

The overlooked impact of methodology in measuring the staffing record in EU civilian missions

**Bachelor Thesis
Carina Steinberg, s1003445**

**European Studies
University of Twente**

**1st Supervisor: Dr. Ringo Ossewaarde
2nd Supervisor: Veronica Junjan**

Date: 22th August 2012

List of Content

Abstract.....	5
1. Introduction: Staffing EU civilian missions.....	5-9
2. The concept of the deployment gap.....	9-12
3. Methodology.....	13
3.1 Data Collection.....	13/14
3.2 Operationalisation.....	14
3.2.1 Capacity.....	14
3.2.2 Gap.....	14/15
3.2.3 Potential.....	15
3.2.4 Improvement.....	15/16
3.2.5 Subquestions.....	16
3.2.6 Conclusion.....	16
4. Individual analysis of methods.....	16/17
4.1 Simple absolute staffing data in comparison.....	17/18
4.2 Member State contributions in proportion.....	18-20
4.3 Gowan and Korski's relative approach.....	20/21
4.4 Jürgenliemk's relative approach.....	21/22
4.5 Concluding remarks.....	23
5. Conclusion: Four approaches in comparison.....	23
5.1 Different results.....	23-25
5.1.1 Simplest methods.....	23
5.1.2 Rankings compared.....	24
5.1.3 More complex methods.....	25
5.2 Reflections and implications.....	25/26
6. The EU's staffing record in 2012 - improved?.....	26
6.1 Top deployers.....	26
6.2 Top improvers.....	26
6.3 Exemplary contributors.....	27
6.4 Exemplary odd case: Germany.....	27
7. Limitations of the findings.....	28
8. Conclusion.....	28/29

References **30/31**

Annexes **32-39**

Annex 1	Ongoing civilian CSDP missions according to the European External Action Service: Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union April 2012.....	32
Annex 2	Member State Categories as named by Korski and Gowan.....	32
Annex 3	<u>Table A</u> : Deployment per Member State, Group and Mission	33
Annex 4	<u>Table B</u> : Simple absolute changes from 2009 to 2012.....	34
Annex 5	<u>Table C</u> : Proportion of the EU's total civilian ESDP deployment by member state 2009 and 2012.....	35
Annex 6	<u>Table D</u> : Gowan and Korski: Deployment only 2009 and 2012.....	36
Annex 7	<u>Table E</u> : Jürgenliemk's approach: Deployment compared to Member State population, Changes in the Deployment/ Population ratio and changes absolute and in percent.....	37
Annex 8	List of missions Gowan and Korski worked with.....	38
Annex 9	Explanation about Jürgenliemk's 2009 - data.....	38
Annex 10	Raw data for the re-applied Jürgenliemk method.....	39

List of tables

Partial tables

Table 1 (B)	Simple absolute changes from 2009 to 2012.....	17
Table 2 (C)	Proportion of the EU's total civilian ESDP deployment by member state 2009 and 2012.....	19
Table 3 (D)	Gowan and Korski: Deployment only 2009	20
Table 4 (E)	Jürgenliemk's approach: Deployment compared to Member State population, Changes in the Deployment/ Population ratio and changes absolute and in percent.....	22

Full tables

Table 5	Deployment per Member State VS Deployment/ Population per Member State....	23
Table 6	Germany's ambiguous scores.....	27

List of figures

Figure 1	Proportion of the EU's total civilian deployment per member state.....	18
----------	--	----

Abbreviations

CCM	Civilian Crisis Management
CHG	Civilian Headline Goal
CPCC	Civilian Planning Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy, now CSDP
SSR	Security Sector Reform

Abstract

The EU's credibility as an actor in civilian crisis management is at stake. Low staffing contributions by the Member States of the Union have been discussed as a main problem in the EU's civilian crisis management since 2009, the year in which the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Several measures have been taken at EU- and Member State level since then.

The central research question of this study is *'What does the staffing record in EU civilian missions look like in 2012, three years after the Lisbon Treaty and how does the way in which it is measured influence the answer?'* Three different methods of measuring the Member State's contributions in 2012 in comparison to those of 2009 will be applied and discussed, a fourth one will be introduced but not applied. It will be seen what the deployment rates look like in 2012 and how the approach applied influences this description.

With regard to the methods, it is concluded that Jürgenliemk's approach is a good option given the lack of data publicly available for any more comprehensive analysis such as Gowan's and Korki's relative method. The latter one could of course better describe the 2012- situation and therewith, potential improvements.

The staffing record in 2012 looks different as that of 2009 for less missions are deployed in 2012 than three years ago. As it is beyond the capacity of this study to describe every aspect of the 2012 deployment situation for every Member State the assessment of the current situation focuses on positive developments in deployment rates, improvements. In 2012, there are twelve countries that are either top-deploying, top-improving or both. They have been found to be good examples for other Member States that do not exploit their potential. But even for this partial aspect of the staffing record, there is no conclusion possible for the EU as a whole as it is not clear what would amount to a real improvement in the situation. This exemplifies the lack of theoretical considerations in the research field.

1 Introduction: Staffing EU civilian missions

In this thesis I am going to do research on the influence of different approaches to examine the staffing record in EU civilian missions on conclusions about the same. That will be done at the example of a comparison between the staffing situation resulting from the deployments by the EU Member States in 2009 and 2012.

The aim of those missions is to contribute to Civilian Crisis Management (CCM), which is *'the intervention by non- military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the intention of preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution'*.¹ To be sure, this is only one definition of CCM and there may be others. However, it emphasizes the most important aspect of crisis management: the intention to prevent an escalation or contribute to the resolution of one.

That is a challenge which only a capable civilian crisis manager should dare to take the responsibility for. The EU, in line with its often cited role as a civilian actor, aims to be seen as such a capable civilian crisis manager. Some go even so far as to suggest that the EU's civilian crisis management could become a complementary to the NATO's military crisis management.²

1 Lindborg, C. (2002). *European Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management*. Washington DC: British American Security Information Council. p.4

2 See Marquina, A. & Riuz, X. (2005) for an argument for an EU's competitive advantage in civilian crisis management and Chivvis, S. (2010) for an explanation why the natural advantages of the EU are smaller than often claimed and an explanation why still, in some cases, the EU may be a good alternative to NATO.

Since 2003, the EU has launched 16 civilian missions and one civilian- military one under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).³ By 2012, those missions have reached a geographical spread from South Eastern Europe to Africa and Asia. In total, there are ten EU civilian missions ongoing in 2012 (see Annex 1).⁴ The functional spread of these missions ranges from four police missions (RD Congo, Afghanistan, BiH and Copps) over two legal- (Iraq and Kosovo), one monitoring- (Georgia) and two border administration missions (Rafah and Moldova/Ukraine) to one mission concerned with security sector reform in RD Congo.⁵ This impressive development in *reach* and *functions* has for long determined the perception of the EU's civilian crisis management performance. A more recent criterion for the mission's evaluations is the *pace* with which they get deployed. In autumn 2008, when a war broke out in the EU's direct neighbourhood between Russia and Georgia and the EU was asked to monitor the compliance with the ceasefire agreement, this factor was recognised to be of paramount importance.

But being on the ground is not enough, a capable civilian crisis manager has an *effect* on the situation. An effective mission, in consequence, is one fulfilling its mandate. The mandate defines the tasks the EU's Member States have agreed upon collectively to mitigate a situation in which the well-being of citizens in the target region is threatened. Both pace and effectiveness depend to a large extent on the amount of personnel available for deployment. For this reason the current Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) for 2010 states that the EU should be able to rely on '*sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel*'.⁶ Knowing that unfortunately the CHG is treated by the Member States rather as declaration of intent than as a list of promised capacities to develop under any circumstance, Jürgenliemk warns: '*If the EU fails to satisfy the promises it set itself with the Civilian Headline Goals it will miss the expectations of its international partners and the recognition as an international crisis manager will be hurt significantly.*'⁷ Bloching is in line with Jürgenliemk by identifying the Member States' '*inability and sometimes unwillingness to meet their own staffing goals*' as '*one of the most obvious shortcomings of CSDP missions.*' '*This*', he argues, '*is not only a problem for the EU which wants to be recognised as a global player in civil- military crisis management, but it renders effective implementation of CSDP missions difficult if not impossible.*'⁸ That latter aspect is crucial: '*[T]he success of a mission often depends on the number of personnel that can be deployed within the first three to six months after the launch.*', as Bloching explains.⁹ Effectiveness in civilian crisis management thus begins with ensuring that reasonable amounts of personnel deployable at short notice are available. That this has not been achieved is criticised by An Jacobs with the embarrassing observation that '*Whereas the decision to launch EUPOL Afghanistan was made in May 2007, it took 14 calls for contributions and almost two years before the planned 195 international personnel was on the ground in February 2009.*'¹⁰

It is understood that this is not effective but to whom exactly does that do harm?

First and foremost, the deployed mission personnel is affected by such a situation. If there is not enough staff on the ground, those deployed are potentially hindered from performing (parts of) their tasks. In the worst case, a lack of staff diminishes the security of deployed personnel.

3 Retrieved on 22th April from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations>

4 Retrieved on 26th April from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations>

5 The European Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was completed with the end of June 2012 (Retrieved on 11th July from: <http://www.eupm.org/>) is still included here.

6 Retrieved on 22th April from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf

7 Jürgenliemk, H. (2011). European Civilian Crisis Management Capacities: Bridging the Resources Gap? *GGI Briefing Paper*, 2/2011. Brussels: The Global Governance Institute. p.6

8 Bloching, S. (2011). Security Sector Reform Missions under CSDP: *Addressing Current Needs*. Brussels: International Security Information Service, Europe. p.8

9 Bloching, S. (2011). p.8

10 Jacobs, A. (2011). EU civilian crisis management: A crisis in the making? *ETH Zurich CSS Analysis in Security Policy*, 87. p.2

A second direct damage from low staffing rates occurs of course in the recipient country. It can be assumed that a region would not ask for an international supporting mission if they wouldn't be in need of help in some way. Thus, if mandates cannot be fulfilled due to a lack of staff, this represents a loss for the country to which it is deployed.

At least in the case of missions deployed in the EU's direct neighbourhood, the Member States profit from well-staffed missions. This is to say, the citizens of the European Union. It is in their interest to have a functioning administration and criminal prosecution in Kosovo, just as it is in their interest to have peace in the caucasus region, through which they also receive oil. Often enough, civilian missions are mainly furthered by a certain Member State, which is proof of the consciousness of those states' governments that it is in their national interest to contribute to international security in a certain region. Of course, having well-staffed missions is in the interest of the EU as an institution. If the EU wants to be taken serious as an international actor and further promote international cooperation and common action by the Member States, crisis management is a field to invest in. The EU under its Neighbourhood Policy spends roughly 12 billion € for the cycle from 2007 to 2013 alone¹¹, an investment in peace and stability which shows how important the neighbouring countries are to the Union. For the EU's interests in international security see the European Security Strategy, which also refers to the contribution missions represent.¹²

It is understood that although everyone seems to benefit from those missions, there must be also those actors who, for the one or the other reason prefer not to engage too extensively in the EU's civilian crisis management.¹³ Hansen has therefore identified '*sheer political will*' as a '*catalyst for success*' [in planning and deploying missions]¹⁴. As for the missions deployed already about which I am doing research in this study the number of proponents in the decisive political positions has been large enough to send them, the analysis below takes the perspective of those profiting from well-staffed missions as explained above, their number is generally assumed to be far larger than that of the opponents.

Researchers agree that there is a gap between what amount of personnel is theoretically available in the EU's Member States, what they promise to contribute and what they deploy once a mission is launched. But as their methods to measure the Member State's contributions differ, they disagree as to which Member States stay far behind their potential when it comes to contributing staff.

Thus, if the EU wants to overcome its staffing problems having such a negative impact on two out of four criteria in the discussion of the EU's civilian crisis management capability, it should be known which Member States can do the most about this problem.

Especially since 2009, the year the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the debate about the EU's civilian capacities has intensified. The treaty, leading to the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the appointment of Catherine Ashton as High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy represents the most visible step towards a more coherent and systematic approach in the development of civilian capacities.¹⁵ New institutional structures are in place by now and still the staffing issue remains on the list of core problems in the field.

11 Retrieved on 19th August 2012 from: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm#4.1

12 Retrieved on 19th August 2012 from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/european-security-strategy?lang=en>

13 See Marquina, A., & Ruiz, X. (2005) *p.84* for factors potentially influencing decisions for or against sending a mission.

14 Dr. Hansen, A. S. (2006). *p.47*

15 Retrieved on 23th April 2012 from: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm

A core problem in the research in this field of civilian deployments is visibility. The EU's website about CSDP operations¹⁶ publishes official information about both the military and the civilian missions. The missions deployed also have their individual webpages, serving to inform the citizens about what they are doing on the basis of which mandate. But knowing the location, mandate, year of launch and actual total personnel employed does not help to assess the size of the gap mentioned. As if there is only one number per mission, the total amount of staff, it is invisible to which degree the individual Member States contribute to it. Also, apart from the Headline Goals maybe, there is very little data about pledges. A bit more data is available about deployments per Member State by now. This results in a situation, where statements about the EU's staffing record are rather vague if looked at closely. Very often the recommendations formulated on the basis of this meagre data situation are very general, which is problematic. When 'the EU Member States' shall do more in the one or other respect, which individual Member State would be ready to take part of the blame and make an effort to improve? In 2009, Gowan and Korski have sorted Member States by their performance in the field of civilian capacities. Jürgenliemk, in 2011, but still on the basis of 2009-data has also sorted Member States by performance but the way he measured the same differed fundamentally from what Gowan and Korski had done. In consequence, the results obtained differed. Therefore, the methods used in the two articles shall be described and evaluated in order to encourage reflection about how to measure the EU's deployment gap.

In coherence with this intention, the key research question of this study has been defined as: *'What does the staffing record in EU civilian missions look like in 2012, three years after the Lisbon Treaty and how does the way in which it is measured influence the answer?'*

The more specific subquestions point first examine the differences between four methods (three used by Korski and Gowan and one applied by Jürgenliemk) to evaluate the Member State's staffing records (which make up that of the EU in this case). Observations about the staffing record of individual Member States are formulated. In the end, a conclusion is drawn, which will state how the staffing record looks like in 2012 compared to 2009. The research question is thus answered in an order different from that of the aspects out of which it is composed:

- 1) What methods have been used by researchers to measure the EU's staffing record?
- 2) How do the outcomes thus produced differ?
- 3) What can be said in conclusion about the development of the Member State's deployments to EU civilian missions from 2009 to 2012?

Asking the questions in this order is meant to demonstrate clearly that prior to concluding anything about the EU's staffing record (at a certain moment in time), it needs to be understood to which aspect or aspects of the staffing record the answer will actually refer.

Chapter 4 will focus in question 1. In that part, quantitative data about each Member State's civilian deployment in 2009 and 2012 for EU civilian missions will be compared to that of the other Member States in the sense that a ranking of Member States by performance in the approach applied is the result. These ranking are meant to reveal that a ranking of Member States by performance in deployment looks different for any of the methods applied, leading to different conclusions about which Member States are on a good way and which states, on the other hand, might need to reconsider their civilian structures for mission contributions. This will be looked at closer in Chapter 5 which focusses on question 2, directly comparing the outcomes of the methods introduced in Chapter 4 to each other. Chapter 6 will then refer to question 3, describing the EU's civilian staffing record in 2012 in comparison to 2009. As it would be beyond the capacity of this thesis to describe all developments measured for all Member States, the chapter will mainly point out increases of deployments.

16 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations>

Given the effort made in the last few years to improve the staffing record in EU civilian missions, it is interesting to know whether deployments increased and in which states. Ultimately the development of civilian capacities is under the responsibility of the individual Member States. Knowing which states have sent more personnel in 2012 or are among the top deployers anyway in this year will be a good starting point for further reflections about what led to these deployments, but that is for other studies. This thesis will only update the information available and sum up observations about it. The interest is two-fold: Firstly, it shall be examined what the different approaches tell about the development of the staffing situation and the staffing record as it is in 2012. In other words, strengths and weaknesses of the approaches shall be named. This part is to encourage methodological reflections for future evaluations. Especially given the very limited amount of data available in the field of deployment to EU civilian missions, it is important to find a way to still measure the Member State's performances in a way that roughly fits their potential if recommendations for the further development of civilian capacities shall become more precise over time and address the right states. Secondly, the reassessment of the situation thus produced shall update the datasets available and make more visible for which Member States the staffing record in 2012 is in fact different from that of 2009 - and possibly higher, as might be expected after the measures taken by both the EU individual Member States in the last years.¹⁷ For, if it does not look any better than three years ago, it might be that (parts of) the recommendations addressed to Member States in the last few years and put in practice (at least in some states) did not achieve to improve the EU's staffing record.

This chapter has introduced the (esearch) field of civilian crisis management and explained the EU's involvement in it, the EU civilian missions. In front of this background the issue of a deployment gap has been raised and declared as problematic. The next chapter will provide a more comprehensive description of the deployment gap - concept and introduce the methods applicable to its measurement.

2. The concept of the deployment gap

Initially (at the Feira European Council meeting in 2000), police, rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection were identified as areas in which civilian capacities should be developed. By 2004, monitoring and the support of EU Special Representatives were added.¹⁸ But even if the EU would have enough policemen (and women), judges and monitors at its disposal, they would need to possess more skills than required for their work in a national setting. Behrendt points out that ' *Great demands are placed on mission staff. Technical expertise, language skills, political acumen, stress tolerance, intercultural competence, and experience in planning and advising are all imperative.*'¹⁹ Therefore, prior to deployment, training is needed. In an ideal structure, the civilian personnel would train together long before a particular mission is planned, the trained personnel would be recruited and deployed shortly after. In reality, there are gaps in this process just as there is a gap between what Member States pledge and ultimately deploy. Over the past few years, these problems became known among researchers and measures were taken to develop the EU's civilian crisis management capacities, also in the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in 2009. The treaty marks the starting point of CSDP mission planning in a more unified EU structure than had previously been the case. The year 2009 marks the starting point for a new round of discussion about the EU's civilian capacities, in fact it was *the* year in the research about them.

17 For a description of measures taken by the EU, see Bloching (2011)

18 Chivvis, S. (2010). p. 6

19 Behrendt, J. (2011). Civilian Personnel in Peace Operations: *From Improvisation to Systems?* Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations. p. 1

It all started in March 2009, when Giji Gya, executive director at the International Security Information Service Europe, published a briefing note in which she stated that '*Although there are some 1.6 million EU personnel available, only 5000 are pledged and 2000 deployed because of competing demands.*'²⁰ From then on, this impressive observation became the basic reference for researchers writing about the gap between aspirations, promises and deployments. For example, Chivvis in 2010 build up his analysis of the EU's staffing record starting from this fundamental disproportion.²¹ In October 2009, Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan from the European Council on Foreign Relations published a '*review of Europe's civilian capacities*'.²² Briefly after Korski's and Gowan's report had appeared, the European Union Institute for Security Studies published a comprehensive study about the first decade of ESDP at the occasion of the policies' 10th anniversary.²³ In 2011, Jürgenliemk used the data from this report for his article. In contrast to the study on the first ten years of ESDP which focused on the missions sent, Korski and Gowan delivered a detailed description of each individual Member States' civilian capacities and contributions. Both articles are based on data about Member State deployment rates in 2009 by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which is now part of the European External Action Service.²⁴ That original dataset does not seem to be publicly available, but the studies building on it are. This is how the debate that had developed over the years gained attention and contributions. Especially from 2009 on, various researchers assessed the EU's performance in the civilian field and suggested explanations for observed shortcomings. The latter now were seen in the pace with which a mission can be deployed and the effect it has, or, in other words, the degree to which it is able to fulfill its mandate (in far as that depends on personnel).

While Dr. Hansen, in a study from September 2006 was still quite optimistic about the evolution of ESDP operations, which she called '*nothing less than impressive*' (In her view, political will is the decisive factor for achieving to plan and deploy missions. She agrees that capacities surely play a role but except for the lack of Brussels-based personnel involved in planning and running missions, staffing does not seem to be the major problem for her.²⁵), later studies are far from enthusiastic. Giegerich in 2010 argues that '*The biggest problem in the civilian sphere is the enormous gap between existing, pledged and deployed personnel*'.²⁶ That gap, he further explains, results to a large extent from Member States using widely different strategies for the generation and provision of civilian capabilities. Chivvis, in the same year, attributes the gap between pledged and deployed personnel to the fact that the launch of a mission (decision by all Member States) does not require any commitment of resources early in the process. Later, when the mission is short of being deployed, Member States may discover that they cannot afford to contribute (a lot of) personnel for financial reasons and/ or because they need their few highly qualified civilian experts at home.²⁷ This very nature of civilian deployments limits the personnel available: civilians are deployed on a voluntary basis, unlike personnel in (international) military missions. To encourage voluntary contribution, however, the structure of the labour market needs to allow for temporary absence, not to mention the creation of incentives to work in a mission: Member-State competencies.

20 Gya, G. (2009). Tapping the Human Dimension: Civilian Capabilities in ESDP. European Security Review, 43.

21 Chivvis, S. (2010). p. 6

22 Korski, D., & Gowan, R. (2009). Can The EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities. London: European Council on Foreign Relations.

23 Grevi, G., Helly, D., & Keohane, D. (editors). (2009). European Security and Defence Policy: The first 10 years (1999 - 2009). Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies.

24 According to the authors of the articles.

25 Dr. Hansen, A. S. (2006). Against all Odds - The Evolution of Planning for ESDP Operations: Civilian Crisis Management from EUPM onwards. Study 10/06. Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations. p.47-50

26 Giegerich, B. (2010). Military and Civilian Capabilities for EU-led Crisis- Management Operations. Adelphi Series, 50:414-415. London: International Institute for Security Studies.

27 Chivvis, S. (2010). p. 44

In early 2010, Khol named the growing deployment gap as one of three main challenges the EU faces in struggling to become '*truly effective* [in civilian crisis management]'. His observation is in sharp contrast to Hansen's perception of the EU's ESDP missions in 2006: '*Over recent years the growing gap between authorised and actual levels of staffing civilian CSDP missions marks the continuation of a worrying trend of understaffing.*'²⁸

This contrast is not surprising, given that Hansen's observations relate to the geographical and functional spread of missions, while Khol criticises explicitly staffing, which is closely connected to pace and effectiveness. Bloching, in 2011, explained that there is also a gap between training, recruitment and deployment of civilians. From those trained, he observes, only few actually get deployed. Plus, the time passing between training and recruitment is long. Bloching attributes this problem to the institutional structure in the Member States which provides for a different degree of cooperation with the training institutes.²⁹ In Jürgenliemk's view there are two other central problems: the focus on military crisis management and the by population largest Member States which do not deploy at rates that would be proportionate to their size. Brief, they do not use their potential. To increase the Member States' contributions, the Global Governance Institute in 2011 on the basis of Jürgenliemk's article, therefore recommended '*EU member states to shift their political focus from military to civilian crisis management. In particular the bigger member states are contributing significantly less civilian personnel than smaller countries, if measured in proportion to their population size. Concrete measures to improve the recruitment and training of civilian personnel are urgently needed. Only if implemented will the EU then be able to position itself as an effective international security actor.*'³⁰

Depending on which problem is seen as central, the measures proposed as a remedy differ. Measures to enhance the EU's civilian capacity can be taken both by the EU and its Member States. As Bloching has described the EU's initiatives and structural changes as implemented in the last few years at length and this study is to compare the Member State's deployment rates (and not the training or planning mechanisms at EU- level), 'measures' in this context are to mean 'measures that are or can be taken by individual Member States'. An example would be the introduction of a roster, a database for the central national registration of civilian personnel willing (and qualified) to contribute to a civilian mission.³¹ It is assumed, that those measures which have been taken in order to influence the EU's staffing record had or will have a positive impact.

Such a development of civilian capacities is only reasonable, given that the worldwide demand for support in matters relevant to the security and well-being of civilians is increasing steadily. It is not only in the interest of the EU but also in that of the UN if the individual states make an effort and establish structures necessary for contributions to civilian crisis management. But, and this is important, the basis for any such measures are recommendations formulated on the basis of data about staffing in missions. Depending on how the data is presented, thus, how the staffing situation is measured, the addressees among the Member States can differ.

Brief, even if researchers agree that a certain measure is needed to be taken, depending on how the data about staffing in civilian missions is expressed, they might turn to different Member States with their request.

The approaches presented in chapter 4 express staffing data basically in two ways: The first two approaches work with absolute deployment data. This means that apart the number of personnel deployed is the only information about each individual Member State that is included. The second two approaches go a step further by placing the deployment rate for each Member State into a national context which consists of an additional information about each Member State.

28 Khol, R. (2010). EU Civilian Crisis Management in Early 2010: The Beginning of a New Chapter Fraught with Complex Tasks. *International Policy Analysis*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. p.5

29 Bloching, S. (2011).

30 Jürgenliemk, H. (2011). p.3

31 For a brief explanation about rosters for civilian experts see Behrendt (2011).

The additional value shall mirror the fact that the EU's Member States' are all but uniform in their structure and possibilities. It will be seen that Jürgenliemk has chosen to include one additional value per Member State (its total population) while Gowan and Korski include two additional values (the national capacity and the number of personnel pledged). The choice for supplementary values is limited by two factors: the availability of that data for all Member States and the nature of the data for if its is not quantitative, a comparison will be hard to do. Fortunately the two studies referred to in this thesis are based on the inclusion of additional values which differ with regard to their availability. While it is a matter of seconds to look the total populations up, it is more difficult to find out about the pledges and national capacities of the Member States. With regard to the condition that the data should be quantitative, the case is a bit more complex. A deployment rate is of course a number just as a state's population. As will be seen in 4.3, Gowan and Korski used numerical data for measuring the states' performance in deployment. The staffing record in their approach is the result of the assessment of seven categories per Member State, with deployment being the only directly measured in numbers. For the other six categories the authors used an ordinal scale, expressing the information about the (non-) existence of other aspects of civilian capacities, for example rosters and training. So it is maybe more precise to say that the information used for an additional value must be measurable in an objective way, that is, it must be information on which researchers can agree even when they different backgrounds and are motivated by different interests. The Gross Domestic Product of a country would fulfill this requirement while it is hard, if not impossible to measure the political will to develop capacities or deploy personnel fulfilling that condition.

In sum, the inclusion of additional values can help to make the calculated model fit more closely both the individual potential of a country and the various aspects constituting together what is called a staffing record (although that term is subject to individual interpretations depending on the researcher using it).

In conclusion, researchers agree that there is a gap between what the Member States of the European Union deploy and what they could potentially deploy, for example already if they would meet the Civilian Headline Goals which they have collectively set themselves. This gap hinders the EU from being perceived as a civilian crisis management actor in possession of appropriate capacities, an asset that could make the EU more credible also for its international partners. Apart from the EU's own aspirations, one could argue that a peaceful group of states with together roughly half a billion inhabitants and a GDP larger than that of the US has a certain responsibility to take over in working towards international security for all regions.

The Member States could become active in some way, be it through the establishment of certain institutional structures or through ensuring that the personnel they train really gets deployed, the argument further goes. If they do so, the deployment rates would increase (as well as the deployment of well-trained personnel). In consequence, then, the deployment gap would be reduced, rendering the EU more capable to quickly intervene even in the most urgent cases.

This is the idea that is directly expressed by the researchers. Their debate is vivid when it comes to describing the reasons they see for the various aspects of the deployment gap.

But the more relevant conclusion to point to is the result from what the researchers don't discuss: There are different ways to measure the Member State's staffing contributions and depending on which method is chosen, different Member States are identified as those having the largest potential left to exploit. Jürgenliemk has identified a different group of Member States (those with the largest populations) as the most problematic for the EU's staffing record as Gowan and Korski and therewith shown that methodology matters in this field as in any other scientific measurement. It should not be forgotten that on the basis of such measurements, policy recommendations are formulated, which, in an ideal case, should suit every Member State's potential.

3. Methodology

This study aims at encouraging methodological reflections in the field of measuring EU civilian capacities (via measuring those of the Member States). As it is also meant to allow future researchers to do reassessments if they wish, a central precondition for the methodology was transparency. Both the source of the raw data and the methods with the help of which the data is re-expressed should be clear.

Especially as there are diverging opinions about which EU missions count as civilian, a simple but all the more necessary precondition is to name clearly describe the set of missions the study refers to. In previous studies, references was often only made to 'ongoing civilian missions', which is as vague as describing the source of raw data with 'based on statistics by the CPCC', especially if no raw data is provided even in an annex. The same holds for potentials. If any potential can be obtained for all Member States it is fine but for an analysis to be reproducible the raw data needs to be included in an annex. Certainly, the small amount of civilian capacity- data publicly available makes it harder to have raw-data published. But, where possible, it should be done.

The methodology was formulated to adress the lack of attention paid to these basic requirements in the research field, annexes were used to complete the information provided to the reader.

3.1 Data collection

The 2009 data is taken over from two scientific articles stemming from that year^{32 33}. In half a dozen emails to Korski about his and Gowan's article I tried to get answers to my questions about their data. Via email, I also tried to get the original 2009-dataset, the two articles are indirectly referring to from the European External Action Service, without success. For a part of the 2012 situation, a dataset published on a website launched by the International Security Information Service (ISIS)³⁴ is used. Four missions for which personal communication with the relevant mission officials is the source of the data are marked in table A in Annex 3.

I had been visiting the EU's monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM) for a day in December 2011, to get an impression of their work. From that, I still had contact to the head of the EUMM's field office in Gori who was so kind to send me the latest data about the staff per Member State in the mission upon my request for it. For the staffing data of EUBAM Moldova/ Ukraine I could not rely on a contact established in advance. Although the mission has a website and a contact form, for technical reasons which I could neither reveal nor solve, I had to find a different way to contact a mission official. In this case I benefited from having helped an intern at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies where I had been intern before him. As I knew he stemmed from Ukraine and worked or studied something in the political field, I asked him by mail whether he would know some EU- person in Ukraine. He knew the contact details for an official at the EU delegation in Ukraine who was so kind to forward my request to the EUBAM mission.

For EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL Copps I requested the data via mail directly to the mission's press contact, in the case of EUSEC in French.

While the data obtained for EUMM Georgia , EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL Copps was simply more recent than that published by ISIS, the mission in Moldova and Ukraine had not been included in the ISIS dataset at the moment of data collection.

In July, two months after I had completed data collection and at a moment where I had already re-expressed and calculated all final data for the study, ISIS published an updated version of their data which differed so much from the data I had from them that I had no choice but to recalculate everything for six out of ten missions and 25 out of 27 Member States.

32 Korski, D., & Gowan, R. (2009).

33 Jürgenliemk, H. (2011). *p.7*

34 Retrieved on 12th May from: <http://www.csdpm.eu/mission-personnel>

The data collected as described above is quantitative information about the amount of personnel each individual Member State has deployed in EU civilian missions in 2009 and 2012. That makes two deployment rates per Member State which can be compared. Of course, such a rate is made up of contributions to several civilian missions (see Annex 3), but for the sake of simplicity all analysis in this study solely refers to the total civilian deployment per Member State.

The phase of data collection also involved taking a decision about which missions to count as civilian for there is disagreement between scholars with regard to the definition of a civilian mission. Police missions for example are seen as civilian by some, as rather military by others. For the following analysis a civilian mission shall be a mission marked as civilian by the European External Action Service in its ' Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union April 2012'.³⁵ Annex 1 contains a list of these missions.

Most of them were already deployed in 2009 and are still on the ground in 2012.³⁶

To account for other definitions of civilian missions this study contains a table with the deployment rates of the Member States for the individual ongoing missions, so that mission data can be extracted by preference.

3.2 Operationalisation

The following concepts and definitions are needed to understand how the approaches that will be presented can be distinguished. Each approach describes the capacity of a Member State in a different way, and thus leads to the assumption of a different potential for improvement.

3.2.1 Capacity

In the literature, reference is often made to the EU's civilian capacities. This relates to the amount of personnel (and equipment) available for EU civilian missions. In a more narrow sense, the term may also point to the qualification of staff or the procedures by which the Member States may agree to send an EU- mission. Rosters used by individual Member States or at Union level to register potentially deployable personnel are often seen as the starting point for the development of organised civilian capacities.

In this study, capacity shall refer to the 'staffing record' of the EU, here the actual number of deployed staff in EU civilian missions. From the perspective of the countries that demanded an EU- mission, this is certainly the most relevant definition of capacities as that is what they see. From the perspective of the EU, however, the total civilian deployment per Member State is at least as important as the overall EU- deployment. Any improvement of the EU's staffing record starts in the Member States.

The actual deployments are also that part of the EU's civilian capacity about which data is accessible relatively easy (contrary to information about pledges, for example).

3.2.2 Gap

The 'deployment gap', which can be summarized as a gap between ambition and reality, consists indeed of several, at least two, overlying gaps:

There is a gap between what states promised to send and what they deploy and there is a gap between what they deploy and what they could potentially deploy. This study will focus on the second of these, but mention where the first gap could be measured as well.

35 Retrieved on 22th April from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations>

36 The mandate of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) mission in Guinea-Bissau , which was among the missions included in the 2009 dataset, expired in 2010. Retrieved on 19th June 2012 from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau?=fr>

In other words, there are 27 gaps (one for each Member State, assuming that no Member State deploys its maximum) of different size. This study aims to put these different sizes into relation to each other. By comparing a Member States' deployment in 2009 to that of 2012 it can be seen whether - and if so, in which Member States - it has increased. The gap between deployment and potential would thus be decreasing in those states.

The definition for the deployment gap is the same for the first three approaches presented. For Gowan's and Korski's relative approach however, the definition of gap would be closer to Bloching's training-recruitment-deployment gap (see 2.)

3.2.3 Potential

If there are thus 27 Member States, each with a gap between what is deployed and could in theory be deployed, there are 27 potentials that could be measured (if the data for this would be available). The potential of the Member States consists of two levels:

A population potential, which means that a state of a certain size can only deploy an amount of staff that is proportionate to its total number of inhabitants, regardless of the amount of budget spent or measures implemented to encourage deployment. This is opposed to a more specific policy potential, which is defined by the policies and current staff situations in the Member States, for example. There could be a third, theoretical potential, which would be created if certain measures were implemented in the Member States or at EU level. This potential would be smaller than a state's population potential, but bigger than the specific current policy potential of a state. A theoretical potential is what is needed to assess a Member States' performance and formulate realistic expectations for the further development of its civilian capacities as it could be reached in the best case.

While the population potential can easily be calculated on the basis of simple raw-data, the policy potential is more tricky to determine as it requires more information and an idea of what factors define the current potential in a state given its specific organisational structure and policies.

The theoretical potential is one step further. The actual policies and structures are now compared to a more favourable setting, for example that of another Member State, to see what can be achieved by political measures. The population potential can now serve to assess whether the outcome, thus, the potential demanded to be developed in a certain state is in fact proportionate.

Approaches taking into account any of these potentials of a Member State are called *relative* in this study.

3.2.4 Improvement

In abstract terms an improvement would be a smaller gap between actual deployment and potential deployment. This would mean that more of the potential is used. The capacity, as explained above, here the number of personnel actually deployed would be greater than it was in 2009.

Of course, what ultimately matters is the joint record of all EU Member States as that is what makes a mission- or not. But this study will focus on the individual records of the Member States as they are in the position to influence their own national capacities, which in turn can increase the EU's capacity. It is thus interesting to see which Member States have improved on their staffing rate. As in this study three methods of evaluation have been applied to the 2012- situation which had already been applied to 2009- data, there are at least three ways in which a Member State's staffing rate can have increased since 2009.³⁷ In order for a gap to diminish, the total positive development in all improving Member States would need to outweigh the total negative development in those other Member States which withdraw personnel.

37 The fourth method is only explained, not used, for firstly it requires more data than is available and secondly it would need more space than this study can offer.

In this study, therefore, it will be explained what a Member State would need to achieve to be a good example for other Member States in the field of civilian deployments to EU missions. The question will then be which (and how many) Member States are on a good way increasing their staffing contributions and -to be fair -which (and how many) of them are at the same time already among the top deployers.

More about this will follow in part 6, where the subquestion on improvement is answered in coherence with these reflections.

3.2.5 Subquestions

The purely quantitative analysis follow these three subquestions:

- 1) What methods have been used by researchers to measure the EU's staffing record?
- 2) How do the outcomes thus produced differ?
- 3) What can be said in conclusion about the development of the Member State's deployments to EU civilian missions from 2009 to 2012?

The third subquestion will not be describing all developments as there are too many of them. It will instead focus on the increases in deployment rates which represent improvements in the sense explained in 3.2.4.

3.2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has defined closer which aspects of the EU's deployment gap play a role in the discussion about the same and how they are going to be measured in this study. In line with the subquestions provided in this part, the analysis will consist of the application of three methods to measure the Member State's staffing rates and the brief explanation of a fourth method. After those four parts, the insights won about the four approaches will be held against each other. It will be discussed, what each of the methods tells or not about the staffing rate situation and development and what data is needed for their application. Finally, a concluding assessment of the EU's civilian staffing record in 2012 will be formulated.

4. Individual analysis of methods

In this section, each of the four approaches will be discussed individually. After some introducing words the data will be presented. In a second step, observations will be formulated and in a third step the advantages and disadvantages of the approach will be listed. The order may vary for layout reasons. The category marked in blue is that was used to rank the Member States for that (part of the) table. All tables in this chapter are short versions, the full tables can be found in Annexes 4 to 7. The inclusion of only partial tables in the analysis is meant to draw the attention to exactly those Member States' performances that are noteworthy. In other words, the partial tables always include the Member States at both ends of the spectrum plus the three smallest and three biggest Member States by population, relevant for a comparison of Jürgenliemk's outcome for these states to that of Gowan and Korski. The full tables in the Annexes are meant to provide all values for all Member States that can serve to update staffing information or to conduct further research in the field of staffing EU civilian missions.

The observations listed for every approach shall help to see which Member States' performance seems to be extraordinary expressed that way. This refers to four possible remarkable aspects: A very high or very low deployment rate and a very high increase or strong decrease in a rate. For the EU's staffing record however, the combined deployments and tendencies of the Member States matter.

This is why observations start with statements about how many Member States have improved their performance since 2009. All improvements in individual Member States' performances will be tracked for every method applied by being marked in green.

4.1 Simple absolute staffing data in comparison

Comparing the absolute deployment rates of 2009 and 2012, 15 Member States have increased their rate, while 10 Member States have lowered theirs. The deployment rate is equal for 2009 and 2012 in Slovenia and Lithuania. The most impressive increases are found for Cyprus, which sends twice as many people than in 2009, and Luxembourg, which sends even more.

The extent to which deployment rates have changed, was noticeable in six Member States which increased their deployments by more than 50% and three Member States which reduced their rate by more than 50%.

This approach is very easy to apply. It does not require any further reflections about weighing of different aspects. And: The data needed for this method is available on the internet. So far for the advantages.

On the other hand, this method's outcome is misleading as it does not account for even the most visible differences between Member States. The approach does not include any reference to potential. Knowing what Member States actually deploy does not tell anything about what they could deploy. Therefore, this method is not suited for deriving recommendations from it.

Table 1 : Simple absolute changes from 2009 to 2012

Rank	Country	2009 absolute (? missions)	2012 absolute 10 missions	Change absolute		Rank	Country	Change absolute		Change percentage
1 st	Netherlands	54	106	+	52	1 st	Luxembourg	+	3	150
2 nd	UK	54	89	+	35	2 nd	Cyprus	+	2	100
3 rd	Bulgaria	46	79	+	33	3 rd	Netherlands	+	52	96,3
4 th	Poland	151	170	+	19	4 th	Estonia	+	9	81,82
5 th	Belgium	47	62	+	15	5 th	Bulgaria	+	33	71,74
7 th	Estonia	11	20	+	9	6 th	UK	+	35	64,81
10 th / 11 th 12 th	Germany	205	209	+	4	7 th	Belgium	+	15	31,91
13 th	Luxembourg	2	5	+	3	9 th / 10 th	Malta	+	1	25
14 th	Cyprus	2	4	+	2	12 th	Poland	+	19	12,58
15 th / 16 th	Malta	4	5	+	1	15 th	Germany	+	4	1,95
17 th / 18 th	Lithuania	14	14	equal		17 th / 18 th	Lithuania	equal		
	Slovenia	21	21	equal			Slovenia	equal		
24 th	Portugal	29	6	-	23	24 th	France	-	113	46,31
25 th	France	244	131	-	113	25 th	Romania	-	121	57,89
26 th	Romania	209	88	-	121	26 th	Italy	-	150	63,29
27 th	Italy	237	87	-	150	27 th	Portugal	-	23	79,31%
Total		1913	1658	-	255	Total		-	255	13,33%

In sum, this method is the simplest possible, but it does not take into account any differences between the Member States that could explain at least the general tendency in the distribution of contributions. The number of observations depends of course on the interest of the reader but it is noticeable that for the following approaches there are a lot more of them.

4.2 Member State contributions in proportion


When looking at the top twelve contributors in 2009 and 2012 (those marked in the pie charts), Denmark is no longer included in 2012, while Belgium has moved up into this group.

In total, 19 Member States augmented their contribution (or benefited from effects letting their contribution look increased). Seven lowered theirs and Malta's contribution remained equal. If measured with this method, the changes are smaller than in the previous approach: From 26 changes, only eleven amount to 1% or more. A second difference is, that while in the comparison of absolute deployment rates the greatest differences were positive, the largest differences in this approach are negative (France: minus 4,8% , Italy: minus 7,15% and Romania: minus 5,59 %).

If the deployment rates are measured with this approach, countries can reach a better rank in the list of Member States without deploying more. Two effects are responsible for this.

An example for the first is Germany, which did not make it to the top because it would have deployed a lot more staff (indeed, the absolute increase as can be seen in Table 1 is meagre 5 more people), but because France, Italy and Romania have cut down their rates. Briefly, if others perform worse, the own performance looks better even if it hasn't changed (a lot). The second effect is related to the total deployment by all EU Member States together. In the case of a comparison between 2009 and 2012 it has decreased by 255, which is 13,33 %. This produces a larger positive percentage change for the individual Member State contributions even for those Member States where the change in the absolute deployment rate was little.

Figure 1: Proportion of the EU's total civilian deployment per member state:



38 Adapted from: Korski, D., & Gowan, R. (2009). *Can The EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. p.82

39 The 2012 data stems from: <http://www.csdpm.eu/mission-personnel>, complemented by personal communication with mission officials.

A clear strength of this sort of analysis is that it can easily be done for any set of missions as only the number of staff per member state and mission is needed, plus the total amount of personnel deployed by the EU in those missions.

Knowing a Member State's share of the staff in a mission allows to roughly estimate its share of the financial burden of staffing that mission, for most personnel deployed is seconded from the Member States and receives their salary from them. That is a second advantage, although of course, financial implications can also roughly be estimated from other approaches. This method, especially if the data is expressed in the form of a pie chart, makes more clear what it means if a small group of Member States stems half of the EU's civilian deployments.

On the negative side, this sort of analysis may be interesting for the EU, but not for the countries to which the missions are sent. For them, the total amount of staff deployed will matter more than the composition of the same. Connected to the previous point and to the last of the observations it can be said that this type of measurement is potentially misleading, at least, as long as the change in the total deployment is not made visible. With regard to the pie chart this could mean to insert a total number of deployment and to make the 2012- pie 13,33% smaller than the 2009 -one.

Also, the potential of the Member States is not taken into account. Especially for this method, including a potential would make sense. This approach answers the question of how the burden is shared. The logical next question would then be: is that distribution fair, given differences in the possibilities Member States have? Including a measure for the difference between states could indicate at least the most basic differences relevant to civilian deployments. The last two approaches are examples for the inclusion of further aspects.

Table 2: Proportion of the EU's total civilian ESDP deployment by member state 2009 and 2012⁴⁰

Rank	State	Percentage		Change by ... percent	
		2012	2009		
1 st	Netherlands	6,39	2,8	+	3,59
2 nd	UK	5,37	2,8	+	2,57
3 rd	Bulgaria	4,76	2,5	+	2,26
4 th	Poland	10,25	8	+	2,25
5 th	Sweden	8,93	7,3	+	1,63
6 th	Germany	12,61	11	+	1,61
7 th	Belgium	3,74	2,5	+	1,24
8 th	Finland	6,33	5,4	+	0,93
17 th	Hungary	3,62	3,5	+	0,12
20 th	Malta	0,3	0,3	equal	
23 rd	Denmark	3,56	4,1	-	0,54
25 th	France	7,9	12,7	-	4,8
26 th	Romania	5,31	10,9	-	5,59
27 th	Italy	5,25	12,4	-	7,15
Change in total deployment				-	13,33%

To conclude, this is the only approach that does not require a constant set of missions to be telling. However, precisely because it only concerns the contribution of any Member State compared to the contribution of the other Member States, it is interesting only for the Member States. At EU- level, it would be more interesting how big the pie is. The same holds for the receiving countries. In sum, this method is useful as an additional or introductory information only. Gowan and Korski placed it in an Annex, at the beginning before detailed description of individual Member State's civilian capacities and the analysis of the same using a comprehensive relative approach.

4.3 Gowan and Korski's relative approach

Country (colour result of 7 categories)	Deployment (1 of 7 categories)	2009 absolute (part of the category 'deployment')
Romania	7	209
France	6	244
Italy		237
Poland		151
Germany	5,5	205
Sweden	5	139
Finland		104
Denmark		77
Hungary		66
Netherlands	4	54
Czech Republic		45
Austria		32
Belgium	3,5	47
Bulgaria		46
Greece		40
Slovenia		21
UK	3	54
Slovakia		16
Ireland		16
Latvia		13
Malta		4
Portugal	2,5	29
Lithuania		14
Estonia		11
Spain	2	35
Luxembourg		2
Cyprus	0	2

Table 3 (left): Gowan and Korski: Deployment only 2009

In their study from 2009, Gowan and Korski decided to assign points from 0 to 10 for the category 'deployment'. But, other than a mere comparison of absolute deployment numbers, they opted for what could be called a double- relative approach:

*' Countries were assessed on a) absolute numbers of deployed personnel relative to national capacity and b) numbers deployed as proportion of numbers pledged under the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) process.'*⁴¹ In 2009, Gowan and Korski had found that *'No country scored higher than 7 in this category because no country has come close to meeting its CHG commitments.'*⁴²

For 2012, this study does not include a new assessment of the deployment category as it has been done in 2009, due to a lack of information about the assumed national capacity and the pledged numbers. Therefore the table in this part is only to illustrate how Gowan and Korski's relative method is to be understood and to display for each Member State its score in the category deployment.

Deployment, for Gowan and Korski, is only one of seven categories (the others being training, planning, debriefs, civilian rosters, police rosters and exercises).⁴³ Having compared EU Member States' capacities in the seven categories, they had come to the conclusion that the states can be divided into four broad groups according to their level of engagement for EU civilian missions from creating potentials to the use of them.

41 Korski, D., & Gowan, R. (2009). p.79

42 Korski, D., & Gowan, R. (2009). p.79

43 Korski, D., & Gowan, R. (2009). p.79

To see which country was placed in which group, see Annex 2 and tables 3 & 5. In green, the Professionals, in blue the Strivers, yellow for the Agnostics, red for the Indifferents.

This approach measures deployment in a double way as it works with 'deployment' as a category measured by three values for each country (national potential, pledged number under CHG and number of staff actually deployed). This is clearly positive. An 'second strength of this method is that while the category deployment only captures what happens in the moment of measurement, the other six categories, which include basic civilian structures such as rosters or training-provisions, measure each Member State's potential. It has to be said, however, that the amount of information needed for an assessment of the Member State's civilian capacities this precise is hard to collect and parts of it are probably not available without personal contact to politicians involved in this field.

4.4 Jürgenliemk's relative approach

Jürgenliemk, in his article from 2011 has looked at the deployment rates of the individual Member States in the light the states' total population. Based on data from 2009 he found a counter- intuitive pattern: Germany, France and the UK each deploy at a level that is around one third of what the top countries send. The list is led by states with a population below 10 million inhabitants.⁴⁴

The three biggest and the three smallest Member States by population are marked in bold to represent this dis-proportionality.

The first observation for a comparison of Member States' deployment rates divided by their population is that suddenly only 11 Member States send more staff per population in 2012 than in 2009 and a majority of 16 Member States sends less.

In general, if measured with this method, the changes are huge: 23 Member States changed their relative deployment rate by 10% or more.

A central question is of course, whether Jürgenliemk's observation that the bigger Member States deploy relatively little still holds and it does: France, Germany and the UK have even scored worse than in 2009 (France minus 72,09 %, Germany minus 18,41 %, and the UK minus 30,88 %).

Cyprus, the Netherlands and Slovenia have increased their relative deployments by more than 60% with Cyprus displaying an impressive increase of 92,86%.

Apart from the big Member States contributing poorly, those countries which are in the media for their severe financial problems (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland)⁴⁵ are grouped at the bottom of the table. They are marked in orange. The observation that countries in a situation of economic hardship deploy less makes sense in so far as almost all personnel in civilian EU- missions is paid for by the Member States sending it. Only a handful of staff (in the higher postions) is EU-funded. Jürgenliemk's argument was that seeing the big Member States at the bottom of the list of contributors was counter-intuitive given their larger amount of inhabitants theoretically available for deployment. The financial argument fits with this reasoning, although the observed positions of these countries are everything but counter-intuitive.

This approach, in contrast to a simple absolute comparison of the Member State's deployment rates, takes into account their population potential which is defined by their number of inhabitants.

The inclusion of an aspect that, even if it does not serve as an explanation and on the contrary, seems to make understanding the contributions in relation to each other more difficult, enriches the debate. Plus, it requires only two values per country, the total deployment and the number of inhabitants. Those are easy to obtain. But if compared to Gowan's and Korski's relative approach (see below) it has to be admitted that Jürgenliemk's method does not include the promises of the Member States, pledges.

44 Jürgenliemk, H. (2011). European Civilian Crisis Management Capacities: Bridging the Resources Gap? *GGI Briefing Paper*, 2/2011. Brussels: The Global Governance Institute. p. 7

45 Retrieved on 1st August 2012 from: <http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/254012/20111122/eurozone-crisis-italy-spain-greece-portugal-ireland.htm>

Table 4: Jürgenliemk's approach: Deployment compared to Member State population⁴⁶, Changes in the Deployment/ Population ratio and changes absolute and in percent

Rank	Member State	Deployed Personnel / Population 2009	Deployed Personnel/ Population 2012		Rank	Member State	Absolute change		Change in percent
1 st	Finland	23,57	19,96		1 st	Cyprus	+	1,69	92,86 (!)
2 nd	Slovenia	10,5	17,5		2 nd	Netherlands	+	2,82	76,01
3 rd	Sweden	15,77	16,26		3 rd	Slovenia	+	7	66,67
4 th	Estonia	12,4	15,75		4 th	Estonia	+	3,35	27,02
5 th	Malta	10	12,2		5 th	Malta	+	2,2	22
7 th	Denmark	15,76	10,65		6 th	Luxembourg	+	1,57	19,5
8 th	Luxembourg	8,05	9,62		7 th	Slovakia	+	0,54	17,36
9 th	Netherlands	3,71	6,53		11 th	Sweden	+	0,49	3,11
16 th	Italy	4,85	4,09		15 th	Finland	-	3,61	15,32
17 th	Romania	10,37	4,03		16 th	Italy	-	0,76	15,67
19 th	Slovakia	3,11	3,65		17 th	Germany	-	0,58	18,41
20 th	Cyprus	1,82	3,51		19 th	Greece	-	1,4	29,54
21 th	Greece	4,74	3,34		20 th	UK	-	0,63	30,88
22 nd	Ireland	8	3,18		21 th	Denmark	-	5,11	32,42
23 rd	Germany	3,15	2,57		23 rd	Ireland	-	4,82	60,25
24 th	UK	2,04	1,41		24 th	Romania	-	6,34	61,14
25 th	France	4,3	1,2		25 th	Spain	-	1,11	70,25
26 th	Portugal	4,28	0,56		26 th	France	-	3,1	72,09
27 th	Spain	1,58	0,47		27 th	Portugal	-	3,72	86,92 (!)

This method thus takes into account differences in the possibilities countries have. Jürgenliemk, with his observation (that the bigger Member States contribute very small amounts compared to their population) which still holds in 2012 has shown that inserting a second value per Member State largely changes the resulting impression of the individual performances. By referring to differences in population, Jürgenliemk has chosen a value that is very easy to obtain and it his reasoning is simple but still expressing a real situation. This combination is special in a research field where most data is hard to find and that data which is public alone is not telling a lot.

46 The 2009 data is taken over from Jürgenliemk's article, the 2012 stems from ISIS and, for some missions, from personal communication with the relevant mission officials. The population data for 2012 stems from: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html>.

4.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter has introduced four approaches and applied three of them to the staffing situation in 2012 in comparison to that of 2009. It has been found that each of the approaches requires a different amount of information and/ or a different expression of it. The way in which the staffing record is measured has an influence on which states appear at the top and which at the bottom if ranked in a list by performance. As a result, the observations made about the Member States' staffing contributions differ in number and content for all methods. Further, it was found that the choice of the approach is subject to implicit restrictions resulting from a general lack of publicly available data on civilian capacities in the context of EU civilian missions. The next chapter is an elaboration on these general conclusions, making visible the influence the methodology has on the perception of the staffing record.

5. Conclusion: Four perspectives in comparison

In the table below, the two simplest types of deployment- assessments used by Gowan and Korski (Total Depl. per MS) and Jürgenliemk (Depl./ Populat. per MS) will be held against each other to see in how far they produce different results. All information in this table is based on 2012 data from April/ May, except for the colour indicating the 2009-group into which Gowan and Korski had sorted the Member States into.

5.1 Different results

5.1.1 Simplest methods

As marked in the table, the two ways to measure Member State's deployment rates produce the same result for 4 Member States only: Sweden ,3rd, Belgium 10th, Austria, 15th and Slovakia, 19th. Eight Member States' ranks differ by more than 10 (Poland and Estonia), with six differing by more than 15 places. For 6 Member States, the difference in ranks was even greater than 15.

To understand what these differences mean in practice, here a closer look on the latter group: Germany (1st by Gowan/ Korski, 23rd by Jürgenliemk), France (4th by Gowan/ Korski, 24th by Jürgenliemk), and the UK (7th by Gowan/ Korski, 25th by Jürgenliemk) score better than they could, their deployment rates are not proportionate to their population. Put differently, they don't make use of their population potential.

For Slovenia (18th by Gowan/ Korski, 2nd by Jürgenliemk), Luxembourg (25th by Gowan/ Korski, 8th by Jürgenliemk), and Malta (25th by Gowan/ Korski, 5th by Jürgenliemk) the absolute deployment rates as measured by Gowan and Korski look as if they would be unwilling or unable to contribute an 'appropriate' number of staff. But Jürgenliemk's data reveals that they are among the top performers in terms of deployment rates. They use their population potential. Jürgenliemk's ratio ensures that deployment rate- expectations and assessments respect that States with different numbers of inhabitant would- even in an ideal situation not contribute the same amount of staff.

Therefore, from here on, for all later argumentation in this study, it will be assumed that Jürgenliemk's simplest method captures the real situation better than the simplest of Gowan and Korski.

These differences should be kept in mind when assessing the Member State's performances and deriving ideas for their future capacity- development.

5.1.2 Rankings compared

Table 5: Deployment per Member State VS Deployment/ Population per Member State

Member State	Total Deployment 2012			Member State	Deployment/ Population Ratio 2012	
	Rank	Number			Ratio	Rank
Germany	1	209	same rank	Finland	19,96	1
Poland	2	170		Slovenia	17,5	2
Sweden	3	148		Sweden	16,26	3
France	4	131		Estonia	15,75	4
Netherlands	5	106		Malta	12,2	5
Finland	6	105		Bulgaria	11,22	6
UK	7	89		Denmark	10,65	7
Romania	8	88		Luxembourg	9,62	8
Italy	9	87		Netherlands	6,53	9
Bulgaria	10	79		Hungary	6,02	10
Belgium	11	62	same rank	Belgium	5,94	11
Hungary	12	60		Czech Republic	5,01	12
Denmark	13	59		Latvia	4,57	13
Czech Republic	14	51		Poland	4,42	14
Austria	15,16	36	same rank	Austria	4,34	15
Greece	15,16	36		Italy	4,09	16
Spain	17	22		Romania	4,03	17
Slovenia	18	21 equal		Lithuania	3,97	18
Slovakia	20,19	20	same rank	Slovakia	3,65	19
Estonia	20,19	20		Cyprus	3,51	20
Ireland	21	15		Greece	3,34	21
Lithuania	22	14 equal		Ireland	3,18	22
Latvia	23	10		Germany	2,57	23
Portugal	24	6		France	1,2	24
Luxembourg	25,26	5		UK	1,41	25
Malta	25,26	5		Portugal	0,56	26
Cyprus	27	4		Spain	0,47	27

5.1.3 More complex methods

In contrast to the methods measuring the deployment rate at a given moment, changes can be expressed both as absolute values and as percentages - like it was done for all the re-applied methods. Whether a trend is expressed as absolute value or a percentage already influences any ranking of Member States. For this study, it is assumed that percentages are better, however, as they reflect the countries' 2009 staffing contributions a little, thus, where the countries have started from.

Apart from expressing data in percentages, any more complex method requires access to data which is hardly published. This is true for the fourth method, Gowan's and Korski's relative approach. Of course, such a comprehensive assessment of Member States' civilian capacities in as much as seven categories is likely to provide a detailed impression of the same. In 6.3 as well as in tables 5 and 6, the rankings (groups) in which Gowan and Korski sorted the Member States in 2009 are included. Even without a reassessment with 2012- data it looks as if their outcome could have been interpreted differently, or the 2012- results would be very coherent with 2009, meaning that 'different results' as a heading also fits to the more complex methods.

5.2 Reflections and Implications

Gowan and Korski have not introduced a remedy for unproportionate underlying expectations. The idea here is simple: Why should a state like Malta develop the same comprehensive civilian capacity-structure that is in place for example in Germany? In this regard, Gowan and Korski's outcome for the category 'deployment' is misleading.

In theoretical terms, Jürgenliemk measures a population potential for each Member State, while Gowan and Korski measure a policy potential for each Member State. Taken together, these potentials would allow to determine a theoretical potential for each Member State: the performance possible under the most favourable policy- situation. This could then guide the definition of future goals that suit each Member State in a proportionate manner.

Gowan and Korski's double relative method is the most comprehensive applied in a scientific article about the EU Member State's civilian capacities. Although Gowan and Korski's method to measure 'deployment' sounds like a refinement of Jürgenliemk's approach - it is taking into account not only a population potential but also national potentials and, as the only approach, pledges - the results of the two relative approaches are almost contrary to each other (assuming that the 2012- results for Gowan and Korski's relative approach would be similar to those of 2009). Rather than concluding that one of the two methods is therefore failing to describe the situation, the outcomes can be explained this way: Gowan and Korski explain what states have deployed in comparison to what they have at their disposal in the moment and what they promised to contribute while Jürgenliemk compares the deployments to national potentials. So what Member States could achieve to contribute if they wanted lies between the assessments of the two authors, a theoretical potential. As explained in part 4.3, Gowan's and Korski's category for 'deployment' includes *absolute deployments relative to national capacity*. Two steps would be imaginable from here: either Jürgenliemk's method is for the larger public only, which does not have access to figures for national capacities. Or, the absolute deployment rates could be set in relation to the national capacity (, the pledges under CHG) and total population. For someone in possession of the first two sets of information including the total population will be easy.

What matters here, to conclude, is that a reflection- process starts in this research field about what to include or not into an analysis of civilian capacities. In the current financial situation in Europe for example, it would be an option to not only include a countries' total population but also the financial pressure it faces (a matter mentioned in 4.4 already).

6. The EU's staffing record in 2012 - improved?

As explained above, a complete description of every Member State's deployment rate development would be too long here, the focus in this chapter will be on improvements.

One general observation about the 2012- staffing situation in comparison to 2009 can be made however, independent of theoretical reflections:

- The overall number of deployed staff has decreased (from 1913 in 2009 to 1658 in 2012). The real decrease (or trend in general) is different, however, as in July 2012, there are only 9 ongoing civilian missions, which is in any case less than in 2009.

Now to the improvements:

In an ideal case, a Member State would be both among the top deployers (Jürgenliemk's simplest method, for explanation see part 5.1.1) and among the (top-) improvers (Tables 1,1a,3&4).

Plus, if data on this would be available, among the best scores for the seven categories defined by Gowan and Korski.

6.1 Top deployers

The average deployment/ population ratio for the 27 Member States in 2012 is 6.73.

Eight Member States reached ratios higher than that average, four of these ratios amounted to more than twice of the average:

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Member State</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Member State</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
Finland	19.96	Estonia	15.75	Denmark	10.65
Slovenia	17.5	Malta	12.2	Luxembourg	9.62
Sweden	16.26	Bulgaria	11.22	(Netherlands	6.53)

6.2 Top improvers

To find the top improvers among the Member States, they were ranked by performance in both changes in percent in their absolute deployment rate (Table 1) and changes in percent in their deployment compared to their population (Table 3). As those ranks differed for 25 Member States, in coherence with the assumption that Jürgenliemk's method better captures the situation, the rank from Table 3 counted twice as much as the one from Table 1. The values below are thus resulting ranks after weighing of the outcome from two different approaches.

Member States marked in bold are both top-deploying (compared to their total population) and top-improving (which here means as explained above roughly 'top deployment rate increasers').

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Result</u>	<u>Member State</u>	<u>Result</u>	<u>Member State</u>	<u>Result</u>
Cyprus	1.33	Luxembourg	4.33	Slovenia	7.67
Netherlands	2.33	Bulgaria	7.22	Slovakia	7.67
Estonia	4	Belgium	7.67	Malta	6.33

6.3 Exemplary contributors

If both groups are combined, 12 Member States can be said to be very active in the EU's civilian crisis management. Even if the most complex method applied by Gowan and Korski could not be used for the 2012 data, it is surprising, to which 2009 groups those Member States belong as one could have expected that the best group from 2009, having the best institutional structure for civilian capacities would be well represented in this ranking. So in this last step, the twelve Member States named above will be marked according to their 2009 group (not claiming that this would still fit for every Member State). The order is alphabetical.

Belgium	Denmark	Luxembourg	Slovakia
Bulgaria	Estonia	Malta	Slovenia
Cyprus	Finland	Netherlands	Sweden

It can easily be seen, that those countries named 'professional' by Gowan and Korski in 2009, here in green, are underrepresented. The same goes for the 'striving' Member States, where only Belgium deploys in an exemplary proportion. The dominating group, against any intuition, is that of the 'Indifferents'.

In the light of these results, some reflection about the methodology might help to diminish such contradictions. A first step could be a re-assessment of the EU's staffing record for civilian missions leading to an update in the groups. As what the analysis above did not take into account are reforms in the civilian capacity-structure of individual Member States that may have developed positively since 2009.

6.4 Exemplary odd case: Germany

In 2012, Germany's total deployment in civilian EU missions is 209, which is the highest number deployed in April 2012 by a Member State. Although the country has a well- developed structure for the registration of civilian personnel and has been put in the group 'The Professionals' by Gowan and Korski in 2009 after an assessment of Germany's civilian capacities in seven categories, the country is only in the middle- field in terms of changes as the table below shows. As explained before, the country scores even extremely low if its total population is taken into account.

Table 6: Germany's ambiguous scores

April 2012 situation right, changes below	Table 1	Absolute deployment 2012	209	1 st	
	Table 3	Deployment/ population ratio 2012	2,57	23 rd	
Table 1	Absolute change		+	4	10 th
	Change in percentage		+	1,95	15 th
Table 2 & Figure 1	Change in proportion of total civilian EU deployment		+	1,61	6 th
Table 3	Deployment/ population ratio change		-	0,58	13 th
	Ratio change in percent		-	18,41	17 th

7. Limitations of the findings

When talking about EU civilian capacities it should not be overseen that Member States are contributing personnel to civilian missions by other international organisations as well, for example the UN, the OSCE and NATO.⁴⁷ Also, Member States that deploy relatively little in EU civilian missions might deploy more in the EU's military missions.

In an extreme case, low deployment rates for missions could neither display if a mission that could be planned and sent does never come into existence because the personnel is missing.

Although sufficient numbers of staff deployed surely contribute to the effectiveness of missions of course the qualification of the personnel matters as much. To finish, a mere staffing rate does neither say anything about the gender balance in missions nor does it include equipment of the staff, two important issues Bloching has explained in his article.

8. Conclusion

In this study, the EU's staffing record in April 2012 has been described and compared to that of 2009. Three approaches have been applied to measure the 27 Member State's performances out of which this staffing record consists, a fourth one has been explained. For each applied approach, observations with regard to the Member State's performances were made and for all approaches methodological strengths and weaknesses were identified.

It was found that methods working with percentages and values defined in relation to potentials better described the situation than those using absolute numbers without any value against which they would be compared.

This study has further shown that different types of potentials can be measured for each Member State. The conscious application of a certain method to express deployment rates can help to formulate more precisely where exactly the gap in the EU's civilian capacities lies and which states can do the most about it. The choice of an approach to measure the EU's civilian staffing record has been found to be limited by a general lack of publicly available data on the Member States' performances.

Besides methodological considerations the question for the staffing record in 2012 in comparison to 2009 was addressed with a focus on increases in deployment rates and high deployments.

Improvements for individual Member States were found, albeit it is hard to tell whether the total deployment to EU civilian missions has improved as well, given a general lack of data and a difference in the number of missions deployed in 2009 and 2012 respectively.

Twelve Member States were found to be either top-deployers, top-improvers or both. They can be seen as good examples with regard to deployment rates. The bigger Member States by contrast, which back in 2009 already possessed developed structures for the recruitment and deployment of civilians, do not contribute personnel in an amount proportionate to their possibilities.

That outcome better fits with Jürgenliemk's observations than with Gowan and Korski's groups.

These results should be understood as a basis for further reflections about both the methods applied for the measurement of civilian capacities and the distribution of work among the Member States.

As stated above, for the receiving countries the national combination of staff deployed for an EU mission is less important than the number (and qualification) of that personnel. Thus, if there are a few Member States that do not possess or develop an advanced system for training of civilian staff, for example because they deploy less than ten people, that in itself is not a problem. The Member States could coordinate their efforts and groups of Member States could specialize in different aspects of the field. Still, the reconfirmed validity of Jürgenliemk's observation can be taken as a serious argument for further debate on the EU's civilian capacities.

If the EU wants to be recognised as a capable civilian crisis manager by increasing the number of personnel available, it will need the larger Member States to contribute to a larger extent. The EU itself as an institution can also provide for parts of the structure needed. In August 2011, Bloching has described those changes in the EU's structure and initiatives taken to improve on the EU's civilian staffing record.⁴⁸ These measures have led to an increase in the EU's policy potential. Those Member States which have actively developed capacities now also have a larger potential. Whether these potentials are indeed used, will be seen in summer 2012 when the EU launches two more civilian CSDP missions: 'EUCAP Nestor' at the Horn of Africa and 'EUAVSEC South Sudan'.⁴⁹⁵⁰ Those missions will be the first civilian CSDP missions to be launched after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The time it will need until they reach their planned personnel numbers will show whether the EU's Member States are on a good way towards closing at least the gap between pledges and deployments. This study might then help to find an appropriate way to measure the EU's performance in staffing.

48 Bloching, S. (2011).

49 Retrieved on 19th June 2012 from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/euavsec-south-sudan?lang=en>

50 Retrieved on 11th July 2012 from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eucap-nestor?lang=en>

References

Print Sources

- Behrendt, J. (2011). Civilian Personnel in Peace Operations: *From Improvisation to Systems?* Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations.
- Bloching, S. (2011). Security Sector Reform Missions under CSDP: *Addressing Current Needs*. Brussels: International Security Information Service, Europe.
- Chivvis, S. (2010). EU Civilian Crisis Management: *The Record So Far*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Giegerich, B. (2010). Military and Civilian Capabilities for EU-led Crisis- Management Operations. *Adelphi Series*, 50:414-415. London: International Institute for Security Studies.
- Grevi, G., Helly, D., & Keohane, D. (editors). (2009). European Security and Defence Policy: *The first 10 years (1999 - 2009)*. Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Gya, G. (2009). Tapping the Human Dimension: Civilian Capabilities in ESDP. *European Security Review*, 43.
- Dr. Hansen, A. S. (2006). Against all Odds - The Evolution of Planning for ESDP Operations: *Civilian Crisis Management from EUPM onwards*. Study 10/06. Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations.
- Jacobs, A. (2011). EU civilian crisis management: A crisis in the making? *ETH Zurich CSS Analysis in Security Policy*, 87.
- Jürgenliemk, H. (2011). European Civilian Crisis Management Capacities: Bridging the Resources Gap? *GGI Briefing Paper*, 2/2011. Brussels: The Global Governance Institute.
- Khol, R. (2010). EU Civilian Crisis Management in Early 2010: The Beginning of a New Chapter Fraught with Complex Tasks. *International Policy Analysis*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Korski, D., & Gowan, R. (2009). Can The EU Rebuild Failing States? *A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations.
- Lindborg, C. (2002). *European Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management*. Washington DC: British American Security Information Council.
- Marquira, A., & Ruiz, X. (2005). A European Competitive Advantage? Civilian Instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 3:1,71-87

Electronic Sources

CIA World Fact Book. (2012). *Country comparison Population*

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html>

European Commission. (2012). *European Neighbourhood Policy: Frequently Asked Questions*

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm#4.1

European Union External Action. (2012). *EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 19. June 2012*

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau?=fr>

European Union External Action. (2012). *EUAVSEC South Sudan 19. June 2012*

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/euavsec-south-sudan?lang=en>

European Union External Action. (2012). *EUCAP Nestor*

11. July 2012

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eucap-nestor?lang=en>

European External Action Service. (2012). *Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union April 2012*

Retrieved from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations>

European Union External Action. (2008). *European Security Strategy: Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy*

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/european-security-strategy?lang=en>

European Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2012). *EU completes its police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

July 2012

<http://www.eupm.org/>

International Business Times. (2011). *Eurozone Crisis: Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland in Debt Web*

<http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/254012/20111122/eurozone-crisis-italy-spain-greece-portugal-ireland.htm>

International Security Information Service Europe. (2012). *CSDP mission personnel statistics February 2012*

<http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel>

Annexes

Annex 1: Ongoing civilian CSDP missions according to the European External Action Service: Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union April 2012*

Mission Name	Region/ Countries	Launched	Strength** (EU+ local+ international staff)
EUPM	Bosnia/ Herzegowina	2003 - 2012	82
EUBAM	Moldova/ Ukraine	2004	200
EUJUST LEX	Iraq/ Brussels	2005	58
EUBAM Rafah	Palestinian Territories	2005	17
EUSEC	RD Congo	2005	98
EUPOL COPPS	Palestinian Territories	2006	91
EUPOL	RD Congo	2007	61
EUPOL	Afghanistan	2007	549
EUMM	Georgia	2008	393
EULEX	Kosovo	2008	2468
		Total	4017

* The nature of several CSDP missions is described as either civilian or military, depending on the author of the source.

** These numbers vary and should therefore rather be understood as rough ones.

Annex 2: Member State Categories as named by Korski and Gowan

The Professionals		Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom
The Strivers		Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Romania
The Agnostics		Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
The Indifferents		Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta

Annex 3 **Table A : Deployment per Member State, Group and Mission**

Member State	E U P O L	E U J U S T	E U P O L	E U B A M	E U P O L *	E U P M	E U L E X	E U M M **	E U B A M ***	E U S E C ****	Total civilian missions	
	RD CONGO	LEX IRAQ	AFGHANISTAN	RAFAH	COPPS	BIH ⁵¹	KOSOVO	GEORGIA	MOLDOVA UKRAINE	RD CONGO	2012	2009 ⁵²
Denmark		4	8		3		35	9			59	77
Finland	1	1	36	1	4		32	24	5	1	105	104
Germany	2	1	30	2	5	4	112	33	17	3	209	205
Netherl.		2	53		4		38	9			106	54
Sweden	6	6	21		6		74	32	3		148	139
UK		5	18		4	2	34	21	2	3	89	54
Austria			4				21	9	1	1	36	32
Belgium	11		2		4		26	7	1	11	62	47
France	9	1	9	1	5		87	2		17	131	244
Ireland		1			2	2	4	5	1		15	16
Italy		3	4	1	3	6	56	8	4	2	87	237
Romania		1	15		1	3	24	34	6	4	88	209
Czech Rep.			11		1		26	13			51	45
Hungary			4			1	39	6	8	2	60	66
Poland			3				128	22	17		170	151
Portugal							1	1		4	6	29
Slovakia			2				8	4	6		20	16
Slovenia						1	17	2	1		21	21
Spain		2	3		4			12		1	22	35
Bulgaria			2		1		51	13	12		79	46
Cyprus					1			1	2		4	2
Estonia			4		2		5	6	3		20	11
Greece			2				32	2			36	40
Latvia			3				1	3	3		10	13
Lithuania			3		1			6	4		14	14
Luxemb.							2	2		1	5	2
Malta							2	3			5	4
Total	29	27	237	5	51	19	855	289	96	50	1658	1913
% planned personnel fulfilled	40 % (42)	39 % (36)	36 % (36)	4 % (7)	54 % (39) ⁵³	7 % (26)	48 % (52)	65 % (56)	Not available	100 % (88)		

51 Mission completed by end of June 2012

52 This 2009 dataset is that of Gowan and Korski and contains 12 missions. For a list of those missions see Annex 3.

53 Values in brackets are those from the February 2012 ISIS dataset.

Table B : Simple absolute changes from 2009 to 2012

Annex 4

Rank	Country	2009 absolute (? missions)	2012 absolute 10 missions	Change absolute	
1 st	Netherlands	54	106	+	52
2 nd	UK	54	89	+	35
3 rd	Bulgaria	46	79	+	33
4 th	Poland	151	170	+	19
5 th	Belgium	47	62	+	15
6 th	Sweden	139	148	+	9
7 th	Estonia	11	20		
8 th	Czech Republic	45	51	+	6
9 th	Ireland	16	15	+	5
10 th /	Slovakia	16	20	+	4
11 th /	Austria	32	36		
12 th	Germany	205	209		
13 th	Luxembourg	2	5	+	3
14 th	Cyprus	2	4	+	2
15 th / 16 th	Finland	104	105	+	1
	Malta	4	5		
17 th / 18 th	Lithuania	14	14	equal	
	Slovenia	21	21	equal	
19 th	Latvia	13	10	-	3
20 th	Greece	40	36	-	4
21 th	Hungary	66	60	-	6
22 nd	Spain	35	22	-	13
23 rd	Denmark	77	59	-	18
24	Portugal	29	6	-	23
25 th	France	244	131	-	113
26 th	Romania	209	88	-	121
27 th	Italy	237	87	-	150
Total		1913	1658	-	255

Rank	Country	Change absolute		Change percentage
1 st	Luxembourg	+	3	150
2 nd	Cyprus	+	2	100
3 rd	Netherlands	+	52	96,3
4 th	Estonia	+	9	81,82
5 th	Bulgaria	+	33	71,74
6 th	UK	+	35	64,81
7 th	Belgium	+	15	31,91
8 th	Ireland	+	5	31,25
9 th / 10 th	Malta	+	1	25
	Slovakia	+	4	
11 th	Czech Republic	+	6	13,33
12 th	Poland	+	19	12,58
13 th	Austria	+	4	12,5
14 th	Sweden	+	9	6,47
15 th	Germany	+	4	1,95
16 th	Finland	+	1	0,96
17 th / 18 th	Lithuania	equal		
	Slovenia	equal		
19 th	Hungary	-	6	9,09
20 th	Greece	-	4	10
21 th	Latvia	-	3	23,08
22 nd	Denmark	-	18	23,38
23 rd	Spain	-	13	37,14
24	France	-	113	46,31
25 th	Romania	-	121	57,89
26 th	Italy	-	150	63,29
27 th	Portugal	-	23	79,31%
Total		-	255	13,33%

Table C: Proportion of the EU's total civilian ESDP deployment
Annex 5 by member state 2009 and 2012⁵⁴

Rank	State	Absolute 2012	Percentage		Change by ... percent	
			2012	2009		
1 st	Netherlands	106	6,39	2,8	+	3,59
2 nd	UK	89	5,37	2,8	+	2,57
3 rd	Bulgaria	79	4,76	2,5	+	2,26
4 th	Poland	170	10,25	8	+	2,25
5 th	Sweden	148	8,93	7,3	+	1,63
6 th	Germany	209	12,61	11	+	1,61
7 th	Belgium	62	3,74	2,5	+	1,24
8 th	Finland	105	6,33	5,4	+	0,93
9 th	Czech Republic	51	3,08	2,4	+	0,68
10 th	Estonia	20	1,21	0,6	+	0,61
11 th	Austria	36	2,17	1,7	+	0,47
12 th	Slovakia	20	1,21	0,8	+	0,41
13 th	Luxemburg	5	0,3	0,1	+	0,2
14 th / 15 th	Slovenia	21	1,27	1,1	+	0,17
	Lithuania	16	0,97	0,8		
16 th	Cyprus	4	0,24	0,1	+	0,14
17 th	Hungary	60	3,62	3,5	+	0,12
18 th	Ireland	15	0,9	0,8	+	0,1
19 th	Greece	36	2,17	2,1	+	0,07
20 th	Malta	5	0,3	0,3	equal	
21 th	Latvia	10	0,6	0,7	-	0,1
22 nd	Spain	22	1,33	1,8	-	0,47
23 rd	Denmark	59	3,56	4,1	-	0,54
24 th	Portugal	6	0,36	1,5	-	1,14
25 th	France	131	7,9	12,7	-	4,8
26 th	Romania	88	5,31	10,9	-	5,59
27 th	Italy	87	5,25	12,4	-	7,15
Total		1658			-	13,33%

Table 3: Gowan and Korski: Deployment only 2009 and 2012
Annex 6

Country (colour result of 7 categories)	Deployment (1 of 7 categories)	2009 absolute (part of the category 'deployment')	2012 absolute (10 missions)	Change absolute		Change percentage
Romania	7	209	88	-	121	57,89
France	6	244	131	-	113	46,31
Italy		237	87	-	150	63,29
Poland		151	170	+	19	12,58
Germany	5,5	205	209	+	4	1,95
Sweden	5	139	148	+	9	6,47
Finland		104	105	+	1	0,96
Denmark		77	59	-	18	23,38
Hungary		66	60	-	6	9,09
Netherlands	4	54	106	+	52	96,3
Czech Republic		45	51	+	6	13,33
Austria		32	36	+	4	12,5
Belgium	3,5	47	62	+	15	31,91
Bulgaria		46	79	+	33	71,74
Greece		40	36	-	4	10
Slovenia		21	21	equal		
UK	3	54	89	+	35	64,81
Slovakia		16	20	+	4	25
Ireland		16	15	+	5	31,25
Latvia		13	10	-	3	23,08
Malta		4	5	+	1	25
Portugal	2,5	29	6	-	23	79,31%
Lithuania		14	14	equal		
Estonia		11	20	+	9	81,82
Spain	2	35	22	-	13	37,14
Luxembourg		2	5	+	3	150
Cyprus	0	2	4	+	2	100

Table E: Jürgenliemk's approach: Deployment compared to Member State population⁵⁵,
Annex 7 Changes in the Deployment/ Population ratio and changes absolute and in percent

Rank	Member State	Deployed Personnel / Population 2009	Deployed Personnel/ Population 2012
1 st	Finland	23,57	19,96
2 nd	Slovenia	10,5	17,5
3 rd	Sweden	15,77	16,26
4 th	Estonia	12,4	15,75
5 th	Malta	10	12,2
6 th	Bulgaria	11,47	11,22
7 th	Denmark	15,76	10,65
8 th	Luxembourg	8,05	9,62
9 th	Netherlands	3,71	6,53
10 th	Hungary	6,88	6,02
11 th	Belgium	5,28	5,94
12 th	Czech Republic	4,51	5,01
13 th	Latvia	8,18	4,57
14 th	Poland	4,11	4,42
15 th	Austria	5,12	4,34
16 th	Italy	4,85	4,09
17 th	Romania	10,37	4,03
18 th	Lithuania	5,43	3,97
19 th	Slovakia	3,11	3,65
20 th	Cyprus	1,82	3,51
21 th	Greece	4,74	3,34
22 nd	Ireland	8	3,18
23 rd	Germany	3,15	2,57
24 th	UK	2,04	1,41
25 th	France	4,3	1,2
26 th	Portugal	4,28	0,56
27 th	Spain	1,58	0,47

Rank	Member State	Absolute change		Change in percent
1 st	Cyprus	+	1,69	92,86 (!)
2 nd	Netherlands	+	2,82	76,01
3 rd	Slovenia	+	7	66,67
4 th	Estonia	+	3,35	27,02
5 th	Malta	+	2,2	22
6 th	Luxembourg	+	1,57	19,5
7 th	Slovakia	+	0,54	17,36
8 th	Belgium	+	0,66	12,5
9 th	Czech Republic	+	0,5	11,09
10 th	Poland	+	0,32	7,79
11 th	Sweden	+	0,49	3,11
12 th	Bulgaria	-	0,25	2,18
13 th	Hungary	-	0,86	9,88
14 th	Austria	-	0,69	13,48
15 th	Finland	-	3,61	15,32
16 th	Italy	-	0,76	15,67
17 th	Germany	-	0,58	18,41
18 th	Lithuania	-	1,46	26,89
19 th	Greece	-	1,4	29,54
20 th	UK	-	0,63	30,88
21 th	Denmark	-	5,11	32,42
22 nd	Latvia	-	3,61	44,13
23 rd	Ireland	-	4,82	60,25
24 th	Romania	-	6,34	61,14
25 th	Spain	-	1,11	70,25
26 th	France	-	3,1	72,09
27 th	Portugal	-	3,72	86,92 (!)

55 The 2009 data is taken over from Jürgenliemk's article, the 2012 stems from ISIS and, for some missions, from personal communication with the relevant mission officials. The population data for 2012 stems from: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html>.

Annex 8: **List of missions Gowan and Korski worked with**

Mission	Included in 2012 dataset?	Reason for exclusion from 2012 dataset
EUPM BiH	yes, although completed	
EUSEC RD Congo	yes	
EUJUST Lex Iraq	yes	
EUPOL Copps	yes	
EUBAM Rafah	yes	
EUPOL Afghanistan	yes	
EUPOL RD Congo	yes	
EULEX Kosovo	yes	
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	no	completed
EUMM Georgia	yes	

EUBAM Moldova Ukraine was not included as a mission by Gowan and Korski.

The list is the result of assumptions derived from Gowan and Korski's article. It may therefore differ slightly from their real list.

Annex 9: **Explanation about Jürgenliemk's 2009 - data**

This explanation refers to table 4:

Jürgenliemk has taken over the 2009 data on deployment rates per Member State from

Grevi, G., Helly, D., & Keohane, D. (editors). (2009). European Security and Defence Policy: *The first 10 years (1999 - 2009)*. Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Jürgenliemk's list contains those ten missions included in the 2012 dataset plus EU SSR Guinea-Bissau which is completed by now and EUSR BST Georgia which is both completed and not listed as a mission by EU operations.

Annex 10: Raw data for the re-applied Jürgenliemk method

Member State	Population 2012 (in millions)	Deployed Personnel 2012
Finland	5,26	105
Slovenia	1,2	21
Sweden	9,1	148
Estonia	1,27	20
Malta	0,41	5
Bulgaria	7,04	79
Denmark	5,54	59
Luxembourg	0,52	5
Netherlands	16,32	106
Hungary	9,96	60
Belgium	10,44	62
Czech Republic	10,18	51
Latvia	2,19	10
Poland	38,42	170
Austria	8,3	36
Italy	21,26	87
Romania	21,85	88
Lithuania	3,53	14
Slovakia	5,48	20
Cyprus	1,14	4
Greece	10,77	36
Ireland	4,72	15
Germany	81,31	209
UK	63,05	89
France	65,63	131
Portugal	10,78	6
Spain	47,04	22

The 2012 deployment rates stems from ISIS and, for some missions, from personal communication with the relevant mission officials.

The population data for 2012 stemms from:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html>.