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Master Thesis

Voice, loyalty or exit:
Anti-partyism and the vote in Denmark, Norway and New Zealand

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"Il y a moins de différence entre deux députés dont l'un est révolutionnaire et l'autre ne l'est pas, qu'entre deux révolutionnaires, dont l'un est député et l'autre ne l'est pas"

- ROBERT DE JOUVENEL, *La République des Camarades,* part 1, (1914).

1. Introduction

The well-known political scientist E.E. Schattsneider (1942) once wrote that 'modern democracy is unthinkable save in the hands of political parties.' Today, many political scientists would agree with the vision that political parties are important ingredients to modern representative democracy. Although political parties are increasingly flanked by single issue organisations, political interest groups and other voluntary organizations (Kaase 1990; Lawson & Merkel 1988), they do still form the primary link between citizens and their governments. By contesting for parliamentary power in general elections, which are still at the core of modern parliamentary democracy, political parties perform an essential representational function and have unequalled opportunities to set the political agenda and influence political decision-making processes. It would therefore be safe to say that "as long as Western political systems are based on parliaments as the central arenas for legislation, parties are bound to play a major role" (Poguntke 1996, p. 321). Results from large scale survey projects have confirmed that such a view also finds acceptance within the mass publics of modern Western democracies (Dennis & Owen 2001; Dalton & Weldon 2005). For example, Dalton and Weldon (2005) found that approximately three-quarters of the public in the 13 democracies they studied said to believe that parties are necessary for the functioning of democracy.[1] At the same time, however, recent research has shown that citizens across Western democracies have grown increasingly disenchanted with political parties (Webb 2002, Dalton & Wattenberg 2000, Dalton & Weldon 2005) and with the institutions of representative democracy in general (Norris 1999, Pharr & Putnam 2000, Dalton 2004). Irrespective of the causal direction between both sentiments, that is the question whether anti-party sentiments should be seen as a consequence of a broader disenchantment with representative politics (Bardi 1996), or as a factor in itself that should be viewed as an explanation for disaffection with the political process in general (Miller & Listhaug 1990, Dennis & Owen 2001), it is clear that political parties, at least in the minds of citizens, still play a central role in most modern representative democracies. Therefore, growing popular disillusionment with party politics, or *Parteinverdrossenheit* (Rattinger 1993), might have major consequences for the functioning of the democratic process.

At the same time, however, we still do not know a great deal about what the behavioural implications of mass anti-party sentiments are. Indeed, only a few studies aimed at systematically testing the political consequences of anti-party sentiments have hitherto been conducted. Among the most frequently mentioned consequences of these negative sentiments are declining levels of party membership (Scarrow 2000), low levels of electoral turnout (Wattenberg 2003, Franklin 2004), and declining levels of party-identification (Dalton 2000). The recent upsurge of protest or anti-establishment parties in many Western democracies, however, has urged political scholars to ask whether support for these parties should be added to the list of consequences of citizens' growing disillusionment with established political parties and politics in general (Gidengil *et al.* 2001, Lubbers & Scheepers 2000, Lubbers *et al*. 2000, Belanger 2004, Dalton & Weldon 2005). There is indeed a

growing body of evidence purporting that among voters of anti-establishment parties, of which some have achieved reasonable electoral successes during the last few decades, anti-party sentiments are more widespread than among supporters of established and more mainstream political parties (Kitschelt & McGann 1995, Lubbers & Scheepers 2000, Gidengil *et al*. 2001, Betz & Immerfall 1998).

Without wanting to state the obvious, protest parties or 'anti-party parties' are inimical to the political regime (i.e. anti-system), and seek to mobilize electoral support on the basis of popular attitudes of political distrust and cynicism. They attack the established political parties and party-based institutions by employing a rhetoric of anti-party populism, which is generally based on hostile attitudes towards the role, function, or performance of political parties (Poguntke and Scarrow 1996; Taggert 2000).

Despite the ostensible simplicity of such a definition of protest parties, the literature about anti-party parties and protest voting is not without its own ambiguities. An important case in point is the recurring debate about the possible endogeneity within the relationship between mass feelings of political discontent and protest party success. Scholars of anti-party politics do generally not agree on the causal direction between feelings of political resentment at the mass level and protest party success. Indeed, one popular type of argument departs from pre-existing feelings of political cynicism and distrust within the mass electorate, possibly reflecting real dysfunctions of political parties, and contends that these feelings are subsequently exploited by populist anti-party leaders in order to gain electoral successes. By doing so, protest parties might play an important representational function by giving disgruntled voters a means of having their voices heard within the electoral arena. At the other hand there is the possibility that popular resentment might actually be amplified and fuelled by protest party leaders, as such a strategy might be favourable to their party's success (Scarrow 1996; Van der Brug 2003). In the absence of panel data, disentangling this causal problem is virtually impossible, as cross-national survey data are usually only gathered after the election event. Therefore, in these surveys, measures of voters' cynicism as well as their acclaimed ideological proximity to protest parties might readily be a function of their vote for such a party, rather than being an exogenous variable explaining an anti-party vote. As for the analyses in this paper use is made of post-election cross-national survey data; we will not delve any deeper into the causal direction between anti-party sentiments and anti-party support. Instead I suffice here with noting that in a recent study of LPF support in the Netherlands, Belanger and Aarts (2006) have demonstrated, by using panel data, that as far as the party profited from cynical feelings within the electorate, these feelings were already present within the electorate, before the LPF entered the political scene prior to the turbulent parliamentary elections of 2002. The authors therefore concluded that "while discontent attitudes are not impervious to change, there exists an important factor of exogeneity within them" (Belanger and Aarts 2006, p. 16). For these parties then, popular feelings of discontent with the existing arrangements of party politics and criticism of the established parties should be seen as an important source behind their success.

A second issue that deserves some attention here concerns the apparent fluidity and generally short-lived electoral successes of anti-political establishment movements. Indeed, with very few exceptions, protest parties have not shown to be enduring political phenomena in most contemporary representative democracies. Part of the reason for this, it has been suggested, is that populism faces a set of dilemmas within it that actually makes it self-limiting (Taggert 2000). The argument here is that the appeal of protest movements is primarily based on their critique of politics as usual and their disgust of the institutions identified with modern representative party government. However, in order to gain support and exploitable opportunities to actually change the

processes to which they agitate, populist parties are readily forced to adopt the form of party which they criticize. Aptly stated, these parties face 'a quintessential dilemma; How to be an effective party at the same time as being an anti-party?' (Taggert 1995, p. 39).

As important as the above mentioned points are to the study of anti-party politics, this paper is not concerned with unravelling the causal ambiguities between mass anti-party sentiments and anti-party success, nor is it with explaining the life expectancy of these parties. The important point is, however, that popular feelings of resentment and dissatisfaction with political parties can apparently, at least in the short run, have important consequences for voters' decisions at election time. Indeed, while we should be aware of both the possible transience of the phenomena we are studying, as well as of the ambiguity that surrounds the status of anti-party feelings as a concept that is exogenous to the success of anti-party parties, we are still in a position to examine the effects of anti-partyism on vote choice at *the individual level*. This paper therefore focuses on the effects of anti-party sentiments on individual level voting behaviour (i.e. the demand side of politics), rather than on system characteristics or on anti-party success as such (i.e. the supply side of politics). This means that the results in this paper tell us something about the electoral behaviour of voters, within a *given* party-political context. Most notably, in this paper, the presence of an anti-party party at the national level is assumed rather than explained and therefore the findings and conclusions reported here cannot readily be extended to countries that lack the presence of an anti-party party within their party system.

The main argument in this paper elaborates on the notion that during election time, in political systems in which an anti-party alternative is present, voters have roughly three options. One way for voters to express their disillusionment with party politics is simply by not going to the polls. This is however not the only option available to them, as voters might also choose to "Vote for a party that vows to do politics differently or, …, for one of the traditional alternatives in the hope that its behaviour will change" (Gidengil *et al*, 2001, p. 494). To accentuate this argument, some scholars have drawn an analogy with the three behavioural categories in the work of Hirschman (1970): *voice, loyalty and exit*. Given election time, voters might choose to 'voice' their grievances by voting for a protest party, they might choose to stay 'loyal' to one of the established political parties - especially those in opposition - in the hope that things will get better, or they might decide to 'exit' electoral politics altogether by not voting at all.[2] The individual-level dynamics underlying these choices, however; the motivations of voters to prefer one behavioural alternative over the other, are hardly known and surprisingly little research attention has been given to them (Gidengil *et al*. 2001, Belanger 2004, Dalton & Weldon 2005, see also Hetherington 1999). It is therefore that this paper addresses the following question: Why do some voters choose to vote for a protest or anti-party party, while others abstain from voting and again others choose to vote for an established political party?

Previous studies that have focused on this question have been limited to either one or few countries; Canada (Gidengil *et al*. 2001), Canada, Britain and Australia (Belanger 2004), all of which have a Westminster-type of parliamentary system with two dominant major parties alternating in office for most of the past century. At the same time, where more countries have been studied (Dalton & Weldon 2005), no attempts have been made to model the choice between the three behavioural alternatives of voice, loyalty and exit, within a multivariate framework that takes into consideration those factors other than anti-partyism that have previously shown to be able to account for electoral

abstention, protest-voting or loyalty towards one of the traditional political parties. The one-sided attention to the electoral effects of anti-partyism in two party systems raises the question whether the findings do actually extend to countries with a multi-party system.[3] This study therefore aims at expanding the empirical evidence to a wider number of countries in which voters make their electoral choices within a multi-party context. To identify the effects of anti-partyism on vote choice and abstention, multinomial logit estimates are performed using individual level survey data from Denmark, Norway and New Zealand. These three countries have all witnessed the emergence of an anti-party party in recent decades. These are the *Danish People's party* in Denmark, the *Anders Lange's party/Progress party* in Norway, and *New Zealand First* in New Zealand. These three parties have all proven to be electorally successful at the national level within a system of proportional representation. Since the 'voice, loyalty and exit model' that was presented above has never been tested in a multi-party system with proportional representation, the three countries offer an interesting case for an inquiry into the electoral consequences of anti-partyism in a multi-party context.

2. The meaning and measurement of anti-party sentiments

2.1 Theoretical objections towards political parties.

In all respects, mass level anti-party sentiment is an elusive concept. It is hard to pin down its exact meaning and it is also difficult to assess where it originates from. For one part this is due to a lack of theoretical clarity about the conceptual meaning of 'anti-partyism', and for another part this is due to a lack of satisfying indicators that might adequately tap the concept of anti-party sentiment. The theoretical debate about the role and desirability of political parties in representative politics is however a longstanding one and goes as far back as the works of political philosophers like Jean Jacques Rousseau and the constitutional republicanism of James Madison.

In democratic theory, largely two broad theoretical paradigms that view political parties as either bad or irrelevant can be discerned. In line with the Rousseauian tradition of political theory, there might be something as what Hans Daalder calls the *denial of party* – "the persistent body of thought which denies a legitimate role for party and sees parties as a threat to the good society" (Daalder 1992, pp. 269-70). Rousseau, in his major political works; *Émile* ([1762]/1978) and *Social Contract* ([1762]/1969), shows an unwillingness to separate free individuals form the process of government, and aims to devise a form of authority to which people can be subject without losing their freedom (Heywood 2004). According to Rousseau, this could only be achieved when citizens do participate themselves directly and continuously in political decision making processes. If one indeed believes that freedom does consist in political participation, then one is almost obliged to accept the view that political parties, as intermediaries between citizens and the state, do actually curtail that very freedom. A similar concern with individual freedom finds its way in the fear of factions and political parties that can be found in the political writings of James Madison, fourth president of the United States of America and important contributor to *The Federalist Papers* (1787-8) during the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787.

Yet another strand of theoretical arguments does not so much see political parties as intrinsically bad to society, but rather contends that "parties are becoming increasingly irrelevant in democratic politics, as other actors and institutions have taken over the major functions which parties once played". This is what Daalder calls the *redundancy of party* (Daalder 1992, p. 269-70).

The growing empirical evidence that people in Western representative democracies have become increasingly disenchanted with political parties (Webb 2002; Dalton & Wattenberg 2002) and that "distrust of political parties is spreading across these nations" (Dalton & Weldon 2005, p. 932), suggests that the debate about the role and functioning of political parties has anything but antiquated. Both theoretical paradigms seem to be of current relevance, as they might be intertwined with contemporary developments in society and politics that may strengthen the believe that political parties are malfunctioning, irrelevant or intrinsically bad elements in representative democratic systems. It is therefore that we will now concentrate on the concept of 'anti-partyism' and how contemporary political scholars have tried to tackle its meaning and empirical correlates.

2.2. Measuring anti-party sentiments.

According to Poguntke and Scarrow (1996, p. 127), "Anti-party sentiment is disaffection with or even rejection of political parties." As simple as this definition might seem, scholars of political science do not agree on the extent to which contemporary publics do indeed carry negative feelings towards their political parties or party politics in general. Usually, the empirical evidence is not unambiguous enough to warrant firm conclusions about the existence and radicalism of popular (anti-)party-sentiments among Western mass publics. For example, after a survey of longitudinal data for 13 Western democracies between 1960 and the early 1990s, Poguntke concludes: "The data I have analysed do not support generalizations about a broad decline of parties and the rise of anti-party sentiment in Western democracies" (Poguntke 1996, p. 338). However, almost a decade later, Dalton and Weldon conclude that: "Sentiments are broadly negative, and this pessimism has deepened over the past generation" (Dalton & Weldon 2005, p. 931).

It seems that much of where one ends depends on how one defines anti-partyism and especially on the indicators that one uses to measure its existence among the mass publics of Western democracies. As direct attitudinal evidence on how citizens actually think about political parties is generally lacking, researchers have frequently been urged to resort to a range of indicators that might at best be seen as indirect evidence of citizens' anti-party sentiments. For example, Poguntke (1996) has listed a range of indicators that might tap anti-partyism: declining levels of electoral turnout, partisan erosion or the decline of psychological commitments to political parties, the growth of 'hesitancy' in the electorate, declining party membership, party organizational decline and the growth of 'anti-party parties'. It is however important to keep in mind that such indirect indicators are only possible correlates of anti-party sentiments, but that they are not the sentiments themselves. Indeed, in proclaiming that "these indicators *could* be interpreted as *partially* tapping anti-party sentiment", Poguntke shows himself aware of the fragility of these indicators as measures of mass anti-party sentiment.

The most important argument that can be levelled against the use of these indirect indicators of mass-anti-party sentiments is that they measure possible behavioural *consequences* of mass anti-party feelings, which could equally well be the result of different societal or political processes than the steady growth of anti-party feelings in Western electorates. For instance, ideological convergence between the major political parties might result in declining levels of turnout, growing voter hesitancy and evaporating partisan ties. After all, if all political parties are perceived to be alike, why then should one make the effort to vote? Why and on what grounds should one choose between one party and another? And why should one identify with one particular party, rather than with one of the others? As ideological convergence might also be a key factor in explaining anti-party sentiment (Webb 1996), choosing between whether either one of these indicators can serve as an indicator of anti-partyism, or rather is a reflection of a related political phenomenon, becomes a touchy subject.

Therefore, a more fruitful approach to the study of anti-partyism, especially for studies directed at unravelling the electoral correlates and consequences of anti-partyism, should find its departure in direct attitudinal measures of anti-party feelings within the mass electorate as measured trough individual-level survey research instruments. This approach is adopted in this paper.

2.3. Specific and generalized anti-partyism.

In addition to the ambiguity surrounding the use of aggregate-level conditions as indicators of popular anti-party sentiments, the literature on anti-partyism is also divided about the object and radicalism of popular anti-party feelings. Are signs of anti-partyism just a result of citizens' disillusionment with the established, traditional major party alternatives? Or are Western mass publics dissatisfied with political parties in general, that is, with political parties as institutions for representing their interests and the system of party-politics itself?

In the anti-party literature, this last distinction, usually referred to as the distinction between specific and generalized anti-party sentiments, is generally acknowledged to be of theoretical importance. As Thomas Poguntke states: "Although it will be, in most cases, impossible to distinguish empirically between specific and generalized anti-party sentiment, the conceptual distinction is nevertheless important for the evaluation of empirical results" (Poguntke 1996, p. 324). Indeed, while specific anti-party sentiments are still reasonably moderate in that they do not deny the role of political parties in contemporary democratic governance; generalized anti-party sentiments are far more radical, since they might stem from the view that political parties are either bad or irrelevant. More precisely then, specific anti-party sentiments refer to disenchantment with the traditional major-party alternatives, those parties that traditionally control government, while generalized anti-partyism is more radical and shifts the object of dissatisfaction to party politics and political parties as elements of the representative democratic system *per se* (Poguntke 1996, p. 324). As such, both kinds of sentiments could also be interpreted in the light of the theoretical framework of David Easton (1965, 1975), because specific anti-party sentiments, the evaluative beliefs about established political parties, bear some resemblance to his concept of specific support, while generalized anti-partyism could be interpreted as a variant of diffuse political support.

Specific anti-party sentiments then are most closely tied to major-party failure. Obviously, if citizens come to believe that their interests and demands are not properly considered or managed by the major political parties, popular resentment will likely be the result (Owen & Dennis 2001). Previous research has shown that citizens' feelings towards political parties are for a large part the result of their representational experiences with political parties and their assessment of the economic conditions in their country (Belanger 2004, Gidengil *et al*. 2001). Failed issue representation, the believe that one's policy interests are not properly represented by neither of the political parties, and issue alienation from the incumbent party can both foster anti-party sentiments (Gidengil *et al*. 2001, see also Miller & Listhaug 1990). Also, issue alienation from the incumbent party or unhappiness with the performance of the incumbent party, might eventually spill over to disenchantment with political parties at large.

Party identification with the incumbent party is however believed to be associated with a less critical view towards established political parties and towards political parties in general (Gidengil et al 2001, p. 499). This is not to say that strong party identifiers do not hold negative feelings towards political parties. Indeed, even a strong sense of party identification may not render people immune to anti-party feelings (Owen & Dennis 1996). Webb (1996), in an extensive study on anti-party sentiments in the UK, also found that major party convergence, the perception that all political parties are basically the same and do not differ substantially on major political issues, and the weakening of the class-vote link, were important factors in explaining anti-party sentiments. He is however cautious to comment that something more is needed to render people actively hostile towards political parties: "While the erosion of the class cleavage makes political party attachments

less important for voters, it takes something more than this, such as the experience of unemployment or a particular sense of national economic decline, for voters to become actively disaffected with the major political parties" (Webb 1996, p. 377).

Indeed, anti-partyism is not completely issue driven as perceptions of economic decline and unemployment are also frequently identified as factors in explaining negative feelings towards political parties (Gidengil *et al*. 2001, Webb 1996). Except for unemployment and perceptions of economic decline, however, social background variables are generally found to have only a modest relationship with anti-partyism. Although Gidengil *et al.* (2001) found anti-party sentiments to be somewhat less prevalent among the better educated, the elderly and among citizens employed in the public sector, most evidence suggests that citizens' feelings towards political parties are for the most part the result of their perceptions of how political parties are doing in representing their interests and fostering national economic prosperity (Lewis-Beck 1988; Kinder and Kiewit 1979; 1981).

It should be noted here, however, that even if one accepts the usual indicators of anti-partyism as sufficient reliable measures of popular anti-party sentiment, and even if one accepts that anti-partyism shows significant correlates with the performance and representative functions of political parties; one is not necessarily compelled to see anti-partyism as a new phenomenon in Western representative democracies or as a factor in itself that might have an impact on democratic processes in these countries.

Some scholars, for example, have suggested that public scepticism about political parties should be seen as the normal state of affairs in Western democracies, rather than as a new development (e.g. Scarrow 1996). This statement is however rebutted by a multitude of longitudinal empirical studies that show that trust in political parties has actually plummeted in recent decades. For example, using National Election Study data from six European countries over a period from the early seventies to the mid-nineties, Dalton (2004, p. 29) found a substantial increase in the number of people who said that 'parties are only interested in votes, not in opinions', in five of the six countries (Austria, Britain, Finland, Norway and Sweden) under study, the only exception being The Netherlands. In addition, he found that levels of party identification had actually fallen in seventeen of the nineteen nations studied over roughly the same period of time (Dalton 2004, p.33).[4]

Another denial of the prominence of mass anti-party sentiments in Western democracies is posed by those who argue that it are not the political parties that are at the centre of the political malaise that strikes modern representative democracies. Indeed, some scholars contend that although parties might be important actors in current politics, dissatisfaction with their functioning is only a reflection of citizens' increasing dissatisfaction with governmental and non-governmental institutions in general, or with the political system at large (see. Miller & Listhaug 1990, Bardi 1996). Dalton & Weldon (2005, p. 935), however, using data from the Eurobarometer series (1997-2004), show evidence that citizens across all, at that time 15 member states of the EU, display significantly less trust in their political parties than in the 13 other governmental and non-governmental organisations that were included in the analysis. These findings therefore lend some support to the claim that mass anti-party sentiments in Western democracies are real. That citizens' evaluations of political parties and party-politics are at least partially independent of their evaluations of other governmental institutions or political processes at large, and that they should therefore be considered to have potential behavioural consequences on their own, such as non-voting or voting for anti-party parties. It is to these possible consequences that we will turn now.

3. The electoral consequences of anti-partyism

Given election time, in political systems in which an anti-party alternative is present, voters have roughly three options. They might choose to vote for one of the established political parties, they might choose to vote for a protest party, or they might choose to 'exit' electoral politics altogether by not voting at all. The obvious question that needs to be answered then is: Why do some voters choose to vote for a protest or anti-party party, while others abstain from voting and again others choose to vote for an established political party?

Previous research has identified a number of factors that might account for the choice of voters between either one of these behavioural options. To begin with, empirical work has shown that the theoretical distinction between generalized and specific anti-party sentiment is not trivial and that the behavioural consequences of both kinds of sentiments can be different, depending on the party-political context. Belanger (2004, p. 1054) in his study of third-party voting in Canada, Britain and Australia, found that in general, third parties benefit from specific anti-party sentiments within the mass public. As such, voting for a non-established political party might be one way for citizens to voice their discontent with the record of their established political parties. The rejection of party-politics *per se* however, was logically found to increase the likelihood of citizens to abstain from voting, unless there is a party alternative that is able to articulate these generalized anti-party sentiments and can use these sentiments to its advantage.

In the literature, these parties that adopt an antiparty rhetoric and strive to electorally mobilize peoples' dissatisfaction with party politics in general are frequently labelled as anti-party parties or protest parties (Ignazi 1996, Owen & Dennis 1996, Poguntke 1996, Taggert 2000). An exemplary case is the Canadian Reform Party that was found in the study of Gidengil *et al.* (2001) to be able to benefit from both specific and generalized anti-party sentiments in the 1997 Canadian Federal Election. Indeed, the authors found that: "As Canada's anti-party party, Reform tapped successfully into both the specific source of this anti-partyism *and* generalized antipathy toward political parties." (2001, p. 504).

For populist politicians, who usually claim that they are outside of the established political parties and are therefore averse to custom political practices, the existence of widespread anti-party feelings within the electorate might indeed provide them with a significant reservoir of political support. It should be noted here however, that mobilizing these feelings of political resentment should not necessarily be seen as inevitably detrimental to partisan politics. Indeed, in their capacity as protest movements, anti-party parties might actually play a vital role in maintaining the link between citizens and the state. Whereas disaffected voters would otherwise be compelled to reluctantly vote for one of the established political parties or to abandon electoral politics altogether, the presence of a protest party can provide them with an alternative means to voice their political discontent in a peaceful and democratic way, by 'channelling dissatisfaction back into the electoral arena' (Miller & Listhaug 1990, p. 363; Fisher 1974). Somewhat paradoxically then, anti-party parties might actually help to sustain the very legitimacy of the existing party system and the system of representative politics in general. At the same time, electoral behaviour that is inspired by anti-party feelings might give anti-party leaders a downright incentive to actually fuel these sentiments and to propagate anti-party arguments even more strongly, creating some sort of feedback effect (Poguntke & Scarrow 1996).

Regarding anti-partyism as a factor in explaining protest voting and abstention, the above discussion leads us to the following set of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: As specific anti-party sentiments increase, individuals will be more likely to vote for an anti-party party than to vote for an established political party.

Hypothesis 2: As generalized anti-party sentiments increase, individuals will be more likely to abstain from voting than to vote for an established political party.

Hypothesis 3: In choosing between abstention and voting for an anti-party alternative, specific anti-party sentiments will incite voters to choose for an anti-party alternative, rather than to abstain from voting.

Hypothesis 4: In choosing between abstention and voting for an anti-party alternative, generalized anti-party sentiments will incite voters to abstain from voting, rather than to vote for an anti-party alternative.

3.1. The policy vote argument.

Somewhere behind the very notion of an 'anti-party party' and 'anti-party voting' lays the implicit assumption that these parties primarily derive their electoral support from voters who are chiefly concerned with voicing their dissatisfaction with 'the' political establishment, rather than with substantive policy issues and influencing public policy. This 'protest vote' argument has gained a prominent place, especially in the literature dealing with popular support for anti-immigrant parties (Mayer and Perrineau 1992; Betz 1994; Swyngedouw 2001). In the relevant literature, protest votes are considered to be qualitatively different from ideological or policy votes. For example, Van der Brug and Fennema (2003, p. 58) define a protest vote as "*a vote primarily cast to scare the elite that is not policy driven*", and state that by this definition "protest voting only occurs when political attitudes are of minor importance". So, in their revolt against the political elite, disgruntled voters vote for a party that is not part of the political establishment, without necessarily ascribing to the by any chance radical ideological- and issue positions of these parties.

This view is rejected in the study of Van der Brug *et al.* (2001), and partly in the work of Van der Brug and Fennema (2003). In their study of electoral preferences for anti-immigrant parties, Van der Brug *et al.* (2001) concluded on the basis of 1994 survey data, that the votes for seven European anti-immigrant parties were based on the same ideological and policy considerations that apply to votes for other parties. As a result, the authors state that votes for these parties should be considered as normal (i.e. policy) votes. A replication of this study with 1999 data by Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) yielded largely the same results with respect to the *FPÖ* (Austria), *Alleanza Nazionale* (Italy), *Dansk Folkeparti* (Denmark) and the *Vlaams Blok* (Belgium). However, for the Italian *Lega Nord*, the German *Republikäner*, The French and Wallonian *Front National*, the Dutch *Centrumdemocraten* and the *Fremskridtpartiet* in Denmark, things turned out to be different. According to the authors, "these parties attracted more protest votes, or rather lost their ideological and pragmatic voters" (Van der Brug and Fennema 2003, p. 55).

These findings suggest that the constituency of these parties is likely to be composed of both non-ideological, pure protest voters and of policy-driven or pragmatic voters. To the extent that the precise distribution of both kinds of voters within the constituency of a party shifts to the former type of voters, labelling a party as an anti-party party becomes more appropriate. It is however imperative to recognize that the electoral successes of anti-party parties are likely to be at least also partly determined by their ability to adequately represent voters' ideological and policy considerations. Anti-establishment parties might, by politicising a hidden issue not represented previously by the established political parties, occupy an ideological niche of their own within the

political spectrum. Indeed, many scholars have pointed out that the success of 'radical populist parties', a term introduced by Ignazi (1992), lies in their ability to effectively combine feelings of anti-partyism with a clear new-right agenda (Ignazi 1992, Taggert 1995, Betz 1993, Betz and Immerfall 1998). According to Ignazi (1992), the rise of extreme-right wing parties in the 1980s provided a non-materialist answer to the post-materialist agenda of the New-left, thereby causing Inglehart's (1977) 'silent-revolution' to come 'full circle'. In this way, a new line of conflict emerged which places "culturally conservative, often xenophobic parties disproportionally supported by Materialists, against change-oriented parties, often emphasizing environmental protection, disproportionally supported by Post-Materialists" (Inglehart 1997, pp. 237-238).

Others have argued that the emphasis of populist right parties on salient issues as immigration and integration, signals a change in the meaning of the traditional cultural and left-right dimensions in Western European Party systems, being the expression of a fundamental conflict between groups of winners and losers in the process of 'globalization' (Kriesi *et al.* 2006). Besides reinforcing the traditional antagonism between pro-state and pro-market positions on the left-right dimension and giving it a more international character, it is in this view that a conflict between *integration* and *demarcation* is expected to lead to an 'ethnicization of politics', as the cultural dimensions is fuelled increasingly with new issues like European integration and immigration. Kriesi *et al.* (2006, p. 924) state that "the demarcation pole of the new cultural cleavage should be characterized by an opposition to the process of European integration and by restrictive positions with regard to immigration". Here then lies an important electoral opportunity for new political parties willing to articulate these viewpoints within the political system. Again, however, populist right parties occupying positions on the demarcation pole of the cultural dimension are also attributed anti-party characteristics, as the authors contend that the populist right is characterized by "xenophobia or even racism, expressed in fervent opposition to the presence of immigrants in Western Europe, and its populist appeal to widespread resentment against the mainstream political parties" (Kriesi *et al.* 2006, p. 928).

As a substantive issue or ideological rationale seems to lie below at least part of the vote for anti-party parties, an attempt to model the choice of voters who are willing to express their political discontent by either voting for an anti-party party or by abstaining from voting should ideally include some control measures for these policy positions. In the dataset used for this paper, however, voters' policy positions on the important issues of immigration and European integration are not available and as a result they cannot be incorporated in the analyses to be presented in the subsequent sections of this paper. The only, though admittedly far more abstract measure of voters' substantive political orientations we have available, is voters' position on the familiar left-right ideological continuum. Left-right orientations are customarily found to be one of the most important factors that determine vote choice. Also, citizens' ideological left-right orientations are commonly found to summarize a wider range of citizens' political orientations, for example orientations towards political parties, government performance, and also political issues. By structuring voters' political preferences, ideological orientations help to maintain the stability in people's political preferences and have, besides a direct effect, also an indirect effect on electoral behaviour. We will therefore in this paper use voters' left-right ideological orientations as a surrogate measure of their substantive policy interests.

Despite the severe criticism that has been levelled against the use of a unidimensional spatial dimension (i.e. the left-right ideological dimension) for representing the policy positions of political

parties and voters (Downs 1957), reference to voters' position on the left-right continuum in explaining support for anti-party parties does not seem to be totally unwarranted.

Indeed, some studies have demonstrated that, even though negative attitudes towards immigrants contribute significantly to their electoral success, it are especially voters' broader ideological beliefs that stand out as the more important factor in explaining votes for right-wing anti-party parties (Tillie and Fennema 1998; Kitschelt 1995; Van der Brug *et al.* 2000). Moreover, in the past few decades, a large number of studies across various European systems has convincingly demonstrated the perennial impact of left-right orientations on vote choice, as well as the capacity of the left-right dimension to structure the behaviour of parties and voters (e.g. Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994; Oppenhuis 1995; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996).

Also, some authors have pointed at the capacity of the left-right dimension to 'assimilate' a wider range of concrete policy issues than just economic policy-conflicts over the degree of government regulation of the economy, to which the dimension traditionally referred to. For instance, Mair (1997, p. 26) refers to the apparent flexibility and catch-all character" of the left-right dimension, while Inglehart (1984) approaches the left-right dimension as some sort of 'super-issue' that functions as a summary statement of positions on a wide range of issues that voters deem important (see also Beyme 1985; Smith 1989; Sani and Sartori 1983). Although we have no convincing evidence that the new issues of immigration and integration have indeed been incorporated within the left-right framework, to the extent that ethnocentric and anti-immigrant attitudes *are* assimilated by the left-right ideological dimension, voters' positions on the left-right continuum could be used, albeit tentatively, as a surrogate for their opinions about immigration and integration issues.

Some empirical evidence for the incorporation of ethnocentric anti-immigrant attitudes within the left-right dimension can be found in the influential work of Herbert Kitschelt (1995). In his view, ethnocentric attitudes are not an isolated 'single issue' but are rather part of a broader constellation of authoritarian attitudes and beliefs. Kitschelt (1995) contends that these politico-culturally authoritarian beliefs tend to go together with economic rightist appeals in explaining the success of New Right parties. In his analyses, a multi-dimensional ideological space turned out to be necessary in order to describe the positions of voters and parties on a wide range of different issues, of which a dimension ranging from left-libertarian against right-authoritarian ideological packages turned out to be the most important. As this dimension was found to be strongly correlated with voters' left-right orientations, some credibility is lent to the suggestion that left-right attitudes might function as a summary indicator for these policy positions, and can therefore, though still tentatively, be used as an indicator of citizens' actual policy preferences regarding immigration and integration issues.

3.2. The consequences of Representational factors.

The relationship between anti-party sentiments and vote choice may reflect popular judgments about the adequacy with which political parties perform their role as representatives of citizens' policy or ideological preferences. Indeed, if citizens come to believe that the political parties fail to represent their interests in a proper manner; popular resentment with political parties is likely to be the result. At election time, this perceived failure of political parties to provide adequate 'issue

representation' (Miller and Listhaug 1990) may prove to be an incentive for voters to abstain from voting or to vote for a protest party.

Failed issue representation could take two forms. First, failed issue representation may find its roots in a perceived lack of differences between the political parties. As aptly stated in George Wallace's 1968 statement that "there is not a dime's worth of difference between the parties", a voter may feel that the political parties are basically indistinguishable (Webb 1996). If asked to place a set of political parties on a policy continuum, such a voter would give all the political parties more or less the same position. Another form of failed issue representation arises in the situation in which a voter actually perceives the political parties to take different issue positions, yet feels that these positions are all distant from his own preferred position. Although it is logical that the resulting 'issue alienation' would be the greatest if even a voter's closest party is still distant from his own position, it is especially the perceived distance from the incumbent party that has turned out to be of primary importance for citizens' feelings that their interests are not properly considered by the political parties (Miller and Listhaug 1990; Gidengil *et al* 2001). It is therefore plausible that dissatisfaction with the incumbent party may spill over to dissatisfaction with political parties at large.

So far, only Gidengil *et al*. (2001) have systematically studied the relationship between these factors and the three options of voice, loyalty and exit. In their study, the most important factor proved to be issue alienation from the incumbent party. It increased both the odds of voting for Canada's anti-party party; The Canadian Reform Party, as well as the odds of not voting at all. However, given the choice between voting Reform and abstention, voters who perceived themselves to be farther removed from the incumbent party were more likely to choose to vote Reform than to abstain from voting altogether (Gidengil *et al.* 2001, p. 503).

A perceived lack of issue differentiation was found to increase both the odds of non-voting and the odds of voting for the Canadian Reform party. However, given the choice between both options, those who failed to see a difference between the major political parties were more likely to abstain from voting, than to choose Reform (Gidengil *et al*. 2001, p. 504). By controlling for people's objective political knowledge, Gidengil *et al.* (2001) ruled out the possibility that "this perceived lack of issue representation is simply a know-nothing effect" (Gidengil et al. 2001, p. 495).[5] At the same time, the authors saw their expectation confirmed that those who are politically involved do prefer to work for change within the system rather than not to vote at all. Indeed, those who are politically involved were found to be far more likely to stay loyal to one of the established parties, but when they did not, they were more likely to vote Reform, than to abstain from voting altogether (Gidengil et al. 2001, p. 504).

Another important factor influencing voters' decision between voting for an established party, voting for an anti-party party and abstention turned out to be identification with the incumbent party (Gidelgil *et al*. 2001). In the tradition of the Michigan school of voting behaviour (see for example Campbell *et al.* 1960), the concept of party identification refers to a long-term, affective psychological identification with one's preferred political party. That is, a long-standing commitment to a political party that is usually acquired during one's youth and that is subsequently relatively impervious to change during adulthood. In the Gidengil *et al.* study (2001), as could be expected, voters who identified with the incumbent party were found to be most likely to stay loyal to this party. However, if they did not, they were found to be far more likely to abstain from voting than to choose Reform (Gidengil *et al.* 2001, p. 504). It seems that at Election Day, strong party identifiers may be willing to passively express their discontent with the existing political parties by not going to the ballot box, whereas actively voicing one's discontent by voting for an anti-party

party might still be a bridge too far for those who identify with one of the established political parties.

The fact that party identification turned out to be empirically different from actual vote choice made party identification a valuable concept for the study of voting behaviour in American elections. However, its analytical usefulness in other countries than the Unites States, especially in European countries, has proven to be questionable ever since scholars tried to apply the concept to elections in European democracies (Budge *et al* 1976; Thomassen 1976; Holmberg 1994). In most European countries, party identification was found to reflect current voting intentions, rather than long-standing commitments to a political party. Indeed, voters' party identification tended to change with the actual vote, something that greatly reduces the analytical value of the concept in European elections. Without going into further detail here, it is the strong interwovenness of party identification and actual vote choice that should make us cautious of including party identification with an established political party as an independent variable in our models of vote choice. Indeed, if party identification serves as nothing but a proxy for the actual vote choice, including it in a vote choice model might have a suppressing effect on the coefficients of the other independent variables. On the other hand, leaving out party identification altogether is not satisfactory either, as previous research have shown that it quite strongly affects views and opinions about political parties (Holmberg 2003). Since the answers to anti-party items might have a partisan bias, it is necessary to control for the effect of partisanship if we are to asses the net impact of anti-party feelings on voting behaviour. Therefore, in this report, analyses are presented that include a measure of identification with the incumbent party. Separate analyses without a measure of partisanship will be performed in order to establish the possible suppressing effects of party identification on the other variables in the model.

Regarding factors that are directly related to the process of representation and the functioning of political parties as the people's representatives, the foregoing discussion leads us to the following set of hypotheses:

> *Hypothesis 5*: Issue alienation from the incumbent party increases the odds of both abstaining and voting for an anti-party party.
> *Hypothesis 6*: Issue alienation from the incumbent party makes voting for an anti-party party more likely than abstaining.
> *Hypothesis 7*: A perceived lack of issue differentiation increases the odds of both abstaining and voting for an anti-party party.
> *Hypothesis 8*: A perceived lack of issue differentiation makes abstaining more likely than voting for an anti-party party.
> *Hypothesis 9*: Party-identification with an established party increases the odds of remaining loyal to that party.
> *Hypothesis 10*: Party-identification with an established party makes abstaining more likely than voting for an anti-party party.

In addition to the factors that are directly related to the process of representation and the functioning of political parties, what should we expect from social background variables? In previous research, social background variables were generally found to be of only minor importance in explaining protest voting or abstention (Gidengil *et al.* 2001, Belanger 2004). However, to the extent

that social background does matter, we should expect the least fortunate strata of the population – the less affluent, the less educated and the unemployed – to be the most likely to abstain from voting or to vote for a protest party, as these groups are likely to view that the party system is unresponsive to their needs (Gidengil *et al*. 2001, p. 492).

3.3. Voice, Loyalty and Exit in a Multi-party Context

It is quite conceivable that the extent to which the above expectations do actually materialize, might in some part depend on the specific party-political context in a country and the availability of a viable anti-party alternative to voters. However, as mentioned before, the studies of Gidengil *et al*. (2001) and Belanger (2004) have been limited to only the countries of Canada, Australia and Britain. In these countries, government has traditionally been dominated by two political parties alternating in office for approximately the past 100 years. Also, these three countries all have a Westminster type of parliamentary democracy, with a majoritarian type of electoral system.[6] There are nevertheless plausible reasons to expect that the 'voice, loyalty and exit model' might work differently in multi-party systems and in systems employing a more proportional electoral formula.

Let us first contemplate shortly the effects of electoral institutions on party systems and individual-level voting behaviour. There is a well-developed branch of literature suggesting that under non-proportional electoral systems, smaller parties have more difficulties to gain seats in parliament than under proportional electoral systems (e.g. Lijphart 1994, Taagapera and Shugart 1989). In his influential work, Duverger (1954) gives two theoretical arguments for plurality rule to destroy third parties. First there is the 'mechanical effect' of the electoral system in countries under plurality rule that prevents votes for small political parties to be actually converted into legislative seats in a proportional manner. In addition to this effect there is a 'psychological factor' that can possibly prevent small parties to gain seats in parliament. Indeed, since voters might be aware that it is unlikely for small parties to gain seats in parliament, instrumentally rational voters in a majoritarian electoral system might perceive a vote for such a party as a wasted vote, and as a consequence will not vote for such a party (Duverger 1954; Blais and Carty 1991).

Duverger's (1954) subsequent attribution of a law-like status to the relationship between the type of electoral system in a country and the number of political parties contesting in elections has received a fair share of criticism in the literature[7]. However, without going into too much detail here, Sartori (1986) has argued that despite the fact that Duverger's acclaimed effects of plurality rule on the number of parties at the party system level might be very hard to substantiate both theoretically and empirically, there is no point in denying the *constraining-restraining* effect of plurality rule (let alone majority rule) at the individual level. That is; unless one is no longer willing to accept that voters behave in an instrumentally rational manner (i.e. based on the expected utility derived from voting), one is compelled to ascribe to the claim that rational voters, eschewing wasting their votes on hopeless candidates, will be constrained to vote strategically for one of the front-running parties, rather than for a small underdog party under majoritarian electoral formulae[8]. Contrary, this constraining-restraining effect of the electoral system should be less present in proportional electoral systems.

For the functioning of the voice, loyalty or exit model, the argument of voters behaving strategically different within diverse institutional contexts suggests that voters who are disaffected with their established political parties or with party politics *per se* might, under plurality rule, be more inclined to abstain from voting than to vote for an anti-party party. This is because they may not see in this party a viable alternative to their established political parties that can represent their political preferences (Miller & Listhaug 1990).
At the other hand, for citizens not willing to spoil their ballot – which in essence bottles down to wasting their vote -, remaining loyal to one of the established parties and hoping that thing will get better might still be a better alternative than abstention. As a result, the effect of Plurality Rule on the relationship between anti-party sentiments and abstention is indeterminate.

In a system with proportional representation, however, the electoral provisions are less conducive to strategic voting, since votes for minor parties are less likely to be considered as wasted votes. Therefore, the prospects of protest parties to serve as a vehicle of political discontent may be considered to be somewhat brighter under proportional representation than under majoritarian electoral systems. To the extent that electoral provisions do indeed determine the number of parties in the party-system, this argument culminates in Miller and Listhaug's (1990) proposition that: "Protest parties can be effectively used, …, to channel discontent back into the decision-making arena in multi-party systems, whereas this is not possible in a rigid two-party system" (Miller & Listhaug 1990, p. 363). In short, whereas to voters in majoritarian systems, abstention or remaining loyal to one of the established parties might be the most common behavioural option given election time, voters under proportional representation might have more incentives to work for change within the electoral system, by voting for a protest party.

A related argument departs from the number of parties within the party-system, rather than from the assumption of voters behaving strategically. An increase in the sheer number of parties in a party-system enhances the possibility of a multitude of opposition parties criticizing the incumbent parties and each other. As a result, voters who are willing to voice their political grievances with the incumbent party (-ies) have more opportunities to do so by voting for an opposition party in a multi-party system than in a system with two or only a small number of political parties.

As a first consequence, this may make abstention less likely in multi-party systems than in two-party systems. At the same time however, the prospects for protest parties to mobilize support in a multi-party system may diminish when voters can voice their discontent by voting for a 'normal' opposition party, rather than for a more extreme anti-party alternative.

For policy oriented voters, it can in addition be expected that the larger number of established political parties in multi-party systems enhances the prospects for them to find a party that adequately represents their policy interests and ideological preferences, as compared to the situation in a two-party system. In a two party-system, the competing parties are, at least in theory, inclined to move towards the median voter in order to maximize their share of the vote (Downs, 1957, p. 115-117). As a result, citizens may fail to see meaningful differences between them. For political parties in a multi-party system however, the best electoral strategy usually is to distinguish themselves from the competing political parties by offering clear ideological differences and taking different issue positions. To the extent that negative feelings towards political parties and dissatisfaction with the established political parties are indeed grounded in processes of failed issue representation or a perceived lack of differences between political parties, we could expect that multi-party systems do a better job in alleviating citizens' discontent, by simply offering more

possibilities that at least some party will represent one's interests. Indeed, as Abedi (2002, p. 555) states: "It can be argued that voters would be less likely to support anti-political establishment parties if they were presented with the choice of voting for an establishment party, regardless of its size, that is noticeable different from its main competitors." In this way, abstention again might become less likely in multi-party systems than in two-party systems.

The main purpose of this discussion is to sensitize us to the possible different effects of anti-party sentiments on vote choice within different institutional and party-system contexts. A rigorous test of the implications of the argument is however beyond the scope of this paper, as the indeterminacy of some of the postulated effects and the correlation between the independent variables (number of parties and electoral system) requires us to study a substantial larger number of cases than the three cases of Norway, Denmark and New Zealand with which I am concerned in this paper. It is however evident that the effects of different institutional and party system characteristics on the relationships between anti-party sentiments and the three behavioural options of the voice, loyalty and exit model might, at least in theory, be quite substantial.

Up and until now, there is only one study that has dedicated attention to the dynamics of anti-partyism and the consequences for citizens' choices between voting for an established party, voting for an anti-party party and abstaining from voting in a wider number of countries. Using data from the CSES project (Module I, 1996-2000), Dalton and Weldon (2005) found anti-party sentiments to influence electoral behaviour in important ways in both two-party majoritarian systems and in multi-party systems in which some sort of proportional representation mechanism is at work.[9] Abstaining from the electoral process was however found to be an especially popular option among disaffected citizens in majoritarian electoral systems (Dalton & Weldon 2005, p. 942). Furthermore, the choice between abstention and voting for an anti-party party proved to be intertwined with the specific anti-party alternatives offered to voters. Comparing Left and Right anti-party parties, it was found that especially the anti-party parties at the right-hand side of the political spectrum were able to benefit from anti-party sentiments (Dalton & Weldon 2005, p. 942). Distrustful citizens were found to be far more likely than the trustful to vote for an extreme-right anti-party party, whereas both groups did not differ in their likelihood of voting for an anti-party party at the Left-hand side of the political spectrum. This, according to the authors, suggests that voters do no longer view extreme left parties as a primary protest option.

As insightful as these findings might be, the work of Dalton & Weldon (2005) suffers from two major drawbacks. First, by solely focusing on a survey question that asks whether respondents think that 'political parties care what people think', it is not clear whether the authors concentrate on generalized or specific anti-party sentiments. As the behavioural consequences of generalized anti-party sentiments might at least theoretically be different from the consequences of specific anti-party sentiments (Belanger 2004), it would be advantageous to incorporate measures for both kinds of sentiments into an analysis of the electoral consequences of anti-partyism. Secondly, Dalton & Weldon (2005) have not tried to model the relationship between anti-partyism and electoral behaviour within a multivariate framework. Since there is a wide number of variables that might potentially affect the relationship between anti-partyism and electoral behaviour, it is necessary to control for these variables in order to establish the purified effect of anti-partyism on the choice between voice, loyalty and exit. As such a model has hitherto only been tested in countries with a majoritarian electoral system and a small number of dominant political parties, it would be

interesting to see to what extent the findings of Gidengil *et al.* (2001) and Belanger (2004) also translate to political settings in countries with a more proportional, multi-party electoral context.

4. Data and methodology

The data used to test the previously discussed expectations about the consequences of anti-partyism come from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES, Module I, 1996-2000).[10] The CSES project is a large scale, cross-national survey research project aimed at facilitating cross-national political research. By including a common set of survey questions in the post-election studies of a wide array of participating countries, the CSES project provides us with a wealth of individual-level survey data that is comparable across countries.

For my research purposes, especially the first CSES module (1996-2000) was found to include a set of interesting questions on anti-partyism, voting behaviour, political knowledge, evaluations of the economy and general opinions towards the political system.[11] In total, thirty-three countries participated in the first CSES module. However, due to reasons of a theoretical and pragmatic nature, I will confine my analyses of the impact of anti-party sentiment on electoral behaviour in the national parliamentary elections of Denmark (1998), Norway (1996) and New Zealand (1997). Besides the conventional limits of space and time that prohibit us from including all thirty-three CSES countries in the analyses in this report, scholars do generally not agree on whether all the thirty-three CSES countries have actually witnessed the emergence of an anti-party party at the national level.

A first point to be noted here is that in recent decades, most anti-party parties have only achieved marginal electoral fortunes and where they have received a larger share of the vote, their life as a 'relevant' party has only been short-lived (e.g. Pedersen 1982; 1991). As a result, survey-based estimates of the effects of different variables on the decision to vote for these parties are likely to be highly unreliable and including them in our analyses is not advisable.

A second point is of a more theoretical nature and has to do with the grave difficulties that scholars of anti-party and minor parties have experienced in identifying what parties should actually be considered as an anti-party party. They do generally agree that in recent decades, the established political parties in most of the advanced industrial democracies have received some competition of one or more anti-establishment parties on either the Left and/or Right hand side of the political spectrum. During the 1970s and 1980s, the New-left and Green parties gained reasonable electoral successes in a large number of modern representative democracies. These parties emphasized non-materialist values (such as freedom, self-expression and environmental issues) and stressed democratic themes by suggesting more direct citizen participation and the introduction of elements of direct democracy. Especially citizens with a post-materialist value orientation were found to be supportive of these 'new politics' parties (Inglehart 1987, 1989). In the 1990s, the party systems of several advanced industrial democracies were extended again by the entrance of a number of extreme-right-wing political parties in the electoral arena. Notwithstanding the fact that both types of parties are clearly of a widely divergent nature, most scholars do agree that the electoral support for these parties is at least partly driven by anti-party sentiment (Ignazi 1992, Poguntke 1996, Mudde 1996). Moreover, according to Mudde (1996), these left- and right-wing parties have all echoed a common message: the establishment parties are self-serving, corrupt, and indifferent to citizen interests.

Nevertheless, several scholars have included different parties under their definition of an anti-party party, depending on their own judgments and definitions of what constitutes an establishment party and what constitutes an anti-establishment party. This definitional problem is further aggravated by the fact that many scholars seem to approach this question in a rather intuitive sense, thus without

specifying clear criteria for distinguishing between anti-party parties and mainstream parties. As the empirical results of any study of anti-party voting are likely to depend on the in- or exclusion of specific parties in either one of these categories, defining what is meant by an anti-party party seems to be a tough but crucially important task.

In his study of the effects of party-system features on the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties, Abedi (2002, p. 556) has proposed the following three criteria for defining a party as an anti-party party:

1. it perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment;
2. it asserts that a fundamental divide exists between the political establishment and the people (all established parties are basically the same); and
3. it challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues.

A party is labelled as an anti-party party only if it lives up to *all* of these three criteria. In my opinion, these three criteria together offer one of the most exact definitions of what is meant by an anti-party party. Moreover, by employing this stringent definition, one implicitly defines the category of established political parties as all those parties that are not outspoken and unequivocal anti-party parties. This means that even minor parties and parties that have never participated in any government coalition are not labelled as anti-party parties, unless they can convincingly be considered as exponents of anti-party politics, determined by the possession of the aforementioned characteristics.

Based on these criteria, Abedi (2002) concludes that the three countries that are to be studied in this paper have all witnessed the emergence of an anti-party party in recent decades. These are the *Danish People's party* in Denmark, the *Anders Lange's party/Progress party* in Norway, and *New Zealand First* in New Zealand.[12] As a result of employing a positive definition of anti-party parties, all other parties are considered as established political parties, although some minor political parties have been left out of the analyses in this paper. See appendix A for the exact classification of all political parties in Denmark, Norway and New Zealand as well as for their electoral results in the parliamentary elections to be studied in this paper.

The Danish People's party emerged in the 1998 national parliamentary election and received 7.2 percent of the vote. The party was founded as a breakaway faction of the former extreme right-wing Progress party, of which the leader of the Danish People's party, Pia Kjearsgaard, had been a leading figure since the mid 1980s (Rydgren 2004). In the build-up to the 1998 elections, the party campaigned especially heavily against the incumbent Social Democratic party, the party that had been the predominant political party in Denmark since the introduction of a system of proportional representation in 1920. With the extreme rhetoric of its leaders, the party placed itself frequently outside of the established political sphere. A quote of Pia Kjearsgaard in the 1998 election campaign is exemplary: "The Social Democrats are today governed by a group of academic theorists that do not understand, and would not dream to try to understand, the worries of the ordinary people". Just as its predecessor, the Danish People's Party is considered to be extreme-right wing (Lubbers *et al.* 2002) and combines ethno-pluralist xenophobia and anti-political establishment populism in order to appeal to the people. It is therefore, according to Rydgren (2004, p. 492), "plausible to assume that the Danish People's Party has benefited not only from the presence of 'floating' voters, but also to

some extent from protest votes. We know that the voters of the Danish People's party are characterized by relatively low trust in politicians".

The Norwegian Progress party entered parliament in 1973 and has attended six legislatures between 1993 and 1997. In these legislatures, the party could count on 6.8 per cent of the seats on average and has since 1973 played an increasingly important strategic role in determining which party block (Labor- Conservatives/Liberals) controls government (Miller & Listhaug 1990). The Progress party came out of the 1997 elections as a winner, achieving its best electoral results ever, while both the established Labor and Conservative parties suffered tremendous losses. With 15.3 percent of the vote, the progress party even replaced the Conservative party as the second largest party in the country. It was the first time since World War II that the Labor party (35 percent of the vote) and Conservative party (13.7 percent of the vote) together received less than half of the votes past in a national election. The progress party is usually considered to be a right-wing anti-immigrant party with a populist outlook. Its success in the 1997 election is therefore somewhat remarkable since the main issues in the 1997 election campaign were health and elderly care and not immigration policy (Aardal 1998). Some authors have suggested that the success of the Progress party in the 1997 election was therefore more likely to be situated in its ability to present itself as a protest party and its accompanying appeal to disenchanted citizens (Aardal 1998, Valen 1998).

In New Zealand, the government has traditionally been dominated by single-party centre-right (National Party) or centre-left (Labour) governments. This classical two-party system resulted from a single-member district (SMD) plurality system. In the 1990s however, a substantial number of minor parties emerged and with the advent of a system of mixed member proportional (MMP) representation in the 1996 general election, the two established major parties of New Zealand received competition of these smaller parties. Especially the New Zealand First party is believed to serve as a 'vehicle of discontent' for those who are dissatisfied with politics as usual. According to Miller (1997, p. 165-7, cited in Denemark & Bowler 2002, p. 51), the party that was founded in 1993 can be characterised as "conceived and nurtured in protest" and a "contemporary example of populism". In the 1996 parliamentary election, New Zealand First received 13 percent of the vote and was able to capture 17 of the 120 seats in the legislature. The party has proposed several anti-immigrant laws and seems to appeal to voters' major party discontent (Denemark & Bowler 2002).

It is clear from the above discussion that the Danish People's party, the Norwegian Progress party and New Zealand First have all proven to be viable anti-party alternatives at the national level within a system of proportional representation. Therefore these cases offer an interesting opportunity for testing the expectations of the 'voice, loyalty and exit model' under proportional representation and within a multi-party system context.

One might object, however, that in selecting these three instances of electorally successful anti-party parties, one runs the risk of selection observations on the values of the dependent variable, thereby introducing selection bias if one is willing to generalize the findings to other advanced industrial countries (Geddes 1991; King *et al*. 1994). Indeed, as King *et al.* (1994, p. 130) state: "any selection rule correlated with the dependent variables attenuates estimates of causal effects on average." I believe however that in the present case, such an objection, at least in this form, is not necessarily warranted. As for one thing, we are strictly speaking not selecting cases on the values of the dependent variable. The dependent variable in our 'voice, loyalty or exit' model is not the success of anti-party parties, but rather the decision of voters to choose between loyalty towards an established party, voting for an anti-party party or abandoning electoral politics altogether.

Therefore, estimates of *causal effects* are only biased in as far as the magnitudes of these *effects* are correlated with the success of anti-party parties. More generally stated: "Where causal effects vary over the units, a selection rule correlated with the *size of the causal effect* would induce bias in estimates of average causal effects" (King *et al.* 1994, p. 139).

In the present situation, the most vigorous threat to the generalizabilty of our results comes from the possibility of anti-party feelings being endogenous to the presence of a successful anti-party party within a country. That is, anti-party feelings are a consequence, rather than a cause of anti-party voting. To the extent that this is the case, estimates of causal effects will not translate to other countries with less successful anti-party parties at the national level. Although it is not possible to address this endogeneity problem thoroughly in the analyses in this report, we can at least compare figures of anti-party sentiment in our three selected countries with those of other advanced democracies, allowing us to grasp the extent to which the countries of Denmark, Norway and New Zealand are exemplary cases for these other countries.

Table 1 below therefore reproduces the findings as reported by Dalton and Weldon (2005, p. 934). It presents the opinions of citizens on two important questions about political parties in thirteen advanced democracies available in the CSES survey: first, are parties necessary to democracy, and second, do parties care what people think.[13] Roughly three-quarters of the public in the selected countries believes that parties are necessary for the functioning of democracy, whereas only an average of about one-third of the citizens reports to believe that political parties actually care what people think. The large difference between both kinds of opinions in these countries is an important finding in itself, as it suggests that people nowadays view political parties as 'democracy's necessary evil' (Dalton and Weldon 2005). Whereas most contemporary publics belief that democracy cannot function adequately without them, they are at the same time rather sceptical about whether political parties care about their interests. For our discussion it is however more important to note that citizens' sentiments in the countries of Denmark, Norway and New Zealand are not markedly different from those in other countries.

Table 1. Feelings towards political parties in 13 advanced industrial democracies.

	Political Parties are Necessary	Political Parties care
Australia	71	23
Britain	77	34
Canada	65	23
Denmark	88	48
Germany	80	18
Japan	65	21
Netherlands	90	43
New Zealand	71	26
Norway	89	39
Spain	83	39
Sweden	80	23
Switzerland	78	39
USA	56	38
Average	76	30

Note: table entries are the percentage agreeing with each statement.
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (module I, 1996-2000)

Only the citizens in New Zealand take a somewhat dimmer view on political parties than citizens in most other countries, whereas compared to other contemporary publics, citizens in Denmark and Norway actually rank among the most positive electorates. When asked if parties are necessary and if parties care what people think, citizens in these countries answer in the affirmative at an above average level. These findings therefore strengthen our case that the success of the three anti-party parties in these countries is not due to the presence of an electorate that is disproportionately sceptical about political parties. Despite the possibility that anti-party sentiments might be induced by the presence of a successful anti-party party, citizens' sentiments in New Zealand, Denmark and Norway are representative for a wider number of countries, making these three countries an interesting testing ground for our model.

4.1. Variables and model operationalisation.

The dependent variable in this paper has three unordered categories; non-voting, voting for an anti-party party or voting for one of the established political parties.

For the purpose of the analyses in this report, the following parties are, in line with Abedi (2002), considered as established political parties (see also Appendix A): *Denmark*: Social Democrats (SD), Socialist People's Party (SF), Centre Democrats (CD), Conservative People's Party (KF), Christian People's Party (KRF), Radical Social-Liberal Party (RV). *Norway*: Christian People's Party (KrF), Labour Party (LAB), Centre Party (S), Conservatives (C), Liberals (V), Socialist Left (SV). *New Zealand*: Labour party (LAB), National Party, Alliance, ACT New Zealand. Respondents saying that they did vote, but did not choose an anti-party party or one of the established political parties are left out of the analyses. Respondents saying that they did not vote in a particular election are considered to have abstained from voting.[14]

The data are analysed by estimating a multinomial logit model of vote choice and turnout for each country separately. The multinomial logit model is a relative straightforward extension of the binary logit model (Greene 2000, Borooah 2001). It offers a more accurate characterisation of vote choice in multi party systems than the traditional binary logit model (Whitten & Palmer 1996). (see Appendix C for more details on multinomial logit models).[15] By adopting a unified model of vote choice, it is implicitly assumed that a voter's decision to vote is not qualitatively different from his decision to vote for one of the competing parties in the election. That is, the decision to vote does not clearly precede one's decision to vote for one of the candidates in the election race. Many researchers assume such a multi-stage model of voting behaviour in which the decision to vote for one of the parties in an election is conditional on one's decision to vote in a particular election. Subsequently they opt for a nested model of vote choice. While theoretically plausible, I do not believe that such a conceptualisation of voting behaviour is warranted, as it might every bit as well be that an individual first decides whether he want to vote for one of the competing parties, and after taking into account the expected utility from voting for one of these parties, the individual decides whether making his way to the polling station is worthwhile. I therefore contend with Lacy & Burden (1999) that it is preferable 'to impose a nesting structure on the data only when one choice is clearly a precondition for subsequent choices' (Lacy & Burden 1999, p. 237).

For the purpose of the subsequent analyses in this report, generalized anti-party sentiment is measured by combining the responses to two questions about political parties into a simple additive scale (the scale is standardized to run from 0 to 1). The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the following statements: "Political parties care what ordinary people think" and "Political parties are necessary to make our political system work".[16] See appendix B for the exact question wording.

The CSES questionnaire did not contain a separate measure of specific anti-party sentiment. Respondents were however asked to rate all political parties on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 means that a respondent strongly dislikes a particular party and 10 means that a respondent strongly likes a particular party. Specific anti-party sentiment is measured by counting the number of negative ratings (<5) given to the established political parties in each country. In order to control for differences in the number of established political parties in each country, the number of negative party ratings is divided by the total number of established political parties.[17]

Empirical measures of a perceived lack of issue representation and issue alienation from the incumbent party(-ies) should, at least from a purist theoretical perspective, be based on items measuring the position of voters and the perceived positions of political parties on one or more major political issues. That is, measures should be based on the 'issues of the day' that play or have played a significant role in shaping party competition and voting behaviour at a particular place at a particular point in time. Unfortunately, items measuring the positions of voters and parties on specific policy issues were not available in the CSES dataset. Moreover, it is not very likely that similar substantive issue and policy concerns have shaped the electoral choices of citizens in the elections in the three countries that are considered here. Given that issue and policy concerns cannot be compared across countries, we have chosen to resort to ideological left-right positions of voters and parties to gauge the extent to which citizens feel that the political parties present their interests. In the rest of this paper, the concepts of 'issue representation' and 'issue alienation' could therefore possibly be more adequately referred to as 'ideological representation' and 'ideological alienation'. However, to foster concordance with earlier research, we will keep to the former labels in the rest of this paper.

Issue alienation from the incumbent party is measured by taking the absolute difference between a respondent's self-placement on a left-right continuum and the respondent's placement of the incumbent party/parties on the same continuum.[18] For Norway this is simply the absolute difference between the position of the respondent and the perceived position of the Labour Party. In New Zealand this is the respondent's distance from the National party. In Denmark the distance between the respondent's position and the incumbent coalition government is measured by taking the absolute difference between the respondents' position and the mean of the two perceived positions of the Social Democratic party and the Social Liberal party, attributed to them by that individual respondent.

A perceived lack of issue representation, the feeling that all parties are basically indistinguishable, is measured by calculating, for each respondent, the absolute distance between the perceived left-right positions of the two established parties that were placed farthest apart. As a consequence, respondents scoring high on this measure see more ideological differences between the established political parties than respondents scoring low on this measure. To facilitate interpretation and for the measure to indicate a perceived *lack* of issue representation, the original scores were inversed (i.e. a score of 1 becoming 9, 2 becoming 8, 3 becoming 7, etc...).

Party identification with an established party is measured by a question that asked respondents to indicate whether they do usually think of themselves as being close to any particular political party. A follow-up question asked about the strength of a respondent's partisan attachment by asking whether the respondent thinks of himself as being very close, somewhat close or not very close to that political party. A dummy-variable for party identification was created. Respondents were assigned a code of 1 only if they perceived themselves as being very close or somewhat close to one of the established political parties. In all other cases, the respondent received a zero-score.

In order to make sure that we are assessing a purified effect of generalized and specific anti-party sentiments on electoral behaviour, we have to rule out as much as possible the possibility that any relationship between anti-partyism and voting behaviour might be the result of a more generalized form of perceived system deficiency or wider political discontent. The models that are to be estimated do therefore also include a measure of external political efficacy, which is the feeling that the political system is basically responsive to the needs and interests of citizens. In the CSES questionnaire, respondents were asked to answer the following two questions: 'Some people say

that members of [congress/parliament] know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of [congress/parliament] do not know what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that members of [congress/parliament] know what ordinary people think, and five means that the members of [congress/parliament] do not know what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?' and 'Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it will not make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and five means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself'. Both questions were combined into a simple additive scale and subsequently rescaled in order to range from 0 to 1. Specification of the models is completed by including a set of socio-demographic control variables (age, gender, education).[19]

5. Findings

5.1. The Distribution of Anti-party sentiments

Citizens' attitudes towards political parties in Denmark, Norway and New Zealand are not markedly different from those among other contemporary mass publics (see table 1). While the electorate generally holds political parties to be necessary for the proper functioning of the democratic political system, it is at the same time rather sceptical about the way in which political parties represent their interests (Dalton & Weldon 2005). For descriptive statistics on the most important attitudinal variables used in the analyses in this chapter, the reader is referred to appendix D. The results in table 2 below also largely echo previous findings with regard to the possible sources of anti-party sentiments among citizens (Clarke and Kornberg 1993; Webb 1996; Gidengil *et al*. 2001).[20] Social background characteristics again turn out to have only modest explanatory value in accounting for variations in anti-party sentiment. Only in New Zealand do the coefficients for age and gender achieve statistical significance, with older people and males showing somewhat less strong anti-party sentiments than their younger and female counterparts. It has been suggested that the lack of women in elected office may make them more sceptical about political parties and political institutions in general, whereas older people may have less anti-party feelings because they were socialized at a time when political parties had a more legitimate status. Still however, coefficients are small and age and gender do not seem to be of much importance in Denmark and Norway. Education turns out to have a mitigating effect on anti-party feelings in Norway and New Zealand, as those with higher levels of education were found to have a less critical view towards political parties than those with lower educational levels. This supports the interpretation of negative political attitudes being inversely related to citizens' cognitive capacities to understand the complexities of representative politics, for example an understanding of the necessity of political parties and politicians to negotiate

Table 2. Correlates of anti-party sentiments.

	Denmark		New Zealand		Norway	
	β	SE (B)	β	SE (B)	β	SE (B)
Age	.03	.00	-.04*	.00	.00	.00
Gender	.02	.01	-.03*	.01	.02	.01
Education	-.01	.00	-.06**	.01	-.07**	.00
Household income	-.03	.00	.01	.01	-.04	.00
Economy worse	.03	.01	.04*	.01	.04	.03
Economy better	-.03	.01	-.03	.01	-.01	.01
Issue alienation from incumbent party	.08**	.00	.06**	.01	.06**	.00
Lack of issue representation	.02	.00	.07***	.01	.00	.00
Identification with established party	-.10***	.01	-.14***	.01	-.16***	.01
Specific Anti-partyism	.06**	.02	.10***	.01	.06**	.02
External political efficacy	-.44***	.02	-.38***	.02	-.36***	.02
Adjusted R^2	.23		.26		.20	
N	1600		2796		1842	

Note: Entries are Standardized Beta coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares Regression, with list-wise deletion of missing data. The dependent variable is the generalized anti-partyism scale. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

compromises on major policy issues, but conflicts with the notion of higher levels of cognitive mobilization leading to more elite-challenging forms of political action and cognitively developed citizens being more deferential towards traditional social and political authorities (Norris 1999; Dalton 2004). Finally, household income as an objective measure of a respondents' social economic status was not found to be associated with anti-party feelings, nor were subjective evaluations of the state of the national economy.[21] While the effects, though small, are all in the expected direction, respondents with a negative feeling about economic developments were not found to harbour more negative attitudes towards political parties except in New Zealand.

As in previous work (Gidengil *et al*. 2001, Miller and Listhaug 1990), the more important factors in explaining anti-party feelings are citizens' direct experiences with political parties and their beliefs about whether politicians and political parties are basically responsive to their needs. It is external efficacy that stands out as the most important predictor of anti-party feelings in all three countries, suggesting that those who believe that the political system is not attuned to their acclaimed rights to influence public policy making, are those to develop the strongest apathetic feelings towards political parties. The causal ordering between both kinds of attitudes is however far from unambiguous, as some scholars have argued that political parties might serve as a 'lightning rod' for a perceived lack of system responsiveness (Bardi 1996), while others have claimed that it is citizens' dissatisfaction with political parties itself that makes for a more negative attitude towards the broader political system (Miller and Listhaug 1990). The implications of both arguments are different though, as when support for political parties is a result of dissatisfaction with the larger political system, feelings towards them are not likely to improve without changing the broader framework in which they operate. However, if political parties are themselves a major source of political resentment, possible improvements might lay in political parties changing the way in which they perform their linkage function between citizens and the state. That representational factors play a role in explaining mass anti-party sentiments can readily be observed from figure 2. In all three countries, anti-partyism resonates significantly among those who are alienated from the incumbent party, whereas a perceived lack of issue differentiation is a significant predictor of anti-partyism in New Zealand. The fact that this is not the case for Denmark and Norway reflects Miller and Listhaug's (1990) proposition that being close to the incumbent party may at times be more important for explaining negative feelings towards political parties at large, than a belief that all parties are basically indistinguishable. Also a rejection of the established political party alternatives is associated with more negative feelings towards political parties in all three countries. This last result is substantiated by the finding that identification with one of the established party alternatives makes people who do so less susceptible to anti-party feelings, although this does not mean that we should consider party identification to make people 'immune' to anti-party feelings (Owen and Dennis 1996). In addition, it might also be that the causal direction between party-identification and anti-partyism runs the other way round, suggesting that party identifiers do not harbour lower anti-party sentiments because they identify with an established party, but rather that they identify with a political party, exactly because they like political parties. Therefore, as a consequence, firm causal conclusions on the basis of the results in table 2 are in any case unwarranted. However, the table suggests that the presence of anti-party sentiments Denmark, New Zealand and Norway is primarily associated with citizens' experiences with politics and political parties, rather than with their socio-demographic background.

A first indication that anti-party sentiments might also have electoral consequences is given by figure 1 below. The figure clearly shows that anti-party sentiments are not uniformly distributed among voters for established parties, voters for anti-party parties and abstainers. When asked whether political parties care what people think, those who abstained from voting and those who voted for an anti-party party are consistently found to be more sceptical towards political parties than those who voted for an established political party. In New Zealand, voters who abstained from voting and New Zealand First voters seem to hold quite similar views on this question, while in Denmark and Norway it are especially the anti-party voters who believe that political parties do not care what ordinary people think. In all three countries, abstainers and voters for an anti-party party were also more often found to believe (figures not shown) that political parties are not necessary for the functioning of democracy than those who voted for an established political party.[22] These findings do therefore suggest that generalized anti-partyism may have electoral consequences.

Figure 1. Feelings that political parties do not care what ordinary people think by vote choice.



Note: Entries are the percentages of respondents who believe that political parties do not care what ordinary people think.
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Module I, 1996-2000).

Also specific anti-party sentiments are not evenly distributed among the three groups of voters: abstainers, voters for established parties and anti-party voters. Table 3 shows the percentages of respondents who give a negative (like-dislike) rating to more than half of the established political parties in each country. In each country, specific anti-partyism seems to be most widespread among those who voted for an anti-party party. This suggests that the anti-party parties in Denmark, New Zealand and Norway might indeed have profited from specific anti-party sentiments within the electorate. In Denmark and Norway, also those who abstained from voting tend to reject the established political parties more often than voters for an established political party. In the next section we will examine the electoral consequences of generalized and specific anti-partyism by estimating multinomial logit models of vote choice for each country separately.

Table 3. Negative party ratings by vote choice

	Established	Anti-party	Abstained
Denmark	14.9	34.4	21.4
New Zealand	28.3	45.5	20.9
Norway	11.7	18.8	15.6

Note: Entries are the percentages of respondents that give a negative (like-dislike) rating to more than half of the established political parties in each country.
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Module I, 1996-2000).

5.2. Anti-party sentiments and vote choice.

Tables 4, 5 and 6 present the results of the multinomial logit analyses for Denmark, New Zealand and Norway. With three choices, multinomial logit estimates two sets of parameters. The third set of parameter estimates (which is, strictly speaking, redundant) can be obtained by subtracting one set of parameters from the other. Each coefficient gives the predicted marginal effect of an explanatory factor on the log-odds of a given choice relative to a baseline choice. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that an increase in the value of an explanatory variable is associated with an increase (decrease) in the relative probability of the given choice over the baseline category. In every column, the second of the two stated options serves as the baseline. The effects of age, gender and education on vote choice are small in comparison to the effects of attitudinal factors in the three countries studied here. A separate analysis of vote choice confirmed this, as also in models without representational factors and citizens' attitudes towards political parties, did the coefficients for the age, gender and education variables remain quite small. Given the choice between voting for an established party and voting for an anti-party alternative, male voters in Denmark and Norway were found to be somewhat more likely to vote for an anti-party party than female voters, whereas education seems to be associated with a vote for one of the established political parties, rather than with abstention or a protest vote in all the three countries studied here. The three social background variables do however barely distinguish between non-voting and voting for an anti-party alternative. In New Zealand and Norway, age was found to slightly enhance the odds of a protest vote over abstention, whereas education was only found to have a significant effect in New Zealand, making a vote for New Zealand first more likely than non-voting among people with higher educational levels.

Table 4. Multinomial logit estimates of vote choice, 1996 Danish Election

	Danish People's party vs. established parties	*Non-voting vs. established parties*	*Danish People's party vs. non-voting*
Intercept	-5.67 (.86)***	-2.40 (.74)***	-3.27 (1.02)***
Generalized antipartyism	1.61 (.57)**	1.66 (.53)**	-.05 (.67)
Specific antipartyism	1.60 (.51)**	.80 (.46)	.80 (.62)
Issue alienation from incumbent party	.10 (.09)	.02 (.08)	.08 (.10)
Lack of issue representation	-.02 (.06)	.01 (.05)	-.03 (.07)
Identification with established party	-4.38 (1.01)***	-2.04 (.38)***	-2.34 (1.08)*
External political efficacy	-.71 (.59)	-1.38 (.52)**	.67 (.71)
Left-Right	.50 (.07)***	.10 (.06)	.40 (.08)***
Age	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.00 (.01)
Gender	.64 (.25)*	.02 (.22)	-.02 (.22)*
Education	-.11 (.06)	-.03 (.06)	.03 (.06)
-2 Log-Likelihood	1079.86		
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R^2	.36		
N	1232		
Correctly predicted	84.8 %		

Note: Entries are multinomial logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. See appendix for variable coding.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

As expected, antipathy towards political parties *per se* increased the odds of non-voting over the odds of voting for one of the established parties in Denmark, New Zealand and Norway. This suggests that abstaining from voting is indeed a viable option for those who are disenchanted with political parties in general. However, the Danish people's party and Norwegian Progress Party were also found to be successful in attracting voters with generalized anti-party feelings, as these feelings were found to significantly increase the odds of voting for one of these parties over the odds of voting for one of the established political parties. In New Zealand, the New Zealand First party was less successful in mobilizing generalized anti-party feelings, as disenchantment with party politics was not found to be associated with a choice between voting for an established political party and voting for New Zealand First. These findings suggest that voters in Denmark and Norway might perceive the Danish People's party and the Norwegian Progress party as 'real' anti-party parties, able to articulate their concerns with the functioning of political parties in general, whereas voters in New Zealand do not believe the New Zealand First party to be an anti-party alternative that shares their negative feelings towards political parties and party politics *per se*. This last proposition is substantiated by the finding that generalized anti-partyism significantly increased the odds of non-voting over the odds of voting for the New Zealand first party. In Denmark and Norway however, generalized anti-party sentiments were not found to be associated with the choice between abstention and voting for an anti-party alternative. So despite the suggestion that the possible constraining-restraining effects of the electoral system on support for minor parties might be feeble in proportional electoral systems (Sartori 1986), the findings here do not unambiguously support the expectation that anti-party parties have therefore better opportunities to pull back into the electoral party system those individuals despising political parties *per se* (Belanger 2004, p. 1055).

Table 5. Multinomial logit estimates of vote choice, 1996 New Zealand Election

	New Zealand First vs. established parties	*Non-voting vs. established parties*	*New Zealand First vs. non-voting*
Intercept	-1.33 (.46)**	1.52 (.59)*	-2.49 (.68)***
Generalized antipartyism	.08 (.28)	1.33 (.39)***	-1.25 (.44)**
Specific antipartyism	1.64 (.19)***	-.54 (.28)	2.18 (.31)***
Issue alienation from incumbent party	-.07 (.04)	.14 (.06)*	-.21 (.07)**
Lack of issue representation	-.05 (.03)	.09 (.04)*	-.14 (.04)**
Identification with established party	-2.515 (.15)***	-1.33 (.17)***	-1.18 (.22)***
External political efficacy	-.41 (.29)	-1.26 (.39)***	.85 (.44)
Left-Right	-.01 (.03)	-.03 (.04)	.02 (.05)
Age	.01 (.01)***	-.03 (.01)***	.04 (.01)***
Gender	.05 (.11)	.14 (.15)	-.09 (.17)
Education	-.18 (.04)***	-.31 (.06)***	.13 (.06)*
-2 Log-Likelihood	3674.21		
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R^2	.31		
N	3226		
Correctly predicted	76.4 %		

Note: Entries are multinomial logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. See appendix for variable coding. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

The safest conclusion would therefore be to state that a rejection of political parties *per se* can be a potential driving force behind both non-voting and anti-party voting, but that the extent to which generalized anti-party sentiment is actually channelled by either one of these paths depends to a large part on the presence of a viable anti-party alternative within the party system.

Turning now to the electoral effects of specific anti-party-sentiments (i.e. a rejection of the traditional/established party alternatives), it was found that negative feelings towards the established political parties were more likely to result in a vote for an anti-party party than in a vote for one of the established party alternatives in the three countries studied here. Indeed, as dissatisfaction with the traditional party alternatives increases, the propensity to voice this discontent by voting for an anti-party increases over the propensity to vote for one of the traditional alternatives (Gidengil *et al.* 2001, Hetherington 1999). At the same time, as expected, specific anti-partyism was not found to increase the odds of abstention over the odds of voting for an established political party. This suggests that while specific anti-partyism can be an important factor in explaining anti-party success, it is not the rejection of the traditional party alternatives that generally leads voters to abandon party politics altogether (Belanger 2004; Gidengil et al 2001). Indeed, given the choice between anti-party voting and abstention, an increase in negative feelings towards the traditional parties is more likely to result in a vote for an anti-party alternative than in citizens spoiling their ballot and not giving 'Acte de présence' at Election Day in the three countries studied here. However, the effect in Denmark just falls short of the conventional levels of statistical significance. This finding supports the earlier conclusion of Belanger (2004, p. 1073), that "all in all, specific anti-party sentiment seems to benefit third parties more than abstention".

Table 6. Multinomial logit estimates of vote choice, 1997 Norwegian Election

	Progress party vs. established parties	*Non-voting vs. established parties*	*Progress party vs. non-voting*
Intercept	-4.86 (.74)***	1.94 (.58)**	-6.80 (.86)***
Generalized antipartyism	1.77 (.56)**	1.19 (.47)*	.58 (.65)
Specific antipartyism	1.42 (.42)**	-.47 (.34)	1.89 (.49)***
Issue alienation from incumbent party	.12 (.06)*	.02 (.05)	.10 (.07)
Lack of issue representation	-.02 (.05)	.05 (.04)	-.07 (.06)
Identification with established party	-2.41 (.29)***	-.91 (.17)***	-1.50 (.33)***
External political efficacy	-.81 (.57)	-1.30 (.44)**	.49 (.65)
Left-Right	.53 (.06)***	-.03 (.04)	.56 (.07)***
Age	-.01 (.01)	-.04 (.01)***	.04 (.01)***
Gender	.45 (.19)*	.45 (.15)**	.01 (.22)
Education	-.16 (.06)**	-.12 (.05)*	-.03 (.07)
-2 Log-Likelihood	2005.07		
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R^2	.33		
N	1711		
Correctly predicted	77 %		

Note: Entries are multinomial logit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. See appendix for variable coding.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Of the other factors in the three vote-choice models it is clearly identification with one of the established political parties that stands out as one of the most important predictors of vote choice in Denmark, New Zealand and Norway. In all the three countries, identification with one of the established political parties increases the propensity to stay loyal to an established political party over the propensity to vote for an anti-party party or to abstain from voting. If they decide not to stay loyal however, party-identifiers are, in line with previous research, found to be more likely to abstain from voting than to vote for an anti-party party (Gidengil *et al*. 2001, Belanger 2004). These findings therefore lend some credibility to the notion that strong party identifiers are willing to passively express their discontent with the existing political parties by not showing up at the ballot box, whereas actively voicing one's discontent by voting for an anti-party party might still be a bridge too far for those who identify with one of the established political parties.[23]

Contrary to the findings of Gidengil *et al.* (2001, p. 504) for Canada, the effects of issue alienation from the incumbent party and a perceived lack of issue representation turn out to be negligible in comparison to the effects of anti-party sentiments and party identification. Most coefficients are rather small and few of them are statistically significant. In New Zealand, issue alienation from the incumbent party was found to slightly increase the odds of abstention over the odds of voting for an established party alternative, whereas in choosing between abstention and a vote for New Zealand First, issue alienation tended to slightly favour abstention.

A perceived lack of issue differentiation increased the odds of abstention over the odds of voting for an established party alternatives, and when confronted with the choice between voting New Zealand First and abstention, citizens seeing only minor differences between the established parties were more likely to abstain from voting than to cast an anti-party vote. In Norway, issue alienation from the incumbent party was found to slightly increase the odds of voting Progress party (as opposed to an established party vote), while it did not seem to affect non-voting or the choice between Progress voting and non-voting.

These generally small effects of issue alienation from the incumbent party and a perceived lack of issue representation fit in with the earlier argument that in multi-party systems, citizens with negative representational experiences might indeed see more suitable options among the available established political parties, than do citizens in a two-party system. As a result, they may choose to vote for another established political party, rather than to abstain or to vote for an anti-party alternative.[24]

External political efficacy (i.e. the belief that the political system is basically unresponsive to one's needs) is not significantly related to the choice between voting for an anti-party party and voting for an established party, nor with the choice between anti-party voting and abstention. As could be expected however, it is significantly and even quite strongly related to the choice between non-voting and voting for one of the established political parties. Indeed, a feeling that the political system does not attend to citizens' input and beliefs was found to make it more likely for voters to renounce electoral politics by abstention, rather than to vote for one of the established political parties. The fact that it is not significantly related to voting for an anti-party party suggests that citizens with a lack of confidence in the responsibility of the political system do not generally believe anti-political establishment parties to be more prone to listening to their wants and interests.

Finally, from the coefficients associated with respondents' left-right self-placement it is evident that the Danish People's party and the Norwegian Progress party were especially popular among

citizens with a rightist political orientation, probably because of the conservative rhetoric and extreme anti-immigrant appeals of these parties. Voters with a more rightist political orientation were found to favour a People's party or Progress party vote over both a vote for one of the established political parties and abstention.

In the three vote choice models presented above, the multinomial logit regression coefficients serve as an indicator of the impact of an independent variable on voters' propensity to choose one alternative over another. Although this is informative in itself, the coefficients do not allow us to draw conclusions about the direction of change in the probability of choosing a particular alternative, as a result of a (small) change in one of the independent variables. This is because in the multinomial model, a change in the value of an independent variable for a particular person affects the probability of every outcome for that individual. Since these probabilities are constrained to sum to unity, whether the probability of choosing a particular alternative goes up or down depends on what happens to the other probabilities. Therefore, in effect, the direction of change in the probability of choosing a particular alternative depends not just on the sign of the particular multinomial regression coefficient, but also on the size of that coefficient relative to the size of the other coefficients attached to the same variable.

In substantive terms, this means that we cannot from the multinomial regression coefficients alone infer the effect of anti-partyism on the probability of voting for an established party, voting for an anti-party party and abstention. To establish the effect of anti-party sentiments on vote choice, however, we can look at the predicted probabilities for the vote choice models. For the two main independent variables of interest, specific- and generalized anti-party sentiments, I therefore computed the difference in mean predicted probabilities by varying each term from its minimum to its maximum value while holding all other independent variables constant at their mean values. To facilitate computation and interpretation, the specific- and generalized anti-partyism scales were first dichotomized (0 vs. 1), with the mid-value of the scale included in the second category. Table 7 reports the impact of the specific and generalized anti-partyism variables on the propensity to vote for a particular party-type and to abstain, as estimated from the predicted probabilities of the models with the dichotomized measures of anti-partyism.

First, as could be expected, the findings in table 7 suggest that anti-party feelings consequently incite voters to turn away from 'politics as usual'. Especially the rejection of political parties *per se* is found to have a negative impact on voters' propensity to vote for one of the established political party alternatives.

Table 7: The impact of Specific and Generalized Antipartyism on propensity to vote and to abstain

Choice		Denmark	New Zealand	Norway
Established	Specific antipartysism	-22.3	-13.11	-3.81
	Generalized antipartyism	-30.2	-21.3	-27.8
Anti-party	Specific antipartysim	17.5	15.97	6.82
	Generalized antipartysim	14.3	11.4	17.2
Abstain	Specific antipartysim	4.8	-2.8	-3.01
	Generalized antipartysim	15.8	9.92	10.6

Note: Entries are first differences in mean predicted probabilities of a vote for an established party, anti-party or abstaining, based on different values (1 or 0) for the specific and generalized anti-partyism variables with the values of all other variables held constant.

Somewhat contrary to what we would expect, however, in New Zealand and Norway, generalized anti-party sentiment turns out to have a larger effect on anti-party voting than on abstention, while the magnitude of the effect of generalized anti-partyism on anti-party voting and abstention is almost identical in Denmark. Notwithstanding the possibility that for an individual voter, in deciding between anti-party voting and abstention, generalized-anti-party sentiments might tip the balance towards abstention, something that is suggested in the MNL analyses for Denmark and New Zealand, this means that a rejection of political parties *per se* can also foster an anti-party vote. However, when compared to the effects of specific anti-party sentiment, the impact of generalized anti-party sentiment on abstention turns out to be far greater than the impact of specific anti-party sentiments in the countries of Denmark, Norway and New Zealand.

For specific anti-party sentiments, the effects are more clear-cut. In all three countries, negative feelings towards the traditional party alternatives turn out to have far more impact on the propensity to vote for an anti-party alternative than on the propensity to abstain from voting altogether. Although in this paper the focus is on anti-party parties, rather than on third parties, this finding seems to corroborate Belanger's (2004, p. 1070) earlier conclusion that "all in all, specific anti-party sentiments seem to benefit third parties more than abstention". What is more, and in line with our expectations, specific anti-partyism turns out to have a somewhat larger influence on the propensity of an anti-party vote, than do generalized anti-party sentiments, at least in Denmark and New Zealand.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, the effect of anti-party sentiments on voting behaviour was examined comparatively using individual-level survey data from Denmark, Norway and New Zealand. Public sentiments towards political parties in these countries are broadly similar to those of other contemporary mass publics in Western democracies. Generally, citizens believe political parties to be necessary ingredients to the proper functioning of democracy, while they are at the same time sceptical about the way in which political parties represent their interests (Dalton and Weldon 2005).

The findings in this paper largely corroborate earlier research regarding the possible sources of mass anti-party sentiments (Webb 1996; Miller and Listhaug 1990; Gidengil *et al* 2001). Anti-party feelings are primarily rooted in citizens' direct experiences with political parties and their beliefs about whether politicians and political parties are responsive to their wants and interests. Social background variables were consistently found to play a very modest -if not insignificant- role in explaining negative feelings towards political parties. In contrast to the findings of Webb (1996) and Gidengil *et al.* (2001), however, negative perceptions about the state of the national economy were not found to be associated with a more critical view towards political parties in general. This suggests that while citizens with a dim view towards current economic developments might blame this on the incumbent government or even the major political parties, they are not likely to translate these feelings directly into a more general rejection of political parties as institutions of representative democracy. There is however always the looming possibility for disgruntlement with the established political parties to 'spill over' to political parties at large, as higher levels of specific anti-party sentiments were found to be correlated with greater antipathy towards political parties in general.

As was found in previous work (Gidengil *et al.* 2001; Belanger 2004), the results in this paper show that popular sentiments towards political parties do clearly find expression in citizens' behaviour at Election Day. More importantly, by expanding the empirical evidence to three countries with a multi-party system within a context of proportional representation, the findings in this paper indicate the workings of the 'voice, loyalty and exit model' to be rather similar to the dynamics behind these choices in systems with a majoritarian electoral system with only a limited number of parties. Table 8 below summarizes our empirical findings with regard to the hypotheses presented in part 3 of this paper. These expectations were deduced from earlier research on the workings of the voice, loyalty and exit model.

Disillusionment with the traditional major party alternatives is most likely to find its expression in a vote for an anti-party alternative, rather than in abstention or a vote for one of the established political parties. As such, although no direct evidence to support this claim is presented in this paper, by giving citizens' an opportunity to voice their discontent with 'politics as usual' within the structure of political representation, the anti-establishment parties in Denmark, Norway and New Zealand may perform an important function in fostering electoral participation, thereby counteracting possible alienating forces.

Regarding the electoral effects of generalized anti-party sentiments, however, our expectations are not as unambiguously confirmed by the results of the multinomial logit analyses. While, as expected, the rejection of political parties *per se* was clearly found to drive citizens away from the established political parties towards abstention, it was not constantly associated with a choice for abstention, rather than a vote for an anti-establishment alternative. Only in New Zealand did citizens, when confronted with a choice between abstention and a vote for New Zealand First, clearly favour abstention. In Denmark and Norway however, the anti-party parties profited from generalized anti-party sentiments, as these sentiments made a vote for these parties more likely than a vote for one of the established parties, while the effects on the choice between abstention and anti-party voting were found to be insignificant.

This finding suggests somewhat tentatively that the Danish People's Party and the Norwegian Protest Party were, at the time of study, really perceived to be viable anti-party alternatives able to articulate citizens' disgruntlement with political parties in general, thereby somewhat paradoxically buttressing the very legitimacy of party-based democracy (Fisher 1974). At the same time, citizens in New Zealand might be more inclined to abstain from voting because they did not perceive the New Zealand First party to be a real anti-party alternative. We may therefore interpret these findings as being an illustration of a continuing identity crisis of anti-political establishment parties and even of populist parties in general (Taggert 1995, p. 39; 1996), in that they are constantly swayed between their role as outsider parties, able to articulate fiercely the anti-party sentiments present within their constituencies, and their role as effective policy-bargaining parties, able to satisfy the substantive policy-interests of voters.

At the same time, as Gidengil *et al.* (2001, p. 506) are carefully to point out, it is the importance of generalized anti-partyism to the support of anti-political establishment parties, that raises the question whether voters for these parties actually perceive their party to be a real party (Mudde 1996; Webb 1996). Indeed, if respondents, when answering questions about political parties, only include the established political parties in their frame of reference, then generalized anti-party sentiments might indicate nothing more that the rejection of a particular type of party, rather than a rejection of political parties in general. At the other hand, the finding of specific and generalized anti-party sentiments carrying different electoral connotations, yet once more underlines the unremitting necessity of distinguishing between them (Poguntke 1996; Belanger 2004).

Of the other factors in our voice, loyalty and exit model, identification with one of the established political parties was, as expected, found to have a strong repelling force on citizens' propensity to abstain from voting and to vote for an anti-party alternative. Indeed, partisan feelings towards one of the established parties make loyalty towards one of these parties the most common option at Election Day, while abandoning one of the traditional parties is more likely to be followed by abstention than a vote for an anti-party party (Gidengil *et al.* 2001; Belanger 2004).

Also in accordance with previous research are the very modest effects of social-background variables. The most consistent factor was found to be education, with citizens with higher educational levels generally showing to have a greater propensity to work for change 'within the system' than those with lower educational levels.

Contrary to the findings of Gidengil *et al.* (2001), however, issue alienation from the incumbent party and a perceived lack of issue differentiation were found to be of only minor importance for explaining abstention and anti-party vote choice in Denmark, Norway and New Zealand. This supports the argument that citizens within a multi-party system may be more likely to see ideological differences between the major political parties, and are therefore given better opportunities to voice their discontent with the incumbent parties or a wider range of political parties, by voting for one of the other established parties, most likely those in opposition (see Dalton and Weldon 2005).

As a consequence, abstention and anti-party voting are less likely to be the result of failed issue representation in a multi-party system. In the short run, to the extent that failed issue representation continuously urges people to abandon the party for which they voted previously and to vote for another established alternative, this is more likely to contribute to growing levels of electoral volatility, rather than to overall levels of abstention or the electoral base of anti-political establishment parties. In the long run however, with institutional factors being conducive to their rise, protest parties might prove to be a suitable option for those alienated from the established parties in multi-party systems with proportional representation.

Table 8. Summary of empirical findings.

Hypothesis	Denmark Confirmed?	New Zealand Confirmed?	Norway Confirmed?
1. As specific anti-party sentiments increase, individuals will be more likely to vote for an anti-party than to vote for an established political party	Yes	Yes	Yes
2. As generalized anti-party sentiments increase, individuals will be more likely to abstain from voting than to vote for an established political party	Yes	Yes	Yes
3. In choosing between abstention and voting for an anti-party alternative, specific anti-party sentiments will incite voters to choose for an anti-party alternative, rather than to abstain from voting.	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. In choosing between abstention and voting for an anti-party alternative, generalized anti-party sentiments will incite voters to abstain from voting, rather than to vote for an anti-party alternative.	Yes	Yes	No
5. Issue alienation from the incumbent party increases the odds of both abstaining and voting for an anti-party party.	No	Yes/No	Yes/No
6. Issue alienation from the incumbent party makes voting for an anti-party party more likely than abstaining.	No	No	No
7. A perceived lack of issue differentiation increases the odds of both abstaining and voting for an anti-party party.	No	Yes/No	No
8. A perceived lack of issue differentiation makes abstaining more likely than voting for an anti-party party.	No	Yes	No
9. Party-identification with an established party increases the odds of remaining loyal to that party.	Yes	Yes	Yes
10. Party-identification with an established party makes abstaining more likely than voting for an anti-party party.	Yes	Yes	Yes

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Appendix A: Election Results and Classification of Parties.

Election Results and Classification of Parties			
	Percentage of list votes	Seats won	Classification for analyses*
New Zealand (1996)			
National Party	33.87 %	44 / 120	Established
Labour Party	28.19 %	37	Established
New Zealand First	13.35 %	17	Anti-party
Alliance	10.10 %	13	Established
ACT	6.10 %	8	Established
Christian Coalition	4.33 %	-	Other
Legalise Cannabis Party	1.66 %	-	Other
Other parties	< 1 %	1	Other
Turnout / registered voters	*88.3 %*		
Denmark (1998)			
Social Democratic Party	35.9 %	63 / 175	Established
Liberals	24.0 %	42	Established
Conservative People's Party	8.9 %	16	Established
Danish People's Party	7.4 %	13	Anti-Party
Socialist People's Party	7.6 %	13	Established
Centre Democrats	4.3 %	8	Established
Danish Social Liberal Party	3.9 %	7	Established
Red-Green Alliance	2.7 %	5	Other
Christian People's Party	2.5 %	4	Established
Progress Party	2.4 %	4	Other
New Democracy	0.3 %	0	Other
Other Parties	0 %	0	Other
Turnout / voting age population	*86.0 %*		
Norway (1997)			
Labour Party	35.0 %	65 /165	Established
Progress Party	15.3 %	25	Anti-Party
Christian People's Party	13.7 %	25	Established
Conservative Party	14.3 %	23	Established
Centre Party	7.9 %	11	Established
Socialist Left Party	6.0 %	9	Established
Liberal party	4.5 %	6	Established
Red Electoral Alliance	1.7 %	0	Other
Other	1.6 %	1	Other
Turnout / voting age population	*78.0 %*		

* Parties in the 'other' category were not included in the analyses in this paper.

Appendix B: Question wording and coding details.

Generalized anti-party sentiment – 'Some people say that political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in [country] don't care what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that political parties care what ordinary people think, and five means that they don't care what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?' / 'Some people say that political parties are necessary to make our political system work in [country]. Others think that political parties are not needed in [country]. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that political parties are necessary to make our political system work, and five means that political parties are not needed in [country]), where would you place yourself?'.

Specific anti-party sentiment – 'I'd like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party. If I come to a party you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so. The first party is [Party A]'

Respondent's self-placement – 'In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?'

Respondent's placement of parties – 'Now using the same scale where would you place [part A-F]?'

Identification with an established party – 'Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?' (yes/no) → 'Which party is that?' → 'Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?'

External political Efficacy – 'Some people say that members of [congress/parliament] know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of [congress/parliament] don't know what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that members of [congress/parliament] know what ordinary people think, and five means that the members of [congress/parliament] don't know what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?' / 'Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and five means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself'. The answers to these questions were combined into a simple additive scale and were standardized in order to range from 0 to 1.

Evaluation of national economy – 'Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in [country] has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse?' A dummy variables was created with respondents saying that the economy has 'stayed about the same' as a reference category.

Age	– Respondent's age in years.
Gender	– Respondent's gender (male = 1, female = 0)
Education	– Ordinal scale from least educated to most educated.
Income	- Respondent's Household income, ordinal scale from least fortunate to most fortunate.

Appendix C: Multinomial Logit

The multinomial logit model is a relatively straightforward extension of the binary logit used for dichotomous dependent variables. When the dependent variable has more than two *unordered* categories, multinomial logit is one of the most frequently used strategies to model the choices of individuals among a specific set of alternatives. The model can, together with the conditional logit model, be considered as a specification of the generalized logit model. In modelling the choice of individuals, the generalized logit model incorporates both factors that are specific to the individual (i.e. individual-specific effects) and factors that are specific to the choice-alternatives and have nothing to do with the individual (i.e. choice-specific effects). The multinomial logit model then is a specification of the generalized logit model in that the choice of one alternative over the other is assumed to be rooted in specifics of the individual, not in the attributes of the choices. By contrast, the conditional logit model only incorporates choice-specific effects and leaves aside individual characteristics. In modelling voting behaviour, the decision to use one model alternative over the other is not self-evident. The decision of an individual to vote for a particular political party or to stay home at Election Day is almost inevitably a composite function of both the preferences and evaluations of the individual voter and the characteristics of the behavioural options available to him. There is however a good reason to support the claim that a multinomial logit specification offers a somewhat more truthful approach to modelling voting behavior in democratic elections than does the conditional logit model. In deciding how to act, voters do not unconditionally adopt and use the information they receive. Besides that we would not naively expect all voters to receive all or the same sets of politically relevant information, it is also likely that different voters interpreted political information differently and that new information might shape individuals' considerations in a number of different directions. Therefore, politically relevant information, for example on party characteristics or party performance, can only exert an indirect effect on vote choice by fuelling and amending the perceptions in the minds of individual voters. Choice characteristics can therefore be assumed to be effectively individual-specific.

Since voters may be viewed as choosing from the list of alternatives the option that suits them best, the framework of utility maximization, especially in the form of a random utility model, can be used as a starting point for explaining the characteristics of the multinomial logit model (Greene 2000, pp.857-859; Borooah 2001, pp. 45-46). Imagine a choice situation in which there are M alternatives (j = 1,…, M), and N individuals (i = 1, …, N), then we might represent the utility that the ith individual derives from the jth alternative by U_{ij}. The utility that an individual derives from a specific alternative is assumed to be a linear function of *R* variables that are specific to the individual and *S* variables that

are specific to the choice. The values of the *R* variables representing the characteristics of the *i*th individual are denoted by X_{ir}, *r* = 1 …, R, and the values of the *S* variables representing the attributes of the *j*th choice are denoted by W_{js}, *s* = 1 …, S. The utility function can then be written as a linear function of the variables *R* and S:

$$U_{ij} = \sum_{r=1}^{R} \beta_{jr} X_{ir} + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \gamma_{is} W_{js} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad = Z_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \qquad (1.1)$$

where β_{jr} is the coefficient associated with the *r*th characteristic of the for the *j*th alternative and γ_{is} is the coefficient associated with the *s*th attribute of the *i*th person. An increase in X_{ir}, the value of the *r*th characteristic for person *i*, will cause his or her utility from choice *j* to rise if $\beta_{jr} > 0$ and to fall if $\beta_{jr} < 0$. Accordingly, an increase in W_{js}, the value of the *s*th attribute for choice *j*, will cause the utility to rise for person *i* if $\gamma_{is} > 0$ and to fall if $\gamma_{is} < 0$. The error term ε_{ij} in the equation conveys the fact that the relationship between utility and the variables in the equation is not an exact one as a result of possible measurement error and the possible omission of other relevant variables in the equation. Let Y_i be a random variable that denotes the choice (*j* = 1,…, *M*) made by the *i*th individual. The paradigm of utility maximization states that an individual will only choose a specific alternative *m* (*j* = *m*) if it is the alternative, among all other alternatives, from which he derives the highest level of utility. The statistical model then is driven by the probability that choice *m* is made:

$$\text{Prob}(Y_i = m) = \Pr(U_{im} > U_{ij}) \text{ for all choices j} \neq \text{ m.} \qquad (1.2)$$

It can be shown (McFadden, 1973) that if the *M* error terms ε_{ij} are independently and identically distributed with a Weibull distribution,

$$F(\varepsilon_{ij}) = \exp(-e^{-e_{ij}})$$

then,

$$\Pr(Y_i = m) = \frac{\exp(Z_{im})}{\sum_{j=1}^{M} \exp(Z_{ij})} . \qquad (1.3)$$

This is the generalized logit model and it incorporates both individual-specific and choice-specific information. Since the multinomial logit model does only incorporate individual-specific effects, the utility function (1.1) should be adjusted by setting $\gamma_{is} = 0$. As a consequence:

$$Z_{ij} = \sum_{r=1}^{R} B_{jr} X_{ir} \qquad (1.4)$$

This model is however indeterminate as a consequence of the restriction that the probabilities Pr(Y_i = *j*) over all available alternatives (*j* = 1,…, M) have to sum to 1. Therefore, we have a system of M equations in which only M – 1 of the probabilities can be determined independently. This problem is circumvented by choosing one of the available alternatives as a reference category. By setting $\beta_{1r} = 0$, *r* = 1, … R, the probabilities are uniquely determined and under this normalization Z_{i1} = 0. Note that the decision about which category to set as baseline is arbitrary. It will not affect the overall fit of the model, but it will affect interpretation. Now the choice probabilities of the *i*th individual can be expressed as follows:

$$\Pr(Y_i = 1) = \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{j=2}^{M} \exp\left(Z_{ij}\right)} \qquad (1.5)$$

$$\Pr(Y_i = m) = \frac{\exp\left(Z_{im}\right)}{1 + \sum_{j=2}^{M} \exp\left(Z_{ij}\right)} \quad m = 2, \ldots, M. \qquad (1.6)$$

The probability of an individual to choose a specific alternative j = m, m = (2, …, M) is now compared to the probability of choosing the baseline alternative or reference category m = 1. The predicted log-odds or log-risk ratio, of choosing alternative *m* over the baseline category can be expressed as follows:

$$\text{Log}\left(\frac{\Pr(Y_i = m)}{\Pr(Y_i = 1)}\right) = \sum_{r=1}^{R} \beta_{mr} X_{ir} = Z_{im} \qquad (1.7)$$

Hence, for each case, there will me M-1 predicted log-odds, one for each category relative to the reference category (When m = 1 then log(1) = 0 = $Z_{11,}$ and exp(0) = 1). The risk-ratio is:

$$\frac{\Pr(Y_i = m)}{\Pr(Y_i = 1)} = \exp\left(\sum_{r=1}^{R} \beta_{mr} X_{ir}\right) = \exp(Z_{im}), \quad (m = 2, \ldots.. M). \qquad (1.8).$$

The risk-ratio expresses the 'relative risk' of falling in a specific category relative to the baseline category. It should be distinguished from the odds ratio which refers to the probability of an outcome divided by 1-the probability of that outcome. Whereas there is no difference between the risk-ratio and the odds-ratio in the binary case, since then the base outcome $Y_i = 1$ is simply the outcome $Y_i \neq m$, in a multiple choice option they cannot be equated since then the outcome $Y_i = 1$ and $Y_i \neq m$ are different. The marginal effect of a change in the value of a determining variable X_{ir} (value of the *r*th determining variable for person i) on the risk ratio of choosing a particular outcome *m* over the reference category ($\Pr(Y_i = m) / \Pr(Y_i = 1)$) can be found by taking the first derivate of the log-risk ratio:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial X_{ir}} \log\left(\frac{\Pr ob(Y_i = m)}{\Pr ob(Y_i = 1)}\right) = \beta_{mr}$$

The relative probability of choosing alternative *m* increases if $\beta_{mr} > 0$ and decreases if $\beta_{mr} < 0$. In other words, each parameter in the multinomial logit model gives the predicted marginal effect of an explanatory factor on the log-odds of a given choice relative to the baseline choice.

An important assumption of the multinomial logit model is that the risk-ratio of choosing a particular alternative over the baseline category is independent of the risk-ratio's for choosing any of the other alternatives over de reference category. In other words, it is assumed that the relative odds between any two outcomes are independent of the number and nature of other outcomes being simultaneously considered. This property is the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA). It is a consequence of the assumed independence of the disturbances in the random utility model of equation (1.1). We could say that the IIA assumption requires that the odds ratio for any two choices is independent of changes in the probabilities of other choices. That is: adding an alternative to the choice set represents an increase in that alternative's probability from zero. As a consequence, the probabilities of the other alternatives already taken into account should decrease proportionally, so that the odds ratios among them remain constant. In reality however, this assumption of a uniform percentage drop in all the existing probabilities is not always realistic. Indeed, in the light of this paper, it would be somewhat unrealistic to assume that the propensity of a dissatisfied voter to abstain from voting as compared to voting for an established political party is totally unaffected by the presence or disappearance of an anti-party alternative. Estimating a

multinominal probit model, which does not make the IIA assumption, might provide us with a way out of the limitations and restrictions that are associated with the IIA assumption in multinominal logit models. However, since the multinominal probit model assumes that the disturbance terms in the random utility model follow a normal distribution, calculating parameter estimates for such a model involves the evaluation of multiple integrals over the normal distribution. Computing multivariate normal probabilities for any dimensionality higher than two is however a rather difficult and time-consuming task and sometimes requires the imposition of equality restrictions on the standard deviations in order for the MNP model to be fully identified (Greene 2000, p. 872). The question is whether the efforts of estimating a MNP model with all its difficulties and possible interpretational problems outweigh the possible consequences of violating the IIA assumption in multinomial models (Lacy & Burden 1998, Whitten & Palmer 1996). After comparing the results of a MNP model of vote choice and turnout in the 1992 US presidential election with the results of a MNL model, Burden and Lacy (1998) concluded that the results of the MNL model were quite similar to the results of the MNP model, despite violations of the IIA assumption.

Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Values	Country					
		Denmark		**Norway**		**New Zealand**	
		Frequency	**%**	**Frequency**	%	**Frequency**	**%**
Evolution of national economy	Worse Same Better	274 992 590 N = 1856 DK/ NA= 145	14.8 53.4 31.8	44 1116 977 N = 2037 DK/NA= 18	2.2 49.9 48.0	830 1368 37.2 N = 3714 DK/ NA = 366	22.3 36.8 40.8
Generalized anti-partyism							
Parties care what people think	1 (parties care) 2 3 4 5 (parties do not care)	334 612 596 228 196 N = 1966 DK/NA= 35	17.0 31.1 30.3 11.6 10.0	172 617 860 281 119 N = 2049 DK/NA= 6	8.4 30.1 42.0 13.7 5.8	186 838 1529 924 527 N = 4004 DK/ NA = 76	4.6 20.9 38.2 23.1 13.2
Parties are necessary	1 (necessary) 2 3 4 5 (not necessary)	1386 344 168 42 36 N = 1976 DK/ NA = 25	70.1 17.4 8.5 2.1 1.8	1381 434 166 40 26 N = 2047 DK/NA= 13	67.5 21.2 8.1 2.0 1.3	1548 1293 796 220 132 N = 3989 DK /NA = 91	38.8 32.4 20.0 5.5 3.3
Specific anti-partyism (scale scores)	0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00	190 632 754 356 69	9.5 31.6 37.7 17.8 3.4	252 784 733 254 32	12.3 38.2 35.7 12.4 1.6	0.00: 1100 0.33: 1552 0.67: 1223 1.00: 195	27.2 38.0 30.0 4.8
External Efficacy							
Do MP's know what people think?	1 (MP's know) 2 3 4 5 (MP's do not know)	224 598 624 270 260 N = 1976 DK/ NA = 25	11.3 30.3 31.6 13.7 13.2	105 556 881 357 143 N = 2042 DK/NA= 13	5.1 27.2 43.1 17.5 7.0	121 667 1454 1133 655 N = 4030 DK/NA = 50	3.0 16.6 36.1 28.1 16.3
Does voting make a difference?	1 (no difference) 2 3 4 5 (difference)	136 156 189 402 1087 N = 1970 DK/ NA = 31	6.9 7.9 9.6 20.4 55.2	78 113 288 696 875 N = 2050 DK/NA = 5	3.8 5.5 14.0 34.0 42.7	180 303 553 1266 1749 N = 4051 DK/ NA = 29	4.4 7.5 13.7 31.3 43.2
Party identification with established	0 No identifier 1 Identifier	1511 490 N = 2001	75.5 24.5	1268 787 N = 2055	61.7 38.3	2332 1748 N = 4080	57.2 42.8
Left-Right self-placement	0-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10	185 368 661 560 158	9.6 19.1 34.2 29.0 8.2	204 483 719 507 97	10.1 24.0 35.8 25.2 4.8	315 731 968 1215 339	9.6 22.4 29.6 27.9 10.4
Lack of issue representation (absolute differences)	0-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10	97 471 804 390 172	5.0 24.4 41.6 20.2 8.9	173 657 747 335 63	8.8 63.8 37.8 17.0 3.2	272 662 1087 908 261	8.5 20.7 34.1 28.5 8.1
Alienation from incumbent party (absolute differences)	0-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10	1248 532 106 19 2	65.4 27.9 5.5 1.0 0.0	1317 436 146 41 8	67.6 22.4 7.5 3.1 0.5	1623 550 482 242 118	53.8 18.3 16.0 8.0 3.9

[1] Dalton & Weldon (2005) based their analysis on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES, module I, 1996-2000). The countries that were included in their analyses: Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA.

[2] According to Lacy and Burden (1999), "omitting abstention as a choice [in vote choice models] leads to potentially erroneous conclusions about the effects of explanatory variables on vote choice" (p. 234).

[3] One might conceivably dispute the adequacy of labeling the party-systems of Canada, Britain and Australia as two-party systems, as in all three countries, third parties and minor opposition parties have at times gained some electoral support at the national level. Also, these small parties have sometimes been able to acquire seats in parliament. At the same time, however, these parties have never managed to actually threaten the factual hegemony of the two major parties in forming single-party governments and in playing a dominant role in every-day politics. Therefore, the party systems of Canada, Britain and Australia are referred to in this paper as two-party systems.

[4] For other longitudinal studies on political party support one might also view → USA: Owen &Dennis (1996), Wattenberg 1996; Germany: Falter & Rattinger (1997); Canada: Kornberg & Clarke (1992); Sweden: Holmberg (1999).

[5] Regrettably, the CSES data used in this paper did not contain a measure of objective political knowledge for respondents in Denmark. Also, the knowledge items for New Zealand and Norway can not be compared, as respondents in these two countries were asked different items that measured their political knowledge. Therefore, political knowledge is not incorporated in the multinomial models in this paper.

[6] In all three countries, lower-house elections are held in single-member constituencies. Canada and the UK have a plurality (First- Past-the-Post) system; Australia has an Alternative Vote system.

[7] See Cox (1997) and the volume edited by Grofmann and Lijphart (1986, ch 1-3) for an extensive overview of the scholarly discussion on the merits and flaws of Duverger's (1954) propositions.

[8] The wasted vote argument has however been fiercely contested exactly on the grounds that its underlying assumption of individual voter's calculations based on the expected utility derived from voting might not be warranted (for a concise discussion, see: Riker 1986). There is however some empirical evidence favoring the expected utility rationale in the work of Aldrich (1976); Cain (1978) and Black (1978).

[9] The countries included in the Dalton & Weldon (2005) study: Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, N-Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA.

[10] The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (www.cses.org). CSES MODULE 1 FULL RELEASE [dataset]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor]. August 4, 2003. The CSES data can be downloaded from the website: http://www.cses.org.

[11] The second CSES module (1996-2000) did not contain questions on citizens' views towards political parties. Currently, researchers are working on the third CSES module.

[12] Also Poguntke (1996) and Dalton & Weldon (2005) classify the Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People's party as an anti-party party. Poguntke (1996) does not consider political parties in New Zealand, but the New Zealand First party is considered to be an anti-party party in the work of Dalton & Weldon (2005).

[13] See Appendix B for the exact wording of the questions. Both items are measured on a five-point scale. For both questions, the percentages of respondents in the two highest categories of the scale were calculated and token as a measure of agreement with the stated propositions.

[14] It is long known that electoral turnout is considerably overestimated in electoral surveys. Two recent studies on overreporting of voting behaviour in electoral surveys are Bernstein *et al*. 2001 and Duff *et al.* 2007.

[15] Statistically, the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption' (IIA) that underlies multinomial logit is violated. Strictly speaking, multinomial probit modelling should be used to model the choice between voice, loyalty and exit. See Appendix C for more details on the choice for a multinomial logit model.

[16] The Alpha reliability coefficients for the scale are 0.446 for Denmark; 0.291 for Norway and 0.440 for New Zealand.

[17] According to Poguntke (1996), it might simply be impossible to empirically differentiate between generalized and specific anti-party sentiments. For the countries in this paper however, low correlations between both measures of anti-partyism were found. The correlation between both measures is respectively 0.12 for Denmark, 0.15 for New Zealand and 0.08 for Norway. These low correlations suggest that both kinds of measures do at least partially measure different dimensions of anti-partyism, at least for the countries that are studied in this paper.

[18] In the CSES questionnaire, no question about the positions of voters and the perceived position of parties on issues of immigration/integration was asked. Given the anti-immigrant and xenophobic appeals of extreme-right anti-party parties, especially electoral support for these parties could have been explained by congruence of position of voters and parties on this dimension. In this paper, the left-right ideological continuum is used as an indicator for the integration-migration dimension.

[19] Ideally, the models should also include control variables for respondents' financial situation (income), overall satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and evaluations of the state of the national economy (Kinder & Kiewit 1979, Lewis-Beck 1988). However, due to the large number of missing values for these variables, inclusion would lead to an unacceptable low number of non-voters in the MNL models, which would severely impair the stability of the data-analysis.

[20] Multicollinearity does not seem to pose severe problems to the stability of the OLS and MNL analyses in this report. In all three countries studied, the highest zero-order correlations were found between the measures of respondents' external political efficacy and generalized anti-partyism, the absolute values (Pearson r) being respectively: .469 in Denmark, .399 in Norway, and .485 in New Zealand. In addition, the variance inflation factors (VIF) from the OLS regression models, indicating whether a predictor has a strong linear relationship with any of the other predictor(s), are relatively low (< 1.18). This value is well below the conventional, albeit arbitrary, VIF level of 10 that is commonly taken as an indication that multicollinearity may be unduly influencing regression estimates (see Myers 1990; Belsley 1991).

[21] In a separate analysis with only the socio-demographic variables in the model, adding respondents' subjective evaluations about the economy did not significantly increase the predictive power (adjusted R^2) of the models in all three countries.

[22] The percentages of respondents who believed that political parties are not necessary for the functioning of democracy are: *Denmark:* Established: 3.1/ Anti-party: 9.3/ Abstained 9.2. *New Zealand*: Established: 7.1/ Anti-party: 8.3 / Abstained: 12.7. *Norway:* Established: 2.6/ Anti-party: 12.7 / Abstained: 3.9.

[23] Separate analyses without party-Identification included in the models were performed. Generally, this did not result in different substantive conclusions. In all three countries, excluding party-ID resulted in somewhat larger coefficients for generalized anti-partyism for all three choices in the MNL models. Nowhere did the sign or significance of the effects of generalized anti-partyism change. For the effects of specific anti-partyism, in the analyses for Denmark and New Zealand, excluding party-ID resulted in the coefficients for the choice between non-voting and established party voting attaining statistical significance, though not in larger effect sizes. In Norway, the exclusion of party-ID had no significant consequences for the parameters of the specific-anti-partyism measure.

[24] One may express concerns with the stability of the data-analysis due to the small number of non-voters in the CSES data file and in the eventual MNL analyses. However, no less than 100 non-voters were available in every analysis. The numbers of abstainers in the MNL analyses are: Denmark: 103 = 8.4%, New Zealand: 227 = 7.0%, Norway: 250 = 14.6%. Since the actual level of abstention is underestimated here, the results of the data analyses are conservative with respect to the effect of anti-party sentiments on electoral turnout.