Support for the Party for Freedom in the Dutch elections of 2010

Studying the characteristics of Party for Freedom voters in the Dutch elections of 2010



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Abstract

In the last decade Dutch politics have been transformed by the shift from established parties to new upcoming parties which marked a shift from the center to the outskirts of the left right continuum. This research focused on the most recent founded party; the Party for Freedom which was established by Geert Wilders. The main research question is: *Why did people vote for the PVV in the Dutch elections of 2010 while others did not?*

Data from the National voting survey has been used to analyze this question. It is hypothesized that the following eight independent factors influence voters whether or not to vote PVV: educational level, unemployment, party identification, anti-immigrant viewpoint, European policy viewpoint, protest voting, confidence in the PVV and charisma of the party leader. These eight hypotheses have been operationalized and 2400 people have been selected into the sample to test these hypotheses. With the use of these eight independent variables a logistic regression model is constructed to examine the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable.

Out of these analyses the conclusion is drawn that unemployment, European policy and confidence are insignificant. The remaining variables: educational level, party identification, anti-immigrant viewpoint, protest voting and charisma of the party leader are significant. With these significant independent variables it is possible to categorize 78,2% of the votes correctly into PVV vote or another vote.

Preface

This report is the result of a master thesis done at the University of Twente. This master thesis is also the final exam to graduate from the master Policy and Governance at the University of Twente. Since my bachelor thesis I have developed a preference for quantitative research. The former faculty of political science and research methods (now: public administration) gave me the opportunity to do research in the field of voting behavior.

This research is an attempt to explain why people vote for the Party for Freedom and adds to the body of knowledge that is already present in this field of research. The main goal of this research is therefore, a contribution to science, although there is also a practical relevance for political parties in the Netherlands. It is the result of seven months of work which confirmed the thought that quantitative research is my prime interest.

Even though this work is written by one person it, of course, could not be completed without the aid of others. Therefore I would like to use this space to express my gratitude to some. First I would like to thank both of my supervisors Dr. Henk van der Kolk and Dr. Pieter Jan Klok. Without their scrutiny, mental coaching and constructive criticism this research would not be the same. Furthermore I would like to thank my college friends as well as my roommates who have provided me with mental help, practical suggestions and physical needs throughout the trajectory. Special thanks are in place for Giske Lagerweij and Almar Snippe for their mathematical expertise, furthermore Bob Mangelsdorf, Stijn Uitdewilligen, Mark Broekhuis and Mark Franken for reading the manuscript and Henk Klooster for the practical discussions. The last persons I would like to thank are my closest relatives; first and foremost my parents and sister who have always believed that I could succeed. Last but not least, my girlfriend Rixt Fopma, thanks for everything you have done.

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1. Introduction

In the political landscape of the Netherlands much has changed in the recent decade. This change started with the foundation of a new political party; the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) that disappeared almost entirely within a year. First, politicians thought that the changes were temporarily, but recently, in the 2006 elections, a new party, the Party for Freedom (PVV), gained nine seats. In the 2010 elections the rise of the PVV continued and increased to 24 seats in total. After the elections of 2010, the party was invited to support a government that consisted of the Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA).

In the past there has never been a newly founded party that gained this amount of seats and doubled in size the following election. What is even more interesting is that the PVV is not a mainstream party. The PVV can be seen as a nationalistic populist right wing party with social conservative characteristics (Lucardie, 2007). Within the Dutch political landscape a party with those characteristics did not exist and the PVV fulfilled a need for such a party. Although the party satisfied a need, it does not reside in the middle of the left right continuum where the majority of the votes are (Cunningham, 2008). Nevertheless, the PVV has proven to survive at least two elections. Because of its remarkable rise, it is interesting to investigate why so many people voted for the PVV in the Dutch elections of 2010.

This leads to the following main research question:

Why did people vote for the PVV in the Dutch elections of 2010 while others did not?

The relevance of this research is mainly scientific. First the scientific marshland of debate, about voting determinants will be explored by discussing several voting theories. Therefore, work of scholars that have expertise in this area is examined (Brug van der & Fennema, 2007; Deth van, 1993; Shanks & Miller, 1990; Woerdman, 1999). In the following chapter the methodological consideration as well as the design of the research will be set forth extensively. Subsequently, analyses will be done to see what effect the possible reasons for voting have on the choice whether or not to vote for the PVV. This will result in an overview of plausible explanations. Emphasis will be placed upon the reasons that are most applicable to voters, of the Party for Freedom, in the 2010 elections. The following chapter will focus upon conclusions that can be drawn from this research. Thereafter, the limitations of this research as well as some recommendations for subsequent research are considered. Moreover, the implications for the field of research will be discussed. This way it is possible to explain why people voted for the PVV. Furthermore, it is possible to add some knowledge to the body of work that is already present on voting theory.

2. Theoretical framework

In following chapter, several different voting theories are discussed, subsequently, the way these theories can clarify why people vote for the PVV is set forth.

2.1 The Funnel of causality

In work of scholars five main complementary explanations can be distinguished that shed light on the question why people vote for a certain party (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960). In the figure below, these five different theories are displayed (Shanks & Miller, 1990).

Figure 2.1: The funnel of causality of voting



The funnel starts on the left side with social structural factors, followed by four other theories. The bold lines symbolize the main relationship between the theories. Hypothesized is that social structural factors influence which party someone votes, and that these have an influence on the party identification of a person. For example, if you are born in a low income household you will identify yourself relatively more often with a socialist party (party identification). This party identification on its turn shapes an individual viewpoint (proximity). Subsequently this influences how you look at what the parties achieved in the time prior to the elections (retrospective). Moreover, it also shapes the way a person looks at media and party leaders. The theory also points at effects in the opposite direction but these effects are marginal to the main effects (Shanks & Miller, 1990). Although most individual viewpoints are determined by the party identification and the social structural factors (bold lines) also the way the parties have performed and media and leadership have an effect (narrow lines). In the following paragraphs these theories will be discussed in subsequent order.

2.2 Social structural factors

From the 1930's to the 1970's social structural factors were well able to explain voting behavior in the Netherlands (Deth van, 1993). They could explain why people would vote for a certain party and predict quite accurately how many seats a certain party would gain. This theory is based upon the idea that social structural characteristics are the leading principle for voting behavior. Especially in the Netherlands, with its former pillared society, this theory was applicable since it was able to predict 72% of the votes (Deth van, 1993). This pillarized society divided the society into four strata: there were Catholics, Protestants, socialists and liberals. For example if a person was born in a working class family he would read the newspaper that everybody read in the working class strata, he would vote for the socialist progressive party (PVDA) and would look at socialist television. Because of the de-pillarization of society, which already started in the 1960's, social structural factors became less valuable for explaining voting behavior (Deth van, 1993; Woerdman, 1999).

Although social structural factors are no longer accurate in explaining why people vote for a certain party, the theory cannot be disregarded without any further consideration.
Research on the impact of social structural factors shows that people are more likely to vote for a radical right wing party when they are less educated (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Rydgren & Ruth, 2011). On the other hand, some studies show a more complex image and do not find evidence that less educated people are more likely to vote for a radical right wing party (Swindal, 2011). There are also studies that show the opposite and conclude that medium education cohorts (Stefanova, 2009) or even the highly educated people (Greskovits, 2007) are more likely to vote for radical right wing parties. Since the Netherlands are also taken into account in the study of Lubbers et.al. it is hypothesized that, a high educational level makes voters less likely to vote for a radical right wing party.

Hypothesis 1:
People with a higher level of education are less likely to vote for the Party for freedom in comparison to people with a low level of education.

Since educational level is correlated with height of income and job opportunities, often combined into the widely used concept of social economic status, economic factors are also taken into account. In general economic conditions influence the voting behavior of people (Kiewiet & Rivers, 1984; Lewis-Beck, 1988).
To investigate what economic conditions are fertile grounds for the rise of radical right wing parties, several scholars have studied the effect of unemployment on the electoral appeal of these right wing parties. Research in this area shows that in case of high unemployment, the amount of votes right wing party receive diminishes (Knigge, 1998; Swindal, 2011). In contrast, some studies conclude that the appeal of right wing parties increases with a rise in unemployment (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Lubbers, et al., 2002; Rydgren & Ruth, 2011). Despite the contrasting outcomes, unemployment might prove to be an important factor in explaining why people voted for the Party for Freedom. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2:
People that are unemployed are more likely to vote for the Party for freedom in comparison to people that are employed.

2.3 Party identification

With the diminishing influence of social structural factors to explain voting behavior several additional plausible explanations entered the field (Deth van, 1993). Party identification suggests that there is a long lasting relationship between the voter and the party he or she feels connected to. This additional theory took into account that votes could shift but, people only changed their vote under special circumstances (for example if they completely disagreed with the party at a certain point in time). The party identification of a person is influenced by social structural factors. Hence, if a person is raised in a liberalistic environment, than it is more likely that this person will identify himself with liberalistic viewpoints and vote for the liberal party in the elections. In comparison to social structural factors, party identification theory takes the possibility into account that a person changes his vote (Deth van, 1993). The main axiom of this theory is that someone has a natural tendency to vote for a particular party (due to social structural factors). This natural tendency to vote for a party will manifest itself in a feeling of adherence to a party or attenuate in a feeling of being attracted to a certain party.

When this theory is applied to the PVV, some problems arise. First of all, the party program of the PVV is quite different from other more mainstream parties. So if someone identifies himself with another party, it is not likely that this person will change his vote to the PVV because the party programs are so different. For example if someone identifies himself with the socialist party than it is possible that this person will vote for a green socialist party since the party programs are quite similar, with the PVV this is not case. Furthermore, the Party for Freedom itself did not exist before the elections of 2006. So a long lasting identification with the party is not present (in comparison to the socialist, liberal, protestant and catholic parties).

It however is possible, within this theory, that for those people who have a long lasting relationship with a party other than the PVV, the likelihood to vote for the PVV is relative low. The identification of individuals with another party makes them less likely to vote for the PVV. This way the theory cannot be applied directly to PVV voters, but it might give some insight in reasons, why people did not vote for the PVV. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated.

Hypothesis 3:
People who feel adherent or attracted to another party are less likely to vote for the PVV relative to people who do not feel adherent or attracted to another party.

2.4 Proximity of parties and voters

The theory of proximity of voters is constructed around the thought that voters have their own vision of a perfect world. If one was able to start its own political party than it would be possible to have a perfect match between the person's own ideas and the political program of a party. Unfortunately there is not a perfect match and therefore people vote for the political program closest to their own preferences, hence the name proximity. If it turns out that a new party is more proximate to their own views this election, in comparison to previous election, these people would vote for the new party (Deth van, 1993). Each election, a voter will determine on which party to vote, based upon the political program of a party and his own changing preferences. Hence, with proximity voting the identification of a person with a certain party is volatile. A person might choose for a specific party one election and may choose for a completely different party next election.

This theory of voting behavior has some downsides to it. First of all, a voter must have knowledge about all the available party programs. Next to that, someone makes a personal consideration of the viewpoints this person prefers (Woerdman, 1999). This results in a compromise on certain areas otherwise no political party program is going to fit.

If this theory is applied to the Party for Freedom, it is made clear that people should somehow feel more proximate to the party program of the PVV in comparison to other parties.
In recent research, emphasis is placed upon a shift in Dutch politics which already began with the rise of the LPF. For a long period of time Dutch politics was divided along three lines of conflict. Due to this shift in politics, a new line of conflict arose (Pellikaan, Lange, & Meer van der, 2007). Voters already made clear in 1992 that there are other significant issues (e.g. immigration and assimilation) that they believed to be important but mainstream political parties did not recognize these issues (Pellikaan, et al., 2007). This is exemplified by the rise of the LPF in 2002, which gained more than 20 seats in parliament, because the party program might have been more proximate to these voters. Other studies emphasize the influence of mainstream competition. When a party is founded with a similar party program as other parties, people will not easily change their vote. Though, if a party is founded which fulfills a need and is therefore different from other political parties, people might vote for this party. Research shows that if there are no competitors on a certain policy subject it is easier for a party to succeed and attract votes (Brug van der & Fennema, 2007). If the Party for Freedom has different viewpoint on certain policy topic compared to the other political parties available, people may vote for them.

The Party for Freedom is a strong advocate of a strict and sober European policy as well as immigrant policy. Although, research does not show that the euro skeptic viewpoints of radical right parties lead to more votes (Brug van der & Fennema, 2008). Concerning anti-immigration viewpoints, there is evidence that in general people are more likely to vote for the radical right because of these viewpoints (Arzheimer, 2008). In general, voters tend to give their vote to the radical right because of the policy preferences of the party (Brug van der & Fennema, 2008). Therefore it could be that people vote for the PVV, because their party program in general is most proximate to the voter's own vision. Therefore the following hypotheses are devised:

Hypothesis 4:
People who are more proximate to the PVV views on anti-immigration policy are more likely to vote for the PVV relative to people who are less proximate to the PVV views on anti-immigration policy.

Hypothesis 5:
People who are more proximate to the PVV views on European policy are more likely to vote for the PVV relative to people who are less proximate to the PVV views on European policy.

2.5 Retrospective voting

Retrospective voting suggests that people vote for a party of which they think did a good job in the period prior to the elections. If people think that the parties who are currently in government did a bad job they are more likely to vote for an opposition party and vice versa. This suggests that people have knowledge about the policy measures taken in the period prior to the elections (Woerdman, 1999). Furthermore it is assumed that people look at history to decide for which party they vote instead of looking to the future to decide which challenges lay ahead and which party is best able to cope with these challenges (Deth van, 1993).

If this theory is applied to the question why people vote for the PVV, it can be seen that in the elections of 2010 many people changed their vote. The PVV has gained a lot of seats thus, there were also parties who lost a lot of seats. It might be the case that the PVV gained the amount of seats because the other established parties did not do a good job in time prior to this election. As a relative new party, the PVV got the advantage of being able to present itself as a party that is new and refreshing. This way it might be that people have voted for the PVV because parties other than the PVV did not do a good job in the time prior to the elections. Several studies show little evidence that PVV voters vote for the PVV because they want to make a statement or protest vote (Arzheimer, 2008; Brug van der, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000). There is also research that concludes that one of the motivations for voting for radical right wing parties is to protest against established parties (Cutts, Ford, & Goodwin, 2011; Mayer & Perrineau, 1992; Swyngedouw, 2001). Evident is that there is still much debate whether or not extreme right votes are protest votes. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed.

Hypothesis 6:
People who are more dissatisfied with the governing parties are more likely to vote for the PVV relative to people who are less dissatisfied with the governing parties.

Another option that should be investigated is that parties receive votes because other parties where not able to execute their party program in a right manner (Pennings & Keman, 2003). Hence, people might have looked at the PVV and decided that this party could serve their interests better compared to other parties in last elections. Hence, it would be the ideal situation if the party would make it into government, to serve its voters interest. If parties in the last elections where not satisfactory and people think that the PVV is better able to guard their interest they will vote for this party.

Hypothesis 7:
People who have more confidence in the chance that the PVV will serve their interest are more likely to vote for the PVV relative to people who are less confident that the PVV will serve their interest.

2.6 Media and leadership effects

The final theory that is taken into account is the effect of media and leadership. This theory tries to explain voting behavior by the leadership qualities of the party leader and media attention that a party receives. This way people do not vote for a party as such, but they vote for a charismatic leader that tells a convincing story in the media (Woerdman, 1999).

Because party leaders are often replaced and since they are only really visible during campaign time, this theory suggests that the decision, for which party to vote is taken closer to the election date than the other four theories (Aarts, Thomassen, & Kolk van der, 2000).
Especially this theory has a short time span since most broadcasted debates are just a few weeks before elections. In this theory the amount of votes is influenced by the performance of the party leader in general and specifically the performance of the party leader in the media (Bean & Kelley, 1988). This media attention is necessary to get the message across, without any media attention the public will not know the party leader and will not know the viewpoints of the party.

When the focus is turned to the effect this theory has on voting for the PVV, several studies claim that leadership effects are really small or not even present (Brug van der & Mughan, 2007; Pas van der, Vries de, & Brug van der, 2011). So the performance of a party leader does not influence the decision for which political party people vote.
In comparison there is research which concludes that, leadership influences the choice for which party people vote (Rosenberg, Bohan, McCafferty, & Harris, 1986). In this research, which was carried out in California, there is a presidential system where there is more emphasize on the leader than there is on the party. Nevertheless there is also evidence that leadership effects are present in parliamentary systems (Andersen & Evans, 2003). Therefore the following hypothesis is developed:

Hypothesis 8:
People who think that Geert Wilders is more charismatic than other party leaders are more likely to vote for the PVV relative to people who do not think Geert Wilders is more charismatic.

Since people decide at a later moment for which party they vote (Aarts, et al., 2000) the effects of media might be stronger than they used to be. Research has shown that there are some media effects on the question for which party to vote (Elmelund-Praestekaer & Hopmann, 2012) but there are other predictors that have a stronger influence. There is also research that shows that; “the impact of media on the perception of the leader and on the perception of policy subjects is present and should not be underestimated” (Stevens, Banducci, & Karp, 2009). Furthermore, there are studies that show that media attention has an effect on populist right wing parties (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007; Walgrave & Swert de, 2004). In these studies the causal relation between media issue attention and the success of populist right parties is confirmed. Therefore it is more likely that persons who watch news programs and read newspapers often are more likely to vote for populist right parties since the media pays more attention to these issues (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007; Walgrave & Swert de, 2004). However, there is also research that presents contradicting evidence (Pauwels, 2010). Due to secondary nature of this research, it is impossible to look at media effects from the perspective of voting theory in this study. Therefore the influence of media effects is not taken into further account.

2.7 Conclusion

In the theoretical framework, an overview is given of five different theories that explain voting behavior. These theories should be considered as complementary to each other (the funnel of causality) and, depending on the country, all have a different explanatory power (Deth van, 1993). With the analysis of recent research, a focus is placed on the PVV and several testable hypotheses are presented. In the following chapter emphasize is placed upon the operationalization of these hypotheses.

3. Design and operationalization

To investigate the main research question "*Why did some people vote for the PVV in the Dutch elections of 2010 while others did not?"* it is necessary to obtain empirical data and test the hypotheses from the previous chapter. To investigate the empirical world, first the design of the study is described. Subsequently, the sampling method is discussed and lastly, the operationalization of the variables and threats to validity are emphasized.

3.1 Design

Since it is not possible to manipulate the independent variables (e.g. educational level) this study uses a non-experimental design namely a cross-sectional study. In this cross sectional study the hypothesis is that certain characteristics of people (e.g. hypothesis one: a high level of education) result in more votes for the PVV relative to people who do not possess this characteristics.

Since a secondary analysis is conducted the data was gathered by the Dutch voting institute (NKO) in the elections of 2010. The design consists of three rounds of questionnaires. The first round is distributed one month before the elections, the second round is distributed a week after the elections and the third and final round is distributed a month after the elections. In all three rounds, the same 2400 people participated (people who have been institutionalized or are otherwise excluded are already deleted from this sample). These 2400 people per round are distributed in a part which is contacted via the telephone and a section which is contacted personally. All 2400 people who have participated in the first two rounds are asked to fill in the subsequent drop-off questionnaire. This way five different samples are created (first and second round personally and telephone contact and a drop-off sample). If someone did not vote for a party in the 2010 elections this person is addressed as missing value. Since voters are the main interest in this study, the units of observation and analysis are: Dutch registered voters of the 2010 election who have casted a vote. Since we only investigate these voters, the conclusions are also limited to the voters in the elections of 2010 (for an extended overview of the data collection methods (Kiezersonderzoek, 2006)).

3.2 Sampling

The research population in this study is: Dutch citizens who are eighteen years of age or older on the election date, the ninth of June 2010 and who live in the Netherlands. In this research people who are institutionalized are excluded (e.g. people in mental institutions or prison).
Out of this research population it is necessary to draw a random sample. The sampling method that is used here is based upon a personal sampling. This means that a person is selected and interviewed instead of that a household is selected, and out of that household a random person is interviewed (household sampling). So every individual has the same chance of being chosen in the sample. Because the sample needs to be representative for the Netherlands, a two level sample is used. This means that first a municipality is selected and out of this municipality a number of citizens are selected. So everyone has a chance X that your municipality is selected and a chance Y that you are selected in your municipality. The product of this is the same for every person in the Netherlands, so everybody has the same probability to be selected into the sample.

3.3 Operationalization

In this study several independent variables are used to measure the dependent variable: to cast a vote for the Party for Freedom or for another party. This way the dependent variable is dichotomous (it is possible to vote for the PVV or not to vote for the PVV). According to the theoretical expectations in chapter two, there are eight independent variables that can be measured and possibly have an effect on the dependent variable. These independent variables are measured using nominal and ordinal scales and sometimes different scales are combined to construct an independent variable. Since a secondary study is done (the dataset is already available and fixed) in combination with a cross sectional design, the construct and internal validity are emphasized rather than the statistical and external validity.

Concerning internal validity one factor in particular is of concern: ambiguous temporal precedence. In the hypotheses concerning party identification and proximity to voters (immigration and European policy), the possibility is present that, since people have voted for the PVV, these people rationalize their choice afterwards. The question is: were people attracted to the policy program of the PVV and are they therefore more likely to vote for the PVV or did they vote for the PVV and did they try to rationalize their vote afterwards by pretending that the policy program of the PVV is proximate to themselves as well? The same argument is applicable for party identification. Were people already attracted to another party before they voted, or did they vote for another party and rationalized their choice afterwards, by saying that they felt attracted to another party? In the design of the questionnaires this threat was already anticipated therefore the questions are posed in a way that it is impossible to rationalize their choice afterwards. The questions that might be influenced by the vote of someone are posted before the elections, this way someone is not able to be attracted to another party once someone voted for this party in the elections.
Another threat of concern is attrition of the people within the sample. From previous research it is known that a percentage of the sample will drop out and therefore does not complete all the questionnaires. There may be items that are completed by all the people in the sample but there might also be items which are only filled in by half the sample. The consequence of this attrition is that the sample might be influenced due to the amount of missing values. The sample will be compared with the population, to investigate the effects missing values have on the sample. This way it is possible to see if people with certain characteristics have left the sample and might have altered the sample.

With respect to construct validity there are also two factors that need further elaboration. First is the reactivity to the research situation. In the Netherlands voting is confidential and asking for which party someone voted can be considered inappropriate. Furthermore there might be people who are unwilling to answer other questions. To look if this reactivity does not pose any problems the variables that are used are scrutinized. Hence, the variables are checked for normality and other parameters.
Another risk that is present in the research is inadequate explication of constructs. Four hypotheses are measured by different items which might be confounding. In paragraph 3.4 a table is included in which the constructs have been made as clear as possible. Furthermore, chi square testing will be performed to look at the relationship within the construct, moreover there will be tested for multicollinearity to look at confounding effects between the independent variables. First the original variables are examined.

Table 3.1 Analysis of original variables

Hypothesis	Independent variable	Original measurement of items	Scale	Missing data	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
1	Educational level	What is the highest educational level you have achieved?	Ordinal	181	1	5	3,69	1,24
2	Unemployment	What is your main source of income?	Nominal	4	1	13		
3	Identification with a party	Do you consider yourself as adherent to a certain political party?	Nominal	6	1	2		
		Do you consider yourself as attracted to a certain party?	Nominal	763	1	2		
		To which party do you feel attracted or adherent?	Nominal	854	1	13		
4	Anti-Immigration viewpoint	Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7 where one stands for more asylum seekers should be allowed in the nation and seven is asylum seekers should be sent back?	Ratio	29	1	7	4,56	1,47
		Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7 where one stands for: asylum seekers should keep their own identity and seven stands for: asylum seekers should assimilate to the habits in their new country?	Ratio	10	1	7	4,91	1,57
5	European policy	Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7 where one stands for European integration should continue and seven stands for European integration has already gone too far?	Ratio	417	1	7	4,34	1,81
		Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7 where one stands for European integration should stop and seven stands for European integration should go as fast as possible.	Ratio	647	1	7	4,66	1,41
6	Dissatisfaction with governing parties	How satisfied are you with the policy of the current government concerning the past three years?	Ordinal	38	1	5	3,13	0,84
		What do you think about the performance of the current government?	Ordinal	431	1	4	2,43	0,58
7	Confidence in the PVV as big party	Which parties should form a government?	Ordinal	283	1	10	4,14	2,28
8	Charisma of leaders	How sympathetic do you think Geert Wilders is on a scale from zero to ten?	Ratio	160	0	10	3,12	2,65
Dependent variable	To vote or not to vote for the PVV	For which party did you vote in the elections of 2010?	Nominal	587	1	15		

Fourteen different original variables are used to measure nine theoretically relevant variables. Table 3.1 gives insight in the main characteristics of the original variables. These new constructed variables are assembled out of original variables, which are present in the dataset. Before the new variables can be constructed, the original variables are examined. The third column shows the original measurement of the items. Some independent variables are measured by one variable in the original database (education) but there are also some variables which are measured using a multiple original variables (e.g. European policy). As showed in table 3.1 several original items measure the construct that is intended (educational level is measured by the highest achieved level of education). There are also constructs that are measured using a derivative of the intended construct (sympathy score for charisma). Since a secondary study is done these derivatives are used because there was no superior alternative available. When it was impossible to measure a certain construct this construct was not tested (media attention). In the fourth column the scale, on which the original items are measured, is presented and it can be seen that the items are measured using nominal as well as ordinal and ratio scales. The fifth column shows the number of missing data. This column shows that there are some items which have a lot of missing values (for example to which party do you feel adherent), this does not have to be problematic, because some people cannot answer this question due to the subsequent order of asking the questions. If a person already answered that he feels adherent to a party this person does not have to answer the follow-up question to which party do you feel attracted to. This results in a lot of missing data on this specific item. The following column presents the range in which the minimum and maximum values are showed. This illustrates that items are measured on different scales. The last two columns present the mean and standard deviation, which indicate if the original items are highly skewed (a mean that is really off-center). The standard deviation indicates if the values are clustered around the mean or are scattered around the minimum and maximum of the range. With the last independent variable (charisma of leaders) there can be seen that the variable is skewed (a mean of 3,12) but that the standard deviation is also really large (2,65). This indicates that the distribution is skewed to the right with respondents also at the end of the range.

With these original items it is possible to compute new constructed variables (for in depth analysis of the original variables see appendix A). All the values that do not correspond with a valid answer are treated as missing values and are not taken into further account. Next the direction of all variables is changed in a way that a high score on a variable makes it more likely to vote PVV in comparison to a low score (for example people who think Geert Wilders is not charismatic receive a receive a low score and people which think Geert Wilders is charismatic receive a high score on the variable charisma). Only the variable education is not recoded in this way because, it is counter intuitive (people with a low educational level also have a low score on the variable). Since the variables are measured on different scales all variables are recoded in a way that every variable has values that range from -1 to 1 with a median of 0. Only the dichotomous variables have a range of 0 to 1. In table 3.2 these transformations are visualized.

Table 3.2: Construction of new variables

Hypo-thesis	Original scale	Transformations	Scale construction
1	Ordinal scale from 1: elementary to 5: university.	1 to 3 is recoded as lower educational level with value minus one. 4 is middle educational level with value zero. 5 is high educational level with value one.	Ordinal scale which ranges from -1 low education to 1 high education.
2	Scale which ranges from 1 to 13 with different categories of most important household income.	The values 1 thru 6, 9 and 12 are recoded into employed (0), the values 7 thru 8, 10 thru 11 and 13 are recoded into unemployed (1).	Nominal scale which has value 0 employed and value 1 unemployed.
3	Two variables which distinguish between adherence, attracted and no party affiliation. The last variable is to identify for which party.	The variables are computed in a way that someone is able to be adherent to another party, attracted to another party and lastly to have no party binding.	Ordinal scale with value -1 is adherent to another party, 0 is attracted to another party, 1 is no affiliation.
4	Two variables which are corresponding. The first variable 1: admit more to 7: send back more. The second variable is 1: keep own culture to 7: adjust to Dutch culture.	The variables are combined into one new variable. If a respondent has a valid value for one variable this value is taken as mean value for both variables.	Ordinal variable where -1 stands for pro-immigration and 1 stands for anti-immigration.
5	Two variables which are contradicting. The first variable: EU integration 1: should continue 7: has gone too far. The second variable European integration should 1: stop 7: speed up.	The second variable is recoded in a way that -1 becomes EU integration should speed up and 1 EU integration should stop. If a respondent has a valid value for one variable this value is taken as mean value for both variables.	Ordinal variable where -1 stands for pro-European policy and 1 stands for against European policy.
6	Two variables which are corresponding. The first variable is a 5 point scale from 1 really satisfied with government policies thru 5 really dissatisfied. The second variable is a 4 point scale where 1 is the government performed very well thru 4 very bad.	The second variable is recoded in a way that the four possible values are evenly distributed around the five point scale. This way there are two scales which are combined. If a respondent has a valid value for one variable this value is taken as mean value for both variables.	Ordinal variable where -1 stands for really satisfied with current parties and 1 stands for really dissatisfied with current parties.
7	A scale which ranges from 1 to 10 where 1 stands for very unlikely that PVV becomes a governing party and 10 is really likely that PVV becomes a governing party.	The scale does not undergo any transformations. It is already in the right direction a high score makes it relatively more likely that this respondent will vote PVV.	Scale, -1 stands for that it is very unlikely that the PVV will become a governing party, 1 is really likely.

8	A scale which ranges from 0 to 10 where 0 stands for Geert Wilders is really unsympathetic and 10 is Geert Wilders is really sympathetic.	The scale does not undergo any transformations. It is already in the right direction a high score makes it relatively more likely that this respondent will vote PVV.	Scale, -1 stands for Geert Wilders is really unsympathetic, and 1 represents that Geert Wilders is really sympathetic.
Hypothesis	**Original scale**	**Transformations**	**Scale construction**
1	A scale which contains all the possible parties which ranges from 1 to 13.	All votes other than the PVV become value 0. All the votes for the PVV become value 1. Invalid or blank votes become missing values.	Nominal, 0 is a vote for another party than the PVV, 1 is a vote for the PVV.

In table 3.2 the way the variables are operationalized is visible. Eight independent variables are identified that correspond with the eight hypotheses of chapter two. First these independent variables (measured by one item or several items) must undergo a thorough examination. If several items are used to measure one independent variable it is necessary to look at the internal correlations of these variables. To do this cross tabulation and Cramer's V testing will be used in SPSS. Furthermore it is not possible to use simple linear regression because the dependent variable (people do or do not vote for the PVV) is dichotomous, therefore it is necessary to use logistic regression, in SPSS, to analyze the data. This way the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable can be analyzed. As showed in table 3.2 all the variables range from -1 to 1 except for the dichotomous variables which range from 0 to 1. This ensures that when using logistic regression all the coefficients are standardized. Furthermore the dependent variable is operationalized which ranges from 0 to 1. In the following paragraph the new constructed variables are analyzed to look at some of the characteristics.

3.4 Reliability of variables

In table 3.3 the new variables are analyzed and the characteristics are scrutinized. Table 3.3 has the same lay-out as table 3.1 which makes it easier to compare the variables and look at the differences that are present. Since all the variables are transformed into a -1 to 1 scale the minimum for the scales is -1 for the ordinal and ratio scales. For the dichotomous scales the minimum is zero. For all the scales the maximum is 1.

Table 3.3: In depth analysis of the new constructed variables

	Scale	Missing values	Valid N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation	Median	Skewness	Kurtosis
Education	Nominal	181	2440	-1	1			0	0,021	-1,324
Unemployment	Nominal	4	2617	0	1			0	4,324	16,711
Party identification	Nominal	27	2594	-1	1			0	-0,202	-1,414
Immigration	Ratio	4	2617	-1	1	0,25	0,44	0,33	-0,223	-0,395
European policy	Ratio	399	2222	-1	1	-0,03	0,44	0	0,349	0,007
Protest	Ratio	25	2596	-1	1	0,02	0,36	0	0,459	-0,274
Confidence	Ratio	283	2338	-1	1	-0,30	0,51	-0,33	0,340	-0,835
Charisma	Ratio	160	2461	-1	1	-0,38	0,52	-0,40	0,560	-0,617
PVV vote	Nominal	587	2034	0	1			0	2,363	3,586

Eight out of nine variables have missing values that do not exceed 20% of the respondents. Only the dependent variable has a large amount of missing values; part of this amount is due to the transformation of non-voters into missing values. Moreover, as already been explained in the threats to validity paragraph, some people are reluctant to answer for which party they voted.

After testing with chi-square the conclusion can be drawn that the missing data does not affect the sample and it is still representative for the population (see appendix B). Moreover, there are several new constructed variables that consist of multiple original variables. To look at the reliability of these transformations cross tabulation as well as chi-square testing is used (for in depth analysis of the combined variables see appendix C). The conclusion can be drawn that the original variables can be computed together and are reliable measurements of the construct under examination. Furthermore, it can be seen that seven out of nine variables have a skewness of less than +1 and - 1. Since there are two variables (unemployment and PVV vote) which are dichotomous and where one value is overrepresented the skewness is higher than 1. The same effect can be seen when looking at the kurtosis; again the same two variables are extraordinary. If the median is taken into account there can be seen that in all cases the median is equal or really close to the mean, which indicates that there are no extreme scores affecting the mean (for in depth analysis of the new constructed variables see appendix D). In conclusion, there are no extraordinary characteristics to the variables and they can be used for further analysis.

Another factor that needs to be taken into account is the correlation between the independent variables. From chapter two (the funnel of causality) the presumption is made that the independent factors are correlated. However, the correlation between the independent variable cannot be too high since this will make interpretation of the individual contributions to the model difficult (for multicollinearity analyses see appendix E). To look at the correlations between the independent variables the following cross tabulation is presented.

Table 3.4:Pearson correlation between independent variables

	Education	**Unemployment**	**Party identification**	**Immigration**	**European policy**	**Protest**	**Confidence**
Unemployment	-0,088**	X					
Party Identification	-0,178**	0,041*	X				
Immigration	-0,286**	0,007	0,209**	X			
European policy	-0,164**	0,024	0,146**	0,244**	X		
Protest	-0,070**	0,043*	0,146**	0,140**	0,183**	X	
Confidence	-0,015	-0,031	0,045*	0,140**	0,024	0,017	X
Charisma	-0,224**	0,043*	0,256**	0,480**	0,174**	0,137**	0,311**

** Significance at the 0,05 level **Significance at the 0,01 level*

Since variables are measured on different scales Kendall tau C as well as Pearson correlation is used. Out of the analysis with Kendall tau C the same correlations were obtained in comparison to the Pearson correlation. Although, some assumptions are violated (ordinal measured variables) table 3.4 shows the Pearson correlations since this makes the correlations comparable. As expected most of the variables correlate with each other (protest for example correlates with all other variables except confidence). However there are also variables that do not correlate much (unemployment) with other variables. Education is the only variable which has a negative correlation with all other variables. This is expected, since it is the only variable that is recoded in a way that a high score makes you less likely to vote for the PVV, otherwise the variable would be counter intuitive. Although the table shows a mixed pattern, the majority of the variables behave as expected by chapter two and therefore empirically supports the theoretical expectations.

4. Analysis

This chapter will focus on the statistical analysis that is performed, to examine which independent variables influence the choice whether or not to vote for the PVV. The focus of the first paragraph will be on the logistic regression model. The second paragraph will concentrate on the explanatory power of the model.

4.1 Logistic regression model

Since our dependent variable is dichotomized, logistic regression is used. With logistic regression it is possible to build a model that explains why people vote for the PVV. First, the effect of social structural factors (hypothesis one and two) is examined. Thereafter, other independent variables are added to the model to examine if those variables have a significant effect on the choice to vote for the PVV. This way, all independent variables are analyzed to see whether they have an effect and to what extent they influence the choice to vote for the PVV.
The second column of table 4.1 shows the baseline model. In logistic regression this baseline model represents the odds that someone will vote PVV when there are no independent variables in the model that influence these odds. In this research there are 1793 people who have voted for another party, 241 people voted for the PVV which gives an expected B value (exp. B) of 0,134 (241/1793). Hence, there is a natural odds of *13,4%* to vote PVV. When independent variables are taken into account it is expected that certain characteristics of people make them more likely to vote for the PVV (higher odds).

In table 4.1, the following five columns (numbered 1 to 5) show the effects, the five theories (which are represented by eight hypotheses) have on the odds to vote PVV. All the scales of the variables are computed in a way that the median is zero or close to zero and the most extreme value is one. Hereby the exp. B value is standardized in a way that a unit increase on a scale represents the increase from 0 (which is the median or close to the median) to the most extreme value. If education is taken as example, the exp. B value shows the decrease in likelihood to vote for the PVV, when the education level of a person increases from the median value (middle educational level) to the most extreme value (higher education level).

Model one, in table 4.1, describes the influence of social structural factors on the likelihood to vote PVV. If a person is highly educated the likelihood to vote PVV decreases with (1-0,375) 0,625. This means that the odds to vote for the PVV decrease with *62,5%* with a unit increase on the scale of education. If someone is higher educated he will be less likely to vote for the PVV.
Unemployment shows a different image since the exp. B values is above the value one, this indicates that a unit increase in x (from 0 to 1) causes a person to be more likely to vote PVV. With unemployment the likelihood to vote PVV increases with (1-1,354) 0,354 which is *35,4%* if a person is unemployed in comparison to when a person is employed. However the exp. B value is not significant which indicates that it is not sure if being unemployed influences the likelihood to vote PVV.

Table 4.1 Logistic multilevel models on voting for the Party for Freedom

	Baseline model		**1**		**2**		**3**		**4**		**5**	
	Exp. B	Sig	Exp. B	Sig	Exp. B	Sig	Exp. B	Sig	Exp. B	Sig	Exp. B	Sig
Constant	0,134	0,000	0,103	0,000	0,052	0,000	0,021	0,000	0,020	0,000	0,038	0,000
Education			0,375	0,000	0,417	0,000	0,553	0,000	0,512	0,00	0,512	0,000
Unemployment			1,354	0,351	1,274	0,489	1,464	0,326	1,673	0,218	1,224	0,665
Party identification					5,679	0,000	4,733	0,000	5,104	0,000	4,794	0,000
Immigration							12,385	0,000	11,584	0,000	4,391	0,000
European policy							1,315	0,176	1,118	0,637	0,986	0,957
Protest									4,432	0,000	4,573	0,000
Confidence									2,368	0,000	1,353	0,145
Charisma											8,946	0,000

The second model in table 4.1 shows that the exp. B value of party identification is 5,679. Therefore, if someone has no party identification he is (1-5,679*100) *467,9%* more likely to vote for the PVV compared to someone who is attracted to another party. Moreover it shows that the exp. B values of education changed due to the interaction effects. The educational level increases in importance to explain PVV voting behavior under the influence of party identification.
The third model shows a remarkable outcome on the immigration hypothesis. The exp. B value is 12,385, which can be considers as high, since people who are at the outskirts of the range (so those who have a negative opinion towards immigration) are 11 times more likely to vote PVV than people who are in the middle of the range.
Concerning European policy, it can be seen that although the exp. B value is above one there cannot be said that people who are in favor of a strict European policy are more likely to vote PVV since the exp. B value is insignificant. Table 4.1 shows again that with the introduction of these two independent variables exp. B values of other independent variable are affected.
The fourth model includes two more independent variables into the model. These two variables (protest vote and confidence) are both significant and both increase the likelihood to vote PVV. Protest vote results in an increase of *343,2%* in likelihood if a person is dissatisfied with the government compared to someone who is the middle of the range of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the government.
The exp. B value of confidence is lower compared to the protest vote. However it is still higher than one, so it influences the likelihood of voting PVV. If someone has confidence in the PVV that the party is able to guard his interest, this person is *136,8%* more likely to vote for the PVV compared to a person who is in the middle of the range.
The fifth and last model completes the range of independent variables that are added. It is showed that the exp. B value is the highest of the whole range of variables. If someone thinks that Geert Wilders is really charismatic this person is eight times more likely to vote for the PVV compared to someone who is in the middle of the scale. Furthermore table 4.1 shows that the addition of charisma as independent variable seriously affects the exp. B value of immigration. Another remarkable factor is that confidence becomes statistically insignificant due to the addition of charisma into the model. Possibly charisma increases the odds to vote PVV so much that confidence becomes insignificant. Moreover, when independent variables are added, the new variables also partially explain why people vote for the PVV therefore, the exp. B values of the other variables are dropping along the way.

Furthermore, the effect of deleting statistically insignificant variables (unemployment, European policy and confidence) from model five is examined. In SPSS the insignificant variables are deleted using iteration. The process starts with all the independent variables in the model (back step), subsequently, values are deleted on the basis of its insignificance (log likelihood iteration). This method has been chosen because the forward method is subject to suppressor effects. Moreover, the log likelihood ratio is used since other statistics can be unreliable. Table 4.2 shows the outcome of this analysis.

Table 4.2: Logistic regression model using back step log likelihood ratio

	Exp. B value	Significance level
Education	0,516	0,000
Party identification	4,732	0,000
Immigration	4,509	0,000
Protest	4,518	0,000
Charisma	9,813	0,000
Constant	0,036	0,000

In table 4.2 the outcome is showed when the three independent variables are deleted from model five (unemployment, European policy and confidence). The exp. B values of the remaining independent variables are not really affected by the deletion of the three variables. The odds ratios do not change much and thus the model is simplified without compromising on the explanatory power. The following paragraph will focus on the contributions of the independent variables to the explanatory power of the model.

4.2 Explanatory power of the model

In the previous paragraph, the constant was already mentioned as well as the contributions to the model. The constant represents the predicted value of PVV votes when there are no independent variables that influence the categorization. Thus, when there are no independent variables in the equation, all the respondents are categorized into the value the model is trying to explain. Hence, in the baseline model all the respondents are categorized into the PVV vote. The second and third column of table 4.3 shows the outcome of this baseline model (where only the constant is included).

Table 4.3: Explanatory power of three different models

	Baseline model		**Model five**		**Back step model**	
	Other vote	PVV vote	Other vote	PVV vote	Other vote	PVV vote
Other vote	0	1793	1201	367	1200	368
PVV vote	0	241	15	169	14	170
Percentage correctly classified		13,4%		78,2%		78,2%

In table 4.3 three different models are presented; a baseline model, model five and the back step model. With the baseline model there are no independent variables to categorize PVV voters and other voters into different cells, therefore, all the voters are assigned to the PVV vote column. This means that *13,4%* of the votes are correctly predicted (the *13,4%* who voted PVV). In model five all variables are taken into account (including insignificant independent variables). Table 4.3 shows that *78,2%* of the votes is assigned correctly so a huge increase in comparison to the baseline model (for individual predictions see appendix F). So, when all the independent variables are taken into account, the logistic regression model is able to predict of *78,2%* of the people whether they are going to vote PVV or not. The back step model investigates what happens if three insignificant independent variables are omitted from model five (unemployment, European policy and confidence). In table 4.3 it is showed that the explanatory power of the model does not diminish. Therefore the back step model is able to predict voting behavior just as good as the model five with fewer independent variables.

5. Conclusion and discussion

In the upcoming paragraph some methodological limitations of this research are discussed. Subsequently, conclusions are drawn about the analyses that have been done, moreover some recommendations for further research will be considered. The second paragraph will focus on the impact of the research.

5.1 Conclusions

The first remark that must be made is that the research has used the NKO data of the 2010 elections. In every election political parties change and adjust their viewpoints on subjects due to recent events or new and refreshing insights. This makes election research a constant changing matter which is subject to the changing reality of the day. Therefore the conclusions drawn in this research only apply to the elections of 2010.

A second remark is the secondary nature of the study. Although secondary studies have many advantages (e.g. a researcher does not have to collect his own material), the disadvantages are also multiple. The first and foremost disadvantage is that some data are not available or have to be adjusted to fit the purpose. In the theoretical framework another hypothesis was formulated concerning media attention, but due to the restrictions in data it was not possible to examine the effect of the media on the question whether or not to vote PVV. This problem can be solved if a researcher has means and time to collect its own data.

In the theoretical framework, eight variables were identified that possibly have an effect on the question whether or not to vote PVV. In the subsequent chapters these variables were operationalized and a logistic regression model was constructed. Out of the analyses the conclusion can be drawn that there are three independent variables of which it is not sure if the influence whether or not to vote PVV. Unemployment and European policy are both insignificant from the first time they enter the logistic model. This is different for confidence since this variable becomes insignificant in model five when charisma is added. These variables therefore do not contribute to an explanation why people vote for the PVV

All other variables (education, party identification, immigration, protest vote, and charisma) are significant and contribute to explanatory power of the logistic regression model. This is also shown in table 4.3 in chapter four, where the back step model excludes the three insignificant variables (unemployment, European policy and confidence) and retains the explanatory power of model five (where these insignificant variables are still included).

If the focus is on the significant variables it can be seen that a high educational level makes an elector less likely to vote for the PVV. Hypothesis one is therefore confirmed by the analysis. Hypothesis two in contradiction, has to be rejected; unemployment does not influence the person's likelihood to vote for the Party for Freedom. The third hypothesis can be confirmed because people who feel adherent to another party or are attracted to another party are less likely to vote for the PVV in comparison to people who have no party affiliation. The fourth hypothesis is also confirmed by the analysis: if a person is in favor of strict immigration rules, this person is more likely to vote PVV. The fifth hypothesis has to be rejected; there is no evidence that people who advocate a strict and sober European policy are more likely to vote PVV.

The protest vote hypothesis is also confirmed by the analysis; people who disagree with current politics are more likely to vote PVV. The seventh hypothesis is also rejected since the variable is insignificant. If a person has confidence in the PVV as a party that is able to guard his interest he is not more likely to vote for the PVV in comparison to someone who does not have this confidence. The last hypothesis is confirmed by the analysis; people who think Geert Wilders is a charismatic leader are more likely to vote PVV than people who think Geert Wilders is not a charismatic leader.

The logistic regression model makes it possible to analyze if a person is more likely to vote PVV or not to vote PVV. This way the main question can be answered: *Why did some people vote for the PVV in the Dutch elections of 2010 while others did not?* Out of the analysis can be concluded that if people possess certain characteristics or have certain viewpoints, these people are more likely to vote PVV. The conclusion has shown that the typical PVV voter has the following characteristics: this person is less educated, not adherent or attracted to another party, advocate of a strong and strict immigration policy, not a partisan of current politics and thinks Geert Wilders is a charismatic leader. If people do not have or only partially have these characteristics, the likelihood to vote PVV declines.

78,2% of the votes can be explained using the logistic regression model. One remark must be made; if it was possible to take the media effects into account, this percentage could even rise. Therefore, it is recommended that in a subsequent study several databases are combined to look at additional explanations why people vote for the PVV and in general why they vote for populist right parties.
A more qualitative follow-up study could attribute to a better understanding of PVV voting. The research that is done has a strong quantitative character, but a qualitative study could validate the conclusions drawn in this study. Moreover the qualitative validation could generate new insights in the reasons why people vote for the PVV that have not yet been explored. This way the qualitative study should have an exploring as well as validating character.
With respect to the logistic regression model there are also some improvements recommended. The foremost is the standardization of the coefficients. In this research the coefficients have been standardized using recoding scales of measurement. This makes interpretation more difficult since it is easier to interpret a 1 to 10 scale compared to a minus 1 to plus 1 scale. Especially the mean and standard deviation are more complex to understand. This problem could be solved using different standardizing method. A point of attention is that with standardizing coefficients most researchers only partially standardize the coefficients on the basis of the standard deviation, this method has no advantages over the method used here and should be disregarded. If another option is chosen for standardizing the coefficients one should standardize the coefficients fully and have a good understanding of the difficulties that come along with this procedure.
The last option to improve the logistic regression model is to analyze in which way construct confounding has occurred in this study. Some independent variables are close to measuring for which party someone voted for (which is the dependent variable) this way multicollinearity could occur. Although this problem has not occurred in this study there are theoretical reasons to disregard a high scoring coefficient from the logistic regression model if multicollinearity is expected on a theoretical basis.

5.2 Discussion

In the theory nine hypotheses were formulated of which one could not be tested. In the conclusion of this research, three of the hypotheses were rejected and five were confirmed. The first rejected hypothesis concerned unemployment and was found to be insignificant. In the theoretical framework some researchers found evidence that supported the hypothesis whilst others found contradicting evidence. The conclusion drawn in this research is therefore in line with the current research that also shows an ambiguous picture.
The following hypothesis that was rejected is European policy. This hypothesis could not be confirmed due to insignificance, remarkably in model five the variable also appeared to have a negative effect. It seems that, if person is in favor of strict European policy he is less likely to vote for the PVV. This finding is in line with the theoretical expectations (Brug van der & Fennema, 2008) which already pointed in this direction.
The last rejected hypothesis was confidence which appeared to be insignificant. Since the variable only appeared to be insignificant in model five there is expected that charisma of the party leader is more important than confidence in a party only. The theoretical expectation was therefore not confirmed.

Although the back step model generates the same explanatory power as model five, the factors that influence voting for the PVV are still multiple. People vote for the PVV for a variety of reasons, therefore it is likely that the party is not different from other parties.

This research is an addition to what is already known about voting for radical right parties and especially about voting for the PVV. Since there are several reasons to vote for the PVV, other parties need to realize that if they want to counter the rise of the PVV they need an integral approach which counteracts all the reasons why people vote for the PVV. Furthermore it is possible for other parties to focus on the main selling points of the PVV as immigration. If the PVV wants to remain a party with many representatives in the house of parliament they also need to realize that there is a constant threat that one of the reasons why people vote for the PVV might change. The PVV might become an established party and therefore may not be able to win the protest votes anymore in following elections.

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Appendices

Appendix A: In depth analysis of the original variables

Table 6.1: In depth analysis of the original variables

	Median	Skewness	Kurtosis
What is the highest educational level you have achieved?	4	-0,992	0,190
What is your main source of income?	1	0,381	0,382
Do you consider yourself as adherent to a certain political party?	3	0,861	-0,051
Do you consider yourself as attracted to a certain party?		Constant	Constant
To which party do you feel attracted or adherent?		Constant	Constant
Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7 where one stands for more asylum seekers should be allowed in the nation and seven is asylum seekers should be sent back?	4	-0,067	-0,288
Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7 where one stands for: asylum seekers should keep their own identity and seven stands for: asylum seekers should assimilate to the habits in their new country?	5	-0,278	-0,630
Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7 where one stands for European integration should continue and seven stands for European integration has already gone too far?	4	0,023	-0,900
Where would you place yourself on a line from 1 to 7 where one stands for European integration should stop and seven stands for European integration should go as fast as possible.	5	-0,602	0,335
How satisfied are you with the policy of the current government concerning the past three years?	3	0,224	-0,527
What do you think about the performance of the current government?	2	0,769	-0,234
Which parties should form a government?	4	0,242	-1,040
How sympathetic do you think Geert Wilders is on a scale from zero to ten?	2	0,595	-0,612
For which party did you vote in the elections of 2010?	3	0,943	0,413

Appendix B: Reliability of sample and population

Table 6.2 Comparison of the sample with the population

Party voted for	**Sample**	**Population**
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	13,3%	13,6%
Social Democratic Party (PVDA)	19,9%	19,6%
Liberal Party (VVD)	21,4%	20,5%
Green left	7,1%	6,7%
Socialist party (SP)	11,4%	9,8%
Democrats (D66)	8,7%	6,9%
Christian union	3,5%	3,2%
Reformed political party (SGP)	1,4%	1,7%
Party for Freedom (PVV)	11,9%	15,4%
Party for animals (PvdD)	1,0%	1,3%
Proud of the Netherlands (TON)	0,4%	0,6%
Other	0,4%	0,5%

As can be seen in table 6.2 the sample does not differ much compared to the whole population. The conclusion can be drawn that the sample is representative for the whole population.

Appendix C: internal reliability of variables

In the analysis four variables (party identification, immigration, European policy and protest) are combined variables. Out of these four variables one variable (party identification) is constructed in a consecutive form that makes cross tabulation pointless. The three other variables are examined in depth in this appendix. First the cross tabulation with the absolute values is shown. Furthermore the chi-square values are presented to look at the internal validity. Moreover the Cramer's V value is given as an indication of the degree of association between the two variables.

Table 6.3 cross tabulation of independent variable immigration

Cult zelf→ Asiezelf↓	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	14	16	5	13	5	5	7
2	14	34	31	30	20	5	9
3	10	42	86	79	59	31	14
4	17	34	105	248	225	109	80
5	3	10	24	78	210	154	76
6	2	5	5	23	87	132	107
7	5	3	3	20	31	50	208

As can be seen out of table 6.3 if a respondent answered value 4 on the first variable it is very likely that it will also submit value 4 on the other value. A line can be identified which runs from the upper left corner to the lower right corner, which is expected. The chi-square value also indicated a highly significant relationship (0,000) and the Cramer's V value is 0,293 what indicates that there is a moderate relationship between the two values. Since there are no extraordinary results, the conclusion is drawn that both variables can be combined into a new variable.

Table 6.4 cross tabulation of independent variable European policy

Snelwens transformed→ Eurzelf↓	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	24	35	34	23	8	5	3
2	11	59	88	50	21	3	1
3	7	63	115	76	28	4	2
4	24	68	152	129	52	13	2
5	18	61	102	61	38	16	6
6	17	50	66	37	30	13	20
7	57	52	66	61	20	26	39

The same image can be seen in table 6.4 as in table 6.3. Although, a line can be identified which runs from the upper left corner to the lower right corner the values show that the image is more blurred than the immigration table. The chi-square value also indicates a highly significant relationship (0,000) Cramer's V in comparison is much lower with a value is 0,153 what indicates that there is only a low association between the two values. Although the Cramer's V value is on the low end of the spectrum the conclusion is drawn that both variables can be combined into a new variable.

Table 6.5 cross tabulation of independent variable protest vote

Pres Reg→ Tevreden recoded↓	1	2,33	3,67	5
1	2	5	1	0
2	14	448	71	2
3	1	612	292	13
4	0	209	372	43
5	2	13	49	28

In table 6.5 a different image can be seen than in the former two tables. Here the values are clustered around a few possible combinations which make it harder to identify if the two values are associated. The chi-square value is again highly significant 0,000 but a remark must be made here since some cells have an expected count of less than five. This makes the chi-square value unreliable and therefore Cramer's V is a better indication of the association between the variables. Out of the Cramer's V values 0,314 the conclusion can be drawn that both of the variables are moderately associated, this leads to the conclusion that both variables can be combined into a new variable.

Appendix D: In depth analysis of the new constructed variables

In this appendix the histograms of all the independent variables as well as the dependent variable are displayed in subsequent order.

Figure 6.1: Histogram of independent variable education



The first independent variable is education, there can be seen that the values are evenly distributed across the range of possible values. The variable is normally distributed with little skewness and a normal kurtosis.

Figure 6.2: Histogram of independent variable unemployment



The following independent variable unemployment shows a different histogram. Since the variable is dichotomous the skewness and kurtosis are not applicable. It is showed however, that value zero is overrepresented relative to value one. This means that most people are employed as expected.

Figure 6.3: Histogram of independent variable party identification



The histogram of party identification shows a slightly skewed image as was expected. A lot of voters feel attracted or adherent to another party (values -1 and 0). The value 1 contains most respondents since this value represents people who have no party identification.

Figure 6.4: Histogram of independent variable immigration



The fourth histogram shows that the independent variable immigration is rather skewed to the left side. This means that a lot of respondents remain at the right side of the range of possible values. The kurtosis of the histogram presents no extraordinary characteristics since there is not a high peak or a sudden dent in the histogram.

Figure 6.5: Histogram of independent variable European policy



The histogram of European policy presents a normal distribution with a peak at the median and mean of 0. Although the histogram shows a rather perfect normal distribution there is a small upswing at the end of the scale (1), this upswing however is small and does not pose any problems for further analysis.

Figure 6.6: Histogram of independent variable protest vote



The following graph shows a different histogram than the previous ones in the sense that it is not normally distributed. There are many possible values due to recoding efforts (a four point scale has been distributed across a five point scale); this makes the histogram rather chaotic. Although the histogram looks chaotic the measurements tell a different story in the sense that the skewness as well as the kurtosis are well within limits. The sudden dents in the histogram can therefore be solely attributed to the recoding effort and does not pose any problems in the analysis.

Figure 6.7: Histogram of independent variable confidence



The histogram of the independent variable confidence presents a relative positive skewed figure. There are a lot of respondent on the left side of the spectrum and few on the right side. The kurtosis of this histogram is therefore quite negative, but well within limits. Although the skewness is quite high it is also within limits and therefore the variable can be taken into account for further analysis.

Figure 6.8: Histogram of independent variable charisma



The last independent variable presents a similar histogram as the histogram of confidence. This histogram is also highly skewed to the right and the kurtosis is also negative. Both of the characteristics are well within limits and it will not pose problems in the analysis.

Figure 6.9: Histogram of dependent variable PVV vote



The last variable is the dependent variable and since it is dichotomous the kurtosis and skewness are not applicable. As can be seen there are lot of voters who voted for another party than the PVV (value 0) and there are also people who voted PVV (represented by value 1). The dependent variable is distributed as was expected.

Appendix E: Multicollinearity between independent variables

In this appendix tests for multicollinearity are performed between independent variables, using the variation inflation factor in SPSS. In this procedure one of the independent variables is taken out of the model and all others are set off against this variable. These results are presented in tables where different variation inflation errors are presented for all independent variables in the model.

Table 6.6: Multicollinearity testing with independent variable education

Independent variables	**Tolerance**	**VIF**
Unemployment	0,990	1,010
Party identification	0,921	1,086
Immigration	0,742	1,348
European policy	0,921	1,086
Protest vote	0,956	1,046
Confidence	0,912	1,097
Charisma	0,696	1,436

Table 6.7: Multicollinearity testing with independent variable unemployment

Independent variables	Tolerance	VIF
Education	0,894	1,119
Party identification	0,914	1,095
Immigration	0,723	1,382
European policy	0,913	1,095
Protest vote	0,956	1,046
Confidence	0,913	1,095
Charisma	0,691	1,447

Table 6.8: Multicollinearity testing with independent variable party identification

Independent variables	Tolerance	VIF
Education	0,894	1,119
Unemployment	0,982	1,019
Immigration	0,723	1,382
European policy	0,917	1,090
Protest vote	0,958	1,044
Confidence	0,909	1,100
charisma	0,708	1,413

Table 6.9: Multicollinearity testing with independent variable immigration

Independent variables	Tolerance	VIF
Education	0,912	1,097
Unemployment	0,984	1,016
Party identification	0,916	1,092
European policy	0,929	1,076
Protest vote	0,960	1,042
Confidence	0,909	1,100
Charisma	0,817	1,224

Table 6.10: Multicollinearity testing with independent variable European policy

Independent variables	Tolerance	VIF
Education	0,893	1,120
Unemployment	0,981	1,019
Party identification	0,917	1,091
Immigration	0,734	1,363
Protest vote	0,971	1,030
Confidence	0,909	1,100
Charisma	0,692	1,445

Table 6.11: Multicollinearity testing with independent variable protest vote

Independent variables	Tolerance	VIF
Education	0,886	1,128
Unemployment	0,981	1,019
Party identification	0,916	1,092
Immigration	0,724	1,380
European policy	0,928	1,078
Confidence	0,909	1,100
Charisma	0,691	1,447

Table 6.12: Multicollinearity testing with independent variable confidence

Independent variables	Tolerance	VIF
Education	0,889	1,125
Unemployment	0,985	1,015
Party identification	0,913	1,095
Immigration	0,721	1,397
European policy	0,914	1,094
Protest vote	0,955	1,047
Charisma	0,742	1,348

Table 6.13: Multicollinearity testing with independent variable charisma

Independent variables	Tolerance	VIF
Education	0,893	1,120
Unemployment	0,982	1,018
Party identification	0,935	1,069
Immigration	0,853	1,173
European policy	0,915	1,092
Protest vote	0,956	1,046
Confidence	0,976	1,024

Since al the tolerance outcomes are above 0,20 there is no reason to further investigate these outcomes. Furthermore all the VIF scores are well below the threshold of 5 this indicates that there is no multicollinearity present. Therefore the conclusion can be drawn that multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis.

Appendix F: Individual predictions of the logistic regression model

Table 6.14: Explained variance using bivariate logistic regression

Independent variables	Explained variance
Education	41,6%
Unemployment	11,9%
Party identification	40,5%
Immigration	48,3%
European policy	13,2%
Protest vote	32,8%
Confidence	11,6%
Charisma	60,8%

As can be seen the independent variables that have high exp. B values also have high explained variances. This means that the independent variable contributes to the explanatory power of the model. The independent variables that are omitted in the back step iteration process also have low values of explained variance in table 6.14.