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The Impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on Human and Democratic Development in Tunisia.

- Perceptions according to Indices on
Human and Democratic Development -

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I. Introduction: Subject of Research & Methodology

Tunisia, its culture, and its political system as it is today, have always been subject of external impacts and processes. Its geostrategic position put the smallest North African country in the focus of the European Union (EU) and its member states ever since. That includes the wish to strengthen democratic values and good governance, that is, human development, in the country within the framework of its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) mainly. Several global indices have been publishing scores on the degree of democratic and human development in Tunisia over the years, offering different perspectives on the progress Tunisia could make in this regard.

This relation shall be subject of the research at hand: The thesis aims at analyzing the results the EMP could achieve concerning human development in Tunisia since 1995 according to those indices; and putting it in relation to the country's role in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue.

Maintaining peace and stability across the neighbourhood and finding ways to establish a “*ring of friends*” (EU Commission 2003) were among the main concerns on the EU's political agenda as it was formulated by the European Union Commission in 2003. This explicitly included Tunisia which was the first of the states in question for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) ever to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in 1995, showing huge interest in a good relation to the EU and its member states (cf. Verheugen 2004: 6).

As a matter of fact, Tunisia has made a development to a close ally of the EU over the past decades. Former French President Jacques Chirac emphasized the “*amitié exceptionnelle*” (Chirac 2003) –the extraordinary friendship with Tunisia; former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier considered it a “*wirklich verlässliche[r] Partner*” (cited after Auswärtiges Amt 2007) –a truly reliable partner. What can be put to record in advance is that the ties between Tunisia and the European Union have intensified continuously which is proven by the institutionalization of that partnership beginning in the 1990s.

Within that partnership, economic issues are in the focus. Basically, the European Union, being a common market and economic union, makes a claim on promoting trade liberalization and achievements in the first place. Yearning for prosperity and economic stability is the guideline which leads the EU's external policies and is also true for the relations to the Mediterranean region: “*One important objective of the Partnership is the creation of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area [...] with substantially liberalised trade both between the EU and*

the Mediterranean region, and between the Southern Mediterranean countries themselves.“ (EU ENPI 2007) In the aftermath, the EU not only seemed confident about arousing positive developments concerning economic achievements: *”Economically and commercially, Tunisia is very closely linked to Europe”* (US Department of State – Diplomacy in Action 2011); but also concerning human development, leading to the declaration of French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008 that *“the space for liberty [in Tunisia] is growing”* (cited after De La Baume/ Sayare 2011). Still, Tunisia is continuously ranked below average in most relevant *indices on good governance and human development* such as the United Nations Human Development Index (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>) or the Freedom in the World-Index by Freedom House (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>), as will be seen in the following research.

This appears unexpected as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership includes a clear commitment to strengthening basic democratic values such as the regard of human rights or the rule of law. As European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner pointed out in her speech at the 8th World Bank Forum in June 2006, improving certain socio-political aspects in the Mediterranean region is extraordinarily important in order to achieve the aim of stability in that region. She made clear that financial investments in the Arab countries and trade liberalization are part of, but not the sole key for a perceivable improvement of the people’s situation. Ferrero-Waldner explained the lacking improvement of the general economic situation of the region with *“insufficient investment in people“* (Ferrero-Waldner 2006: 2) and demanded a new thinking concerning reform-oriented measures the EU would take towards the countries of the Middle East and North Africa.

This approach is similar to the basic idea of this thesis: It is important to make a clear difference between economic and socio-political aspects. The aspect of *‘investing in people’*, as Ferrero-Waldner put it, is an important part of maintaining security and stability in and around Europe and of establishing the EU as a major actor in international politics.

Subject of Research

The academic discourse on results and effects of the Euro-Tunisian relations so far rather focuses on economics and trade relations (e.g. cf. White 2001). Therefore, this thesis shall contribute to the scientific findings aiming at analyzing the Euro-Tunisian-partnership focusing on the democracy-supporting elements from the EU’s part and their effects as measured by international indices on democracy, human rights, and good governance. It shall be examined whether the reform-oriented elements of the EU’s Mediterranean policy have influenced the

*human and democratic development*¹ in Tunisia positively, negatively, or not at all. Then, possible reasons for the determined effect of the EMP on human development in Tunisia shall be pointed out.

Having studied this thesis, one should have learned which methods the EU used to promote democratic and human development in Tunisia; which impact it had on the country according to the most relevant indices on good governance, democracy, political freedom, press freedom, corruption-perception, and rule of law; and which possible reasons for the development can be argued.

Methodology

For that purpose, the thesis will start giving an overview about the instruments the EU uses within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP); originating in the *1995-Barcelona Process*, the *European Neighbourhood Policy* which has been established in 2004, and the *Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean* in 2008. Afterwards, Tunisia's part within those policies will be analyzed in detail.

Then, relevant data indices will be introduced as a thread in the thesis to identify political development and reforms in Tunisia concerning relevant fields such as human rights, rule of law, and press freedom. That part will be built up chronologically, aiming at associating the measures taken by the EU in the country to the indices' data for Tunisia and analyzing those effects. The examined period starts in 1994 in order to allow changes to occur from 1995 on, when the Barcelona Summit ushers the beginning of enhanced Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

In order to underline the results of the analysis, an index called *Tunisia Democracy Development Index (TDDI)* will be calculated to display the weighted average of the scores of the indices examined antecedent in the thesis. The methodology will be explained in detail – as will the selection of indicators and the relevance for the scientific research.

The EU is Tunisia's most important trading partner and close ally (European Union Commission 2010) and as will become obvious, very interested in a good relation to the EU. Changes concerning press freedom and prevention of corruption can be understood as a mean to get closer to the EU, its institutions and its promised share of the benefits (cf. EU Commission 2004: 3). As the literature agrees that the EU is "*the most prominent democracy promoter*"

¹ *Human and democratic development* means the combination of the above mentioned socio-political indicators (democracy, regard for human rights, rule of law, good governance, press freedom, economic freedom, and absence of corruption).

(Thompson 2011: 1/ cf. also Magone 2011: 31) in the Middle East and North Africa, it can be accredited with a very high degree of influence on human and democratic development in Tunisia – whether positive or negative.

Therefore, the respective development of scores for Tunisia will show whether the EU could contribute to an improvement of Tunisia’s socio-political situation in the past two decades. It has to be expected that a positive development concerning the scores for Tunisia can be seen because of the efforts the EU put in that issue. However, other factors –such as Tunisia’s partnership with the USA (cf. US Department of State – Office of the Historian 2011) - cannot be conclusively ruled out. If the development of the scores in the indices is negative or remains static, a failure concerning a basic element of the Euro-Tunisian partnership has to be concluded anyway: That would mean that the EU could neither promote democracy nor counteract a negative/ static development.

II Main Part: The EMP and Human and Democratic Development

1. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The EU uses different instruments to strengthen the partnership with Tunisia. In this chapter, the major policies shall be pointed out. While the Euro-Tunisian relations run within a multilateral framework in the Barcelona Process and its 2008-successor Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), bilateral agreements are made within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (cf. Powel 2008: 127). The importance of the different policies varies in dependence on the specific policies and issues in question which will be concluded after reflecting them in the following. What is true for all policies is that *“all trade and cooperation agreements with third countries contain a clause stipulating that human rights are an essential element in relations between the parties.”* (EU EAS 2012a)

The legal foundations for the EMP and the relevant policies are laid down in art. 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU): *„The Union may conclude with one or more third countries or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure.“* (EU EUR-Lex 2010: 144)

1.2. Barcelona-Process 1995-2008

The Barcelona Process has been initiated during the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 1995, and was a first but huge step into institutionalizing the partnership between the EU and its southern neighbours. It has been decided that of the non-EU-members only the immediate Mediterranean-neighbouring countries could participate in the summit which made it an alliance of 27 states: The EU-15 of 1995, plus Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey; and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Mauritania, Syria, Tunisia, and the Palestinian territories (cf. EU EAS 2012b).

The Barcelona Process established a partnership on a variety of fields which are categorized in three baskets: 1. on political cooperation, and strongly on security-political subjects, 2. on economic and financial matters, and 3. on social, cultural and humanitarian issues (cf. EU EAS 2012b/ cf. Gaedtke 2009: 170ff.). One of the reasons the Barcelona Process found positive response from the participating countries was the need to find a way to deescalate the tense situation in the region caused by the Middle East conflict. Bringing the parties together in a union pursuing common goals seemed a good way to begin with. However, it has to be pointed out that the Barcelona Process was not meant to find solutions for the conflict between Israel and the Arab world in the first place (cf. Powel 2008: 127).

In the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, the signing countries agreed on common principles and goals, and were “*convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights*“ (EU 1995: 2). This verbalized intention of positively effecting human development justifies the assumption this thesis is built on: At that point, in some parts of the Mediterranean, basic democratic structures were not sufficiently developed and thus needed contractual attention.

The Barcelona declaration can be understood as the groundwork for the following association and cooperation agreements. The Barcelona Process led to the first Association Agreements and arrangements (AAs) between the EU and its neighbouring countries which have been concluded from the 1995 on.

Based on the agreements of the Barcelona summit, 44 countries (among them 27 EU-members) came together for the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008.

1.3. European Neighbourhood Policy – since 2004

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was established in 2004, meaning to present a common framework for the AAs between the EU and the Mediterranean-bordering countries and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the countries bordering the EU on the East. The earlier cited Communication Paper from the Commission of the EU says that a “*zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations*” (EU Commission 2003: 4) should be developed.

Contrary to the concept of the Barcelona Process, the basic idea of the ENP is that each country and its respective interests can be addressed individually. The ENP categorizes the EU’s neighbouring countries into countries which have a membership-perspective in the EU on the one hand –for which the ENP is meant to be an intermediate step- and countries which cannot join the EU because of geographical exclusion. However, the ENP and its instruments are independent from other negotiations and do not interfere with questions of potential membership (cf. EU Commission 2003: 5).

A major column of the ENP are the Action Plans (AP) bound by contract which are updated every three to five years and are based on the results of the cooperation until that point. The APs –despite their individuality- generally address an identical set of topics which includes political dialogue and reform, economic and social reforms and development, cooperation in juridical and security matters, in energy and transportation, intercultural exchange and migration, environmental and scientific issues, coordination of regional and sub-regional projects and processes, and –as a major aspect- the financing of the measures in the respective Action Plans (EU ENPI 2006: 1).

Referring to this, the EU provides high means, and, significantly, introduced a measure of governance facility in 2007 which grants the ENP-countries a share in proportion to the progress they made concerning their respective APs, the so-called European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). It covers financial support for countries to the east, the south (replacing the programme of MEDA – *mésures d’accompagnement financières et techniques*), and to Russia (cf. European Union ENPI 2006: 1-14). For the period between 2007 and 2013, its budget amounts to €12 billion while the provision is granted according to the respective priorities of the programmes (cf. European Union ENP 2011). The establishment of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) along with the ENP once more proves consciousness of the necessity to improve democratic structures in the

Mediterranean. The EIDHR contributes with a share of its €1.104 billion-budget for democracy-supporting measures worldwide (cf. European Union Commission 2011). It is concerned with working in cooperation with civil society organizations and monitoring electoral processes, for instance; the EIDHR can directly transfer money to the relevant actors in order to pursue the desired objectives and thus ensures its usage for the intended purposes (cf. Barbé/Johansson-Nogués 2008: 87f.). This can be understood as a new approach for the EMP in order to strengthen democratic and human development. In the aftermath of the Barcelona Process, financial assistance primarily focused on the economic partnership and the aim of bringing forward a free trade area between the EU and the Mediterranean countries.

Nervi Christensen describes that especially “[t]he Italians had a fairly consistent set of priorities and interest in the Mediterranean. These have been to protect economic interests, to secure its energy supplies, and to create a web of interdependency with the individual states of the region.” (cited after Nervi Christensen 2011: 95f.) Besides, Italy’s geographical situation urged the country to put security issues at a high priority on the agenda. Great Britain and Sweden proposed the introduction of a rewarding system in which relations would be enhanced in case a country fulfils certain reform-oriented objectives first. But especially Italy opposed that idea with the argument of avoiding the creation of hierarchy in the Maghreb. The Italian government had the viewpoint that establishing equal partnerships based on trust and cultural understanding should be the main intent of the EU’s Mediterranean policy (cf. Nervi Christensen 2011: 103f.). Italy, at that point, had the advantage that the President of the European Commission between 1999 and 2004, former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, was one of the main initiators of the ENP, giving the Mediterranean bordering countries a chance to be in the focus of the EU’s external policy’s agenda: “*What Prodi was proposing [namely the basics of the ENP-] was fully in line with Italian preferences.*” (cf. Nervi Christensen 2011: 103).

The ENP is considered a milestone in the EU’s external policies by EU-officials. As Romano Prodi repeatedly put it, it was designed to “[share] everything with the Union but institutions” (Prodi 2002), giving the participating countries a perspective to approach the EU to an unprecedented level. The ENP’s intention is to make each country feel respected for –and in some cases *despite*- its very special circumstances, giving them a chance and the measures to get closer to the EU.

1.4. Barcelona-Process: Union for the Mediterranean – since 2008

Even though the ENP covers many important issues concerning economic and political cooperation with the Mediterranean, the need arose to further develop the EMP. Negative perceptions of the EMP within the Mediterranean states and demands for modernization led to the necessity of thinking about a new way to approach the cooperation with the North African countries. The fact that all EU-members but not all Mediterranean/ North African countries were initially members of the 1995-Barcelona Process is referred to by White as “*selectivity*” (White 1999: 846). Besides, for those which participated, an unequal advancement of cooperation with the EU was suspected (cf. Driss: 1). While the latter is the central idea of the ENP, the former was subject to renewal when it came to implementing the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

On the side of the EU, however, discrepancies occurred between the many different national interests. During the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy planned launching a forum in addition to the existing projects Barcelona Process and ENP to enhance cooperation between the Mediterranean neighbouring countries on both sides (cf. Woyke 2010: 301).

France always had a special interest in close partnership to the countries of the Mediterranean. When the states of the Maghreb gained their independence, France introduced a system known as ‘*présence française*’ that was accepted by Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. It was aimed at a postcolonial cooperation for development in order to maintain stability and strengthen political and economic structures (cf. Hubel et al. 1988: 153f.). The advantage for France laid in the fact that it could remain present in Northern Africa and assure its position as a leading European country. France apparently did not mind playing such a big role in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue; however, part of the responsibility is delegated from other EU-countries (cf. Bensedrine/ Mestiri 2004: 184ff.; cf. Woyke 2010). But when it came to the instalment of the UfM, other EU-members, amongst them Germany as a leading force, asked for the inclusion of the whole EU-27, not leaving France the role of a single player (cf. Driss 2009: 2). On the one hand, this slowed the process down as each country brought in its own interests to the dialogue and laid focuses on different aspects. On the other hand, including the EU-27 proves the significance the EMP was considered with from the viewpoint of the Southern Mediterranean governments which favoured that approach (cf. Driss 2009: 2). Additionally, Germany proposed to create the project as a reform of the 1995-Barcelona Process instead of establishing a new framework (cf. Gaetdke 2009: 173). The outcome could be

agreed on by all participants and so on July 13th 2008, 43 nations came together in Paris to finally launch the UfM: 27 EU-countries, plus the Southern Mediterranean nations, and Mauretania and Jordan. Another innovation compared to the 1995-Barcelona Process was the implementation of a co-presidency which should give the countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East the certainty of being proactive in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue (cf. Driss 2009: 3).

The UfM was supposed to ensure that the EU has the possibility of bringing in its interests concerning regional and interregional processes in Northern Africa and the Middle East independently from the Middle East-Quartet or from agreements with the USA (cf. Gaedtke 2005: 225ff.; cf. Johannsen 2009: 128).

It is a set of several commitments concerning a variety of topics, most of which can be regarded as *updates* of previously made pledges. Primarily, the ministers who participated in the Paris Summit focused on projects on improving the infrastructure and the water quality of the Mediterranean, or on expanding the use of sustainable energy sources in the region (cf. Gaedtke 2009: 174). However, and strikingly on the first page, the declaration also includes re-commitments concerning human development in the Maghreb: *“The creation of an area of peace, stability, security and shared prosperity, as well as full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms and promotion of understanding between cultures and civilizations in the Euro-Mediterranean region.”* (EU Commission 2008: 1)

The Arab League is designated to join all meetings which take place within the framework of the Union and one of the objectives the Union aims at contributing to is to *“achieve a just, comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict”* (EU Commission 2008: 1). How important the UfM actually is in the global political network, can be understood by the fact that it represents the only international forum except from the United Nations in which Israel and Arab countries come together on a regular basis.

A further mean the EU uses for democracy promotion in its foreign policy in general is the human rights dialogue (cf. EU EAS 2012b) which is mainly conducted through diplomacy based on the EU’s guidelines on, amongst others, human rights, the death penalty, on torture, on inhuman treatment and punishment, on children, and on human rights defenders in its *acquis communautaire* (cf. EU Commission 2011).

As could be seen, the EMP comes along with a variety of tools aiming at fostering both economic and political cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean countries. Incentives seeking to support democracy in the Mediterranean could be detected in all of these instruments. However, the intensity changed over the years.

- The 1995-Barcelona Process represents the initial point of the EMP as it is today and led to an enormous increase of trade relations between the EU and the North African nations.
- The ENP gave the partnership a framework and offered clear plans and stable strategies. Along with it came initiatives for the ENP-countries which announce enhanced cooperation in case of positive human development.
- The UfM is designed to give the partners on both sides not only a forum but also a platform for exchange and cooperation, including revamps and innovations compared to the initial Barcelona Process of 1995.

The ENP turns out to be the most sustainable policy of the EMP as its structures are stronger established than those of the Barcelona Process or the UfM. It gives the clearest instructions of how improvement of the socio-political (and also economic) situation of a country can be realized and offers perspectives which are attractive for the ENP-countries. The APs are well elaborated and aim at achieving significant changes in both short- and long-term-perspectives. Summarized, the commitment for democratic principles and promotion of human development does play a major role in the EMP and thus in the Euro-Tunisian dialogue.

2. Tunisia in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The EU tried to promote democratic development through the EMP which includes several instruments as can be concluded from the previous chapters. Tunisia has been part of this process from the very beginning of the EMP, participating already in the Barcelona Process in 1995 and steadily enhancing partnership to the EU.

Tunisia and the Barcelona Process

The Barcelona Process in 1995 led mainly to agreements concerning economic cooperation of which the Association Agreement of 1998 between the EU and Tunisia is of utter importance (cf. Ben Hammouda et al. 2007: 26). It contains the explicit commitment to democratic values and yearns for improvement of the people's socio-political situation in Tunisia (cf. EU EUR-Lex 1995). Art. 2 declares the "*respect for human rights and democratic principles*" as an "*essential element of the Agreement.*" (EU EUR-Lex 1995)

However, the focus remained on economic issues and on promoting free trade of different kinds of goods between Tunisia and the EU. The previous agreements on trade and cooperation which have been in force since 1969 and 1976 (cf. EU 2011: 1) have been replaced by the AA, giving the Euro-Tunisian partnership a structure and trend-setting for the future. Tunisia's economy benefited from the cooperation. Bensedrine/ Mestiri refer to it as the "*principal bénéficiaire*" (Bensedrine/ Mestiri 2004: 142) – the main beneficiary of financial support in the EMP-framework, for instance; explaining that the country received 14% of the available budget of the MEDA-programme between 1995 and 2004. One of the main outcomes of the Barcelona Process for Tunisia has been defined as the aim of establishing a free trade area until 2010 (cf. EU EUR-Lex 1995). For that, the EU made dedication to ensure human rights and democratic values from the part of Tunisia a condition. That the free trade area could not be established until 2010 is an indicator for the lack of democratization since the Barcelona Process which hindered the EU to foster economic cooperation. As the benefits for Tunisia and its democratic and human development are little, the focus on the ENP is strengthened all the more.

Tunisia and the ENP

The specialty of the ENP –namely laying the focus on the unique situation of each country and (re)acting according to it- gives this instrument an upscale significance for this research:

Clear benchmarks for the handling with Tunisia are set up in the Association Agreement and the Action Plan, and the progress is regularly evaluated by the EU in the Country and Progress Reports. These features are assistive when it comes to analyzing human development in Tunisia. As mentioned before, Tunisia was the first country to sign an AA on July 17th 1995 coming into force on March 1st 1998. That means that by 2004, when the ENP was initiated, the economic and trade relations between Tunisia and the EU have already been on an advanced level and could thus be intensified through the implementation of the ENP. In 2004, Tunisia has been offered a strengthening of trade relations, reduction of trade barriers to and from Europe, participation in certain EU-politics, and increased financial support (EU EAS 2004: 2). Until that point, the most developed fields of cooperation were those of free trade area, sectoral cooperation and social issues (cf. EU Commission 2004b: 4). Nevertheless, there was urgent need for further steps which embodies in the Action Plan of the partnership between Tunisia and the EU.

On a general note, there is a certain degree of cohesion between the Action Plan and Tunisia's own priorities –what the ENP generally always tries to achieve- but not concerning all sections of the partnership: While Tunisia expected an improvement of its economic situation and access to a free trade area with Europe, the EU tried to effect basic political changes in the Northern African country. Still, the core fields of cooperation have been successfully set to mutual consent in the Action Plan of 2004 (cf. EU Commission 2006: 2f.). The planned actions are manifold among which priority actions are highlighted. The first action of high priority is “*the pursuit and consolidation of reforms which guarantee democracy and the rule of law*”, followed by the pursuit of “*enhancing political dialogue and cooperation in areas such as democracy and human rights [...]*” (EU EAS 2004: 3).

To mention key objectives, the 2004-Action Plan focuses on aspects like increasing the political participation by all sections of Tunisian society and encouraging exchanges of experience between Tunisian and European members of parliament. Besides, it has been planned to support opposing political parties –and with it political pluralism- as their power has been limited under former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (cf. EU EAS 2004: 4). Those political aims have been more or less accepted by the partner state but the EU expected further approaches. To guarantee a stable neighbourhood, the EU aimed at exporting certain values to its surrounding. Also, Tunisia was supposed to work on reforms concerning the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and on strengthening the rule of law and improving detention and prison condition in that country. Another important aspect would be continuing to promote the right to associate and to assemble and –in the Tunisian case with

priority- the freedom of expression and opinion. A high commitment to media freedom and pluralism is also aimed at pursuant to the Action Plan as well.

There have been fewer discrepancies in the intentions of both partners concerning the economic dialogue. Without listing each single sectoral field of cooperation only the most important will be mentioned: Relevant to this is the focus on creating productive employment by making the Tunisian economy a knowledge-based one and as a conclusion more competitive in the international business competition. This issue was assigned with a high importance because the unemployment rate among young graduates was constantly growing (cf. EU Commission 2004b: 13).

It becomes clear that many of the measures taken by the EU concerning the Northern African country are supposed to have an impact on the Tunisian home affairs as the EU considers the Tunisian political system on a very low level and far from European standard. The European Union Commission explains that most of the political aims have not been reached; especially concerning human development: *“Tunisia has decided to embark on cooperation in the areas of good governance and justice and home affairs on a very gradual basis only.”* (EU Commission 2004b: 4) Obviously, relations between the steering committee of the Tunisian League of Human Rights and the authorities continue to be problematic.

Bensedrine/ Mestiri point out that it also means stability for the power of the respective political leaders who hope to achieve rear cover by the EU for their regency. Besides, the regimes use the Middle East-conflict as a subterfuge limit certain human rights (cf. Bensedrine/ Mestiri 2004: 192f.). Especially Tunisia excessively tried to distract the work of democracy-supporting and –measuring organisations (cf. Abou 2004). The Tunisian government rather had an interest in improving its economic situation. Being connected to the EU through association and cooperation agreements basically has been associated to achieving economic stability.


The ENP is a good example for showing that the EU is well aware of the difficult situation concerning the regard of human rights and the dedication to improve human development. In the ENP-CR of 2004, the EU declares that *“[d]espite the constitutional guarantees on democracy and freedom of association, a number of factors militate against the development of political pluralism in Tunisia, such as unclear rules regarding the criteria for setting up a political party, the conditions governing authorisation of a party by the Ministry of the Interior and the existence of an electoral system favouring the party in power.”* (EU Commission 2004b: 6)

Tunisia and the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

Being the successor and a revamp of the 1995-Barcelona Process, the UfM was expected to establish its instruments in a rather short period time. These expectations, held by Sarkozy in particular, could not be met (cf. Woyke 2010: 301). Instead of that, it actually still suffers from its start-up problems. The conflict in Gaza, for instant, in 2008 made Egypt –after all a major player in the Mediterranean region- stay away from UfM-meetings (cf. Driss 2009: 4).

Tunisia, on the contrary, tried to actively contribute to developing the UfM to an important platform for cooperation by suggesting reforms such as the implementation of a Euro-Mediterranean bank for development (cf. Driss 2009: 6). Since 2008, the country aimed at achieving the rank of an advanced status-partner in the framework of the UfM which is was not granted yet due to a tense situation of the human rights in the country (cf. Party of European Socialists 2009). In January 2011, after the Tunisian revolution, the ministers of foreign affairs of the EU agreed on revisiting negotiations concerning the country’s chances of a reinforced partnership (cf. EU ENPI 2011). While Jordan and Morocco, for instance, have been granted that status, Tunisian participation in the UfM is still limited.

Conclusively, “*the Union for the Mediterranean based in Barcelona has not been able to do any important work*“ (Magone 2011: 13) so far. Several obstacles such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or the 2011-Jasmin Revolution in Tunisia complicated the dialogue among the UfM-countries on the Southern Mediterranean coast since 2008 which is one of the main reason for which the UfM could neither significantly contribute neither to the recent happenings in Tunisia nor to the democratization process of the Mediterranean region in general (cf. Magone 2011: 14).



The EMP and its respective policies concerning Tunisia endeavour to ensure respect for democratic principles and human development. However, the Euro-Tunisian partnership clearly lacks concrete strategies how to realize those demands.

Once again, it becomes obvious that the most specific programme in the EMP concerning human development in Tunisia is the ENP. The policy includes political objectives in the AP and concrete demands the EU has towards Tunisia. However, both partners showed a certain reluctance of realizing the ambitious objectives concerning improving democratic standards and human development.

3. Data Indices: Tunisia under Observation

This thesis works with several indices of non-governmental and governmental institutions in order to draw a significant picture of the socio-political situation in Tunisia. Aiming at analyzing *human development* in Tunisia, the choice of the indices and their sub-indicators has been carefully conducted in regard to their significance, content and respective research methods. This will be explained for each index in detail in the following.

Relevant information can be extracted from the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI; United Nations 1990-2012), the World Bank data (World Bank 2012), Heritage Foundation: Index of Economic Freedom (IEF; Heritage Foundation/ The Wall Street Journal 1995-2012), Freedom House: Freedom In The World and Freedom of the Press (FIW/ FOP; Freedom House 1973-2012), Reporters Without Borders' Press Freedom Index (PFI; Reporters Without Borders 2002-2012), and the Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (CPI; Transparency International 1995-2012). These data-indices will be analyzed each concerning their respective scores for Tunisia. The intention is to give an overall picture of Tunisia's socio-political development during the past two decades.

Then, the Tunisia Democracy Development Index (TDDI) will be presented: Its purpose is to underline and verify the precedent results of this chapter, weighting the included indicators from the previously analyzed indices in relation to their relevance for the research question. This includes the above mentioned HDI, eight indicators from the World Bank data, FIW and FOP by Freedom House and the PFI. The IEF and economic data from the World Bank database are explicitly excluded. This selection offers a focus on the relevant aspects of *human development* which has been defined earlier in the thesis.

3.1. The Indices

As a matter of fact, there is plenty of data concerning Tunisia's economic and commercial achievements (cf. Magone 2011: 8/ e.g. WEF 2012); but, as mentioned before, few deal with actual human or democratic development. The following selection of relevant indices does not make a claim to be complete; but thorough research revealed that the most important indicators which help interpreting the socio-political development in Tunisia are included in this chapter.

a.) The UN Human Development Index

The United Nations Human Development Index (UN HDI) measures both the social and economic development of a country by taking into consideration data for issues of health, education, income, inequality, poverty, sustainability, and human security. The scale ranks from 0 (low human development) to 1 (high human development) (cf. UN 2011b). It is part of the annual Human Development Report (HDR).

Those categories contain between three to eight indicators each which altogether compose the HDI for the countries. The United Nations' declared goal is to draw a significant picture of the people's economic and social situation and to work with easily available data: Maternal mortality rate, adult literacy rate, and the percentage of the population living with less than \$1.25 per day are amongst the factors (cf. UN 2012a) – indicators which can be compared between countries and different editions of the HDR.

It has to be questioned, though, whether the data provided by the respective governments are reliable and based on the actual situations of the people or not. As can be seen in the UN's databank, governmental statistical bureaus are amongst the main providers of the data used by the UN for the index (cf. UN 2012a). This might be the only way to receive any data for several countries at all but it must be clear that the measurements and the results could differ in means of reliability, accuracy, or regularity with which the data is measured. The UN itself states that the HDI is "*primarily a user, not a producer, of statistics*" (UN 2011c: 1) with which it emphasizes that is not responsible for the data acquisition. The HDI still is a central part of this thesis because the UN is a reliable and accurately working organisation whose data should be able to be used for scientific purposes.

The UN did not include Tunisia into its 1995-measurement of human development as it is one of the countries for which only every ten years new evaluation took place until 2000. The next scores for Tunisia were published in 2005; from then on, annual evaluation for the country was conducted. Despite the lack of data for the relevant years 1995 and 2004, the available scores offer a clear image of Tunisia's economic and social development from the viewpoint of the UN. According to the HDI, Tunisia has shown an outstanding performance since the beginning of the measurement. It has been able to raise its HDI by 1.5%; from 0.436 in 1980 to 0.683 in 2010 which is the latest data available (cf. UN 2011d). This ranks Tunisia 81st out of 169 countries in the latest ranking. It is obvious that Tunisia performed extraordinarily well from the UN's viewpoint, being presented as a role model for the region. By the end of 2010,

the UN ranked Tunisia amongst the top ten countries that increased their HDI since the beginning of the measurement which was explained by noteworthy progress in major fields of human development such as health and education (cf. UN 2011a: 24). As these indicators can be signs for good governance, the inclusion of the HDI is essential for this study.

b.) World Bank

The World Bank offers data on mainly economic issues. Its databank contains information on both “*drivers of growth*” and “*participation [of the people] in growth*” (World Bank 2011a: 51). That offers a good solution for the above mentioned problem of not finding enough data on socio-political issues. Here, the researchers of the World Bank are well aware of the fact that political stability cannot be achieved without economic growth and link it to the degree of participation of the respective people. The economic-oriented World Bank data shows that Tunisia indeed did make huge progress concerning its economic situation which seems to be the product of both external influence and development in domestic issues. Indices which indicate that are growing values of gross domestic product, and foreign direct investment, and increased trade between Tunisia and the EU.

For the subject of research, other scores will be relevant, though. As figures for government expenditure on health and education can be symptomatic for the degree of good governance, the scores for *General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)*, *Government health expenditure per capita (current US\$)*, and *Adjusted savings: education expenditure (% of GNI)* (cf. World Bank 2012) will be considered. Besides, the Africa Development Indicators (ADI) have to be highlighted.

The ADI –which are part of the World Governance Indicators databank (cf. World Bank 2011c)- even give more detailed information about the North African governments. They require regard within the research because they can be regarded as indicators for good governance. The data “*relies on 33 sources, including surveys of enterprises and citizens and expert polls, gathered from 30 organizations around the world.*” (World Bank 2011c: 174) Despite the data’s validity –being used by the World Bank-, it has to be made clear that part of it are estimated measures and all of it relies on subjective perspectives on the issue. It has to be considered that data on perception of corruption or the feeling of safety cannot be measured through objective data. The literature agrees: “*[I]t is nearly impossible to measure governance in any other way than by relying on the experiences and views of informed respondents.*” (World Bank 2011b)

The relevant sub-indicators are “*Political Stability/ No Violence*”, “*Government Effectiveness*”, “*Regulatory Quality*”, and “*Safety and Rule of Law*” (cf. World Bank 2011a: 51). Their respective scales rank from -2.5 to 2.5; higher values indicate a better situation. As the scores are difficult to analyze because they are perceptions and generally not comparable between countries due to the unequal extent of data available, they will help giving an overall impression of human development in Tunisia in combination with the other relevant indices in this thesis. So far, it can be determined that the development of all these indicators took different courses in the examined time period. The score for Political Stability increased from 0.05 in 1996 to 0.24 in 1998. Another even more significant change occurred between 2003 and 2004 when the score sunk from 0.28 to 0.05 again. The highest political stability, according to the respondents, could be measured in 2006 when it reached 0.31 points. After that, the score remained rather stable around 0.20 until 2010, when it sunk again to 0.10. Dissimilarly, the scores for Regulatory Quality strongly differs and indicates values between 0.66 in 1996, 0.07 in 2002, -0.14 in 2005, and 0.14 in 2008. In 2010, the score was -0.02. The scores for Government Effectiveness and for Safety and the Rule of Law remained stable throughout the measurement. Effective governmental procedures have been rated by scores between 0.55 in 1996 and 0.41 in 2009. Only in 2010, it sank to 0.19.

Regulatory Quality and especially Political Stability/ No Violence show a strong inconstancy. The thus carefully conducted interpretation show that the degree of good governance in Tunisia actually varied to that extent. Again, the estimative character of the indicators makes it necessary to not over-interpret the scores and rather consider them in the context of the combination of indices in the TDDI.

c.) The Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index (EIU DI) was first published in 2006 which means the index accompanies Tunisia’s development for a short time only and thus is barely comparable with or to other indices. Although that fact limits the DI’s importance for this study, its statements are helpful for the analysis. Its relevance lies in the fact, that the index’s data is based on the categories electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture – factors which clearly indicate human and democratic development and are necessarily to be taken into account.

As for the methodology of the DI, democracy is defined as a system in which free and fair elections are held and in which basic human rights such as the freedom of speech or relig-

ion, the freedom of “*freely chosen participation*” and a working judiciary are guaranteed (cf. EIU 2010: 29f.). Based on this determination, the EIU DI classifies four types of regimes: Full democracies (10-8), flawed democracies (7.9-6), hybrid regimes (5.9-4) or authoritarian regimes (4-0) (EIU 2010: 31).

While the UN awards Tunisia improvement concerning its economic and political development, The Economist points out that the country has made a negative development: Tunisia has been listed as an authoritarian regime in both the 2006- and the 2008-edition of the EIU DI, which is already much of a statement. Within the range from 0 to 10, Tunisia ranked 144th out of 167 with 2.67 in 2010 – way behind Belarus (130), China (136), Egypt (138) and Vietnam (140). According to the authors of the research, in authoritarian states “*political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed. [...] Some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but these have little substance. Elections, if they do occur, are not free and fair. There is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship. There is no independent judiciary.*“ (EIU 2010: 32)

Confirming the tendency, Tunisia’s score declined by 0.17 points between 2008 and 2010, and so did its rank by 3 (cf. EIU 2010: 14). It currently ranks 92nd in the recently published 2011-research, having a score of 5.53 (cf. EIU 2011). This means Tunisia managed to leave the ‘*authoritarian regime-area*’ of the scale and is listed as a hybrid regime. The striking statement which the DI makes is that Tunisia was still considered to be among the least developed countries concerning human rights and political pluralism until 2010, while economic agreements with the EU were at their best and close partnership also on democracy-supporting issues should have shown more effects.

d.) The Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal: Index of Economic Freedom

Indicators such as the GDP, FDI or figures of trade are not necessarily symptoms of high human development – *economic freedom* indeed is: According to the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, economic freedom does not only stand for *Business and Trade Freedom* but further includes *Fiscal Freedom*, *Government Spending*, *Monetary*, *Investment*, *Financial*, and *Labour Freedom*, and the *Right of Property*. Besides, *Freedom from Corruption* is another variable of the IEF (cf. HF 2012a). All of these indicators are contributing to human development and personal self-determination and also are signs for the degree of good governance. This is why these variables are building the commonly published Index of Eco-

conomic Freedom (IEF) which undoubtedly has an economic focus but through its indicators makes it possible to associate it with the socio-political culture of a country as well.

While Tunisia's first appearance went along with an above average score of between 63.4 in 1995 and 63.9 in 1998, the country's ranking soon decreased due to significant negative development in the fields of freedom of trade and business. Tunisia thus took a slow but definite negative development over 60.2 in 2002 and 58.4 in 2004 to 55.4 in 2005.

Overall positive developments concerning economic freedom could not be observed according to the study. Contrary, the peak it had in 1996 and 1998 has been highly underperformed by 2010, indicating a score of 58.9. The researchers also make clear which elements of economic freedom can be held responsible for the development of the IEF: On the whole, Trade Freedom increased from 45.5 in 1995 to 53.5 in 2010; but the values have sunk to 35.0 between 1996 and 1998 and 27.2 in 2002. This development massively affects the scores and signifies an inconstant regard for economic freedoms in Tunisia. Other sub-indicators show a clearer development, such as Freedom from Corruption: According to the Heritage Foundation, it decreased from 50.0 in 1995 to 44.0 in 2010.

The opposite applies for Government Spending and Fiscal Freedom as measurement revealed an increase from 69.1 in 1995 to 78.5 in 2010 and from 69.1 to 78.5 in the same period, respectively. The points for Investment Freedom havened.

A slight boost of the scores can be observed from 2006 on – two years after Tunisia's AP of the ENP came into force. In that year, economic freedom in Tunisia increased to 57.5 and to 60.3 in 2007. That small raise does not cover the impression that there is a gap between the promotion of human development through the EMP and the actual progress – even when it comes to the economic cooperation between the EU and Tunisia. Neither the extensive trade liberalisation which are implemented through the AA of 1998 nor the ENP and its economic focus of the AP from 2004 on could notably spill over to the economic freedoms in the society.

e.) Freedom House: Freedom in the World

Freedom House offers some of the most relevant indices for information on human and democratic development of a country. Most of the data dates back to 1972, including the scores for Tunisia and the other North African states. Another remarking aspect underlining the significance of the data is that Freedom House's methodology has been scientifically approved (cf. Campbell/ Barth 2009: 210). Freedom House explains that its "*rigorous research meth-*

odology has earned the organization a reputation as the leading source of information on the state of freedom worldwide.“ (FH 2012) The Economist also refers to it as “*the best-known measure*” (EIU 2010: 28) for democracy.

Freedom House thus measures ‘*freedom*’ which is defined as “*the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centres of potential domination.*“ (FH 2011) There are two main data constructs which play a role for the research at hand: *Freedom in the World* (FIW) and *Freedom of the Press* (FOP). The scores of both indices refer to the antecedent year; that is e.g. the 2011-edition measures the degree of freedom for 2010.

Freedom in the World

For FIW, Freedom House uses a scale ranking from 1-2 (free) over 3-5 (partly free) to 6-7 (not free). Two main variables are responsible for the ranking: Political Rights/ Freedom (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL). PR includes ten specified indicators and aim at “*[enabling] people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate.*“ (FH 2012) CL includes 15 indicators and per definition “*allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.*“ (FH 2012)

These classifications precisely express the main aspects of democratic and human development and thus the Freedom House-indicators will be very useful for the analysis. While Freedom House also determines the amount of electoral democracies, the FIW-Index gives detailed information about how ‘*free*’ concerning human development and democratic values a country actually is.

The scores by Freedom House are steady throughout the years, indicating little change. In 2006, however, a significant change occurred according to Freedom House: “*Tunisia’s political rights rating declined from 6 to 7 due to credible accusations of rampant corruption among the president’s family and close associates.*” (FH 2008) Freedom House says that Tunisia was not an electoral democracy being considered under “*exercised authoritarian rule*” (FH 2008) and “*not free*” until 2010 (cf. FH 2011). That is concluded from the combination of the determined scores for the country which is 7 (“*not free*”) for PR and 5 (“*partly free*”) for CL. More striking events have been necessary to change the perception of Tunisia’s degree of freedom: In 2011, it was the only country that could improve its status in the ranking

because of the upheaval and the collapse of the government on January 14th 2011. It is now classified as *partly free* (PR: 3; CL: 4) which Freedom House explains with the “*free and fair elections for the transitional Constituent Assembly*“ (FH 2012: 20) and increasing freedom in all important areas of public life. This massive step up, however, remains unconsidered for this study as the recent process in Tunisia cannot be correctly analyzed in the framework of the research.

Freedom of the Press

The calculation of the FOP-Index is based on three indicators consistent of a set of various questions each which the respondents assign points to: Legal Environment (0-30 points), Political Environment (0-40), and Economic Environment (0-30). Freedom House aims at rating the environment in which the media operates; taking into consideration several aspects such as the availability of laws on press freedom and regulation and the government’s tendency to apply or abuse them. Press-related penalties, political control, (self-)censorship, handling of and with foreign journalists, issues of media ownership, corruption in the media, and costs for establishing medial institutions are further indicators (cf. FH 2011: 35). The respective points are accumulated: A total of 0-30 points means *free*, 31-60 *partly free*, and 61-100 *not free*.

The FOP-Index shows that also in this category, Tunisia is entitled *not free* throughout the years. Since the evaluation started in 2002, the score for Tunisia was constantly high; with the best result in the first year with a score of 73. In the edition of 2011, Tunisia attained a total score of 85 for 2010, meaning the same result as one year earlier (cf. FH 2010: 236f.) and the worst score for Tunisia ever. The score for Legal Environment is 27, for Political Environment 33 and for Economic Environment 25. The country currently ranks 184th of 196 surveyed countries along with China and Laos (cf. FH 2011: 17). Obviously, the country undertook a negative development concerning press freedom according to Freedom House. The organisations especially criticize the gap between the legal regulations and actual practise, speaking of “*ill-defined [legal] protections*” (FH 2010: 236) which the government would not respect. The researchers conclude that the high control of the press by the government in Tunisia, amongst others, is “[*O*]f long-standing concern” (FH 2011: 9).

f.) Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index

The absence of corruption is a clear sign of a democratic environment in which the rule of law and political stability are present. The Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) therefore serves as an indicator for human development. Noting that the perception of corruption is not the same as the presence of corruption, and vice versa, it contributes to the determination of the extent of democracy to a certain degree.

The authors of the research point out that it has been very difficult to assemble the data for the index. This reveals the main deficit of the CPI: The differing lack of data –also between the years- leads to a lesser comparability of the index within itself (cf. TI 1997: 15). While the CPI has been published in 1995 for the first time, there is a huge lack of data for countries such as Algeria, Morocco, or Libya while Tunisia has been included in 1998 (cf. TI 1995).

The scores for Tunisia have started on a high level in the early years of the measurement even leaving behind several European countries: E.g. in 1998, Tunisia ranked 34th with a score of 5.0, leaving Greece (4.9), Italy (4.7) and Turkey (3.6) behind (cf. TI 1999). In the following years, the score increased slowly, rising to 5.2 in 2000 and 5.3 in 2001. Being continuous until 2005 (4.9), the score dramatically decreased to 4.6 in 2006 and 4.2 in 2007. The score of 4.4 in 2008 was followed by 4.2 in 2009 and 4.3 in 2010. The recent score for corruption perception for Tunisia marks the so far minimal turning point of 3.8 (cf. TI 2011a).

While Tunisia had a relatively high score from the start on, the CPI shows a negative development for the country. The lack of data between 1995 and 1997 makes it difficult to determine whether the situation has changed between the signing and the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU, or even before. What *can* be said is that the scores did not significantly react in the aftermath of the Barcelona Process – that is in the run-up to the implementation of the ENP. Parallel to the implementation of the ENP in 2004, the scores started decreasing without recovery until 2010. That means that bringing Tunisia closer to the EU, its institutions, and its common market and offering the country incentives for positive development did not lead to an extrusion of corruption in various fields of public life from the viewpoint of Transparency International.

This trend is confirmed by the perception of Economy Watch on the same subject.

g.) Economy Watch: Corruption Perception Index

The Corruption Perception Index by Economy Watch (EW CPI) also rates the perception of corruption in a country. The scale goes from 0 (high perception of corruption) to 10 (absence of perception of corruption) (cf. EW 2011b). The first data for Tunisia was published in 2001, giving it a score of 5.3 and the 31st rank. Its position continuously sunk to the 59th rank in 2010 with a score of 4.3, indicating a clearly negative development for the country (cf. EW 2011a). However, several factors are responsible for the non-consideration of the EW CPI for more detailed research in the following chapters: First, it only measures data since 2001; second, as the name proclaim, Economy Watch publishes data on economic issues in the first place; besides, it is among others based on data by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the UN, and even Transparency International which would lead to overlapping data in the analysis (cf. EW 2011b). Conclusively, the CPI by Transparency International sufficiently covers the aspect of absence of corruption as an indicator of human development in the research.

h.) Reporters Without Borders: Press Freedom Index

Since 2002, the French-based organisation Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontiers; RSF) releases an annual ranking of the press freedom in the world: The Press Freedom Index (PFI). Besides, it publishes news concerning press freedom limitations and politically persecuted journalists. Tunisia has been in the focus of RSF because of negative headlines only: Jailed freedom and human rights activists, hunger striking journalists and lawyers, and intimidated internet users make the RSF's headlines about Tunisia (cf. RSF 2012). RSF refers to the country as a “*textbook case in press censorship for the past 20 years*” (RSF 2007). Contrary to the FOP-Index by Freedom House, the PFI only considers press freedom violations in its research. It is based on a questionnaire containing 43 different criteria of press freedom infringement answered by RSF's partner-organizations and –correspondent in the respective countries. The answers are scored and accumulated to the final score for each country (cf. RSF 2010b: 1f.). The ranking is not a limited scale: The higher the number, the lower the press freedom is. 0.00 means no observed press freedom violations (held by Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland). Eritrea ranks last in the 2010-edition with a score of 105.00, while it had a score of 115.50 in 2009 (cf. RSF 2010a). When the evaluation started in 2002, Tunisia ranked 128th out of 139 with a score of 67.75. It could

improve its position in 2003, scoring 50.83. A rather inconsistent development leads to the scores of 62.67 in 2004, 57.50 in 2005, 53.75 in 2006, and 57 in 2007. 48.1 in 2008 meant the lowest and thus best result for Tunisia in the PFI, followed by a high 61.5 in 2009. The 2010-ranking provides Tunisia with its worst score of 75.5. Its 154th rank scores worse than Libya (156th with 64.50) for the first time in the history of the PFI.

Even though the PFI was only published in 2002 for the first time, the question of press freedom is an important characteristic of the determination of the democratic culture of a country that its informative value is of high relevance (cf. FH 2011: 1). It is closely linked to issues of freedom of expression and information and the right of political participation. While the FOP-Index by Freedom House measures the legal, political, and economic environment for press freedom, the PFI measures the press freedom violations in a country. The indices have been compiled by the use of different approaches – both have been published by reputable organisations with a good network of information so that a consideration of both of them for the TDDI in the following is appropriate.

3.2. The Tunisia Democracy Development Index and its Interpretation

The Tunisia Democracy Development Index (TDDI) is introduced.² It measures the weighted average of the earlier analyzed indices. The weighting of the single components is conducted according to their relevance for the subject of research. That is, it is composed of the UN Human Development Index, selected World Bank data, the Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, Freedom House: Freedom in the World and Freedom of the Press, the Press Freedom Index by Reporters without Borders, and the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.

The TDDI is designed as a mean to 1. make clear that the before-mentioned indices are in their basic form not comparable to each other due to different measurements, data sources and availability, and different emphasizes; 2. to underline the results achieved through the analysis of the before-mentioned indices on human development, the degree of democratization, economic and political freedom, and good governance.

The analysis of the TDDI takes place in relation to value of 100.00 points in the base year 1994. If the score rises above that value in the following years, an improvement of the overall

² This chapter refers to the attached calculation sheet 'TDDI_Calc_FINAL'. The Methodology and Calculation of the TDDI is attached to the Annexe (Ch. iii. and iv.).

situation of human and democratic development compared to 1994 can be concluded. A lower score means a worsening of the situation. If a score is higher or lower than in the antecedent year, that also means an improvement and vice versa.

Until 2001, the TDDI-time series displays higher scores than in the base year 1994 which indicates a positive progress of human and democratic development in Tunisia. In 1995, it rises at a rate of 1.509 points. Mentioning only benchmarking data, the further development seems promising at first glance: It indicates 100.781 in 1996, (101.072 in 1997), 101.072 in 1998, (100.699 in 1999) and the peak of the TDDI of 102.301 in 2000.

In 2001, the score indicates a negative development compared to 1994 for the first time with 99.257 points. Although it could recover to a value of 100.71 in 2004, human development declined continuously after that according to the TDDI. The negative extreme is reached in 2007 with a score of 96.354 points which has only slightly got ahead of by a score of 97.075 points in 2010.

On the whole, the course of the TDDI takes a negative development between 1995 and 2010. While the scores are rising until 2001, it struggles not to decrease too low compared to the base year from 2002 on. Especially after 2006 the index even signifies a decline of human development instead of taking advantage from the, at that point, strongly intensified institutionalized partnership between Tunisia and the EU. By the end of the measurement in 2010, the TDDI could not even meet the value of any year between 1994 and 2000 while an improvement could have been expected.

Although several weak points could not be completely exempted from the calculation of the TDDI –such as variation in terms of validity or comparability, overlapping of sub-indicators of the indices, and different measurement and scales of the base data- the course of the TDDI indicates the general development of the sub-indices and supportively contributes to the analysis of the research question.

4. The EMP and its Effects on Human Development in Tunisia

Analyzing the relevant indices on democracy, economic freedom, good governance, press freedom, and the perception of corruption in the previous chapter, it became obvious that Tunisia experienced a worsening concerning the regards of democratic principles and human development: While the UN HDI and part of the World Bank data attest Tunisia a positive development since 1995, negative development of human development took place according to the Economist, Freedom House, Transparency International, Reporters Without Borders, and the TDDI.

It is striking that, between 1995 and 2010, Tunisia is among the least democratic countries according particularly to the EIU and the examined indices on press freedom while the UN HDI ranks it among the most encouraged and top quick learners in the world. This, evidently, needs to be explained by the different focus the UN and the EIU had for the data acquisition and for the calculation of the indices. Again, it becomes obvious why the combination of the data databases has to be considered for this work because one index by itself is not likely to draw a significant picture of a country and its political status and social issues.

As concluded, the first Barcelona Process led mainly to agreements concerning economic cooperation (cf. Ben Hammouda et al. 2007: 26). However, the literature gives little information about achievements in socio-political matters; and the examined indices show that human development was not positively developing but remained static in the aftermath of the 1995-summit. Especially, when the ENP was implemented and the Action Plan for Tunisia came into force in 2004, a more positive development could have been expected than what the TDDI shows. The most surprising development probably comes into account when it comes to the freedom of the press: While the EU explicitly aimed at improving the situation of press freedom, the relevant indices and documents come to the conclusion that it actually became worse – strikingly especially after Tunisia joined the ENP-programme.

Since the UfM only recently became part of the EMP, it could not manage to gain equal importance and vigour as the ENP to become an instrument for mutual benefits. Especially the discrepancies between the Arab countries and Israel led to blockades in the dialogue. Besides, the recent developments in Northern Africa and the Middle East originating in the political upheaval in Tunisia made a straight orientation of the UfM difficult. Being still in the making, it could not actively contribute to positive human development in Tunisia yet. Instead, it will be an essential framework for future cooperation. Its advantage is that it can readjust its approaches and policies according to the needs which developed from the chal-

lenges the political upheaval in Tunisia and other Arab states brings up (cf. UfM 2011). Even though a clear strategy remains undetermined, the UfM is in the position to react in an appropriate way in order to define a plan for Tunisia. For the future, it will be necessary to “*define what the Union for the Mediterranean is for. The first two years of the UfM were quite negative and characterised by stagnation.*” (Magone 2011: 32) Youssef Amrani, the Secretary General of the UfM, is well aware that promotion of human development and human rights in Tunisia “*must go hand in hand with the eradication of poverty, especially in the poorest regions.*” (cited after UfM 2011)

The EU could not be satisfied with the degree of effect it had on the democratic and human development in Tunisia in the past years. That conclusion resulted in considering new initiatives such as the instrument of European Endowment of Democracy or increase in mobility between north and south in order to “[*move*] *now to a more proactive agenda of democratization.*” (Magone 2011: 31)

To understand the reason for lacking political reforms in Tunisia, the relevance of the involved national states and their governments’ respective interests have to be considered. It is true for most European states that they explicitly focus on economic cooperation. That also applies for Italy whose role in the endorsement of the ENP has been pointed out earlier in the study. The literature offers various theses as possible explanation for insufficient promotion of democracy in Tunisia, or the Maghreb. Youngs points out that the EU had to protect its own interest –which experienced a great shift during the decades- for which it used the Mediterranean region as: While until the 1990s, strategic thoughts concerning the Cold War have been in the foreground, that issue lost its relevance with the new European order (cf. Youngs 2002: 2f.). The EU needed to achieve standardization in various fields; not only within itself but also around it, meaning also its southern flank. The aim was to bring stability to the region and benefiting from peace and security around Europe – being within a *ring of friends*. Also, the need to react to the rising rate of migration from Northern and Central Africa urged the EU to strengthen economic development in order to raise living standards and limit economic migration. This was especially the case for the Southern European countries which have been eagerly enforcing quick decisions concerning North Africa aiming at maintaining stability in their immediate surrounding (cf. Gaedtke 2009: 169; cf. Magone 2011: 3; cf. Youngs 2002: 4).

Another main aspect would be the incoherence within the EU-member states of implementing strong democracy-supporting measures, as explained by Voss (cf. Voss 2010: 5ff.). This is agreed on by Magone who states that “*the EU is at the moment the champion of soft power*“ due to lacking consensus to promote a “*hard power*“ (Magone 2011: 10) policy for the Mediterranean. Tying in with that argument, Demmelhuber points out that a phenomenon he calls “*muddling through*” (Demmelhuber 2009: 168f.) caused the lack of political reform: A mix between the incapability of implementing strong policies from the part of the European elites and the hope for spill-over-effects of economic achievements.

While certainly the combination of these factors is responsible for the negative perception of human development in Tunisia according to the analyzed indices, it could be understood that the performance of the democracy-promoting measures has been poor.

III. Conclusion

The EU and its member states appeared very courageous to introduce the idea of a *ring of friends* and to encourage democratic development in its neighbourhood; but the results are deflating: What the majority of the available literature indicates, could also be verified and underlined by the design of the Tunisia Democracy Development Index: Firstly, it becomes obvious that the EU put a lot of effort into its relations to the Maghreb, and to Tunisia. Its geographical proximity, its history, and its position as the main promoter of democracy in the Maghreb are demonstrably unquestioned, as is the EU's intention to support human development in Tunisia. Secondly, positive changes concerning the socio-political factors in Tunisia's political culture remain marginal and thus must appear as unsatisfying to the EU. This is due to a reluctance of both sides –the European nations and the Tunisian government- to more eagerly pursue the implementation of the ambitious objective targets. This is stated in unity by the available literature and can also be confirmed by the TDDI. For instance, while Tunisia received a huge part of the available budget of financial measures throughout the years, only 5% of that have been used for projects in the civil society (cf. Morisse-Schilbach 2007: 8; 10). The third conclusion is an interpretation of the EU's intention as described in the previous chapter and states that instead of trying to *force* the Tunisian government to implement any changes concerning deficits of democratic and human development, the EMP was hoping for a spill-over-effect: The economic developments were supposed to have a positive impact on factors such as freedom of speech or political participation in the medium or long-term view.

Bringing Tunisia closer to the EU by institutionalizing the partnership or by letting the people participate in economic and technical achievements obviously are part of what led to the political upheaval in 2011. That means that the EU's institutionalized partnership to Tunisia indeed aimed at supporting human development and democracy in some ways, leaving the question open whether the process could have been speeded up. But it has to be considered that „*any democratization process that may start now will take a long time to transform the political culture and structure*“ (Magone 2011: 5) in a country.

This conclusion agrees with Ferrero-Waldner who stated that bringing stability to the region was a “*matter of self-interest*” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006: 2) from the European point of view: A stable surrounding automatically ensures stability for Europe itself. But even though the EU does have a certain responsibility to promote democracy in its neighbourhood (and

preferably everywhere else), it must be understood that each country –and Tunisia in this case- must ensure the development of its political culture and civil society itself. The EU’s Mediterranean policy is institutional and supportive, but not meant as any kind of interference. However, the EMP –and the ENP in particular- offered Tunisia several initiatives for changes concerning the situation of democracy and human development which Tunisia did not take advantage of to a sufficient level according to this study.

As a conclusion, it is not easy to determine, how a more distinct positive development could have been achieved in any other way than by the EMP-programmes along with diplomatic endeavours. It would have been desirable to put more effort into promoting human development and democratic values in Tunisia. As Frank-Walter Steinmeier put it, the EU has to go beyond diplomatic statements and find an effective way of ensuring human development in Tunisia. The recent happenings obviously offer a chance to give the EMP a new adjustment which would ensure sustainable development of democratic values. Steinmeier adds that “*Europa braucht jetzt so etwas wie einen Marshall-Plan für den Maghreb*“(Steinmeier 2011) – Europe now needs something like a Marshall Plan for the Maghreb.

ANNEXE

i. List of Abbreviations

ADI	Africa Development Indicators
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DI	Democracy Index
EAS	External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EU	European Union
EUC	European Union Commission
EW CPI	Economy Watch Corruption Perception Index
FH	Freedom House
FIW	Freedom in the World
FOP	Freedom of the Press
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
HF	Heritage Foundation
IEF	Index of Economic Freedom
MEDA	Mésures d'accompagnement financières et techniques
PFI	Press Freedom Index
RSF	Reporters Sans Frontières (Reporters Without Borders)
TDDI	Tunisia Democracy Development Index
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TI	Transparency International
UfM	Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank
WEF	World Economic Forum
WGI	World Governance Indicators

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iii. Methodology & Calculation of the Tunisia Democracy Development Index (TDDI)

The Tunisia Democracy Development Index (TDDI) is introduced.³ It measures the weighted average of the earlier analyzed indices. The weighting of the single components is conducted according to their relevance for the subject of research. That is, it is composed of the UN Human Development Index, selected World Bank data, the Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, Freedom House: Freedom in the World and Freedom of the Press, the Press Freedom Index by Reporters without Borders, and the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.

The TDDI represents a well-arranged dataset with an appropriate degree of input information. The choice of the selected input is based on the results achieved in the previous chapters. That alleviates making a distinguished evaluation of the relevance of the respective indicators.

The concept of the TDDI is aiming at underlining the results achieved through the analysis of the before-mentioned indices. Besides, the relevant data is aggregated to a new index in order to thwart the negative aspect that the indices in their basic form are not comparable to each other as they differ in terms of measurement, data sources and availability, and emphasis. Further, weighting the single components according to their respective significance and relevance for the research subject ensures a strong focus on scores on human development, the degree of democratization, economic and political freedom, and good governance. The weighting of the sub-indices of the TDDI is conducted as follows:

- United Nations: Human Development Index:	10%
- World Bank: Adjusted savings: education expenditure (% of GNI):	5%
- World Bank: GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$):	0%
- World Bank: General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP):	5%
- World Bank: Government health expenditure per capita (current US\$):	5%
- The Heritage Foundation: Index of Economic Freedom (overall score):	10%
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World: Political Rights Score:	10%
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World: Civil Liberties Score:	10%
- Freedom House: Freedom of the Press:	7.5%
- Reporters Without Borders: Press Freedom Index:	7.5%
- Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index:	10%
- World Bank: Political Stability/No Violence (estimate):	5%
- World Bank: Government Effectiveness (estimate):	5%
- World Bank: Regulatory Quality (estimate):	5%
- World Bank: Safety and Rule of Law:	5%

Those indices which are considered to have a positive effect on the informative value of the TDDI are weighted by 10% each. That includes the UN HDI, the data by Freedom House for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, and the Corruption Perception Index. The Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal is weighted by 10% as well to make sure a certain variety is given in the spectrum and that economic factors are not completely left out as they actively contribute to human development.

Freedom of the Press by Freedom House and the Press Freedom Index by RSF- make 7.5% of the TDDI each – the accumulated 15% pay respect to the importance of the issue of press freedom without overrating it in relation to the other factors.

The World Bank provides two different types of data to the index of which all indicators receive a weighting of 5%: a) economic-financial data as indicators for good governance:

³ This chapter refers to the attached calculation sheet ‘TDDI_Calc_FINAL’.

Annexe

Adjusted savings: Education expenditure, General government final consumption expenditure, and Government health expenditure per capita; b.) Perception-based scores on Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Safety and the Rule of Law.

1. The first step of the calculation assures an accurate and standardized calculation:

a.) Data series in which lower scores mean higher democratic standards or positive development have been inverted. This applies for the Freedom House scores for *Political Rights*, *Civil Liberties*, and *Freedom of the Press*, and the *Press Freedom Index* by Reporters Without Borders. The calculation is based on the formula:

$$V_{i,t}^{adj} = V_{i,t} * (-1) + V^{max} + 1$$

$V_{i,t}$ = original value of time series i in year t

$V_{i,t}^{adj}$ = adjusted value of time series i in year t

V^{max} = highest possible value of time series i

b.) Data series including negative figures have been moved into the positive range on the scale by adding up the absolute value of the lowest score of the index to the data. This applies for the World Bank indicators on *Political Stability/ No Violence*, *Government Effectiveness*, and *Regulatory Quality*.

2. The second step means the indexation of the sub-indicators in order to standardize them. The development shall be examined from 1995 on, meaning that the score for the antecedent year 1994 of each indicator is assigned the value of 100.00 points. If the score for 1994 is missing in a sub-index, the following year for which data is available will serve as start value. The formula for the indexation is:

$$I_{i,t} = \frac{V_{i,t}}{V_{i,b}} * 100$$

$I_{i,t}$ = indicated value of time series i in year t

$V_{i,b}$ = value of time series i in base year b

If there is data missing for any other year, the score previously available serves as value for it. If an index is not available for 1994, the respective index remains unconsidered until its first appearance and would thus valorise the other indices proportionally.

$$W_{i,t}^{adj} = W_{i,t} + W^{out} / n_{TDDI}$$

$W_{i,t}^{adj}$ = adjusted weighting of index i in year t

$W_{i,t}$ = weighting of index i in year t

W^{out} = weighting of index without score

n_{TDDI} = number of entities which are considered for the calculation of the TDDI in year t

3. As a last step, the indicated value for each year in the time series is multiplied with its respective adjusted weighting and finally accumulated to the TDDI:


$$TDDI_t = \sum_{i=1}^{nTDDI} I_{i,t} * W_{i,t}^{adj}$$

The result of the TDDI-calculation is a score in a time series visualized by a graphic which gives information about the development of human development in Tunisia. It can be put in relation to the measures the Euro-Tunisian partnership took to support democratic values in the country and will thus be a help finding an answer to the research question.

The analysis of the TDDI is conducted in relation to the assignment of the value of 100.00 points to the base year 1994. If the score rises above 100.00 in the following years, that means an improvement of the situation of human and democratic development compared to the base year while a lower score means a worsening. If a score is higher or lower than in the antecedent year, that also means an improvement and vice versa.

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iv. Course of the TDDI



Time Series Tunisia																	
Year	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Value	100	101,509	100,781	101,888	101,072	100,699	102,301	102,043	99,2567	98,761	100,71	99,1515	100,176	96,3541	96,6758	96,5185	97,0752