


# BACHELOR THESIS



BETWEEN RISK AND OPPORTUNITY –  
MEDIA FRAMES ON THE BLUE CARD  
DIRECTIVE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE  
NETHERLANDS & GERMANY FOR THE  
PERIOD OF 2006 TO 2009 AND THEIR  
CONTRIBUTION TO PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR  
THE EUROPEAN UNION.

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## [0.0] Abstract

This Bachelor thesis in European Studies has dealt with the research problem of continuously declining public support for the European Union. In search for the factors behind public support for the European Union, the attention was turned to the influences of the mass media on people's attitudes towards the supranational project. An extensive literature review has revealed that biased media frames indeed matter to the formation of public opinion. Based on this observation, a content analysis examined to what extent newspaper media in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany employed the technique of risk and opportunity framing regarding the coverage on the Blue Card directive for the period between 2006 and 2009. The outcomes of the content analysis suggest that framing in terms of risk and opportunity indeed was made use of. However, framing in terms of risk and opportunity was relatively weak, not always one directional, and against our expectations predominantly neutral in terms of tone. Lastly, this thesis suggest that risk and opportunity framing on the Blue Card was only to an inconsiderable extent able to influence public aggregate support for the European Union over the period under study. The lack of visibility – or put differently the importance attached to the issue – coupled with predominantly weak framing in terms of risk and opportunity, reduced the likelihood of these effects to occur from the outset.

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## [1.0] Introduction

In the classical sense, democracy is the governance by the people (Münkler, 2006). Yet, finding consensus for legislative output among an entire population is in practice hard to realize. The citizens of democracies therefore willingly transfer their power to a fair number of representatives who are then put in charge of the affairs of the country through the electoral process. While participating in elections, voting in referenda as well as deliberation, the people legitimize the decisions of their representatives for as long as those govern their country according to their will (Münkler, 2006).

Even though the European Union is not a federal democratic state per se, it produces political output, which needs to be legitimized by Europe's citizenry. However, public European support – an indicator for the people's willingness to legitimize the EU's political output – is according to Hix (2007) dangerously low. In the light of this observation, the present bachelor thesis in European Studies attempts to examine the factors behind public support for the European Union, since these need to be fully understood if one attempts to introduce means for boosting public support for the supranational project.

In line with this argument, special attention will be paid to the contribution of media framing effects on public support for the European Union because these effects have yet only been examined in the context of grand scale EU events such as for example parliamentary elections or enlargement rounds. However, even the media coverage on ordinary EU legislation such as directives, regulations or recommendations may also carry a great potential to influence the attitudes of European citizens, since media contributions surround Europe's citizens almost constantly. The present thesis therefore seeks to extend the scope to ordinary EU legislation in the field of migration policies, namely to the coverage on the European Union's Blue Card directive of 2009.

Based on the notion that issues of the immigration domain are seemingly salient, politically relevant, contentious and carry the potential to create winners and losers (Davoudi, Wishardt & Strange, 2010; Boeri, 2006), we expect that the Blue Card directive has in fact clearly been framed as a risk versus opportunity situation

by German, Dutch and British newspaper media. We furthermore expect that framed contributions will also be biased in terms of tone. We do not expect, however, that opportunity and risk frames on the Blue Card policy will contribute much to the formation of public aggregate EU support, since it can be doubted that framing on an even contentious single policy output is universal, one directional and concentrated enough in order to account for traceable shifts in overall public support.

Thus, based on the research problem at hand, namely continuously declining public support for the supranational body as well as our interest in the intersection between framing effects on the Blue Card directive and public support for the European Union, this thesis seeks to answer the following central research question:

#### **Central research question**

*To what extent could newspaper framing in terms of risk and opportunity on the Blue Card directive in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom contribute to aggregate public support for the European Union over the period between 2006 and 2009?*

In order to be able to answer this central research question we pose two additional sub research questions, which should on the one hand deliver the necessary information, and on the other hand help to structure this work.

#### **SRQ1:**

*According to the literature, to what extent do framing effects contribute to the formation of public support for the European Union?*

#### **SRQ2:**

*For the period between 2006 and 2009, to what extent did the newspaper media in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany employ the technique of risk and opportunity framing regarding the coverage on the Blue Card directive?*

Sub research question number one will be addressed through a theoretical literature review and contributes to our understanding of the relationship between framing effects and public support for the European Union. Based on the results of a content analysis of German, Dutch, and British newspaper contributions on the Blue Card directive, we will be able to conjure answers to sub research question number two. Both sub research questions should in conjunction deliver enough knowledge to connect the dots and to answers the above given central research question.

This work will be structured as follows: the introductory part of this thesis has touched on the research problem of declining public support for the European as well as the idea that media contents matter to the formation of public support. The following part will go into depths and elaborate why further research in this area will contribute to the current body of knowledge. It shall additionally be shown why a lack of input legitimacy for the European Union might in practice hinder the process of European integration. It will furthermore be proven that most of the research so far has dealt with the link between media coverage on grand-scale EU events and public support but not yet with the question of how day-to-day legislation originating in Brussels is presented to the public. The theoretical part of this work will then focus on the current literature on media effects and public support for the EU, especially focusing on the concept of framing in terms of 'risk' and 'opportunity'. The insights gained from this theoretical part will be used to answer sub research question one. The methodology part of this paper will pave the way for the content analysis of newspaper articles on the Blue Card directive. This analysis shall generate enough information in order to answer sub research question two. A concluding part will follow which ultimately conjures answers to the central research question of this inquiry. A critical review of this work will tie in with the conclusions.

## **[1.1] Background**

In the spring of 2005, a majority of citizens in France and in the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union. The outcome of the two referenda was shocking news for any strong supporter of European integration, since for the first time in history; citizens of two of the founding members of the European Community so obviously withdrew their support for any closer political cooperation at the supranational level (Hix, 2008).

This latest uprising against top-down decision-making is not an original precedent. Already in 1992, Danish voters clearly rejected their support for the Maastricht treaty, which among other things laid the foundation for the introduction of the highly disputed common currency. Only after the Danish government decided to opt out from the introduction of the Euro as well as a handful of other irreconcilable provisions, could the Maastricht treaty be passed in a subsequent referendum (Siune, Svensso & Tonsgaard, 1994).

The overwhelming no-vote on the Maastricht treaty and the Constitution for Europe can also be evaluated in the light of continuously declining public support for the European project (Hix, 2008). By posing the question of: generally speaking, do you think [your country's] membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad, or do not know, Eurobarometer surveys are meant to measure public support for the EU across time. Whereas in the early 1990s over 70 per cent of the citizens supported European integration and trusted their governments to represent their interest in Brussels, today, the absolute level of support is according to Hix "only hovering just above 50 per cent" (Hix, 2008, p. 52). Having regard to this continuous decline of popular support for the European Union and the outcomes of the above-mentioned referenda, it becomes important to note that in order to accomplish an even deeper degree of European Integration, policy-makers will find themselves confronted with thinking about ways to revitalize public support – or in Münkler's words (2006) – increase the input legitimacy for the European Union. It is namely the citizens of Europe who go to the polls and legitimize political candidates and even political outputs on the basis of their electoral decisions (Meyer, 1999). This recognition "adds to the relevance of

determining the factors that influence the dynamics behind public EU support” (Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgaarden & De Vreese, 2008, p. 417).

Nevertheless, doing so seems to be quite complicated given the fact that the determinants of public support for the EU are manifold. According to De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006), public support for the European Union has up until now mainly been explained through making use of the concepts of cognitive mobilization, utilitarian and economic considerations, satisfaction with the incumbent government as well as social-demographic characteristics and political ideological preferences. However, a different, and at the same time unsaturated strand of research suggests that in addition to these broadly accepted theories, the media do also matter to the formation of public opinion, and likewise to public support or opposition for the European Union (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006).

First, in western democracies, the mass media are primarily responsible for the transfer of political communication (Meyer, 1999). Hence, if citizens want to inform themselves about what is happening in the sphere of politics, they will most likely turn on the daily televised news or alternatively start reading the politics section of their favored newspaper (Vliegenthart et al., 2008). Second, the information they derive via the media will also have an effect on what they think about, and more important for this inquiry, how to think about the matter at stake. It is namely the information people derive via the media, which carry an underlying message impacting their basis for political evaluations and attitudes formation (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). Or as Just puts it: “Media representations of the EU provide significant clues as to how citizens make sense of the EU/Europe” (Just, 1999, p. 244).

With view to the underlying research problem at hand, namely record low public EU support, this work not only attempts to describe the influences of media effects on EU support in general, but especially directs its focus to media frames on a single policy instrument of the migration domain and its link to public support for the EU. The policy instrument in question is the European Commission’s directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, or in short: the Blue Card directive. This directive is a legally binding document managing the influx of highly qualified



migrants to the EU. The passing of the directive can be traced back to the problem of Europe's demographic shift and pressing labor shortages in various member states of the Union. As a core measure for increasing the attractiveness of the European Union for highly qualified non-EU citizens, the blue card extends the principle of freedom of movement also to third country nationals, thereby allowing migrants to travel and work across the EU's internal borders after two years of being successfully admitted to the territory of one member state. Furthermore, the directive includes measures to simplify the admissions criteria for highly skilled migrants (Eisele, 2010). This policy measure is especially fit for analyzing media coverage, as it is an important first step of managing migration inflows at the supranational level in order to counteract the problem of ageing and the expected decline in working age population (Eisele, 2010; Davoudi, Wishardt & Strange 2010). It becomes thus valuable to assess whether newspaper editors followed this thinking and framed the Blue Card as an opportunity or rather as a risk for Europe as a whole or the EU's member states.

Probably one of the strongest motivations for doing research on a single policy output such as the Blue Card is the novelty factor. As a matter of fact, most of the research on the relationship between public support and media content has been conducted in the light of grand-scale EU events, as for example parliamentary elections or enlargement rounds (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2003). As of now, however, there is only little knowledge of how 'day-to-day' legislation – in this case EU legislation not requiring treaty change – is portrayed by the media and how this relates to public support (De Vreese & Kandyla, 2009). Yet, it is exactly this kind of legislation, which makes up most of the EU's political output and therefore deserves adequate coverage in order to close the information gap between the EU and its citizens (Sinnott, 1997).

Although the work of the EU stretches across a wide range of policy fields such as for example agriculture, economic and monetary affairs, energy security, trade policy, development and cooperation to mention just a few, the focus of the present thesis will lie on a policy output that can be classified to the immigration domain.

This choice has a couple of underlying reasons as well: firstly, immigration policy is seemingly a salient and politically relevant issue in European politics

especially considering the negative consequences of the demographic change for European welfare systems and labor markets (Davoudi, Wishardt, & Strange 2010). Secondly, the issue of migration is not only contentious for European policy makers, but also for European citizens who often fear that immigrants would constrain national welfare system or directly compete for scarce employment opportunities (Boeri, 2006). Third and lastly, claims have been made that on contentious issues, “where the stakes are high for various groups, media depictions may be crucial in shaping the way the public forms policy preferences” (Branton & Dunaway, 2009).

This thesis will especially place emphasis on the media effect of news framing, though other effects will also be shortly introduced. It is namely framing effects on public opinion, which have attracted most of the scholarly attention related to the influences of political communication on support for the European Union (De Vreese, 2007; De Vreese & Kandyla, 2009; De Vreese, Boomgaarde & Semetko, 2010).

This chapter of the present thesis has elaborated on the research problem of declining public support for European integration and has furthermore put it into the context of media effects. It has been shown that public support is a necessary mean to legitimate policy outcomes and the trend-setting of European institution and personnel. We have stressed that according to the current literature, media contents do in fact matter to the formation of public opinion towards the European Union. We acknowledged, however, that the connection between media effects and support for the European Union has so far only been established in the case of grand scale EU events such as parliamentary elections or enlargement rounds, whereas the literature remains relatively mute on whether these framing effects can also be found with view to the media coverage on single policy issues, such as the Blue Card directive. By the help of the upcoming literature review we attempt to establish the theoretical backbone for this enquiry. We additionally attempt to focus the reader’s attention especially down to framing effects in terms of risk and opportunity.

## [2.0] Theory

In their groundbreaking work “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media”, McCombs & Shaw (1972) investigated the influences of the mass media on voter’s perceptions of issue importance during presidency election campaigns in the United States. What they found was a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media placed on certain issues and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Consequently, when media gatekeepers – that is the people possessing enough clout to decide what to publish and what not – focused their reporting on the issue of price stability for instance, voters consequently mentioned that price stability also had a high importance on their own agenda. This effect has been referred to as agenda setting.

Other scholars have focused their research on priming, a practice that is often understood as an extension of agenda setting (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Priming refers to the media’s behavior of intentionally focusing the overall coverage on one given issue, whereas intentionally reducing the coverage on other topics. By doing so, gatekeepers are able to alter the criteria citizens base their evaluations on. To give an example borrowed from Krosnick and Brannon (1993) on news priming, consider the evaluation of President Bush’s performance during the 1990s. When the media reported at lengths on the Gulf War of 1991, President Bush was primarily evaluated in the light of his war performance. One year later, however, when the media chose to report mainly on issues dealing with the state of the U.S. economy, Bush was no longer evaluated on his war performance, but primarily on his skills of handling the economy.

So, considering the backdrop of Europe’s legitimacy crisis, decreasing turnouts and the alleged knowledge gap between the EU and its citizens, which we discussed in the introduction, do European topics actually penetrate the public discourse – or put differently – are EU issues high on the media’s agenda? On the basis of intense media content analysis it has been found that “EU news is only marginally covered, and that the coverage usually centers on important EU events” (Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, De Vreese & Schuck, 2010, p. 520). What is more, European topics account for only a very small proportion of the reporting in national

media and European officials are almost invisible during periods without big EU events (Machill, Beiler & Fischer 2006; Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgarden & De Vreese, 2008). The Europeanization of national debates, which Gerhards among others (1993) examined, is therefore only partially taking place. As a consequence, citizens, who are reliant on the media as a source of political information, can not effectively scrutinize the actual powers of the EU (Eriksen, 2005; Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgarden & De Vreese, 2008).

According to De Vreese (2007, p. 275), “neither priming nor framing have dealt with support for policies – such as issues of European integration – as the dependent variable”. Thus, the effects of agenda setting and priming can only tell so much about explaining how news coverage is able to shape public support for the EU. What these effects are good for in particular, is explaining in how far the actual amount of information available to citizens will alter their understanding of issue importance. Yet, considering that the “effects of news media are likely to be conditioned by their actual contents”, and not by the amount of information the media provide, we need to focus our attention on a tool by the help of which we can actually study media content (De Vreese & Kandyla, 2009, p. 456).

News framing “takes as a starting point that news media can portray the same topic in very different ways by emphasizing certain aspects of an issue at the expense of others” (De Vreese & Kandyla, 2009, p 458). This definition suggest that whereas agenda setting deals with the overall salience of issues, framing is on the other hand concerned with how an issue is presented by newsmakers. In a positive, negative, or neutral manner, news frames also provide an organizing principle to the structure of a news story (De Vreese, 2002; De Vreese, 2005). In practice, framing devices are specific visual and textual elements. Thus, a media frame may contain metaphors, examples, catch phrases, depictions as well as visual images in order “to present alternative characterizations of a course of action” (De Vreese, 2005, p. 53). Oil drilling for instance can be presented through framing the issue as either economic costs of gas prices, unemployment, environment or the US dependency on foreign energy sources.

A distinction can be drawn between issue-specific frames and generic frames (De Vreese, 2005). Whereas issue-specific frames are sensitive to particular issues or

events, generic frames can be identified over a range of different topics, time horizons and cultural contexts (De Vreese, 2002).

To give an example of issue-specific framing, consider the news coverage on Clinton's final stages of his presidency. Analysts have found that three major frames had been constructed: Clinton behavior scandal, Conservative attack scandal and liberal response scandal (De Vreese, 2005). A generic frame on the other hand usually contains strategic elements, such as for example winning and losing from a given policy.

In addition to the classifications introduced, frames will usually differ in terms of their valence. A biased frame carries positive, neutral and/or negative elements and is therefore indicative for good and bad (De Vreese & Kandyla, 2009). Thus, a biased frame attaches a directional bias to the coverage, thereby implicating that a given issue is a good or bad thing. In practice, quite a number of studies have used news framing as the explanatory variable for public EU support. A framing effect takes place "when in the course of describing an issue or an event, a speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions" (Druckmann, 2001, p 1042).

Curious whether these effects can be found in relation with EU support or public opinion on European matters, De Vreese (2007) set out to examine whether strategically framed news, that is euro-politics being an area for self-serving politicians, have an impact on Euroscepticism. As a result, De Vreese (2007) discovered that on conditional basis strategically framed news indeed fueled public cynicism and skepticism towards the EU. Based on a survey-embedded experimental study, De Vreese, Boomgaarden & Semetko (2010) proofed that public approval for Turkish EU accession was lower if newspaper coverage was negatively framed, but higher if news contained positively biased frames. Furthermore, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2003) have found that the framing of a key European Union summit in the Netherlands, the UK and Germany was mainly disadvantageous towards the European Union and further enlargement. After having conducted an experiment in which respondents had been given either "advantageous" or "disadvantageous" framed news about the EU to watch, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2003) could

proof that participants exposed to “disadvantageous” news showed lower levels of EU support than those exposed to “advantageous” news. Furthermore, participants who had been treated with “disadvantageous” framed news, also considered less positive aspects of enlargement than other respondents.

Yet, even though the above-mentioned studies are a good proof for the existence of framing effects on public opinion and EU support in the first place, one also has to take into account individual’s orientations and attitudes existing prior to the exposure to certain frames such as political knowledge or high personal political involvement, for these can moderate the relationship (Schuck & De Vreese, 2006; De Vreese & Kandyla, 2009).

The enquiries fitting most accurately the purposes of this bachelor thesis have been conducted by De Vreese and Schuck (2006) as well as De Vreese and Kandyla (2009). Again, both studies dealt with framing effects on public support for the European Union or alternatively its policy outputs. De Vreese & Schuck (2006) have analyzed whether biased news frames had an impact on citizen’s support for EU enlargement. Central to their inquiry was the thought that frames are “insufficiently summarized by a general, clear-cut distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’”. In order to overcome this problem, the researchers analyzed media coverage in terms of the presence and effect of two more distinct frames: opportunity and risk. They defined risk as “the expectation of a future disadvantageous situation and the perception that an action or process may involve an unpleasant future outcome” whereas opportunity “involves the perception that an action or process may involve a pleasant future outcome and is connected to an expectation of likely future advantages” (De Vreese & Schuck, 2006, p.11). Based on previous research they thus hypothesized that: news items on EU enlargement containing opportunity frames would have positive effects on public support for EU enlargement, whereas items containing risk frames would negatively effect public EU support. The author’s media content analysis showed that EU news coverage on enlargement indeed contained opportunity as well as risk frames. In addition to that, De Vreese and Schuck (2006) showed that frames in the opportunity condition induced more positive thoughts about enlargement than news coverage carrying risk frames. Political knowledge, however, was found to be moderating the relationship.

In a subsequent study De Vreese and Kandyla (2009) not only confirmed that in general news framed in terms of risk and opportunity directly effect public support for the EU but that in addition, the support for actual policy outputs (Common Foreign & Security Policy) of the Union is also moderated by biased frames. Interestingly, this relationship was affected by the variable fear of globalization (De Vreese & Kandyla, 2009).

As one of the most contentious EU policy topics, immigration policy can easily be conceptualized as a risk versus opportunity situation. On the one hand, citizens might perceive the EU's Blue Card policy as a risk because it increases the competition for jobs on national labor markets. On the other hand, however, citizens may recognize the negative implications of the demographic change and perceive the Blue Card as a tool for combating labor shortages, and thus as an opportunity to revitalize Europe's economies.

This theoretical part has narrowed down the spectrum of media effects to framing in terms of risk and opportunity, since these seem to fit most accurately the purposes of this work. Furthermore, through reviewing the literature in the field of media effects on public support for the EU, it could preliminarily be affirmed that the media indeed matter to public opinion formation and that it is therefore worthwhile to study actual media contents on even small scale policies. We also stressed that in general, European topics are only marginally covered, and that media attention peaks during grand scale EU events. When assessing the contribution of media frames to public opinion formation on European Union matters, it is of importance to take into account individual attitudes existing prior to the exposure to certain frames, for these can moderate the relationship. Framing in terms of risk and opportunity – this answers sub research question number one – was found to indeed affect individual's attitude formation. The following part will construct a methodological framework in order to put the key variables "opportunity" and "risk frames" into operation.

### [3.0] Methodology

According to Babbie (2007, p. 320), “content analysis is particularly well suited to the study of communications and to answering the classic question of communications research: who says what, to whom, why, how and with what effect?” Clearly, the research questions of the present work are in line with the classic question because they aim to analyze how, and with what effect the mass media have presented the issue of the Blue Card to the European public. In order to answer the relevant research questions, the following empirical work thus rests upon the content analysis method.

By the help of this method, it shall be seen whether or not media editors have employed two certain frame types: opportunity or risk frames.

The sample of the content analysis will contain Dutch, German and British contributions exclusively. This decision is firstly based on the availability of language skills of the author and secondly on limitations concerning time and resources. What is more, Germany and the United Kingdom have been chosen because of their central role as political drivers in the EU (Schuck & De Vreese, 2006). It has to be admitted though, that including a greater number of countries into the examination would increase the external validity of the study. Nevertheless, given the fact that immigration debates seem to come alive in the chosen countries (‘Fachkräftemangel’ debate in Germany, record-high turnouts for the PVV party in the Netherlands arguing against migration influxes, and asylum budget cuts in the UK), this research has a very actual character.

As a consequence of the fact that the proposal of the Blue Card was already tabled in 2007 and televised documentation was not readily accessible at the point of writing, it is not possible to focus on the whole range of media outputs simultaneously. For that reason, this thesis will focus on newspaper contributions only, though television news seem to be the most commonly used source of information on issues of European integration for Europe’s citizens (Commission, 2003). The content analysis will be conducted for news articles published between a year prior to the Commission’s proposal in October 2007, and May 2009 when the council had finally adopted the directive. The data collection will be conducted via



the electronic search engine LexisNexis employing the following filtering scheme for British news items: “Blue Card” AND “European Union” OR “Blue Card” AND Commission. The search string will be translated into German and Dutch in order to account for language differences<sup>1</sup>.

The newspaper sample contains all newspapers available in the LexisNexis Database for each respective country. In the case of the United Kingdom the newspaper sample thus includes; ‘The Express’, ‘The Herald (Glasgow)’, ‘The Observer’, ‘Sunday Herald’, ‘The Independent’, ‘The Mirror’, ‘Financial Times’, ‘The Sun’, ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Sunday Express’. The German newspaper we will consider are; ‘Berliner Morgenpost’, ‘Stuttgarter Zeitung’, ‘Tagesanzeiger’, ‘Berliner Zeitung’, ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’, ‘Die Welt’, ‘Börsen Zeitung’, ‘Generalanzeiger’, ‘Hamburger Abendblatt’ and ‘Taz, die Tageszeitung’. Dutch newspapers under study are ‘AD/Algemeen Dagblad’, ‘De Volkskrant’, ‘NRC Handelsblad’, ‘Het Parool’ and ‘Trouw’.

The operationalization for the key variables ‘opportunity-’ and ‘risk frames’ will be given below.

### **[3.1] Operationalization**

The measurement of the variable news frames “stands within the tradition of deductive approaches, predefining certain indicators for the presence or absence of frames” (Schuck & De Vreese, 2006, p. 13). In line with the research of Schuck and De Vreese (2006), we thus define two sets of questions intended to cover the conceptual dimensions of risk and opportunity frames. These sets of indicators will then be used to scan for the existence of the two above mentioned frame types. One set refers to positive implications of the policy (opportunity condition), whereas the other set to negative aspects of the Blue Card (risk condition). The frame indicators are formulated as follows: (1) does the article contain positive/negative emotional expressions that welcome/oppose the passing of the directive? (2) Does the story deliver arguments or facts that support/oppose the policy measures of the Blue Card directive [rational arguments]? (3) Does the story outline any general

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<sup>1</sup> German translation: “Blue Card” AND “Europäische Union” OR “Blue Card” AND “Europäische Kommission”, Dutch translation: “Blue Card” AND “Europese Unie” OR “Blue Card” AND “Europese Commissie”

advantage/disadvantage or specific future benefit/cost of the policy for the EU or its citizens? (4) Is there a quote of any kind from an actor that is positive/negative in tone towards the measures of the Blue Card directive? (5) Does the story see promising/problematic developments for third countries as well as promising developments for Europe's labor markets?

This approach of operationalizing the two key variables stands within the tradition of latent coding, a method by the help of which one can tap the underlying meaning of communications. In the case of latent coding, the coder will subjectively decide what wordings or phrases shall be considered for tapping the key concepts/variables. This approach scores high in terms of validity, but comes at a cost to reliability and specificity (Babbie, 2007). The two sets of questions can be answered in a binary way, whereas the answer 'yes' is coded as '1', and 'no' as '0'. The codes are then added up for each article and divided by the total number of frame items in order to construct two different index scales for both conditions. These scales therefore range from zero to one. The higher the frame score, the stronger the presence of a certain frame type.

To give an example, assume that an article is checked for the presence of both frames. In the opportunity condition we can identify three frame items to be present. The sum of the codes 'yes=1', 'yes=1', 'yes=1' is therefore three. Divided by the total number of frame indicators, which is 5, we will obtain an index score of 0.6. If the same news article simultaneously contains one frame indicator of the risk condition, we would hence have to contrast a score of 0.6 for the opportunity condition with a score of 0.2 for the risk condition. In this example the opportunity score outweighs the risk score and therefore the article will be marked as containing predominantly opportunity frames. In general, a high score on the opportunity scale indicates that the news coverage emphasizes future benefits or gains through the Blue Card policy, whereas a high risk score accentuates the exact opposite, namely future disadvantages, costs or losses. In the case of equal index scores, we will have to conclude that both frames are equally present. However, since this condition will leave a somewhat ambivalent picture, we will at that point refer to a subjective evaluation concerning the overall tone of the newspaper towards the Blue Card, ranging from (1) very positive to (5) very negative. This evaluation is based on the

coder's personal assessment and is among others influenced through the occurrence of qualitative statements, the amount of positive or negative citations and the persuasiveness of arguments in favor or against the blue card.

This methodological part of the thesis has argued in favor for the application of a content analysis by the help of which we can examine the newspaper sample for whether opportunity and risk frames have been utilized. The chapter below will present the results of the content analysis, which will be then be interpreted and discussed in the concluding part.

## [4.0] Analysis

The content analysis was conducted for the period between October 01, 2006 and May 31, 2009. The documentation of the content analysis has been approached by means of a tally sheet and can be found in the appendix. This tally sheet comprises of the following elements: article ID, article name, date of release, newspaper name, opportunity score, risk score, dominant frame and an overall evaluation of the newspaper tone.

The initial search via LexisNexis produced an overall sample of (N=66) articles of which (N=15) were either doubles or with regards to contents irrelevant to the purposes of this undertaking and therefore crossed out.

*Table 1 – Contributions on the Blue Card by country*

Relevant coverage by country	Count	Ratio (number of contributions per country divided by number of newspapers in country)
Germany	N=30	3.0
United Kingdom	N=12	1.8
Netherlands	N=9	1.2
Total	N=51	2.0

The majority of the total number of contributions (N=51) appeared in the German press (N=30). The selected British newspapers released (N=12) contributions on the Blue Card, whereas the Dutch press published (N=9) articles on the directive.

*Table 2 – Total distribution of frame conditions across sample*

Case	Count
Dominant frame type: opportunity	N=33
Dominant frame type: risk	N=6
Frame scores equal	N=8
No frame indicators/frame score 0	N=4

The analysis has revealed that in (N=33) of the total (N=51) articles, the opportunity score outweighed the risk score. In comparison, only in (N=6) cases did the risk score outweigh the opportunity score (11%). Whereas (N=8) articles had equal scores, (N=4) articles did not contain any frame indicators. Moreover, in (N=18) articles, frame indicators for both conditions could be found.

*Table 3 – Distribution of opportunity and risk frames by country*

	Germany	United Kingdom	Netherlands
Opportunity frame	N=8	N=17	N=8
Risk frame	N=2	N=4	N=0
Total	N=10	N=21	N=8

Broken down into the contributions by country, the analysis has furthermore shown that the German press published the lion share of articles containing opportunity frames (N=17), whereas the Dutch and British press to (N=8) at a time. While Dutch editors did not make use of risk frames concerning the coverage on the Blue Card, a number of (N=2) of the British contributions contained risk frames compared to (N=4) articles published by German newspapers. Having regard to these counts it can be claimed that on face value, opportunity frames were the most dominant frame type to be found.

*Table 4 – Newspaper tone*

Tone	Very positive	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Very negative
Count	N=3	N=15	N=28	N=5	N=0

When it comes to the evaluation of newspaper tone, a majority of the articles under observation were coded as neutral in terms of tone (N=28). The coder furthermore found that (N=3) articles had a very positive directional bias, while (N=15) were coded to be positively biased. In comparison, (N=5) articles were negatively biased. Those articles, which contained either no frame indicators or for which the opportunity and risk scores cancelled each other out were as well coded neutral in terms of tone (N=9).

*Table 5 – Distribution of frame scores*

Frame scores	Count
$\leq 0.4$	N=34
$>0.4 \leq 0.6$	N=12
$\geq 0.8$	N=5

Strikingly, only (N=17) of the total (N=51) articles yielded opportunity or risk scores greater than 0.4, indicating that the frames were not employed to the greatest extent possible. The analysis furthermore revealed that that articles with opportunity or risk scores greater or equal than 0.6 had a somewhat stronger directional bias in terms of tone: all of the (N=13) articles with opportunity scores greater or equal than 0.6 were coded either positive or even very positive in tone. In comparison, only two of the articles containing risk frames had a risk score greater than 0.6 and a clear negative directional bias in terms of tone.

Frame indicators number two and four, which are rational arguments in favor or against the Blue Card as well as quotes of third parties on the topic, were detected most frequently. The visibility of the other three indicator types was comparatively lower. To give an example for a type two frame indicator consider the following extract taken from a German newspaper: “Entrepreneurs in Germany moan that in 2006, the German economy was short of 165.000 engineers, technicians as well as IT-specialists. Trade associations therefore welcome the plans of Brussels” [own translations] (Taz, die Tageszeitung, Article ID: 035). From this perspective, the Blue Card policy is an opportunity for German Entrepreneurs who are in need of specialists. News editors did also quite frequently make use of

quotations which are supposed to highlight the opinion of third parties, such as for example Germany's former interior Minister Mr. Schäuble: "Germany needs more education instead of immigration. For as long as we have three million unemployed people in Germany we have to tell our economy that if it seeks specialists, it must first of all search among those three million" [own translation] (Hamburger Abendblatt, Article ID: 27)

When emotional expressions (indicator type one) were used in order to attach directional bias to the coverage, these were generally straight forward and clearly depicting a risk versus opportunity situation: "Europe faces an invasion of 20 million immigrants from Asia and Africa if plans by Brussels Eurocrats to relax border control across the Continent get the go-ahead" (The Express, Article ID: 011). Only in few cases did the newspaper editors directly refer to a future benefit or costs of the policy and thus matched the requirements of indicator number three: "the EU wants to be more competitive in a battle with other Western states for technology workers and hospital staff from the developing world, resources that are increasingly needed to fill labor gaps" (The International Herald Tribune, Article ID: 002). In some cases, reference had been made with view to promising or diplomatic developments for third countries or Europe's labor markets (indicator number five): "the European population becomes senile in the meantime. According to the EU, one third of the EU's population will be older than 65 by 2050. At that time, 20 million jobs will be vacant" [own translation] (NRC Handelsblad, Article ID: 013).

In a nutshell, we found that opportunity and risk frames had indeed been employed by the media in the countries studied. It is striking though that the coverage was predominantly toned in a neutral fashion. Indicators for the opportunity frame condition could be found more frequently than indicators for the risk frame condition. Nevertheless, only to a minor extent were those indicators sufficiently traceable in order to support the claim that clear and one-directional risk/opportunity framing had been employed. If this situation did occur, however, a concurrent directional bias in terms of tone could be detected. The results of this content analysis will be interpreted in the following concluding part.

## [5.0] Conclusions

This concluding part shall wrap up the findings of this bachelor thesis and bring them down to a format, which enables us to answer the research questions of this work. Let us begin with answering sub research question number one: according to the literature, to what extent do framing effects contribute to the formation of public support for the European Union?

According to the literature studied, framing effects indeed have an influence on public support for the European Union. Several studies have proven that framing, even in the distinct form of risk and opportunity, could be directly correlated to changes regarding people's perception of the European Union. However, these effects are moderated by each individual's attitudes existing prior to the exposure to certain frames as well as by other variables such as for instance political knowledge or the fear of globalization. Additionally, for framing effects to be able to affect people's support for the European Union, the visibility of the coverage must be correspondingly high, for otherwise media frames remain unrecognized and thus effectless.

Let us now turn to answering sub research question number two: to what extent did the newspaper media in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany employ the technique of risk and opportunity framing regarding the coverage on the Blue Card directive?

Based on our operationalization of the key variables and our findings of the content analysis, we may conclude that the media in the countries under study have indeed employed the technique of risk and opportunity framing. This observation is supported by the overall counts of risk as well as opportunity frames embedded within the contributions (N=33 Opportunity, N=6 Risk). However, due to the fact that the scores of the dominant frame types were in (N=20) of the (N=39) cases smaller or equal than 0.4, our initial statement loses persuasive power. We have thus to conclude that only those articles for which we could detect higher or equal scores than 0.6 contain strong and valid indicators supporting the presence of opportunity and/or risk frames. This is also backed by the relative absence of clear single-edged framing: (N=18) articles were found to contain frame indicators for both directions.

This observation – coupled with the considerable spread of neutral toned articles – supports the coder's overall impression that although framing in terms of risk and opportunity occurred to a moderate extent, media editors intended to tell the story from both angles in a predominantly neutral fashion. This is against our initial expectations that framing in terms of risk and opportunity would be predominantly accompanied with a clear directional bias in terms of tone. Nevertheless, whenever articles contained three or more frame indicators, which is congruent to a frame score higher or equal to 0.6, these articles also had a directional bias in terms of tone. This can be seen – despite our above given interpretations – as a clear intention of attaching directional bias to the coverage.

In a nutshell, we can conclude that despite our initial expectations, the newspaper coverage on the Blue Card policy was predominantly neutral in terms of tone. However, frame indicators could be found in a majority of the articles analyzed, but only to a minor extent were those indicators sufficiently traceable in order to support the claim that framing clearly occurred in terms of risk and opportunity. If this situation did occur, however, a strong concurrent directional bias in terms of tone could be detected, arguing for the utilization of a risk versus opportunity situation by Dutch, British or German newspaper editors. Opportunity frames were employed more often than risk frames. The relatively weak bias in terms of tone might be due to fact that although the Blue Card directive would to some extent harmonize the admission of highly-skilled personnel to and across the EU, the admissions criteria set by the individual member states would in practice still remain in place next to those of the European Union. Moreover, the United Kingdom is due to an opt-out clause exempted from EU legislation in the field of migration policy. Both factors in conjunction may have caused a decrease in attention towards the Blue Card directive, especially in the UK but also in the Netherlands and Germany respectively.

Let us now turn to answering the overall research question of this inquiry: to what extent were opportunity and risk frames on the Blue Card directive in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom able to contribute to the formation of public aggregate support for the European Union for the period between 2006 and 2009? A starting point can be made by acknowledging that public



support for the European Union is a complex construct, which is likely to be influenced by an interplay of numerous independent variables such as for example utilitarian and economic considerations (Gabel & Palmer, 1995), social-demographic characteristics and political preferences (Gabel, 1998) or cognitive mobilization, referring to the level of political involvement and knowledge of individuals (Inglehard, 1970). Data on aggregate EU support, by which we mean the percentage of citizens of a country supporting European integration, are for instance mainly gathered based on Eurobarometer surveys, asking for people's opinion on questions of European integration. These surveys can highlight changes in public support for the European Union over time, but they offer only little insight when it comes down to assessing in how far single variables influence the process of public opinion formation. It is due to the sheer amount of variables explaining public support for the European Union that the attempt of tracing back drifts in public aggregate support to the influences of opportunity and risk frames alone, becomes in practice hard to realize. It is for this reason that answering our central research question in a straightforward way becomes a hard task to accomplish.

The key to nonetheless finding an answer to our research question is to argue in terms of the overall likelihood that risk and opportunity frames on the Blue Card can in fact contribute to shifting aggregate EU support.

To begin with, in order for media effects to possibly have an effect on people's political attitudes, citizens must first of all have the opportunity to get grip on news items on the policy in question. This requires the media's interest on the matter at stake to be considerably high, which manifests itself through the relative amount of coverage published on the issue. Gazing specifically at the coverage on the Blue Card directive it can thus be concluded that this interest has in practice been strikingly low. This claim is supported by the results of the content analyses of this inquiry, showing that for a period of nearly three years, only N=51 articles on the policy had been released.

In comparison, a similar content analysis by Schuck & De Vreese (2006) for the German newspaper media has produced a far greater sample of (N=285) articles on EU enlargement. This suggests that the visibility of stories on the Blue Card

directive was comparatively low, reducing the likelihood of exposure to risk or opportunity frames from the outset.

Moreover, the likelihood of opportunity and risk frames on the Blue Card to affect people's attitudes towards the EU is once more reduced through the relatively weak development of clear directional framing as well as the weak occurrence of frame indicators (only N=13 articles show scores greater than 0.4).

Last but no less important, it must be acknowledged that shifts in aggregate EU support, which could be possibly due to the influences of opportunity and risk frames on the Blue Card policy, might be cancelled out through opportunity and risk framing on other legislative acts of the European Union. In 2009, the institutions of the European Union have adopted a total of 1773 secondary legislative acts, including directives, regulations, decision and others. This figure stems from the EUR-Lex service, which is a service providing legal texts of the European Union. Public aggregate EU support, if at all, might also be influenced by news framing on these items as well, reducing the likelihood that changes in aggregate support over the period under study can be traced back to opportunity and risk framing on the Blue Card. Next to that, we have to stress that the topics addressed by policy issues are different to be begin with. They are therefore likely to affect people's opinions in different ways: the coverage on hot topic issues such as immigration or taxation might influence the attitudes of citizens in a different way than the coverage on the Union's fisheries policy does, since citizens might hold stronger opinions on immigration than on fisheries policies. We hence have to acknowledge that generalizations based on the results of this inquiry could be misleading.

Narrowing down the above said to a format answering the overall research question of this inquiry, it can be claimed that opportunity or risk frames on the Blue Card directive were only to an inconsiderable extent able to influence public aggregate support for the European Union over the period under study. The lack of visibility – or put differently the importance attached to the issue – coupled with predominantly weak framing in terms of risk and opportunity reduced the likelihood of these effects to occur from the outset.

The present research design has its methodological flaws. Firstly, although the author did all the coding by himself, no guarantee can be given that the

definitions and standards employed were kept constant throughout the enterprise, since experimenter bias always poses an uncontrollable threat to the internal and external validity of a study (Babbie, 2007). Secondly, the possibility to inadequately describe the constructs under examination, that is opportunity and risk frames in our case, poses a threat to construct validity (Shadish, Cook & Campell, 2002). Even though a multitude of indicators have been installed to measure the presence or absence of these frames, it remains questionable whether this collection suffices for measuring what we actually intended to measure. The overall strength of latent coding – the technique that has been employed for the current design – is the ability to tap the underlying meaning of communications (Babbie, 2007). However, this advantage comes at the cost of specificity and reliability, since readers as well as coders might have different interpretations of how to employ the standards that had been agreed upon: “A passage that one coder regards as erotic may not seem erotic to another” (Babbie, 2007, p. 325). Repeating the analysis with different coders but keeping the coding scheme constant might therefore produce different outcomes from time to time, which poses a threat to reliability.

This threat to reliability and specificity is amplified in the case of the current design, since manifest coding, that is the tracing of constant and visible surface content, has not been made use of. A combination of manifest and latent coding is therefore recommendable for a follow up content analysis. Importantly, even though the current sample includes a variety of newspapers (tabloids and broadsheets), the ability to draw generalizable conclusions about the coverage on the Blue Card in national or European media remains weak. The options available on LexisNexis were restricted and the sample thus misses out on some popular newspapers, which may have an important stake in the public discourse. The attempt to link overall support for the European Union to the effects of opportunity and risk framing should furthermore be viewed with caution. The dependent variable of overall aggregate support for the EU is affected by a multitude of variables, which makes it hard to trace back up-and downturns of public support to the influences of opportunity and risk framing. The biggest flaw of the current design is the fact that it could at that point only deliver speculations with view to assessing

the actual contribution of opportunity and risk framing on day-to-day legislation and public overall EU support.

Regardless of the above-mentioned shortcomings, this Bachelor thesis could give important as well as interesting first insights into media framing on a single EU policy as well as the contributions of those frames on individual's levels of public support for the European Union. As already pointed out in the introduction, research related to the influences of media effects on public support for the European Union has up until now only sparsely been conducted. Yet, during times of dangerously low public support for the European Union it becomes crucial to understand the whole spectrum of determinants for public EU support, including the role of the mass media. In today's societies, the mass media firstly take on the role as the major supplier of political information, and secondly surround European citizens almost constantly. They thus have the potential to continuously influence public opinion either in an EU favorable or EU critical way.

Taken together, these factors make media contributions an important variable to consider if one is interested in explaining the determinants for overall support for a political system. The literature on public support for the EU naturally focuses on grand-scale EU events, such as enlargement rounds, or treaty revisions, since media attention is high on these issues. Yet, it remains relatively mute on the question of whether media contributions on single policy issues are likely to influence public support for the European Union just as much as biased contributions on grand scale EU events. The present bachelor thesis exactly seized this notion and examined whether directional framed media reporting on a single policy instrument of the immigration domain (Blue Card) in fact holds the potential to influence public support for European integration. Based on the insights gained from this thesis, a follow up study could go even further and attempt to examine whether causal relationships between risk and opportunity framing on daily EU legislation and attitude formation actually exist. If they do exist, the lesson learned for the European Union could be to use the media in its own interest. As a mean to deliver positively framed news and for thus boosting public support, the EU could for example make use of daily news broadcasts on public channels, or through publishing a European integration related newspaper. But should any democratic

political system knowingly influence the attitudes of its citizenry by the help of the mass media? Could this perhaps initiate the extinction of the reflective citizen?

## [6.0] References

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## [7.0] Appendix

ID	Article Title	Date of release	Newspaper name	Opportunity score	Risk score	Dominant frame: opportunity VS risk score	Overall evaluation of tone towards Blue Card directive  1=very positive 2=positive 3=neutral 4=negative 5=very negative
001	Secret plot to let 50 million African workers into EU	11/10/2008	The Express	0.4	0.4	none	4
002	EU moves to attract highly skilled migrants	26/09/2008	The International Herald Tribune	0.6	0.4	Opportunity frame	3
003	EU pact set to encourage skilled migration and discourage illegals	25/09/2008	Financial Times London	0.6	0.2	Opportunity frame	2
004	Not so fast, Sarko	07/07/2008	Financial Times London (Asia edition)	none	none	none	3
005	France unveils pact on EU-wide immigration: Sarkozy waters down scheme to appease Spain: Push for approval by all 27 states at October summit	08/07/2008	The Guardian	0.4	none	Opportunity frame	3
006	IRAN WARNS THAT IT WILL USE MISSILE STRIKES IF IT IS ATTACKED BY ISRAEL	29/06/2008	The Sunday Independent	none	0.2	Risk frame	3
007	Brussels plans to woo skilled migrants	24/10/2007	Financial Times London	0.8	None	Opportunity frame	1
008	EU offers blue card for skilled immigrants	24/10/2007	The Guardian	0.4	None	Opportunity frame	2
009	EU 'blue card' to lure skilled labour	24/10/2007	The Independent	0.6	None	Opportunity frame	2
010	EU seeks migrants (if skilled)	24/10/2007	The International Herald Tribune	0.6	0.2	Opportunity Frame	3

011	Green light for 20m migrants	14/09/2007	The Express	0.4	0.6	Risk frame	3
012	Europe told to open borders for 20m Asian and African workers	13/09/2007	Financial Times London	0.2	None	Opportunity Frame	3
013	Migratie naar Europa valt niet tegen te houden	09/05/2009	NRC Handelsblad	0.4	None	Opportunity frame	3
014	Europa is nog niet toe aan 'green card' zoals in de VS	26/09/2008	NRC Handelsblad	0.4	0.4	None	3
015	No Title	26/10/2007	De Volkskrant	0.6	0.2	Opportunity frame	2
016	'Blue card' voor slimme immigrant	25/10/2007	Het Parool	0.2	None	Opportunity frame	3
017	Werkgevers en vakbond enthousiast maar kritisch over plan 'blauwe kaart'; Kennismigranten	25/10/2007	Trouw	0.6	0.4	Opportunity frame	2
018	'Europa dreigt de regeling te ingewikkeld te maken'	25/10/2007	Trouw	0.6	None	Opportunity frame	2
019	Blue card EU mist verblijfsgarantie; Houders van woon- en werkvergunning krijgen na twee jaar geen automatisch verblijfsrecht in andere landen	24/10/2007	De Volkskrant	0.2	None	Opportunity frame	3
020	Kennismigrant welkom, mits; Europese Unie voert 'blauwe kaart' mogelijk volgend jaar al in	24/10/2007	Trouw	0.4	None	Opportunity frame	3
021	No Title	18/10/2007	NRC Handelsblad	0.4	None	Opportunity frame	3
022	SPD will neue Einwanderungspolitik; Bundestagsfraktion fordert die Einführung eines Punktesystems und eine schnellere Freizügigkeit für neue EU-Bürger	25/03/2009	Taz, die Tageszeitung	None	None	None	3
023	Brüssel behält Scanner trotz Widerstands auf der Agenda; EU-Kommissar: Mehr Sicherheit für Flugverkehr	21/11/2008	Die Welt	0.2	None	None	2
024	ZUWANDERUNG; Nur die Wirtschaft zählt	15/10/2008	Berliner Zeitung	0.2	None	Opportunity frame	3
025	EU-Job-Berater schwärmen aus; Zentrum in Mali klärt auch über Risiken illegaler Einwanderung auf	04/10/2008	Frankfurter Rundschau	None	None	None	3

026	EU lässt Iraker weiter warten ; Innenminister schieben Entscheidung über Zehntausende Flüchtlinge erneut auf	26/09/2008	Frankfurter Rundschau	None	None	None	3
027	Weiter Streit um Blue Card; Zuwanderung: EU will Hochqualifizierte aus Drittstaaten anwerben	26/09/2008	Hamburger Abendblatt	0.2	0.2	None	3
028	Die europäische Blue Card als Pendant zur US-Greencard; EU-Kommission will den Zuzug von Fachkräften und Akademikern erleichtern - Uneinigkeit bei Übergangsregeln für neue EU-Staaten	10/09/2008	Stuttgarter Zeitung	0.6	None	Opportunity frame	2
029	Irlands No behindert EU-Migrationspolitik; Der Lissabon-Vertrag hätte die Entscheidungsprozedur über Einwanderung in die Union demokratischer gemacht	19/06/2008	Taz, die Tageszeitung	None	None	None	3
030	Fachleute meiden Deutschland ; Bürokratische Hürden für Qualifizierte zu hoch	23/01/2008	Frankfurter Rundschau	0.4	None	Opportunity frame	2
031	Blue Card: Süder warnt vor Migration durch die Hintertür	13/01/2008	Welt am Sonntag	None	0.4	Risk frame	4
032	Green Card der EU: Deutschland fordert strengere Maßstäbe	07/12/2008	Berliner Morgenpost	None	0.4	Risk frame	3
033	Die blaue Karte sorgt für rote Köpfe	30/10/2007	Tages Anzeiger	0.2	0.8	Risk frame	4
034	Bessere Ausbildung Einheimischer soll die "Blue Card" der EU verhindern; Immer mehr Firmen finden keine Facharbeiter im Inland. Die Staatsregierung lehnt aber eine Anwerbung von Zuwanderern strikt ab	28/10/2007	Welt am Sonntag	0.4	0.4	None	3
035	Union zeigt der Blue Card die rote Karte; Bildungsministerin kritisiert EU-Pläne zur Zuwanderung Hochqualifizierter: Die Bildung von Deutschen habe Vorrang	25/10/2007	Taz, die Tageszeitung	0.6	0.4	Opportunity frame	3

036	Blue Card soll Fachkräfte nach Europa locken; EU-Kommission legt Gesetzentwurf vor	24/10/2007	Berliner Zeitung	0.4	0.2	Opportunity frame	3
037	Die blaue Karte als Ticket nach Europa	24/10/2007	Tages Anzeiger	0.8	0.4	Opportunity frame	2
038	EU-Card nur für Topleute; EU-Kommission plant "Blue Card", um die Einreise f,r Fachkräfte aus Nicht-EU-Staaten zu erleichtern	24/10/2007	Taz, die Tageszeitung	0.8	None	Opportunity frame	2
039	Zweitbeste Lösung	24/10/2007	Die Welt	0.8	0.2	Opportunity frame	1
040	Deutsche Wirtschaft hofft auf "Blue Card"; Hoch qualifizierte Einwanderer sollen Lücke auf dem Arbeitsmarkt schließen - Gesetzentwurf vorgelegt	24/10/2007	Die Welt	1	None	Opportunity frame	2
041	Blue Card f,r EU-Fachkräfte: Kommission stellt Gesetz vor	23/10/2007	Berliner Morgenpost	0.4	None	Opportunity frame	3
042	EU-Kommission legt Pläne für die neue Blue Card vor; Was Hochqualifizierte mitbringen müssen	23/10/2007	Die Welt	0.6	0.2	Opportunity frame	3
043	Hochqualifizierte: EU riskiert neuen Streit mit Berlin	22/10/2007	Die Welt	0.4	None	Opportunity frame	3
044	Bi-kulturell und selbstbewusst; Die Lebenswelten von Migranten sind vielfältig. Deren Integrationswille hängt von der Bildung ab	17/10/2007	Berliner Zeitung	0.4	None	Opportunity frame	3
045	No Title	15/11/2007	Berliner Zeitung	None	0.4	Risk frame	4
047	Pressestimmen	15/09/2007	Stuttgarter Zeitung	0.6	None	None	1
048	Brüssel will Zuzug von Arbeitskräften fördern	14/09/2007	Berliner Zeitung	0.2	None	Opportunity frame	3

049	Die Festung Europa muss sich öffnen	14/09/2007	Berliner Zeitung	0.6	None	Opportunity frame	2
050	EU wirbt um Millionen Einwanderer nach Europa; Wer qualifiziert ist, soll kommen. SPD, FDP und Grüne begrüßen Vorstoß, Union sagt Nein.; Blue Cards: Fachkräfte aus Afrika und Asien gesucht	14/09/2007	Hamburger Abendblatt	0.4	0.2	Opportunity frame	2
051	SPD und Industrie unterstützen "Blue Card"-Pläne der EU	14/09/2007	Hamburger Abendblatt	0.8	0.2	Opportunity frame	2