

Bachelor thesis
to obtain academic degree
Bachelor in Public Administration (BA)
Bachelor in European Studies (BSc)
June 2011

**“First Steps of a Young Democracy or a Façade Democracy?
Transition Process in Bulgaria (1989-2007)”**

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Introduction

1.1 Title and research question

The following paper aims to present basic features of a bachelor thesis. Its main purpose would be to track the transition process in Bulgaria from its beginning 1989 until its accession to the European Union 2007.

The provisional phrasing of the topic title is in form of a question and sounds: **“First steps of a young democracy or façade democracy?”**

The idea of my thesis is to analyze the first years of the Bulgarian transition from totalitarian to democratic government and from planned to market economy as well. Beginning with the new elections after 1990 and the ratification of the constitution in 1991 it goes hand in hand with transition to political pluralism and the birth of new parties. The problem of the thesis can be initially described, using the famous quote of Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov Lenin (1921) – the definition of political science “Who? Whom?”. On this basis the research question of the paper is formulated as:

“How did the first years of the transition process in Bulgaria go?”

To be able to answer it we should form a list of sub questions:

“Who sets what aims?”

“Who profits from these aims?”

“How is that all journalism legitimized and how does media present it to the citizens?”

In other words the problem of the thesis is related to the question of political interest. It is an important aspect in analyzing the political process, together with organizations and institutions. Therefore, in order to trace back the beginning steps of the transition in Bulgaria, I would like to examine the change of the actors, their aims, their interests, the reasons that they follow and the outcomes that they achieve.

In this respect, here is the place to mention the hypotheses that are to be tested in this paper. My main hypothesis is that the transition process in Bulgaria did not stop with the accession to the EU. This main assumption includes in itself a lot of other suggestions. For instance, I would like to examine if:

Although the process is uncompleted there is a progress that cannot be renounced.

The young democracy is not a façade democracy.

The society is more satisfied with democracy than with the totalitarian regime.

Today there is still a lot of weakness for the Bulgarian democracy to confront with. If we look on the society we find lack of trust and reluctance to participate and to be interested in all form of politics. This is why, the problems of the young democracy in Bulgaria deserve to be analyzed twenty two years after their birth.

1.2 Literature and sources summary

As next step, I would like to present a part of the relevant literature. For my research I find as useful not only Bulgarian sources, but also international works about the country, compared to other former Soviet states. In this respect I would like to mark some common features presented for the majority of the cases. Wolfgang Merckel's work (2000) on this field could be considered as helpful for this purpose.

The biggest help in evaluating the current situation through the years provides the European Commission and its reports on the progress in Bulgaria.

Relevant papers we can find in internet sites like the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

As a first step of a possible course of investigations I would like to form a theoretical framework, which aims to present some theories of Democratization. It will introduce the most common characteristics of the political change in a transition country and test which ones are relevant also for the Bulgarian case.

The actual analysis takes place under the context of the different governments and pursuit the goal to answer the start questions for each one of them from 1989 to 2007.

I would like to take into consideration the role of the society and its attitude as a sign of positive or negative change.

According to the sources, I would like to use objective data by international organizations as IMF, EU, World Bank. As mentioned earlier we will take a look into reports of the European Commission. Another source is the press release of the International Monetary Fund on Bulgaria. An interesting view presents the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in association with the World Bank in its Life in Transition Survey, conducted

in December 2006. The Euro barometer surveys are another useful source of information. Nevertheless, I would like to mention the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and its Country Report on Bulgaria.

1.3. Methodology and possible outcomes

Regarding the methodological part I chose to conduct a single case study, tracing back the political, economical and social development in Bulgaria after the transition. For this purpose I would like to combine data from the above named sources in order to see the changes through the years and the relationships between them. This study should result in answers of the start question and hypothesis.

As possible outcomes from the research I expect verification of the following hypothesis:

“The young democracy achieves some progress that cannot be renounced.”

“The problems of the democracy during the transition process do not mirror façade democracy.”

Secondly, I assume that the hypothesis “The society is more satisfied with democracy” will be falsified.

1.4. Structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 will sketch the theoretical framework and will consist of explanation of historical background and will provide some theories as a base of the research.

In chapter 3 you will find the research methodological section and information about the single case approach. Variable dates will be presented, as well as their sources.

Chapter 4 is the actual analysis of the thesis. On the basis of the theoretical and methodological parts I will describe the relationship between the variables and respectively between the transition process and the other spheres of life.

Chapter 5 represents the conclusion, where the answers of the main question and the sub questions are given. Here can be found either the verification or the falsification of the start hypothesis.

Finally you will find list of references and annex with tables and graphs.

Historical background and theoretical framework

2.1. Historical background

Before identifying the theoretical boxes with regard to the examined process we will make a brief historical review of the events within the time framework that is set in the title – 1989-2007. We can divide the period into two parts. The first one includes the first eight years of the transition. As an initiative point we should notice the amendment of Article 1 of the Constitution that gave monopoly power for the Bulgarian Communist Party (later, like many post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe it changes its name Bulgarian Socialist Party - BSP). The head of the party, therefore of the state Todor Zhivkov is expelled. However, this is not necessary a reason for a great change. The new leader in the country – the Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov is part of the Zhivkov's party background. 1989 can be noticed also as the birth of the opposition with the establishment of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS). The first free elections in the newest Bulgarian history take place in June 1990. They are won again by BSP. This fact creates Bulgaria an image of a state which is "immature and unprepared" for democracy and has a manifest preferences for the old. (Terzieve-Karayaneva, 1995) The first ray of hope for the democracy is the new President – the SDS leader Zhelyu Zhelev. This line of democracy continues with the next elections 1991. Although the lack of unity in the Union, they manage to get more votes than BSP. Nevertheless they remain divided and as a result the origin coalition is broken up. The continuing differences and conflicts in SDS become cause for the failure of the democratic opposition. The next years are marked by often changes in the government, votes of no-confidence, resignations and political instability. The society is also divided in "red" and "blue" (BSP-SDS), following the bipolar model, established in the first years of the transition. The division occurs also on the line East-West. The citizens support whether pro-Russian or pro-European and pro-American orientation. This results in frustration among the citizens, they are disappointed from the idea of the democracy, they become familiar with in the latest years. At the end of this first part Bulgaria gets in financial crisis during the government of Jean Videnov. The GDP falls by 10.1 % and it comes to hyperinflation in early 1997, as for less than two months the price of one US Dollar raises from 500 to 3000 Bulgarian Leva. This situation triggers waves of discontent and the outcome is the termination of Videnov's mandate and a new SDS-coalition on the head of the country. At this moment begins the second part of the period. It is associated with more optimism and better results. The new cabinet with Prime Minister the former Economic Minister Ivan Kostov manage to make a

Currency Board Arrangement and through this to stabilize the economy. It conducts very necessary economic and structural reforms, attracts foreign investments in the country and paves the way for the West, namely for its accession in NATO and EU. It is also the first government after 1989 that remains in power for its full mandate. However, there are still problems with lack of transparency and corruption that cannot be renounced.

2001 is the year of the first break up in the bipolar political model in Bulgaria. The parliamentary elections are won by a new party, close neither to “red” nor to “blue”. The ex Bulgarian king Simeon II Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (or Simeon Saxcoburggothski), who was expelled in exile in 1945 from the communists, returns in Bulgaria. He establishes a new party and enters the political life of the country. He wins the elections and gets 50 % of the parliamentary seats. The new cabinet continues Kostov’s policy and as its first success should be noticed the exemption from Schengen visa requirements. 2004 Bulgaria becomes a member of NATO. Still the above mentioned problems remain unsolved and the society does not revote NDSW (the party of Saxcoburggothski). The remarkable election outcome in 2005 deserves special attention. None of the party obtain majority of the votes and it comes to a broad coalition between NDSW and the post communist formation “Coalition for Bulgaria” that become the highest share of the votes - 33.98% and the party of the Muslim minority group (DPS). Although from today’s point of view the government should be evaluated as controversial during its reign happens the culmination of the Bulgarian transitional period – on 1. January 2007 the country is accessed in the European Union.

2.2. Theoretical framework

If we aim to answer the question whether the transition process in Bulgaria reminds of facade democracy we should first find out what describes such a democracy and what are its elements. The topic is subject of research in the works of Momchil Badjakov, a docent in the department “Political Science” in popular Bulgarian universities. He develops the concept of the façade democracy from its birth after some mentions during interviews of the former Prime Minister Ivan Kostov.¹ Badjakov creates specific definition for this phenomenon and therefore identifies specific elements that determine the “façade” in the democracy: lack of trust in democracy, its institutions, parties and politicians, unacknowledged democratic political system (2007). On some places the docent mentions façade, defective,

¹ “*I don’t want this façade democracy and prosperity for gangsters.*” in the Bulgarian newspaper “Sega”, 13.11.2003

unconsolidated, delegate, unstable, incomplete, fragile or half-democracy as similar to each other depending on the level of political development and construction.

On the next pages you will find first some core assumptions about the stages in the transformation process. Next I will discuss some definitions of liberal and defective democracy as well. I will identify what are the basic features that belong to every type. Therefore a comparison between the defective and façade elements will be done in order to find the current place of Bulgaria on the field of democracy consolidation. Finally, I will take a look at the Wolfgang Merkel's multilevel model (2007) under the context of analysis of façade democracy.

2.2.1. Klaus von Beyme and the consolidation of the transition

To be able to deal with the birth of the Bulgarian democracy I build my work on a theoretical base, created toward specific phases, which a transition state traditionally goes through. Klaus von Beyme (1994, pp. 51) presents the first phase as the “breakdown of the ancient regime” and the second as the consolidation of the transition. As we look for evidences for the way the process went on we concentrate the theory on the second stage according to Beyme's (1994) example.

2.2.2. Thomas Carothers's transitional paradigm

Another contribution on the subject of the definition of a transitional paradigm gives Thomas Carothers (2002). He defines five core assumptions in this respect. The first one is the presence of movement away from a non-democratic government (dictatorial, authoritative) towards a democratic one. This theory contains in itself all the following four assumptions.

The second one covers again the above mentioned phases in the process and defines that a democratisation goes through three stages – from opening (connected with the ideas and the will for a revolution) through breakthrough (like Beyme (1994): the end of the old regime) to consolidation – “a slow but purposeful process” (Carothers, 2002, pp. 7) when the real change should happen and should be established.

The third claim underlines the important significance of elections as a central manifestation of the democracy and a good method for legitimacy and accountability to be provided.

Next the author argues that regardless of other hypothesis a lot of circumstances like political tradition, socio-cultural features, economic growth are not so strong determinative for the transformation process of the country.

The last assumption is that the functioning state exists a priori and the democratic and state building happens in parallel and they together support each other.

On this place can be assumed, that Bulgaria is on its way for a change. After combining the both theories by Beyme (1994) and Carothers (2002) we select to observe the consolidation stage after the beginning of the new regime. Further in the text we will see once again the importance of the elections interpreted by many authors and in the methodological part of the thesis we take into consideration the circumstances and their affect for the consolidation.

2.2.3. Wolfgang Merkel's control criteria

To understand which democracy can be considered defective we should first know what the features that form a functioning liberal democracy are. For this purpose I take a look into six control criteria developed by Wolfgang Merkel (1999) on the basis of three dimensions of the democracy.

The first one, also known as the concept of polyarchy, extracted from Dahl's definition for democracy. He expresses it laconic as "contestation open to participation" (Dahl, 1971, pp. 5). The first two dimensions are incorporated by the general concept of legitimacy – vertical and horizontal. While the vertical describes the relationship between the voters and the elected by them, the horizontal secures the power control in the government and the basic rights.

Further Merkel (1999) adds the next dimensions, necessary when we deal with a young democracy. It is extremely important that the power is exercised only by fairly elected people and it does not serve reserved political domains or veto players.

Using these three dimensions Merkel (1999) states the following six criteria (see Table 1):

- Power legitimacy stands for the sovereignty as the only basic principal of legitimacy.
- Power access raises again the importance of free elections and stresses the features of the universal right to vote: general, equal, free, secret.
- Power monopoly touches the non-democratic domains issue and states that only properly elected people (see above) have decision making right.
- Power structure accents on the checks and balances principle and reminds the horizontal control legitimacy dimension.
- Power extent limits the power of the governors toward citizens taking into consideration the negative freedoms that should been embedded in the constitution.
- The way of power exercise should follow democratic norms and rule of law principle.

2.2.4. Wolfgang Merkel's types of defective democracy

After identifying the control criteria, necessary to categorize a democracy as consolidated, we take a look now into the results of missing or fault regarding to some of the six criteria (see Figure1). Merkel (1999) forms three types of defective democracies depending on the central issue presented in the state: exclusive, domain or tutelary and illiberal democracy.

Exclusive type is characterized by exclusion specific groups of the society on the basis of religion, ethnicity or gender. Thus, the universal right to vote is violated, as well as the people sovereignty. Hence, when we speak of exclusive democracy, we have a break into the first two control criteria.

The problem in the domain type is due to breaks into the power legitimacy, monopoly and its extent. The central issue is the presence of traditional veto players, coming from undemocratic circles. Such a veto player could be part of military, oligarchy or remaining from the previous regime parts of the “nomenklatura”².

The last type of defective democracy calls Merkel (1999) illiberal. He explains that if all the other criteria are present but the administration gets round the basic rights and freedoms of the people, this makes the democracy illiberal.

As opposed to other authors (like for instance Guillermo O'Donnell, 1993) who adds another fourth type of defective democracy, distinguishing between illiberal and delegative democracy, Merkel (1999) believes they are very similar and puts them under the common concept of illiberal democracy. He does that as he combines horizontal and vertical legitimacy and includes the violation in the checks and balances (specific for the delegative democracy) in the infringement of the principle of rule of law.

2.2.5. Façade democracy

After I observed in detail the several types of defective democracy now I shall apply their elements to the concept of façade democracy to see what are their common features and clarify what type of democracy exist on Bulgarian soil and what level of consolidation has been reached (see Table 2). For this purpose two definitions are to compare first.

Slightly rephrased sounds the definition for defective democracy as following: it is a political system, characterized on the one hand by largely functioning democratic electoral system, which regulates the power access. On the other hand there are still holdbacks for the function

² “The set of lists containing the decision-making positions of the communist society, such as they were established by the high authorities of the Party, as well as the persons who occupied these positions at various moments.” (Vozlenski, 1984).

logic of one or more of the rest control criteria that are essential for a functioning democracy with secured freedom, equality and control. (Merkel, Puhle, Croissant, Eicher & Thiery, 2003).

In order to make a comparison toward Merkel's one et al. (2003) definition is added to the Badjakov's (2007) description of the façade of the democracy. He states that firstly this type of democracy shows external imitation of functioning elements of modern democracy: free elections, multiparty pluralism, media freedom, separation of powers. In practice, however, this is only the external façade that hides deep contradictions and discrepancies between the announced and even formally functioning democratic principles and the reality that has nothing to do with them.

Examples for that can be found easily, but more about that comes next, while I go through the concrete elements that characterize the façade democracy in Bulgaria and combine them with the already known issues in the defective democracies.

The first element presents the attitude of the society against the democratic system (see Table 2). The author argues that it is not affirmative accepted among the citizens and this tendency becomes stronger. The data varies between discontents with the parliamentary form of republic through preferences to a presidential one to extreme favoritism toward the former totalitarian or even dictatorial regime. Another negative feature is the top-down principle that creates the feeling that the ordinary voter cannot really affect the political process.

The next elements can be unified under the common concept of trust and lack of trust. We can speak of no trust in the democracy itself and in its components, namely institutions, governments, parties, politicians. After all it is no surprise that this lack of trust results also in no political culture among the people.

But let us first see some details in connection with the problem of no trust. When it comes to trust in democracy, a clear distinction should be made. On one side, people accept the democracy itself but believe that it exists only formally and have no trust in its components and institutions. This is one more time the exact definition of the façade and the falseness of the Bulgarian democracy. Similar to other weak, unconsolidated and defective democracies behind it can be found antidemocratic and non democratic practices like clientelism or corruption that reminds of O'Donnell's delegative type (1994). The mistrust between the elites and the voters produces populism. Speaking of elites, the next similarity with the four types of defective democracies, namely with the domain, can be found in the so-called symbiosis between new democratic practices and old totalitarian traditions (Linz & Stepan,

1996, pp.5). Here should be mentioned also the sense for presence of latent or hidden elites among the citizens (Minev & Kabakchieva, 1996, pp.127-133).

As the next problematic element of the façade democracy is presented the missing trust in the institutions. Traditionally the President as an institution stands well with people, regardless of party affiliation or concrete action and activity. On the other hand the trust in the other institutions varies during the legislation period. So support the voters and the institutions mostly after elections and at least on the eve of new ones. This both phenomena are a sign for the new hope of the citizens at the beginning of the new mandate and reminds of majority preferences and concentration of expectations toward one person. (For instance: the President or Prime Minister)

These majority preferences are also related to the other problematic area, concerning lack of trust, namely the parties and the politician as a job. This is characterized by constant increase in the anti-party attitudes among the society and the charge against the politicians that they protect their party and personal interests and so thus they do not fulfill their basic function to serve the democracy. 2001 is marked by the entering the Bulgarian political life by its former king Simeon Saxcoburggothski. This event is the brightest example for the above described phenomena and results in deeply shaken trust in the political system. It is widely spoken about changes in the constitutions and even return of the monarchy.

This element provokes also calls for creating technocratic, non-party and non-political governments of experts, involving popular people and celebrities in the political life only with the purpose to gain more trust and votes among the unacquainted and apathetic citizens.

This wide range of mistrust in the society leads inevitably to a general lack of political culture, combined with remarkable paradox: traditionally Bulgaria is known for a high level of interest toward policy. However, therewith should be taken into account the low level of trust that makes finally antinomy, resulting in constantly decreasing interest, apathy and frustration among the voters. This is also in a close relation to a plenty of other determinates like financial condition, some socio-demographic features like age and education. Depending on that varies the interest of the people toward policy and its belief that they can affect political life and they have a significant influence.

After it is already clear what is the most characteristic about the façade democracy in Bulgaria I shall try to apply the collected information about it, and the four types of defective democracy as well to Merkel's multi-level model of consolidation (2007). This would be helpful to determine the level of consolidation of Bulgarian democracy.

2.2.6. Wolfgang Merkel's multilevel model of consolidation

Let us first now take a theoretical look on the model itself. It consists of four levels of consolidation that present in many cases also the chronological development of the process. It is assumed that the first level is the earliest and plays the role of a basis for the next three (see Figure 2.). We can observe the model also on the macro-micro scale, presenting macro structures, applied by actors on meso-level and directed to the society on micro-level.

The first level, constitutional consolidation presents the basic constitutional institutions in a state: the already discussed President as the head of state, Ministers, Parliament, judicial and electoral system. This first level builds the frame for the other levels. It is responsible for the establishment of the rule of law principle, as well as other control criteria like power access (electoral system) and power structure (the relationship between institutions). This responsibility is realised whilst creating the necessary norms, restrictions and rules that should be followed on the next levels.

Representative consolidation refers to the actors on the presentation of interest by the parties, its territory and function. Kind of connecting bridge role could be ascribed to this level, due to the fact that the parties work together with the institutions from the first level for creating the norms and on the other hand they are engaged to control the behaviour of the informal actors from level number three.

These informal actors are in the centre if the behaviour consolidation is on the third level. We know them already as potential veto players or domains, presented by military, specific groups etc. For the higher quality of consolidation they should not take advantage of its veto power possibility to block democratic forces of the previous levels.

Assuming democratic consolidation is achieved on the all three levels, it is a good precondition for reaching its highest stage – the consolidation of civic and political culture and civil society. It is the longest and slowest process and sometimes it requires a change of generation for the society to be freed from the past, its practices and to get used to democracy. At the end only fully consolidation on the all four levels could bring a strong, stable, resistant to crisis democracy.

And where is Bulgaria's place on this model?

Speaking of constitutional consolidation it should be noted first that in the first years of the transition process the democracy enjoys a big popularity and high percentage trust (see Figure 2). It is still defined as one of the best democracies in its region on the Balkans. However it cannot be renounced that the macro structures of the first level constantly lose the trust of the

voters. Problems in the judicial system are still big and vicious practices and like corruption do not make the picture better.

As already discussed the lack of trust is all along the line and affects also the parties and politicians. This is why it cannot be argued that the representative consolidation is a fact. This signs also the tendency of increased anti-party attitudes.

Looking at the so called symbiosis between the new elites and the traditional structures from the previous regime it is clear that the threat of influence by potentially risk groups is not avoid. Therefore we cannot speak of neither of fully behaviour consolidation.

Consequently, Bulgaria is also still away from the establishment of strong civil society and civic culture. However an optimistic trend can be observed among some society groups consisting of young, well educated people (some of them even in western universities) with modern ideas.

So far, so good with the theory, how consolidated is Bulgaria's democracy from 1989 till 2007 on practice? I would like to share more about that by means of empirical evidences in the next methodological part of this thesis.

2. Methodological part

In order to defence the claims, presented in the previous part of the thesis, I conducted a single case research about Bulgaria and its first steps in the democracy. Going through the elements of defective and façade democracy I systemized various data estimating the level of presence of these elements on Bulgarian soil using a multiple sources of information.

I begin with information from Bulgarian Public Opinion researches, going through some data from objective international state report created by Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index for Bulgaria), using also statistical data about the society attitudes, developed on the one hand by Eurobarometer and on the other hand extracted within the "Life in Transition Survey", prepared for The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Alternatively, I present a different point of view taking a look in the declassified reports of former US-Ambassadors in Bulgaria, published on WikiLeaks platform.

Finally, I present the data collected from the annual monitoring reports of the European Commission on the progress towards the accession and on the basis of the listed various generators of information I try to give an answer to the hypothesis questions set in the beginning of this paper.

3.1. Bulgarian democracy “through Bulgarian eyes”. Public Opinion Researches

When we speak of political researches the first indicator are the elections. They provide information about the political activity, interests, attitudes etc. of the society. This is why I sketch a picture of the elections in Bulgaria after the change (Figure 3). First of all, we can speak generally of a constantly decreasing turnout (Stoikova, pp.9). Let us now take a look into the turnout data of every single election. Looking at the elections for Grand National Assembly 1990 we can speak of a remarkable result – 90.6% of the citizens uses their right to vote. The high percentage remains during the elections for a parliament a year later – 83.9%. Following years are characterized by gradual and permanent decline of the voters' participation. It is worth to be mentioned, that the first elections for European Members of Parliament go under the sign of record low turnout – 28.6%. The official data which is base of my interpretation includes also the outcome of the local elections 2007. They show again low rates – respectively 49.8% at the first round and 43.3% at the second.

Analysts argue that the decreasing use of passive right to vote by the citizens is barely a result of disinterestedness in the political life and the future. However the high level in the beginning of the period is doubtless sign of permanent increasingly frustration and apathy. This negative attitude can be found on multiple levels not only in the election for parliament, president but also in those for European parliament and for local government (mayor, municipal council). Looking at the lowest rate in the figure (28.6%) we could assume that the Bulgarians still do not feel involved in European policy and are distanced to their representatives in the European Union. In contrast, despite the lack of distance and the closest proximity the local elections also do not obtain greater values.

The next Figure 3.1 presents the distribution of the citizens' positive attitudes towards the both biggest (and only) parties between 1990 and 2001 (Stoikova, pp. 9). The drawing is restricted until 2001 because this is the year of the breakdown of the bi-polar political model in the country by entering into political life of the new party NDSV. This event brings enormous changes in the situation in Bulgaria and will be more interpreted further in the paper. Looking at the graph *prima facie* it can be understood that there is no clear tendency which is followed through the whole period. The voter changes its attitude almost every year. This is why the elections outcomes are also different by different years. It is still to mention that the Union of Democratic Forces obtains better results when the attitude towards it is positive. It is to observe that SDS gets seven times positive evaluation among over 30% of the population ('90, '91, '94, '95, '97, '98, '99) while for BSP this happens only three times. In this respect the margin in the percentage of SDS is bigger most of the years. The Union gets

also the highest rate of approval through these years – 57% 1991 when Zhelyu Zhelev wins the presidential elections under the condition of the second highest turnout – 83.9%.

The attitudes division between SDS and BSP gradually becomes equal in the latest years of the observed period – respectively 21% and 20% and one year later dropped to 10-14%. This can be explained with the new actor on the scene – the party of the former Bulgarian king Simeon Saxcoburggothski NDSV which becomes the most approved party with the highest rating 58%. However this rating remains not for long and the party goes through a gradual decline until its collapse 2007, when only 1.9% of the citizens would vote for it.

This is the year when they see a new star in the political sky, the present Prime Minister Boyko Borisov. He repeats Saxcoburggothski's big success and this is an evidence for a specific phenomenon among the Bulgarian voters. They transfer its trust to brand new parties that sometimes have a totally different ideology. As a result from that it can be observed that the hard electorates of the traditional parties shrink up and the role of the so-called mobile voters becomes stronger. Here is the place to mention that these mobile voters are in most of the cases people who are not interested in politics, have no political culture and if the turnout gets lower and lower, the hard electorates – more and more narrow, they have bigger and bigger influence. This changes the whole political picture of the country.

Great example for the above mentioned transfer of trust to different parties with totally different political programme is the latest presidential election 2006. Then the BSP's leader Georgi Parvanov obtains the highest percentage (64%). Second is the leader of the new right-centrist party with nationalistic elements Ataka Volen Siderov (21.5%). Second round of elections is embedded in case of turnout under 50% (in these elections – 42.5%). The both with the highest outcomes participate in the runoffs. Missing a strong right candidate who could bring together the "blue" voters, these voters have no other choice instead of keeping their voice or giving it to a person with different political ideas. (See Figure 3.2)

On the next pages I analyse the level of trust among the Bulgarian citizens towards the most important institutions in the country. The following five graphs help us understand changes of the voters' approval. Let us now begin with parliament. As already noted, the trust in Saxcoburggothski's new party (respectively also in the parliament) goes down very fast. This is easy to see also in the graphical description (Figure 4). While the approval is continuously on the decrease, the disapproval obtains higher values. A specific point of the figure is 2005 when both curves reach the same values. The moment coincides with the parliamentary election. It is easy to explain the equal levels of trust and mistrust with the decreasing

approval towards NDSV and the usual hope on the eve of new government. Thereafter the approval curve goes further down and the disapproval – up.

Otherwise looks the graph about the presidential institution. The president has been traditionally well evaluated in Bulgaria. Figure 5 presents the clear tendency of relative high trust and low mistrust. It should be noticed that the peaks of trust (and respectively the lowest point of mistrust) is reached again 2005, when the President Georgi Parvanov plays an active role in the formation of the three-party coalition between Bulgarian Socialist Party, NDSV and the Movement for Freedom and Rights (the party of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria).

The next Figures 6,7,8,9 introduce society's attitudes toward the judicial system, presented by Court and Prosecution, as well as the police and army.

Bulgarian citizens have no trust in the judicial institution; they live with the knowledge that they are not equal in front of the law and the Court. The same applies also to the Prosecution. Therefore this is the reason for the data we see on the graphs: permanent high levels of negative attitude and low levels of positive evaluation.

The last two Figure 8 and Figure 9 present generally the tendency of high trust in police and the army. Both institutions enjoy positive attitude among society with a tiny difference. While for the police both curves (positive and negative) reach high values above 30%, meaning it is not only positive evaluated in the society, the army enjoys full approval with high trust result and low mistrust values.

3.2. Bulgarian democracy “through international eyes”

To be objective in a single case study about Bulgarian transition to democracy I would like to involve in my research a series of international sources which show how European organisations see the Bulgarian progress.

3.2.1. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI, 2003, 2009)

If we speak of transition process we first take into consideration the country report about Bulgaria, drawn up by Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI, 2003, 2009). Still describing the history of transformation before the actual examination of criteria for democracy the organisation determines the democracy as a façade as it writes: “The creation of democratic institutions, though often highly praised by the international community, is merely a façade behind which many old structures, attitudes and personalities are skillfully hidden.” (BTI, 2003, pp.3).

The first indicator that is analysed in the report is the stateness or the monopoly of the power in the hands of the state. However BTI does not miss to notice the role of specific economic

groups. They have a significant impact on this monopoly and were already discussed in this paper in the theoretical part as possible dangerous veto players. These groups consist in most of the cases of well financed people from the old authoritative structures and their nomenklatura or recently grown rich ones who took advantage of the transformation process. The issue for the power monopoly becomes more serious with the claims about relationships between these people and crime organisations that intensify their activities during the nineties. Organised crime is also subject of European Commission's monitoring report 2008.

The political participation gets some more positive assessments in the BTI report. Generally the free and fair elections are secured in Bulgaria. Still there are offsets in this area, related to the problem of buying and selling votes. It is also very popular, especially in boarder areas with predominantly Turkish population; whole buses with voters, who do not live in the curtain municipality, but travel on the Election Day and give their voices for the specific candidate. Therefore to this indicator applies again the problem with domain players. The politicians are actually elected in a correct process but they still bear their relationships with suspicious circles and transfer them to a government level.

The same problematic groups exercise their influence on the free expression right. Bulgarian media is characterized as "partly free" in Freedom House report (BTI 2010, pp. 10). There are not only economic interests that restrict the freedom of expression, but also political. Nevertheless, the authors of the report notice a positive trend in the development of internet blogs and sites in defence of human rights and democracy.

The most serious failure in Bulgarian democracy remains in the area of rule of law. BTI concludes that the separation of powers exists only on paper and checks and balances principle does not work properly. The biggest criticism in this field can be found in the judicial system. In this respect it is mentioned the missing punishments for politicians and the way they take advantage of immunity. This can be seen in a close relation to the low trust in the judicial system among the citizens. Naturally, this mistrust results in refusal to seek justice in the Court. Therefore it is to criticise that Bulgaria still has huge corruption problems and it is extremely serious when it comes to such problems on high levels in the country.

Speaking of institutions BTI pays attention first to the president and concrete to the last Bulgarian president Georgi Parvanov. It is noticed that despite the formal role of the presidential institution prescribed by the constitution, Parvanov tries to strengthen his position on the political scene and to increase his influence in the legislative power.

Next subject in the report is Bulgarian party-system. It is characterized as "fragile" (BTI, 2003, pp.5) and it is paid attention to the huge number of parties which in most of the cases

stay under the 4% threshold. As a result of the end of polarisation after 2001 the authors point out the often and abrupt change in the political preferences of most of the voters. Stable remain only the DPS supporters and this has its logical explanation in their ethnicity.

Speaking of democracy as a whole, it becomes clear that the majority of the Bulgarians support theoretically this government form. The reality is however different. The trust in the most of the institutions goes down and down (Figure 4, Figure 6, Figure 7). People express their disappointment as leaving the country or getting apathetic to the political life. It is however no mistrust in the democracy generally, only in its representatives. For example, a big part of the voters argues that democracy is best represented in EU but they have more trust in the EU institutions than in Bulgarian ones.

Finally, the report provides information about the civil society in Bulgaria, presented by the big number of NGO in the country. It is a positive fact but still has to be stressed that the increase in the number of these organisations is not directly proportional to their activity and the outcomes of it.

3.2.2. WikiLeaks

As far as it can be considered a reliable source, latest information is provided on WikiLeaks platform. Good contribution about the domains threat in Bulgaria give us some recently announced classified documents of former US- Ambassadors in Sofia sharing their opinion about the present Prime Minister Boiko Borisov by the time he enters the political life in Bulgaria, becomes mayor of the capital Sofia and plans to candidate for the post occupied in the moment. I pay attention to the transcript written by John Beyrle. The then Ambassador first tells of Borisov's political and personal background, as well as he describes his most noticeable and mind-bending features, calling him "Bulgaria's most popular politician" in the title and "Something like a Phenomenon" (Beyrle, 2006, pp. 1). The transcript provides a great example of the mixture between business, politics and media in Bulgaria. The reader understands first about the security firm, created by Borisov at the dawn of the changes, when this branch (together with insurance) was connected with illegal activities and "extortion" (Beyrle, 2006, pp. 3). By that time Borisov's firm was responsible for the body-guard of the former leader of the Communists Todor Zhivkov. Thereafter, it does the same for Simeon Saxcoburggothski, who appoints Borisov a Chief Secretary of the Interior Ministry. Therefore it becomes clear that the future Prime Minister cares for his image as paying to the media for positive presentation. The last evidence for the relationships between politicians and crime or economic groups results from the information about communication between Borisov and

emblematic figures from the illegal drug trade. It is argued that he secured protection for them by the distribution of the substances. The transcript reveals the not so known Russian connections of the then Mayor of Sofia. He did a series of suspicious deals with the director of the fuels company LUKoil Bulgaria Valentin Zlatev.

3.2.3. Eurobarometer

After I have observed the attitudes of the Bulgarian citizens towards institutions, the levels of their trust through the years until the EU-Accession, I want to take a look how these have developed 2007 according to the European Union. First I directed my research on the statistical data from Eurobarometer, published in the National Report on Bulgaria in the autumn 2007 in the framework of Standard Eurobarometer researches on Public Opinion in the European Union and 2007 document part of the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer that observes ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990.

Generally it can be assumed that the reports end with positive conclusion about Bulgarian progress. The main subject of the research is based on three issues: how do people see the future of their own country? How do they see the image of the EU? And what are their voting intentions for an eventual referendum on joining EU? Bulgaria marks high scores on all three issues and manages visible improvement on those fields.

Compared to other countries from the region the country is characterized by markedly improvement for the time between 1990 and 1997. Bulgarians adopt positive the EU-image and they consider the European Union together with USA and NATO best partners. They still suffer criticism regarding the level of awareness about of some basic thing connected with EU. For example, relatively high percent (14%) of answers are with “don’t know” on the question if they have heard about EU (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, 2007, pp.8). In contrast Bulgarians are quite well aware about the European Bank of Reconstruct and Development. According to both reports there are still problems in the level of information that media presents to the society. A positive development is observed also in pro-membership intentions not only in with regards to EU, but also to NATO. A big part of the respondents argue that Bulgaria will benefit from NATO membership and they believe that this will make the country closer to Europe. Bulgaria heads the list with the strongest wish for European integration as their citizens determine that it will be a balanced relationship with mutual benefit. The report points out that Bulgaria has made the strongest improvement on the field of Human Rights policy and conclude that the country and its citizens “took a big

step” (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, 2007, pp. 42) as increasing their optimism and the hopes that they have influence on the political changes.

Here is the place to mention that some of the information undergoes minor changes after the first months after the accession (Eurobarometer 68, 2007). For example, it is to observe that missing interest in European affairs admit 34% of the respondents. There is also a light decrease in the opinion that Bulgaria would benefit from its membership in the Union. The positive scores go down from 66% 2004 to 52% 2007 and the negative – respectively from 21% to 34%. However the scores remain high compared with other EU countries (Eurobarometer 68, 2007, B13, pp. 12).

The national country report confirms the data about lack of trust in institutions that was already presented. Therefore an interesting tendency reveals the answers of the question whether the things in Bulgaria go in right or wrong direction. The percentage is quite close for three of the four possibilities. 25% answer that the direction is right, 35% - wrong and a remarkable high score reaches the variant “Neither right, nor wrong (spontaneous)” (Eurobarometer 68, 2007, B.7.2, pp.26). This means that a significant part of the society handles such important questions spontaneously. Therefore it is asked the same question with regard to the EU. 53% of the Bulgarians answer that the direction is right, only 4% - wrong and 8% pick up the “neither...nor” option (Eurobarometer 68, 2007, pp. 27). This is why in the executive summary of the report it is concluded that Bulgarians bear optimism towards the Union, but their opinion is still not well shaped and the common undefined answers like “don’t know” are a sign of low self-confidence (Eurobarometer 67, 2007, pp.10).

This conclusion stands in a close relationship with the extremely important issue of satisfaction with the democracy. The national country report informs that the levels of dissatisfaction with the Bulgarian democracy are decreased with 4% but on the other hand the satisfaction values are still at the bottom, compared with the other EU countries and still every second citizen defines himself as dissatisfied with democracy. The same situation appears to be true with regards to the way democracy function on EU level. Bulgarians express the lowest dissatisfaction with EU democracy (19%) after only Spain, Poland, Macedonia, Ireland, respectively with 14%, 15%, 16%, 17% (Eurobarometer 68, 2007, B.11, pp. 45).

In this connection the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (2007, pp. 40) provides a serious contribution, introducing their results: only 21% of the Bulgarian is satisfied with the way democracy is developed and 75% consider themselves not satisfied. The authors of the report make a distinction between function and development of the democracy in order to present the opinions of the society. It is said that “Those interviewed in Romania, Slovakia and

Bulgaria, on the contrary, are more satisfied and especially less dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their countries than with the way it is developing.” (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, 2007, pp. 40). The lack of unanimity on the concept of democracy could be another evidence for the still not well shaped opinion, resulting from the youth of the Bulgarian democratic society.

3.2.4. European Commission

Finally, to get a full picture of the outcomes of Bulgaria’s transitional process we use the monitoring reports of the European Commission regarding the progress of the country towards the accession criteria. As the amount of the paper is restricted, I concentrate as so far on the political criteria, especially democracy and rule of law.

First I take a look on the Commission Opinion on Bulgaria’s Application for Membership of the European Union (DOC 97/11, 1997). The detailed document gives information about the government form in the country. They are presented the three powers: Legislative with the Parliament and the General Assembly, Executive with President and Government and Judicative. It is said that the institutions work smoothly but they need more cooperation. The multi-party system and the free and fair elections in Bulgaria are stressed. The checks and balances principle is mentioned because the government as a whole as well as every minister individually are accountable to the parliament. The executive power works smoothly although the often changes since 1990 have led to instability. The corruption is pointed out as the first serious problem. Together with the lack of transparency and clarity in the administration it results in mistrust among the society. Criticism is expressed regarding the judicative power although its independence is secured in many ways by its complex structure – the existence of Supreme Council, President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, President of the Supreme Court of Administration, the Procurator General. Every member of the judicative power cannot be a member in a political party. The Commission stresses problems regarding the overburdening and long time needed for every case. The stuff in the system is another significant problem because of the lawyers’ salaries and their lack of experience. The report appeals for reforms in this direction. Regarding to the Human Rights area Bulgaria has to strengthen the minority rights of Roma and their integration.

Finally the Commission concludes “that Bulgaria is on its way to satisfy the political criteria”. There are still problems and negotiations to be opened as soon as the state prepares itself better for the obligations (DOC 97/11, 1997, pp. 122-123).

The Commission's positions remains similar in the reports through the next years. It admits the gradually progress that Bulgaria achieves every year. However, there are still problems that deserve a significant attention. The usual areas are the Public Administration, Judicial system and the fight against corruption. Often mentioned is also the necessary improvement in the integration of Roma minority.

In 1999 positive assessment gets the new administrative system in the country that includes 28 new regions with own governor. This step increases significantly the independence of local governments and contributes to the decentralisation.

Improvement in the judicial system is made the same year by completing the reform of the notary system in Bulgaria which makes every notary independent.

1999 is abolished the death penalty in Bulgaria.

At the end of 1999 the Helsinki Council decides to open negotiations with Bulgaria. This becomes a reason for establishment of a Council on European Integration in Bulgaria – an institutions responsible for monitoring the Bulgarian role in the negotiations.

The next years pass under the sign of slight positive development regarding the corruption problems as it is created National Anti-Corruption Strategy which has to be implemented in the next years by following an Action Plan on that area. In its report from 2002 the Commission expresses positive assessment on the implementation of fiscal decentralisation giving greater independence for municipalities on health, education and social affairs.

2004 in Bulgaria is established the institution of Ombudsman.

Despite the listed improvements, the reforms in the Public Administration are still very important, as well as the problems in the judicial system. Most common criticism is expressed on its budgeting, administration, effectiveness, transparency and staff professionalism and training.

The same following problems are listed in the 2006 presented Monitoring report for the state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania: justice system, fight against corruption, money laundering, and organised crime.

In its first report after the Accession the Commission refers to the same issue areas, systematizing them into six benchmarks. They can be divided in three groups: judicial system, corruption, organised crime.

Improvements have to be made in the independence, transparency and efficiency, professionalism and accountability of the judicial system.

Corruption have to be fight especially on high levels, borders and local governments.

In the area of organised crime the country have to deal further with serious crime and money laundering.

Concluding its report six months after Bulgaria's accession in the EU, the Commission points out the progress and explains that there is not enough time to show better results in the problem fields.

4. Conclusions

After it is already clear what characterize different types of defective democracy, as well as façade democracy finally it can be concluded what exactly describes the Bulgarian democracy developed after eighteen years of transitional process.

On the basis of the conducted single case study, applied to the theoretical framework I can infer that greatest offsets Bulgaria shows on the area of Power monopoly and the Way of power exercise (Merkel, 1999).

If we look at the elements describing exclusive democracy, we can find some shortcomings in the way of the election process but generally in Bulgaria no person regardless of its ethnic, religion or gender. The most elections go fair and free, taking due account of problems of buying and selling votes.

From most of the used sources of information can be deduced that Bulgaria's democracy contains features mostly of domain and illiberal (delegative) democracy. Let us now see the evidences.

In Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2003, 2009) it is clear argued that the state monopoly is seriously in danger of participating in political life by specific groups, protecting their personal interests.

Brand new information on that topic gives the latest publishing of secret documents from US-Ambassadors about Bulgarian politicians on the platform WikiLeaks. They speak definitive of relationships of the present Prime Minister with media, business and figures of organised crime.

Illiberal can be considered Bulgarian democracy as it still demonstrates defects in the rule of law, checks and balances and as a result from that the legitimacy is affected.

BTI (2003,2009) points out some faults on this topic and claims that the checks & balances principle does not work properly in the country.

The best arguments for describing the new democracy in Bulgaria as illiberal are the monitoring reports of the European Commission. The Commission recognizes some progress

in all the areas but still points out every year that there are still further changes and reforms to be done.

As a next step in order to determine the level of consolidation of Bulgarian democracy I try to apply the evidences presented in the methodological part on the multi-level model of consolidation of Wolfgang Merkel (2007).

The first level of constitutional consolidation is affected by lack of trust towards almost all of the institutions (with exception: presidential, police and army). As it was shown (Figure 4,6,7) Bulgarians bear traditionally mistrust and lack of approval to the Parliament, as well as the judicial system. This mistrust can be explained by the serious corruption problems on high levels in the country. As a result they cannot identify themselves with some politicians or their ideas and therefore they prefer to keep their voice on the elections. This automatically becomes a threat for the legitimacy and for the proper development of the next three levels of consolidation as the first should create the basis for them.

We could analyse the second and the third one together as they present representative and behaviour consolidation, meaning the society attitude towards the official representatives like parties and the informal actors. As the case of institutions, the Bulgarian hides mistrust and lack of positive attitude also for the most of the parties and their leaders. As it was repeatedly shown in Bulgaria exists a close connection between the second and the third level – the parties, politicians and the possible veto players like business, economic and crime groups. Naturally this connection also provokes mistrust among the society.

Finally, the last level of consolidation presents consolidation of civic culture. Here can be argued that as a result from all that was said above Bulgarians are strongly deprived of faith. However, there are still great hopes for a better future and ability to influence the political life in the country, presented by Eurobarometer (2007).

Finally, overall considering all conclusions I made I would like to give an answer to the hypothesis set in the beginning of this paper.

First hypothesis sounds as follows:

“Although the process is uncompleted there is a progress that cannot be renounced.”

The best argument for the positive response of this hypothesis is European Commission’s position. In every report we can see that Bulgaria make some progress and finally 2007 it becomes a full member of the European Union.

Second hypothesis “The young democracy is not a façade democracy.” cannot be answered simply. The lack of trust and well developed civic culture in Bulgaria are a sign for a mere form of the new democracy. They are however also elements of defective democracies types. This is why I would argue that it can be rather defined as defective (in the first place domain and illiberal) than façade. It is also to mention that all the sources show that Bulgaria is on its way to create liberal, non defective, consolidated democracy. It is still too young and needs more time to strengthen the achievement.

The last hypothesis “The society is more satisfied with democracy than with the totalitarian regime.” People in Bulgaria show the tendency of more and more frustration with the situation on their country. They mistrust politicians and institutions. A big percentage of the society declares preferences to other forms of government. Although Eurobarometer (2007) researches show that Bulgarians support EU democracy, they are still at least satisfied with democracy and their level of dissatisfaction is one of the highest. Thus we can conclude that it is not clear whether totalitarian regime is preferable but it is proved that Bulgarians are not satisfied with democracy in their country.

5. Annex:


Tables and figures

Table 1: Control criteria of non defective democracy

Control criteria (presented in...)	...) non defective democracy
Power legitimacy	Sovereignty
Power access	Universal right to vote
Power monopoly	No domains
Power structure	Checks and balances
Power extent	Negative freedoms
Way of power exercise	Norms, rule of law

Source: Own interpretation based on: Merkel, W. (1999). Defekte Demokratie. In Merkel, W. & Busch, A. *Demokratie in Ost und West. Für Klaus von Beyme*. (pp. 361-381). Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.

Figure 1: Types of defective democracy by affected criteria



Sources: Own interpretation based on:

- Merkel, W. (1999). Defekte Demokratie. In Merkel, W. & Busch, A. *Demokratie in Ost und West. Für Klaus von Beyme*. (pp. 361-381). Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
- Puhle, H.J. (2005). *Democratic Consolidation and 'Defective Democracies'*. Retrieved May 10, 2011 from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Derecho. Web site: www.uam.es/centros/derecho/cpolitica/papers.htm.


Table 2: Types defective democracy and its central issue(s)

Type defective Democracy	Exclusive democracy	Domain democracy	Illiberal democracy	Delegative democracy	Façade democracy
Central issue(s)	No inclusive, universal suffrage: Exclusion on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion	Veto players: Military, oligarchic groups	No rule of law, political liberties, civil rights	No checks & balances	No affirmative accepted democratic system No trust in: Democracy, Institutions, State government, Parties, Politicians. No political culture

Sources: Own interpretation based on:

- Merkel, W. (1999). Defekte Demokratie. In Merkel, W. & Busch, A. *Demokratie in Ost und West. Für Klaus von Beyme*. (pp. 361-381). Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
- Puhle, H.J. (2005). *Democratic Consolidation and 'Defective Democracies'*. Retrieved May 10, 2011 from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Derecho. Web site: www.uam.es/centros/derecho/cpolitica/papers.htm.
- Badjakov, M. (2007). *Elements Of Façade Democracy*. Retrieved May 13, 2011 from http://www.mediatimesreview.com/march2007/fasade_democracy2.php.


Figure 2: Multilevel model of consolidation, applied to Bulgaria



Sources: Own interpretation based on:

- Merkel, W. (2007). Gegen alle Theorie? Die Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Osteuropa. Retrieved May 15, 2011 from http://homepage.univie.ac.at/vedran.dzihic/Merkel_PVS_3_48.pdf.
- Badjakov, M. (2007). *Elements Of Façade Democracy*. Retrieved May 13, 2011 from http://www.mediatimesreview.com/march2007/fasade_democracy2.php.

Figure 3. Election turnout in Bulgaria (1990-2007)




Legend:

- I, II: First, Second round;
- L: Local elections

Source: Own interpretation based on:

Stoikova, P. Political and Electoral Attitudes in the Bulgarian Society during a transitional process. (1989-2007). Retrieved May 28, 2011 from <http://www.uni-plovdiv.bg/logos/GetResource?id=892>.


Figure 3.1 Positive attitudes towards the both biggest parties in Bulgaria (1990-2000)



Source: Own interpretation based on:


Stoikova, P. Political and Electoral Attitudes in the Bulgarian Society during a transitional process. (1989-2007). Retrieved May 28, 2011 from <http://www.uni-plovdiv.bg/logos/GetResource?id=892>.

Figure 3.2 Final results of the first round elections for president and vice-president of Republic Bulgaria, 22.10.2006




Source: Own interpretation based on:
http://www.izbori2006.org/results_1/index.html, retrieved 30 May, 2011.

Figure 3.3 Final results of the second round elections for president and vice-president of Republic Bulgaria, 22.10.2006



Source: Own interpretation based on:
http://www.izbori2006.org/results_2/index.html. Retrieved 30 May, 2011.

Figure 4. Evaluation of the activity of the parliament




Sources: Own interpretation based on:

Alfa Research (2004). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2005). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2006). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Figure 5. Evaluation of the activity of the president




Sources: Own interpretation based on:

Alfa Research (2004). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2005). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2006). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Figure 6. Evaluation of the activity of the court




Sources: Own interpretation based on:

Alfa Research (2004). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2005). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2006). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Figure 7. Evaluation of the activity of the prosecution




Sources: Own interpretation based on:

Alfa Research (2004). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

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Figure 8. Evaluation of the activity of the police




Sources: Own interpretation based on:

Alfa Research (2004). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2005). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2006). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Figure 9. Evaluation of the activity of the army



Sources: Own interpretation based on:

Alfa Research (2004). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2005). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

Alfa Research (2006). Public Opinion Research. Sofia, Bulgaria.

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Individual declaration of Academic Honesty

By signing this declaration I am confirming that I understand:

the meaning of “plagiarism” and the meaning of “collusion”.

I, Kristina Atanasova declare that for this submitted work:

- I did not cut-and-paste information from others without appropriate use of quotation marks and direct reference to their work;
- I did not re-word the ideas of others without proper and clear acknowledgement;
- I did not write ideas or suggestions that originated from other students and claim these as my own;
- I did not include words from other students’ work unless this was explicitly permitted in the description of this assignment.

Signed:

Date: