed to be part of an unimportant minority. Thus, the feeling of an overall consensus about the infeasibility of multiculturalism and the need for immigrants to adjust to the German *Leitkultur* is established.

In conclusion, in these examples the impression of a consensus is created by the lexical style that implies consensus, the degradation of all opponents and most importantly the argumentative scheme.

Bild: underlining consensus about the threat posed by Muslims and Islam

The Bild seems to have a tradition of manifest intertextuality as can be seen in articles discussing Wulff’s speech or Sarrazin’s claims. In each of these texts it is intensively drawn on quotes from experts, politicians and Bild-readers who have commented in the forum. These articles mostly only consist of a short introduction and several sub-headlines in-between the quotes.

To begin with, a few examples from articles dealing with Wulff’s speech have to be considered. The first headline reads:

“So denken die Deutschen” (Bild, 05 October 2010)

Hence, it starts with a generalisation suggesting a collective opinion towards Wulff’s statements. The author of the article proceeds by drawing on figures from a survey:

„Hat Christian Wulff (51) mit dieser Behauptung Recht? 66% der Deutschen sagen NEIN!“

Next to the emphasis that is put on the rejection by choosing capital letters for the ‘no’, the author also chose to write that 66% of the German people instead of the respondents disagree with the president. Therefore, it can be said that a generalisation of this point of view takes place. Moreover, after this presentation of figures, the text proceeds by quoting people who expressed their disagreement on the president’s homepage or in the Bild forum. Interesting about these quotes is the use of the (nick-) names of the people before the actual quote. So it is written: ‘Anton W. wrote: (...)’ or ‘marci1984: (...)’. This individualisation of actors is used in order to underline their ordinariness and therefore simplifies the identification of the reader with the quoted people. As a result, the sense of a common point of view is strengthened.

This method is also used in another article dealing with Sarrazin’s hypotheses (Bild, 2010). However, in this article the effect is even stronger because not the names of the quoted readers but their professions and with that their social statuses are given. Thus, it says: ‘...the teacher: (...)’, ‘...the banker: (...)’, ‘...the detective chief superintendent: (...)’, ‘...the American Jew: (...)’, ‘...the senior prosecutor: (...)’ but also ‘...the retired couple: (...)’ and the ‘...property manager: (...)’. Hence, everyone is included; especially, respectable and trustworthy people of whom all of them support Sarrazin’s hypotheses, shortly tell their own anecdotes to support their ‘prophet’. Note that not one quote from a Muslim is included which again points to limited access to the discourse.

With this kind of manifest intertextuality, a very convincing case for Sarrazin and against Muslims is made and everyone who needed more proof must now be convinced that all these honourable people are right and therefore, once again, consensus in this matter is encouraged.

As it became obvious, the Bild works with generalisation of opinions and individualization of actors in order to support consensus. However, this is also achieved by the use of certain expressions and by framing. The following example taken from an article written by politician Buschkowsky (SPD) shows how this is done:

„Inzwischen lässt sich eine zunehmende Tendenz der Deutschfeindlichkeit und des Mobblings gegen deutschstämmige Schüler von türkisch- und arabischstämmigen Jugendlichen wohl nicht mehr leugnen“ (Bild, 05 October 2010)

First of all, the importance of the origin of the students and the contrast made between students from German origin and students from Turkish and Arabic origin is a framing strategy. The differences are insuperable since origin cannot be changed. Moreover, consensus is especially created by saying “lässt sich (...) wohl nicht mehr leugnen”. This sentence construction implies in the word ‘wohl’ that naturally but also regrettably, there is no doubt in the truth of how German students are bullied and that hostility towards Germans has increased. As also in the examples from the FAZ elaborated above (‘finally’, ‘since long’), these small

words can have a strong influence on how a message is received. The alleged fact is naturalized and seems undeniable. However, this opinion that is thus included in the claim is probably rarely noted by the reader and can therefore have maximum influence on opinions.

In conclusion, the Bild has done intensive quoting from comments of readers in order to create a sense of a consensus regarding the threat posed by Muslims and has introduced each quote with the name or social status of the quoted person. This individualisation of the readers can be used in order to increase the credibility of the claims. Moreover, in the second example, the style that has been used already presumes the correctness of the framing statement. Hence also here consensus has been reproduced.

Consensus about the threat posed by Muslims and Islam: Conclusion for both newspapers

The most noticeable difference between the methods of the two newspapers is the extensive use of quotes from readers in the Bild. Instead of doing that the FAZ has applied an argumentation schema that implicitly degrades the statements that try to create a more positive picture of Islam and Muslims.

Involved in the creation of the impression of consensus are mainly the authors who cite different people, mostly politicians in order to reinforce the credibility of their statements. Besides, the last article of the Bild from which it has been quoted has been written by a politician of the SPD. This indicates again, that the debate does not only take place in the conservative political spectrum and that thus a variety of actors is involved in the exertion of social power over the reader.

As the figures in Annex A show there is a consensus in negative attitudes towards Muslims and Islam. These attitudes might have been co-produced by the newspapers and as it has just been found out, they are also further reproduced in newspaper articles.

Disproportionality of the concern towards Muslims and Islam

The fourth characteristic of moral panics is disproportionality. There are different ways in which claims can be disproportional. Figures can be exaggerated or it might be that the perceived threat does not exist altogether or that more attention is paid to one subject though the threat posed by another matter is just as or maybe even more important. Lastly, if a matter is given more attention than at an earlier or later point in time though there is no objective increase in urgency, it can be spoken of disproportionality (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). In the German newspaper article sample, proof for the existence of disproportionality regarding the matter of Muslims in Germany has been found. For example, the repeated request of the newspapers to introduce a law against burqas is quite disproportional considering that the wearing of a burqa is by no means a mass phenomenon in Germany. However, there are by far more concrete examples to be considered.

FAZ: pointing to the disproportionality in the reporting on education of Muslims

There is one example in which disproportionality towards Muslims and Islam in the media is criticized. The article is written by political scientist Naika Foroutan (FAZ, 16 September 2010). Referring to the claims that migrants with Turkish origin do not want to integrate or are not intelligent enough, she explains how the statistics on level of education are mostly not interpreted. She explicitly focuses on the increase of migrants from Turkey who have obtained their diploma from the German secondary school qualifying them for university admission. While most statements regarding this matter only describe the low education of Turkish migrants the increase of about 20% between the first and the second and third generation is not mentioned. She holds that this creates a contorted picture of the situation and only therefore claims about the intelligence of migrants are discussed as being possibly valid.

Her criticism is thus directed towards exaggeration of figures. Significantly, she is one of the very few Muslim actors who take part in the discourse on Islam and Muslims.

Anyhow, there are many more examples that justify her criticism and that are discussed below.

FAZ: disproportionality of the concern towards Muslims and Islam

The first criterion for proving disproportionality

Starting with a brief account of how disproportionality shows itself in hyperboles it can be pointed to the claim of Alice Schwarzer that every second woman of Turkish origin in Germany lives in a forced marriage (FAZ, 08 November 2010). However, since there are no representative statistics for Germany on this matter and since only in 2010 a law has been passed that explicitly protects women from forced marriages it can be assumed that the first characteristic in order to prove disproportionality has been met.

The second criterion for proving disproportionality

Moreover, it can be referred to an example that has already been discussed earlier on. It concerns the results of the studies presented by minister Schröder which can be understood as disproportional (FAZ, 26 November 2010). These two studies were aimed at determining whether Muslim children have an increased inclination towards violence. Even though both studies failed to find a significant relationship between the variables male, Muslim and violent, minister Schröder held on to her conclusion. She still stated that there seemed to be a correlation between increased Muslim religiousness and an increased approval of norms of masculinity resulting in legitimization of violence. With this example the second criterion of how to prove disproportionality applies, at least until a significant relation between the variables can be proven. Other factors are not taken into account by Schröder, though one of the researchers noticed that the relation between the variables was only found if also the social and economic situation was bad. Thus, there is also the possibility that social or economic circumstances constitute the independent variable. This, however, is not discussed by the minister who holds

onto her earlier manifested point of view and thereby supports a disproportional perspective on the relation between Muslims religiousness and violence.

The third criterion for proving disproportionality

At last, there is one example that is most important when discussing disproportionality in the FAZ articles. It will also be discussed in the section on how the Bild uses language and facts that are disproportional in the articles on Muslims and Islam.

The article deals with the autumn conference of the Federal Criminal Police Office. Its title is

“Bedrohung durch islamistischen Terrorismus präsenter denn je” (FAZ, 20 October 2010)

This citation of the president of the Federal Criminal Police Office, Ziercke, is taken from his speech in which he defined four major threats for the German society: right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, crimes related to the rocker scene and Islamism. Of all these threats, Islamism had the lowest number of known followers and still the author chose to use this quote for the title. This relates to the textual element of macrosemantics. The author thus did not choose to define the topic as for example ‘Four major threats to German society’ or at least ‘Islamism is one of the threats to German society’. Instead by choosing this title, he thus defined Islamism as the most important of the threats that have been addressed at the conference. This assumption is also supported by the fact that in the article itself only criminality of rockers is mentioned next to Islamism and hence the greatest threats that have been addressed (right-wing and left-wing extremism) are not mentioned. In order to illustrate how disproportional the description of threats in this article is, it has to be looked at the numbers Ziercke presented (Bundeskriminalamt, 2010).

At the conference he stated that the National Security Authority assumed that there were more than 1.000 violence-prone Islamists, of which 131 are categorized as agitators (“Gefährder”) and another 274 as relevant persons. Comparing this with the figures presented for right- and left-wing extremism clearly shows the disproportional character of this news. Ziercke speaks of 9.000 right-wing and 6.600 left-wing extremists as well 6.000 members of rocker groups. It could be argued that the author of the article particularly chose to report about Islamism since Islamist attacks tend to harm more people at once than assaults of one of the other groups. However, the choice of the title, the complete omission of all figures referring to left- or right-wing extremism and the narrative with which the author particularly focused on Islamism by concentrating on this matter first and for more than half of the article, indicates disproportional reporting in terms of the third disproportionality characteristic- it is paid more attention to Islamism than to the other threats thought they are more dangerous than the first. This supports the interpretation of Islamophobia as a moral panic.

Consequently, it can be said that enough proof has been found in order to state that the reporting on Muslims and Islam has been characterized by disproportionality. This has been done by exaggerating figures, by claiming that there is a relation between religiousness of Muslims, norms of masculinity and violence and by focusing on Islamism as the most important threat to Germany even though more dangerous threats are known.

Bild: disproportionality of the concern towards Muslims and Islam

The third criterion for proving disproportionality

There is also an article of significance about the autumn conference of the BKA in the Bild. The newspaper published an article reporting about this conference of the Federal Criminal Police Office with the title:

“Gewaltbereite Islamisten sind mitten unter uns!” (Bild, 20 October 2010)

This article does not mention the other threats explained by Ziercke at all. Moreover, it includes the finding presented at the conference that with radicalisation not ideology is the most important factor but a disrupted family background. However, in this statement the author does not include the other factors that are named by Ziercke and that might also lead to radicalisation such as failure of educational and social systems. Hence, with this argumentation the author denies societal responsibility for radicalisation. The news of an increasing threat by Islamism is used in order to push a political goal in the end. Thus, more storage of personal data is claimed to be essential for the fight against Islamist terrorism. This points to the reproduction of political ideas by the Bild which signifies the preferential access of politicians to the newspaper discourse. This article is an example of the third criterion that can be used for proving disproportionality since more attention is paid to the threat of Islamism than to the other, greater threats.

The second criterion for proving disproportionality

Another example that has also already applied for the FAZ and disproportionality is the presentation of studies by minister Schröder (Bild, 26 November 2010). The title of the article already assumes the validity of the studies as it reads: “So ticken Macho-Muslime” and the first sentence of the article underlines this assumption:

„Männlich, Moslem, Macho – das ist der Dreiklang, aus dem häufig Gewalt entsteht. So bestätigen es zwei aktuelle Studien, die Familienministerin Kristina Schröder (33, CDU) heute vorgestellt hat.“

The fact that the studies have failed to prove a correlation between the variables is not mentioned during the whole article in which different answers for the question of ‘why Muslim boys so frequently become brutal machos’ are elaborated. Only in the last few sentences it is

admitted that the studies have not presented reliable figures and that therefore the relation that has been explained in the article of two pages does not necessarily exist. However, this has a weak impact considering the preceding analysis of how the three variables are related. Hence, it could be argued that the figures are at least exaggerated or even that the threat does not exist and therefore, this article is another proof for disproportionality and with that a confirmation of the interpretation of Islamophobia as a moral panic.

The first criterion for proving disproportionality

At last, there is one more example that will also help to understand how disproportional reporting adds to Islamophobia. The only article that has been found in the Bild using the keyword Islamisation discusses whether Turkish schools in Germany are the demise of the occident (Bild, 03 March 2010). In this text, the author states that there are schools in Germany in which 80% of the students do not understand any German and that around 30% of the Turkish people living in Germany leave school without graduating. This statement for which the present tense is used creates the impression that nowadays 30% of all students with Turkish origin leave school without graduating. However, putting it like this is an exaggeration since 30% only applies when speaking of all Turkish migrants who have come to Germany starting with the first generation. In contrast, nowadays, 8% of migrants of Turkish origin who have the German citizenship and 13% of those who do not have the German citizenship leave school without graduating (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 2008). Thus, since the impression is created that 30% of students of Turkish origin who leave school these days have not graduated, it can be argued that this is an exaggeration of figures and with that the first criterion for proving disproportionality has been met.

Also regarding the examples of the Bild it can be stated that disproportionality in the reporting on Muslims and Islam has been proven. This was shown by identifying the first criterion of disproportionality in an article on school performance of Turkish students. Moreover, it has been pointed to disproportionality by also pointing to the second criterion in an article on Schröder's studies as well as the third criterion in an article about the autumn conference of the BKA.

Disproportionality of the concern towards Muslims and Islam- Conclusion for both newspapers

Interestingly, the examples of the two newspapers are very interrelated. Thus, in both newspapers disproportional concern towards Muslims and Islam has been communicated. This has a significant influence on how the reader understands Muslims and Islam since he is not likely to check and verify the information he is given by the newspaper articles. Hence he has to assume that Muslims are really still performing very badly at school and that there is no bigger threat to society than Islamism. Moreover, the cognitive model of the reader now also entails that somehow there seems to be a relation between being male, Muslim and violent. This corresponds

with the information on Islamists who threaten the German society. The illustration of the cognitive model that possibly develops in the reader's mind, points to the framing influence of disproportional reporting.

Volatility of Islamophobia

As the working group EURISLAM that has been co-funded by the EU Commission has established in its report on media content regarding Islam, there has been a development of claims towards the position and rights towards Muslims. The report of the working group establishes that between 1999 and 2001 the position towards Muslim rights almost neutralized before it became very negative after 9/11. It became quite neutral in 2005 and 2006 again before it deteriorated in 2007 and became almost neutral once again in 2008 (EURISLAM, 2010:57). Unfortunately, the report does not include any further conclusions for the following years.

However, due to the analysis above and due to the results presented by the study of Pollack⁴ and the study of the FES that explains that negative attitudes towards Muslims have increased between 2003 and 2010 (FES, 2010:134), it can be assumed that the position of claims towards Muslim rights has become quite negative. From the results of the FES study it could be concluded that there has already been an underlying concern regarding Muslims and Islam before 2010.

Moreover, considering the articles that have been selected for this analysis the following becomes apparent. 12,5% of the articles selected from the Bild were published in July, 50% in October and 25% in November. For the FAZ the statistics are similar: 17,25% have been published in September, 44,85% in October and 13,8% in November.

This calculation shows that there has been a peak in October for both newspapers. This is probably connected to Wulff's speech on October 03 since most articles have referred to the President's statements which seem to have motivated a fierce discussion about the role of Islam in Germany and integration of Muslims.

Despite these results, a final conclusion about volatility can however not be made. For that, it has to be observed how Islamophobia in Germany further develops.

4.1.3. Conclusion

Taking the results of the preceding analysis into account, it can be followed that enough material has been found for stating that it has been tried to exert cognitive power over the German non-Muslim population in order to cause a moral panic about Muslims and Islam in Germany. For each characteristic of moral panics a thorough analysis has been conducted and for each characteristic strong proof has been found.

In relation to the research question it can be summarized that certain methods of language have been used in order to achieve a marginalizing effect. First of all presuppositions and implications that are part of the local meaning and coherence aspect of textual analysis have been used in order to implicitly include negative assumptions about Muslims and Islam. Besides, more

⁴ Annex A and B

openly this has been done by hyperboles. Next, it has been common to use neologisms which for example presupposed the unwillingness of Muslims to integrate. This is related to the frequent generalisations in which Muslims in Germany are regarded as one group. This group is then marginalized by extensive framing, *e.g.* by claiming that Muslims' values are opposed to the own values. Also the term 'Christian-Judaic values' has a strongly excluding character. Next to that, the text schema of argumentation could often be interpreted as blurring the boundaries between Muslims and Islamists. Especially the Bild has also frequently used an aggressive lexical style which is typical for tabloid papers (van Dijk, 1993).

Regarding the access to the discourse which is part of the contextual analysis and through which direct dominance over discourse can be reproduced, it is very important to note that only in a very small number of articles Muslims have expressed their point of view or even defended their fellow believers. Accordingly, it can be assumed that access to the discourse is limited to Muslims and that the folk devil is not able to express his view as much as the elite can.

Considering the assumption that the actors consist of interest groups and have made use of initial public concern, it can be referred to the study of the FES which proves that there has already been a certain level of concern in Germany before this year. The groups of actors that have been identified throughout the analysis were quite diversified. Though most of them were liberal or conservative politicians, also some social democrats, a Muslim woman, a feminist and a clergy man have participated in the preservation of non-Muslim dominance. All of these people are well educated and have privileged access to the newspaper discourse, either because of being prominent or because of their position as a so-called expert.

In conclusion with regard to the hypothesis that holds that Islamophobia is a social construction and a moral panic that has been reproduced by the language used in newspaper articles, it can be said that it can be accepted for this part of the analysis. The analysis has shown that Muslims and Islam are interpreted as constituting a social problem. Moreover, the CDA has demonstrated that Islamophobia can be interpreted as a moral panic and that it has strongly been supported by the language used in newspaper articles. All in all, evidence of social power abuse has thus been found.

4.2. The Netherlands

The analysis for the Netherlands is structured along the same lines as the analysis for Germany above.

4.2.1. Is there a social problem regarding Muslim immigrants and their religion in the Netherlands?

After the preceding analysis of Islamophobia in online newspaper language in Germany, attention now turns towards the Netherlands. In line with the theoretical framework of the thesis, the existence of a social problem constituted by Muslims and Islam is discussed first. Hence, it

has to be shown that Islam is collectively defined as problematic. For this, the four criteria for identifying a social problem are drawn on again.

To start with, it can be reasoned that the establishment as well as the national success of the PVV can be interpreted as “organized, collective action (...) on the part of some members of a society to do something about, call attention to, protest or change (...) a given condition” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:152). Consequently, it can be spoken of a social movement against Muslims and their religion who are thus perceived as social problem.

Secondly, considering the criterion of introduction of legislative bills that would have a criminalizing effect or at least deal with Muslims, it can once again be referred to the PVV and their party programme with which it became the third biggest party during the last national elections. In this party programme the PVV demands a ban of headscarves from all public buildings as well as an interdiction of the Koran (PVV, n.d.). This position has also had an impact on the ‘gedoog-accord’ of the new government VVD-CDA-PVV⁵. In the concept version of the coalition agreement it says that the Cabinet is going to introduce a motion for banning all kinds of clothing that conceals the face such as burqas. Moreover, it is stressed that police agents as well as anyone with judicial function should be forbidden to wear a headscarf (VVD, PVV & CDA, 2010). Thus, taking this into account, it can be said that Muslims and their religion are obviously regarded as a social problem.

Thirdly, there are several ways in which it can be established that Muslims and their (failing) integration are considered to be one of the most serious problems of the country. Primarily, there are of course the 15,5% of voters who voted for the PVV whose most important point on the agenda is dispelling the Islamisation of the Netherlands. Besides this, also in the media it is put that ‘immigration, integration and Islam’ are one of the key problems faced by the Dutch society (NRC, 11 September 2010). Hence, Muslims are perceived as a social problem by parts of the population and this definition is supported by the media.

Finally, also the last characterizing factor of social problems is met in the Netherlands. Already since the late 1990s multiculturalism and Islam are important matters in the public discussion that were brought to the attention by politicians such as Frits Bolkestein (VVD) or later on Pim Fortuyn (LPF). These days, when Wilders’ party supports the government there probably does not pass a day without a news story or a TV show about Muslims, integration or Islam.

Taking into account that every characteristic of social problems has been fulfilled, it can be followed that there is a social problem concerning Muslims and Islam in the Netherlands. Regarding the most important actors, it can be pointed to experts, politicians and the public.

As important experts Ayaan Hirsi Ali or Afshin Ellian can be mentioned who were both born in Muslim countries and therefore their reports and opinions are understood to have a certain authenticity. Regarding important political actors it can naturally pointed to the

⁵ From this chapter on, ‘CDA’ refers to the Dutch conservative party and not Critical Discourse Analysis. Whenever the latter is meant, the full term will be written.

representatives of the PVV as well as their predecessors Bolkestein and Fortuyn. Lastly, the public expressed its concern during the last national as well as provincial elections.

With regard to these different actors and the role of the public, the earlier assumption that the interest group theory applies combined with the grassroots model is preliminarily confirmed.

4.2.2. Islamophobia in the Netherlands: reproduction in newspaper article discourse

After it has been established that Muslims are considered to constitute a social problem in the Netherlands, it must now be considered whether there does also exist a moral panic. In contrast to the diverse topics of the German debate, the discourse of the Dutch articles is mostly focused on the statements and opinions of the Party for Freedom (PVV) of politician Geert Wilders. An example of this is the interpretation of a Turkish documentary on the spreading of Islamophobia in the Netherlands as an “anti-Wilders film” (Telegraaf, 23 December 2010). This documentary was subsidized by the Dutch government and instead of interpreting it in terms of its content, it is labelled as ‘anti-Wilders’. This indicates that the social movement and concern to which Wilders owes his success is rather disregarded by the media and that the debate on Muslims and their religion is regarded to be strongly connected to Wilders’ personality. This connection also becomes obvious in the analysis below.

Concern about Muslims and Islam in newspaper article language

As it has been explained above, Islamophobe concern is characterised by fear and anxiety regarding actions and values of Muslims. Topics that are important for the reproduction or discouragement of concern towards Muslims and Islam are Wilders and his party, the distinction of Islam and Islamism and the historical relations between ‘the Western world’ and the ‘Islamic world’.

NRC: discouraging concern about Muslims and Islam

In the Dutch quality newspaper NRC quite a lot of effort is put into discouraging concern. Hence, in the first example, politicians of the CDA are strongly denounced for working with the PVV and the author poses the rhetoric question:

Is men bezig het hetzerige populisme van Wilders te domesticeren, of is het de aankondiging van een onvoorwaardelijke capitulatie? (NRC, 16 October 2010)

This macrosemantic definition of Wilders’ statement as agitating is reflecting the author’s negative attitude towards Wilders’ points of view. Also by suggesting that an acceptance of Wilders and populism would constitute an unconditional capitulation shows that the author regards Wilders as belonging to another hostile group. Thus, he encourages concern regarding the current political situation rather than towards Muslims and Islam.

The article continues warning that whenever talking about ‘hard-working citizens’ one should be aware of the fact that that could also include Muslims since they also pay for highways as well as the protection of Geert Wilders. Thus, the opposite of framing is used when including

Muslims as possible citizens and tax payers. Thereby, basic similarities are stressed and concern towards Muslims and Islam is discouraged.

Besides this, in another article Wilders and his hypotheses are degraded:

“In de verwrongen ideologie van Wilders gaat onder elk hoofddoekje een potentiële terrorist schuil, is iedere moskee een vijandig legerkamp en ligt bij alle islamitische ouders een toekomstige Bin Laden in de wieg.” (NRC, 09 March 2010)

In this statement a predication strategy (“verwrongen ideologie”) is used in order to degrade Wilders’ hypotheses from the beginning and afterwards Bin Laden serves as a metaphor for evil. The obvious exaggerative character of the sentence that is achieved by these rhetorical tropes, illustrates that the author regards Wilders’ ideology as wrong and his thoughts on Muslims as false accusations. It is achieved that the reader at least has to reconsider his potential support for the politician of the PVV.

There are two more examples that can be discussed when considering the discouragement of concern. However, both also have elements that might increase concern.

First, there is an article about a claim of PvdA politician, Cohen, that the exclusion of Muslims these days was similar to that of Jews before the Second World War. This increases the awareness of what exclusion of groups can lead to and should result in concern regarding current methods of exclusion with regard to Muslims. Moreover, the politician is cited when saying that Muslims are afraid of what is going to happen now that the PVV is part of the government and that most of them want nothing else but ‘house-tree-pet’. This enumeration underlines the banality of their wishes that are no different from the wishes of any Christian or Dutch family. Anyhow, in this article also Wilders’ opinion on Cohen’s point of view is given in which he refers to ‘the Islamisation’ and the persecution of criminal Moroccans as necessity caused by the mistakes of the PvdA. This addition decreases the effect of Cohen’s comparison even though it cannot diminish the negative impression of Wilders as agitator.

At last, an article about the growing anti-Islam movement in Europe has to be considered as it tries to include historical reasons for Muslim immigration to Europe and concludes that from a historical perspective the impact of ‘the West’ has been quite severe (NRC, 22 September 2010). The author mentions the French conflict with Algeria, the Gulf wars and the war in Afghanistan and stresses the death of many civilians in these countries and the destruction that has been left behind. As a consequence, he admits that Muslims have had many material reasons for emigration. This argumentation schema is aimed at stressing the own responsibility that is rarely mentioned by right-wing, anti-Islam politicians. Moreover, the author tries to relate the Islam opponents’ positions to possible actions:

“Wat willen ze in de praktijk om dit (Islamisation) te vermijden? Massale deportatie van moslims? Hoe? In veewagens? En waarheen? Is dit in de 21^{ste} eeuw niet het voorspel tot een ouderwetse godsdienstoorlog?”

The distinct questions about how to deport Muslims and the suggestion of stock cars undoubtedly reminds the reader of images of Jews being deported in train wagons and therefore the reader is likely to shy away from the image created here and the suggestion of a religious war seems more probable.

However, also in this article framing takes place by frequently referring to ‘us in the West’ and ‘them’ or by discussing the relations between Muslim and non-Muslim countries in terms of ‘the Islamic world’ and ‘the West’. Thus, even though the article encourages to think about possible consequences of anti-Islam movements and calls upon greater trust in the survivability of ‘the European culture’, it also contributes to the separation groups of Muslims and non-Muslims.

In conclusion, by exaggerating and literally interpreting Wilders’ demands and claims the reader is presented a very negative vision of how reality could look like. Moreover, in these articles framing is rather used in order to exclude Wilders instead of Muslims who are partly defined as fellow citizens.

Concerning the actors, there are the journalists themselves as well social democrat Cohen (PvdA).

NRC: supporting concern about Muslims and Islam - Islam is a religion or a political ideology?

Language in politics

Next to these articles in which it has been tried to put concern towards Muslims into perspective, there are also several examples of the opposite. The following example is taken from an article that deals with the “allochtonenstop” that has been requested for the amateur soccer clubs in The Hague by the PVV (NRC, 21 October 2010). It is pointed out that the PVV is often accused of using too harsh terms such as the neologisms “kopvoddentaks” or “allochtonenstop”. This lexical style of the party has a very negative and framing effect because of its aggressiveness which is even increased by the accusation that the problems of the soccer clubs such as defaults of payments or disrespectful behaviour and violence are only caused by the foreigners. Anyhow, the article also includes the point of view of other parties who accuse the PVV to be too xenophobic. Hence, it is rather the political rhetoric that has a framing effect than the article itself.

This is also the case in the next article. Here it is referred to a declaration of the three party leaders Rutte (VVD), Verhagen (CDA) and Wilders (PVV) that they do not agree on whether ‘the Islam is a religion or a political ideology’ but that they will anyway work together (NRC, 30 July 2010). First of all, the nominal presupposition inherent in the mentioning of ‘the Islam’ suggests that there is one definition and interpretation of the religion and secondly, the acceptance of this disagreement by the representatives of the VVD and the CDA, might be understood by the reader as a kind of legitimization of the definition of Islam as political ideology. Hence, since this definition is legitimate, concern about the behaviour of Muslims is

supported. As also in the German newspapers, this lack of distinction results in a blurring of the definitions Islam and Islamism.

In these examples, the most important strategies of increasing concern towards Muslims and Islam were to use an aggressive lexical style that was represented in rhetoric tropes such as neologisms and ambiguity towards the distinction of Islam and Islamism. Moreover the text schema of argumentation used by the PVV according to which problems in soccer clubs are caused by Muslims and foreigners in general is also an attempt to reproduce the dominance of the non-Muslim group over Muslims.

Definitions of Islam, Islamism, Muslims and Islamists

Next to these effects of political language, the way Muslims, Islamists and Islamism are named is of greatest importance for the support of concern. Hence, for example in an article that is generally critical of Wilders and the anti-Islam movement, it is referred to the “moslimfundamentalisten” who threaten Geert Wilders and with that the Dutch parliamentary democracy (NRC, 09 March 2010). Regarding this from the perspective of macrosemantics, it can be noted that the dimension of the threat is increased from not only threatening anti-Islam politician Wilders but the Dutch democracy as a whole. This has the effect of increasing the perception of a threat. Moreover, the neologism ‘moslimfundamentalist’ suggests a much stronger relation between Muslims and Islamist extremists than the word ‘Islamist’ does. This is because it indicates ‘moderate’ or general faith as foundation for radicalisation and concern is supported because of the similarity of the terms that suggests a strong relation between Muslims and Islamists.

Similar to this is the notion of a ‘moderate and integration-supporting Islam’ (NRC, 03 July 2010). If the usual Muslim believes in a moderate Islam, then what is the ‘usual Islam’? This predication strategy, which assigns the ‘usual Islam’ the quality of being non-moderate, *i.e.* extreme, leads to a cognitive model in which the concepts of Islam and Islamism are strongly interrelated and Islam as such is regarded as inclined to extremism.

Relating to this are more terms that have a similar impact. Thus, in an article it is referred to “het islamitische terrorisme (die) gefundeerd (is) in de politieke islam”, “ultramoslims”, “het islamitische regiem” and “radicale moslimjongeren” (NRC, 06 November 2010). It has to be noted that in Dutch there is no differentiation between the adjectives Islamist and Muslim; both are to be translated with ‘islamitisch’. Therefore, referring to “islamitische terrorisme” is confusing as such and when combined with “ultramoslims” instead of ‘islamiet(e)’, there is no doubt to what attitude the author has. Repeatedly, a relation is made between Muslims and Islamists between Islam and Islamism so that the reader is unquestionably influenced to accept this relation. The same applies for the notion of “radicale moslimjongeren”. Consequently, framing takes place as the reader distances himself from the group that is so ambiguously defined. Next to this set of problems with naming, the author of the article also refers to ‘the Islamic regime’ as if there was one head of all Muslim communities. This generalisation also contributes to the existence of concern as it represents Muslims as an organized entity.

In sum, especially the ambiguity of terms used to define Muslims, Islamists as well as terrorism and Islam has a very framing consequence. The lack of clear definitions results in a possible identification of Muslims with Islamists and Islam with Islamism. At least, both are understood to be closely related which consequently causes and legitimizes marginalization of Muslims.

All in all, the NRC articles have contributed to the reproduction of concern towards Muslims and Islam by allowing framing through the ambiguity of terms, by quoting from PVV representatives using their neologisms such as “allochtonenstop” and referring to the PVV’s argumentative scheme that foreigners and Muslims have caused the problems in soccer clubs. Actors that have contributed to this reproduction of concern are the PVV politicians as well as the journalists.

Telegraaf: supporting concern about Muslims and Islam- Islamism as part of Islam

In the Telegraaf, mainly nominal presuppositions that result in generalisations as well dichotomization are used for supporting public concern. Hence, it is referred to ‘the Islam’ (Telegraaf, 31 December 2010) as well as ‘the Muslims’ (Telegraaf, 15 December 2010).

In addition, in an article dealing with Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s visit to the Netherlands for promoting her new book, her thoughts on Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands are reproduced (Telegraaf, 16 March 2010). Hence, it is pointed out that Muslims in the Netherlands have to integrate and adjust to the Dutch culture. Moreover, the former politician demands that Muslims let go of the ‘social-political part of the Islam’ which she defines as including the sharia, the jihad, oppression of women or intolerance towards homosexuals as well as towards people who were born as Muslims and decided not to want to be one. This request that has also frequently been observed in the German media, suggests that most Muslims do regard the ‘social-political part of the Islam’ as an important aspect of their faith.

Moreover, when defining all these negative aspects as being the social-political part of Islam, this creates the impression that thus, Islamism that is frequently connected to the violent jihad is an inherent part of Islam. This argumentation has a concern-increasing effect as Islamism as well as the other elements that are defined as the ‘social-political part of the Islam’ are endangering the values of the Dutch society.

Summing it up, there has been very little material for this characteristic of moral panics. In the examples that have been given, especially the argumentation schema of Hirsi Ali in which she describes Islamism as part of Islam can be interpreted in terms of the exertion of dominance and the reproduction of social inequalities between different groups.

Concern about Muslims and Islam: Conclusion for both newspapers

Taking the findings of both paragraphs into account, it can be pointed to the necessity of clear definitions and distinct terms. However, especially in the NRC terms have been used that are confusing and relating Islam and Islamism and Muslims and Islamists to each other. This is one of the ways in which stereotypes such as those described in chapters two and three develop.

This confusion that results from the terms that are partly neologisms ultimately leads to a marginalization of Muslims as they are understood as posing a threat to society.

This impression is supported by the article from the *Telegraaf*, in which the argumentation results in the definition of Islamism as part of Islam.

The actors that have been involved are politicians from the PVV, the journalists as well as Aya Hirsi Ali.

All in all, it has to be noted that the most evidence has been found for concern discouraging articles in the NRC. Those have decried Wilders' and his claims and requests and have confronted the reader with literal and ironic interpretations of the political aims of the PVV. Thereby, a negative vision of a possible reality has been presented that has a deterrent effect and thus does not result in concern towards Muslims and Islam.

Hence, taking all these aspects into account, it has to be concluded that concern towards Muslims and Islam has not been significantly more reproduced than discouraged by the language used in the newspaper articles.

Hostility towards Muslims and Islam

Hostility towards Muslims and Islam is defined by an understanding of Muslims as threat to society's values and interests. In order to reproduce Islamophobe hostility, framing and consequently marginalization of Muslims can be applied.

NRC: discouraging hostility towards Muslims and Islam

Also considering the second criterion of moral panics theory, first the articles that have not supported hostility towards Muslims in the Netherlands have to be considered. Remarkable is again the dominance of Wilders and the PVV in the relevant articles.

Military vocabulary

To begin with, it can be drawn on an article that has been found by using the keyword 'Islamisation'. In this article the author warns of how the language used by politicians such as Wilders can rarely be met with serious argumentation and facts when aiming at making a positive impression on the citizen at same time (NRC, 30 October 2010). In the end, it is concluded:

“Nu tracht de PVV de burger wijs te maken dat moslims vanuit een religieuze dogmatiek (takiyya) hun echte bedoelingen met Nederland verborgen houden. Terwijl de Nederlanders die moslims accepteren ‘dhimmi’ zijn: collaborateurs die vast ook de sharia willen invoeren. Alleen hebben ze het zelf niet in de gaten.
(...) Gelukkig zitten we niet allemaal in de loopgraaf van Wilders. Zelf nadenken, feiten controleren en eigen conclusies trekken: het kan nog.”

The choice of words, thus the lexical style in this paragraph is quite interesting. First, it is said that the PVV ‘aspires (...) to make the citizen believe’ in the bad character of Muslims. The

word ‘aspire’ suggests a negative character of the PVV as it has a negative connotation as well as the phrase ‘trying to make someone believe something’ does. This additionally suggests that the PVV is wrong in this matter but that they anyway try to persuade the citizens of the truth of their claims.

Moreover, it is pointed out that those who are accused of supporting the introduction of the rule of the sharia in the Netherlands are not even aware of supporting this matter. Thereby the credibility of this claim of the PVV is destroyed by the local meaning included at this point.

Lastly, the use of military vocabulary stands out. By referring to the ‘dugout’ of Wilders, the severity of the situation and of Wilders’ claims is stressed. Then, finally, the author calls upon the readers to think, check facts and come to own conclusion. His own conclusion that this is so far still possible combined with the military choice of words earlier on, results in an impression of urgency. All in all, by this article hostility towards Muslims is discouraged while distrust towards Wilders’ party is promoted.

This use of war language, especially the notion ‘dugout’, is used frequently when referring to Islam opponents. Thus, also in the following example this is the case (NRC, 12 November 2010). Next to the military lexical style, the ‘apocalyptic atmosphere’ that is created in texts of Islam opponents is mentioned by the author. He points towards the reality in which the current global allocation of power does not support the claim that ‘the West’ is going to have to deal with the threat of an ‘Islamic colonisation’. Hence, with this text schema of argumentation the author stresses that the alleged threat of Islamisation does not exist and that means that here hostility is discouraged.

Besides, there are also articles that refer to the ‘war language’ that is used by the PVV. In the chosen example, the author performs a thought experiment with the reader. He suggests that the reader should imagine that he had been abroad for some years and had not heard anything from what happened in the Netherlands. Then, on the way home, the reader is supposed to see a newspaper with the headline “Almeerse PVV wil stadscommando’s” (NRC, 01 March 2010). From here on the article leads the reader on an interesting path on which he is supposed to realize how extreme the wording and especially the requests of the PVV are. Hence, it is naturally followed that the reader would think of war when reading the headline and that he would be shocked that there are ‘streetterrorists’ (“straatterroristen”) in the Netherlands who need to be fought by “stadscommando’s”. This strategy that is applied here has a great influence on the reader’s perception of current affairs. By putting him in the position of an outsider while he has the knowledge of someone who lives in the Netherlands, is most effective since he realizes the exaggeration of the political rhetoric and thereby can think and decide more objectively. With this strategy the author aims at neutralizing the reader’s way of thinking in order to prevent exaggerated feelings such as hostility.

Finally, there is one last example that is pointing towards a threat posed by the possible realization of the PVV’s requests and not by Muslims in the Netherlands (NRC, 22 February 2010). By means of literally interpreting every claim of the PVV and using several hyperboles it is suggested to burn all Korans ‘as it was done during the Second World War with radios’ and

that Clairry Polak (Dutch moderator) should be burned as leftist witch on top of the books. Moreover, all mosques have to close in this ‘new Netherlands’ and every Moroccan who is suspected of any crime, no matter how trivial, should first be shot into the knee and then send out of the country. Next, the military should be put in charge of the districts that are up to now ruled by left-wing parties and the Netherlands would support Israel when it decides to attack neighbouring Muslim countries with nuclear weapons. At last, all subsidies for culture events will be withdrawn and in the end, every Dutchman will get a free subscription of the Telegraaf.

With these hyperboles which can be interpreted in terms of the textual element of rhetoric, the threat is defined to be the aims of the PVV. Thus, hostility towards Muslims is discouraged and concern about the PVV’s aims is created.

Summarizing all points, it can be concluded that the credibility of the PVV is undermined by the use of a military lexical style as if the Netherlands were at war and by again literally applying the aims of the PVV to an imagined reality. Thereby the credibility of the argumentation against Muslims is diminished and hostility is prevented. Instead the reader becomes aware of the unfeasibility and exaggeration inherent in the ideas of the PVV.

NRC: supporting hostility towards Muslims and Islam- the ‘D-day’ in the fight against Islamisation

After this elaborate analysis of how hostility is not reproduced by the NRC, it can be turned towards how hostility towards Muslims is in fact supported in some other examples taken from the same newspaper.

Moroccans as folk devil

In an article about the regional coalition forming in The Hague it is pointed out that the PVV has admitted that the ban of headscarves is not necessarily a point that must be part of the coalition agreement. However, because of this concession the PVV expects that

“Andere partijen zouden de PVV dan tegemoet moeten komen op zaken als (...) in het bijzonder **Marokkaanse** probleemjongeren, en het tegengaan van **de** islamisering.”
(NRC, 02 April 2010, emphasis added)

Here, it is remarkable that whereas in the German media, the Turkish adolescents were marked as problematic and were the folk devils, in the Netherlands the focus lies on the Moroccan youth. Moreover, the nominal presupposition of ‘the Islamisation’ results in the impression that Islamisation is a process of which the presence is proven and as that results in the increase of the perception of a threat, hostility increases as well.

War allusions

Besides, an article about the book of Member of Parliament for the PVV, Martin Bosma, can also be considered to have fostered hostility towards Muslims. Also in this part, war language is used:

“Arabist Jansen: ‘D-day’ bereikt in strijd tegen islamisering” (NRC, 29 September 2010)

According to Jansen, the D-day has arrived because of the government agreement between PVV, CDA and VVD. To this allusion to the arrival of the Americans in France during the Second World War, the Arabist Jansen adds that still there will be conflict maybe even with ‘rivers of blood’. Hence, he regards the PVV and its representatives as strong and saving force as the Americans have been against the Nazi-regime and ‘the Islamisation’ as a movement like fascism that has to be fought if necessary with force and weapons.

Moreover, the author of the book, Bosma, predicts that at the end of the 21st century the grandchildren of Dutchmen would have emigrated to Australia because Tom Hanks would have stayed home this time. Here he alludes to the American movie ‘Saving private Ryan’ in which the arrival of the Americans in the Normandy in 1944 is dealt with. Hence, again an allusion to D-day and war is applied. The necessity of war against ‘the Islamisation’ which is emphasized by these allusions and the reference to the Second World War leads consequently to an increased feeling of threat and hence to hostility towards the ‘war-time enemies’.

To sum up, in the NRC Moroccans are presented as the Muslim folk devils and nominal presuppositions are used in order to indicate the realness of Islamisation. Moreover, by making quite explicit connections between Islamisation and fascism, the alleged Islamisation is related to the darkest chapter of the 20th century of Europe and this results in the perception of a threat to the existence of the Dutch society and thus hostility.

Telegraaf: supporting hostility towards Muslims and Islam

In an article published by the Telegraaf it is reported on a conversation with Wilders about a new book the politician planned to published. In this article, Wilders is quoted saying that though this book is intended for the American market, it is also supposed to be an international sign for the Arabic world that the PVV is fighting back (Telegraaf, 31 December 2010). Next to the framing inherent in ‘the Arabic world’ as probably opposed to ‘the West’, the statement that it is fought back includes the implication that ‘the Arabic world’ is fighting against ‘the West’. Hence, not only the separation into groups is supported but also the impression that there is an active fight in which the PVV takes the role of the saviour of ‘the West’. This emphasis on the good characteristics of ‘us’ and the bad ones of ‘them’ (framing) is typical for creating hostility.

Furthermore, also nationally Wilders is very active. Thus, in another conversation with the Telegraaf he refers to the ‘Moroccan street-terrorism’ in Amsterdam as well as the moral agenda of ‘the Islam’ that is among others supposed to be dominated by the oppression of women and honour killings (Telegraaf, 25 March 2010). Primarily it can be noted again, that by calling ‘street-terrorism’ a Moroccan activity, this group is denoted as criminals and terrorists. Moreover, since Wilders connects this to the Islamic religion, they are also presented to be

Islamists. Next to this, speaking of a ‘moral agenda of the Islam’ suggests that ‘the Islam’ has a plan laid out to conquer the Netherlands. Since this results in fear for the own values and even for safety (‘terrorism’), hostility is the response.

As well as it has been done in Germany by Seehofer, Wilders requests the restriction of any further immigration from Muslim countries due to the violence, intimidation and delinquency that are characteristic of Muslims and especially Moroccans (Telegraaf, 01 March 2010). Hence, these features are connected to the Islamic religion (predicational strategy) which, hence, leads to a negative generalisation and with that exclusion and dichotomization.

In another article with the title “Hero Brinkman: Jullie zijn hier te gast (*gast = tijdelijk*)” a PVV follower clears up with the confusion of definitions of Islam (Telegraaf, 29 May 2010). He states that ‘the Islam’ had no fundamentalist or moderate identity and that therefore there was no room in NL for it. ‘The Islam is the Islam.’ This means that there are also no ‘moderate’ or usual Muslims but only those who threaten the Dutch values. Hence, according to this definition the Dutch people have to beware of all Muslims. Moreover, the referential strategy in the title in which the immigrants are called guests denies Muslims the possibility of becoming full members of the Dutch society.

Besides, also how it is reported on the “allochtonenstop” that the PVV wanted to implement for amateur soccer clubs in The Hague, contributes to hostility towards Muslims. The author writes:

“Volgens de partij loopt het college weg voor de gevolgen van de massa-immigratie en daarmee gepaarde islamisering van het Haagse amateurvoetbal.” (Telegraaf, 21 October 2010)

Thus, next to the neologism “massa-immigratie”, a connection is made between immigration and Islamisation. Hence, it is suggested that immigrants are Islamists who cause all kinds of problems as illustrated by those of the amateur soccer clubs.

Finally, there is one more example of how hostility is created. Regarding the arrest of several suspected terrorists Wilders calls for a relentless approach towards “islamterrorisme” (Telegraaf, 25 December 2010). Here, the neologism has a framing as well as a predicational effect since terrorism is presented to be based on Islam and thus all Muslims become possible suspects.

From these examples it can be concluded that framing in form of contrasting ‘the Islamic world’ with ‘the West’ and predicational strategies assigning negative characteristics to Moroccans and Muslims are the most frequently used methods for reproducing hostility in the Telegraaf. The most important actor is Geert Wilders.

Hostility towards Muslims and Islam: Conclusion for both newspapers

From the findings derived from both newspapers, it can be followed that in the Netherlands, Moroccans are the Muslim folk devils. This is underlined in both newspapers by assigning different negative characteristics to them.

Besides, in the NRC use of lexical allusions to war are made which regarding the content results in the connection of Islamisation with fascism.

Moreover, by assigning Muslim immigrants the status of guests, they are denied full membership of Dutch society.

In this part, the dominance reproducing elite consists of the representatives of the PVV.

However, also for the criterion of hostility many examples from the NRC in which hostility towards Muslims and Islam is discouraged have been found and analyzed. Those are very strong and thus once again, it cannot be stated hostility towards Muslims and Islam has been reproduced significantly more than it has been discouraged.

Consensus about the threat posed by Muslims and Islam

The following characteristic in moral panics theory is consensus. Considering the newspaper articles it has to be stated that the perspectives given in both of the newspapers are so diversified that it could be argued for as well as against the reproduction of consensus equally well.

The figures presented by the study of Pollack (2010) give a better indication. Thus, the researcher found out that 35,9% of the Dutch population have a negative attitude towards Muslims. Even more important is what comes to people's minds when they think of Islam. 80,2,% of the respondents thinks of gender inequality and 73,7% think of fanaticism. 66,6% connect Islam to inclination towards violence while only 26,3% relates it to respect for human rights. Hence, 36,4% support the statement that the religious rights of Islam should be restricted and only 32% think that 'the Islam' can fit into 'our Western world'.⁶

Taking these figures into account, it can be assumed that there is a quite high consensus that Muslims possibly pose a threat to the Dutch society. This has also been indicated by the results of all recent election in the Netherlands in which the anti-Islam party PVV gained increasingly more votes.

Disproportionality of the concern towards Muslims and Islam

There have been no articles that related to this characteristic of moral panics. Anyhow, it can be referred to the third indicator of disproportionality: more attention is paid to one subject even though another subject poses a similar or even greater threat. The cooperation of the minority government with the PVV has resulted in immigration being the most important aspect of the coalition agreement, being the first and longest chapter of the report even though other matters such as the stability of the Euro should be much more important. However, finances are only shortly discussed on the last page of the agreement.

⁶ See Annex A and B

Moreover, the PVV's claim that by 2030, the Netherlands will be overrun by migrants from non-western countries is disproportional as well.⁷ As the Statistical Office of the Netherlands (CBS) predicts, the immigration from countries such as Morocco will have a small increase of 900 people while the immigration from Turkey will even decrease about 290 people in 2055 to 2059 (CBS, 2010).

Volatility of Islamophobia

As also with the same moral panics criterion for Germany, it can be drawn on the figures of EURISLAM. It has been found out that after the dominance of mainly negative claims towards Muslims between the end of 2001 to 2007, the positions towards Muslims are becoming more positive again (EURISLAM, 2010:32). Anyhow, before 2001, the positions have been even more positive.

However, in order to assess the criterion more thoroughly a study of Islamophobia over a period of time would have to be conducted.

4.2.3. Conclusion

Considering the preceding analysis regarding Islamophobia as a moral panic in the Netherlands, it is significant to note the diversity of results. Whereas there have indeed been articles which had elements pointing towards a reproduction of Islamophobia, most of these were quotations in the text and not the article itself. However, there have been numerous articles that have criticized the strategies of Islam criticism used by the PVV and its representatives who have been the most important actors concerning Islamophobia in 2010.

Therefore, it has to be concluded that even though a moral panic might exist in the population, this has not been significantly supported by the analyzed newspapers. Hence, that means that social inequality has not extensively been supported by the discourse. It follows with regard to the hypothesis that even though Muslims and Islam are considered to be a social problem, Islamophobia in the Netherlands is not a moral panic and relatively seen the language in the newspaper articles has not had a significant reproducing effect on Islamophobia as social reality.

Anyhow, it has to be noted that in terms of access Muslims were barely represented which points to a limited access to the discourse as it has also already been found out for Germany. Thus, a dominance can still be easily executed over the population as long as there are not too many opponents in the own group.

4.3. Similarities and Differences in the debates in Germany and the Netherlands

Thus, to what extent has the reporting of the two German newspapers been different from the reporting of the two Dutch newspapers? Moreover, to what extent did similarities exist? In

⁷ See Annex C

fact, the answers to both questions are quite straight-forward. It is be looked at use of language, actors and topics/requests of actors.

Starting with the similarities, it can first be pointed to similar neologisms that have been created in both countries. Hence, for example, in Dutch articles it is spoken of “islamlijfhebber(s)” (NRC, 06 November 2010) while in German texts those people are defined as “Islamfreund(e)” (FAZ, 10 October 2010). Moreover, in both countries it is spoken of ‘migrantchildren’. Thereby in both countries the children are denied the national identity of the host country no matter which citizenship status they have.

Most interesting considering language is however the reliance in both countries on ‘Christian-Judaic’ traditions and values. In a Dutch article the objection of some CDA-members to cooperate with the PVV is discussed by referring to the earlier agreement of those CDA-members with former Prime Minister Balkenende’s excluding and framing reference to Christian-Judaic values (Telegraaf, 01 September 2010). Thus, regarding this in relation with the numerous examples of the same rhetoric in the German media it can be said that in both countries it seems to have been tried to mobilize Judaism at the side of Christianity against Islam.

Furthermore, in both countries extensive framing has been used in order to marginalize Muslims or legitimize negative attitudes towards them. Additionally, frequently the text schema of argumentation was used in order to implicitly communicate sets of beliefs and attitudes. Considering the contextual elements of discourse, it can be noted that in both countries Muslims seem to only have limited access to the newspaper discourse.

Next, concerning the actors, differences can be observed. In the Netherlands the PVV is very dominant and most concern- or hostility-supporting statements can be related to this party or people who have close relations to it. In Germany, claims are stated by members of different parties and in the newspapers more comments of other actors such as clergy men or writers were included.

Concerning topics and requests several similarities as well as differences can be observed. In both countries the authors and other actors could not agree on whether ‘the Islam’ is a ‘moderate’ religion or a political ideology. However, in both countries Islam-critics warned of the introduction of the Sharia and the Islamisation of the country. Also headscarves and burqas were discussed in all four newspapers.

Interestingly, however, the typical folk devils in the two countries are different. Whereas in Germany it is always referred to ‘the Turkish migrants’ and Muslims are also automatically assumed to be Turkish, the same is done in the Netherlands with Moroccans even though there are seemingly more Turkish people in the Netherlands than people from Morocco.⁸

Moreover, the request for not allowing anymore immigration from Muslim countries has been made in both countries. Anyhow, in the Netherlands, the PVV goes much further than any actor in Germany by suggesting ‘stadscommando’s’.

⁸ Annex D

Besides, in Germany the *Leitkultur* debate is very prominent. Even though the concept is never defined except for its foundation being Christian-Judaic values, no politician dares to deny the necessity of a *Leitkultur*. No equivalent to this part of the debate has been found in the Dutch articles. Relating to this is the negative reactions that have followed Wulff's speech at the German Unification Day. This reminds of the criticism former minister Vogelaar got for predicting in 2007 that eventually one would speak of a 'Judaic-Christian-Muslim tradition' in the Netherlands (NOS, 14 July 2007).

The most important difference, however, is the fact that concerning the Netherlands the hypothesis had to be rejected whereas for Germany it could be accepted. This was due to far more critical articles published by the Dutch newspapers.

All in all, the debates are quite similar even though in the Netherlands it seems less hysteric which is probably due to the longer period of time in which it has been dealt with this. Moreover, it stands out that there was far less material for the Netherlands than for Germany. Again, this might be related to the greater acceptance of the debate in the Netherlands.

5. Conclusion

The answers that have been found to the research question are quite complex. Recall that the research question was:

How has Islamophobia been (re)produced by the use of language in internet newspaper articles in Germany and the Netherlands in 2010 and what are the similarities and differences of the two discourses?

In order to answer it, different aspects have been analyzed in terms of the theoretical concepts and by applying the method of Critical Discourse Analysis in 68 newspaper articles. For summarizing the answer both parts of the research question have to be answered together.

First, a lot of evidence has been found that supports the hypothesis that Islamophobia has been reproduced by the language used in the newspaper articles in Germany. For this, numerous examples have been used that point towards the production of racial inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Mainly, this dominance has been exerted by the political elite whose (Islamophobe) statements have been reproduced by the media. However, also members of the clergy, individuals as Thilo Sarrazin or feminists as well as Muslims as Necla Kelek have used language that aimed at reproducing the separation of 'us' (the non-Muslims) and 'them' (the Muslims) by fostering suspicion and announcing the existence of a threat.

In terms of the theories that have been established it can thus be concluded that in Germany, Islamophobia indicates a social problem and that it can also be interpreted as a moral panic. Since a lot of evidence for the dominance of the elites has been found in the newspaper discourse, it can thus be said that Islamophobia has been reproduced by the language used in German newspaper articles. This means that for Germany the hypothesis has been accepted.

This is different for the Netherlands. In this part of the analysis it has been found out that more pro-Islam and pro-social equality strategies are applied. Hence, the articles in which power is tried to be used for legitimizing restrictive measures against Muslims mostly draw extensively on statements of the PVV and its leader Wilders. The others openly criticize the exaggerated Islam criticism of the right-wing party.

Consequently, in terms of the theories it can be concluded that Islamophobia cannot be interpreted as a moral panic that has been reproduced by the language of the Dutch newspaper articles, even though it has been established that Muslims and their religion are perceived as a social problem. Thus, regarding the national political developments in the Netherlands, this social problem has been enough to motivate the population to vote for the PVV so that it became the third biggest party of the national elections in 2010. However, of course, it has to be noted that there might still exist a moral panic in the population that has merely not been reproduced by the analyzed internet versions of the newspapers. Anyhow, because of the nature of discourse which at the same time reflects social reality as well as actively reproduces it, this does not seem likely.

Thus, the biggest difference between the discourses in the Netherlands and Germany is the fact that in Germany the internet newspapers do reproduce Islamophobia as a moral panic, whereas in the Netherlands this is not the case. Next to this important difference, the most interesting similarity has been found is the referral to the 'Christian-Judaic traditions' as well as addition of politicians that nowadays there were 'Christian-Judaic-Muslim traditions' and the uproar that followed these statements in both countries.

Moreover, in the German debate it was noticeable that citizenship is still a normative concept that in the mind of the people is still related to the *ius sanguinis* principle which means that migrants even though they might have the German citizenship are always labelled as migrants.

This has been less obvious in the Dutch articles, which is related to the history of different immigration policies and the missing *ius sanguinis* principle.

The theoretical implication of the findings of this study is that Critical Discourse Analysis informed by the theories of social constructionism and moral panics is very useful for analyzing the reproduction and reinforcement of dominance over religious minorities. Many of the articles have used argumentation schemata and implications as well as presuppositions of which the reader is most probably not aware. Therefore, in order to be able to change this dominance that reproduces and legitimizes cultural racism, the reader has to become aware of the elites' strategies. Only then he can recognize the discursive strategies with which power is reproduced. However, since it has been argued that the elites are interest groups that made use of an already existing concern in the society regarding Muslims and Islam, the reasons for this underlying concern do also have to be analyzed.

This relates to how the findings of this thesis relate to study results of others. Especially Schiffer (2005 & 2007) has been involved in studies exposing the discursive strategies that result in cultural racism towards Muslims. Besides, the studies of Pollack (2010) and the FES increase

the awareness of the problem. As Pollack has found out (2010) the more contact people have with Muslims, the more positive they are about them. Hence, framing and marginalization cannot solve any problems between Muslims and non-Muslims.

What should be the implication of the results of this analysis for national as well as EU governance? Since in both countries members of the government are strongly involved in the reproduction and reinforcement of Islamophobia, it is unlikely that any change can be expected on national level in the short term. Moreover, considering that this development is not only taking place in the Netherlands and Germany but also in many other countries such as Denmark, France and Austria, the same difficulty namely that the ‘cognitive power elites’ also have the political power diminishes the hope for change.


Up to now, no other research has given such a detailed description of Islamophobe discursive strategies in newspaper articles. According to Pollack’s research results, German people are the most hostile towards Muslims in comparison with the Netherlands and the three other European countries that were part of the study. Thus, this research might have been a first step towards an explanation of Pollack’s findings. The result that in the Netherlands no moral panic has been reproduced by means of the newspaper discourse even though in Germany this has been the case, relates to Pollack’s research results. This could among others be caused by the more institutionalized criticism that is applied concerning Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands. Consequently, for further research on Islamophobia the relation between the range of Islamophobia and the extent of institutionalization of the problem in different countries could be studied.

6. Annex

Annex A

Exzellenzcluster „Religion und Politik“


> Negative Haltungen gegenüber Muslimen, Hinduisten, Buddhisten und Juden




Frage: Wie ist Ihre persönliche Haltung zu den Mitgliedern folgender religiöser Gruppen? (Antwort „eher“ bzw. „sehr negativ“ in Prozent)

Exzellenzcluster „Religion und Politik“

> Religiöse Rechte




Zustimmung in Prozent




(Pollack, 2010)

Annex B



› Woran denken Sie beim Stichwort Islam?




(Pollack, 2010)

Annex C


Niet-westerse allochtonen 2030

prognose, per gemeente

Percentage van de bevolking



— provincies




Bron: PBL/CBS

www.zorgatlas.nl

(PVV, 2011)

Annex D



(CBS, 2007)

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