

Bachelor Thesis

University of Twente
School of Management and
Governance
Bachelor Public Administration

Marc Bakker
S0051993
August 2011

Supervisor:
Dr. J.S. Clancy

Second reader:
Dr. P.J. Klok

China in Africa, a challenge for European development cooperation a case study to the implications for Angola

Abstract

This research focuses on the consequences of increased Chinese engagement in Africa for European development policy. Chinese development policy differs from European development policy, in the sense that no political conditions are attached to aid and trade, while European policy has strong political conditions attached. These political conditions try to promote human rights, good governance and democratic rule and to fight corruption. Political conditionality can be used as an instrument for foreign policy. But also gaining trade benefits with aid relations can be seen as a form of political conditionality.

This research is conducted by a literature study combined with interviews with politicians, policy makers, policy advisors and scientists. The central question in this thesis is: *How does the European Union respond, in its development cooperation policy, to the growing influence of China in Africa?* In this study Angola is used as a case study.

Angola is one of the most important partners of China in Sub-Saharan Africa, at the same moment this country has tight relations with the EU. Therefore it is an interesting case to study.

Chinese engagement undermines the goals of European development policy, since it focuses on economic growth and Chinese interests. Chinese projects in Africa are often conducted by Chinese workers, this does result in unemployment for the local African population.

The EU reacts by suggesting low-level trilateral dialogues between China, the EU and Africa. These dialogues focus mostly on projects and not at government levels. At the same moment the attention for political conditionality in Europe seems to decrease.

Samenvatting

Dit onderzoek richt zich op de gevolgen van de toegenomen Chinese betrokkenheid in Afrika voor het Europese ontwikkelingsbeleid. Het Chinese ontwikkelingsbeleid verschilt van het Europees ontwikkelingsbeleid, in die zin dat er geen politieke voorwaarden zijn verbonden aan hulp en handel, terwijl het Europese beleid een sterke verbinding heeft met politieke voorwaarden. Deze politieke condities proberen de mensenrechten, goed bestuur en democratie te bevorderen en corruptie te bestrijden. Politieke conditionaliteit kan worden gebruikt als een instrument voor het buitenlands beleid. Maar ook het verkrijgen van de handelsvoordelen met hulprelatie kan worden gezien als een vorm van politieke conditionaliteit.

Dit onderzoek is uitgevoerd door middel van een literatuurstudie in combinatie met interviews met politici, beleidsmakers, beleidsmedewerkers en wetenschappers. De centrale vraag in dit proefschrift is: Hoe werkt de Europese Unie, reageren in het beleid voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking, om de groeiende invloed van China in Afrika? In deze studie Angola wordt gebruikt als een casestudy.

Angola is een van de belangrijkste partners van China in Sub-Sahara Afrika, op hetzelfde moment heeft Angola nauwe betrekkingen met de EU. Daarom is het een interessante zaak om te studeren.

Chinese betrokkenheid ondermijnt de doelen van het Europese ontwikkelingsbeleid, omdat het zich richt op de economische groei en Chinese belangen. Chinese projecten in Afrika worden vaak uitgevoerd door Chinese arbeiders, die leidt tot de werkloosheid voor de lokale Afrikaanse bevolking.

De EU reageert door te suggereren low-level trilaterale dialoog tussen China, de EU en Afrika. Deze dialogen richten zich voornamelijk op projecten en niet op regeringsniveau. Op hetzelfde moment is de aandacht voor de politieke voorwaarden in Europa lijkt af te nemen.

Abbreviations

EDF	European Development Fund
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission
EEC	European Economic Community
EC	European Community
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
G77	a loose coalition of 131 developing countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

Contents

- Abstract 1
- Samenvatting..... 2
- Abbreviations 3
- 1. Introduction..... 6
 - 1.1. Aim and research questions 7
- 1. Methodology 8
 - 1.1. Research design..... 8
 - 1.2. Methods and data collection..... 8
 - 1.2.1. Literature review 9
 - 1.2.2. Semi-structured interviews 9
 - 1.3. Limitations..... 10
- 2. Theory..... 11
 - 2.1. Political conditionality 11
 - 2.1.1. Definition of political conditionality 11
 - 2.1.2. Does political conditionality work? 12
 - 2.1.3. Critiques on political conditionality..... 12
 - 2.2. South-South Cooperation..... 13
 - 2.3. Conclusion 14
- 3. China in Africa..... 15
 - 3.1. History of Chinese-African relations..... 15
 - 3.2. Chinese activities in Africa..... 16
 - 3.3. China and political conditionality..... 17
 - 3.4. China and corruption in Africa 18
 - 3.5. China in Angola..... 18
 - 3.5.1. Financial cooperation 19
 - 3.5.2. Extractive industries 19
 - 3.5.3. Foreign direct investment 20
 - 3.5.4. Bilateral trade..... 20
 - 3.6. Conclusion 21
- 4. EU in Africa 22
 - 4.1. A development superpower 22
 - 4.1.1. EU-Africa Strategy 23
 - 4.1.2. Joint-EU Africa strategy 23

4.1.3.	From Aid to Economic Partnership.....	24
4.2.	Conditionality	24
4.2.1.	Fighting corruption.....	25
4.3.	Europe in Angola	25
4.3.1.	Short term goals	25
4.3.2.	Medium and long term goals	26
4.4.	Conclusion	26
5.	European Response to China in Africa	28
5.1.	Common objectives.....	28
5.2.	European Union debates.....	28
5.2.1.	European Parliaments report on China's policy and its effects on Africa	28
5.2.2.	Trilateral dialogue.....	29
5.3.	Implications for Angola	30
5.4.	Conclusion	31
6.	Conclusion	32
	References.....	34
	Appendices	37
	Appendix I General Frame of interviews.....	37
	Appendix II Participating interviewees.....	38

1. Introduction

It seems that China woke. The role of China in international relations is increasing, and international politics is changing. Is the world shaking? What are the implications for the European Union?

The presence of China in Africa is growing. China offers loans and aid, it promotes investments and remits high debts, but it also creates a market for Chinese products and secures the supply of resources to China. China does this for the short-term oil supplies, which are necessary for the rapidly growing Chinese economy, but also on long-term to position itself as an important global player in the international oil market (Dijk, 2007, p.584).

Chinese investments help the continent, on short-term, with the building of infrastructure, which is welcomed by most. At the same moment, the Chinese demand for energy has resulted in inflated prices, and high incomes for these states. In 2004 the economic growth on the African continent was almost 4,5% (Campos, 2008, p.39).

China's engagement in Africa is not new. There is archaeological evidence that shows there were contacts between China and Africa during the Sung Dynasty (960-1279). But for the purpose of this thesis, only the period of decolonialization and independence will be regarded. China was not an important geo-political player in the process of decolonialization, although it supported most countries in their attempts to get independence. Most of these struggles took place during the cold war, the most prominent powers of the cold war were also most active in the independence struggles.

China's post-cold war relations with Africa have been characterized by aid agreements. In the struggle for independence in Africa, China was willing to assist the new nation states with prestigious projects, emphasizing that it had given all it could in terms of financial and technical resources.¹⁵ China's strategy was simple: it was trying to cultivate as many allies as it could and maintain old friendships. Today, relations between China and Africa are more pragmatic. Trade and mutual benefits are central in current partnerships. However, China still supports a number of African countries with direct aid. Three major themes can be distinguished: building projects; Chinese medical teams; and scholarships for Africans to study in China (Aguilar, 2009, p.1544)(Keukeleire, 2008).

The recently active role played by China in Africa attracts attention. After the cold war most of the development relations Africa had were with European countries and the United States. China was only a small development power, but recent changes made China an important player.

As mentioned European countries and the EU are important aid donors. The EU and its member states are the largest aid donor in the world. Africa was priority of the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union (EU) in 2007. In December 2007, a summit was held in Lisbon where the EU and the African Union (AU) adopted a new strategy for the relations with Africa and a series of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were signed with former colonies (the ACP countries, including many African countries). These EPAs replace the Cotonou Agreement, because it did not comply with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). There are two other reasons why the EU wanted to talk with the African states. First, because the illegal flow of Africans trying to reach Europe, continues. Second, Brussels is concerned about what China is doing in Africa. This thesis will look at

the strategy of the Chinese in Africa and has taken Angola as an example, a country that has long ties with China.

1.1. Aim and research questions

China's financial support to Africa is often interpreted as having a possible deterrent effect on EU political influence and conditionality¹, therefore effectiveness of European aid development is at stake. Political conditionality is a main characteristic of European development aid. After the end of the cold war international politics changed, including western involvement in Africa. China is becoming a new world power, with a different approach to Africa and its development than traditional aid donors. An important difference between the EU and China is that China uses the principle of non-interference, instead of political conditionality². This development offers new opportunities for Africa, but there are also threads at stake. After a period of Western dominance in African development, a new era has started. With new superpowers like China, India and Brazil getting involved in African development, consequences for European development policy are inevitable.

The central question of the thesis is: *"How does the European Union respond, in its development cooperation policy, to the growing influence of China in Africa?"* In this study Angola is used as a case study.

Angola is chosen as an example because it is one of the most important partners of China in Africa. Angola has the third largest oil reserves of sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria and Sudan. But at the same moment Angola is among the poorest countries in the world. Since Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975, the country has had a development relationship with the EU. Angola is probably one of the countries in Africa where the differences between the European and Chinese approach to development are most visible.

To answer the central question, both China's and EU's Africa policies in general, and policies towards Angola especially, will be elaborated upon. The differences between both policies are huge as we look at the goals of the policies and the conditions attached to aid.

Before starting with the overview of the Africa policies of China and the EU, conditionality will be explained. Conditionality has been a key characteristic of European development policy. Chinese Africa policy is characterized by non-interference in national politics.

After giving an overview of China's and EU's Africa policies, an evaluation of debates on the consequences for European development policy with the Chinese involvement in Africa will be made.

¹ In Chapter 2 the concept of political conditionality will be explained further.

² In Chapter 3 the Chinese foreign policy will be explained.

1. Methodology

1.1. Research design

The research strategy used is a combination of a general study with a case study. The general study is used to give an overview of the development aid policies of China and the European Union in Africa. The case study is used to the specific policies of both China and the EU in Angola give an opportunity to evaluate the effects of the policies. For instance, a case study can scrutinize the effects of a certain policy that has been implemented, it can describe an intervention and the context where it was utilized, or investigate situations where a certain endeavour did not lead to clear results. A case study can also be used to focus on a certain issue and to get more insights in the practice of a certain policy. In this research the interaction between different policies has been focused on. The case study is not only explorative; it intends to explore the nature of the changes in conditionality within the European aid policy, which happens at the same moment in time as the growing presence of China in Angola. It also is used to explain why changes in the policy have been made. These events are of course independent of each other, but international actors do not act in a vacuum. Actions of one actor can have influence on the policies of another actor. The general study of the policies intends to get understanding of how different international actors, the European Union and China, act as aid-powers and which consequences these could have for the policies of each other. This does not imply that there is a causal relation between a policy decision of one of these actors and a policy change of the other. Strength of this combination of a general and a case study is that it can handle many different types of empirical material and methods; policy documents, interviews, other research papers and political debates.

A weakness of case-study research is that generalisation of outcomes is often very difficult. In this research only one factor, which possibly has influence on European policy choices for development aid, is being taken into account. Undoubtedly, there are many more factors and actors which have influence in some way on the policy choices. The influence of countries like India, Brazil and Arabic countries are examples of other influences, but also changing political preferences in Europe, economic recession and international terrorism, etc.

A weakness of the combination of a case-study and a general study is that country-specific situations, like the natural resource richness of Angola, are used in the general conclusions. Certain policy choices of China can be specific for this situation and therefore may not apply for other countries. To overcome this problem, the general policy choices of China and the EU in Africa will be taken into account.

1.2. Methods and data collection

The methods and techniques used for gathering, organizing and analyzing data for this research are predominantly qualitative ones. However, quantitative data was used to complement and support or indicate the results of the qualitative data. Typical for qualitative research is the use of different data sources and the emphasis on understanding of individuals, groups or situations, in this case policies. The use of a flexible research design which can still change during the research is part of its characteristics. Central to qualitative research is that a phenomenon preferably must be studied within its own context.

Often in qualitative research, data, and therefore the results and conclusions, are characterized as subjective and not reliable. It is indeed difficult for a qualitative study to repeat the same circumstances, because research is conducted on a location where many factors are not under control. Moreover, with the exception of pure experimental studies in a laboratory setting, this also applies to a lesser extent, quantitative research. In the field of studies of international relations and political science it is difficult to make a research design of an experimental study.

Validity and reliability of data and statements are typical quality criteria for quantitative research. But these concepts can still be used (Baarda, 2009, p.109). Some say that the validity of qualitative research can be stronger than that of quantitative, in the field of social research. In conducting open interviews a better understanding can be achieved of what one means by a certain concept. The possibility for a researcher to go into depth of the meaning of concepts for quantitative research is less available than for qualitative research (Babbie, 2001, p. 299). The problem of reliability in qualitative research is much bigger. In-depth research measurements are often very personal, and are strongly influenced by the reference-framework of the researcher. To limit the problem of reliability, it is important to wary for purely descriptive measurements.

The analysis will be based on both primary data, predominately collected through interviews with politicians, researchers and government officials³, as well by official government documents and transcripts of political debates in the European Parliament and the Dutch Parliament. Also academic literature, news articles and reports from international organizations are used. So, besides interviews other procedures, such as revising and analyzing documents, are used to understand the issue under study. This triangulation of methods is useful to acquire broader knowledge about the matter and it illuminates different facets of the topic (Boeije, 2008, p 26). For triangulation different data collection methods are used to collect data on the same research units. When the data on the phenomenon, which is collected by using these various sources, shows similar results and thus converges the data might be valid (Baarda, 2009, p. 200). Using triangulation can only give an indication on the validity of the data, but it gets stronger when more sources of data are used.

A problem in this specific research is that official documents and statements of government officials do not always reflect the reality of the field. Political preferences, diplomatic difficulties and historic backgrounds of international relations play an important role in these sources of information. This means that these sources cannot be used in the same way as scientific literature. This does not mean that these sources cannot be used at all, but there must be support of other sources as well.

1.2.1. Literature review

Interviews are a useful and functional methodological tool; nevertheless, they require a scientific basis to formulate good questions. Therefore the importance of a thorough literature review before carrying out the interviews, and as the research is being carried out, cannot be overemphasized. In relation to this, the study will make use of an extensive literature review and look into areas such as the direction of the Chinese development aid and investments in Africa, European development aid and theoretic background on political conditionality. The introduction has already shed some light on some important aspects regarding the thematic background to the research problem. This will be expanded to get broad and in-depth knowledge of the problematic put under inquiry.

1.2.2. Semi-structured interviews

Interviews are used to find out what people know, think, feel or want, on certain topics, persons or events. When using interviews, you can choose between different forms. Interviews offer a more comprehensive understanding about the research subject than those offered by statistics and questionnaires. For this research semi-structured interviews were used, using relatively open questions.

In conducting the interviews a general frame was used to guide the interviews, however for each interview some specific questions were asked in the field of expertise of the interviewee (see

³ In section 1.2.2 the use of interviews will be explained further, in appendix 1 there is an outline of the questions used in the interviews.

appendix 1). During the process of the research, some changes were made to the questions, based on experiences of other interviews, which made them more suitable for this study.

In recruiting interviewees, there was made use of different techniques. First, a selection was made, based on literature of organizations which hold expertise in the field of this research. This can be partially for one, or more of the topics which were in the focus of this research. Secondly, a technique which is called gatekeepers was used. A gatekeeper is a person who can provide access to groups that focus on a particular study, in this case organization. Often these gatekeepers are researchers who have written articles used in the literature study, but also politicians or directors in organizations. A third technique is called snowballing; in this technique one contact can help in recruiting another contact (Boeije, 2008, p. 21).

Contacts for interviews were made via e-mail, and often appointments were made to do interviews by phone. The interview with Mr. Ton de Bruin, Ambassador for the Netherlands in Angola was conducted via e-mail.

All interviews took place with time pressure, which of course limited the amount of questions that could be posed. The names of all interviewees can be found in appendix 2. Depending on native language of the interviewee the interview took place in either English or Dutch.

A difficult group to reach are politicians. Many of them wish not to cooperate in these interviews since they get many requests to take part in such interviews, and they have only very little time. Therefore most quotes of politicians were found in the transcripts of political debates in the European Parliament and the Dutch parliament.

Since there are no quantitative selection criteria used for selecting the interviewees, the participant sample is not representative. Using techniques as gatekeepers and snowballing to find participants always gives an incomplete image of the reality. It creates the risk of only getting a small overview of what is really going on. This risk was limited by using multiple "snowballs" and selecting participants with different backgrounds. Also the use of literature was used to compensate, additional data can be retrieved from literature to support, criticize or reject information gained by the interviews.

1.3. Limitations

Conducting qualitative research always brings some limitations to the generalisation of found outcomes. Since the group of interviewees is not representative the outcomes cannot and will not be generalized. It is not in the purpose of the research to make general statements.

Another limitation is the availability of data. Since China is subject of analysis, it is important to get a good overview of Chinese opinions and motives for some political choices. It was very difficult to find Chinese officials to take part in this research. This resulted in the fact that the Chinese position had to be formulated out of official government documents and scientists dealing with China. This can result in a very limited overview of Chinese motives. And causes this thesis is written from a European perspective. This is even strengthened by the fact that the interviews were dominantly held with people with a background in Dutch and European politics and policy making.

Another limitation is that no actual field research was conducted. When a part of the research could have been conducted in Angola, interviews with people working directly with the effects of Chinese and European presence could have been held a more complete and accurate overview of the effects of Chinese engagement would have been made visible.

2. Theory

2.1. Political conditionality

“For donor governments, development assistance has been – and still is – an instrument to pursue foreign policy objectives” (Stokke, 2006, p.2). These objectives differ for each donor, and are not always clear. Many states explain their development aid policy as targeting poverty and ensuring sustainable development in recipient countries.

European Official Development assistance is characterized by its link with issues of human rights, democracy and good governance, also known as political conditionality. It originates from the structural adjustment programs which were initiated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The original goals of this political conditionality were market liberalisation, administrative reform and budget balance (Stokke, 2006, p.1). Between these two generations of political conditionality, the main distinction is that it originally focused on economic policy reform and later on political reform. In the post-cold war period, development aid policy objectives of many donor governments were the promotion of civil and political rights, democratic government and accountable and effective governance. Crawford makes a distinction between positive and negative support. Positive support is aimed at specific aid projects and programmes which strengthen respect for human rights and democratic rule. Negative support means aid sanctions in cases of violations of human rights or lack of democratization and state corruption. Most definitions of political conditionality only focus on this negative support (Crawford, 1997, p. 70).

2.1.1. Definition of political conditionality

The definition of political conditionality is important to understand its implications, but there are different definitions used in the literature. One of the elements in all definitions is the use of pressure. The donor can threaten to reduce, suspend or even terminate aid, if the recipient does not meet the conditions.

Stokke (2006, p.14) distinguishes six levels of conditionality:

1. The highest level he calls *the systemic level*, which consists of interventions in the system of government and governing institutions. Pressures for democratic reform and introduction of a multi-party system and pressures for improvement of human-rights belong to this level.
2. Pressures which aim at changing *national policies and priorities* are the second level of conditionality. This can involve economic policy, but also human rights, democracy and ‘good governance’.
3. Interventions which attempt to change *specific policies* are the third level of conditionality. There is an overlap with level 2 interventions, but these interventions are focused to change policies within just a sector or area.
4. *Programme/project level* interventions are the fourth level of conditionality. This can involve institutional reform, official regulations and financial or personnel contributions with reference to the environments of aid activity. This is often also about the way in which recipients use their own resources.
5. *Financial conditions* are the fifth level of conditionality. This can involve the distinction between grants and credits⁴, but also the specific terms of credits.
6. *Administrative conditions* are the last level of conditionality interventions. These involve procedures for the transfer of resources, accounting, reporting, evaluation, privileges, etc.

There are different reasons for the use of political conditionality. The first reason is the promotion of security. Donor countries can request low military spending from the recipient country. This should

⁴ This distinction mainly focuses on whether or not the loan has to be repaid under which conditions this is. It could be for example that there is no interest rate attached to the loan, or one below market-level.

help in maintaining the security of the donor, since a country with little military capacity is less likely to start a military conflict with another country, or represses its people with force. But it can also have a different purpose, when military spending is low, there are more resources available for development and addressing poverty.

A second reason can be to spread western ideologies and values, such as democracy and respect for human rights. Donors value the spread of good governance and those ideologies as their moral obligation, whereby aid can be used as allocation tool (Zanger, p.296).

A third reason can be the fostering of economic development. Improving democratic governance and human rights is believed to be “a significant determinant of the developmental returns to ODA” (Zanger, p. 297). By implementing those conditions, the donors hope to achieve the development goals easier and better. Haynes states it as: “*Driven by a presumption that a prime cause of Africa’s economic weaknesses and political instability was a lack of democratic governments, Western countries sought to pressurize regional authoritarian regimes- vulnerable to such pressure because they desperately needed foreign aid- to democratize*” (2005, p.62).

2.1.2. Does political conditionality work?

Important in discussions on aid is always the effects of measures which are taken. Also in discussions on political conditionality this plays a role. Stokke puts forward some general propositions on the factors which may have impact on political conditionality and sanctions:

1. The domestic position of the recipient government and its power basis, weak or strong.
2. The recipient government’s ability to use the occasion of external intervention to strengthen its position domestically, at least in the short run.
3. The extent of dependency on aid of the recipient country and, in particular, the importance of the aid at stake, in relation to the total aid package to the Gross National Product (GNP).
4. The magnitude and importance of the bilateral relations
5. The probability that a unilateral action may have a snowball effect
6. An internationally co-ordinated action by donors stands a better chance of success than a unilateral action in terms of attaining the policy reforms pursued (Stokke, p.42-45, Crawford, 2011, p.72).

One of the donors which uses political conditionality in its aid is the European Union. The EU believes that conditionality can be effective, when applied in the proper way: “*the principle of conditionality should apply in an appropriate manner, including through the withdrawal of incentives when a third country does not co-operate in the effective implementation of its readmission obligation, without prejudice to existing international legal obligations.*” (Council of the European Union, 2011, p.3). It must be said that the EU does not make a statement on the level of political conditionality to which this may apply. But this statement shows that the Council of the European Union still believes in political conditionality as an appropriate mean of achieving goals.

This statement also shows that the EU has a different opinion about political conditionality than for example China, which in its official statements always underlines the non-interference principle. In chapter 3 and 4 the visions of China and the EU on political conditionality will be explained further.

2.1.3. Critiques on political conditionality

Sørensen describes three controversies concerning political conditionality. The first is the issue of double standards (or foul play). Many critics to political conditionality state that donor countries employ double standards by applying political conditionality when it is politically expedient and not when other economic or security interests are at stake. A Ugandan observer, John-Jean B. Barya, came with a clear denunciation:

“... the new political conditionalities have nothing to do with a desire of Western countries to actually encourage democracy in Africa. For a long time Western countries supported dictatorship in for instance Zaire, Liberia, Uganda and Kenya. France distinguished itself in supporting dictators with open military interventions on their behalf against popular opposition. With the collapse of the Soviet-led state socialism Western countries can no longer justify their support for dictators who have hitherto been so-called “bulwarks against communism”. The new conditionalities in the emerging unipolar world therefore are designed to serve in the new situation, three purposes: one, to crush once and for all the ideology of socialism and to replace it unambiguously with the ideology of free enterprise world-wide; two, to create a new credible source of legitimacy for hegemony and thereby ensure leverage over specific countries which are considered economically and politically useful to the West...; three, a “justification for the impending decline in Africa’s share of global assistance as resource flows to Eastern Europe begin to mount” (Sørensen, 2006, p. 393).

Double standards also apply from the side of recipient countries. They want to enjoy the sovereignty in the form of freedom from outside intervention and be recognized as equals in the international society of states. Before the Second World War sovereignty was bestowed only on countries which were able to demonstrate a capacity for self-government. This does not apply for many countries which gained independence after the Second World War. Sørensen distinguishes two main elements in the new system of sovereignty. First, the right to self-determination of ex-colonies, also meaning that they are treated as equals to and by the developed countries. Second, an entitlement of poor countries to a development assistance regime where aid flows from developed countries to underdeveloped ones. If developed countries have obligations to come to assistance of underdeveloped countries it is difficult to recognize the rights to ensure that their assistance is properly and efficiently used by the recipient governments, if we consider the first element. This means that there is a strong tension between the two elements and full sovereignty of developing countries cannot be achieved before a certain level of development has been reached (Sørensen, 2006, p. 395).

The notion of democracy as a problem for policies which aim to promote the practice of democracy is the second controversy. Many political systems in developing countries cannot meet demands such as a highly inclusive level of political participation and a level of civil and political liberties. But there is increasing unanimity on a universally valid core of civil rights and political liberties which any political system must meet in order to qualify as democratic. Turning back to political conditionality, the role of negative conditionality is to keep rulers from abusing human rights of their opponents. Positive conditionality aims at strengthening groups in civil society.

The third controversy concerning political conditionality is the relationship between democracy and economic development. Often democracy is seen as a precondition for economic growth. Looking at authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, like China and Taiwan, there could be said that some form of authoritarian regime is conducive to the formation of strong states which is capable of rapid economic development. At the same moment, a transition towards democracy is not a guarantee for rapid economic development. Transition can even lead to instability and the breakdown of authority involving a worse violation of human rights than before. Democracy does not ensure automatic improvement of economic development and welfare, but it creates a window of opportunity, *“a political framework where groups struggling for development and human rights have a greater potential than before to organize and express their demands”* (Sørensen, 2006, p. 407).

2.2. South-South Cooperation

Chinese engagement with Africa is sometime being regarded as South-South Cooperation. The concept of South-South Cooperation is used to describe the cooperation and exchange of resources, technology and knowledge between developing countries. China is often being regarded as a developing country itself.

Scholars have advocated a deepening of trade relations between developing countries for various reasons; however, three crucial aspects stand out: “First, the creation of a wide range of trade partners might reduce market uncertainties. Second, the increment in the share of world trade could provide more collective bargaining capacities for the south. And third, technologies available in developing countries are perceived by many to be more suitable to the needs and requirements of the South. It is also understood that the manpower required for these technologies is available in the south and clearly more cost-effective than alternatives from the North” (Mahmoud, 2007, p.87).

Another way of putting South-South Cooperation in perspective is to consider it as part of the reconfiguration of international politics that has been ongoing since the end of the cold war. Many thought the time for unilateralism and unchallenged American hegemony would mark the collapse of the Soviet Union and would be the ultimate corollary in a bipolar international system that was going to lead us to the “end of history”. Although nations such as China, Brazil, and Turkey are firmly challenging the notions of such a future, South-South cooperation is merely regarded to be a “facilitator and a building block for multilateral and global cooperation and never an alternative to it” (Mahamoud, 2007, p. 88).

2.3. Conclusion

Political conditionality is a concept which is widely used and can mean different things. Political conditionality can be used as an instrument for foreign policy. An example of this is the mandatory cooperation, which the EU demands, for recipient countries in accepting migrants back. But also gaining trade benefits with aid relations can be seen as a form of political conditionality. The best know form of political conditionality, as used by the EU, is for achieving normative goals. Promoting human rights, fighting corruption, improving good governance and democratic rule are normative goals of European political conditionality.

Political conditionality is used at all levels of aid. Best known are the high level political conditions which apply to systemic level and national policies and priorities. But also low level conditions are widely used.

The use of political conditionality raises many questions. Countries which use political conditionality are often accused of using double standards and treating different countries in a different way. Weaker countries get often more political conditions with their aid than powerful developing countries.

Political conditionality undermines sovereignty of recipient countries. Therefore it is perceived as interfering with national affairs. But at the same moment, these countries often rely on aid.

Another way of giving aid is South-South Cooperation. This is the concept which describes the aid and trade relationship between developing countries. Often, the relation between China and Africa is seen as South-South cooperation.

3. China in Africa

China pursues an active policy on Africa and has already invested a lot. Especially in countries where the traditional aid donors did not want to give aid. For example in Sudan, which seems embroiled in continuing civil wars, Angola, which is rebuilding itself after a thirty-year civil war, or Zambia, a country where structural adjustment programs in the eighties did not succeed. Chinese investment and development in Africa increases rapidly, while China itself receives substantial foreign investment and aid figure 1 shows the rapid growth of China's trade with Africa.




Figure 1 China's trade with Africa 1995-2005 source: news.bbc.co.uk

There are also African countries where China is not as prominent, but charm offensives are opened, for example in Ethiopia and Tanzania. Tanzania is trying to attract Chinese investors and wants more joint ventures with Chinese companies. Although the Chinese are particularly interested in buying Tanzanian commodities and selling Chinese products in Tanzania, in August 2006 there was a Chinese mission promised that investments would be made.

3.1. History of Chinese-African relations

The Chinese were present in Africa in the fifties, when Mao Zedong gave support to socialist regimes in their struggle for independence. The construction of the railway from Zambia to Tanzania by the Chinese and their support in the struggle for independence in Angola are two examples. China now concentrates on trade and investment. Examples are China's role in the oil sector in Angola, Nigeria and Sudan and the Chinese activities in the mining sector in Congo and Zimbabwe (copper, cobalt, platinum, etc.). China buys timber in Congo Brazzaville and iron ore in South Africa. Chinese

construction companies are also very active in Africa. They now have a market share of more than fifty percent of subcontracted work in Africa, according to the OECD. Much of this work is conducted by Chinese workers. This has led to much critique from the EU, since the Chinese investments in Africa often don't give many opportunities for local Africans to do the work. This sometimes led to higher unemployment than before China was involved in the projects (Interview dr. Grimm).

3.2. Chinese activities in Africa

At the summit in Beijing, during the Forum on Cooperation between Africa and China in November 2006, 48 African heads of state were present (out of 53 African countries that maintain diplomatic relations with China). It was made clear that China wants relations with Africa. The result was a plan to which China said it will double aid to Africa, promising a China-Africa development fund to be set up to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa (Dijk, 2007, p.584).

There are four groups of countries in which Chinese intervention can be distinguished:

1. Countries where China is deeply involved in the energy sector and where such assistance and aid agreements with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) is unnecessary, because China provides more credit without conditions (Angola and Sudan);
2. Countries that are among the dominant western development, but which for historical reasons, many Chinese investments (Zambia and South Africa);
3. Countries where China is building up political credit to be more active (Ethiopia and Tanzania) and;
4. Countries where the Chinese are hardly involved (smaller West African countries for example).

The way China engages in Africa is often with package deals of aid, trade and investment. For many African governments this one-stop shop can be very attractive, since many foreign affairs departments of African States have very limited staff resources. It makes it easier for them to negotiate on a large package deal instead of negotiating separately, for example, on foreign policy, development assistance and trade, every time with different people (Interview Dr. Grimm)⁵.

It is striking how strategically China operates in Africa. China tries to get control over more stages of the production chain, from raw material to end product. Early 2006 China published its African policy paper. That paper was used during the discussion on economic cooperation with Africa during the Africa-China Forum. This led to different principles for cooperation with Africa, the so-called Beijing Consensus. It turns out that China in cooperation with African countries uses a number of principles. The role of institutions such as the African Union, NEPAD and regional (trade) organizations is recognized in this. The emphasis is on peaceful cooperation with a mutual interest. The paper explains a coherent vision and develops a strategy to achieve the goals. These goals include ensuring the supply of raw materials to China, creating a market for Chinese products and services and provide an alternative model to the Western development model. The Chinese alternative is often called the Beijing Consensus on development. Where western models for development often focus on market liberalisation, focuses the Beijing Consensus on strong state control on the economy.

China committed itself to issue aid for the period 2006-2009 as follows:

- *Preferential credits*: US\$5 billion, consisting of US\$3 billion concessional loans and US\$2 billion export buyer's credits.

⁵ Dr Grimm gave as example that when he had to deal with the ministry of foreign affairs of Rwanda, the total organization consisted of 65 people. A 'one-stop shop' is much easier to deal with for such an organization than smaller individual deals.

- *Direct investment*: A US\$5 billion China-Africa Development Fund to support Chinese FDI in Africa.
- *Trade*: Further opening up China's market to Africa by expanding the list of duty free African exports and setting up trade cooperation zones in Africa.
- *Grants and debt relief*: A doubling of 2006 assistance, to build hospitals, malaria prevention and treatment centres, and rural schools in Africa and a conference centre for the African Union; and cancellation of all interest-free loans owed by eligible countries that had matured by the end of 2005.
- *Technical assistance*: Training for African professionals and sending agriculture experts to Africa; setting up agriculture technology demonstration centres in Africa; doubling Chinese government scholarships for African students (Wang, 2007 p.13).

3.3. China and political conditionality

Chinese foreign policy can be characterized by non-interference. In 1954, China formulated "Five principles of Mutual Coexistence":

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity
2. non-aggression
3. non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. equality and mutual benefit
5. peaceful coexistence (Taylor, 2006, p. 18)

Originally these principles were set-up for the relations between China and India, but in the 1970's China expanded them to all countries.

China offers an alternative to Western development cooperation. Moeletsi Mbeki, the brother of South African President, formulated the Chinese alternative as "China offered Africa a new model that focuses on straight commercial relations and fair market prices without the ideological agenda" (IHT, November 3, 2006).

The Beijing Consensus on development focuses mainly on economic aspects. There is an important role for government in the economy, but the market can be used to achieve economic growth. There are no conditions to aid soft loans and debt relief made. And it is mainly about the use of Chinese workers, business and technology. Although there are no political conditions in the sense that China demands political change in Europe it demands from African governments that there is no recognition of Taiwan, it wants political support for its ideas in the UN and other international organisations. Stability of African governments is more important than regular elections, although this last point is not really different from the western point of view.

"There is a long ex-ante condition list on the European side whereas the Chinese don't have conditions, except for some very basic ones. If you look at how the aid is given, it is not really aid, but a package deal of aid, trade and investment." (Interview Dr. Grimm).

In April 2011 the Chinese government published its white paper on Aid. In this paper there is not much explanation for the policy choices made by China. It gives an overview of activities and interventions of China in Africa.

An important notion in this white paper is that "China is still a developing country with a low per capita income and a large poverty-stricken population" (PRP, 2001 & Grimm, 2011, p. 17.) China sees its aid to Africa as South-South cooperation, therefore it is different.

In an official statement on Chinese television the Chinese government stated on the publication of the Chinese white book on foreign aid that aid is for friendship, not for resources. Furthermore they

state that Chinese Aid has no political conditions, but China respects equality. Fu Ziying, Chinese vice-minister of commerce said that Chinese investments in Africa are not limited to resources, and that China is not grabbing resources.⁶ This statement was a reaction to the critiques from the EU and the United States that Chinese engagement with Africa is solely about resources.

3.4. China and corruption in Africa

Africa is struggling with corruption. One of the motives for using political conditionality is fighting this corruption. Since China does not use political conditionality, what does this mean for corruption? Does China try to fight corruption in a different way, or does it perceive corruption as an issue for internal politics, and so not an issue for the aid and trade relationship? Or do Chinese activities even increase corruption?

In dealing with Africa, China deals with corrupt regimes, like the regime of Mobutu in Zimbabwe. In dealing with those regimes, China makes it possible for those regimes to stay corrupt (Graham, 2009). This does not imply that the official Chinese engagement in Africa corrupt is, but there are no signs that China helps fighting corruption.

But the Chinese government is not the only Chinese actor, which is active in Africa. Most of the activities are conducted by Chinese companies. These companies often stay in Africa after the projects have been carried out. These companies undertake new activities in Africa, often without control from Beijing. Without this control and in a country where corruption is part of everyday life, corruption will be supported and will increase (interview prof. Dietz)⁷.

3.5. China in Angola

Chinese relations with Angola date back to the early years of the anti colonial struggle, when it supported the three major movements which were fighting for independence. Unlike some other countries, China did not directly choose to support one of those movements (Campos, 2008, p. 33). In 1975 the MPLA, which was mainly supported by the Soviet Union came into power and declared independence. It took until 1983 for China to recognize Angola's independence. This means that China did not choose a political side in the conflict. This is in line with the non interference principle of China's foreign policy. In 1984 the first trade agreement was established.

Angola has in the period of sustained peace, since 2002, become one of the most successful economies in sub-Saharan Africa. It has experienced exceptionally high growth rates, 20.6% in 2005, 18.6% in 2006, 23.4% in 2007 and 26.6% in 2008, at the same time inflation dropped from over 300% in 1999, to 12% in 2006 (Campos, 2008 p.33). If we look at the statistics of Chinese-African trade, we see that Angola was the largest trade partner of China in Africa, with 27.4% of all Sino-African trade (Taylor, 2007, p. 3). Most of this trade involves oil. Angola's trade patterns are changing rapidly (Aguilar, 2009, p. 1548).

⁶ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cf9hUkg1hT4>

⁷ Prof. Dietz nuanced this by saying that there was a Chinese businessman in Zambia who had killed a few of his employees. In China media reacted to this by starting a debate on business ethics abroad and how Chinese should behave. This debate focused mostly on the what Chinese actions would mean for the way China was perceived by other countries.

TABLE 1
Angola. Composition of Exports (in percentages)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006 (est.)
Oil	90.6	89.4	92.3	91.7	94.1	95.9	95.4
Diamonds	9.4	10.6	7.7	8.3	5.9	4.1	4.7
Extractive	99.2	99.3	99.5	99.6	99.5	98.7	98.9
Non-extractive	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.5	1.3	1.1
Total Exports	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In 2004 the United States was still the largest trading partner of Angola, but China came close at that moment. The trade with the European Union decreased (relatively) since 2002.

Aguilar and Goldstein stated “On the import side, on the other hand, both China and India are still minor partners compared to OECD countries and Brazil.” (p. 1559).

3.5.1. Financial cooperation

Most of the financial assistance from China to Angola is invested in projects in infrastructure, telecommunications and agro-businesses, which are part of the Angolan National Reconstruction Program. In 2003 a “framework agreement for new economic and commercial cooperation” was adopted by the Angolan Ministry of Finance and the Chinese Ministry of Trade. This framework consisted of a finance package of US\$2-billion for the period until 2007. The first phase of this package consisted of 31 contracts on energy, water, health, education, communication and public works. Part of this deal was that seven Chinese firms were engaged. One of those firms was the China Roads and Bridge Corporation build a 371 kilometres long road between Luanda and Uíg (Campos, 2008, p36). But also in the health sector investments have been made. There was a priority for the rehabilitation and enlargement of provincial and municipal hospitals and district health centres. The education sector was in the scope of these investments as well, investments were used for the rehabilitation of secondary schools.

The second phase of these investments still has a focus on education, but there is a shift towards more investments for supporting fisheries and telecommunication projects.

3.5.2. Extractive industries

China has great interests in the natural reserves of Angola. After the first financial package was adopted, the China Petrochemical Corp. also known as Sinopec Group, acquired its first stake in the Angolan oil industry. A joint venture with Sonangol, the Angolan national oil company, was created, Sonangol Sinopec International (SSI). Sinopec agreed with Shell to take over its stake in block 18. With this deal India’s Oil Company ONGC was sidelined.

China’s vice premier Zeng Peiyang visited Angola in 2005, during this visit nine cooperation agreements were signed, most of these were energy related. It was also agreed upon that Sonangol that it would supply oil to Sinopec with a long-term agreement.

In the years following SSI acquired new oil block, both on land and offshore. Plans were made by the joint-venture for an oil refinery with a capacity of 240.000 barrels a day, which was planned for Lobito. The negotiations for this refinery collapsed in 2007, when Sonangol declared it would manage this project on its own.

Besides oil, China is also interested in Angola’s diamonds. In 2005 a joint-venture was founded between the Angolan and Chinese state-owned diamond companies. But in 2007 it was reported, by Angolan media, that the agreement was annulled by the Council of Ministers, but the reason for this was not given (Campos, 2007, p.16.).

3.5.3. Foreign direct investment

Chinese involvement in Angola includes foreign direct investment (FDI) as well. We have seen that the largest investments have been made in the field of oil exploration, construction and extraction. One of the possible reasons for the increasing FDI in Angola can be the relative stable economy Angola has had since peace was recovered.

Another reason is that the Angolan National Agency for Private Investment, an agency of the Angolan government, promotes investments, both national as foreign, by providing tax incentives.

By providing credible legal protection and stability for investment, Angola has become more attractive for FDI. It is predicted that Chinese FDI will increase more as new cooperation agreements are signed.

Chinese firms, which were executing projects which were part of the credit lines, sometimes establish themselves in Angola after completing their projects. They get this possibility since local Angolan capacity is weak, Chinese constructions are known for quality and completion of it is quicker and cheaper than constructions of (European) rivals (Campos, 2008, p. 15).

3.5.4. Bilateral trade

Oil counts for over 95 % of exports and it is also the main product China imports from Angola. China has become the second largest oil importer of Angolan oil, after the United States. As figure 2 shows, trade between China and Angola has grown extremely. This has led to the fact that Angola is China's biggest trading partner in Africa.




Figure 2: China-Angola Trade Volume (1995–2007) Source: Xinhua's China Economic Information Service. (Campos, 2008, p.13)

Chinese exports to Angola also increased significant. In 2004 Chinese imports in Angola reached \$194 million, which raised China from the seventh to the fourth largest trading partner of Angola. In 2007 it increased to \$368 million, which made China the second largest trading partner of Angola, behind Portugal (Campos, 2008, p.12).

3.6. Conclusion

China's engagement in Africa has brought many opportunities for Africa. First it is a large trading partner. This gives opportunities for African producers to enter the Chinese market. But it is probably more in the interest of China to enlarge its possibilities to sell its products on the African market. For African producers it can also mean that China will compete with them on the African market.

Since China is strict in its non-interference policy, no political conditions have been set by China in its development policy. By doing this corruption can proliferate, human rights will still be violated, undemocratic regimes can hold on to power and governance is not improving. Although China does not interfere with national politics, it demands from African governments to take a pro-China position in international organizations, like the United Nations. This policy undermines the equal position of the developing countries and can, of course, be seen as a political condition.

In many countries, including Angola, China works with large groups of Chinese workers, instead of local African workers. This results in high unemployment and very limited benefits for local communities when work is being conducted.

The quality of Chinese work is often low. Therefore, African governments sometimes choose for other countries to do the work, even if this is much more expensive and comes with political conditions.

But Chinese activities are not all bad for Africa. China undertakes other activities than EU does. The EU invests much in health care and education, where as China invests more in infrastructure. So, Chinese and European activities in Africa can be complementary.

4. EU in Africa

European engagement in the developing countries dates back to the Treaty of Rome (1957), when France demanded a special position for its colonial and ex-colonial territories as a condition for its accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) (Flint, 2009, p. 80). At this moment, the basis for the European Development policy can still be found in article 166 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The European Union development policy aims at fostering:

- “The sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;
- The smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;
- The campaign against poverty in the developing countries.” (European Commission, 2003, p.6).

In 1958 the first European Development Fund (EDF) was established, it had to grant technical and financial assistance to colonies and some countries with which some member states had historical relations. In 1963 the relationship between the EEC and 18 African states, which had become independent of France, was formalized when the Yaoundé Convention was signed. The first and second Yaoundé Conventions formed the basis of the ACP-EU cooperation, which is the largest part of EU development policy at this moment. Most of the development policy of the EU is dealt with, within the framework of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. The ACP group of countries consist of African Caribbean and Pacific countries. Most of these countries are former colonies. In the early years it consisted mostly of former French colonies, but when more states gained independence from their colonial powers, more states became member of the ACP group of states. This resulted in the need to review the agreements, and improve aid and trade relations with the ACP. But also international agreements in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) forced to review the earlier agreements with the ACP. The earlier agreements resulted in unequal competition in the trade between the EU and ACP states and the EU and non-ACP states. An important part of the new development strategies are the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).

The framework of the EPA's can be found in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement which laid down the framework of the new trade and development relationship. In an earlier agreement between the EU and the ACP countries, the 1975 Lomé convention, the ACP states were offered preferential access to the EU markets. Since this agreement discriminated against other developing countries, it was not in line with WTO regulations. The idea was that the EPA's would lay the basis of new reciprocal trading agreements. This had to be settled between the EU and six groups of ACP states. (Hinkle, 2006, p. 267).

4.1. A development superpower

The EU has moved from being a civilian power to a normative or ethical power, as the title of EU's Security Strategy suggests, Europe in a better world. The European Security strategy (2003) and the European Consensus on Development (2005) both stress that security and development are complementary (Wissenbach, 2009, p. 5).

The European Consensus on Development aims at supporting the socio-economic and political integration of Africa, to accelerate the creation of larger and regionally-integrated markets and to improve and sustain African infrastructure and services (European Union, 2006, p. 1).

The framework of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA's) can be found in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement which laid down the framework of the new trade and development relationship. In an earlier agreement between the EU and the ACP countries, the 1975 Lomé convention, this offered

the ACP states preferential access to the EU markets. Since this agreement discriminated against other developing countries, it was not in line with WTO regulations. The idea was that the EPA's would lay the basis of new reciprocal trading agreements. This had to be settled between the EU and six groups of ACP states (Hinkle, 2006, p. 267).

More than half of the EU's development funds are spend in Africa. Each year €14 billion is spend on Sub-Sahara Africa. More than half of al ODA Africa receives comes from Europe. There is a tendency that aid from Europe is clustered in a number of states.

European development cooperation is organized in a multi-level system. The European Commission has some competences for its cooperation programmes, but the member states themselves have their own programmes as well. There is no political majority in Europe to centralize this (Grimm, 2008, p. 17).

4.1.1. EU-Africa Strategy

In 2000, the European Council stated on the EU's development policy, that a limited number of areas was selected which are used to achieve the goals of the policy and which provides an added value. These are: "link between trade and development; support for regional integration and co-operation; support for macro-economic policies; transport; food security and sustainable rural development; institutional capacity-building, particularly in the area of good governance and rule of law (European Commission, 2003, p.6).

In 2005 the European Union adopted the European Strategy for working with Africa, The EU & Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership. But even before this strategy was adopted it was criticized from the African side, it was almost completely written from an unequal position between the EU and African countries. Therefore, the joint African Union-European Union Strategy for Africa is currently under development. The goal was to adopt this strategy at a EU-Africa Summit in the fall of 2007 (Mackie, 2006, p.10). The strategy was indeed adopted at that summit, which included the first Action Plan covering 2008-2010. In November 2010 at the third EU-Africa Summit, held in Tripoli, Libya, the second Action Plan covering 2011-2013 was adopted

About every five years a new EDF is established, at this moment the 10th EDF is being executed. The EDF has a variety of instruments, particularly non-refundable aid, risk capital and interest-based loans to the private sector.

The conventions of Lomé and Cotonou are important in the establishment of the relations between the EU and the ACP countries. In the Lomé IV convention respect for human rights, democratization and good governance is linked to development policy. In 1995, the possibility of a non-execution clause was introduced, which made it possible to stop aid to a country where persistent and grave human rights violations were committed (website European Commission). This clause was used for example in Zimbabwe, to pressure the regime of Mugabe. In the period between 2002-2009 about €600 million was spend on humanitarian aid, but almost nothing on structural aid.

The non-execution clause is also part of the negotiations on the EPAs. There is much resistance against this since it undermines the equal position of both parties. When the EU decides to take action, under this clause, African states cannot take steps against the EU.

4.1.2. Joint-EU Africa strategy

In 2007 the at the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon, the member states of the European Union and the African Union and Morocco agreed on a joint EU Africa strategy, the EU Strategic Partnership. In this strategy priorities for the development have been set up which are:

- Peace and Security,

- Governance and human rights,
- Trade and regional integration,
- Infrastructure,
- The Millennium Development Goals,
- Energy,
- Climate change,
- Migration, mobility and employment, and
- Science, knowledge society and space.

It was not these goals which made this strategy special, but the fact that it is a truly joint strategy, which defines the agenda for the coming years (Grimm, 2008, p. 21). He means with this that the EU saw Africa as an equal partner in the negotiations. The goals of the strategy were not set by the EU, but the African Union was asked to determine its own goals for development, and by which means this should be achieved.

Talking about a joint strategy and an equal partnership is of course done by politicians and policy makers. We can ask the question if this partnership is really equal. This is difficult to achieve, since the EU has to decide on how money is spent, and the African countries are recipients of aid. Just asking what the African countries want does not create a joint strategy. African states acted jointly in the negotiations between the EU and the AU, which made the position of African states stronger than in earlier negotiations where different African States did not act as one block.

4.1.3. From Aid to Economic Partnership

The EU and the ACP group of countries have negotiated trade agreements, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The framework of the Economic partnership agreements can be found in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement which laid down the framework of the new trade and development relationship. The Lomé convention (1975) offered the ACP states preferential access to the EU markets. Since this agreement discriminated against other developing countries, it was not in line with WTO regulations. The idea was that the EPA's would lay the basis of new reciprocal trading agreements. This had to be settled between the EU and six groups of ACP states. (Hinkle, 2006, p. 267).

There is much critique on the EU's position in the negotiations on the EPAs. The focus of the EU is on establishing free trade agreements. "EPAs demand reciprocal market opening from the ACP, in order to maintain the access they currently have into EU markets, the ACP have to reciprocate and open up markets in return" (Griffith, 2008, p.7). The ACP states have a different opinion whether this reciprocity would support development, since this would mean hard competition on the African markets between products produced in Africa and the EU.

4.2. Conditionality

The promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law is both one of the major objectives of EU foreign policy and "one of the constructive elements of the EU as a values-driven international actor" (Keukeleire, 2008, p. 223). It is difficult to give an overall picture of the approach the EU uses to promote democracy, human rights and other prioritized values.

An example of political conditionality, as used by the EU lies in the field of return of migrants. Countries that in the field of return of migrants cooperate constructively with the EU can count on support in the wider area of aid and support. If countries of origin insufficiently cooperate in repatriation of their nationals, this would have consequences for bilateral cooperation with these countries, including the possible development funds which the government receives.

In a communication to the Dutch parliament the Dutch government states that the Netherlands is sure that the principle of political conditionality will be used by the EU in the future. In return for European efforts, requirements for development among the field of migration and return will be set out (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2011, p. 3).

Another example of political conditionality, with respect to the promotion of democracy, is the Commission's very active policy with regard to election assistance and monitoring and its funding of both reforms in developing countries and specific projects through NGOs.

4.2.1. Fighting corruption

The first goal of the Cotonou agreement is "to enhance the political dialogue dimension between ACP and EU by developing peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution strategies, supporting good governance, and tackling corruption" (European Union, 2006). One way the EU tries to tackle is by political conditionality. At different levels this can be applied. Fighting corruption is often high at the agenda of official high-level meetings between the EU and Africa. But also at lower levels, like financial conditions, the EU tries to tackle corruption in the field. By setting conditions for financial support, like administrative accountability, a better control can be created for EU aid and investments in Africa.

4.3. Europe in Angola

Angola became a member of ACP in 1985, and therefore received EC aid. In the period between 1985 and 2000 it received €789.6 million. The EC programmes aimed at improving the health and rural development sectors. Food security and food aid for the most vulnerable people (European Commission, 2003, p21).

Overall, Angola received each year between 1990 and 1999 an average of €360 million in ODA, this includes the EU. The European Union was the main donor in this period with an average of 17%. But also Norway and the United States are big donors.

Not all aid was used for development. In 2000, more than a third of all aid was spend in response to the humanitarian crisis. This year €166 million was spend on food aid, €29 million on other emergency aid.

After the war broke out again many donors changed their aid to emergency humanitarian interventions, or only concentrated on the easy reachable coastal areas.

In this period no specialization between the different donor countries was taken care of. Not only the European Union was involved with Angola, but also Portugal, Italy, France and Spain were involved in supporting agriculture, rural development, economic development and education. Norway, the United States and Brazil were involved in supporting the Ministry of Finance.

The idea behind the 2002 country strategy paper for Angola is to improve the aid and try to get different donors to specialize. For the period 2002-2007 support of measures which promote peace and conflict resolution are an important priority.

4.3.1. Short term goals

The short term goals of the European development policy for Angola focus on the consolidation of the 2002 peace process. The focus at this moment lies on disarming, demobilising and reintegrate combatants. This is necessary in order to "deal with critical needs of populations at risk" (European Commission, 2003, p. 24). This includes partisan and political liberties and should lead to an improved democratic environment, resulting in free and fair general presidential and legislative elections in 2008.

The Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission (ECHO) is active in Angola for humanitarian assistance. The priority sectors for this department are health, nutrition, water/sanitation, emergency relief, protection and logistics. Also food aid, in cooperation with the WFP, will be continued where necessary. Not only continuation of existing aid is necessary, but also improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of the humanitarian aid. This has to be done in coordination with the Government and humanitarian agencies, at national and provincial level.

The civil society can play an important role in the development of Angola, according to the country strategy paper, since much of the development field work is being conducted by civil society. The EU believes that this will increase the ownership, by local people and organizations, of the Angolan development. This document suggests that a dialogue between the Angolan parliament, government and civil society needs to be developed. The EU supports actively initiatives which aim to achieve this, especially when gender issues are involved.

The specific role of civil society is put forward in the Cotonou Agreement, where it is seen as a participant in cooperation, and this agreement proposes to enhance the contribution of civil society in the development process, by supporting the creation of mechanisms which will enable them to participate in the definition, implementation and evaluation of strategies and programs.

4.3.2. Medium and long term goals

The European Union does not only focus on the short term development of Angola, but also on medium and longer term development. Since the short term focus lies on the peace process and stabilizing the country, it means that the strict focused approach the EU pursues cannot be applied yet in Angola.

At this moment much attention goes to the immediate needs of the population, but the EU has tied this in with conditions for long-term sustainability. The EU supports social sectors and food security, which have to make a transition from relief and rehabilitation phases to development requirements, which culminate in the long term into a more classic focal sector approach.

With regard to the health policy, the EU supports the medium term development of it, by developing operational strategies for the sector, better management strategies for the scarce human resources and better coordination between national, provincial and local authorities.

4.4. Conclusion

The European Union is one of the largest aid donors of Africa. The relations between the EU and Africa find their origins in post-colonial aid. Over the years much has changed in the European policy. An important change, at least in official documents, is the way in which African states are seen. Originally, European development policy was strongly known by a paternalistic approach of developing countries. Now days, African countries are more seen as equal partners. As result of this change, the joint EU Africa strategy was adopted in 2007, which gave more ownership of African development to the African countries. Goals for development cooperation were set, and are being reviewed every two years.

But a consequence of a donor-recipient relation is that it cannot be complete equal. This is even more difficult with the EU, which connects political conditions to aid and trade. These conditions aim at improving human rights, democratic governance, good governance and fighting corruption. Since other actors are active in Africa, it seems that these goals are more difficult to reach, since not all actors agree with these goals.

Another change is the shift from aid to trade. A good trade relationship is seen by the EU as a stimulant for development. When a country reaches a certain level of national income, aid will not be given. Loans and trade will be the only possibility for those countries.

Angola is such a country, because its national income is relative high, resulting from oil trade, it does not receive any aid from the EU. But at the same moment it is also one of the poorest countries in the world. It seems that national income is not sufficient to determine whether a country needs aid, or it can rely on loans and trade.

5. European Response to China in Africa

The presence of China in Africa has only limited impact on Europe's economic interests. This is because Chinese and European companies often don't compete for the same niche markets

5.1. Common objectives

Europe and China share at least one common objective for Africa in their activities, which is the promotion of economic growth, in order to reduce poverty (Scholz, 2008, p. 63, Wenping, 2008, p.74). Wenping has made a comparison between different Chinese and European Africa policy documents, he concludes: "*...China and Europe share common goals of promoting Africa's development: assisting Africa in achieving peace and security, reducing poverty and boosting economic development and in finally fulfilling the UN Millennium Development Goals*" (p.75).

Rene van der Linden said that the presence of China in Africa, and the debate on the consequences for European Aid has led to a renewed attention from the EU towards Africa (interview Van der Linden).

Traditional thinking about different approaches to development go back to the Cold war zero-sum games, which potentially could prevent Chinese-European cooperation.

5.2. European Union debates

In the European Union several debates have taken place on the implications of Chinese presence in Africa for European relations with the continent. Two important debates in this respect are the debates of the European Parliament and the debate on the proposal of the European Commission on the trilateral dialogue between the EU, China and Africa.

5.2.1. European Parliaments report on China's policy and its effects on Africa

In 2008 Ana Maria Gomes (MEP) was rapporteur for the European Parliament on China's policy and its effects on Africa. This report pleads for a common approach towards China, which should help overcome the divergences caused by national interests, which undermine Europe's ability to influence Chinese foreign policy (European Parliament, 2008, p. 24). Furthermore, the reports states that it is "vital [for the EU] to stick to its policy of conditional engagement, while also expanding "positive conditionality" by increasing support to governments, institutions, civil society organizations and media that promote human rights, democracy and accountable governance in African countries". A critique on the way China act came from Mr. Belder (MEP) during the debate: "The Committee on Foreign Affairs deplores China's purely pragmatic cooperation with the repressive regimes in Africa". With this he meant to say that Chinese activities are conducted, without regard of the situation of the country with which is dealt, concerning human rights, good governance, fight against corruption and democratic legitimacy of the regime.

During the debate Mrs. Gomes states: "*In this report, we propose that the EU should encourage China to step up its participation in multilateral donor meetings and adopt specific internationally accepted criteria and guidelines on transparency of aid, the extractive industries, good governance, environmental protection, labour rights, etc., with a view to ensuring that it really contributes to poverty reduction, the Millennium Development Goals and promoting peace and security in Africa.*" (Debate European Parliament)

Important in the debate was the reaction European Commissioner Louis Michel gave: "*I support the numerous recommendations that you made concerning the policy that the European Union must adopt to tackle China's growing presence in Africa.*" With this statement Michel suggests that Chinese presence in Africa undermines European presence in Africa. He explains the European approach with political conditionality as: "*There are no political conditions attached to the cooperation or the funding that we provide. The nature of that aid, the way in which it is used, yes. Budgetary support, for example, will not be offered if there is not good governance, there will be no*

budgetary support for countries where conflict exists. However, that does not stop us from offering development assistance or humanitarian aid, even when we do not agree with the government or the regime in place.”

The European Parliament recognizes that the presence of China in Africa also has positive consequences. “China’s involvement in Africa has already had the positive effect of creating a renewed interest in Africa, contributing to a shift in perceptions.” This shift is important in the way Africa is being seen in Europe. The traditional perception of Africa is that it is a continent of poverty and conflict, which relies on aid and charity. The new perception is that Africa can offer great potential for business and offers an alternative for risky Middle Eastern oil supplies.

The report stresses that the EU should hold on to its strategy of political conditionality. Mr. Mitchell (MEP) stated: *“The development potential and the conditions for development are two sides of the same coin. Without one it is not possible to achieve the other”*. On the way there should be dealt with China he states: *“Diplomacy – quiet diplomacy – has a better chance of achieving what we want to achieve. I think that Europe should work with China to encourage best practice in what could be the first real opportunity to do something for Africa after years of talking about it and doing nothing.”*

5.2.2. Trilateral dialogue

In 2008 the European Commission presented its plan for a trilateral dialogue and cooperation between the EU, Africa and China. The plan suggests that trilateral cooperation could offer a gradual, but progressive way from which all can benefit. The principles for trilateral cooperation, as proposed, are pragmatic and progressive approach. This means that on the ground cooperation is most likely to succeed, whereby concrete projects and sectors are used. A second guiding principle is a shared approach. This means that projects can only be conducted with full association and agreement of all parties involved. The third principle is effective aid. With a trilateral dialogue it is possible to coordinate both EU’s and China’s activities at country level. With this dialogue duplication of efforts can be avoided.

Mr. Wissenbach explains why the European Commission came up with the plan for a tri-lateral dialogue: *“We proposed this initiative, because we felt that our partnership with both, China and Africa was very important and that these partnerships will actually work more in synergy... We want to concentrate on four sectors which we think are particularly important, those are peace and security, stability (which is a pre-condition for development), infrastructure, in which the Chinese are very good, but where they don’t really support projects on regional African continental integration, sustainable management of natural resources, and finally agriculture and food security.”* (Interview Wissenbach).

The EU does not have the ambition for a high level trilateral dialogue, in for example an EU-China-Africa summit. High level summits are often used to reach understanding and agreement between different power blocks. There have been separate EU-Africa, EU-China and China-Africa summits last decade. At this stage the EU believes that a lot can be gained from low level dialogue, and cooperation at project level.

Wissenbach describes three key challenges for EU-China-Africa relations. The first challenge is to overcome value differences, in order to address the global challenge of sustainable development as partners. Second, China has to avoid confrontations with the US and Europe over critical differences, while dealing with trade and economic relations with developing countries. And last, the African role in international relations has to change. Africa is too much an object of Great Power agendas, as it was during the Cold War. It has to act more as a unified actor in international relations (2009, p.8). If

African states cooperate stronger, they can form a block. Instead of being an object of Great Powers, they can become a power with influence at the international level.⁸

The lack of political conditionality in Chinese relations with Africa made China an attractive partner for African policy makers. In a reaction to this, the EU refocused in its development policy on ownership at continental, regional and national level in Africa. This could be a sign of loosening the strict political conditionality. The equal partnership, which is the basis of the joint EU-Africa strategy, gives new incentives for development in Africa.

The strong tendency of China to hold on to its non-interference policy gets even stronger by western attempts and expectations for China to adopt its norms and policies. Wissenbach points that a clash between China and the EU (and the rest of the western countries) may lead in the end to an internationally recognized set of norms (Wissenbach, 2009, p.11).

If we look at the typology which was introduced by Stokke (see chapter 2) we can say that the EU applies political conditionality at most levels. But there is a change visible on where the priorities lie. Last couple of years there is a tendency that there is less attention for political conditionality in the EU. The reason for this is multiple. First, the economic situation in the world results in less attention for developing countries. Second, in many European countries political preferences have changed, which results in a more critical position of many governments towards spending on aid and development. And third, a new approach towards developing countries, in line with the idea of equal partnerships, is the fact that there is much more attention for fair processes for European companies which deal with Africa (interview prof. Dietz).

5.3. Implications for Angola

In the EU's country level evaluation for Angola China's financial support is interpreted as "having a deterrent effect on EC political influence and conditionalities" (Joint evaluation unit, 2009, p.76). The same report also states that "China's financial assistance and interventions of other non-EU development partners, mainly the World Bank and Brazil, are not negatively affecting the implementation of the EC Country Strategy" (p.27). The possible negative effects of China's presence in Angola are not seen yet, but the Angolan government has welcomed the absence of political conditions in Chinese aid and investments.

The absence of political conditions in Chinese aid and investments is used in negotiations with the EU, by which the political conditions of the EU are subject of the negotiations. The threat that the government of Angola could chose for oil backed loans from China, instead of loans from the EU, to which political conditions are attached, can be an incentive for the EU to loosen its political conditions.

At the same moment, China is not a threat to all forms of political conditionality. Angola sometimes chooses to deal with European investments and firms, instead of Chinese, when high-quality and technical standards are needed (Interview, dr. Grimm). For the construction of roads and bridges, the Chinese are known for fast delivery and good quality, but for the construction of high-tech factories often European firms are dealt with.

⁸ An example of strong African cooperation is the 2009 UN climate Summit which was held in Copenhagen. During this summit the G77-China block was able to suspend the negotiations because they feared "they would lose many of the gains they made when the Kyoto Agreement was signed (Black, 2009) The G77 is a loose coalition of currently 131 developing nations which aims at promotion of the collective economic interest of the block.

Many infrastructure works are very prestigious, difficult to carry out and require advanced expertise; here the Chinese have been left out. The new bridge over the Catumbela River is an example of such a work, which was built by the Portuguese company Mota Engil. So there is some degree of consideration among the Angolan government in dealing with the Chinese” (Interview Mr. Van Honk).

5.4. Conclusion

The debate on the consequences for European development policy as a result of Chinese engagement in Africa focuses much on establishing dialogue between the EU, China and Africa. The goal of this dialogue seems to convince China that the European approach for development in Africa is the only proper way to do this.

At the same moment it seems that the EU lack ambition to deal with African development at high level. These dialogues have to take place at low levels, often even at project level. This will result in a good alignment of these projects, but it will not result in a common goal for development.

The differences in approaches for development are huge. So it would be naive to think that a Sino-European Consensus on development could be reached.

In the EU the focus on political conditionality seems to decline. The focus is put more on strong trade relations, instead of aid relations. In negotiations on trade agreements African countries are much stronger than they were for aid agreements. Therefore it is more difficult to introduce political conditions into these agreements.

6. Conclusion

It is impossible to give a clear causal relation between the involvement of China in Africa and changes in European development policy. There are many other factors which cannot be excluded from having influence on these changes. First, there are changes in Africa going on. In Angola, after decades of civil war, peace was recovered and reconstruction of the country started. Second, the political preferences in Europe have changed, whereby national priorities changed. Third, China is not the only growing partner of Africa, countries like Brazil and India have also increased interests in Africa.

The practice of development cooperation often differs from the policy intentions. This study focuses on the policy, but the practice is not being neglected. In official policy document of the EU, political conditionality is still an important issue. The European Union wants to be a normative superpower. This self-appointed role in the world is often perceived as a double-headed approach. The EU focuses in the development policy on the ACP-group of states. This means that not all developing countries get equal attention from the EU. All sub-Sahara African countries, except South-Africa, are part of the ACP.

Membership of the ACP does not mean automatically an aid relation with the EU. Angola hardly gets any aid from the EU, since the country is rich in natural resources, but the aid-relationship has been replaced by a trade-relationship.

An advantage for Africa is that it gets more empowered. In the old situation, where Europe was dominant, African governments did not have much choice. They could accept aid and investments, which were accompanied by the political conditions, or they could reject it, but in that case there were almost no alternatives for budgetary support, aid and investments. With the raise of China the position of African governments has been improved, especially those governments of countries which get a lot of attention from the Chinese.

China is often perceived as being one actor, but reality is different. It is not only the government of the Peoples Republic who engages in African investments, but also private companies are engaged with projects in Africa.

The EU fails in achieving the objectives of the political conditionality. The EU has used the argument that democracy is necessary for achieving economic growth and fighting poverty. With the raise of China as an economic super power, whereby not only elites benefit from the economic growth, but also a large part of the Chinese people, it became clear to many African leaders that democracy is not always necessary.

Conditionality often brings stress for the administration of projects. Europe demands transparency on how money is spent. Of course this is understandable from a European perspective. African governments, however, often lack capacity; therefore it is difficult for them to comply with the conditions of European aid and investments. When there are other possibilities for investments which don't have these conditions, it is often for a practical reason that governments choose not to use European investment possibilities.

But does this mean that the EU should sit-back and let China deal with development of Africa? The EU still has possibilities for an active role in the development of Africa. But the characteristics of the relations have to change fundamentally. Still too often the EU chooses for a paternalistic approach in dealing with Africa. Since the continent has other options for getting funds, the EU should choose for an equal approach. At the same time the focus of European development policy should be narrowed down to the achievement of the MDGs.

The central question of this thesis is “*How does the European Union respond, in its development cooperation policy, to the growing influence of China in Africa?*” The answer to this question is not unambiguous.

An important reaction from Europe is to look for dialogue. Attempts from the European Commission for a trilateral dialogue between the European Union, China and Africa focus on low levels. There are no signs that there will be a trilateral summit on development. Trilateral dialogues at local, regional and national level are logical. This can prevent doubling of development work and prevent that NGOs try to do opposite things.

The statement of the European Commissioner Louis Michel in 2008 that the EU must “*tackle China’s growing presence in Africa*” has not been translated to actual policy. Chinese engagement in Africa only grows, and the influence of the EU seems to decrease.

A main problem in the European development policy is the fact that it is a multi-level competence. Therefore the EU has no clear role to play, but has to share it with its 27 member states.

References

- Aguilar, R., & Goldstein, A. (2009). The Chinasation of Africa: The Case of Angola. *The World Economy*, 32 (11), 1543-1562.
- Baarda, D.B., M.P.M. de Goede, J. Teunissen(2009) *Basisboek Kwalitatief onderzoek, Handleiding voor het opzetten en uitvoeren van kwalitatief onderzoek*. Groningen: Stenfert Kroese.
- Babbie, E. (2001) *The Practice of Social Research*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning
- Berger, B. (2006), *China's Engagement in Africa: Can the EU Sit Back?* *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 13: 1, pp 115-127.
- Boeije, H. (2005). *Analyseren in kwalitatief onderzoek*. Amsterdam: Boom Onderwijs
- Campos, I. and A. Vines (2008) Angola and China, a pragmatic partnership, in J. Cooke (ed.) *U.S. and Chinese Engagement in Africa. Prospects for improving U.S.-China-Africa cooperation* Washington DC: Centre for strategic and international studies.
- Council of the European Union (2011), *Council conclusions defining the EU strategy on readmission*. 3096th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting Luxembourg, 9 and 10 June 2011.
- Crawford, G.(1997) *Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency*, *Democratization*, 4: 3, pp. 69- 108 .
- Dijk, M. P. van (2007) China's aanwezigheid in Afrika. *Economisch statistische berichten*, 92(4519) pp. 584–587.
- European Community, Government of Angola (2003) *Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for the Period 2002-2007* Luanda.
- European Commission (2003) *A Secure Europe in a Better World, European security strategy*. Brussels: European Commission.
- European Commission (2008) *Communication on "The EU, Africa and China: Towards a trilateral dialogue and cooperation on peace, stability and sustainable development"*, 17 October 2008.
- European Parliament (2008) *Report on China's policy and its effects on Africa*, Rapporteur: Ana Maria Gomes. European Parliament session document A6-0080/2008.
- European Union (2006). *The European Consensus on Development*. Official Journal of the European Union. C46/1.
- Flint, A. (2009). *The End of a 'Special Relationship'? The New EU-ACP Economic partnership Agreements*. *Review of African Political Economy*, 119:79-92.
- Graham)Harrison, E. (2009) *China trade outweighs corruption fears for Africa* Reuters nov. 5 2009.
- Griffith, M. and S. Powell (2008) *Partnership under Pressure, an assessment of the European Commission's conduct in the EPA negotiations*. Brussels: ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Tearfund and Tradecraft.
- Grimm, S. (2008) The European Union's Africa policy, in W. Jung, D. Messner, Y. Guang (eds), *Chinese and European Perspectives on Development Cooperation with Africa. Values, Objectives and Modalities*, KAS Schriftenreihe China No. 84, 2008. pp. 14-22.

Grimm, S. (2011) *China as Africa's Ambiguous Ally – Why China has a responsibility for Africa's development*. Discussion paper 1/2011 Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University.

Haynes, J. (2002), *Politics in the Developing World, A Concise Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Hinkle, L., M. Hoppe, and R. Newfarmer (2006), *Beyond Cotonou: Economic Partnership Agreements in Africa*. In *Trade, Doha, and Development - A Window into the Issues*. Washington DC: The World Bank, Trade Department.

Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). *The Foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mahmoud, Y. (2007). *Chinese development Assistance and West African Agriculture: A Shifting Approach to Foreign Aid?* Lund University.

Scholz, I. (2008). Europe and China in Africa: Common objectives, diverging perspectives, new challenges. in W. Jung, D. Messner, Y. Guang (eds), *Chinese and European Perspectives on Development Cooperation with Africa. Values, Objectives and Modalities*, KAS Schriftenreihe China No. 84, 2008. pp. 63-72.

Sorensen, G. (2006), *Conditionality, Democracy and Development*, in O. Stokke, *Aid and Political Conditionality*, The European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI) book series 16, pp. 392-409 London, Franc Cass.

Stokke, O. (2006) *Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art*, in O. Stokke, *Aid and Political Conditionality*, The European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI) book series 16, pp. 1-87 London, Franc Cass.

Taylor, I. (2006). *China and Africa, Engagement and Compromise*. New York: Routledge.

Taylor, I. (2007). *Unpacking China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa*. Center on China's Transnational Relations. Hong Kong: The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

Joint Evaluation Unit (2009), *Country Level Evaluation Angola*. Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission. Contract No. EVA 2007/geo-acp. Brussels, European Commission

Wang, Jian-Ye (2007), *What Drives China's Growing Role in Africa?*, Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, October 2007.

Wenping (2008), *China-Europe development cooperation in Africa: Goals, values and methods*, in W. Jung, D. Messner, Y. Guang (eds), *Chinese and European Perspectives on Development Cooperation with Africa. Values, Objectives and Modalities*, KAS Schriftenreihe China No. 84, 2008. pp. 73-78.

Wissenbach, Uwe (2009). *The EU's response to China's Africa safari: Can triangulation match needs?* European Journal of Development Research Special Issue, 24 (1).

Zanger, S.C. (2000) *Good Governance and European Aid: The Impact of Political Conditionality*. European Union Politics 2000: 1: 293 pp. 293-317.

Websites used:

BBC Richard Black *Climate negotiations 'suspended' 14-12-2009*: www.bbc.co.uk

Debate European Parliament Tuesday, 22 April 2008 in Strasbourg, retrieved from:
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20080422+ITEM-016+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

International Herald Tribune: <http://global.nytimes.com/?iht>

Youtube: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cf9hUkg1hT4>

Appendices

Appendix I General Frame of interviews

European Development policy

What are the main challenges for European development policy?

The European Union has in recent years much effort into improving cooperation and coordination between Member States and the European Union. Are there agreements on issues like political conditionality?

What are the most important changes which were made in the European Development policy last decade?

Conditionality

What is Political Conditionality?

Is political Conditionality conducted in different ways by donor countries?

How do recipient countries perceive political conditionality?

Are there other ways of achieving the same goals?

China in Africa

Is China's White Paper on aid a change in foreign policy of the Peoples Republic?

What are the positive and negative (direct and indirect) effects of China in Africa?

Chinese engagement with Africa is often seen as negative from a western point of view, by politicians and media. Do you believe that this is true, or does China really contribute to African Development?

What are the unique selling points of China in Africa?

Consequences for European development policy

Did the EU change its development policy, as a result of increased Chinese engagement in Africa?

In which ways does the Chinese approach to Africa differ from the European approach?

Appendix II Participating interviewees

Prof. Dr. Ton Dietz, Director of the Africa-Studies Center, Leiden University.

Dr. Sven Grimm, Director of the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University in South Africa.

Uwe Wissenbach, Coordinator for Africa-China relations at the European Commission, DG Development.

Prof. Dr. Xuewu Gu, Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies, Ruhr-Universität Bochum.

Rene van der Linden, Chair of the Committee for European Cooperation, Dutch Senate, former state-secretary for foreign affairs.

Dirk Klaasen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands.

Cor van Honk, Ambassador for the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Luanda, Angola.

Helmut Reisen, Research Director, OECD Development Centre.

Dr. Dirk Willem te Velde, program leader of the Investment and Growth Program, Overseas Development Institute.

Ana Gomes, MEP, Rapporteur for China's policy and its effects on Africa (2008) European Parliament (PES).

Dr. Robrecht Renard, The Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB), University of Antwerp, Convener Working Group on Aid Policy and Performance EADI.

Dr. Jonathan Holslag, Director Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (BICCS) Vrije Universiteit Brussels.