



Bachelor Thesis

A Taxonomy of Interest of the “European Smoking Tobacco Association” and the “European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention” on the Basis of Theories of Strong and Weak Interests

Name: Christoph Eike Burggraf
Address: Johannes-Calvin-Str. 25
26725 Emden
Germany
Phone: 0049 176 80219152
Email: christophburggraf@ewetel.net
Semester: 6
Student ID: 364782 (D)
1247573 (NL)
Program: Public Administration (European Studies)

1st Supervisor: Jochen Dehling, M.A.
2nd Supervisor: Dr. Michel L. Ehrenhard

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Table of Content

- 1. INTRODUCTION 1**

- 2. METHODOLOGICAL ENTRANCE – RESEARCH DESIGN 4**

- 3. THEORETICAL REFERENCE FRAME..... 6**
 - 3.1 THE TERMS OF “INTEREST” AND “INTEREST GROUP” WITHIN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 6
 - 3.1.1 *The Concept of “Interest”* 6
 - 3.1.2 *The Concept of “Interest Group”* 7
 - 3.2 STATUS OF RESEARCH – POLITICAL STRENGTH OF “INTERESTS” REPRESENTED IN “INTEREST GROUPS” 8
 - 3.3 CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE INTEREST STRENGTH CAPACITIES..... 10
 - 3.3.1 *Theoretical Distinction of Weak and Strong Interests* 10
 - 3.3.2 *Research-Raster and Further Proceeding* 15

- 4. ANALYSIS AND APPROACH 17**
 - 4.1 EUROPEAN UNION PERSPECTIVE – INTEREST GROUPS WITHIN THE POLICY-FIELD OF SMOKING AND TOBACCO CONTROL 17
 - 4.2 FOCUS 1: EUROPEAN SMOKING TOBACCO ASSOCIATION 19
 - 4.4 FOCUS 2: THE EUROPEAN NETWORK FOR SMOKING AND TOBACCO PREVENTION..... 25
 - 4.4 CONTRASTING JUXTAPOSITION 31

- 5. CONCLUSION 32**
 - 5.1 EVALUATION AND REFLECTION ON THE RESULTS..... 32
 - 5.2 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT – THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY 34
 - 5.3 FOLLOW UP AND IMPLICATION..... 34

- REFERENCES 36**

1. Introduction

“I am pleased to see that the last few years have seen a clear trend towards smoke-free environments in several Member States. However, there is still a long way to go to achieve a smoke-free Europe.”¹ (European Commission, 2011a, p.1)

These words of John Dalli, the European Commissioner in charge of Health and Consumer Policy in 2011 put one of the current and contemporary European political controversies in a nutshell: The rapid and sustainable development of the European Union (EU) tobacco control policy.

However, it was not that long ago when smoking was rather in fashion and an expression of adventure lifestyle or being grown up for juveniles. Movies, sport events or nightclubs and bars were hardly imaginable without any contact to tobacco. Along with that, every government regulation on tobacco was interpreted as superfluous and a restriction of individual freedom in life. Politicians all over Europe did not acknowledge the need to change legislation and the tobacco industry was pleased about a successful interest campaigning and financial profits. In contrast, the non-smokers could not influence the political agenda and stood in the shadow of a liberal attitude towards smoking.

In the 21st century though, the EU and its member states shifted their priorities significantly and above all rapidly. They implemented a series of directives, activities and initiatives dealing with one of the largest single cause of premature and avoidable death and disease in Europe, killing 650 000 Europeans every year (Stevenson, 2011). Serving to maintain and strengthen the tobacco control policy among all member states, especially the directives on Tobacco Products from 2001 and on Tobacco Advertisement from 2003 are notable developments. Firstly, the legislations governed the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products and imposed compulsory warning labels. Secondly, cross-border advertisement of tobacco products was banned in TV, cinema, radio, online- and printed media. Finally, the sponsorship of cross border events - like the Formula 1 car race - became prohibited (European Parliament and Council, 2001; 2003). The world wide acknowledgement of tobacco control and harm of tobacco products continued with the first international public health treaty, the World Health Organization's (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Promoting an international cooperation within non-smoker protection, it came into force

¹ All following quotations and cited references within this thesis not being originally in English are translated by me, the author.

in 2005 and was ratified by all EU member states including the European Community represented by the European Commission (Grüning, Gilmore & McKee, 2006).

Remaining national competences to provide rules and structures for other preventions, cessations or smoke-free rules, the member states possess a main part in this shifting process. According to Joossens and Raw (2007) “no European country had banned smoking in bars and restaurants by January 2004.” (p.15). However, in 2011 already 15 member states had laws that protected citizens from tobacco smoke, including bans on smoking in all enclosed public areas, workplaces, public transport or bars and restaurants (European Commission, 2011b). Although some smoke-free laws give exemptions and problems of a stringent enforcement are known, the overall expansion of tobacco control legislation all across Europe recognizes the smoking issue and reduces the smoking possibilities in order to protect non-smokers. Nowadays, the interests and activities of the tobacco industry seem to be disregarded (European Commission, 2004).

In the light of these significant and rapid changes within the European tobacco policy, the present influence success of the non-smokers protection and health interest against the work of the tobacco industry appears striking. Gradually, the former clear distribution of interest roles somehow ceases. For a long time, it was common sense to consider the commercial interest of the tobacco companies to be potentially powerful, adroit and predominating health interests. Compared to this, the political influence of the non-smokers was intuitively characterized as potentially weak. However, interest taxonomy guessing at first sight is not accompanied by scientific standards of political science and leads easily to wrong perceptions. Thus, a theoretically based examination of the true condition of the opposing interest groups seems to be highly necessary in order to solve this puzzle and to balance the demands of the manifold interest strength. Formulating the research question

“To what extent can one distinguish and classify the strength of non-smokers’ interests on the one hand and the tobacco-industry’s interests on the other hand as potentially strong or potentially weak?”

the thesis at hands focuses on the epistemological interest concerning the scientific examination of the intuitive taxonomy of the two opposing positions within the European tobacco control.

Using the interest group research theories of strong and weak interest, the assumption will be that different capacity endowments influence the political potential of the respective interest. Therewith, this thesis is seen in line with other interest group research assignments denying the possibility of an equal organisation of democratic

interests. Here, especially the widespread pluralism theory assumes that interest group differences are leading back to a balance of power. The political arena is basically accessible for every interest representation under equal circumstances (Barry & Wilcox, 2009). In contrast, this central suggestion is given manifold alternative theoretical concepts, also within this thesis. Instead, certain dimensions are expected to explain the potential interest strength and the access to the system (Schubert, 1992). As Dehling and Schubert (2011) put it, strength and weaknesses are understood as “the relative position within a competition situation of different interests and interest groups” (p.125). Hence, the research strategy foresees the consideration of two main representatives and their potentialities. As the title already indicates, the attention will be drawn on the “European Smoking Tobacco Association” as stakeholder for the tobacco industry and the non-smoker’s interest group named “European Network for Smoking Tobacco Prevention”. However, this thesis does not aim to evaluate the advantages or disadvantages of the influence of smoking or to judge interest groups’ methods. On that account, it may be suggested that the main focus should not be put on any policy making process. Rather the organisation-theoretical dimension – meaning the actual structure and capacities of the interest groups representing the bespoke opinions pro and con tobacco control – will be dealt with.

To solve the scientifically relevant puzzle, the first part of this thesis is dedicated to the modus operandi (*Chapter 2*). In discussing and implementing the comparative case study as a convincing research design, the methodological approach is paving the way for the conceptualization of the theoretical reference frame (*Chapter 3*). Herein, I will first define the notions “interest” and “interest group” in order to make a comprehensive interest group research possible (*Chapter 3.1*). Afterwards, the focus will be put on the actual theoretical distinction of the former into strong and weak (*Chapter 3.2*). In favor of retrieve significant results about the potential of the interest a research raster summarizes and conceptualizes the main indicators. This will use input from the existing theories regarding interests depending on different capacities (*Chapter 3.3*). Then, the actual empirical approach follows. In order to answer the research question, I will analyze the capacities and thus the potential influence of the case paradigms within the political process (*Chapter 4*). In conducting such an theoretical analyzes, I expect a relevant explanatory approach for the position of interests group within the tobacco control in Europe. Besides the conclusion of the results, the final part deals with a critical assessment of this thesis and possible implications for the political science and interest group research concerning tobacco control (*Chapter 5*).

2. Methodological Entrance – Research Design

In regard to the academic requirements of a complete research design the following methodological considerations encompass the modus operandi for the qualitative research on strong and weak interest in order to classify the two opposing interest groups. Before gaining a deeper understanding of the theoretical reference frame, the first thing to recognize is the scientific approach of the research. In search of the most efficient and convincing way to contribute, to understand and to work on the relevant political problem concerning the smoking-policy arena this chapter is discussing different ways of working procedures.

Comparative Case Study

Referring to the overall research design, the structure and frame of each research plays the key role within each scientific approach. Since, each research practice contains advantages and disadvantages scholars have to choose the design according to research circumstances and possibilities. Frequently, scientists assign randomized experiments as the “golden standard” to make the empirical evidence available and reveal causal inference as they control for all variables except the one of interest (Shadish, Cook, & Campell, 2002, p.13). Nevertheless, a series of trade-offs in the form of practical and ethical reasons hamper and impede this ideal methodological approach (Gerring, 2007).

Because of the serious issue of inappropriate randomized laboratory experiments within the interest group research, scholars are forced to resort to other designs. In regard to the level of analysis – interest groups within the European smoking policy – the number of objects of investigation stays limited to a finite index of cases. However, concerning the question about the amount of treatable cases a tense relationship between specification and generalization is being revealed. This means that analyzing many units generates a possible result that can be very extensive but only on the surface. In comparison, examining only one or two samples, the results appear very concrete and detailed, staying albeit applicable in only a few cases. To maximize both parameters simultaneously is barely possible (Detlef, 2006).

After weighting the mentioned trade-offs, it is assumed that the case study method is most useful in order to analyze two concrete samples (N=2) to set detailed statements about the potential strength of two interests. Defining case studies as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units” Gerring (2004, p.342) outlines the appropriateness for my epistemological interest. Dealing with the concept of weak and strong interest within the tobacco control

policy field it is inevitable to focus on case examples in a one-shot manner. With respect to the thesis at hand, the limitation on two different interests groups – namely the European Smoking Tobacco Association and the European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention – opens up the possibility to zero in on the expected different significant positions. Within social sciences qualitative case studies are often used in order to avoid the necessity of a randomized laboratorial experiment, even though they can only “shed light on causal mechanism” (Gerring, 2004, p.349). These thoughts imply the positive possibilities of the method since scientists state that “qualitative research strategies are based on the model of the social sciences and follow an inductive approach of research” (Kohlegger, Maier, & Thalmann, 2009, p.52). However, a critical assessment about possible problems of the internal or external validity will be made in the final part of this thesis.

Taking all mentioned reasons into consideration, I will conduct the qualitative case study method as a rather feasible research design including elements of a qualitative comparison. Especially the reflection on the aforementioned organizational-theoretical dimension – which is particularly considered within the research about the form and structure of the interest groups – benefits from such a case-oriented approach. Due to the possible in depth interpretation and description of social and political structures and circumstances, case studies are characterized as strong in descriptive analysis (Blaater, Janning & Wagemann, 2007). Since the descriptive research question of this thesis deal with the descriptive examination of such a case, this analysis constitutes a major advantage of the applied method.

Thus, the comparative case study first of all encompasses an analysis of two single cases. According to Reutter (2012) such a juxtaposition is “ubiquitous and a value added research strategy” (p.42) for the research on interest groups. On the one hand, an interest group in favor of the tobacco-control policies – precisely European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention – will be analyzed. On the other hand, the European Smoking Tobacco Association serves as opposing case contra tobacco control policies. The focus on two group samples allows an examination of this subject within an appropriate framework for a bachelor's thesis. In doing so, the methodological strategy gives indications in order to answer the question whether the pro-tobacco control interest needs to be characterized as weak or strong and vice versa the anti tobacco control interest. Before evaluating this issue, the following part concerns the theoretical background. Subsequently, this section will refer to the empirical samples.

3. Theoretical Reference Frame

Having explained the research design and therewith the overall structure of the method, the next step includes the presentation of a satisfying theoretical conception of “interest” within a political context and their determining factors. In a first step, the different aspects and dimensions of the term “interest” respectively “interest group” will be introduced. The following chapter deals with the actual distinction between the strengths and weaknesses of the latter. Since this descriptive concretization determines different characteristics, it is possible to discuss and compile a research-raster for the potential capacities of political interests. In doing so, the reference to the significant scholars displays the relevance to deal with the research on tobacco-control interest's conditions.

3.1 The Terms of “Interest” and “Interest Group” within the Political Context

According to Winter (1995), the category “interest” is one of the most frequently applied terms within social sciences and therefore being referred to as a “key category” (p.29). Different research strands are stressing different theoretical point of views. However, this section will highlight the key terms being most beneficial for this complex and eclectic field of research.²

After considering the concepts of the dynamic relation between interest-stakeholders, groups and the subject of interests, the focus will be put on the actual interest groups representing strong or weak interests.

3.1.1 The Concept of “Interest”

This chapter deals with the concept and the utilization of “interest” represented by individuals and bundled in certain groups or representatives. As the defining meanings are being approached, it is necessary to give an initial access to the concepts. Since the analysis will examine strong and weak interests regarding representatives within the tobacco control in Europe it is of significant importance to consider the most eminent aspects of the emergence background of “interests” and their relations to one another.

According to Willems and Winter (2007, p.20) the notion of interest is used as synonym for all societal and political wishes or preferences. In a narrower sense,

² For further and introducing research on theories of interests within organizations see among others Hirsch-Weber 1969; Schmid 1998; Sebaldt & Straßner 2006; Berry & Wilcox 2009.

interests are seen as utility for the purpose of the exploration of advantages or to improve the social position. Herewith, it is assumed that interests are influenced by the individual self-seeking in order to obtain material resource advantages and to improve the position within the society (Mueller, 1991). This particularly economic point of view on the individual interest – as one relevant theoretical assumption (cf. Chapter 3.2) – already indicates an asymmetric structure of chances to realize preferences or wishes. Furthermore, Willems and Winter (2007) emphasize the importance of the distinction “between self related [own interest] and not self related [social action-orientation]” (p.20). From an economic point of view, interests do not automatically origin from an altruistic background but can also include utility maximization calculation.

In this context, this understanding is often contrasted with moral standards (Ruß, 2005). Generally, the formation of interest preference follows not only the values by the individuals but rather by the political and social correlations within societies. As a result, the moral standards and values are being transformed into goals and finally into the actual interest. This process turns mere individual concerns towards a utility guided group interest (Winter, 1995). Therewith, the concept of “interest” is shifting away from an individual point of view and needs to be particularly examined in terms of groups and collectives. In the circumstances at hand, such an opposition of attitudes seems to be of high relevance since this thesis will focus on specific groups, the tobacco organizations on the one hand and non-smokers interest groups on the other. Tensions and contradictions between those two orientations may be expected and are consequently of high importance for the upcoming analysis.

3.1.2 The Concept of “Interest Group”

After formulating the multilayered theoretical understanding of “interest” it becomes inevitably important to substantiate these thoughts in order to describe the interest groups and their capacities. Against the backdrop of different emphases and focuses by several scholars, it is problematic to offer an overall summarizing definition of interest groups. In particular, it is important to take all the various scientific thoughts around the former into account. That is why Wootton (1970) points out, that the different approaches of the term “interest group” can be characterized as profusion which “may be charitably interpreted as a sign of the vitality of political science”. However, “it nonetheless makes for confusion” (p.1). Being mainly differentiated within “interest groups”, “pressure groups” and “political parties” in particular, the heterogeneity of the terms within the research on interest is outlined.

To begin with political parties, scientists distinguish between the primary goal of the power purchase and the acquisition of public or political offices. Since interest

groups have no ambition to mobilize people for electoral votes the “organizational structure, targets and operation modes serve as clear distinguishing criteria” (Willems & Winter, 2007, p.22).

Furthermore and again in contrast to the term “interest group”, the use of the circumscription “pressure group” is stated to be rather limited on the scope to influence politics. Ignoring other aspects, the complex relationship among organized groups and the public is not managed accurately (Salisbury, 1975). Considering the approach of the present assignment, the strict separation in “pressure groups” is seen as too narrow.

Being aware of all these diverse versions and handlings by the political sciences it seems to be necessary to settle down on a working definition for this thesis or in fact a characterization of the most important attributes of interests. In the face of the abovementioned heterogeneity of the group labeling, Willems and Winter are recommending a wide definition of the term “interest group” as non-governmental actors. In line with Olsen (1965) – who defines “groups” as “a number of individuals with a common interest” (p.8) – I constitute “interest groups” as “institutionalized merger of natural or legal persons in order to fulfill the interest of the members or those of a select clientele or other goals - oriented on values or moral principles.” (Sahner, 1993, p.26).

Summing up, within a social environment interests are subjective and are formulated within goals and needs by individuals or groups. In this way the grasp of the important role of the social coherences and society/groups beyond the mere individual level is significant (Wooton, 1970). Moreover, the working definition puts interests and interest groups into one and gives first indications of different conditions and capacities of the former (Winter, 2000). In the following, it is important to take these introducing thoughts into account while examining the strength of interests by analyzing the interest groups in favor and against tobacco-control.

3.2 Status of Research – Political Strength of “Interests” represented in “Interest Groups”

The previous chapters introduced the theoretical thoughts about interests and interest groups. Within the political science a wide range of scholars is working on the topic of interest groups and their influence and role inside the political process – whether on national or international level.³ Recognizing new perspectives in analyzing the mode of

³ Among others, a detailed and comprehensive view on the different classic theories on interest groups is given by Sebaldt and Straßner (Eds.) 2006.

behavior of interest groups under the assumptions of differentiated determination features, the thesis at hand focuses mainly on representatives of recent theoretical developments (Sebaldt, 2006).

With such an initial situation, the discussed approaches are running contrary to the thoughts and assumptions of one of “the oldest and outstanding influential research strand” (Sebaldt, 2006, p.16) on interest representation – the pluralism. For pluralistic scholars like Truman (1951) or Fraenkel (1964) interests are formed easily and naturally within interest groups with free access into the political arena. Assuming favorable political framework conditions interests can be characterized as basically able to organize. To put it another way, each interest can be seen as strong - meaning politically important and with high potentialities. Any imbalance emerging by one set of groups exerting higher influence on the political system is assumed to balance back to a natural equilibrium because of the building of opposing interest groups (Berry & Wilcox, 2009).⁴

Formulating a pioneering counterpoint, the theories about weak and strong interest deny this pluralistic self-evidence. In comparison, scholars like Olson (1965) or Offe (1969) stating that some types of groups form and act more easily than others; being the consequence that the interest group environment is not always at equilibrium (Barry & Wilcox, 2009). Therewith, one needs to distinguish between rather strong and rather weak interests within the political arena. They estimate the organisation of interest groups in a differentiated manner: not all social groups are able to articulate and aggregate their interest within the political process in the same way (Sebaldt, 2006). Instead, the sciences explore issues, asking what may turn certain interests into „strong” ones so that the interest groups become influential and important? And why are some interests characterized as “weak” and classified as less influential?

As mentioned in the first remarks, the potential ability of interest groups and representatives to act successfully within the political process is measured by different factors of capacities. They are repeatedly discussed and part of distinct scientific research (Olson, 1965; Offe, 1969; Winter, 1995; Winter/Willems, 2000; Behrends, 2001; Ruß, 2005, Dehling/Schubert, 2011; and others). Following the assumption that only certain group interests have the ability to enforce their ideas and positions, the theories on weak and strong interest are confronted by a variety of variables that could contribute to the potential assertiveness. Characterized as “conditions of success”, scholars like Willems and Winter (2000, p.11) presenting capacities which are determining the political importance of an interests respectively the interest groups.

⁴ For further descriptions about the development of the pluralism theory of interest groups see Kremendahl 1977; Steffani 1980; Detjen 1988.

Hence, this framework aims at identifying the most convincing factors in order to deal with the interest representatives within the area of European tobacco control. In the light of the abundance of approaches four main capacities are defined as highly relevant for the potential strength and thus the potential assertiveness: organizational capacity, material resources, conflict capacity as well as argumentation skills and justification capacity (Ruß, 2005; Gallas, 1995).

Indeed, all the mentioned works and factors are only establishing a compressed summary of the research on interests, without claiming to consider all indicators. All the approaches and classifications are pieces of theoretical criticism as well as developments (Reutter, 2012). Taken these criteria for relevance and the “main political science engagement” (Ruß, 2005, p.42) into account, the work is being aware of a present ambiguity. However, this overview provides a possible point of reference about the distinction between strong and weak interests.

Thus, the following part will put a deliberated focus on the organizational and conflict capacities, highly connected with the overall resource endowment. Combined with the argumentation skills and justification capacity of interest, these potentialities determine the interest position within the political arena (Winter, 1995; Winter/Willems, 2000; Ruß, 2005). In addition to an in depth description of the relevant capacities, a conceptualization will implement indicators which are used by the political science to measure the strength. With respect to these evidences a qualitative interpretation will be possible to assemble an actual research raster to handle the selected interest groups within the anti-smoking arena.

3.3 Conceptualisation of the Interest Strength Capacities

3.3.1 Theoretical Distinction of Weak and Strong Interests

At this place, the reference frame will focus the actual theoretical distinction of strong and weak interests in order to present a characterization of the influencing indicators. What do we mean while talking about organizational, conflict, resource or justification capacities and what does the endowment with the former signifies for the characterization of the taxonomy of interest? As already indicated throughout this work, weak interest are characterized as resource-poor, hard to organized and above all without political clout. In contrast, strong interests are defined as political assertive due to a high capacity endowment (Clement, Nowak, Ruß, Scheerer, 2010). In short, the capacities are determining as influencing factors “the potency of an interest group to influence the political decision making process” (Daumann, 1999, p.119) according to

their ideas. These understandings form the basis of the examination within the following chapter.

Since a one-dimensional orientation “underlines the limitation” (Winter, 2000, p.40) a rather multifarious approach is required in order to make concrete statements about interest's strength. However, referring to the conceptualisation of weak and strong interest, science can only “hardly provide a convincing operationalisation” (Winter, 2000, p.39) to make the capacities comprehensively feasible. As a consequence, one needs to be fully aware of the problem of the absence of an all-encompassing reference. Recognising this issue, this thesis on interest groups deliberately relies on data of rather qualitative nature. Qualitative and interpretative methods are connected to the empirical evaluation and in line with other multi-factorial approaches (Ruß, 2005, Behrends, 2001, Gallas, 1994). Having made these introductory remarks, the research about the four main capacity dimensions will provide important evidence about the actual indicators – consequently leading to a collocation of a distinctive research-raster.

Factor 1: Organizational Capacity

According to the political research, the size and composition of the group is influencing the organizational capacity of the interest in particular. Especially the scientific work by Mancur Olson (1965) constituted a leading paradigm within the interest group research and established a standard reference for the research on organizational capacity (Schmid, 1998; Dehling & Schubert, 2011; Reutter, 2012). From his point of view, individuals are engaging within interest groups depending on their expected cost-benefit ratio. Against the backdrop of the assumption of people's rational action, they will rank certain preferences according to their expected utility. All actions are assumed to be based on self-interest, with the aim that the individual will choose the action with the highest expected utility rate (Dehling & Schubert, 2011; Schubert, 1992).

With regard to the interest-group research, this indicates that rational acting group members seeking to maximize their personal welfare are not acting automatically “in advance of their [...] group objectives” (Olson, 1965, p.2). Seeing groups and organizations provide collective goods (group goods) which are exposable (e.g. public security or consumer protection), they become consumable by everyone. This means that people benefit without individual costs: they do not have to engage within the provision process. Therefore, interest organization within large groups is most improbable because big groups are characterized by anonymity where individual action is hardly noticed. Consequently, the absence of control over conduct leads towards the need to fight against free-rider temptation since no sanction is possible: passive

members are exploiting the achievements of actively involved members within the interest group (Olson, 1965). Numerical small sized groups are stated to be more likely to tackle the problems of rational acting individuals. Only coordinated and concentrated action within small and specialized groups can minimize the cost of provisions for the interest and turns the former into a strong and privileged one (Olson, 1965; Willems, 2005). Hence, a regular structured and proficient organizational set-up determines the overall organizational capacity and is determining a viable group size and collective commitment (Gallas, 1994).

Since the literature does not offer a proven threshold, the organizational capacity of the group size is estimate in relation to the interest group in competition. It appears to be certain that widespread and diffuse interests without clear allocation to a single status group are hardly to organize. “Especially the categories of the general and basic needs (those relating to residence, health, education)” (Offe, 1969, p.198) are rather dedicated to the sum of individuals and thus to a large and heterogeneous group. Only the groups which are performing a concrete and limited service are able to organize their interest (Reutter, 2012). However, by creating sub-groups the interest can be represented within a smaller cohort wherein the social pressure to act is increased (Behrends, 2001).

Tightly bound to the group organization, scholars refer to the general cognition of a common interest as important key point. The basic difficulty concerns “the ability of the interest stakeholders to pursue their needs as conscious interest” (Ruß, 2005, p.41) Hence, the act of realization can be a critical characteristic since with “a distinct low level of awareness, a central organizational requirement is missing” (Dehling & Schubert, 2011, p.125). Consequently, not only the size of the group, but also the field of interest determines the organizational capacity (i.e. market and business orientated or not, etc.). In addition, the internal structure, e.g. regarding simple participation opportunities or the general composition of members, is influencing the degree of organization. Hereby, indicators like homogeneous vs. heterogeneous member interests or the geographical position (long distance and large areas increase organizational difficulties and thus limit the potential capacity) are playing a significant role (Dehling & Schubert, 2011). With respect to these facts, the organizational capacity needs to be connected to the material resources and organizational expenses which are expressed first and foremost – although not solely – through the financial strength.

Factor 2: Material Resources

In line with the presented theoretical work, it is assumed that interest groups have unequal resources. Thus, examining the different material endowments in particular will give important information about the potential strength of the respective interest. According to Ruß (2005) well-organized and networked groups are depending on the utilization of resources which include primarily financial power. It seems to be clear that financially strong members owe more ability and opportunities than others. In connection with a homogenous background of the representatives, the interest is stated to be potentially strong. Klüver (2011) adds that “interest groups with a large resource endowment should find it much easier to succeed than interest groups that are only poorly equipped.” (p.484). Taken the overall structures of interest groups into consideration, especially those with economical and occupational specific characteristics are interested in their own financial profit and potentially assertive. With a high financial power the interest group might also implement selective incentives to compensate organizational difficulties, e.g. member advantages such as free information material or free counseling services. That is why Ruß (2005) suggests in addition that “mainly specific and market-oriented interests” (p.41) are easy to mobilize and thus potentially characterized as strong. By contrast, members of socially and economically marginalized groups are considered as weak, including low mobilizing effect and degree of participation (Schubert, 2001; Willems, 2005). Social status improvements of the group members lead to an increasing level of resources. Changes within the education or rising living standards are enhancing the potential to act collectively. On the other hand, withholding resources limit the capabilities of the group (Winter, 2000; 1995).

In order to measure the material resources the focus will be mainly put on the financial composition of the interest group. Trying to examine the available capital and the special incentive systems offered to the members, also the overall internal and external intellectual support shall be taken into account. So, the resource mobilization and the collective action might be supported by sponsorship. In other words, “the more influential allies are available the greater the mobilization” (Winter/Willems 2000, p.23) and the stronger the interest. This provision of additional work and services (e.g. advice, supervision, expertise, etc.) is again connected to the overall potential to react against existing social and political structures in an accepted and profound manner. Having elaborated on this aspect, the conflict capacity and the justification capacity will be edit in the following as the third and fourth factor for political strength.

Factor 3: Conflict Capacity

On further reflection, Dehling and Schubert (2011) point out that the research on interest is not only constrained to focus on hard facts (e.g. the size of the group or financial resources). Next to the question of the organizational capacity and the material resources, the notion of the conflict capacity was introduced to consider the strength of interests even more differentiated (Behrends, 2001). Complementing the first two factors, Offe (1969) concludes that at the same time organized interest needs to have a high capacity of conflict in order to possess a high potential of political influence. He expounds the “ability to evade or refuse relevant economic services from the society” as essential for a strong interest (Offe, 1969, p.169). To put it briefly: “The higher the potential capacity of conflict, the higher the chance of political influence” (Behrends, 2001 p.59) and also, the stronger the interest.

Concerning the theoretical remarks the withdraw possibilities of interest groups within the political system express themselves in a wide range of action. In practice, “labor strikes, lockouts, boycotts or investment strikes” (Alemann/Heinze, 1981, p.17) are decisive factors determining successful interest. Furthermore, the power of sanction characterizes the potential of the interest and determines the opportunities for political influence (Offe, 1969). Herein, also just the threat to refuse services generates the potential to influence. However, the disruption of the public order or the so called “chaos-potential” might open opportunities for weak interests (Ruß, 2005, p.47). Due to a possible disproportionately frightening, such activities might unfortunately upset former interest supporters (Straßner, 2006). For the analysis of interest groups within the smoking policy this interference potential is complemented by the consideration of financial and informational support by external partners. In this context, Behrends (2001) concludes that “single interest groups with a relatively high influence potential [and public credibility] are able to assertive their own interest compared to less powerful or rather unorganized interest groups” (p.59). Thereby, a link to the justification capacity is provided and will be the last characterized factor.

Factor 4: Argumentation Skills and Justification Capacity

Additionally, the potential capacity of interests to act can also be measured by the consideration of the argumentation skills and justification capacity. This theoretical extension moves beyond “the authority to dispose material resources, threat-, power- and incentives potentials” and focuses rather on the “symbolic-linguistic level of politics” (Nullmeier, 2000, p.92). Hereby, the capacity to convince in a credible manner determines weak and strong interests (Gallas, 1994). The prioritization of

communicative and argumentative strategies might compensate missing material resources and shortage of the interest's organizational and conflict capacities. According to Nullmeier (2000) argumentative skills and justification are characterized by the competence of gaining public recognition with accepted causes. Thus, strong and weak interest can be differentiated once more between indicators such as infrastructural or personal resources, repertoire of reasons and above all grounding in values and norms within the society. Using the ability of frame amplification, interest groups might convert their present ideas into successful claims. A high potential of the prerogative of interpretation characterizes a strong interest (Nullmeier, 2000; Ruß, 2005).

Recognizing an overlap with the other capacities it can be argued that interest groups are forced to bring forth justifications and reasons, which are credible and acceptable by others. Moreover, Ruß (2005) elaborates that these potentialities - regarding the characterization - reflect on rather vague theoretical estimations and thus, making the "interpretative framework [for the measurement] multifunctional" (p.52). Indeed, justification and argumentation capacities need hardly measurable conditions depending on the specific political culture or present societal zeitgeist. Anyhow, the research options benefit from these ideas and playing an important part within the taxonomy of tobacco and non-smokers interest.

3.3.2 Research-Raster and Further Proceeding

Taking all foregoing conceptualized indicators into account this conclusive chapter collocates a research-raster about the characteristics of weak and strong interest including internal and external influencing factors under ideal circumstances. Thus, table 1 simplifies and filters the relationships of cause and effect between indicators and interest's strength. On the one hand, this collocation will serve as feasible summary of the theoretical reference frame. On the other hand, it implements the background for the conduction of the actual analysis concerning the opposing interest group positions within the tobacco control policy. Although this figure is an idealized distinction, it gives an important and decidedly overview on the results worked out yet. Hence, focusing on the main capacities of interest strength, a necessary concentration within this complex field of research is implemented. Again, I will concentrate on the most central influencing and acknowledged capacities.

TABLE 1: RESEARCH RASTER TO DISTINGUISH THE INFLUENTIAL POTENTIAL OF STRONG AND WEAK INTEREST

	Strong Interest	Weak Interest
Factor 1: Organizational Capacity		
<i>1. Degree of Organization:</i>	regular structured, homogeneity	Irregular structured, heterogeneity
<i>2. Affected Group:</i>	Small sized and specific group, implemented sub-groups	Oversized, undefined group size, without sub-group organisation
<i>3. Nature of Interest:</i>	Single locus of control, Point of reference to fix a problem	Vague/diffuse, Complex causal explanation
Factor 2: Material Resources		
<i>1. Financial Provisions:</i>	operating commercially, high capital movement	not operating commercially, low capital movement
<i>2. Expert knowledge:</i>	Intellectual competences, customized support	Non-Intellectual competences, little customized support.
Factor 3: Conflict Capacity:		
<i>1. Interference potential:</i>	High: Labor strikes, lockouts, boycotts or investment strikes	Little: No or only ineffective action possible
<i>2. System relevant performance:</i>	Possibility to refuse or to threat	No refuse or threat possible
Factor 4: Argumentation Skills and Justification Capacity:		
<i>1. Attitude of the influence addressee:</i>	In line with values and norms within the society	No matching with societal values and norms
<i>2. Degree of public attention:</i>	Prerogative of interpretation, production of supporting reasons infrastructural or personal, agency of ideas, related institutes, affiliated research, publications	No possibility for an argumentative professional development

Source: own presentation following Schmid, 1998, p.50; Behrends, 2001, pp.63 et seq.

In the following section, I will analyze the capacity endowment of the European Smoking Tobacco Association and the European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention in order to examine the taxonomy of both interests. Thus, considering the measurement of interest potentialities the theoretical thoughts need to be linked to the appropriate analysis of data collection. Therefore, the actual approach relies on textual descriptions and document analysis, using data from statements, publications or position papers. Wherever possible, scientific works and background literature regarding the interest groups will be considered. The literature analysis deploys documents provided by the European Union Transparency Register or the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library. On the one hand, relevant published information from the substantial interest groups will be used as primary sources. On the other hand, reports and essays about the structure and situation of the interest groups by external scholars are serving as secondary sources. Since this collection of indicators is also based on normative and interpretative conclusions, the qualitative aspect of this approach is stressed.

Beforehand, a general introduction about the interest representation within the European Union will set the scene for the concretization and consideration of the two different interest groups. Then, I turn towards the research raster approach concerning the question about the strength of the respective interest potentialities.

4. Analysis and Approach

4.1 European Union Perspective – Interest Groups within the Policy-Field of Smoking and Tobacco Control

With respect to the research on interest groups, the examination of interest representation in the European Union has continued to increase as the European integration has progressed. Eising and Kohler-Koch (2005) are identifying a “narrow interconnection of European, national and regional political processes” and thus an “Europeanization of the associational work of interest groups” (p.13). Furthermore, Greenwood (2007) indicates a significant growth in the number of citizen groups as well as professional associations and companies. Depending on capacities, preconditions or range of expertise, every institution can be a venue for interest representation. Herein, private and public interest operate in a highly structured environment with manifold channels to influence the EU decision-making process (Sebaldt, 2004). Taking these developments into consideration, a highly relevant object

of study for the political science in the form of European Union interest group research is revealed (Reutter, 2012, Greenwood, 2007).⁵

For the thesis at hands, the focus will be placed on the interest groups acting within the policy field of tobacco control. Also here, such an Europeanization had occurred and moved interest representation mainly on European level. On this basis, I like to introduce rather briefly the actors within the smoking policy arena in order to put the chosen interest group cases in a proper perspective.

The first thing to recognize while analyzing the strength of non-smokers interest on the one hand and tobacco industry interest on the other, relates to the involvement of a wide range of different process participants on European level. According to the European Transparency Register about 35 interest groups are dealing with the key term “tobacco”. Just to cite a few, this includes the European Public Health Alliance, European Cigar Manufacturers Association, Tobacco Industry Platform or Smoke Free Partnership and the World Federation Against Drugs (European Transparency Register, 2012a). Furthermore, other interest groups are registered under the heading “cigarette” or “smoking”, such as Deutscher Zigarettenverband e.V. or Philip Morris International Inc. (Transparency Register, 2012b). Hence, interest groups of the diverse areas are connected to the issue of smoking policy and tobacco control. All of them representing their interests in the European policy making process. With regard to the conscious decision to focus on a case paradigm, the introduced case study method offers the opportunity to answer the epistemological interest about the potential strength of the tobacco interest opposed by the interest of the non smokers in particular.

Within the following part, two of the leading interest stakeholders beyond the mere national level will be analyzed (Neuman, Bitton & Glantz, 2002). Firstly, it will be important to consider the tobacco interest and the position against further tobacco control. Hence, the European Smoking Tobacco Association serves as one object of study. In contrast, the interest of a non-smoking interest group in form of the European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention will be presented. With respect to the European focus of this thesis both groups typify these requirements. After a short introduction, the following part deals with the actual analyses, presenting the adjusted research-raster table as summary of the interest strength.

⁵ For further information on the structure of the European Union also regarding interest group activities see among others: Eising, 2012; Kohler-Koch, 2006; Greenwood, 2011.

4.2 Focus 1: European Smoking Tobacco Association

Applying the research-raster on one interest group sample in favor of a liberal tobacco policy the European Smoking Tobacco Association (ESTA) is chosen. Founded in 1990 ESTA represents the interest of the European manufacturers, distributors and importers from fine-cut tobacco, pipe tobacco, chewing tobacco as well as nasal snuff tobacco in Brussels. 49 interest groups and companies from all European Union member states as well as the European Economic Area are organized within the association. Although ESTA self-proclaimed that they will take note of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control or health protection, they also make clear that they are condemning further state regulation such as tax raises or public smoking bans (ESTA Secretariat, 2010). Following this classification of the European umbrella interest group for the tobacco industry, the analysis among the relevant criteria given by the theoretical reference frame will provide more detailed information.

Factor 1: Organizational Capacity

In the process of drawing closer to the “European Smoking Tobacco Association” - as the considered paradigm for an interest not in favor of tobacco-control - the first thing to recognize is the organizational structure of the interest group. With respect to the indicators described within the research raster the specific nature of interest sets the conditions for a high degree of organization (Ruß, 2005). Those primarily economical interests – videlicet to safeguard the economic profit and obstructing effective tobacco control – are linked to one specific commercial sector (Duina & Kurzer, 2004). Supportive, Offe (1969) points out that only efficient, high-performance and specialized groups are legitimated in a mainly economic based society to “organize and [to find] serious political significance” (p.169). In the case of the smoking tobacco interest group these criteria are compiled due to the commercial and economical interest (European Smoking Tobacco Association, 2012).

Furthermore, the examination of the overall organizational set-up shows a high degree of organization, too. In line with Willems’ (2005) and Ruß’s (2005) abovementioned assertions, mainly small, specific and market-oriented groups minimizing costs and are easy to organized. A clear management structure indicates an easy control of tobacco industry activities. In addition, working and sub-groups are supporting the general strategy and positioning. Representing 49 European companies and national associations of the tobacco industry, a homogeneity within the interest representation regarding the economical focus is assumed. Finally, the joined forces on the fix and tangible problems - such as potential advertising restrictions, warning labels,

bans on public smoking or increased taxation - are supporting the ability to organize (Gilmore/McKee, 2002). Transnational cooperation inside such an international interest group reduces the transaction costs and promotes a strong organization specifically active on European level (Eising & Kohler-Koch, 2005).

Summing up, the indicators regarding the organizational capacity have been met and are characterizing the interest of the “European Smoking Tobacco Association” as potentially strong. The realization of a common interest of protecting economical profits creates good organizational conditions. Next to the consciousness in regard of the interest, the set-up and performance of the tobacco interest support this notion. The affected group seems to be clearly worked out as homogeneously economical motivated. In view of Ruß (2005) evaluation on high organizational degrees for specific and market-oriented interest, the following part will focus more accurately the overall resource endowment of the association.

Factor 2: Material Resources

In terms of the material resources, the tobacco industry – represented by the umbrella organization ESTA – is particularly active in gaining intellectual competences and customized support. Within a research on the actions by the European Smoking Tobacco Association members, Bornhäuser, McCarthy and Glantz summarized the tobacco interests as versatile and high endowed. “Carefully planned collaboration with selected scientists, health professionals and policymakers, along with a sophisticated public relations programme” (Bornhäuser, et al., 2006, p.1) give an insight into the potentialities of the interest group.

On the one hand, the industry funded outside-academics in order to implement arguments of the industry regarding tobacco control, which is only possible with high economical power. According to the European Union Transparency Register the association moved 300 000 till 350 000 Euro for representing their interest in the year 2011. On the other hand, showing further material opportunities, the interest group uses its own facilities to conduct own health-effect research. For example, the establishment of the Research Council on Smoking and Health is depending on the funds by the tobacco manufactures represented by the ESTA (Grüning et al., 2006). Closely linked with the justification aspect, both internally and externally activities were “an essential part to slow public acceptance of the scientific evidence linking smoking with disease” (Bornhäuser, et al., 2006, p.9). The expansive effort to shape science and influencing politicians or scientific committees is especially examined through the research by Grüning et al. (2006). Establishing alliances with groups of various industries on a pan-European level allows the interest group to maintain intellectual

competences and customized support. In this context, Neuman, Bitton and Glantz (2002) reveal expansive tobacco industry commissioned projects to place European anti-tobacco proposals as “progressively restricting personal freedom” (p.1328). Thus, the scholars are also connecting the high material opportunities of the association with the production of perceived legitimate influence and consequently a potentially strong interest.

Financially intensive actions confirm the high resource endowment. In particular, money investments for advertisements, “comparing the risk of lung cancer from passive smoking with a variety of other apparent risk from everyday activities” (Gilmore/McKee, 2002, p.338) express the strategy of using the financial strength in order to influence the public opinion. Following the meaning of the research–raster and due to the presented economical power on the one hand and a pan-European network of partners and members (e.g. Verband der Deutschen Rauchtobakindustrie, Imperial Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH, Imperial Tobacco or Heintz van Landewyck) on the other, the interest of the anti-tobacco control regarding material resources needs to be conclude as strong.

Factor 3: Conflict Capacity

Focusing on the conflict capacity the collocated indicators stipulate the importance of the interference potential. With regard to the European Smoking Tobacco Association only little potential can be examined at the first glance: despite the powerful role of the interest group in the previous parts and the suggestion of a rather strong interest in line with the theory, the endowment with conflict capacity in the classic definition seems to be underdeveloped. Since the production and selling of cigarettes are no system relevant performances, the regular instruments like strikes or boycott would not harm the society in general. The desired effect of political pressure and action in favor of the tobacco interest may not comply. Indeed, less cigarette sales only serve to damage the own economic balance (Clancy, 2009).

However, we have to take a closer look at the forms of refused services or interference potential beyond the classical definition. Not infrequently, the association positions itself as an important industry and therefore as a system relevant employer (Dearlove, Bialous & Glantz, 2002). Promoting the risk of unemployment, e.g. within the manufactory sector or the hospitality industry, due to lost profits through the implantation of smoking-bans or tax rises, the anti tobacco control interest developed opportunities in order to assert their ideas and demands. With statements about little and small entrepreneurs which suffer particularly from political regulations the tobacco industry in form of the European Smoking Tobacco Association acts as an influential

advocate of the ordinary colleagues (Schulze, 2007). In addition, the opportunity of threatening the political authorities with disinvestments may also serve as a potential mean of enforcing their interest and thus supporting their strength and interference potential. Here too, the professionalism and financial strength are paying off and supporting a powerful interest of the tobacco industry group.

Factor 4: Argumentation Skills and Justification Capacity

Referring to the indicators of the endowment with justification capacity, emphasis is placed on the association's efforts to maintain credibility in the general public. The accessible written scientific materials are examining the restraint of further tobacco control. In the light of the recent political developments these activities need to be critically assessed. Even though a wide range of actions and effort concerning justification and argumentation is outlined, the European tobacco actors – organized under the auspices of the European Smoking Tobacco Association – are more and more challenged. Herein, the aforementioned connection to prominent government allies as well as the funding of scientists and research groups (e.g. the European Working Group on Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer) is the attempt to receive power of persuasion and high argumentative skills, influencing the public debate. The implementation of an industry interpretation about low risk of passive smoking by using powerful political partners or even scientific evidence is an old instrument in order to prevent an increasing tobacco control (Neuman, Bitton & Glantz, 2002). Furthermore, partners e.g. in the restaurant and hospitality sector are used to develop arguments in favor of their interest. In this context, Kyrs, Pötschke-Langer and Grüning (2006) analyzed the early tobacco interest group activities and showed that campaigns against non-smokers protection were partly successfully framed as an economical threat for sales, profit and thus also unemployment through tobacco control and smoking bans. Gilmore and McKee (2002) see this as an instrument of gaining a legitimized prerogative of interpretation. In doing so, they examine a noticeable successful production of supporting reasons, since leading newspapers accepted the commissioned research and contributed to important credibility (Gilmore/McKee, 2002). According to Grüning et al. (2006) the production and promotion of favorable results, the suppression of unfavorable findings and “the promulgation of alternative explanations for diseases associated with tobacco use [...] lead to undermined efforts to control tobacco use, just as the industry desired” (p.27).

Nevertheless, as the consideration within the introduction already hints at, the acceptance of smoking and tobacco declines year after year. The changing zeitgeist expresses itself especially within the smoking rates in the EU member states. For

instances, in the period from 1985 to 2003 the rate decreased from 51% to 30% in Denmark. In the same period the pollsters measured declining developments from 50% to 36% in France or from 30% to 16% in Sweden (European Commission, 2005; WHO Tobacco Control Database, 2012). Politicians within the WHO, EU or national level are implementing programs which run contrary to the interest of the European Smoking Tobacco Association. Regarding present smoking bans, the example of Ireland – one of the first EU member state countries dealing consequently with tobacco control – represents the present attitude against smoking (Joossens & Raw, 2007). “According to a recent survey 96% of the Irish inhabitants are in favor of the smoking ban policies.” (European Commission, 2005, p.4). Furthermore, only little breaches against the state regulation are measured. This development is exemplary for the present values and norms within the European society contra smoking. Finally, all efforts of the tobacco industry will increasingly lose impact and effectiveness (Bornhäuser et al., 2006). In terms of the justification capacities which is highly depending on the public perception, the ESTA interest is assumed to limited and weak.

TABLE 2: THE POTENTIAL STENGTH OF THE EUROPEAN SMOKING TOBACCO ASSOCIATION INTEREST

Tobacco Industry	European Smoking Tobacco Association	
Factor 1: Organizational Capacity		Potentially Strong Interest?
<i>1. Degree of Organization:</i>	Business experienced, regular structured with homogeneity of interest in saving profit and avoiding pan-European tobacco control with sub-group organisation	+
<i>2. Affected group:</i>	Large group size however single-minded, recognizing the common aim	(+)
<i>3. Nature of Interest:</i>	High mobilization potential due to economical interest in saving profits	+
Factor 2: Material Resources		
<i>1. Financial Provisions:</i>	operating commercially, profit seeking, Official: moving around 300 000 till 350 000 Euro for interest representation Unofficial: Even higher dark figure, Expensive public relation actions	+
<i>2. Expert knowledge:</i>	Funding scientist, lawyers or other intellectual competences, Using own research facilities	+
Factor 3: Conflict Capacity:		
<i>1. Interference potential:</i>	little interference action possible, rather self-harming	(-)
<i>2. System relevant performance:</i>	Threat of disinvestment, job cuts, ...	+
Factor 4: Argumentation Skills and Justification Capacity:		
<i>1. Attitude of the influence addressee:</i>	Values and norms within the society do not support the goal of the tobacco industry – changing zeitgeist	-
<i>2. Degree of public attention:</i>	High effort to produce supporting reasons, however limited successful Cooperation with related institutes and researchers Own publication and advertisement	(-)
Key: + = fully applicable; (+) = partially applicable; (-) = does not rather apply; - = does not apply at all		
<small>Source: own presentation</small>		

4.4 Focus 2: The European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention

As an international interest group the non-profit making European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention (ENSP) was founded in 1997 in Brussels to represent and advocate the non-smokers' interest on EU-level. Besides a few individuals who are registered as associated members, first and foremost 400 member organizations from national coalitions from 26 European smoking prevention associations are involved and active as full members in the Network. On behalf of its stakeholders, the ENSP maintains relations with the European institutions. Here they raise their claims in the policy arena and combine efforts for tobacco control in Europe. Thus, the ENSP urges to develop a strategy for a coordinated action among all interests that are active within this issue. The group is described as platform for best practices, policy analysis, advocacy and research and recognized by the official public health portal of the European Union (European Commission, 2012b). In doing so, the counteracting of tobacco industry strategies or the general support and promoting of legislative processes and regulations forms the basis for the overall interest. This includes "smoke-free work and public places, a ban on tobacco advertising, plain packaging and above all a tobacco-free Europe by 2040" (Grogna, 2012, p.5). After this brief introductory interest group description, the following examination of the interest capacities will highlight the situation expedient to the research.

Factor 1: Organizational Capacity

To begin with the organizational capacity and in line with the theoretical frame, the interest of a healthy and smoke-free Europe needs to be defined as a freely available end-product, which becomes consumable by everyone, without necessary engagement within the provision process. Such a group good is stated to be hardly organized. Following the theoretical assumption of self-interest, individuals do not help to reach the interest aim, since they would benefit also without personal cost. That is to say, normal non-smokers who might be still interested in a smoke-free and healthy environment do not see the necessity to contribute with time, effort or money for a goal which will be publicly accessible for them in the end either way.

In this context it becomes especially important to point to the fact that the group of non-smokers might have difficulties to become aware about their common interest anyway (Ruß, 2005; Dehling/Schubert, 2011). The number of those affected by tobacco is widespread in all social classes. However, even though characterized as latent involved, not all non-smokers are able to react due to a missing consciousness

and mobilization opportunities. Without close contact and communication the non-smokers cannot recognize a need to act in a coordinated manner. The organizational conditions become limited.

Confronted with such a potentially mobilization problem the foundation of the ENSP is especially remarkable. A first examination shows a regular interest group construction through a differentiated organizational set-up, including general assembly, executive board and ENSP secretariat. Due to this administrative machinery though and the different delegates and opinions within the relevant body organs, the homogeneity of the composition of the members remains still questionable. On the one hand, the general assembly for instance consists of representatives from the European member associations and networks active in tobacco control and health promotion and thus rather professional members. On the other hand, non-professional individuals as well as natural persons are part of the general assembly (ENSP Secretariat, 2012). Even though this is a sign for a flat hierarchy, the involvement of too many different actors might blockade the productivity. According to the research raster, only coordinated and concentrated action within small and specialized groups can minimize the cost of provisions for the interest (Ruß, 2005; Offe, 1969; Olson, 1965). Since non-smokers are not only represented within one professional group, the apparent diverse individual backgrounds of academics, workers, students or pensioners are leading to a weak organizational capacity and thus defining a potentially weak interest.

Notwithstanding, the general management of the coordination of the European network appears to be proficient and well connected with international partners like the European Public Health Alliance or the Smokefree Partnership. With the consequence that the individual contribution to reach the collective interest increases, while the anonymity decreases on this level. In fact, it might be assumed that once an executive level is established, the interest group transforms the generally diffuse and heterogeneous group of non-smokers into a more suitable size. This might help to create a coordinated and concentrated action, focusing on a point of reference: a smoke free Europe. Whether all non-smokers are represented in such a Network stays questionable as well as the issue of the organizational potential.

Factor 2: Material Resources

According to Gallas (2004) especially the successful development of social movements – such as the present non-smokers network – are depending on their resource endowment in terms of financial provisions. It provides the base for actions and a distinctive justification of their position. With reference to the European Union Transparency Register the total expenditures of the organization directly related to

representing interest to the institutions of the European Union amount less than 50 000 Euro in 2011. Furthermore, the interest group publishes a financial report showing a total shortfall of income in 2011 since the European Commission rejected the financial funding of the non-profit organization – besides membership fees the main source of income (Grogna, 2012, p.36).

Despite limited financial resources, the lack of subsidies and an overall operation outside the commercial area, material resources in form of intellectual competences and customized support might be provided. “Mandated to gather information” (Neuman et al., 2002, p.1328) the European Network for Smoking Prevention aims to create greater coherence among smoking prevention activities. Through coordinated actions and joint projects the ENSP is equipped with a catalogue of competences: First, the organisation of education and training seminars or conferences on matters relevant to smoking and tobacco prevention mirror a main potential of the interest group’s material resources. Second, requiring a high investment of time and money sponsoring exhibitions or issued publications for public and professional audiences on the health risks of smoking, the resources are applied skillfully. Finally, Bornhäuser et al. (2006) also analyze the providing of “legal assistance to non-smokers going to court” (p.5), confirming the potentially high customized support by the non-smokers interest group. All in all, the resource endowment of the ENSP on behalf of the European non-smokers is depending on opportunities beyond the mere financial funds. Hence, in his possibilities one might state the non-smokers interest as potentially strong. In terms of the theoretical reference frame it has to be noted as rather weak.

Factor 3: Conflict Capacity

For the European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention, the refusal of systemically important performances is hardly possible. Neither the withholding of labor through strikes or walkouts nor classical threat instruments can be monitored. Solely, the collective boycott action of buying cigarettes might increase the potential conflict capacity. However, these economical opportunities for costumers cannot be considered as an indicator for a strong interest in the case of the ENSP. Since non-smokers do not smoke and thus, do not buy tobacco products anyway a further disinvestment would not be an opportunity. Speaking about the composition of the members one need rather pay attention to another opportunity to interfere the society system. Citizen interest associations, like the described Network, might have a potential for chaos which is also scientifically recognized (Ruß, 2005; Gallas, 2004). However, due to the possible obstruction of innocent people any occupation or partisan

manner is in danger of worsening the social acceptance and legitimacy of the claims. Nevertheless, the mobilization of such abnormal interference potential by the Network is not known yet. And pursuant, one cannot state the conflict capacity as strong currently.

On the other hand, with the identification of the tobacco industry as a clear enemy in the sense of a main culprit for unhealthiness and tobacco pollution the non-smokers interest group are able to communicate their interest in a comprehensive and binding manner. With respect to this aspect of the conflict capacity, an overlap with the argumentative and justification aspect is expressed. These additional potentialities of the pro-tobacco-control interest of the European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention shall be discussed in detail in the following and may deliver other reasons to classify the non-smokers interest as strong. All in all and with regard to the presented theoretical reference frame, the endowment of conflict capacity needs to be summarized as weak.

Factor 4: Argumentation Skills and Justification Capacity

Referring to the opening remarks and the previous analysis of the justification capacity of the tobacco industry, the position of the European Network of Smoking Prevention is in accordance with the current general public. Supporting the interest of smoking bans and state regulation, several surveys published results in favor of tobacco control. In the industrialized nations of Europe smoking lost its significance (Drings, 2010). The amount of smokers has been decreased stating that only 28% of EU citizens smoke in 2012 (European Commission, 2012a). Against this changing background within the societies, the issue of smoking policies is widely recognized in the political arena. Political actors from the World Health Organization, to the European Union and to national governments are dealing with the concerns about public health in connection to smoking. Various political programs are supported by citizens with the result that smoking is not only received as unhealthy but also as an “unsocial activity” (Drings, 2010, p.1). A good example for this changing zeitgeist expresses Germany: according to the German Cancer Research Center, 77,8% of the German citizens support a smoking ban within the HORECA industry (Hotels, Restaurants and Cafés). In the year 2005 only 53% were in favor of such a state regulation. These numbers confirm also the results of the Irish poll. Remarkable: within this recent representative survey from 2012 even 51% of the actual German smokers are supporting a smoke free restaurant environment (Deutsches Krebsforschungsinstitut, 2012). Thus, the community and social level as well as the political institutions are formulating norms and values which

are perfectly in line with the claims of the ENSP interest: a major development, great for the justification.

Furthermore, the providing of information or joining projects tackling smoking in general (e.g. working with communities to reduce health inequalities within the “Protecting Children and Young People from Tobacco” Program), the Network produces supporting reasons for their own idea of a harmful tobacco and a healthy smoke-free Europe. Several position papers are published as own research or as monitoring the tobacco industry activities concerning tobacco control (Grogna, 2012).

Above all, the European Network for Smoking Prevention uses the justifying and argumentative potential to strengthen their interest and to combine efforts for effective tobacco control in Europe. Hence, the public opinion in favor of tobacco control measures is a good indicator for high argumentative skill. These circumstances express the importance of the final capacity and the dependency of the interest position on the overall political problem framing (Ruß, 2005; Nullmeier, 2000).

TABLE 3: THE POTENTIAL STENGTH OF THE EUROPEAN NETWORK FOR SMOKING AND TOBACCO PREVENTION INTEREST

Non-Smokers		European Network for Smoking & Tobacco Prevention	
Factor 1: Organizational Capacity		Potentially Strong Interest?	
<i>1. Degree of Organization:</i>	Regular structured, proficient management level		+
<i>2. Affected Group:</i>	oversized group of latent affected people		-
<i>3. Nature of Interest:</i>	Health as collective good does not force mobilization of individuals to contribute. Behind the claim "Smoke Free Europe" diverse sub-goals		-
Factor 2: Material Resources			
<i>1. Financial Provisions:</i>	Non-profit organisation, not operating commercially, moving around 50 000 Euro for interest representation		-
<i>2. Expert knowledge:</i>	Efforts in supporting projects, trainings or publications relevant to smoking and tobacco prevention		+
Factor 3: Conflict Capacity:			
<i>1. Interference potential:</i>	little interference action possible, only in disturbing the public order		(-)
<i>2. System relevant performance:</i>	No useful threat possible		-
Factor 4: Argumentation Skills and Justification Capacity:			
<i>1. Attitude of the influence addressee:</i>	Values and norms within the society do support the goal of the non-smokers network		+
<i>2. Degree of public attention:</i>	Publicity through actions, publications, conferences and international co-operations.		+
Key: + = fully applicable; (+) = partially applicable; (-) = does not rather apply; - = does not apply at all			
Source: own presentation			

4.4 Contrasting Juxtaposition

Finally, the empirical findings about the European Smoking Tobacco Association and the European Network for Smoking and Tobacco Prevention will be compared. In regard to the summarizing table presented below, it is obvious to recognize the different interests as unequally endowed with distinct preconditions to act within the political arena. While the tobacco interest is potentially strong within the organizational capacity and material resources as well as conflict dimension, the non-smokers interests are able to assert themselves within the argumentation skills and justification factors (cf. Table 4).

TABLE 4: SUMMARY: CONTRASTING JUXTAPOSITION OF THE POTENTIAL STENGTH OF THE ESTA AND ENSP INTEREST

	ESTA (Tobacco Industry)	ENSP (Non-Smokers)
Factor 1: Organizational Capacity	Potentially Strong Interest?	Potentially Strong Interest?
<i>1. Degree of Organization:</i>	+	+
<i>2. Affected Group:</i>	(+)	-
<i>3. Nature of Interest:</i>	+	-
Factor 2: Material Resources		
<i>1. Financial Provisions:</i>	+	-
<i>2. Expert knowledge:</i>	+	+
Factor 3: Conflict Capacity:		
<i>1. Interference potential:</i>	(-)	(-)
<i>2. System relevant performance:</i>	+	-
Factor 4: Argumentation and Justification Capacity:		
<i>1. Attitude of the influence addressee:</i>	-	+
<i>2. Degree of public attention:</i>	(-)	+
Results	Potentially strong regarding Organizational, Material and Conflict Capacity. However, potentially weak regarding Argumentation & Justification Capacity	Potentially weak regarding Organizational, Material and Conflict Capacity. However, potentially strong regarding Argumentation & Justification Capacity
Source: own presentation		

As outlined within the previous sections, the relationship between the capacities is characterized as closely related and complementary. In parts, a high endowment in one capacity might compensate other weak conditions. Therefore, this substitution effect contributes to the overall interest strength. For instance, little material resources might be balanced out by a strong conflict capacity in order to increase pressure and assertiveness. Recognizing this overlap of capacities also for the ESTA and ENSP situation, the following conclusion will evaluate the results summarized within the table above. Due to this reflection, the overall theoretical work might be adjusted and is leading to a reconsideration of the analyzed estimation concerning the strength of tobacco related interested groups.

5. Conclusion

Finally, the manifold results of this thesis will be concluded. Furthermore, a critical assessment and a suitable follow-up will take place within this final chapter showing central points to enhance future approaches.

5.1 Evaluation and Reflection on the Results

Against the backdrop of a systematic analysis, the thesis has tried to bring light to the puzzle of a constant improvement of the tobacco control unlike an intuitive estimation of a weak non-smokers versus a strong tobacco industry interest. Thus, the thesis attempted to answer the research question about the theoretically driven classification of the strength of non-smokers' interests (European Network of Smoking Prevention) on the one hand and the tobacco-industry's interest (European Smoking Tobacco Association) on the other hand. Interest group activities are seen as an indispensable component of the policy making process and therefore highly relevant to consider for the interest group research (Greenwood, 2007). Within this comparative case study it has been shown that the abovementioned intuitive common sense taxonomy can be verified also under scientific conditions. In regard to the most important explanatory dimensions, the ENSP needs to be defined as potentially weak compared to the ESTA. However, only the constitution of the argumentative skills and justification capacity forms a significant exception. In a first step, it can be concluded that the analytical review quite clearly answers the epistemological interest regarding the classical interest taxonomy: strong tobacco interests versus weak non-smokers interests.

Notwithstanding, the last capacity concerning the social acceptability of interests is worth closer study here. The theories assume that the organization of potentially weak interest – as the examined non-smokers' case – is highly depending on external

resources. As a result, they react extremely sensitive to changes within the present context conditions (Winter/Willems, 2000). According to Ruß (2005), weak interests have a high chance to assert, if they are “perceived as part of a social problem and discussed on the political agenda” (p.17). Since the last decade produced the outlined improvement of smoking and tobacco bans among all EU member states, the current political sentiments are totally in favor of the non-smokers network. The ENSP interests and thus the political discussions are driven by the described change of the zeitgeist - offering a window of opportunity against the (under normal conditions) dominant tobacco industry. This important transnational shift in moral attitudes towards tobacco is expressed once more in the findings from the latest EU survey on attitudes of European citizens towards tobacco: “Around three respondents in five support measures banning advertising at sales points (64%), banning flavours (63%), banning Internet sales of tobacco (62%) and keeping tobacco products out of sight in shops (58%).” (European Commission, 2012a, p.89).

In particular, these developments influence the argumentation and justification capacity of the respective interests; gaining higher significance concerning the classification of actually weak interest. Referring to a “structure of opportunity” Winter and Willems (2000, p.23) utter that a favorable social climate can compensate for possible deficits in other areas. This is where the thesis implicates an advancement of the theoretical set-up. A usually weak interest might turn into a political recognized and strong one, if it is not only formulated as particular interest but instead capable for societal generalization and admitted as matter of concern. Thus, the political opportunity structures plus the current political culture need to be considered extensively. The scientific approaches cannot just concentrate on organizational or conflict capacities while analyzing big or non-market-oriented interests. Facing these potentially theoretical shortcomings, the thesis at hands considers therefore a different setting of priorities. Here, and in line with Ruß (2005) and Willems (2005), the interest success depends on the recognition of the interest as politically important. First and foremost, this is expressed within the argumentation and justification capacity. Examining a higher relevant impact of the argumentation and justification within the case of the European tobacco control the present developments have to lead to a new estimation of the taxonomy. With regard to the contemporary political and social changes and the following theoretical extensions, the conclusion at second glance classifies the non-smokers’ interests represented by the ENSP as potentially strong and ESTA on behalf of the tobacco industry vice versa.

Referring back to the theoretical classification within the interest group research, this thesis positions itself as an alternative to the assumptions of the introduced

pluralism theory. Therefore, also the case of the tobacco control interest group competition showed in each instance: “While it may not be the case that a single group dominates all politics, neither is it true that all groups are equally represented and have equal resources to engage in politics.” (Berry and Wilcox, 2009, p.11).

5.2 Critical Assessment – The Question of Validity

Now, it is still questionable whether the results of this case study analysis can be stated as valid. This question deals with the internal validity on the one hand and the external validity on the other hand. “Internal validity concerns whether the indicators used [...] measure what they intend to measure.” In comparison, external validity expresses to what extent “claims made for one case can be generalized on other cases” (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p.356-357).

According to Gerring (2004) case studies only achieve low internal validity in general. Most threats such as omitted variables or measurement errors cannot be controlled. However, it is scientifically recognized that every variable formation can only submit an initial and temporary structuring of possible distinguishing features (Weber, 1977). Despite the known problems concerning the internal validity and biased results, the conscious handling of such potential issues may be regarded as mitigating circumstances.

With respect to the external validity, the decision to examine only two samples produced very concrete and detailed interferences about the ENSP and the ESTA interests. Speaking about external validity as a generalization of the results to units, settings and outcomes, a small number of cases limits a high representativeness (Shadish, Cook and Campell, 2002). According to Detlef (2006) in-depth case studies are forced to stay applicable in only a few cases. However, the manifold approaches and thus the findings regarding the ENSP and the ESTA can give important references to the overall interests of similar groups (units). It is assumed that they can benefit from similar settings. Therefore, a further research on other tobacco industry interest groups respectively non-smokers interests groups will mainly reveal equal results and outcomes. Consequently, the findings can be very valuable and may contribute to further analyses concerning the question of the taxonomy of interest groups.

5.3 Follow up and Implication

In regard to the specific field of tobacco control in Europe, a subsequent research could focus on the actual policy making process and the impact of interest representation. Since the thesis in hands dealt mainly with structures and capacities of the respective interest groups, the beginning has been made to increase the level of research. Now it

appears relevant to analyze the actual assertiveness and the following political outcome of the interests bespoken. Guiding questions might conduct a new epistemological interest: how did the policy making process result in strengthening the legislation of tobacco control in many European countries, so that the tobacco industry deployed all available instruments for interest group representation? What causes the policy outcome on EU level as well as within the individual member states? And especially the success of interest group influence needs to be indentified more precisely (Klüver, 2011; Joosens and Raw, 2007).

Within such a policy process analysis, one might draw back on this present research approach. Its significant results in developing a sophisticated methodology for characterizing and classifying a potentially strong non-smokers' interest on the one hand, compared to a potentially weak tobacco-industry's interest on the other hand, are building the first step for a comprehensive analysis of the tobacco control policy making within the EU. In the light of the analyzed situation, it will be interesting to see how the interest groups will develop further influence on the European atmosphere and legislation concerning tobacco control developments.

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
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I hereby declare the bachelor thesis at hands is the result of my own independent work and makes use of no other sources or materials other than those referenced, and that quotations and paraphrases obtained from the work of others are indicated as such.

Münster/Enschede, September 14, 2012



Christoph Eike Burggraf