

UNIVERSITEIT TWENTE

Bachelor Assignment

Voting behaviour in the Netherlands and Denmark

Yvonne Vermonden

23-1-2012

Openbaar verslag

Student Number: S0198676

1e begeleider: Kees Aarts

2e begeleider: Ariana Need

European Studies Bachelor

Table of contents

List of figures and tables	3
1. Introduction	4
2. Theoretical framework.....	6
Theory of class voting.....	6
Theory of class voting.....	6
Reality of class voting	9
Concluding remarks.....	9
3. Research design.....	10
Research question and hypotheses.....	10
Data and measurements	11
Case selection.....	11
Concepts	12
4. Case Selection	14
Why the Netherlands and Denmark?.....	14
The political system in Denmark	14
The political system of the Netherlands	14
Political parties in Denmark	15
Political parties in the Netherlands	16
History of right-wing politics in Denmark.....	18
History of right wing politics in the Netherlands	19
Concluding remarks.....	22
5. Research.....	23
Hypothesis 1.....	23
The Netherlands	23
Denmark	26
Hypothesis 2.....	28
Hypothesis 3.....	29
Comparing the Netherlands and Denmark	31
6. Supply and Demand explanations.....	32
Possible explanations offered for Denmark and the Netherlands.....	32
Supply	32
Demand	34
7. Right-wing parties in the Netherlands and Denmark.....	36
Development of the new right parties in Denmark	36
Development of the new right parties in the Netherlands	37

Concluding remarks.....	39
8. Conclusion.....	40
Appendix 1	43
Table comparing the Netherlands and Denmark.....	43
Sources.....	44

List of figures and tables

Figure 1: classification of class following Erikson and Goldthorpe	12
Figure 2: table comparing the Netherlands and Denmark	43
Table 1: the log-odds ratio of Class Voting in the Netherlands 1945-1990	23
Table 2: parameter estimate and model-of-fit for left-wing voting in the Netherlands 1972-1998	24
Table 3: parameter estimates of the likelihood for voting left-wing according to class	24
Table 4: linear trend of the likelihood for voting left-wing according to class	25
Table 5: the level of class voting in Denmark 1945-1990	26
Table 6: probability for voting for a party, ordered by class.....	27
Table 7: Social Class and Party Groups Lor-scores for each decade	27
Table 8: the impact of Class on Party Choice	28
Table 9: predicted probabilities of voting for the new (radical) right in Western Europe	29
Table 10: choice right-wing populist parties according to class	30

1. Introduction

In this bachelor assignment the relationship between social classes and voting behaviour is researched, more specifically the theory of class voting is used to research a new phenomenon in the political landscape. This new phenomenon is the upsurge of new right-wing parties in different countries across Europe and the support for these parties by the working class. There are a lot of different explanations in the literature for these two phenomena. In this thesis the new right-wing parties and the class voting theory will be examined.

However, the most striking aspect about these parties is not the fact that they have surfaced, but the kind of voters they attract. It seems that across Europe the lower social classes are most attracted to the new right-wing parties. This is a particular fascinating and enigmatic development given the fact the class voting theory proposes that that people will vote according to what is best for their economic position. In this case the lower social classes are expected to vote for left-wing parties (Manza, Hout, & Brooks, 1995b; Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

In order to investigate these two phenomena, that is the upsurge of extreme right-wing parties and the decline of class voting, two countries are compared, namely: the Netherlands and Denmark. In the chapter about case selection it is outlined why these two countries are researched. The main reason is that they are very similar in their basic political set-up, but that they differ a great deal in their recent history with extreme right-wing parties.

The research question for this bachelor assignment is: 'Has there been a shift from traditional working class voting towards new voting behaviour in the Netherlands and Denmark in the period between 1970 and 2006?' This question will be answered via several sub-questions and hypotheses which can be found in the chapter on Research Design.

This paper is a review of existing literature and uses secondary research in order to answer the research question posed. The scope of this paper is limited because it uses only two European countries, it uses a fixed time period and the paper has only one theory to research voting behaviour. By focussing on these aspects it becomes possible to look at an interesting phenomenon across Europe, namely: the emergence of new right-wing parties. Also, it become possible to look at the decline of class voting which has been going on for a longer time. A limitation for this paper is that the research used is restricted to the specific questions posed in the scientific articles, this means that the paper's questions and hypotheses are also restricted to these areas.

The scientific relevance of this paper lies in the comparison between two countries on the same phenomenon, which means that any similarities found can potentially also be important for other countries. However, any differences that occur between the countries could be country specific and should therefore be handled differently. It is important to no longer look at this phenomenon in isolation because it is wide-spread and in this time of globalization events in countries are almost never occurring in isolation. Another aspect of this paper is that it brings together several different research articles and compares them on the same phenomenon. Thus, the research field becomes less fragmented and the different explanations offered are brought together into one paper.

The social relevance of this paper lies in finding out the attractiveness of these new right-wing parties. This is important because these parties are mostly associated with racism and the exclusion foreigners. It might be beneficial to know what drives voters to these extremes and to see if there are solutions that do not exclude groups in societies.

A possible finding in this paper could be that that the vulnerable classes, for example the unskilled workers, have moved towards these extreme parties because they feel that these parties represent their interests. Furthermore, it could become apparent that the interests being represented are no longer in the realm of economics, but in the realm of social and/or culture values.

This paper is structured as follows: first the theory of class voting will be explained, then the research design is presented and the case selection is explained. The next part is the actual research done, in this part it will be attempted to find evidence for the hypotheses formulated. The third part is the comparison between Denmark and The Netherlands. Also, some explanations are offered as to why this is occurring. The main approach in this part will be based on supply and demand, with supply being the political parties and demand the side of the voters. The final part of this thesis will be a conclusion. In this conclusion the research question is answered via the answers to the different hypotheses.

2. Theoretical framework

Theory of class voting

In the following part I will describe the theory of class voting and the events that are now happening which are not in line with the theory.

Theory of class voting

The idea that a society consists of classes and not only individuals is not new. One of its first proponents is Plato in his book 'the Republic'. He states that there should be a ruling class called the guardians to guard over the rest of the population. He further defines the society into classes and assigns each class its own attributes (Plato). This idea of classes in society has been further developed in time and a more modern view on classes stems from Karl Marx. In his view a class is a group of people who share the same relationship to the means of production and who therefore develop a distinctive view of themselves and the world. In the view of Marx the most important thing about a person was the kind of work they performed because he believed that this created our view of the world. According to Marx, people did not develop on their own, but they developed through the class to which they belonged (Shively, 2008). For Marx the main divide was between the people who own capital and the workers. These divides shaped the political choices because the capital owners wanted to maintain their power over the workers and the workers wanted a redistribution of power. This meant that in the past the capital owners would vote for the right wing parties and the workers for the left since these choices represented the economic choices of the classes (Jansen, 2011).

The concept of Marx was directly related to socialism and is typically used to illustrate the class struggle between the working class and the capitalist class (Shively, 2008). Weber has built on this theory of class struggle, but he went beyond the capital/labour divide of Marx. For Weber the term classes went beyond the simple economic status of a person. The theory of Weber is primarily concerned with life chances, access to scarce goods and services. In this theory it is not just access to production means, but it is also social esteem and social closure. For Weber social closure meant that the class to which a person belongs determines his future or in other words closes a person in. In the lower class this closure is much more forceful than it is for the higher social class, since the higher social class have more means to gain information. For Weber the term class was actually a Status Group, which meant it was not only associated with economic relations but also with prestige rankings and consumption patterns (Jansen, 2011).

However, the Weber approach of class is very broad and implies an unlimited amount of cleavages. The concept was made more narrow by Lipset and Rokkan. They propose that the conflict of class is along a limited number of structural cleavages. The main conflict is along the lines of employers (owners) versus labourers (workers) stemming from the industrial revolution. However, another cleavage is along the lines of the different religions. The socio-cultural cleavage is also developed by Lipset and Rokkan (Jansen, 2011).

The term class is thus one of the cornerstones of classical political sociology (Cainzos & Voces, 2010). The general assumption was that there is a significant relationship between class and politics. It was assumed that political behaviour was shaped according to class lines and indeed research on political participation generally confirms this relationship (Cainzos & Voces, 2010).

The idea behind class voting is that one votes according to one's own self-interest. In the class voting theory self-interest concerns the economic position of a person, in the theory it is proposed that a person will behave in order to improve his/her own position (Manza, et al., 1995b). The first studies, published between 1950 and 1960, researched the relationship between social class and politics. The studies began by looking at a person's social and economic position and his voting behaviour.

Almost all studies done showed that people from lower classes (manual classes) were more likely to vote for left wing parties than other classes (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

The main idea is that leftist parties will fight for social change in the direction of equality and the lower-income groups will support them in order to become economically better off. In contrast, the higher-income groups will oppose leftist parties in order to maintain their economic advantages (Manza, et al., 1995b). This idea was already argued in 1954 by Lipset and his colleagues.

Three hypotheses or statements can be formulated regarding the theory that people vote according to their economic position, thus their class. The first is that voters are concerned with material interest, the second concerns nonmaterial interest and final statement concerns the characteristics of parties and politicians. Especially the material interest of voters is a key aspect to class voting since it concerns the economic position of the voter (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

The historical materialism trend, which is the idea proposed by Marx that classes are based on the relationship of a person to capital, states that the manual workers have different economic interests than the non-manual workers. In general a left-wing party will better fit the economic position of the manual workers since they promise better living conditions and a higher income. Whereas a right-wing party will be ill-fitting because they seek to maintain the economic position of the non-manual workers. (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999). According to Lipset, this explains why there is such a thing as class voting. He states that people vote according to simple self-interest, thus a working class person will vote for a leftist party because they traditionally represent themselves as instruments of social change in the direction of equality which means that the lower income-groups will support them to become economically better off (Manza, et al., 1995b).

There are some factors that either strengthen or weaken the effect of class voting. One such effect is class mobility. Class mobility means in short, that the more mobile a voter is the less likely it is that he or she is influenced by the current class to which he or she belongs. However, the longer a person belongs to a certain class the more likely it is that he or she will act according to their present economic interests and thus the class to which he or she belongs to at that moment (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

A factor that heightens class voting on a nationwide level is union density. The relationship is as follows: the higher the union density, the bigger the chance that manual workers vote for left-wing parties. This is the case because the unions clearly define the relationship between politics and the interest of the social class, which makes the choice easier for the workers. This means that the relationship of class voting and politics is strengthened (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999). A further assumption is that this will also work on the individual level, since the worker himself is influenced by the Union and thus will make his choice along the lines of class voting.

If we look at the material interest of voters then class voting seems a good predictor of voting behaviour. But there are two factors that complicate the matter, namely: *the non-material interests of voters* and *the characteristics of parties and politicians*.

Non-material interests are all other interests besides economical interests. For example a minority group in a country might be part of the lower social class and therefore be expected to vote for a left wing party according to their economic (thus material interest). However, because of their minority status they have also non-material interests. It could well be that these interests are better represented by a Centre or a Right-wing party. Thus, in the case of non-material interests some parties represent these interests better than the traditional parties.

It should be noted however, that in most cases it has been the left-wing parties that represent the most of these kind of priorities, so this will not influence the outcome of voting behaviour but it does influence the decision making process why people make a certain decision to vote for a party (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

The last factor influencing class voting is *the characteristics of parties and politicians*. The assumption is that parties and thus politicians seek to increase their vote share. They will focus on the groups that are the most numerous and will try to attract them. What this means for the class voting theory is the following: if the lower classes are numerous the parties will focus on them and will try to shape their policies accordingly. For example, if there are more workers than higher level controllers in the society, the political parties will focus on the workers since this will mean that they will attract more votes (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

The theory of class voting thus focuses on the demand side of politics in that it tries to show how people vote. Classes vote according to their self-interest. However, the supply side also needs to be highlighted. With supply side we mean the political parties. These political parties did not just appear to fulfil the voters' needs, but they were created and reformed over time.

The political party was first developed in the nineteenth century in response to the appearance of elections involving large numbers of voters. A political party can be defined as follows: 'a political party is a group of officials or would-be officials who are linked with a sizable group of citizens into an organization; a chief object of this organization is to ensure that its officials attain power or are maintained in power' (Shively, 2008). The political party is intimately linked with democracy because with the coming of elections the people saw that a large club was beneficial to gaining offices. However, even without a democracy a party can be established such as for example the Communist Party in China. A political party provides several key features: a basis for the mobilization of masses of citizens; a means of recruiting and socializing political leaders; structured political identity at the mass and elite levels; and a method of control within a government structure (Shively, 2008).

Important for the theory of class voting is the aspect of 'party identification'. This means that a person identifies with a political party; this identification is not just agreement with its policies or candidates of the moment but an enduring identification with the party itself (Shively, 2008). Thus the expectation of the traditional class theory is that a worker will identify himself with a socialist party.

In time however the theory has proven to need further theorizing of the mechanism linking class membership and voting (Manza, et al., 1995b). The research studies done in the post-war period have provided two distinct hypotheses about the relationship between class and political behaviour. The two hypotheses can be summarized as follows:

1. Columbia School
2. Michigan school

The Columbia school hypothesis states that voters had high levels of stable partisanship and that the voters most likely to change their vote were the voters that were least interested in politics. The reason that voters of the same class had such a stable partisanship was because they experienced the cumulative effects of the historical experiences of their group and because their network reinforced their behaviour. The networks that the voters were apart of were relatively homogenous. In this model class voting is thus the result of '...common experiences of key historical moments and the reinforcing effects of intra-class friendship networks and social organizations (Manza, et al., 1995b).'

The Michigan school hypothesis proposed that social structural variables (including class origins) lead to social-psychological attributes (including political attitudes). The model proposed by this hypothesis was that of a funnel where class is at the mouth of the funnel and behaviour at the narrow end, thus social structural variables lead to social-psychological attributes. However, in order to get to class voting the hypothesis states that a person needs to be aware of their own class location and that they should actively use the voting class heuristics (Manza, et al., 1995b).

In sum, the traditional class approach is that people vote according to their economic position. Which means that working or manual class vote for left-wing parties and non-manual workers vote for right-wing parties. This behaviour has been called the 'natural behaviour of class'. The natural behaviour depends on their economic position as proposed by Lipset. The main rationale behind this natural behaviour is that the manual workers have a poor economic position which means they will prefer economic redistribution and thus vote for leftist parties. While middle-class or non-manual citizens will reject economic redistribution because of their privileged position and thus vote for right-wing parties.

The main idea is thus that people seek to maintain or improve their economic position, even at the expense of other classes (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006a). However, the label 'natural' is very ambiguous and it's too narrow for the purpose of this thesis. In this thesis the following is proposed: the theory of class voting predicts that people will vote according to class when material interests, thus economics, are at stake.

Reality of class voting

There are two processes being studied in this paper: the upsurge of (extreme) right wing parties in Europe and the decline of class voting. The connection between the two is explored in this paper via the different hypotheses. It needs to be stated that the decline in class voting has been going on for a longer time, while the new right-wing parties are a new phenomenon for most of the countries in Europe. However, the expectation in this thesis is that these phenomenon are in some way related to each other.

The decline in class voting means that the voters have changed their voting behaviour from traditional class voting to a new way of voting. Especially for manual workers this behaviour leads to 'unnatural voting (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006a)' or as it will be termed in this thesis 'unexpected voting behaviour' namely from the traditionally expected left-wing parties to presumably the unexpected (extreme) right wing political parties. The traditional theories predict that people will vote for left-wing parties in line with their economic position, but in reality they are now voting for right-wing parties. Traditionally the right-wing parties were seen as representatives of the capital owners. This seems to have changed towards other patterns.

In this bachelor assignment this phenomenon is researched to see if class voting has declined, if voting patterns have changed and there will be a comparison between two European countries, namely Denmark and the Netherlands, to see if there are similarities between these two countries. The rationale behind this is that if there are indeed similarities, they will most likely be found in other countries and the theory could be improved upon. Also, if there are no such similarities than it become clear that the decline in class voting in some countries while not in others is an isolated event which might be related to country specific characteristics.

Concluding remarks

In the existing literature there are already several explanations given, but it is now important to see if class voting has actually decreased in the Netherlands and Denmark. The assumption is that it has declined, but it is important to see if this decline has indeed taken place. Also, it is important to compare the trend in both countries to see if it is to the same degree in both countries.

3. Research design

Research question and hypotheses

The central question this research is going to address is: if there has been a shift in voting behaviour from expected left-wing voting to the unexpected right wing voting for the working class population? This is unexpected because traditional voting theories predict voting for left-wing parties under certain conditions. For example the workers are expected to vote for left-wing parties because this is in their economic interest. The main rationale behind the traditional voting theories lies in the economical dimension, thus people will vote for a party that represents their economical position or improves their economical position.

The research question for this thesis will be: 'Has there been a shift from traditional working class voting towards new voting behaviour in the Netherlands and Denmark in the period between 1970 and 2006?'

The focus will be on traditional class voting theories and the change that may have occurred. The question then needs several sub-questions in order to be answered. The first step is to establish what the expected voting behaviour is according to the theory of class voting. This will be answered by using the following question:

- What is the expected voting behaviour according to the traditional theories?

The second step is to see if there has been a shift from the traditional voting behaviour to unexpected voting behaviour. The focus in this bachelor assignment is on the working class and the question related to this topic is:

- Has there been a shift from traditional left-wing voting to right wing voting by the working class in the Netherlands and Denmark?

However, this question is not easily answered and several hypotheses are needed in order to arrive at an answer to this question. The first two hypotheses are related to each other and are the following:

- Hypothesis 1: the voting patterns of the manual working class have shifted from traditional left-wing voting to a pattern that fits the voting behaviour of the general population between 1970 and 2006.
- Hypothesis 2: between 1970 and 2006 the votes from the manual working class have gone more towards the (extreme) right wing parties than to any other party family in the system

Both hypotheses describe in effect the same trend namely: the voting behaviour have changed from the old parties to new parties. The expectation is that the working class traditionally voted for the socialist parties, as is in line with the theory, and that they have now changed their voting behaviour by voting for new (extreme) right-wing parties which is unexpected voting behaviour.

The last step to look at in regards to the question if there has been a shift from traditional left-wing voting to right wing voting by the working class in the Netherlands and Denmark, is to see whether the working class are actually overrepresented in these new parties. The hypothesis that belongs to this question is:

- Hypothesis 3: the working class are overrepresented in terms of percentages among the new right-wing parties

It is important to look at this because if they are not overrepresented in these new parties it means that there actually is no real shift towards right-wing voting but merely a shift away from the traditional parties. This means that class is altogether unimportant in relation to voting. However, if they are indeed overrepresented it could mean that class is still a predictor just not in the way of the traditional class voting theory.

The first three hypothesis mainly focus on the demand side of the question, namely what do the voters want? However, the supply side also needs to be researched, thus what do the parties offer. Because until recently most of the new right-wing parties did not exist, it is important to look how they came into existence and how they were able to attract voters.

Another question that needs to be answered is thus about the parties:

- How did the new right wing parties come into existence and how were they able to attract voters?

By looking at this question it can be seen if the process is the same in the Netherlands and Denmark, furthermore we can see how demand and supply work together.

The next step of this bachelor assignment is to analyse the differences and similarities between Denmark and the Netherlands. Also, to shortly look at some explanations that might explain the possible shift in traditional voting behaviour. The following step is to draw a conclusion, in this conclusion the hypotheses will be repeated and the findings will be reported. And the final part will be a tentative answer to the sub-questions and the research question.

Data and measurements

In this paper secondary data is collected from different scientific articles as well as specific country data. The data used pertains to the period between 1970 and 2006. In the research part of this assignment there will be a detailed report of the data and measurements used.

Case selection

The units of analysis will be voters from Denmark and the Netherlands. The time period will be between 1970 and 2006. The rationale for choosing Denmark and the Netherlands is explained at length in the chapter concerning this topic. For the purpose of this chapter a short overview will be given.

The Netherlands and Denmark have been chosen via the method of induction. Thus several European countries have been looked at and the Netherlands and Denmark been chosen because they are the most comparable on this situation. Several other countries could have been chosen for this assignment for example France where the Front National was founded or Belgium which also has a history with extreme right with Vlaams Blok (Kottman, Waard, & Gruyter, 2000) . Furthermore, Germany is also experiencing an upsurge in extreme right party. However, these countries have not been used for very specific reasons. In the case of Belgium it is the divide between Flanders and Wallonia which shapes most of the politics while the other cleavages are of secondary importance. In France and in Germany the institutional set-up is very different from the other European countries, and this set-up can easily influence the election results. In the end the Netherlands and Denmark are more suitable to compare with each other. There are several reasons for this and they will now be outlined.

In short, the rationale behind choosing these specific countries is that their institutional set-up is similar and therefore easily comparable. This also means that any differences found between the two countries can with almost absolute certainty not be attributed to differences in the institutional set up since they are so similar. Furthermore, both countries are democracies, have a monarch and are welfare states. This in short means that the general features of the countries are also comparable.

In contrast, there are several important differences between the Netherlands and Denmark which makes it interesting to compare these two countries out of all the countries in Europe. Firstly, the two countries have very different histories concerning extreme right. This means that the reaction to the new right are very different also.

Furthermore, in the Netherlands the phenomenon of new (extreme) right-wing parties is recent and in Denmark it has been going on for a longer time, this makes it possible to say something over a longer period in time. Thirdly, in the Scandinavian countries class voting has always been the main determinant for voting behaviour whereas in the Netherlands other cleavages are also important. What this means for the bachelor assignment is that it is possible to see that if the trends are still comparable even if the effect is much smaller in one than in the other country.

In the following part the most important concepts used in this thesis will be outlined and defined.

Concepts

Class, for the purpose of this bachelor assignment, follows the classification of Erikson and Goldthorpe. The classification is based on the types of occupation. This means that it follows the classification of Lipset and Rokkan, namely that the main cleavages are along the lines of workers and capital owners (Jansen, 2011) but the classification of Erikson and Goldthorpe is more extensive. The classification by Erikson and Goldthorpe can be shown as follows:

Figure 1: classification of class following Erikson and Goldthorpe

Types of Occupations	Names Used in Erikson–Goldthorpe Study
Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials, managers in industrial establishments	Higher-level service class
Lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials, higher-grade technicians, supervisors of non-manual employees	Lower-level service class
Routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce, sales personnel, other rank-and-file employees	Routine non-manual workers
Small proprietors with and without employees	Petty bourgeoisie
Farmers and smallholders, other self-employed in primary production	Farmers
Supervisors of manual workers, skilled manual workers, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, agricultural workers and other workers in primary production	Workers/working class

(Knutsen, 2001)

Political party is a group of officials or would-be officials who are linked with a sizable group of citizens into an organization; a chief objective of this organization is to ensure that its officials attain power or are maintained in power (Shively, 2008). For the purpose of this paper the following is added to this definition: a party is any political group, in possession of an official label and of a formal organization that links centre and locality, that runs at elections and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free) candidates for public office (Paynter, Hawkesworth, & Kogan, 2003).

Old left wing are parties based on socialism. In the Netherlands the main party is the PvdA (De Graaf, Heath, & Need, 2001) and in Denmark this party is the Social Democrats ("Denmark - Political parties,").

New left wing, in the Netherlands the party that accounts for this movement is the D66. This party is left for the most part in that the citizen is central to the programme ("De uitgangspunten van Democraten 66," 2004), but it acts much more towards a centre party than does the old left (De Graaf, et al., 2001). In Denmark the New left is characterized by the Socialist's people's party ("Denmark - Political Parties," 2011).

Green left politics place special emphasize on environmental issues. These parties thus place special interest in postmaterialist values. For example in the Netherlands the main green left party is 'Groenlinks' (De Graaf, et al., 2001). In Denmark the main green party is the Red-Green alliance or 'De RødGrønne'.

Free market right is a political ideology generally characterized by a belief in individualism and minimal government intervention in the economy and society; also a belief in the virtue of the status quo and general acceptance of traditional morality (Radicevic, Aha, Katz, & Hill, 2008). In the Netherlands the main party belonging to this ideology is the VVD (De Graaf, et al., 2001). In Denmark it's 'Venstre' ("Venstre - Denmark," 2011).

Old extreme right-wing parties were traditionally party that are anti-systemic. The main ideology is that of an authoritarian and hierarchical governmental structure. Furthermore the parties are associated with aggressive nationalism. The old extreme right parties are typically linked to fascism and have an ethnocentric outlook (Knigge, 1998).

New (extreme) right-wing parties (right-wing populist parties) have usually distanced themselves from fascism. The parties focus on immigration issues and a strong state with a tougher law system (Knigge, 1998). Their main ideology is that of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-political-establishment populism. Most parties base their ideology on the ethno-pluralist doctrine (Rydgren, 2008). In the Netherlands the parties representing this ideology are: the LPF and the PVV. In Denmark it is the Danish People's Party.

Theory of class voting is that people vote according to their economic position. Which means that working or manual class vote for left-wing parties and non-manual workers vote for right-wing parties. This behaviour can be called the 'natural behaviour of class'. The natural behaviour depends on their economic position as proposed by Lipset. The main rationale behind this natural behaviour is that the manual workers have a poor economic position which means they will prefer economic redistribution and thus vote for leftist parties. While middle-class or non-manual citizens will reject economic redistribution because of their privileged position and thus vote for right-wing parties. The main idea is thus that people seek to maintain or improve their economic position, even at the expense of other classes (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006a).

The next step is to explain the case selection, thus why this assignment studies the Netherlands and Denmark of all the countries in Europe.

4. Case Selection

Why the Netherlands and Denmark?

In this chapter it will be explained why the Netherlands and Denmark are compared. The chapter will be structured as follows: first a short overview of some general features of both countries will be given, then the political system for both countries will be explained, after that the parties that are in parliament will be shortly described and finally a short history of (extreme) right in both countries will be given. As the concluding remarks the case will be made why it is possible to compare these two countries and why it is good to do so.

The choice for the Netherlands and Denmark was done via the method of induction. Induction means: the logical model in which general principles are developed from specific observations (Babbie, 2007). In the following part it will be explained why the Netherlands and Denmark are very suitable to compare.

The political system in Denmark

In Denmark there is a system of proportional representation in place. The legal age from which a person can vote is 18, this person has to be permanently domiciled in Denmark and he/she can then also be a member of the Folketing (Lentz, 2009).

Furthermore, Denmark is a constitutional monarchy. The current monarch is Queen Margrethe. The monarchy is based on hereditary succession. The main function of the monarch is to represent Denmark both abroad and at home (Jespersen, 2008).

The voting system in Denmark is called a mixed member proportional system and it has several key factors. The system is developed in a way that allows candidates to have a regional affiliation in order to gain votes. The parliament has 135 seats that are obtained in an election, this election takes place in 10 multi-member constituencies and the election takes place once every four years. The parliament also has 40 supplementary seats for the parties, this was done for mathematical accuracy. In total the parliament has 175 members that are elected in Denmark and two members that are elected in the Faroe Islands and two in Greenland (Lentz, 2009).

Denmark has only one house of parliament, the Folketing, that governs the country. The Folketing is presided by a president and he/she is assisted by four vice-presidents. These five functions make up the Presidium of the Danish Parliament and the officials body representing the Folketing extramurally (Lentz, 2009).

In Denmark the government has been made up by a coalition government and more often than not this coalition needed the tolerance support of another party. For the last couple of years the government was made possible by the tolerance support of the Danish People's Party, but at the last election this changed. Currently the government is made up of the Social Democrats party, the Social Liberals and Socialist People's party. The current Prime Minister is Helle Thorning-Schmidt from the Social Democrats party ("Governments and Politics," 2011).

The political system of the Netherlands

The Netherlands has a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system (Gray-Block, 2011). This monarchy is regulated in the constitution and works via succession of birth ("Nederland: een parlementaire democratie," 2010). The current monarch is queen Beatrix, she acts as the official head of state. The prime minister acts as the head of the Cabinet. The Netherlands is a representative democracy and consists of three tiers; namely: the national government, the provincial governments and the local or municipal councils (Gray-Block, 2011).

The Netherlands has two chambers of parliament, the first chamber consists of 75 members and is called the senate. The second chamber consists of 150 members and is directly voted for via general elections, in contrast the first chamber which is indirectly voted for (Gray-Block, 2011).

Every four years there is an election for the lower house, the second chamber, and after these general elections the government is formed by the formateur which is appointed by the Queen and the future prime minister, which is usually the leader of the party that won the most votes. The MPs for the second chamber win seats according to a proportional representation system. The government has the executive power and is responsible for governing the nation, but the lower house has the final word in a conflict because the lower house supervises the government. The lower house has several rights in order to be able to supervise the government. They have to right to: approve the budget, the right to ask questions, the right of interpellation, the right to submit motions, the right to institute an inquiry, the right of amendment and the right of initiative. These rights have been in the constitution since 1848 (Gray-Block, 2011).

The final say on legislation proposed by the government is made by the senate, they have veto rights. The senate can either approve or cancel a legislation, but it cannot make amendments or propose new legislation (Gray-Block, 2011).

Historically the Netherlands had a government that was a coalition of two or more parties. However, today the Netherlands has a minority coalition. The government was formed on October the 14th 2010 by Mark Rutte who is a member of the liberal VVD party. The government was formed together with the Christian Democrats (CDA) and they are supported by the Freedom Party (PVV) (Gray-Block, 2011).

Political parties in Denmark

The following part will be a short description of the political parties in Denmark. The descriptions will include their political orientation and the results from the latest parliamentary elections. They will be ordered according to the left-wing, right-wing scale, starting with the left-wing parties.

Red-Green Alliance	Socialist people's party	Social Democrats	New Alliance party
Liberal Party	Conservatie people's party	Radical Liberal party	Danish People's party

The Red-Green Alliance (Unity List), Enhedslisten de Rød-Grønne, was established in 1989 as an electoral alliance of the Left Socialists, the Communist-Party of Denmark, and socialist Workers party. In later years it developed into an independent party. The party focuses mainly on ecology and socialism and is the most leftist party in the Parliament. In the most recent elections the party received 2,17% of the votes and therefore has 4 seats in parliament ("Denmark - Political Parties," 2011).

The Socialist People's Party, Socialistisk Folkepartij, was founded by Aksel Larsen after he was expelled from the Communist party. The party was established in 1959 and its ideological profile is popular socialism. The Socialist People's Party is a left-wing party. In the most recent parliamentary elections the SF received 13.04% of the votes and therefore has 23 seats in parliament ("Denmark - Political Parties," 2011).

The Social Democrats, Socialdemokraterne, was founded in 1871. It was traditionally the strongest party in Denmark. Its associated with democratic socialism. In the most recent elections the party received 25,47% of the votes and therefore has 45 seats in parliament ("Denmark - Political Parties," 2011).

The New Alliance party, Ny Alliance, was formed in 2007 by two former members of the Danish Social Liberal Party and one former member of the Conservative People's Party. In the beginning the party did not display any clear common political platform, but the party presented itself as a centre party. In 2008 the party changed its name to Liberal Alliance. In the most recent elections the party had 2.81% of the votes and hence has 5 seats in parliament.

The Liberal Party, Venstre, was founded in 1870 as the United Left (Det Forenede Venstre). Between 1895 and 1910 the party was known as the Left Reform Party (Venstrereformpartiet) after 1910 it became known as the Venstre party its current name. After the 1960s the party evolved into a classical liberal party. In the most recent election the party received 26.26% of the votes and so it has 46 seats in parliament ("Denmark - Political Parties," 2011).

The Conservative People's Party, Det Konservative Folkeparti, was established in 1915. The party was based on the former party called 'the Right'. The KF is a traditional conservative party. In the most recent election the party received 10.39% of the votes and correspondently has 18 seats in parliament.

The Radical Liberal Party, Det Radikale Venstre, is a social liberal party. The party was established in 1905 and was also a splinter party, in the case of the RV it sprang from the Left Reform Party. The RV is at the centre of the left-right political scale. In the most recent election the party received 5.12% of the votes and thus has 9 seats in parliament ("Denmark - Political Parties," 2011).

The Danish People's Party, Dansk Folkeparti, was formed as a splinter party of the Progress Party in 1995. The Danish People's Party is a populist right-wing party, it opposes immigration and Denmark's membership in the EU. In the most recent elections the party gained 13,86% of the votes, which means that they have 25 seats in parliament ("Denmark - Political parties,").

Political parties in the Netherlands

The following parties are active in the Netherlands and will be ordered from left-wing to right-wing connotation.

The parties are ordered as follows, where left means left progressive and right means conservative. The parties are ordered following their further description. So for example the SGP is conservative and Christian. The following order then follows from this:

SP GL PVDD PVDA D66 CDA CU VVD SGP PVV

What follows will be a short description of the different parties and their position on the left-right scale.

The Socialist Party was founded in 1972, in that time it was named Communist Party of the Netherlands (Marxist-Leninist). The core issue this parties strives for are employment, social welfare and investing in education, public safety and health care. The party calls for a society where human dignity, equality and solidarity are most important. The party is against privatization of public services and it was one of the loudest voices against globalization. In the most recent election the party had 9,82% of the votes and has 15 seats in parliament ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

Groenlinks, greenleft, was a party that brought together the Radical Political Party, the Pacifist Socialist Party, the Communist party of the Netherlands and the Evangelical People's Party. The four parties merged in 1989 and formed the Greenleft party. The main emphasize lies on the conservation of nature and the environment. The party has its roots in socialism and pacifism. In the most recent parliamentary election the party received 6.67% of the votes and the party has 10 seats in parliament ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

The PvdD, the party for the animals, was founded in 2002 by a group of animal rights activists, that were already active in the society and politics ("Organisatie," 2011). The party first gained seats in the Dutch Parliament in 2006. Despite its name, the party claims not to be a single-issue party. The party programme states that it is neither a right-wing nor a left-wing party, but from their party programme and the different acts it can be deduced that it is a left-wing party slightly more towards the centre ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011; Partijprogramma Partij van de Dieren," 2011). In the most recent parliamentary elections, 2010, the party gained 1,83% of the votes and has 2 seats in parliament ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

The PvdA, the labour party, also came about through a merger between parties in 1946. This party was a merger of the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP), the Free-Minded Democratic League (VDB) and the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU). This merger was seen as an attempt to break with the old pillar system. The main ideals of the PvdA are shared responsibility, stewardship, justice and solidarity. In the most recent election the party received 19,63% of the votes and has 30 seats in parliament ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

The D66 party is mostly recognized as the centre party in the Netherlands. It was founded in 1966 as a progressive-liberal and radical-democratic party. This party also wanted to abolish the pillar system in the Netherlands. Their main goal was to appeal to the people to re-take their democratic institutions. Within the parties there are two main currents: the radical democrats and the progressive liberals. In the most recent election the party received 6.95% of the votes which translated into 10 seats in parliament ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

The Christian Democratic Appeal, the CDA, was founded in 1980 and also resulted from a merger, this merger was between three religious parties. The parties that merged into the CDA were: the Catholic People's Party (KVP), the Christian-Historical Union (CHU) and the Anti Revolutionary Party (ARP). In terms of economy and defence politics the party is mostly in a centre position, but it does have a tendency to lean towards a more conservative attitude. For most coalitions in the Netherlands since 1917 the CDA or its predecessor has been a part of the coalition. In the most recent election the party had 13.61% of the votes which translated into 21 seats in parliament ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

The Christian Union, CU, was established in 2000. The CU is also the product of a merger between political parties namely the 'Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (GVP) and the Evangelische Volkspartij (EVP). The CU is an orthodox reformed political party. It has conservative views on ethical and social issues, but is more centre-left on economical and environmental issues. In the most recent election the party has 3,3% of the votes and 5 seats in parliament ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, the VVD, is currently in government and its party leader Mark Rutte is the prime minister of the Netherlands. The VVD was founded in 1948 and had as its basis the secularized middle class. The main representation of the VVD lies in the liberal traditions and they are a strong supporter of private enterprises in the Netherlands. The VVD is mostly seen as centre-right, free market or conservative party. In the most recent election the party had 20.49% of the votes, which meant 31 seats in parliament and as mentioned earlier their party leader is prime minister ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

The Party for Freedom, the PVV, the party was founded as recently as 2006 and was the successor of the one-man party of Geert Wilder's (group Wilders). The party combines liberalist ideals on economic issues with a conservative programme towards immigration and culture. In the most recent election the party had 15,45% of the votes and correspondingly 24 seats in parliament. Currently the PVV is not in the cabinet, but it permits the cabinet which means the cabinet can govern in its minority capacity ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

The last party is the Political Reformed Party, the SGP, it is an orthodox protestant party and was established in 1918. The SGP is the longest existing party and has always been in the opposition. The party is called a testimonial party because they refuse to cooperate in any cabinet and they have orthodox political ideals. In the most recent election the party received 1,74% of the votes and therefore has 2 seats in parliament ("Netherlands - Political Parties," 2011).

History of right-wing politics in Denmark

Like other Scandinavian countries, Denmark does not have a long history of old extreme right wing parties or movements. During the 1930s and 1940s Denmark was one of the few countries in Europe that did not have a strong Fascist movement, nor did it have a strong Nazism movement. However, like other European countries the country experienced an upsurge in new right-wing parties during the 1980s (Rydgren, 2004). In the following part the history of right-wing parties in Denmark will be outlined.

The first right-wing party that gained votes in Denmark was the Danish Progress Party. The party was founded in 1972 (Knigge, 1998). The DP received 15.9% of the votes in the election of 1973. During the 70s this party was known as a populist, anti-tax, protest party, which advocated a neo-liberal economic policy (Rydgren, 2004). The party had a strong populist outlook (Knigge, 1998). But during the 1970s this party could not be called an extreme or radical party, at least not when concerning social-cultural issues. The party programme of the DP did not even mention immigration, nor nationalism. However, this all changed during the 80s (Rydgren, 2004). The Danish Progress Party was unique in Europe, no other far right party was as successful in gaining votes at this time. A possible exception to this is the Progress Party in Norway (the Fremskrittspartiet) which was founded in 1973. However, the party only really gained electoral support in 1989 when it received 13% of the votes, before this the party hovered around 5% of the votes (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990).

Thus the progress party in Norway gained more support than in other countries at this time, but it was not until much later that it became a real political player. The Progress Party in Denmark had success much earlier and it could thus be stated that it was a unique case.

Since the mid 1980s the Progress Party changed its programme and rhetoric to where it now fits that of other right-wing parties. The focus of the party is on (anti-)immigration themes. These themes have been important for the last two decades (Rydgren, 2004). This was necessary because electoral support for the party was declining considerably during this time. The party managed a come-back by shifting the focus to law-and-order and was able to increase the importance placed on immigration issues (Knigge, 1998).

Although the Progress Party changed its rhetoric, most authors argue that Denmark did not truly have a radical right-wing populist party (RRP) till the emergence of the Danish People's Party. The argument is that although the Progress Party had (anti-)immigration themes, they did not have a doctrine of ethno-pluralism, nor was the political programme built on ethno-nationalism. The Danish People's Party which came after the DPP, and in a way followed up on the DPP, had both of these elements at its core (Rydgren, 2004).

The Danish People's Party was founded in the mid-1980s as a breakaway faction of the Danish Progress Party. The leading figure for the Danish People's Party has been Pia Kjaersgaard ever since this time. Pia Kjaersgaard was in fact the person who founded the Danish People's Party. The reason behind her founding this new party followed from a series of events in the DPP. In 1984 Pia Kjaersgaard was the temporary replacement of Mogens Glistrup in the Danish Progress Party because he was imprisoned for tax fraud. In this time Pia Kjaersgaard was able to build a strong platform within in the party, but when Glistrup returned he was reinstated as leader.

This eventually led to the departure of Pia Kjærsgaard along with a sizable group of followers from the Danish Progress Party and the Forming of the Danish People's Party. The party had their first election in 1998 and at that time they received 7.2% of the votes and in the election of 2001 they had increased their votes to 12% (Rydgren, 2004). In the latest elections the party gained 13,86% of the votes, which means that they have 25 seats in parliament ("Denmark - Political parties,").

History of right wing politics in the Netherlands

Before 2002 the Netherlands had no real far right movement that had a change to gain the majority of votes. It was common practice to compare a far right party with fascism and the Nazi's and this generally discouraged voters for voting for far right parties (Dorussen, 2004). However, the number of voters for far right parties was fairly constant between 1970 and 2000 so there was, however small, a platform for these parties (Dorussen, 2004). In the following part the far right parties between 1970 and 2000 in the Netherlands and their success or lack thereof will be described.

In the 1970s the Dutch People's Union (Nederlandse Volks Unie, NVU) was the main party for the Dutch far right movement. The party was founded by Guus Looy. The party had no real success until Joop Glimmerveen became active for the party. His main idea was to focus on the guest-workers. His focus was that the guest-worker had to disappear from the Netherlands. The party was a clear example of a neo-fascist party ("De Partijen - Extreem Rechts," 2000; Dorussen, 2004). The party was banned in 1978, but could not be dissolved because of certain provisions in the law ("De Partijen - Extreem Rechts," 2000).

During the 1980s the Netherlands experienced an upswing of far right voting, which is actually in common with the trend in other Western European countries (Betz, 1999). During the 1980s the first party to emerge was the Centre Party (Centrum Partij, CP) which was succeeded by the CP'86 and the Centre Democrats (Centrum Democraten, CD). The most successful of these three parties was the Centre Democrats with Hans Janmaat as its leader. At the beginning of the 80s Janmaat was the leader of the Centrum Party, this party had some success in the election of 1982, but the party was troubled by internal divisions. These divisions eventually led a split into the Centrum Democrats and the Centrum Party. After which Janmaat became the leader of the Centrum Democrats. At the beginning both the parties seemed unsuccessful after the split, but the Centrum Democrats party recovered and performed well in the elections of 1994. In the elections of 1994 the Centrum Democrats actually gained three seats in parliament. However, in the elections of 1998 the Centrum Democrats and the Centrum Party failed to gain seats and both parties were absent in the 2002 elections (Dorussen, 2004).

All three of the parties mentioned above were clearly part of the right-wing doctrine. Their main positions were strongly nationalist and all three had anti-immigrant positions. The main goal of the parties was to maintain or restore a strong national identity with traditional values. These values were for example: respect for law and order and authority in general.

The anti-immigration position could be seen in their aim to halt immigration and to try and encourage already established immigrants to return to their country of origins. In the period between 1980 and 1990 the targeted group of immigrants were the so-called 'guest-laborers' like the Turkish and Moroccan workers. General features of all three of the parties could be described by nationalism and xenophobia, but the policy positions in other policy fields were not clearly written out and the focus was on immigration and nationalism (Dorussen, 2004).

The Centrum Democrats was not the same as the other two parties in a number of respects. The main difference was that the Centrum Democrats tried to distance itself from the fascist past of World War 2, whereas the Centrum Party, CP'86 and the NVU had much more members of neo- and ordinary fascists in the parties and in its leadership.

Also, the Centrum Democrats generally accepted the existing Dutch political system, while the other parties were anti-systemic parties. Furthermore, the Centrum Democrats differed in their approach to immigrants. The CP, CP'86 and the NVU openly condoned violence and in particular violence against immigrants. It might be that these three differences made it possible for the Centrum Democrats to have more votes and thus success than the other parties before it (Dorussen, 2004).

The electoral base for the Centrum Democrats could be found in the large cities in the West of the country. These cities were: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague and Utrecht. The main voters could be found in large districts which had large groups of (recent) immigrants and higher levels of unemployment and lower status scores. Especially in Rotterdam and the Hague this pattern could be found. The supporters for the CD/CP were most likely low-income earners with limited formal education. Another overrepresented group were the unemployed and the disabled. A sociological profile of the typical CD/CP voters tells us that it were typically young males with little experience in the democratic process (first time voters). Furthermore, CD/CP voters usually had limited attachment to existing social structures or to put it differently they had limited social capital. However, over time the voters for the CD/CP became much less distinct for the average Dutch voter (Dorussen, 2004).

If there was a far-right movement in politics during this time, why did it fail in the Netherlands and succeed in other parts of Europe? For example Le Front National in France and the Freedom Party in Austria had some success in their national elections, but in the Netherlands there seemingly no was place for these parties. The article by Dorussen provides three possible explanations:

1. *A repressive social and legal climate in the Netherlands.* The Dutch media and authorities have indeed kept a close watch on the activities of far-right parties. Arguably, the Dutch far-right parties have even suffered a fair amount of (state) harassment. It remains, however, debatable whether such harassment actually deterred the far right (Dorussen, 2004).
2. *The lack of an existing organized nationalist subculture in the Netherlands.* A nationalist subculture may indeed help to explain the success of the far right in Belgium, Austria, and Italy. In other countries, however, far-right parties have demonstrated this ability to succeed without such subculture; for example, the Scandinavian Progress parties (Dorussen, 2004).
3. *Poor political entrepreneurship on the extreme right.* This final argument appears best supported. In particular Janmaat, the spokesperson of the CD, showed himself to be a weak political leader unable to organize the far right into a political force. In the article by Dorussen it is stated as follows: 'Should Janmaat, therefore, be replaced by a person of higher caliber, then the Dutch extreme right arguably would enjoy success' (Dorussen, 2004). Thus, the party could have had more success with a more successful leader at the top.

These three explanations might explain the failure in the period between 1970 and 2000 and could possible explain the emergence of the far right in the period from 2000 and onward in the Netherlands. In the spring of 2002 the political climate in the Netherlands received a sudden shock. The extreme right party: List Pim Fortuyn (lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) had gained a broad electoral support in a short amount of time. Their main political ideas were founded in opposing immigration and Islam, support for law and order and a defence of typical Dutch or Western values (Dorussen, 2004).

Until the rise of the LPF, the far right movement of the Netherlands had always been a marginal movement. But when the LPF entered the elections they gained 26 seats in parliament, the most a far right movement had ever gained after the post-war period and not only that, they were also the most successful new party in the Dutch system ever to receive this much votes in its first election. Also, the major parties that usually held the seats in parliament received historically low support (Koopmans & Muis, 2009).

Some question marks have been set by the label of far right for the LPF. The political leader, Pim Fortuyn, always opposed being compared with the Front national for example (Koopmans & Muis, 2009). However, I would argue that the LPF is part of the new right movement for several reasons. The first reason is that the leader of the party used a very aggressive style of campaigning, which is quite typical for populism and populism is a strong part of the new right movement (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). A second reason is the focus on the restructuring of the public sector and the restrictive policy on immigration that the LPF wanted to introduce.

These two instances are also very typical for the new right movement, especially the focus on immigration (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). The third reason is his strong opposition of Islam, this is shared amongst almost all new right-wing parties like for example the now populair PVV in the Netherlands and also the Danish People's Party in Denmark. Pim Fortuyn was quoted as saying that Islam was a backward culture and no new asylum seekers would be allowed in the country (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003).

However, there is also another trend in the literature to label the LPF as a populist anti-statist movement (Dorussen, 2004). This has several reasons, firstly: Pim Fortuyn himself protested against the label far-right and did not want to be associated with for example Le Front National. Secondly, Pim Fortuyn was able to mobilise discontent against the established government and to call for a new political culture in the Netherlands. Finally, the electorate of the LPF supports to some extent that the LPF is more a populist anti-state party, because there is only a modest relationship between social class or social position and a LPF vote. According to Kitschelt, a populist anti-state party have a broad socio-economic appeal. And indeed election studies for this period support that there is a modest relationship (Dorussen, 2004).

Nonetheless, there is further evidence that we could label the LPF a party along the lines of the new right. The first indication is that although the LPF is less capitalist oriented, it is more authoritarian. Authoritarianism is a key characteristic of the new right movement. Furthermore, if the LPF was an anti-statist party it should actually be *less* authoritarian. Moreover, studies show that the only difference between the LPF voters and the rest of the voters lies on the focus of law and order and immigration. The LPF strongly opposes immigration and wishes a harder line in law and order, the studies show that this is the main appeal for the LPF voters (Dorussen, 2004).

Although the picture is somewhat mixed, most of the literature seems to support the notion that the LPF can be included into the new right-wing movement in Europe (Dorussen, 2004; Koopmans & Muis, 2009; Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). For the purpose of this assignment the LPF will be seen as a party that fits, in most respects, the far right movement of the early 21st century.

If we look at why the extreme right failed in the Netherlands before, thus according to Dorussen the following points:

1. *A repressive social and legal climate in the Netherlands.*
2. *The lack of an existing organized nationalist subculture in the Netherlands.*
3. *Poor political entrepreneurship on the extreme right (Dorussen, 2004).*

We could argue why the LPF was successful now. One of the main findings is that Pim Fortuyn was able to dominate the media and thus to break the repressive social and legal climate (Dorussen, 2004; Koopmans & Muis, 2009). Furthermore, with Pim Fortuyn the LPF had a strong political leader (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003) which meant that they had good political entrepreneurship as opposed to the Centrum Democrats under Janmaat. The second argument by Dorussen is more difficult to prove, thus that the government at that time did not enjoy the approval by the voters. In 2002 more than half of the voters believed that the government had a positive effect on the economy. However, general satisfaction with the government had dropped by 10% compared to 1998.

Thus at the time of the 2002 election the established government still received the support from the voters. At least to such an extent that we cannot say there was any unrest or huge dissatisfaction on the part of the voters (Dorussen, 2004).

After the success of the LPF another far right party came into play namely the PVV. This party was already mentioned in 'the political parties of the Netherlands' chapter of this assignment. The PVV was able to follow the trend set by the LPF and the parties actually show a lot of similarities.

For example both have a strong political leader. Furthermore, the PVV is also able to dominate the media and receives a lot of media coverage. Both these parties represent the new phenomenon that is researched in this paper and in the following parts of the assignment it will be attempted to describe and explain this phenomenon.

Concluding remarks

The reason for comparing the Netherlands and Denmark is twofold. The first reason is because of the similarities. Both countries are very similar both in general features because they are both welfare states, but more importantly they are similar in the institutional set-up. Both countries are democracies, have a form a monarchy and similar election rules. This makes it very comparable in terms of voter turnout and election results.

However, if they were just the same then it would suffice to research one country and then apply it to the other country, but they have one important distinction which makes this comparison so valuable. The difference between the two countries lies in their recent history with (extreme) right political parties. Whereas in the Netherlands it is very recent, in Denmark the phenomenon has been going on more or less since the 1970s. For a long time it was believed that there was no place for (extreme)right in the Netherlands, but recent events have changed this view. In Denmark the (extreme) right had a place in the political landscape since the 1970s and political parties of the right have had big successes in this country. For example in the Danish Progress Party received 15,9% of the votes in the 1973 elections. Although the DPP is not a populist right wing party, it is a far right party and at the time it was the only party in this category that received this much support. The main difference is the attitude of established social order in both countries. In the Netherlands the extreme right was shunned and compared to both fascism and Nazism. Whereas in Denmark the extreme right was soon accepted and even supported by prominent social movements.

Another important reason is that in Denmark, more generally in the Scandinavian countries, the main cleavage was along class lines whereas in the Netherlands other cleavages were also of significant influence for a long time. The most important cleavage being that of the pillar structure. This means that we can see the difference between countries with a strong history of class structures and that of countries where other considerations are also in place. These other considerations are mostly based on religion.

In the rest of the assignment both data from the Netherlands and Denmark will be compared and used to answer the main research question. The reason to use both these countries in this respect is because I have very recent data for this phenomenon since it is just occurring in the Netherlands, but I am also able to look for trends because in Denmark it is an established phenomenon for a lot of years now.

In the next part of the assignment it will be attempted to answer the question: Has there been a shift from traditional left-wing voting to right wing voting by the working class in the Netherlands and Denmark? This will be done via the specific hypotheses that are outlined in the research design.

5. Research

In the following part it will be attempted to test the hypotheses formulated in this bachelor assignment. The hypotheses are formulated in order to find an answer to the central research question: *Has there been a shift from traditional left-wing voting to right-wing voting by the working class in the Netherlands and Denmark?*

In order to answer this research question three hypotheses are formulated. The first hypothesis is: *the voting patterns of the working class have shifted from traditional left-wing voting to a pattern that fits the voting behaviour of the general population between 1970 and 2006.*

The second hypothesis is: *the votes from the working class have gone more towards the (extreme) right wing parties than any either party family in the system.*

The third hypothesis is: *the working class is overrepresented in terms of percentages among the new right-wing parties.*

In order to answer these hypotheses I will be using the research done in scientific articles and I will research if their findings correspond with my hypotheses. For both countries the analysis of the hypotheses will be done.

The next part will be an attempt to test the first hypothesis, namely: the voting patterns of the working class have shifted from traditional left-wing voting to a pattern that fits the voting behaviour of the general population between 1970 and 2006.

Hypothesis 1

The Netherlands

In the case of the Netherlands we will look at different time periods because they will reveal several important aspects of class voting in the Netherlands. The first period is between 1945 and 1990. For this period it is clear that in the Netherlands there are relatively low levels of class voting compared with other European countries (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

The period 1971 till 1990 is divided up further into four time periods, namely: 1945-60, 1961-70, 1971-80 and 1981-90. The following table can be made for the Netherlands and these time periods.

Table 1: the log-odds ratio of Class voting in the Netherlands, 1945-1990

	1945-60	1961-70	1971-80	1981-90	Trends Change/10 years	No. Of years	range
Netherlands	0.61	.65	.94	.86	-.01	25	1950-1990

(Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999)

From this table we can deduce that up until 1980 the level of class voting was actually increasing in the Netherlands and after 1981 there was a decline in class voting. This trend is only -0.01 and therefore is very small.

We could further note that apart from a slightly higher level in the time period 1971-80 (.94) the level of class voting has never been very high for the Netherlands (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

However, the effect may be small for this period it is also slightly in decline. This means that for the period 1971 till 1990 class voting declines somewhat in the Netherlands (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

We can thus say that for the first part of the period under consideration, class voting is indeed in decline in the Netherlands. It is important to see if this trend continues over time. The second period we look at is the period till 1998 because several important developments occurred in this period.

If we look at the period between 1970 and 1998, we can show that the difference between voting for a left wing party is reduced between all the classes. Thus that the probability for voting left-wing is becoming more similar for all the social groups. We can model this as follows: a parameter estimate and model fit for left-wing voting. The model contains the years 1972, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998 with the unskilled manual class as reference group. The following figure can be constructed, the first number in the second column is the parameter estimate and the number in parentheses is the standard error:

Table 2: parameter estimate and model fit for left-wing voting in the Netherlands, 1972-1998

	Trend
Constant	2.90 (.27)
1972	-0.71 (0.20)
1977	-0.62 (0.19)
1981	-1.13 (0.20)
1986	-1.51 (0.27)
1989	-2.34 (0.32)
1998	-2.39 (0.35)

(De Graaf, et al., 2001).

We can deduce from this model that after 1977 the parameter gets bigger in a negative sense, thus that class voting is strongly in decline. Or in other words that the probability for voting left-wing is become more alike for all social groups. Especially in 1989 and 1998 the difference is severally reduced, as shown by the large negative parameter estimate. However, it is possible to be more detailed about class voting, namely by looking at the different classes and comparing them to the reference group namely the unskilled manual working class.

If we look at the whole period under consideration here, thus 1970 till 2006, we can state that in 1971 the upper service class in the Netherlands was least likely to vote for the old left wing parties compared to the unskilled working class, this fits our general expectation that classes vote according to their economic position. After the upper service class comes the lower service class, the routine non-manual class and the petty bourgeoisie (De Graaf, et al., 2001). This is also in line with the theory since the most likely to vote for left wing party are the lowest social classes and the least likely are the highest social classes. The following parameter estimates can be given, with the unskilled manual workers as reference group.

Table 3: parameter estimates of the likelihood for voting left-wing according to class.

Social class	
Upper Service Class	-10.4 (1.44)
Lower Service Class	-7,23 (1,25)
Routine Non-Manual Class	-7,19 (1.30)
Petty Bourgeoisie	-6.96 (1,72)
Skilled Manual Class	-1,79 (1,46)

(De Graaf, et al., 2001)

Thus the table shows which class is most likely to vote for a left wing party compared with the reference group. From this table we can see that the least likely to vote for a left-wing party is the upper service class, than the lower service class, the routine non-manual class, the petty bourgeoisie and then the skilled manual class, this is thus in line with the theory (De Graaf, et al., 2001).

However, up until 1995 this difference is severely reduced. This is the case for the upper service class, the petty bourgeoisie, the lower service class and the routine non-manual class compared to the unskilled non-manual class. The skilled and unskilled manual class have no significant difference in class voting, neither in the 1970 nor at any other point in time (De Graaf, et al., 2001). This makes sense as the skilled and unskilled manual classes are both included in the working class by the definition by Erikson et al (Knutsen, 2001). The reduction in difference means that in effect they are becoming more similar and the voting patterns between the different classes are converging.

For the period 1972 till 1995 there is a negative trend in the strength of class voting or in other words class voting seems to be declining in the Netherlands for this period (De Graaf, et al., 2001). We can graph this as follows. The year is multiplied by the class under consideration thus a linear trend is graphed. We can then see that every year the likelihood that a group will vote for an old left-wing party is increased and the following number can be construed.

Table 4: linear trend of the likelihood for voting left-wing according to class

Interaction: linear trend	
Year X Upper Service Class	0.10 (0.02)
Year X Lower Service Class	0.07 (0.01)
Year X Routine Non-Manual Class	0.07 (0.02)
Year X Petty Bourgeoisie	0.05 (0.02)
Year X Skilled Manual Class	0.02 (0.02)

(De Graaf, et al., 2001)

We can thus see that for every class during the years the likelihood for voting old-left is increased, this is contrary to the theory since this assumes that the preferences of a group are fixed and that they have parties that fit their needs best. We can thus tentatively conclude that the classes are converging in voting behaviour (De Graaf, et al., 2001).

Furthermore, we can see that this trend has continued on well into 2006, which is the final time period under consideration here.

Until 2002 the differences between the working class and all other classes are in decline, this means that they become similar in their voting behaviour. In other words, the distinction between the manual class and all other classes for voting old-left vs. a free market liberal party is less important every year.

For example in 1971 the parameter estimate is -3.23 for the higher technocrats and in 2006 this is -1.13, thus the difference between the working class and the higher technocrats in their voting behaviour is reduced (Jansen, Graaf, & Need, 2011).

Another important development in this period is that until 1981 the working class was much more likely to vote old left-wing, as is in line with the theory, while the lower technocrats and the lower social-cultural specialist were least likely to vote old left wing in this period. This gradually changed after 1981 and especially after 1994 we can see that the lower social and cultural specialist become more likely to vote for a new left-wing party than the working class. In fact the odds that a socio-cultural specialist will vote for a new left party is about 2.5 times as high in 2006 compared to the odds that a working class voter will do the same.

This means that the differences between these two classes have increased for the period 1971-2006, while for all the other classes the difference have declined as was shown in the previous figure. However, for the higher technocrats it remains that the working class is much more likely to vote old left than they are (Jansen, et al., 2011).

We can thus conclude that for all three periods traditional class voting was in decline in the Netherlands. However, this trend became increasingly strong after the 1990s. For this period all the classes started to converge in their voting behaviour. It does become clear that there is some reversal in voting behaviour in that higher classes vote new left and the lower classes new right (Jansen, et al., 2011), but this will be researched with the second hypothesis.

Denmark

For Denmark roughly the same time periods are tested in order to get comparable results with the Netherlands, starting with the period 1971 until 1990. Unlike the Netherlands, Denmark always had significant class voting, however like the Netherlands in Denmark this process is in decline. In Denmark this decline started as early as the 1970s. In the period 1961 – 70 there was a strong increase in class voting, but after 1971 up until 1990 class voting declined just as rapidly, the trend can be seen in the following table:

Table 5: the level of Class voting in Denmark, 1945-1990

	1945-60	1961-70	1971-80	1981-90	Trends Change/10 years	No. Of years	range
Denmark	1.82	2.33	1.18	.97	-0.30	29	1945-1990

(Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

As the table shows the level of class voting has always been higher in Denmark than in the Netherlands. Also, like the Netherlands, during the 1960s there was an increase and class voting and like the Netherlands class voting is now in decline. This trend is much stronger in Denmark with -.30 than it is in the Netherlands (-0.01) (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999).

Not only did class voting decline in Denmark, the nature of class voting has also changed in Denmark. In Denmark, for the period 1970 till 1995, several changes occurred. In the early 1970s the workers were more likely to support the social democrats while the other party groups received more support from the new middle class as is line with the predictions of the class voting theory. The following can be graphed as follows.

Table 6: probability for voting for a party, ordered via class

	Workers	Lower-Level Non-Manual Employees	New Middle Class	Total
Left Socialists	18.0	18.1	23.1	19.8
Social Democrats	51.5	36.3	22.6	36.7
Centre	7.7	13.4	16.2	12.4
Rightist	22.8	32.2	38.1	31.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Socialist Parties	69.5	54.4	45.7	56.5

(Knutsen, 2001)

From this table we can conclude that in the 1970s, workers are most likely to support the social democrats, the probability for a social democrat vote is 51.5. The other party groups receive more support from the new middle class. The largest difference is between the social democrats and the rightist parties, with centre parties following close behind.

However, this has changed over time and in the late 1970s the new middle class became more inclined to vote for the left socialist parties. The new middle class was even more likely to vote for these parties than the workers (Knutsen, 2001).

An important development that occurred in the period 1980-90 was that the social democrats lost the support of the workers, this meant that there was a decline in difference between the working class and the new middle class. The major class decomposition took place in the 90s. For the centrist party there is no major changes in class composition. The above mentioned statements can be supported by the following table (Knutsen, 2001).

Table 7: Social Class and Party Groups LOR-Scores for Each Decade Denmark

	All Survey	1970s	1980	1990s	Change 1970-1990s
Left Socialists	0.31**	0.08	0.31**	0.43**	0.35**
Social Democrats	-1.29**	-1.45**	-1.47**	-1.13**	0.33**
Centre	0.84**	1.01**	0.84**	0.83**	-0.18
Rightists	0.73**	1.07**	0.58**	0.64**	-0.43**
Socialist Parties	-1.00**	-1.40**	-0.89**	-0.86**	0.55**

**significant at the 1% level

(Knutsen, 2001)

Thus, we can see that the support for the party groups is changing. This is especially the case for the rightist and the socialist parties (Knutsen, 2001).

Up until this point in time, the 90s, we can thus conclude that class voting is declining in Denmark. This is not remarkable since the Scandinavian countries have the strongest class based cleavages in Europe (Knutsen, 2001). We should keep in mind that precisely because of the very high levels of class voting the drop will be larger. Since it is the case that there is a ceiling to the level of class voting and in Denmark this ceiling was reached, thus the social classes were almost fully divided up among the political parties, the only thing that could have happened was that the numbers changed, thus dropped because voters will most probably change their votes over time.

For the final period, until 2005, we can see that this trend is continuing, thus that the class variable is losing its impact. Especially for the traditional largest parties: the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives. For all the parties we can show this in a table.

Table 8: The impact of class on party choice (each party vs. All other parties) (Nagelkerker's R^2 , 1984 – 2005)*

	1984	1987	1993	1996	1999	2002	2005
Social Democrats	0.12	0.10	0.15	0.12	0.10	0.05	0.05
Social Liberals	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05
Conservatives	0.05	0.07	0.11	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.04
Socialists	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01
Liberals	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01
Progress Party (1984-1998) and Danish People's Party (1998-2005)	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.05

* Approximation of the numbers from the graphs by Stubager.

(Stubager, 2010)

From this table we can note that the Class variable lost a lot of explanatory power in the case of the Social Democrats (from 0.12 to 0.05) and the Conservatives (from 0.05 to 0.04). For all the party there is a decline in impact, except for the Social Liberal Party. Furthermore, at the beginning of the period, thus 1984, the class variables played a large role in relation to the three large parties, the social democrats (0.12), the Liberals (0.10) and the Conservatives (0.05). This continued until 1990 when there was a peak for the Social Democrats and the Liberals, but in the periods after 1990 the impact of the Class cleavage declined (Stubager, 2010).

Also, we can make some general observations about the distribution of the voters amongst the different political party families in Denmark. The first is that the voters of the socialist parties have moved more towards the centre. Furthermore, the liberals and the conservatives seem to attract voters with a slightly less capitalist profile over time, thus less the traditional better of voters and more towards a general profile. It is clear that the class based economic cleavage is in decline, this also means that the differences between the classes becomes smaller (Stubager, 2010).

For the whole period, thus 1970 till 2005, we can thus conclude we have found evidence that the voting patterns of the manual working class have shifted from traditional left-wing voting to a pattern that fits the voting behaviour of the general population between 1970 and 2006.

In sum, for both the Netherlands and Denmark we can conclude that we have found evidence that the voting patterns of the working class have shifted from traditional left-wing voting to a pattern that fits the voting behaviour of the general population between 1970 and 2006. However, we must also conclude that class voting is more strong in Denmark to begin with and that in the Netherlands other cleavages might be more important.

The next step is to see if the working class have actually changed their votes to the new right parties. It becomes clear from the answers to the first hypothesis that we can reasonably assume that the voting patterns were converging at the end of the 90s and the beginning of the new millennium. But what happened in the period after 2000, did the working class vote more for the new right wing parties?

Hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis will be researched by using secondary research, just as the first hypothesis. The second hypothesis is: between 1970 and 2006 the votes from the manual working class have gone more towards the (extreme) right-wing parties than any either party family in the system.

The expectation behind this hypothesis is that the lower classes are more likely to vote for new right (populist) parties than the other social classes. Especially the working class is expected to vote more for the new right parties than the other classes. The research confirms that there is a clear difference in the likelihood to vote for a new right-wing party, this difference is dependent on the class a voter is in. The classes with the highest probability to vote new right are unskilled workers and self-employed. The classes with the lowest probability are the higher controllers and the routine non-manual workers (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011).

The following table can be constructed for the year 2002. The table contains the probability for all the social classes that they will vote for a Populist Radical Right party or as it is called in this paper: a new right-wing party.

Table 9: Predicted probabilities of voting for the new (radical) right in Western Europe

Class	Predicted Probability	Confidence Interval
Higher Controller	0.11	(0.09; 0.14)
Lower Controllers	0.13	(0.11; 0.16)
Routine Non-Manual	0.11	(0.08; 0.14)
Lower Sales-Service	0.13	(0.10; 0.16)
Self-employed (incl. Farmers)	0.16	(0.12; 0.19)
Skilled Workers	0.16	(0.13; 0.19)
Unskilled Workers	0.18	(0.15; 0.21)

(Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011)

From this table we can see for example that the probability that a unskilled worker will vote for a Populist Radical Right party is 0.18 and the probability that a higher controller will do the same lies at 0.11, which means that there is a 0.07 difference in probability, this was for the year 2002 because all the country in the analysis than had an Populist Radical Right Party running for election.

From the table, we can conclude that the unskilled working class is much more likely to vote for a new right party (probability is 0.18) than the other social classes (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011).

In sum, we can say that the working class has indeed started to vote for right-wing parties and not the expected left-wing voting. The research support my hypothesis that between 1970 and 2006 the votes from the manual working class have gone more towards the (extreme) right wing parties than any either party family in the system.

However, is this change significant? In order words, are the working class actually overrepresented in the new right political parties? In order to answer these question we will have to look at the third hypothesis, namely: the working class are overrepresented in terms of percentages among the new right-wing parties.

Hypothesis 3

We have already established via the first two hypothesis that the working class are more likely to vote for extreme right wing parties than any other social class. This effect is stronger in Denmark, but there is some evidence that this is also the case for the Netherlands. It is however also the case that the self-employed, routine non-manual workers and the unemployed are more likely to vote for extreme right wing parties, at least when compared to the service class (Lubbers, Gijssberts, & Scheepers, 2002). This is in line with the expectation that the lower social classes in general vote more for the new right parties. The last question to answer is if these social classes in general and the working class in specific are also overrepresented in the mark-up of voters for new right parties.

In the article by Lubbers et al. a parameter estimate was given via logistic multilevel models for extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe and their voters social background characteristics. From this we can conclude that in descending order the most likely to vote for right wing parties are: Unemployed, Housewives, Self employed, retired, Manual workers, non-manual workers and since the reference group is the service class they are the least likely (Lubbers, et al., 2002).

This is not totally in line with my hypothesis that the working class is overrepresented. However, it is in line with the general expectation that the lower social classes are overrepresented for this group. Furthermore, the working class do have a much bigger parameter than any of the other social class like for example the higher service class.

In general, we can confirm the trend that the lower social classes are overrepresented in the new right parties, but does this trend hold for the specific countries studied here namely Denmark and the Netherlands?

If we look at the time that both the countries had a strong new-right party in place of elections, and for which we have data, we can look at the years 2002-2003. In Denmark the Danish People’s Party ran for election and in the Netherlands the LPF. This time period is very significant since it was the first time that a party from the new right gained a lot of support in the Netherlands.

It is therefore important to note that this time period might give a slightly skewed image for the Netherlands since it is such a new party. However, for the purpose of the hypothesis the time period is very suitable since it clearly shows the distribution of the voters across right-wing populist parties.

Furthermore, it should not matter for the traditional theory that there is a new party since the social classes are assumed to have a best fitting party. The new right parties should attract the higher social classes and the newness of a party should not influence this process.

For the year 2002 the following table can be constructed. This table shows voters’ social class and the percentage of them which voted right-wing.

Table 10: Choice right-wing populist parties according to class

Class	Denmark		Netherlands	
	%	100	%	100
Service Class	5,2	64	14,7	90
Routine non-manual class	5,9	73	17,7	109
Self-employed	9,6	120	21,7	134
Farmers	0,0	0	4,3	27
Working Class	13,1	163	18,6	114
Unemployed	5,5	69	15,7	97
Total	8,0	100	16,2	100

(D. Scheuregger & T. Spier, 2007)

In this graph the total represents the percentage of votes the right wing party collected and the percentages for the different social groups are the shares for the right-wing parties. In Denmark we can conclude that the working class has the highest percentage of votes for right wing parties namely 13,1% followed by the self-employed, 9,6%. In the Netherlands we can see that actually the self-employed have voted more for the right wing populist parties (21,7%), however the working class is close behind with 18,6%. What we do see in this table is that in the Netherlands the spread of the votes is actually not that different for the classes. Whereas in Denmark there is a clear overrepresentation of the working class (D. Scheuregger & T. Spier, 2007).

We can thus conclude that for both countries the working class is overrepresented in the new right wing parties. However, this effect is stronger in Denmark and in the Netherlands the self-employed are slightly more overrepresented in these parties.

Comparing the Netherlands and Denmark

In the next part the Netherlands and Denmark are compared based on the three hypotheses formulated in this assignment. As short recap:

The first hypothesis is: *the voting patterns of the working class have shifted from traditional left-wing voting to a pattern that fits the voting behaviour of the general population between 1970 and 2006.*

The second hypothesis is: *the votes from the working class have gone more towards the (extreme) right wing parties than any other party family in the system.*

The third hypothesis is: *the working class is overrepresented in terms of percentages among the new right-wing parties.*

The first hypothesis was tentatively confirmed for both countries: it does appear that the traditional voting patterns of the working class have shifted to resemble the general population. The expectation that they went from voting mostly left-wing to other parties was confirmed by the data. The second hypothesis which stems from the first hypothesis was also confirmed for both countries, namely that the votes than went more towards new right-wing parties than any other party in the system.

Some comments do need to be made regarding these two countries. The first is that Denmark, like most other Scandinavian countries, has had a strong class voting tradition (Rydgren, 2004) whereas in the Netherlands this strong affiliation seems absent and other cleavages first determined voting behaviour (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999). The second comment is that although they differ in their strength in class-voting, both countries have exhibited a strong decline in class voting and for both countries it appears that the votes from the working class have gone more towards the new-right wing parties.

The natural follow-up question is: have the voting patterns for the whole population changed? I have chosen to look at the working class again to see if they are overrepresented in the new right-wing parties, since if they are they have started to deviate from the general population again.

Again, for both countries, this was somewhat confirmed. However, in the Netherlands the self-employed are actually even more likely to vote for new-right parties than the working class. In Denmark the working class is overrepresented. Furthermore, for the Netherlands although the self-employed and the working class voted the most for the new right parties, the differences between the other class aren't actually that large whereas in Denmark the differences are much bigger. So hypothesis three is only partly confirmed by the data.

6. Supply and Demand explanations

Possible explanations offered for Denmark and the Netherlands

There are two ways in looking at the emergence of the new right-wing parties; namely: supply and demand. Supply means that the change lies with the political parties and demand means that the change lies with the voters themselves. In the following explanation we will first look at the supply side and then the demand side. For both approaches some general comments are made, after this we look specifically at Denmark and the Netherlands.

The supply side or top-down approach focuses on the issues of re- and dealignment, the development of a new master frame and the creation of political niches. The demand side or bottom-up approach focuses on re- and dealignment and education.

Supply

A prevalent explanation as to why the new right-wing parties came into being is the invention of a new master frame. This invention was needed because after World War 2 anything associated with Fascism or Nazism was rendered obsolete and since the right-wing parties are usually associated with these movements this meant that the right-wing parties did not appeal to voters. Furthermore, up and until the 1970s the economy was booming and people still had high levels of political trust. This meant that the existing parties were able to attract a lot of voters and also that the voters were satisfied with the existing choices (Rydgren, 2004).

After the oil crisis in the 1970s and the decreasing levels of political trust there became a niche for the right-wing parties to start attracting votes. However they still needed something new to appeal to the voters. The solution came with the development of a new master frame, first developed by Le Pen for the Front National in France. Jens Rydgren posits that exactly this development led to the success of Extreme Right-Wing Populist Parties or as it has been called in this assignment: the new right parties. He especially states that this is the case in Denmark and mentions also the List Pim Fortuyn which is in many ways the frontrunner of the PVV (Rydgren, 2005).

The main innovation of the new master frame for the Extreme Right-Wing populist parties was the combination of '...ethno nationalism based on cultural racism, the so-called ethno-pluralist doctrine, and a populist (not antidemocratic) anti-political establishment rhetoric (Rydgren, 2005)'. This meant that people who normally would never vote old extreme right with its extremist position on biological racism and/or antidemocratic stances could now be attracted to the new right without its traditional negative stigmatism (Rydgren, 2005).

However, a new master frame is not enough there have to be political opportunities in order for the Extreme Right-Wing Populist parties to be successful. A political opportunity is: '...consistent – but not necessary formal, permanent, or national' resources that are external to the party or movement in question (Rydgren, 2005)'.

There are several political opportunities that contribute to the success of Extreme Right-Wing parties in countries, namely: the emergence of niches (defined as gaps between the voters' location in the political space and the perceived position of the parties, i.e. the party images and/or position on crucial issues, in the same space (Rydgren, 2005))' in the political structure.

In most societies there have been a lot of changes in the electorate mainly because of the change from a industrial to a post-industrial society and the economic, political and cultural globalization processes. These two events have led to stress, frustration and disillusionment among several groups of voters, among which the working class is very prominent. Which meant that in the political landscape new niches became available which in turn the new right were able to exploit.

These changes have led to four important effects:

1. The focus of certain voters' groups have changed, from mainly economic considerations to socio-cultural considerations
2. Voters have perceived a threat to their identity
3. They have fuelled discontent with existing political actors (political parties, politicians) because they have been unable to solve the problems these voters are facing
4. The voters feel that the 'old' frames no longer represent them (Rydgren, 2005)

The political opportunity scheme also explains the decreasing importance of class voting because there is a decreased salience of the economic cleavage and this leads people to focus on other values (Rydgren, 2005).

The political niches that have emerged because the traditional parties couldn't or wouldn't address them are: sociocultural authoritarianism, ethno nationalism and xenophobia. These niches fit the Extreme Right-Wing parties to a tee. Furthermore, because of the discontent voters feel with established political parties and structures, the Extreme Right-Wing Populist parties have presented an alternative to the existing order. This means that because of freeing resources and opening up of niches the new Extreme Right-Wing Populist parties could claim a spot in the established political order of countries (Rydgren, 2005).

A very prevalent explanation for this phenomenon is that of dealignment and realignment (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Manza, Hout, & Brooks, 1995a). In sum, this means that the traditional explanations are no longer aligned with the choices and that new processes dictate the voting behaviour. Or in other words there is a new alignment with issues (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Manza, et al., 1995a). These processes may present the political opportunity structures needed to provide the Extreme Right-Wing parties with an opportunity (Rydgren, 2005).

In most Western European countries two cleavages exist side by side: the economic cleavages and the social cultural cleavages. If we look at the economic cleavages the prevalent explanation is that of the class voting theory. However, the social-cultural cleavage needs different explanations (Rydgren, 2005). Or in other words when looking at the economic cleavages the traditional class approach is correct since this constitutes 'natural' voting behaviour, however the 'unnatural' votes stem from a limited cultural capital which leads to cultural conservatism (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006b). This means that as soon as there are other considerations in place besides economic motives, working class voters will vote differently than what is expected from the traditional class approach (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006b).

There are now several indications that the old economic cleavage is not the main determinant of voting anymore and the sociocultural cleavage is becoming more important. This is the result of the politicization of social-cultural issues like: immigration, abortion and feminism (Rydgren, 2005).

In the past the economic issues dominated the agenda and this led to a left-wing vote by the working class. However, the Extreme Right-Wing Populist parties have been very able at attracting working class voters because they have placed the focus on social-cultural issues. It was always known, or suspected, that the working class was not in line with the left-wing parties on sociocultural consideration but as long as the economic cleavages was most important they attracted the votes.

In the last decades the economic cleavage lost much of its appeal and this lead to the focus on socioeconomic issues.

The parties that translated this the best for the working class are the Extreme Right- Wing Populist Parties. They did this by increasing the salience of and the focus on sociocultural issues such as immigration rather than economic issues (Rydgren, 2005).

The previous process is called realignment of issues, however there is also a process of dealignment. Namely: the old cleavages are seen as redundant. This means that the old political parties are no longer seen as the defender of their issues. Thus, socialist parties lose their appeal to workers (Rydgren, 2005).

In order to make sure that the prevalent issues are known to the voters and are the main concern for the voter, thus that realignment and dealignment processes can occur, parties need agenda setting functions and politicization of new issues (Rydgren, 2005). Thus as long as economic issues remain the main focus the socialist parties will attract the working class vote, but as soon as sociocultural issues become the most important focus the Extreme Right-wing Populist parties attract the working class vote.

Another issue that existing parties may face is that of a degree of convergence of political parties (Rydgren, 2005). This can be in the area of economics, but also in the area of socio-cultural values for example positions on immigration. What this means is that the existing parties become more alike over time and the voters feel that they don't have a real choice anymore. As soon as a new party comes along they can attract these voters since they have not been subject to the convergence processes.

Demand

In the previous explanation several explanations have actually already been given for the bottom-up approach. Namely that as long as voters vote along economic lines, they follow the class approach but as soon as sociocultural issues come into play they will vote in an unexpected way, thus not along the lines of the class voting theory (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006a).

However, there are other considerations in place when looking at the voters' perspective and the main focus is on the role education plays in voting behaviour. Previously the focus has been on occupation of the voters and their voting behaviour. This has resulted into very mixed results, like the results found in my third hypothesis, for example in the Netherlands the self-employed and the working class are overrepresented. It thus seems that while occupation, thus social class, was a good predictor in the past when it concerned economic issues has now become less suitable to study voting behaviour especially the voting behaviour for new right-wing parties. Several authors propose to look at the education level of the voters (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011; Jansen, et al., 2011; Stubager, 2010).

The argument goes something like the following: the higher the education the less likely a vote is cast for the new-right populist parties or the other way around the lower the education the more likely a vote for the new-right wing populist parties (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011).

One could argue that since the working class is on average also lower educated, that social class still has the main effect. However, Ivarsflaten and Stubager have shown that this is not the case.

Although one cannot really go with the other, they have shown that education has the strongest effect in predicting a new right-wing vote separate from the class variable (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011). Furthermore, they find that the economically vulnerable classes do vote more for new right-wing parties such as the working class.

There is thus an association between education and new right-wing voting, but what drives this association? The article by Ivarsflaten and Stubager finds that in line with the theory the economic cleavages drive class voting, however issues of immigration lead to unexpected voting behaviour namely the lower educated turn to right-wing parties, thus against immigration and higher education leads to more leftist positions of immigration.

This is significant since immigration is a strong issue with the new right-wing parties and thus similar positions in this cleavage lead to right-wing voting. In sum, this means that the lower education voters are more likely to vote for new right-wing parties because of their values in relation to immigration and not based on their economic position (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011). It is argued by the authors that education is thus a better predictor of voting behaviour than the traditional class approach, although the class approach is not absolute (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011). It is not surprising that they find this effect since the lower class are usually also lower educated than the higher social class. Voting becomes based on sociocultural values and not economic motives.

There is also research done on how these sociocultural values came about and one could conclude that these values were formed via education. It is argued that there is a strong connection between education and authoritarian-libertarian values. The argument goes that the higher the education the more libertarian the person becomes and the lower the education the more authoritarian. This also reflects the cleavages between the left wing parties and the new right parties, with the left-wing being more libertarian and the new right-wing being more authoritarian (Stubager, 2010).

From this we can thus conclude that when looking at economic issues the traditional class theory is still effective, but when we look at sociocultural values it make sense to also look at the education cleavage (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011; Stubager, 2010).

7. Right-wing parties in the Netherlands and Denmark

Development of the new right parties in Denmark

In Denmark the main focus is on the emergence of the Danish People's Party since this represents the new right in Denmark. Denmark already had a right wing populist party in the 70s namely the Progress Party, this party has withered away however and made place for the Danish People's Party. The Danish People's Party (DPP) fits the description of the new right movement better and therefore we will focus on how they came into being (Rydgren, 2004).

The Danish People's Party mostly can mostly be explained by applying the top-down explanation set out in the previous chapter. The party formulated an effective new master frame, they used the niches that were created in the Danish political society and they used the media to focus on the cleavages they found important. An important addition as to why the Danish People's Party became so successful is that they were supported by the Danish Association. The Danish Association is an organization by far right intellectuals.

The Danish Association focuses on issues of immigration and their main goal is to: 'secure Danish culture, language and mode of life in a world threatened by chaos, overpopulation, violence and fanaticism (Rydgren, 2004)'. The main focus is on how immigration threatens the way of life in Denmark and that integration policies should not be pursued. The association has started to support the Danish People's Party and the party has accepted their help. However, since the party has to run for election they have toned down some of the more extreme statements of the association (Rydgren, 2004).

The new master frame of the Danish People's party focuses on ethno-nationalist and ethno-pluralist xenophobia. The party states that the Danish culture is threatened by immigration and globalization, such as the process of the EU. Most of the frames, namely 3 out of 4, are based on the master frame developed by the Front National and the ideas proposed by the Danish Association. The main focus is on the threat immigration presents to do the dominant, thus Danish, culture in Denmark (Rydgren, 2004).

So far we have established that the support of an elite group and the creation of a new master frame have helped the Danish People's Party develop, but they also need a place in the political society in order to attract voters. They have found their place by the niches that started to emerge do to dealignment/realignment issue and the politicization of new issues. By which we mean that the focus has shifted from socio-economic issue to social-culture issues. This has meant that parties who promoted authoritarian socio-cultural issues became able to compete in the politics of Denmark. Especially the immigration issue and the multicultural society became subjects of discussion during the mid 1980s and this lead to the success of the Danish People's Party. Furthermore, most voters viewed the Danish People's Party as a protest vote and this was used by the party to gain more votes. Also, the party benefited from the skepticism surrounding the EU and were able to attract the EU-sceptical voters in Denmark (Rydgren, 2004).

The Danish People's Party was also able to mobilize the working class voters because they shifted the focus from the traditional socio-economic issues to the new socio-cultural issues. This meant that the left-wing socialist parties lost the support of the working class because they no longer fit the with the voters preferences. It was already theorized, by Lipset amongst others, that the socialist parties never really represented the socio-cultural values of the working class, but only the economic values and now the focus has become on the socio-culture side the new right-wing parties were able to attract the working class. Another side effect of these dealignment processes is that the voters become less attached to their traditional parties and thus more easily swayed to vote for other parties.

Furthermore, the Danish People's Party was able to politicize new political issues that went at the heart of the working class such as immigration and globalization issue. This meant that they could further attract the working class.

We have now established how the top-down process in Denmark worked. Let us now turn to the bottom-up process. It becomes clear that re- and dealignment processes are at the heart of the success of the Danish People's Party, this means that we have to look at the role of education in Denmark in voting for the new right-wing parties.

The education cleavage is actually related to the top-down process in that it expresses that the focus of the voters have changed which meant a change in voting behaviour. The main argument behind the education cleavage is that the higher the education the more liberal you are, the lower the education the more authoritarian you are. This assumption is confirmed in Denmark, the class cleavage is losing in explanatory power and the education cleavage has increased explanatory power. The parties in the system should then also follow a clear pattern on the authoritarian-libertarian scale and indeed in Denmark this is the case.

The libertarian group consists of the Socialists and the Social liberals and the authoritarian group consists of the Liberals, the Conservatives, the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party. This is in line with our findings that the lower educated tend to vote more for the Danish People's Party and the higher educated vote more for the Liberal parties (Stubager, 2010).

Development of the new right parties in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands the main populist party right now is the PVV, but since this party has come into power so recently that not a lot of information is available. However, in 2002 another populist party not unlike the PVV came into power namely the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and the focus of the development of the new right parties in the Netherlands will be on this party.

In the Netherlands there was niche for the new right parties since the 1990s because there really wasn't a party focussing on immigration issues. The main right party the VVD was actually becoming more like the other parties on this issue which left quite a gap for a new party to emerge. However, this does not mean that such a party would actually come into being. The only way a party could come into existence is if the focus is on this gap, which is actually what happened. The LPF was in a position to attract the focus on the socio-culture cleavage and this made it possible to attract the attention towards immigration issues. No other party was really active in this field and the parties were even converging to the same arguments, which meant that the new right parties offered a new voice and could thus attract voters. In other terms this is called 'discursive opportunities' meaning that if a party is able to steer the discourse, they can influence the agenda and make sure that their issues are what matter to the voters (Koopmans & Muis, 2009).

The LPF does present a problem to the theory of the master frame. Although the party focussed on immigration, law and order they did not state that the program was based on the example set by the Front National. In fact, the party presented itself more like an anti-state populist party. Although the issues are the same as the Danish People's Party the focus was still more on integration. However, the party did focus on maintaining the 'typical' Dutch values as formulated by the LPF and they did see immigration as a threat to the Dutch culture (Koopmans & Muis, 2009).

Another difference between the LPF and the DPP is that the LPF did not have the support of an elite group. In fact, the LPF was actually criticized by the existing political elite. However, this did not harm the party it actually benefited the party because they were able to bring their views in the news. Furthermore, even if the existing parties suddenly adopted the issues presented by the LPF it meant more support for the LPF.

They were thus able to shift the focus from traditional socio-economic issues to socio-cultural issue and also to have some sort of monopoly on these issues (Koopmans & Muis, 2009).

In sum, the LPF and the DPP do share some important characteristics like the immigration issues and the focus on native values. Also, they have in common that both parties were able to put the focus on the cleavage that was most beneficial for them namely from the traditional socio-economic to the socio-cultural issue. They do have some important difference namely the DPP is more populist and the LPF is more anti-statist, furthermore the innovation of a new master frame was very important for the success of the DPP and less so for the LPF. Although, the LPF did distance themselves from the extreme right-wing past (Koopmans & Muis, 2009).

The next step is to look at the bottom-up approach and thus the change with the voters. Again we find evidence that the re- and dealignment issues influence voters since the LPF shifted the focus from socio-economic to socio-cultural issue (Koopmans & Muis, 2009). The next step is to see if there is also a role for the education cleavage as is the case with Denmark.

As is in line with the expectation in the past a higher education usually led to a right-wing vote while a lower education led to a left wing vote. However, during the last 2 decades this trend has almost completely reversed with a higher education leading more often to a left-wing vote and a lower education to a new right-wing vote. This association is based on the libertarian-authoritarian scale, with the higher educated being more libertarian and thus more likely to vote left-wing and the lower educated being more authoritarian and thus more likely to vote new-right (Jansen, et al., 2011).

The pattern of education is thus the same for the Netherlands as it is for Denmark. The education cleavage, furthermore, seems to become more important and better able to predict the outcome of voting than the traditional class cleavage. I would like to argue that I think the two theories should supplement each other since a lower education is usually associated with a lower social class and with the higher education it is the other way around. Therefore I don't think the class cleavage has totally disappeared with regard to new-right wing voting, it has just changed.

Concluding remarks

For both Denmark and the Netherlands the new right parties were investigated and some parallels can be drawn.

Both countries were able to mobilize the voters by shifting the focus from the traditional socio-economic cleavage to the new socio-cultural cleavage. This was important in order to be able to attract the working class, since it was already theorized by Lipset in 1959 that as soon as there are cultural or value issues at the stake, the working class is not in line with the traditional socialist parties (Jansen, et al., 2011). As soon as the new right was able to focus on precisely these issues they were able to attract the working class.

The issues that represent this new socio-cultural cleavage were the issues of: immigration, law and order and native values. For both Denmark these issues are represented by the DPP (Rydgren, 2004) as well as for the LPF (Koopmans & Muis, 2009). These are all top-down explanations, for the bottom up explanations we have to turn to re- and dealignment processes as well as the education cleavage.

For both Denmark and the Netherlands it is the case that the de- and realignment processes made it possible for the working class to shift their vote. The focus become on socio-culture issues and the new-right represented these cleavages for these voters. Also, for both Denmark and the Netherlands the education cleavage is a good explanation as to how the right-wing attracted the working class vote. For both countries it is the case that the higher the education the more liberal the voters are and the more they vote left-wing, while for lower education this is the other way around (Jansen, et al., 2011; Stubager, 2010). This is also expected because at first the focus was on economic issues and later on it became about cultural issues. The higher educated used to focus on economic issues and thus vote right-wing, but since the focus now is on cultural and social issues they vote more left wing. For the lower educated this is exactly the other way around (Jansen, et al., 2011; Stubager, 2010).

The main difference between Denmark and the Netherlands lies in the support by the existing elite and the development of a new master frame. While in Denmark the DPP was highly supported by an right-wing elite (Rydgren, 2004), in the Netherlands the LPF was mostly ignored or criticized by the elite (Koopmans & Muis, 2009). Interestingly enough, the effect was the same. While the support of the Danish association lend validity to the DPP, the critic of the LPF also made that they received more support (Koopmans & Muis, 2009; Rydgren, 2004). Thus, while in both cases the elite played a role, the manner in which this role mattered differed greatly.

As to the master frame, the DPP openly acknowledged its connection to the Front National in France (Rydgren, 2004), the LPF wanted to disassociate itself with them and present itself more as a anti-statist right-wing party (Dorussen, 2004).

The DPP and the LPF thus have a lot in common in regards to voting mobilization and the political opportunity structure, but are different in regards to their approach.

8. Conclusion

In this bachelor assignment the following research question was posed: Has there been a shift from traditional working class voting towards new voting behaviour in the Netherlands and Denmark in the period between 1970 and 2006? In order to answer this question several hypotheses were posed. In the following chapter the findings in this paper will be summarised and the research will be tentatively answered. Furthermore, the research as such will be discussed as well as the limitations of this research and possible further research that needs to be done.

In this assignment the theory of class voting is proposed to analyse voting behaviour. The theory in short proposes that people vote according to their class and in the scope of this theory class roughly means socio-economic position. The main assumptions of this theory is that people will vote for the party that best represents their economic position. In the past this has meant that the left socialist parties have attracted the working class voters and the liberal right parties have attracted the higher social class such as for example the higher level controllers.

The theory of class voting is used for two reasons. The first reason is to predict voting behaviour of the working class and see if the voting behaviour in the time period set for this assignment, thus 1970 till 2006, is in line with the theory. And secondly to see if it can explain the voting behaviour for the new extreme right wing parties.

The expectation at the beginning of the thesis was that the working class will vote for the left-wing political parties and that the higher social classes will vote for right-wing parties, as is in line with the class voting theory. This means that if the working class is exhibiting new voting behaviour by voting for the (extreme) right wing parties, than this behaviour presents an anomaly to the theory. In order to analyse this behaviour and to research if this is indeed the case several hypotheses and sub-questions have been formulated. In the following part the findings and tentative answers to these hypotheses and sub-questions have been summarized.

It is important to outline why this phenomenon is researched in Denmark and the Netherlands. The rationale behind choosing Denmark and the Netherlands is explained at length in chapter 4, therefore a short overview is given here. The main reason is that they are very similar in their institutional set-up as well as other general features. For example they both have a constitutional monarchy and both are welfare states. This means for this research that any differences found cannot be attributed to differences in the institutional set-up, but are country specific reasons. Furthermore because they are so alike it makes it easier to compare the data. However, if they were just similar it would suffice to do one country and generalize the results. The reason behind choosing these specific countries was that they differ a great deal in their recent history with extreme right-wing parties, this means that even though they are extremely alike they differ a great deal on the key variable researched here. Furthermore, this means that we can use very recent data on extreme right-wing parties since it is so relevant in the Netherlands, but we can also see the development of this movement in Denmark.

The first step was to ask: what is the expected voting behaviour according to the traditional theories? To answer this question the class voting theory is outlined. This theory has developed throughout the years and has several contributors. It started with Plato, he developed the concept that a society consists of classes. The main idea today comes from Marx, namely that classes are determined by the relationship to the means of production.

Thus a controller of capital will have different preferences than a worker in a factory. This theory has been refined by Lipset and Rokkan to include socio-cultural aspects. To answer the question what is the expected voting behaviour there has to be a distinction between socio-economic and socio-cultural values. And the main expectation is that on socio-economic values, the lower social classes will vote left-wing and the higher social classes will vote right-wing.

The second question is related to the actual research conducted in this assignment. The question is: Has there been a shift from traditional left-wing voting to right wing voting by the working class in the Netherlands and Denmark? In order to answer this question the following hypotheses were formulated:

- Hypothesis 1: the voting patterns of the manual working class have shifted from traditional left-wing voting to a pattern that fits the voting behaviour of the general population between 1970 and 2006.
- Hypothesis 2: between 1970 and 2006 the votes from the manual working class have gone more towards the (extreme) right wing parties than to any other party family in the system
- Hypothesis 3: the working class are overrepresented in terms of percentages among the new right-wing parties

In order to find answers to these hypotheses secondary research from scientific articles was used.

In short, we can say that there is a shift in the voting pattern for the manual working class in both countries. In Denmark we can see that this shift is more pronounced than it is in the Netherlands, but this makes sense since class voting was always a strong cleavage in Denmark but it was much weaker in the Netherlands. Furthermore, for both countries we can state that class voting first gained in importance but in Denmark this dropped in the 1970 and in the Netherlands after 1980. For both countries the class cleavage was as expected right after World War II which means that the left-wing parties received the support from the working class and the right-wing parties received their support from the higher social classes. In Denmark this pattern started to change after 1970 and in the Netherlands this pattern shifted after the 1980s.

The second hypothesis also seems confirmed by the research. It seems that the votes from the working class have gone towards extreme right-parties. For both countries we can see that the probability that the working class will vote for a new right-wing party is much higher than the other social classes. We should note that the self-employed also have a higher probability of voting for the new right-wing parties.

Finally the third hypothesis was researched. For this hypothesis we have found mixed results. It seems that for both countries the working class is overrepresented in terms of percentages in the new right-wing parties. However, in the Netherlands the self-employed are actually slightly more present than the working class. The self-employed are at 21,7% and the working class at 18,6%, in 2007 (Scheuregger & Spier, 2007). Although the difference between the working class and the self-employed is low and the differences between the other class is much bigger. In Denmark it is the case that the working class is overrepresented, the class accounts for 13,1% in 2007 while all the other class are under the 10% (Scheuregger & Spier, 2007).

We should note, however, that in Denmark class voting was a much stronger force than it was in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands class voting has never really been the most important cleavage, whereas in Denmark it was.

Also, in Denmark the (extreme) right (populist) parties have been active and more or less successful since the 1970s, whereas in the Netherlands the phenomenon started in the early 2000s.

The final question to be answered is: How did the new right wing parties come into existence and how were they able to attract votes? The parties developed like other political parties, namely there was a demand for such a party and the politicians provided it. Precisely this process has been used to answer this question. The main reason that they were successful, in both countries, is that they were able to make voters focus on socio-cultural values and no longer on socio-economic values. This makes sense because it was suspected earlier that the social classes were voting along the lines of socio-economic values, but that their socio-cultural values were not in line with the political parties.

This means for example that the working class voted for the left-wing parties since this was in their socio-economic interest, but that the socio-cultural interests were not really represented.

To return to the main research question, thus: Has there been a shift from traditional working class voting towards new voting behaviour in the Netherlands and Denmark in the period between 1970 and 2006? Evidence has been found for both countries that there has indeed been a shift in voting behaviour. Furthermore, this shift is not in line with the expected theory. It seems that for both countries, the working class have shifted from voting almost exclusively for left-wing parties to voting for (extreme) right-wing (populist) parties. An important difference between the Netherlands and Denmark is that in Denmark the new-right wing parties have been active since the 1970s and in the Netherlands these parties started to play a significant role after 2000.

This research has of course several limitations, which will now be outlined. The most important limitation is that it uses secondary research. This means that the research is restricted in what I can research. My questions had to follow to a certain extent the pre-existing research done. However, the research used has been reviewed and used by other researchers which means that the research could be seen as very reliable.

Another constraint on this thesis is that it uses only two European countries and this makes it difficult to draw general conclusions about the whole of Europe. It could well be that because Denmark and the Netherlands are so alike, that they have the same results because of these similarities. Furthermore, the restriction to two countries is also beneficial since we do get to see the same processes at work in two different countries. Also, Denmark and the Netherlands are similar to each other but also to other European countries which means that the result found for the Netherlands and Denmark could be generalized to other countries how share some similarities with them. And finally, precisely because it is restricted to two countries the research is much more in depth for the specific countries than it would have been if there were more countries involved. There would have been more data with more countries, but the results would have to be researched superficially and not as detailed as it is now for two countries.

Future research in this field should focus on the education cleavage in the area of (class) voting. In this paper this cleavage is only hinted at, but due to time constraints this is not fully developed. In the future the expectation is that the education cleavage will play a bigger role in determining voting behaviour than the class cleavage. Mainly because the welfare in the European countries is now at such a level that socio-cultural values become more important than socio-economic values and this means that education will be a larger role. Furthermore, this research should include more European countries not just the two countries being studied here in order to come to more general conclusions.

Appendix 1

Table comparing the Netherlands and Denmark

Figure 2: comparing the Netherlands and Denmark

Country	The Netherlands	Denmark
Area	41,526 sq. km	43,094 sq. km
Terrain	Coastal lowland	Low and flat or slightly rolling; highest elevation is 173 m
Climate	Northern maritime, with cool summers and mild winters	Temperate. The terrain, location, and prevailing westerly winds make the weather changeable
Population	16.6 million	5,557,709
Nationality	Dutch	Dane
Ethnic groups	Predominantly Dutch; large minority communities are Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese, and Dutch Caribbean	Scandinavian, Inuit, Faroese, Turkish, German, Polish, Iraqi, Lebanese, Bosnian, Pakistani, Yugoslav (former), Somali, Iranian, Vietnamese, British, Afghan
Religions	Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim	Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church 80.7%; Muslim about 4%. Other majority consisting of Protestant denominations and Roman Catholics
Education	Years compulsory: 13. Attendance: nearly 100%. Literacy: 98%.	Years compulsory: 9. Attendance: 100%. Literacy: 99%.
Health	Infant mortality rate: 4.4/1000. Life expectancy: 78.3 years for men and 82.3 years for women	Infant mortality rate (2009):3.6/1,000. Life expectancy: men 76.5 years, women 80.8 years.
Type of government	Parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch	Parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch
Constitution	1814 and 1848	1849
Branches	Executive: monarch (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. Legislative: bicameral parliament (First and Second Chambers). Judicial: Supreme Court	Executive: monarch (head of state), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. Legislative: unicameral parliament (Folketing). Judicial: appointed Supreme Court
Political parties	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Freedom Party (PVV), Labor Party (PvdA), Liberal Party (VVD), Socialist Party (SP), other minor parties	In parliament: Venstre (Liberal), Social Democratic, Danish People's, Socialist People's, Conservative, Social Liberal, New Alliance, Unity List, Christian Democrat
Suffrage	Universal at 18 ("Background note: The Netherlands," 2011)	Universal adult (18 years of age) ("Background Note: Denmark," 2011)

Sources

- Aarts, K., & Thomassen, J. (2008). Dutch Voters and the Changing Party Space 1989-2006. *Acta Politica*(43), 203-234.
- Achterberg, P., & Houtman, D. (2006a). Why do so many people vote 'unnaturally'? A cultural explanation for voting behaviour. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(1), 75-92.
- Achterberg, P., & Houtman, D. (2006b). Why do so many people vote 'unnaturally'? A cultural explanation of voting behaviour. *European Journal of Political Research*(45), 75-92.
- Andersen, J. G., & Bjørklund, T. (1990). Structural Changes and New Cleavages: the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway. *Acta Sociologica*, 33(3), 195-217.
- Babbie, E. (2007). *The Practice of Social Research*: Thomson Wodworth.
- Background Note: Denmark. (2011). 2011, from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3167.htm>
- Background note: The Netherlands. (2011). 2011, from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3204.htm>
- Betz, H.-G. (1999). Contemporary Right-Wing Radicalism in Europe. *Contemporary European History*, 8(02), 299-316.
- Cainzos, M., & Voces, C. (2010). Class Inequalities in Political Participation and the 'Death of Class' Debate. [Article]. *International Sociology*, 25(3), 383-418.
- De Graaf, N. D., Heath, A., & Need, A. (2001). Declining cleavages and political choices: the interplay of social and political factors in the Netherlands. [doi: 10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00061-X]. *Electoral Studies*, 20(1), 1-15.
- De Partijen - Extreem Rechts. (2000). Retrieved 3th of January, 2012, from <http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Profiel/Extreemrechts/partijen.html>
- De uitgangspunten van Democraten 66. (2004). Retrieved 3th of January, 2012, from <http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/politiekepartijen/d66/beginselProgrammas/beg-prog.pdf>
- Denmark - Political parties. 2011, from <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Denmark-POLITICAL-PARTIES.html>
- Denmark - Political Parties. (2011). Retrieved 6th of October, 2011, from http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/denmark/parties.html
- Dorussen, H. (2004). Pim Fortuyn And the 'new' far right in the Netherlands1. [doi: 10.1080/00344890408523255]. *Representation*, 40(2), 131-145.
- Governments and Politics. (2011). Retrieved 4th October, 2011, from <http://www.denmark.dk/en/menu/About-Denmark/Government-Politics/>
- Gray-Block, A. (2011). The Dutch Political System and Prinsjesdag. Retrieved 4 October, 2011, from http://www.expatica.com/nl/essentials_moving_to/country_facts/the-dutch-political-system-806_9513.html
- Ivarsflaten, E., & Stubager, R. (2011). Voting for the populist radical right in Western Europe: The role of education. 22.
- Jansen, G. (2011). *Social Cleavages and Political Choices*. Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Nijmegen.
- Jansen, G., Graaf, N. D. d., & Need, A. (2011). Class voting, Social changes and political changes in the Netherlands 1971-2006. *Elsevier*, 30, 510-524.
- Jespersen, K. J. (2008). Hereditary Monarchy. Retrieved 4th October, 2011, from <http://www.denmark.dk/en/menu/About-Denmark/Royal-Denmark/The-Danish-Monarchy-An-Overview/Hereditary-Monarchy/>
- Knigge, P. (1998). The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 34(2), 249-279.
- Knutsen, O. (2001). Social Class, Sector Employment, and Gender as Party Cleavages in the Scandinavian Countries: A Comparative Longitudinal Study, 1970-95. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 24(4), 311-350.
- Koopmans, R., & Muis, J. (2009). The rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands: A discursive opportunity approach. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(5), 642-664.
- Kottman, P., Waard, M. d., & Gruyter, C. d. (2000). Extreem-Rechts. Retrieved 3th of January, 2012, from <http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Profiel/Extreemrechts/landen.html>

- Lentz, C. J. (2009). *The Parliamentary System of Denmark*. Retrieved from http://www.ft.dk/English/~/_media/Pdf_materiale/Pdf_publicationer/English/The%20Parliamentary%20System%20of%20Denmark_A4_Opslag_24s%20pdf.ashx.
- Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, 345-378.
- Manza, J., Hout, M., & Brooks, C. (1995a). Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment or Trendless Fluctuation? *Annual Review of Sociology*, 21, 137 - 162.
- Manza, J., Hout, M., & Brooks, C. (1995b). Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation? *Annual Review of Sociology*, 21(ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: 1995 / Copyright © 1995 Annual Reviews), 137-162.
- Nederland: een parlementaire democratie. (2010). Retrieved 4 oktober, 2011, from <http://mens-en-samenleving.infonu.nl/politiek/31302-nederland-een-parlementaire-democratie.html>
- Netherlands - Political Parties. (2011). Retrieved 6th of oktober, 2011, from http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/netherlands/parties.html
- Nieuwbeerta, P., & Ultee, W. (1999). Class voting in Western industrialized countries, 1945–1990: Systematizing and testing explanations. *European Journal of Political Research*, 35(1), 123-160.
- Organisatie. (2011). Retrieved 6th of oktober, 2011, from <https://www.partijvoordedieren.nl/departij/organisatie>
- Partijprogramma Partij van de Dieren. (2011). Retrieved 3th of january, 2012, from <https://www.partijvoordedieren.nl/departij/partijprogrammas/p/1-inleiding>
- Paynter, J., Hawkesworth, M. E., & Kogan, M. (Eds.). (2003) *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics* (2nd ed.).
- Plato. *The republic* (B. Jowett, Trans.).
- Radicevic, A., Aha, K., Katz, M., & Hill, N. (2008). Manual on Political Party Identity and Ideology. 2011, from http://www.ndi.org/files/2321_identitymanual_engpdf_06032008.pdf
- Rydgren, J. (2004). Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark. [doi:10.1080/0140238042000228103]. *West European Politics*, 27(3), 474-502.
- Rydgren, J. (2005). Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(3), 413-437.
- Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47(6), 737-765.
- Scheuregger, & Spier. (2007). Working-class authoritarianism and the vote for right-wing populist parties. An empirical analysis for five west European countries. *Kolner Zeitschrift Fur Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie*, 59(1), 59-+.
- Scheuregger, D., & Spier, T. (2007). Working-class authoritarianism and die Wahl rechtspopulistscher Parteien. Eine Emperische Untersuchung fur funf westeuropaische staaten. *Kolner Zeitschrift Fur Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie*, 59(1), 59-80.
- Shively, W. P. (2008). *Power and Choice - an introduction to political science* (11th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Stubager, R. (2010). The Development of the Education Cleavage: Denmark as a Critical Case. [doi: 10.1080/01402381003654544]. *West European Politics*, 33(3), 505-533.
- Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., & Irwin, G. A. (2003). Never a dull moment: Pim Fortuyn and the Dutch parliamentary election of 2002. [doi: 10.1080/01402380512331341101]. *West European Politics*, 26(2), 41-66.
- Venstre - Denmark. (2011). 2011, from http://www.liberal-international.org/editorial.asp?ia_id=720