



Organizing the Connection

An evaluation of network effectiveness in the field of mobility, in networks the province of Gelderland participated in.

L.A. (Bart) van Oort

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Author

L.A. (Bart) van Oort
University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
School of Management & Governance
Student Public Administration
Track: Policy & Governance

First supervisor University of Twente

Dr. P.J. Klok

Second supervisor University of Twente

Prof. Dr. G.J. Hospers

Principal

Provincie Gelderland

Supervision Provincie Gelderland

Drs. O.R. Mudde
R. Roskes

Summary

In this thesis an evaluation is made of the performance of network effectiveness in the field of mobility, in networks the province of Gelderland participated in. This evaluation is of practical relevance, having seen the characteristics of mobility issues. Due to the high specificity and complexity of mobility issues, the hierarchical and market forms of governance are, in contrast to networks, not able to manage such issues. In addition, the Provincial Executive (Gedeputeerde Staten) of Gelderland formulated the desire to fulfil the provincial role as a partner instead of more traditional forms of governance. Therefore an examination is made in this thesis on the effectiveness of network governance in the field of mobility. We will examine if the current use of network governance of the province of Gelderland is successful, in order to enable them to use networks as mode of governance in an effective way.

Having seen the characteristics of network governance, governance within networks is problematic. Relationships in networks are defined less clearly than relationships in hierarchies and markets. Therefore, when networks are used problems in the adaptation, coordination and safeguarding of activities occur. As a consequence the organization of governance in networks can be arranged in several ways. In this thesis we focussed on the structure of association between network members. Because of this we used three modes of governance in networks based on the literature of Provan & Kenis (2007): shared governance, lead organization governed networks and network administrative organization (NAO) governed networks.

According to Provan & Kenis (2007) there are four conditions of network effectiveness: trust, number of network participants, goal consensus and need for network-level competencies. The extent to which the values on the conditions of network effectiveness and the ideal typical values on the conditions for the mode of governance in networks correspond, gives us information about the expected network effectiveness.

We tested this theoretical rationale on two cases of the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility, the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden' and the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'. Based on these cases, we conclude that the way network governance is structured in the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility is related to the extent of network effectiveness. Furthermore, based on our results we conclude that the more the values on the conditions of network effectiveness and the ideal typical values on those conditions for the mode of governance in networks correspond, the higher the expected effectiveness of network governance will be.

After having drawn this conclusion, it seems suitable to advice the province of Gelderland to improve its performance with regard to network effectiveness, by organizing network governance in such a way that the mode of governance in networks corresponds as much as possible with the matching conditions of network effectiveness for that mode of governance in networks. Furthermore the province of Gelderland has to make administrative frames explicit in order to gain trust of other organizations involved and to more easily come to a common goal together with the other organizations. In addition, if possible the province of Gelderland should avoid the hierarchical instruments and put them aside when using the network approach. This is also expected to enhance trust at the other organizations. Finally we advised the province of Gelderland to delegate a Provincial Executive instead of a civil servant in the steering committee, in order to enhance the credibility of both the underlying project and of the position of Gelderland in general.

Preface

This thesis is written as part of the Public Administration (MSc.) programme at the University of Twente, by order of the province of Gelderland. I am very grateful to the province of Gelderland, division Policy and Strategy – team Mobility, that they give me the opportunity to write my thesis in order of them.

Since the first meeting we discussed in an open sphere several possible issues. In the end the supervisors of the province of Gelderland give me the assignment to elaborate two issues. A meeting later we discussed my ideas combined with their practical relevance. As a consequence the subject of network governance was chosen. The province of Gelderland wonders about the fact how to organize network governance in an effective way. Therefore in this thesis the performance of the province of Gelderland of network effectiveness is observed.

Writing this thesis was not possible without the aid, advises and energy of certain persons, that I would like to thank here. My supervisors from the University of Twente, Dr. Pieter-Jan Klok and Prof. Dr. Gert-Jan Hospers, both bound to the School of Management and Governance of the University of Twente. My supervisors from the province of Gelderland, drs. Olof Mudde and Rob Roskes. Next to it, I will thank all respondents who were willing to discuss the subject of network governance with me. Finally I will thank all team members of the Policy and Strategy division – team Mobility, for their critical and interesting questions, comments and recommendations during my stage period, and for their time and open attitude during my presence in Arnhem.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"It is unlikely, if not impossible, that public policy of any significance could result from the choice process of any single unified actor. Policy formation and policy implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality of separate actors with separate interests, goals and strategies." (Fritz Scharpf, 1978, p. 347)

This citation of Scharpf gives a beautiful introduction to the object of our research. In this thesis we will investigate the effectiveness of network governance in the field of mobility. Exactly in this policy field, network governance seems to be more effective in comparison with hierarchy or market forms of governance. In other terms, the field of mobility has such characteristics that network governance has comparative advantages and is therefore likely to emerge. In order to describe network governance as governance form, we will start first with a comparison of network governance with hierarchy and market. Subsequently we will give an explanation for the comparative advantages of network governance in comparison with hierarchy or market forms of governance in this policy field.

As Williamson stated already in 1975, in his *Markets and Hierarchies*, there are different forms of governance which developed over years. An evolution over time can be perceived.

On the one hand the market, that by competition and business contracts tries to improve efficiency. For example in case of a tender for public transport in region Achterhoek, the province of Gelderland will choose for the best offer. When the second time, another transport operator will present a better offer, the province will pick that one. Of course, there can be stable relationships, but in principle the province, led by self interest, will always choose the best offer made. This indicates that the market offers choice, flexibility and opportunity. However, due to the fact that prices are the simple mechanism here in order to coordinate interorganizational contacts, problems occur in more complex situations (Powell, 1990, pp. 302-303). For instance, when in the abovementioned tender – and not difficult to imagine – also quality, safety, reliability and consumer satisfaction are important criteria to judge. As a consequence transaction costs will rise and the need for other ways to coordinate interactions will rise as well.

On the opposite of markets, hierarchies are distinguished. Where markets use the invisible hand of supply and demand, in hierarchies supply and demand are coordinated. Administrative procedures and work rules defined by higher level supervisors are leading for individual employees. An authoritative system of order is created by dividing tasks and positions. This structure effects a high reliability, due to the specialization a large number of goods of a certain quality can be produced. In addition accountability is guaranteed, because by formal decision procedures it is documented how resources have been used. Hierarchies however are not flexible, liabilities are exposed when demand fluctuates or unintended changes occur (Powell, 1990, pp. 302-303). In such situation production costs seems to be high, at all events when demands ask for flexibility. For example instead of a tender and market situation, the province chooses for a state owned enterprise to accomplish the public transport. Quality can be high and the procedures are transparent. However, due to a lack of competition, prices are expected to be high.

In the last few decades a transformation can be seen from more traditional governing mechanisms to new arrangements of governance. This shift is a reaction on changes in society (such as globalization) and a reaction to failure of government forms and mechanisms. These reactions implicate influences

in forms and mechanisms of governance as well as location of governance, the governing capacities and the styles of governance (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004, p. 143).

Networks are a pluricentric form of governance in contrast to the hierarchical (unicentric) and market (multicentric) forms of governance (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004, p. 148). Network governance is different from the other forms, due to the fact that it uses interaction or interorganizational coordination. Network governance tries to achieve the objectives, by exchanging resources and negotiating with the network participants on the one hand and bringing relevant actors together on the other. These relevant actors might be relatively autonomous, but interdependent to each other. The central notion of network governance to interaction is framed by trust among the network participants and regulated by the rules as agreed by the network participants (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004, pp. 148-151). Of course, network governance tries – as all other forms of governance try – to increase the effectiveness and / or efficiency of a proposed policy, and may even increase legitimacy and innovation. For instance when organizations like the ‘Kamer van Koophandel’ as representatives for entrepreneurs is involved in decision-making, or the organizations together may, by exchanging resources, come to new innovative solutions.

In our example of the tender here, in preparation of the tender, the province organizes a network of region Achterhoek, municipalities, transport organizations, citizen groups, and companies. All these groups can give their opinion to the most optimal offer. Consequently the province can translate these opinions to criteria (price, quality, safety, accessibility) in order to pick the best offer made by the members, which can derive broad acceptance of the actors in the network.

In the literature the discussion arose whether networks have to be seen as a simple combination of market and hierarchy, or as unique forms of governance (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 4). In this thesis we will see networks, like Provan & Kenis, as a unique form of governance, due to the fact that networks have their own structural characteristics, modes of conflict resolution, and bases of legitimacy.

Networks help to structure multilateral coordination, needed to handle with complex issues (here: e.g. constructing a provincial road). According to a functionalist perspective, networks can produce positive outcomes that were not possible with a market or a hierarchy. Therefore failures of markets, failures of hierarchical coordination, and societal and technological developments, indicate networks as a response. A network must be governed without the benefits of hierarchy or ownership. Moreover, network participants have limited formal accountability to goals on network level, and are voluntary in accordance with rules and procedures (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 3-5).

Having seen this, an explanation can be formulated why network governance has comparative advantages over hierarchy or market forms of governance in field of mobility. Firstly, we argue this is caused by the characteristics of mobility issues. Activities in the field of mobility, especially in infrastructural issues, are highly specific (such as drilling a tunnel) and involve large investments. In addition mobility issues are complexly constructed. For example public organizations on different levels are owner of, and therefore responsible for, their own roads. Usually when (re)structuring a road the need to coordinate will be high. For instance because it has consequences for other roads – whether local, provincial or (inter)national – in the road network, or for instance because it has consequences in terms of road safety in a rural centre. In addition, to make it even more complex,

entrepreneurial and / or environmental interest groups may have their desires too in the route of the road.

Secondly and related to abovementioned first argument, hierarchical or market forms of governance are not compatible to deal with these characteristics. Hierarchical forms are not compatible since the need for coordination with other organizations is high. The province of Gelderland cannot determine the road system by their own, but needs partners like municipalities, the ministry of transport and public works and 'Rijkswaterstaat'. Market forms are not compatible since mobility issues, infrastructural projects in particular, are highly complex activities. As seen earlier in this section, prices are the simple mechanism here in order to coordinate interorganizational contacts, and therefore not appropriate for more complex situations. Since the road system demands coordination with a lot of partners it is not likely that the market forms of governance deal with mobility issues. Furthermore market forms of governance are not appropriate, since you are not able to replace for instance the municipalities you are talking with.

As seen above, networks can be seen as a mode of governance – apart from market and hierarchy. We have seen that in the field of mobility network governance has comparative advantages over hierarchical or market forms of governance. In addition sometimes network governance is the only available form of governance in mobility issues, having seen the characteristics in the field of mobility. Although network governance has comparative advantages or is the only appropriate form of governance, it is difficult to organize the governance within networks. In hierarchical forms of governance, the top has the power defined by procedures and formal regulations to decide, whereas in market forms of governance the 'invisible hand' of the price mechanism (demand and supply) structures the governance within markets. The governance in networks is difficult since different organizations are united in a network in order to reach consensus or a compromise with all organizations involved, while simultaneously each organization has its own interests.

We will explain this issue with the help of transaction cost theory. Transaction costs are the costs that represent the costs involved in arranging, monitoring and enforcing the contract. Transaction costs are opposed to production costs that represent the costs involved in executing the contract (Van Genugten, 2008, p. 28). Transaction cost efficiency depends on the match between governance structures and transactions. So aligning transactions and governance structures leads to a transaction cost economizing result (Van Genugten, 2008, pp. 74-75). Having seen the characteristics of the field of mobility, networks as form of governance are preferred to market and hierarchical forms of governance or the only appropriate form of governance. In other terms we assume transaction costs most efficient in the field of mobility by using networks as mode of governance, because of the match between networks and the characteristics of the field of mobility.

Having seen this it is not difficult to imagine that different modes of governance in networks can be distinguished, due to the fact that there are differences in characteristics of issues, such as amount of actors in the field, kind of relationships, and the allocation of resources between the actors. For example, when reconstructing a provincial road and underlying road infrastructure it is likely that the province has to do with several municipalities, and maybe some environmental or economical interest groups. However the type of partners and the role of the province probably differ from for instance a particular initiative concerning a new fast ferry. Then, besides the province, the particular initiator itself, some public transport organizations, a university may form the network members.

Here the type of network actors differ, but probably also the role of the province in the network. Whereas in the first network the province has a initiating role, in the latter network the province can wait for the initiative of the private actor.

Therefore in this thesis we will determine whether or not misalignment between the governance in networks and the values on the conditions of network effectiveness leads to a lower level of network effectiveness.

In addition to abovementioned differences in role, the administrative framework of the Provincial Executive (Gedeputeerde Staten) of Gelderland formulates that the province has to look for her new administrative role. It is desirable according to the Provincial Executive that the province of Gelderland is a partner of the municipalities in the province of Gelderland. The province has to offer professional support. Municipalities are confronted with problems that ask for a solution on larger scale than the local level. In such a situation cooperation between municipalities is desirable. The province will stimulate cooperation by being a initiating actor. However the traditional supervisory the province will keep its task towards the municipalities, and will have other characteristics than abovementioned partnership (Coalitieakkoord Gelderland, 2011, p. 9).

Partly due to this administrative desire to look for a new administrative role in terms of partnership, the province of Gelderland asked for an evaluation of their current use of network governance, to use network governance in an effective way.

This paper takes modes of governance in networks as central notion, and will apply theoretical ideal types of organization of governance in networks to projects of the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility. Subsequently we will observe to what extent the projects show network effectiveness. In the end we will look if we can explain the extent of network effectiveness, given the organization of network governance. The success of a mode of governance in networks depends on the circumstances in which they are applied. According to the results of that analysis we are able to examine if there is a discrepancy between the theoretical ideal type and practical organization. In the end we are able to conclude if this discrepancy has consequences in terms of network effectiveness, and potentially formulate some recommendations.

To prevent possible problems of generalizations out of other policy fields and other areas we will focus in our empirical part on projects of the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility only.

Due to this brief introduction we can formulate the following research question:

Is the province of Gelderland successful in reaching its policy goals in the field of mobility by using network governance?

The paper is constructed as follows. First we will attend to the conception of networks and how to evaluate them according to the theory. This leads to the first sub question:

- 1) *What are, according to the theory, the characteristics of network governance, the different modes of governance within networks and their expected effectiveness?*

Then we will apply the theoretical concepts on our empirical findings in the province of Gelderland:

- 2) *In what way is network governance structured in the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility?*

Based on the structure of network governance in the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility and the answers of the respondents on the interview questions, we will formulate an expected extent of network effectiveness with the help of the following sub question:

- 3) *What is, given the organization of network governance in the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility, the expected extent of network effectiveness?*

Subsequently an analysis and conclusions are given of the possible similarities and discrepancies between empirical findings and theoretical concepts by answering the following sub question:

- 4) *Is there a relation between the way network governance is structured in the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility and the actual extent of effectiveness?*

In the first, introductory, chapter we have explored network governance by distinguishing this form of governance against market and hierarchical forms of governance. Furthermore we argued why network governance is typically appropriate to use in the field of mobility. In the end we emphasized the practical relevance of this thesis, since the Provincial Executive (Gedeputeerde Staten) formulated the desire to be a partner of the municipalities in the province of Gelderland in the coalition agreement.

In the second chapter the theoretical concepts are explained. We will start with defining network governance. Then we will attend to the problems with governance in networks. Subsequently we distinguish three modes of governance in networks, according to the theory of Provan & Kenis (2007). We will continue with a explanation of network effectiveness and the four conditions of network effectiveness that are distinguished according to Provan & Kenis (2007). In the end we will formulate four hypotheses and show the network effectiveness we may expect for several values.

The third chapter is used for an operationalization of the concepts. Furthermore the case selection is explained as well as the methods of data collection, data processing and the selection of respondents.

In the fourth chapter the first case in this thesis 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden' is introduced. In addition, the organization of the network and the results on the conditions of network effectiveness are described. Then a comparison is made between the theoretical concepts and the empirical findings. Based on that results, an analysis is made on the extent of expected network effectiveness.

In the fifth chapter the second case in this thesis 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding' is introduced. In addition, the same procedure is completed.

In the final chapter six, conclusions are made based on the results and analyses of the two cases in the field of mobility. Next to it a we will attend to assumptions made in this thesis and discuss some limitations in the use of these findings, in the discussion section.

Chapter 2: Structuring network governance

As explained in the first chapter, it is possible to distinguish networks as one mode of governance. In this chapter we will focus on how to define networks, observe its characteristics and distinguish several modes of network governance.

2.1 Defining network governance

As described in the introduction, network governance characterizes itself by interorganizational coordination. In other terms by interactions between organizations. Network governance tries to achieve the objectives of the network, by exchanging resources and negotiating with the network participants on the one hand and bringing relevant actors together on the other. These relevant actors will be relatively autonomous, but interdependent to each other (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004, pp. 148-151). In this paragraph an overview of the characteristics of the network model is given. We will use the institutional analysis of Ostrom as used in the article of Van Heffen & Klok (2000).

2.1.1 Characteristics of network governance

In the institutional analysis of Ostrom, an action arena for analysis is used. An action arena includes an action situation component and an actor component. In the actor component, actors operate within the framework of the action situation component. The latter describes the rules of the game on an abstract level in terms of types of governance (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, pp. 1-2).

Starting with the action situation component, *position rules* define the positions that are central in the action arena. In terms of a network the main positions are those of member and non-member. In other terms, those who are in and those who are out. In markets we see the positions of seller and buyer, and in hierarchies the positions of authority and citizen.

The *boundary rules* define whether it is difficult or not to enter the arena. In a network, these boundary rules can vary from very restrictive to non-restrictive. It is not difficult to imagine that some networks might have tight rules (like a rotary club), whereas others are open to all actors that are willing to participate (like an informal voluntary running group). On the other hand, markets present a free entry for sellers and buyers. Hierarchies show limited entry for authorities, since tasks are mostly constitutionally defined.

Again, according to *authority rules*, a variety of possible arrangements occurs in network governance. Authority rules might be defined for certain positions in networks, but could also be a decision by agreement of all participating actors. In markets actors have freedom to act on property and deals. In hierarchies the authority decides what to do, and citizens act in accordance to this decision.

Concerning *aggregation*, network members usually come to collective decisions by multi-actor agreement (such as consultation). Collective decision making can be caused or enhanced by spontaneous individual actions, but the extent will differ over the modes of governance in networks. In markets aggregation takes place by bilateral agreement between sellers and buyers through individual action and the price setting by supply and demand. In hierarchies aggregation is organized by constitutional rules, for instance by simple majority vote.

The *scope rules* of networks are restricted by the interconnectedness of actors that constitute the network. For instance the network around the issue of the reconstruction of a provincial road, they might make collective decisions on the route. However we might assume they would not interfere in members' activities around the issue of a new railway route.

In networks the *pay-off rules* might be the result of collective action or of individual action. However most times collective decision making will play a role, and will be directed towards the mutual benefits of the members of a network. In markets pay-off takes place by exchange through payment, whereas in hierarchies budgets are set by rules.

When *information rules* in networks are specified, they are restricted to members only. In markets truthful specification of prices and products is an important rule. In hierarchies a public motivation of decisions by authorities has to be given (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, pp. 3-5).

Continuing with the actor component of the analysis, *preferences of actors* are formed by own perceptions of personal interests. In networks a mix between common and personal interest may be expected. It will vary from network to network to what extent certain interests are present. Market actors only have their personal (and organizational) preferences to guide decisions, whereas in hierarchies mainly the common interest of all citizens is the basic guideline.

The *information processing capacities* in networks are characterized by personal or organizational contact, but in general supplemented with the capacity to exchange information with members of the network.

Again, when talking about what actors use for taking action, the *selection criteria*, in network situations a combination of personal and common interests (of the members only!) can be seen.

In terms of *resources*, network actors can enhance their own (personal or organizational) resources with those of other members through exchange. In markets individual resources are used, whereas in hierarchies pooled resources of the organization are used (Van Heffen & Klok, 2000, pp. 5-6).

2.2 Governance in networks

As seen above, we derived a general view on network governance and the main characteristics of networks. Continuing our article we will attend to modes of governance in networks more into detail. It is important to mention here that, as the paragraph title already suggests, we will continue with governance in networks. Governance in networks contains the organization or coordination within networks.

2.2.1 Problems with governance in networks

As seen in the introduction, in contrast to markets and hierarchies, relationships in networks are not clearly defined. In markets exchange of products (goods) takes place for money, and competition as well as non-fixed relations try to effect efficiency. In hierarchies procedures and formal regulations define the relationship between actors. However the autonomous actors in networks have no clearly defined exchange mechanisms in contrast to markets and hierarchies. Therefore networks face problems in the adaptation, coordination and safeguarding of results. We will explain these governance issues in networks below.

First, network members have to do with the goal of the network as a whole, apart from their own organizational goal. This network goal and the goal of the own organization do not necessarily correspond to each other. In order to achieve network success in terms of attaining the network goal, network members need to reach a compromise with the other network members to adapt to that network goal.

Secondly, when talking about coordination we have to distinguish coordination of implementation and coordination of association. The first one concerns the realization of activities. In terms of

transaction cost theory – introduced in chapter one – the coordination of implementation can be defined by *production* costs that represent the costs involved in executing the contract.

Whereas the coordination of association is directed on the cooperation into the process with the network members. Since networks have no clearly defined relationships, the network members need to make their own arrangements to organize the network. Network members have to make agreements on how they think the network can be governed best. Again in terms of the transaction cost theory, the coordination of association can be defined by *transaction* costs that represent the costs involved in arranging, monitoring and enforcing the contract (Van Genugten, 2008, p. 28).

Finally, the network members want to prevent that for instance one of the network members frustrates the ability to achieve the network goal, or that one of the network members will leave the network with crucial information and the ability to achieve goals by itself. In other terms, network members want to safeguard their results. Therefore procedures and rules are developed as agreed by the network members (Sydow & Windeler, 2003, p. 78).

Provan & Kenis (2007) distinguished three ideal types to structure network coordination and four conditions of network effectiveness that make it more difficult or more easy for networks to adapt, coordinate and safeguard results. We will describe these ideal types and conditions of network effectiveness in the next section.

2.2.2 Modes of governance in networks

In network governance we have to distinguish the coordination of implementation and the coordination of association. When coordinating implementation we will observe the realization of activities in terms of the final result. In the coordination of association it is central, how the association with network members is structured. In this section we will look to network coordination. Three ideal types to structure networks are derived here, according to the lines of Provan & Kenis (2007).

To classify modes of governance in networks, Provan & Kenis distinguish two dimensions. First of all, governance in networks may or may not be brokered. Network coordination can be organized in the way that within the network there are very few direct organization-to-organization contacts. In such a situation coordination in the network is managed by a single organization of the network, acting as lead organization or highly centralized network broker. On the other side networks can be organized, that every organization interacts with every other organization to structure the network, resulting in what is called a dense and highly decentralized form. Then all network members that comprise the network participate in network governance.

Secondly, the network can be governed externally or by its participants. In an externally governed network, a unique network administrative organization (NAO) governs the network. Such an organization can be voluntarily established by network members or mandated as part of the network formation process. When the network is governed by its participants, the network can be governed collectively (shared) or by a single organization as said above (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 5-6).

The authors argue that these two dimensions result in three modes of governance in networks. These modes are distinguished principles to organize coordination, and not intended to describe principles for application. Therefore they are called ideal types. We assume that the ideal types are

theoretical concepts that do not exist in practice exactly as such, but deliver useful information to categorize practical forms of network coordination. We will attend to the three modes of governance in networks below:

- *Participant-Governed Networks*: the network is collectively governed by the members themselves. This form of network governance depends exclusively on the involvement and commitment of all participants. In other terms there is no separate and unique entity. The participant-governed networks may be formally or informally accomplished. Formally, through regular meetings or informally, through uncoordinated efforts. The latter situation occurs for instance, when different civil servants contact other civil servants, private organizations and / or citizens about a project.

As a consequence the network participants themselves are responsible for both the internal network relations and the external relations with for instance citizens or investors. According to this ideal type, coordination of association can be best organized by involving the participants in decision-making and managing network activities. Furthermore, according to this mode, when all members participate on equal basis, commitment of participants to the network as a whole is expected to be higher. For instance because network members feel that they are able to influence or even steer the network.

As a result power, at least with respect to network-level decisions, will be more or less symmetrical, unless differences in organizational size, resource capabilities and performance (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 7).





Figure 2.1: Graphical representation of a participant-governed network



These arrows refer to the interorganizational contacts. In participant-governed networks we may expect that all members are bilaterally connected to each other. In this mode of governance in networks, participants are involved in decisions-making and managing network activities. As a consequence regular contacts may be expected. Therefore the arrows are continuously represented.

- *Lead Organization-Governed Networks*: a single participating member coordinates all key decisions and major network-level activities. This form of network governance is a reaction to the inefficiencies in the coordination of association according to shared governance, such as slow decision-making due to the involvement of all participants, the absence of a central organization to address to. In particular situations a more centralized approach is preferred,

because overhead can be decreased to a minimum, which lead to a decrease of transaction costs. Lead organization-governed networks occur mainly in networks, where a single member has sufficient resources and legitimacy to act as a lead organization. In contrast to participant-governed networks, all key-decisions and network-level activities are coordinated by a single participating member. As a result, in this situation the lead organization facilitates the activities of member organizations in their efforts to achieve network goals and / or provides administration for the network. Members may have contact with the lead organization, but it is not necessary. On the one hand it might strengthen their (collective) position 'against' the lead-organization to set their goals more clearly. On the other hand the network as a whole might become less effective if the other members agitate together against the lead-organization. The network goals may be closely aligned to the goals of the lead organization. The role of the lead organization may be framed by the members of the network on what they think is efficient and effective, but may also be mandated by an external funding source (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 7-8).






Figure 2.2: Graphical representation of a lead organization-governed network



The continuous arrows refer here to the interorganizational contacts between the lead-organization (in this graphical representation: province) and the other members of the network. We expect these relations to be bilateral. The province has a strong position in this network and facilitates the activities of the member organizations in their efforts to achieve the network goals. Although unilateral relationships might be expected, we argue that the lead-organization has to communicate with the other members to set network goals. In addition the lead organization may be framed by the members of the network on what they think is effective and efficient.



The dotted arrows refer here to the possible contacts between the other members of the network. It is not necessary that they provide for contacts with other members than the lead-organization.

- **Network Administrative Organization (NAO):** the network is led by a separate administrative entity, which is set up specifically to govern the network and network activities. In this centralized model, the NAO plays a key role in coordinating and sustaining the network. In comparison with the lead organization-governed networks, the NAO is centralized too, but is not another member organization providing its own services. In a NAO situation, the network is governed by an external organization, which is not one of the network members. The NAO

is established by the members themselves or established by mandate. A NAO may occur in the form of a single individual. On the other hand, the NAO may be a formal organization. A NAO is often referred as network facilitator or broker (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 8).




Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of a network administrative organization (NAO) network.

- ↔ The continuous arrows refer here to the interorganizational contacts between the Network Administrative Organization (NAO; here: foundation 'Reconstruction N18') and the other members in the network. We expect bilateral contacts here. Although the NAO plays a key role in coordinating and sustaining the network, the other members of the network monitor the activities of the NAO.
- ⋯ The dotted arrows refer to the possible, but not necessary contacts between the members of the network except the NAO.

2.3 Evaluating network governance

So far, the article focused on the characteristics of networks. Furthermore we started with the problem of governance in networks. As a consequence we distinguished various modes of network coordination or governance in networks. We realize that the modes of governance in networks are ideal types, and that in practice various mixed forms exist.

In the following section we will start with a conceptualization of the concept effectiveness. Subsequently, a connection is made between the modes of governance in networks as distinguished in paragraph 2.2 and the network effectiveness. We will outline to what extent network effectiveness may be expected, given the mode of governance in networks and the values on the conditions of network effectiveness.

2.3.1 Introduction to effectiveness

According to Bressers & Hoogerwerf, effectiveness is the extent certain policy or policy instruments contributes to the achievement of objectives. It is important to notice, that the effectiveness of a certain policy or policy instruments can be smaller than its achievement of objectives. However, this works in the other direction too. Policy can be effective, even when the achievement of objectives is not met to a certain extent (Bressers and Hoogerwerf, 1995, p. 24). An example, hypothetical the province of Gelderland has given a compensation for travel costs to their employees to travel by public transport and not by car. An ex-post evaluation learns the province that after an experiment of two months 20 percent more employees travel by public transport than by car. The province concludes the arrangement was a success, but is this still the case when we look to a more complete picture? A further look let the researchers see that due to activities on highways in the surroundings of Arnhem, a certain amount of those employees has chosen for the arrangement of the province, and not by the incentive of compensation for travel costs. In this situation the achievement of objectives can be explained from other factors than the arrangement of the province. Apart from the example, also the opposite can be the situation. The objective might be not met, but without the policy instrument the situation could have been even worse.

In our research we would like to focus on the effects of network organization on network effectiveness of the province. We have put this phrase here, in order to explain the concept of effectiveness in a broader sense. However we have to emphasize that in this thesis we will observe network effectiveness. We will explain this concept in the next paragraph.

2.4 Network governance effectiveness

When evaluating network effectiveness, we will focus on the question whether the network is effective in achieving the set network goals in a cooperative way. Since multiple organizations are involved in a network, these organizations have to deal with multiple sets of constituencies. Therefore assessing network effectiveness is more complex than evaluating a single organization. Consistent with this line of reasoning, effectiveness of network governance is described here on three levels of analysis that Provan & Milward (2001) distinguish: the network level, the community level, and the organizational level.

2.4.1 Network effectiveness on network level

On network level, we will examine the organization of the network. A network must become an executable interorganizational entity if it is to survive, when it may benefit the community in which it is embedded. To do this effectively, the network members must act as a network in order to decrease transaction costs (Provan & Milward, 2001, pp. 417-418). According to Provan & Milward (2001) we can observe for instance the growth of the network, the strength of the relationships in the network, the member commitment to network goals, etcetera (p. 416).

According to Provan & Kenis there are certain conditions that can be identified which values can be matched with the mode of governance in networks. The extent a match between the mode of governance in networks and the values on the conditions can be observed, explains whether we may expect a network to be effective or not. Of course the four conditions on network level they present, and which we will outline below, are not complete. There are other relevant conditions, but based on network literature the four conditions are important and are able to give an extent of network effectiveness we may expect. In the end, it may explain considerable variance in the choice of one mode of governance in networks over another (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9).

As said in paragraph 2.2.1, exchange mechanisms in networks are not clearly defined in contrast to markets and hierarchies. Actions are coordinated and decisions are made by negotiating and consensus building. Therefore autonomous actors develop relatively stable relations. We said earlier that the problems of networks with adaptation, coordination and safeguarding results can be more difficult or more easy by the predictors Provan & Kenis distinguish. We will examine now four key predictors of effectiveness on network-level, that can tell us something about the effectiveness we may expect about the modes of governance in networks. We will use the four key predictors Provan & Kenis (2007) distinguish.

First, we will outline the four key predictors: trust, size (number of participants), goal consensus and nature of the task (the need for network-level competencies). Next to it we will examine the relationship between the key predictors and the problems with governance in networks. Subsequently we will show the desired values on the key predictors of network effectiveness by the three ideal modes of governance in networks. The key predictors are chosen so by Provan & Kenis because, seeing the network literature, they are important and are able to give an extent of network effectiveness we may expect. In the end, it may explain considerable variance in the choice of one mode of governance in networks over another (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9).

Firstly, in a network *trust* is critical for network performance and sustainability. We can describe trust as “the willingness to accept vulnerability based on the positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviours” (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9). Furthermore, in network-level interactions, the distribution of trust is critical and whether it is reciprocated among network members. So, is trust in a network for instance widely distributed among the members (high density of trust relations) or only narrowly distributed within cliques (low density of trust relations)? (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 9-10)

Secondly, the *number of network participants* faces networks with problems of coordination and accommodation of activities. It is important to realize that an increase of organizations participating in the network, the number of potential relationships increases exponentially (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 10-11).

Thirdly, in general – derived from the discussion on *goal consensus* – it is expected to be more easy to attain goals when there is consensus in goals than conflict. In network relations it is even more complex, due to the fact that network members have both interests to the network they are in, and to their own organization. However, according to Provan & Kenis, when there is general consensus on the broad network-level goals, network participants are more likely to be involved and committed to the network and more likely to work together. However, this does not mean that goals of the members need to be similar. The latter could create new difficulties in working together, for instance in terms of competitive positions (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 11-12).

Finally, the *need for network-level competencies* faces two issues here. On the one hand the nature of the task as performed by network members. On the other hand the external demands and needs as faced by the network. If the interdependency between network members is high on substantial issues, for instance all network members are needed to take attain the goal (e.g.: a new road), then the need for network-level competencies will be high. If the interdependency between network members is high only on timing issues, then the need for network-level competencies will be much lower. In the latter situation the network members are not interdependent in terms of the result, but only the timing of the project. In other terms the interdependency between network members is in the latter situation lower. Therefore we may assume that the higher the interdependency between network members, the higher the need for network-level competencies (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 12-13).

So far, we outlined four key predictors of effectiveness on network level. Now we will make a link between the predictors and the problems with governance in networks. As introduced by Jones et al (1997), problems with governance in networks lay, due to the interdependencies between network members, in the sphere of adaptation, coordination and safeguarding results. Afterwards we claimed that the four conditions distinguished by Provan & Kenis (2007) say something about whether it will be more difficult or more easy to govern in networks. We will now look more extensively to that latter part.

Starting with adaptation, despite network members have different interests and desirable outcomes, they need to develop a common aim of the network as a whole. This implies that network members have to adapt partially to network goals. This need to adaptation seems to be less present if goal consensus is high. Then network members are more committed to network goals, and the need to adapt from the own organizational goals to the broader network goals is less present.

The problem with coordinating governance in networks is the following. On the one hand the network members agree that they have to do something together to improve the current situation. On the other hand they do not know how to organize the network and how to take a decision about it, due to the fact that there is no formal decision making process. The consensus on how to act in these situations is influenced by the number of participants. We assume that when there are more actors, it takes longer to reach consensus. In addition, how difficult it is to reach consensus is dependent of the interdependency between network members. The presence of network-level competencies, for instance the knowledge of each other, could help to coordinate high levels of interdependency.

Finally, when safeguarding results we will look how to ensure that everybody shows loyalty to the taken decision(s). In other terms we are looking how to prevent opportunistic behaviour. Here the

condition trust plays a role. If trust is high it seems more difficult to show opportunistic behaviour, otherwise you will effect more costs by yourselves.

Having seen this, we understand better why Provan & Kenis took exactly these conditions to say something about network effectiveness. Now we will link the key predictors of network effectiveness on network level and the modes of governance in networks.

To do this systematically, we will first mention certain values on the key predictors and then explain what mode of governance in networks is most appropriate seeing the given values.

In situations managers observe a high density of trust, only a small number of participants, a high goal consensus, and a low need for network level competencies, shared governance as mode of governance in networks may be expected as most effective. Firstly, when density of trust is high, there will be a basis for collaboration among network members. Secondly, problems can be solved by full and active face-to-face participation by partners best, when the number of participants is low. Thirdly, when participants agree on the network-level goals, the participants can work together without significant conflict and contribute to their own goals as the broad network goals as well. Finally, since network members act on basis of equality and the interdependency may be low the need for network-level competencies will be low (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 10-13).

In situations managers observe a low dense, but highly centralized level of trust, a moderate number of participants, a moderately low goal consensus, and a moderate need for network level competencies, lead organizational governed-networks as mode of governance in networks may be expected as most effective. Firstly, when density of trust is low but highly centralized, a more brokered mode of governance in networks is preferred. In this situation, network members have no trust in most of the network members, but rather in the lead organization. In addition lead organizational governed-networks are controlled by a single network actor or a couple of network members. Therefore trust may be lower dense than for a network administrative organization (NAO), because the network members in a lead organizational governed-network only have to trust the lead organization. Secondly, because direct involvement of all organizations is no longer required, the lead organization is able to coordinate cooperation with larger numbers of network participants. Thirdly, when network members do not succeed to solve the problem by their own and despite they are committed to network level goals they look to their own organizational goals mostly, lead organization governed-networks are preferred because those networks show centralized adjustment of cooperation. The network needs an organization that is taking the lead, as a consequence most of the strategic and operational decisions are taken by the lead organization. Finally, lead organizations are expected to have a particular set of skills and competencies, which could but not per se match with the collective needs of the network as a whole. The extent to which the particular set of competencies of the lead organization matches with the collective needs of the network as a whole, may influence the need for network-level competencies derived by the extent of interdependency. We may expect interdependency on a moderate level here (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 10-13).

In situations managers observe a moderate density of trust, a moderate to great number of participants, a moderately high goal consensus, and a high need for network level competencies, network administrative organization (NAO) governed networks as mode of governance in networks may be expected as most effective. Firstly, when density of trust is moderate, again a more brokered mode of governance in networks is preferred. However in a NAO situation members of the network

collectively monitor the actions of the NAO. Therefore we argue the network members trust the NAO, because they are governing it. Secondly, as in lead organization governed-networks, because direct involvement of all organizations is no longer required, the NAO is able to associate with larger numbers of network participants. In addition, due to its unique administrative structure with the lack of operational activities, the NAO is able to handle with larger numbers of diverse participants. Thirdly, participants have a strategic involvement with the network as a whole and are typically committed to network-level goals. In a NAO situation, the conflict may not directly occur due to differences in goal consensus, but more on what the network should be doing and how participants should be involved. Finally, the need for network-level competencies will be high, because the interdependency on substantial issues between network members may be high (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 10-13).

Having seen this, based on the theoretical rationale on the organization of governance in networks (network level), we may expect the following:

- *In situations trust between network members is widely shared (high density), were there are only a little members in the network, the goal consensus is high and the need for network competencies is low, we may expect shared governance networks as mode of governance to be most effective.*
- *In situations trust between network members is narrowly shared (low density, high centrality), were there are a relatively moderate number of members in the network, were goal consensus is moderately low, and the need for network-level competencies is moderate, we may expect lead organization-governed networks as mode of governance to be most effective.*
- *In situations trust between network members is moderately to widely shared (moderate density), were there are a moderate number to many members in the network, were goal consensus is moderately high, and the need for network-level competencies is high, we may expect network administrative organization (NAO)-governed networks to be most effective (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 13).*

More in general this has as main consequence that we may expect the following:

- *The greater the inconsistency between the key predictors of effectiveness and a particular mode of network governance, the less likely the chance that a particular mode of network governance will be effective. This will lead to overall network ineffectiveness, dissolution or change in the mode of network governance (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 13).*

Furthermore, a categorization of modes of governance in networks and the four key predictors can be made. The figure below shows the effectiveness that may be expected, given the values on the key predictors of network effectiveness:

Governance Forms	Trust	Number of Participants	Goal Consensus	Need for Network-Level Competencies
Shared governance	High density	Few	High	Low
Lead organization	Low density, highly centralized	Moderate number	Moderately low	Moderate
Network administrative organization	Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High

Figure 2.4: Effectiveness that may be expected, given the values on the key predictors of network effectiveness (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9)

So far, the connection between modes of governance in networks and conditions of effectiveness, gives us information about the network effectiveness we may expect. Furthermore, the scheme can be used to explain the choices made to choose for a certain network governance form given the values of the key predictors.

2.4.2 Network effectiveness on community level

When measuring network effectiveness on community level, networks are judged by their contribution they make to the community they are trying to serve. We understand by ‘community’ here, the local area that is affected by the outcome of a network. It may be for instance a population of a city, or a region as a whole that benefit from the ‘products’ provided by the network. Here networks are seen as a tool to provide value to community that could not have been achieved through uncoordinated provision of products.

When evaluating network effectiveness on community-level, we will assess aggregate outcomes for community. Secondly, an examination can be made of the overall costs of treatment and product for community. Since networks aim to enhance adequate community outcomes, while maintaining or reducing costs due to their interorganizational contacts instead of formal procedures.

As said the network has to satisfy the needs and expectations of those groups within a community that have both a direct and indirect interest in seeing that community needs are adequately met. However it is a dilemma for the evaluator to determine which groups constitute the target population that is to be evaluated (Provan & Milward, 2001, p. 417).

2.4.3 Network effectiveness on organizational level

Having seen the ways of evaluating network effectiveness on network level and community level, a third way of examining network effectiveness can be distinguished: the organization or participant level. When participating in a network, organizations are still motivated partly by self-interest. Although the broader value networks may have to community, they can also contribute significantly to organization level outcomes.

From the perspective of the province of Gelderland we may expect the goals on community and organizational level to be more or less equal. Since the province of Gelderland acts on a provincial

(upper local) level it has a more strategic role in comparison with the municipalities in the area. The province of Gelderland has to reflect the interests of the citizens in the whole province, in contrast to municipalities that in the basis only have to look to their citizens within their own municipality. As a consequence we expect specific interests (e.g.: a new local road) to be higher for municipalities than for the province of Gelderland. Therefore we may assume that the goals on community level and organizational level are more or less equal on provincial level.

2.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, we started defining network governance. Having seen the characteristics of network governance, we introduced the problem of governance within networks. There are no clearly defined relationships in networks in comparison with hierarchical and market forms of governance. Therefore networks face problems in the adaptation, coordination and safeguarding of activities. There are several arrangements to organize the activities. In this thesis we will use three modes of governance in networks as distinguished by Provan & Kenis (2007): shared governance, lead organization governed networks, and network administrative organization (NAO) governed networks. After it a combination is made with four conditions of network effectiveness, which make it more difficult or more easy for networks to adapt, coordinate and safeguard results.

Therefore a conceptualization of the concept effectiveness is made in a broader sense first. Having seen that a policy still can be effective, although the goals of the policy are not achieved, we continued with a more narrow definition of effectiveness here. We specified effectiveness in terms of network governance on community level, network level and organizational level. In terms of the network level four conditions of network effectiveness were formulated: trust, size, goal consensus, and need for network-level competencies. The conditions of network effectiveness can be used in two ways for managers to organize a network according to a particular mode of governance. First, they give managers an expectation of effectiveness of the network. Second, they might explain the choices of the managers. We would only expect to choose for a certain network form if conditions are met.

According to the lines of Provan & Kenis (2007) an overview is given of the ideal typical values of the conditions of network effectiveness for the distinguished modes of governance in networks. These values provide essential information for the theoretical rationale that is established to evaluate the performance of networks the province of Gelderland participated in here.

In addition both the community level and organizational level are not observed in this thesis, because we assume that the goals on community level are accomplished by the projects of the province of Gelderland. Furthermore we would like to focus on the organization of the network.

In the chapters four and five, we will describe two projects of the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility and we will observe how they score on each of the selected variables on network level. Subsequently we will formulate an expectation of network effectiveness based on our theoretical rationale. Afterwards we will observe if there is a discrepancy between ideal typical values and the found values on the conditions for network effectiveness, and the expectation we made based on the theoretical rationale provided in this chapter.

Chapter 3: Research methodology

In the following chapter we will start with an operationalization of the concepts used in our thesis. In the thesis we will use a multiple case study as research design. As a consequence the case selection process will be described. In the remaining paragraphs attention is given to the method of data collection and data networking.

3.1 Operationalization of concepts

In order to give an answer on the research questions, the variables as distinguished in chapter two need more explanation.

3.1.1 Operationalization of effectiveness

We will observe network effectiveness on network level here on the basis of the set goals on network level in proportion to the goal attainment on network level in the end if known. If not, we will ask respondents to their expectations of the goal attainment on network level. Probably in documents, more specifically in the policy statements, the set goals are noticed. Furthermore In interviews we will ask respondents what the network goals are and to what extent they think these goals are or will be accomplished.

In addition we will observe network effectiveness by indicating the functioning of the cooperation in the network. Therefore we will examine so called process indicators, by asking respondents for the efforts made to arrange cooperation between network members, and the extent they think these attempts succeed. Then we will ask the respondents if organizations have a task in the decision-making process. Furthermore, we will ask respondents to indicate the real distribution of tasks in terms of cooperation. In the end we will compare these latter two process indicators according to what is written in official documents, first with the organizations that have a role in the decision-making process, then with the distribution of tasks in terms of cooperation.

3.1.2 Operationalization of conditions

In the conceptualization we said trust is “the willingness to accept vulnerability based on the positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviours” (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9). In order to correct for ‘social desired’ answers, we distinguish three dimensions to measure trust. In the first place we will ask respondents to indicate to what extent they think each network member operates leaded by their own interest or by common interest. Here we will use a 1-4 scale with the following codes:

- 1 = low level of own interest
- 2 = moderately low level of own interest
- 3 = moderately high level of own interest
- 4 = high level of own interest

In the second place we will ask respondents to indicate to what extent each network member follow the agreements made. Again we will use a 1-4 scale with the following codes:

- 1 = low level of following agreements
- 2 = moderately low level of following agreements

- 3 = moderately high level of following agreements
- 4 = high level of following agreements

As a final question to measure trust in this thesis, we will ask respondents to indicate to what extent they trust each other network member, again by using an ordinal level of measurement. We will use a 1-4 scale with the following codes:

- 1 = low level of trust
- 2 = moderately low level of trust
- 3 = moderately high level of trust
- 4 = high level of trust

The scale is assigned in this way, because it is set widely enough in this way to give respondents the opportunity to characterize their relationship with each other network member. In addition, from the point of view that a scale has to be balanced in order to not influence respondents in a certain direction, the scale contains as much negative as positive answer possibilities.

In the end we will use a 1-5 scale to categorize the value of the variable trust as a whole, as an outcome of the three indicators. Therefore we will use the following codes:

- 1 = low level of trust
- 2 = moderately low level of trust
- 3 = moderately level of trust
- 4 = moderately high level of trust
- 5 = high level of trust

As indicators for goal consensus, we will observe the commitment of each network member to network goals, and we will observe to what extent the network goals differ from the organizational goals. First we will observe to what extent the set goals on network level as noticed in the documents, differ from the perception on the network goals of every network member (if available). In interviews we will ask respondents for their perceptions to what extent the set network goals (whether derived from documents or respondents' perceptions) correspond to their perception on the network goals. Secondly we will ask in interviews what the organizational goals are to participate in the network.

The more the set network goals, in policy statements in official documents, differ from the organizational goals of every network member and / or the perceptions on the network goals of every network member, the goal consensus will be lower. On the opposite, the more the set network goals, in policy statements in official documents, correspond to the organizational goals of every network member and / or the perceptions on the network goals of every network member, the goal consensus will be higher.

According to Provan & Kenis (2007), we make use of four levels of goal consensus: low, moderate low, moderate high, high. As a consequence we will use a relative scale here, that indicates the percentage of network members that show corresponding organizational goals and / or perceptions on network goals to the set network goals. In the end we will use a 1-5 scale to categorize the value

of the variable goal consensus as a whole, as an outcome of the indicators. Therefore we will use the following codes:

- 1 = low level of goal consensus
 - 2 = moderately low level of goal consensus
 - 3 = moderately level of goal consensus
 - 4 = moderately high level of goal consensus
 - 5 = high level of goal consensus
-

In order to measure the amount of network members, we will attend to the number of network members. Although there is no specific number of organizations that is 'correct' for each form of governance in networks, to categorize the number of participants we will provide us a precept. We will follow the small groups literature as indicated by Provan & Kenis. Here the quantitative norm of less than six actors is used to indicate a few participants (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 11) Based on this line of reasoning, we will use the following norms. Less than six actors (few participants), six up to and twelve (moderate number of participants) and above twelve (many participants).

To determine what members are involved in the network, we will look to documents who have signed officially documents to take part in the network. If these documents are not available, we will ask respondents which organizations according to them are network members.

Concerning the variable need for network-level competencies, Provan & Kenis argue that the need for network-level competencies strongly depends from the interdependency between network members (2007, p. 12). The interdependency between network members is high, when network members are dependent of each other in terms of the substantial result. The interdependency between network members is low, when network members are not dependent of each other in terms of substantial result.

The more interdependent network members are, the higher the need for network-level competencies. On the opposite, the less interdependent network members are, the lower the need for network-level competencies. As an indicator for the need for network-level competencies we will examine on the one hand to what extent network members are interdependent, by indicating the set network goals as contained in official documents. On the other hand we will ask respondents to what extent they think competencies for cooperation between network members are needed. In addition we will ask respondents how difficult it is to introduce the competencies for cooperation between network members.

In the end we will use a 1-5 scale to categorize the value of the variable need for network-level competencies as a whole, as an outcome of the indicators. Therefore we will use the following codes:

- 1 = low level of need for network-level competencies
- 2 = moderately low level of need for network-level competencies
- 3 = moderately level of need for network-level competencies

4 = moderately high level of need for network-level competencies

5 = high level of need for network-level competencies

3.1.3 Operationalization of ideal types

To determine whether we have to do with shared governed, lead organization governed or NAO-governed networks we will use the following indicators. We will follow here the classification of Provan & Kenis (2007). They argue on the one hand the network may or may not be brokered. Is there a broker, core agency or NAO present. On the other hand the network is participant governed or externally governed. Participant governed networks may be governed collectively by members, or by a single network participant. Externally governed networks are governed by a unique network administrative organization (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 5-6).

In order to indicate what ideal type can be distinguished, we will look to the agreements made to facilitate the decision-making process. Therefore we will use what is written in official documents about the distribution of tasks and the existing embedding of institutions. In addition we will ask respondents in interviews to reflect on the roles of network members in meetings. If there is an external entity in the network, we will observe the official task (based on official documents). If the external entity has an assigned role to design, guide or lead the process of the project we will indicate the network as externally governed.

To determine whether a network is governed centralized or decentralized, we will observe the defined cooperation in the network by the policy statement. If it is the intention to involve all organizations in decision making, the network will be more decentralized. If it is the intention to leave the decision making to a single organization or a few organizations, the network will be more centralized.

Both factors can evolve during the project or implemented in another way. Therefore we will correct the official tasks and way of cooperation by the practical implementation according to the respondents' perceptions.

3.2 Case selection

In order to answer our research questions we will use the multiple case study as research design. Within such a design selection of cases takes place based on the preliminary theory developed in the research as a template in order to compare empirical findings and characteristics from the cases. The selected cases should reflect problems and characteristics as identified in the theoretical framework.

The theoretical framework is leading here to identify, a particular phenomenon is likely to be found or not. The number of case replications can help to enrich the underlying theoretical propositions and the certainty of our research, but is constraint by time.

The cases, as our units of analysis, are all still running or already completed projects of the Province of Gelderland in the field of mobility. The cases are selected based on their accessibility on information on the one hand, and the ex-ante expected difference on the organization of the network on network level.

We discussed five possible projects of the province of Gelderland. One project was not related to the field of mobility, and since this was essential seeing the differences between policy fields in network

governance theory, the case was not appropriate. Next to it, one project was more related to citizen participation than network governance and was therefore less appropriate. Finally, one project was still in the beginning of the designing process and therefore an expectation on the organization of the network on network level was difficult to be given, and there was uncertainty about the availability of information since the project was not started yet.

Therefore we choose two cases that – ex-ante expected – differ in organization of the network on network level and expect to be accessible to information since both projects are (far) advanced over time. In our view the case ‘Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden’ is expected to be related most to a participant-governed network as derived by the theory of Provan & Kenis (2007), having seen the desire of the organizations involved to develop a common vision agreed by the network members, without a substantial role for a external organization. The case ‘A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding’ seems to be related most to a network administrative organizational (NAO) governed network, since an independent programme team was asked to take care of the process.

3.3 Methods of data collection and selection of respondents

In order to analyze and understand network effectiveness we will use two types of data collection. On the one hand we will observe documents such as policy statements and minutes of meetings of the several committees of the network. On the other hand interviews with members in the network will be held, in order to provide more (additional) information about for instance the objectives of the members in the network, the network goals, and the network tasks.

In order to provide a proper image of the network, a representative of each of the members in the network is provided an invitation for an interview. We selected the civil servants of the formal committees of both cases. Since in the formal committees the decision-making is prepared, and later on officially confirmed by the representatives in the steering committee. So we argue the real networking occurs in the formal committees. Therefore we used those representatives to interview.

3.4 Method of data processing

In the first place all detailed transcriptions of the held interviews (18 in total) are sent back to the respondents to make some comments on the transcription. Potential comments are incorporated in the final version of the transcriptions. Furthermore, in order to process the data, we code the data with the help of a software programme ‘Atlas Ti, version 6.2’. This programme helped us to assign all quotations to one specific condition or code – for instance trust – and get an overview of all quotations related to that code. In addition the data are reflected in an anonymous way in this thesis. This is said beforehand the interview started, that the respondents are not tending to give social desirable answers.

Chapter 4: Case ‘Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden’

The next chapter will provide an overview of the first case in this thesis, ‘Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden’. In the first part we will describe the background of the case. Subsequently we will describe the link of the case to network governance. Then we will describe agreements made on coordination of the network in terms of the distribution of tasks and organizational mechanisms of the network. After it, the values on the conditions for network effectiveness are derived. As a consequence we will conclude if the coordination in the network is expected to be effective.

4.1 Background of the case

The beginning of this project is caused by the desires of the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel, that would like to enhance their infrastructure and improve connectivity. The municipality of Geldermalsen explored the possibilities for a new by-pass to the east of the built-up area of Geldermalsen. Furthermore they explored the possibilities for a second bridge to cross the Linge river. On the other hand the municipality of Tiel wanted a new road on the Westside of the built-up area of Tiel to open up the new and still developing quarter ‘Passewaaij’.

In this picture we present the current situation of the Tielerwaard. In addition we drew a blue oval around the new quarter ‘Passewaaij’ located in Tiel.




Figure 4.1: The new quarter ‘Passewaaij’ located in Tiel indicated by the blue oval (Goudappel Coffeng, Wegenvisie Rivierenland-Midden - uitwerking (concept), 2011, p. 7).

In the figure below we present the desirable or exploratory infrastructural developments. With the blue colour we show the road mindset to the west of Tiel. The yellow colour presents the by-pass mindset to the east of Geldermalsen.



Figure 4.2: The exploratory infrastructural developments in the neighbourhood of Tiel and Geldermalsen indicated by the yellow and blue lines (Goudappel Coffeng, Wegensie Rivierenland-Midden - uitwerking (concept), 2011, p. 7 (Edited)).

In order to observe the mutual influences of the future infrastructural ambitions in the Tielerwaard (formed by the borders as indicated in the figure, but in the north bounded by the municipality frontiers of Geldermalsen and Tiel), in 2008 the province of Gelderland thought that it was necessary to examine the ambitions on a larger scale, in terms of influences for the whole Tielerwaard. As an effect, a platform was created to add the issue on different agendas, both municipal / regional and provincial. The aim of this stage was to map out the importance of different roads in the area in terms of what kind of traffic use the roads, what is the departure location and the destination both inside and outside the area, and the function of certain roads. Consultancy organization Goudappel Coffeng, specialized on the field of mobility, was requested by the province of Gelderland (financer of the study) to observe the traffic streams in the area and point out the supralocal issues of interest in a report.

Based on this report, in the so called 'vervoerberaad' an agreement was made between the province of Gelderland and the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel. Namely, the two municipalities will take the initiative to give the report a follow up with a process to determine direction on the supralocal issues of interest. Furthermore the province of Gelderland made the commitment, that it will get the discussion going and give advices, as well as delegating civil servants in the advisory committee (here: the network). However, the province of Gelderland did not finance the process,

due to the fact that they already invested in the report and the goal was to place the local ambitions into the supralocal perspective.

As a consequence the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel are set as principal in this case. The province of Gelderland as said discusses and gives advices to the Region Rivierenland – primarily to the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel as principals in this case – to develop a regional vision around the network of roads (regionale wegennetvisie). The Region Rivierenland is a cooperation (public body) of the areas Betuwe and Bommelerwaard, and looks after the interests of the following ten municipalities in the ‘Rivierengebied’: Buren, Culemborg, Geldermalsen, Lingewaal, Maasdriel, Neder-Betuwe, Neerijnen, Tiel, West Maas en Waal en Zaltbommel (Regio Rivierenland, 2011). In this case five out of ten municipalities the Region Rivierenland represents, are part of the network.

In the vision has to be written, what the regional partners want according to the different ambitions of the municipalities in the region. When a largely shared integral vision is formulated, the vision can be handed in formally to the Provincial Executive (‘Gedeputeerde Staten’). Due to the involvement of the province in the process, it may be expected that it does not lead to surprising effects by the province. In addition, also the reaction of the province to the regional partners may be expected to be clear. It is said by the province of Gelderland that the finished report of the regional partners, is not necessarily equal to the opinion of the province (Mail provincie Gelderland, 11 december 2009).

With the ambition to look to the local assignments and ambitions on a larger scale, and to develop a regional vision on the road infrastructure, the stakeholders aim for a legitimate plan of the region. Therefore the need for organization of the stakeholders in a network was high. In addition, instead of their traditional role to judge a vision as a result of the region / regional partners, the province opt for a network based role in this project. In order to give the municipalities and the region information, making adjustments if needed and to prepare the Provincial Executive itself, by being a network actor.

4.2 Organization of the network

In this paragraph we will observe the organization of the network according to documents as primarily source. In addition some practical elements are also taken into account. In the end we will conclude which mode of governance in networks best describes the organization of the project here.

As said in the former paragraph, the stakeholders opt for a network based organization of their cooperation. This cooperation was formed by a formal committee (ambtelijke werkgroep), which consist of civil servants of network members, and a steering committee (stuurgroep), which consist of executives of network members. In the following paragraph we will look how the roles of the network members are defined according to documents, such as policy statements, minutes of meetings and mails between network partners. Subsequently we will examine which mode of governance in networks best describes the introduced organization of the network.

In a meeting of the ‘stuurgroep wegennetvisie’ of december 2009 (in which the province not took place yet), the stakeholders decided to formulate a concept statement. Subsequently, the stakeholders invite tenders for work to obtain the order.

In the statement the stakeholders of the project are indicated. According to the statement, the formal committee (ambtelijke werkgroep) consists of representatives of the municipality of

Geldermalsen, the municipality of Tiel, the province of Gelderland and Rijkswaterstaat. The steering committee (stuurgroep) comprises the aldermen of the municipalities of Buren, Culemborg, Geldermalsen and Tiel, and a governmental representative of the province of Gelderland. Chairman of the steering committee is the alderman of the municipality of Geldermalsen. In addition to the policy statement, representatives of the municipalities of Buren and Neerijnen, a representative of the Region Rivierenland and the consultancy organization Goudappel Coffeng are involved in the formal committee. The representative of the municipality of Culemborg consciously did not attend the meetings of the formal committee, but received the agenda and minutes of the meetings, and was therefore called 'agendalid' (Verslag ambtelijke bijeenkomst, 9 juni 2011, p. 1).

Due to the fact that the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel have commissioned the report by Goudappel Coffeng in this case, both municipalities finance 50 percent of the research. For practical reasons the municipality of Geldermalsen becomes the formal principal (Verslag ambtelijke bijeenkomst, 9 juni 2011, p. 2). Furthermore, the organizations choose the Region Rivierenland to be the delegated principal here. As a consequence, the Region Rivierenland is the contact organization for Goudappel Coffeng instead of the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel, however do not finance the study. This means that the Region Rivierenland is concerned with the following tasks. Firstly, to send round documents from Goudappel Coffeng to the network members, such as the submitted offer, and presentations as held by Goudappel Coffeng. Secondly, the evaluation criteria in the field of accessibility, traffic safety et cetera, are elaborated and communicated by Goudappel Coffeng to the Region Rivierenland before those are presented to the executives in the steering committee (Verslag eerste bijeenkomst, 23 november 2010, p. 4).

The aim of the network is to develop a common vision agreed by the network members. It is the intention of the network members to accomplish this aim by arranging the process as follows. Each network member is part of the network on an equal basis, and the members behave themselves as partners (Verslag ambtelijke bijeenkomst, 9 juni 2011, p. 2).

So far, it can be seen that the process in the network is intended to be based on partnership, on an equal basis. Since the aim is to develop a common vision agreed by the network members for the region 'Rivierenland-Midden' (Verslag ambtelijke bijeenkomst, 9 juni 2011, p. 2).

Furthermore the consultancy organization Goudappel Coffeng has indeed a role in the network, but according to the policy statement, the role is only operational and has not to do with the organization of the process. As follows from the statement, Goudappel Coffeng has to make some calculations, analyses, and develop the vision.

According to the statement, Goudappel Coffeng is asked to develop a road infrastructural vision for the region 'Rivierenland-Midden', in which take in the following components:

- Analysis of traffic bottlenecks on local and regional network of roads.
- Adjustment of current traffic models.
- Observation of territorial, economical and environmental components.
- Formulation of solution directions based on analysis of traffic bottlenecks.

Furthermore it is formulated that the function of the new road to the west of Tiel and the by-pass to the east of Geldermalsen have to be examined specifically.

Based on the components above, Goudappel Coffeng designs a empirical research on the traffic streams in the area. Therefore the network members in the formal committee need to deliver (if available) data about how many cars pass a certain road. In the second part the network members discuss the necessity of roads and the road system in the region as a whole. This is a more political discussion (Opdrachtformulering Wegennetvisie Rivierenland midden, 2010). In terms of coordination, the organizations involved need to reach consensus on the winding up of traffic by regional or national roads seeing the evaluation criteria. For instance traffic from Tiel to Geldermalsen is able to opt for the provincial road or the national high road. Furthermore the scope of the vision is a discussion point. From the background of the project the infrastructural ambitions of Geldermalsen and Tiel effect a focus on these developments, whereas other network members feel more for a vision on a broader scope with the consequences for the area Rivierenland-Midden. However we have to take into account that the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel are two large municipalities in the region in terms of population.

According to the documents and the operationalization made in chapter three, we can conclude the following, based on the two dimensions Provan & Kenis distinguish to categorize process arrangements. On the first dimension, is the network externally governed or not, we argue that when the external organization had a role to design, lead or guide the process, then the network is externally governed. However the policy statement shows only an operational role here for Goudappel Coffeng, and no procedural one. This means that Goudappel Coffeng has no role in the discussions as described above, and do not need to make minutes of meetings or have to preside them. This procedural role is left to the formal committee. So the network is not externally governed according to the official documents.

Concerning the second dimension, is the network brokered or not, we argue that when it is the intention to involve all organizations in decision making, the network will be more decentralized. When it is the intention to leave the decision making to a single organization or a few organizations, the network will be more centralized. The minutes of the meetings show us the intention to develop a common vision agreed by the network members by partnership, on an equal basis. So the network is intended to involve all organizations in decision making, and therefore the network will be more decentralized. Having seen this, we categorize this network as decentralized (or not brokered) and not externally governed. This is in line with the characteristics of a participant governed network / shared governance.

However we have to make some marginal comments here. The external organization Goudappel Coffeng makes the minutes of the meetings and takes with it a part of the procedural role we described earlier in this section, in addition to their fully operational role. As a consequence the network would be externally governed according to our operationalization. However we argue here, this implication is too weak to speak of a procedural role in general.

A second comment is the fact that the network members do not feel involved all in the same manner. The Region Rivierenland and the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel were during the process more seen as leading members, whereas the rest of the members feel themselves more following members (Verslag ambtelijke bijeenkomst, 9 juni 2011, p. 1). As a consequence the

network would be more centralized then. However, due to the fact that the members emphasized the partnership role on equal basis in that meeting too, we may presume a decentralized approach.

4.3 Expectation of effectiveness

In this paragraph we will make an expectation of the effectiveness of the network, based on the values on the conditions Provan & Kenis distinguish, as explained in chapter two and three. In this paragraph we will try to come to an expectation of effectiveness based on documents (minutes, mails and policy statement) and the interviews with all representatives of the different organizations in the formal committee, plus the representatives of the municipality of Culemborg, and consultancy organization Goudappel Coffeng. Since the municipality of Culemborg was invited as member of the formal committee, and although based on documents Goudappel Coffeng had a substantial role only, some respondents argued else. First, we will observe how the project scores on the conditions Provan & Kenis distinguish. In combination with the chosen mode of governance in network, as derived in paragraph 4.2, we are able to make some expectations in terms of effectiveness in the end. This structure is in line with our assumption that the chosen mode of governance in networks combined with the conditions we distinguish, say something about the effectiveness we may expect.

So far, we looked only to the chosen mode of governance in networks. We will now attend to the values on the conditions trust, number of network participants, goal consensus, and the need for network-level competencies here.

4.3.1 Trust

In order to measure trust in the network we will observe “the willingness to accept vulnerability based on the positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviours” (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9). In this thesis three questions were posed directed towards the condition trust. Firstly, we will attend here to the results on the question, in which we asked respondents to indicate the involved organizations in the formal committee plus Culemborg and Goudappel Coffeng, to what extent they trust each organization on a four point scale. From the nine respondents, eight respondents give an answer on this question. Six from the eight respondents who answer, indicate trust for all network members to a relatively high extent or high extent. From the remaining two respondents, a relatively low extent of trust was given by both of them to the municipality of Geldermalsen and Goudappel Coffeng. In addition one of the remaining two respondents indicates a relatively low extent of trust to Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland too. The respondents report in the case of the municipality of Geldermalsen that this is effected by the political situation of Geldermalsen. So, from the results on this question, trust is relatively high.

Secondly, we asked respondents to indicate the extent organizations keep their appointments on a four point scale again. From the six respondents who give an answer on this question, five respondents noticed a relatively low extent of keeping their appointments. In all cases it concerns Goudappel Coffeng here. In addition the municipality of Culemborg is mentioned two times, and the municipality of Geldermalsen is mentioned one time. In spite of this, we observe that respondents indicate keeping one’s appointments to a relatively high extent or high extent in all remaining cases. So, in general we may argue that organizations find each other reliable.

Finally, we asked respondents to indicate whether organizations have an eye for their own interests or for the common interests of the project, again on a four point scale. From the eight out of nine

respondents who gave an answer on this question, all eight respondents signal several organizations with a relatively high extent or high extent of own interests. In general the municipalities of Geldermalsen, Tiel and Neerijnen, and Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland show in six or more cases a relatively high extent or high extent of own interests. The municipality of Geldermalsen reveals most (five times) high extent of own interests according to the respondents, whereas also the municipality of Tiel shows a high score on the high extent of own interests value (three times).

Apart from the multiple-choice question on own interests, several comments about own interests are made during the interviews. All nine respondents argue that in the project the involved organizations look too much to their own interests. Three of the respondents notice that the various interests of the organizations, result in a selection of outcomes. According to them, this works restrictive. Furthermore three respondents said they have the impression that the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel influence the process, and were dominant in comparison with other organizations in the formal committee. The fact that there is much attention in the other interview question to the own interests of organizations, combined by the results on the multiple-choice question, shows that the extent of own interests is high.

In terms of the condition trust we have seen two indicators, the extent of trust itself and the extent of keeping their appointments, that reveal relatively positive outcomes (relatively high to high extent) in terms of trust. However the indicator of own interest shows also a relatively high to high extent, but in terms of this indicator it is negatively related to the condition of trust. In addition, not only the multiple-choice question refers to this observation, but also reactions from respondents outside the question of own interest. Although two of the three indicators show relatively positive outcomes in terms of trust, we will categorize the condition trust as moderately low. The reason therefore is the emphasis of the respondents on own interest of the network members. Not only in answer on the multiple-choice question, but also in open questions the respondents argue that the focus on own interests is a risk for the achievement of network goals. Furthermore the respondents argue that the emphasis on own interests lead to a selection of outcomes is a risk for the trust in the network. This is worrisome in terms of trust, and therefore we will interpret the result on the variable trust as a whole as moderately low.

4.3.2 Number of network participants

The most easily condition to derive is the number of network participants. In this network according to the organization of the formal committee, nine network participants are involved. We distinguish the following network participants: Region Rivierenland, municipality of Geldermalsen, municipality of Tiel, municipality of Culemborg, municipality of Buren, municipality of Neerijnen, province of Gelderland, Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland, Goudappel Coffeng. According to our operationalization this falls in the category six up to and twelve participants, which is called a moderate number of participants.

4.3.3 Goal Consensus

The goal consensus criterion focuses firstly on the set network goals in comparison with the perceptions of network goals by the network members. The set network goal is on the one hand derived from documents here, develop a common vision agreed by the network members on road infrastructure for the region Rivierenland-Midden (Verslag ambtelijke bijeenkomst, 9 juni 2011, p. 2). On the other hand we asked respondents what was the network goal in this project and to what

extent they agree with it. The eight of nine respondents who gave answer on this question, agree to a large extent on the network goal of the project, which is to develop a common vision agreed by the network members on road infrastructure for the Region Rivierenland-Midden. Although the consensus on the first face of it between the nine respondents, we have to notice that half of the respondents speak about a 'common vision', which is not necessarily the same as a 'common vision agreed by the network members'. It is not clear here if they meant it consciously, or they meant the same, but say it in a different way.

In addition eight of the nine respondents gave an answer on the question, whether they agree with the network goal or not. From those eight respondents, seven agree with the network goal as mentioned in the beginning, based on the minutes of the meeting of June 9th 2011. One respondent said that the goal is changed since the last meeting, but apparently this has to do with the timing of the interviews. However two respondents argue that this should be the network goal, but doubt if it is the network goal. Furthermore two respondents question if the area 'Rivierenland-Midden' is the right area or not.

Secondly, the goal consensus criterion focuses on the organizational goals, and the extent the organizational goals differ from the network goals. We asked respondents what the goals are for their own organization to participate in the network. From the nine respondents, eight respondents answered this question. Seeing the organizational goals of the eight respondents, six of them are referring to goals that differ strongly from the network goal. On the one hand these six respondents are interested in the effects or focus on the roads in their area. On the other hand these six respondents think about how they can approach the higher authorities, for instance for financial support. The organizational goals of the remaining two respondents focus on the shared character of the cooperation between organizations and a prioritizing of infrastructural issues in the region.

So, in terms of the goal consensus condition, we have observed a twofold of indicators, the network goal and the extent respondents agree to it, and the potential differences between organizational goals in comparison with the network goal. The first indicator showed us, apart from some nuances or particular differences in details, a high extent of agreement on the network goal. Nevertheless, the second indicator demonstrated differences in organizational goals in comparison with the set network goal to a large extent. We argue that, by the large discrepancy between organizational goals and the set network goal, in combination with the nuances made on the character of the vision, the goal consensus should be indicated here as moderately low.

4.3.4 Need for network-level competencies

Before attending to the need for network-level competencies, we will start with an overview of the division of tasks for both the operational and coordinating tasks. In the case the activities can be distinguished in operational tasks and coordinating tasks. The operational tasks are executed by Goudappel Coffeng. This consultancy organization makes the analyses and based on that analyses develops the vision. Therefore they need the knowledge of their own employees and the input of data by the municipalities, province of Gelderland and Rijkswaterstaat.

The coordination of activities is partially delegated to the Region Rivierenland. As seen earlier in this paragraph, the Region Rivierenland is delegated principal to Goudappel Coffeng. Apart from that task, which is elaborated earlier, the Region Rivierenland is chairman of the network according to the

documents. The discussions on the scope of the study and the winding up the traffic by which roads, are presided by the Region Rivierenland. However this task is filled in as facilitating network actor, more than initiating and strongly advising network actor. In fact, apart from these roles, no further division of tasks is made by the organizations involved. Having regard to the background of the case, seeing the infrastructural ambitions of Geldermalsen and Tiel, it seems to be necessary to organize an open process based on equal basis. In order to avoid a dominant position for the larger municipalities in population, since the goal is to develop a common vision agreed by the network members. On the other hand, in view of the contrasts between the network members in terms of the scope of the study and the agitations around the shared based character, we assume that a strong leader who can find common binding elements is needed.

Concerning the variable need for network-level competencies, Provan & Kenis argue that the need for network-level competencies strongly depends from the interdependency between network members (2007, p. 12). Firstly, we observed to what extent network members are interdependent, by indicating the set network goal as contained in documents. Due to the fact that the vision has to be common and agreed by the network members, we might conclude that the organizations are interdependent in terms of the substantial result.

Secondly, we asked respondents to what extent they think competencies for cooperation between network members are needed. From the nine respondents, six respondents answered this question. All six respondents argue that it is needed to introduce competencies for cooperation between network members. Respondents argue that you need to listen to other network members, and estimate what certain outcomes mean for a network member. More in general it is the task, according to these six respondents, to connect the organizations so, that they find each other in the network goal or a compromise. Certainly this reflects the second part of the discussion, in which organizations need to negotiate about the roads and road system in the given area 'Rivierenland-Midden'. Furthermore these six respondents argue that it is important to have a strong leader, that is guiding the process. In addition three respondents said that the organizations do not succeed to give each other feedback, and point out to organizations to take responsibility.

Thirdly, we asked respondents how difficult it is to introduce the competencies for cooperation between network members. From the nine respondents, eight respondents answered this question. Six of the eight respondents conclude it is difficult to introduce such competencies. Also six respondents argue that a potential reason for that, is that the division of roles was not clear. In other terms the organizations do not know what they could expect from each other. Apart from this reason, two respondents argue that the capacity in terms of time is crucial here, so organizations have no time to introduce competencies for cooperation between network members. In addition a single remark is made by the fact that a network-based organization of the process, was new to the organizations involved.

Having seen this, the need of network-level competencies was measured by three indicators, the interdependency of organizations, the extent competencies for cooperation were needed, and how difficult it was to introduce such competencies for cooperation. The three indicators indicate that the need of network-level competencies is high, and that it is difficult to introduce them. Therefore we will indicate the need of network-level competencies as high.

4.3.5 Expectation of network effectiveness by theoretical rationale

Having seen the (intended) mode of governance in networks and the conditions of network effectiveness, we will conclude this paragraph with an expectation of network effectiveness. As follows from the decentralized and non-externally governed approach, we derived participant governed network / shared governance as intended mode of governance in networks. This deviates partially with our current findings on trust, the number of network participants, goal consensus and the need for network-level competencies. In the figure below we show the values on the conditions where shared governance, ideally spoken, seems to be most effective in comparison with the values on the conditions derived from our findings in the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'-case.

Effectiveness criteria ↓	Mode of governance in networks →	Participated network Governance / Shared	Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden
Network level	Trust	High density	Moderately low
	Number of participants	Few	Moderate
	Goal consensus	High	Moderately low
	Need for network level competencies	Low	High

Table 4.1: Values on conditions of network effectiveness for the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden' in comparison with the ideal typical situation of participated governed networks.

We see a difference in values on the conditions of network effectiveness between the ideal typical situation for shared governance, and the situation in the project 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'. Based on the discrepancy between mode of governance in networks and the values on the conditions for network effectiveness, we might expect network effectiveness to be moderately low.

4.4 Analysis

Having seen the expected extent of network effectiveness based on the theoretical rationale in the former paragraph, we will now look to the assessment of network effectiveness by the respondents, looking for potential differences, and analyze the results. We will first describe the results of the assessment of network effectiveness by the respondents. Then we will determine to what extent the expectation and assessment match with each other. In the end an explanation is given for the potential differences between the expectation and the assessment, and the extent of effectiveness as a whole.

4.4.1 Assessment of network effectiveness by respondents

In this section we will describe the assessment of network effectiveness by the respondents. Firstly we will attend to network effectiveness as goal attainment, secondly to network effectiveness as

process. Finally we will combine these two factors and conclude with the assessment of network effectiveness by respondents.

In interviews we asked respondents if they judge the goal of the project, develop a common vision agreed by the network members on road infrastructure for the region Rivierenland-Midden, will be achieved. All nine respondents answered the question, of which six respondents argue to estimate the goal will be achieved. Two respondents have strong doubts about the goal achievement, and one respondent argues not to estimate goal achievement.

In addition, most respondents (eight) give an explanation for their judgement. Four respondents argue that achieving the goals depends on the extent organizations agree on the common goal. In other terms, are the organizations convinced of the fact that they cannot achieve the common goal by their own, but by cooperating with each other as essential part in it. Two respondents doubt the shared character of the final vision. These respondents have the feeling that it is primarily the vision of the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel. Furthermore one respondent argues that the long throughput time is a risk for the project to succeed. Finally one respondent said that it is only a financial issue now.

As a second indicator for effectiveness, we asked respondents to what extent attempts are made to cooperation with other organizations, and to what extent the cooperation between organizations succeeds.

Firstly, we will attend to the question to what extent attempts are made to cooperate with each other, and to what extent the cooperation succeeded. All nine respondents answered both questions. All nine respondents argued that attempts are made to develop cooperation between organizations. However three respondents made some nuances. One respondent concludes that these attempts are still rather scarce. Whereas another respondent have doubts about whether the attempts are made crossing all organizations instead of two or more organizations particularly. Finally one respondent remarks that it seems if the organizations have to cooperate, but are not directly willing to.

In answer on the question, whether the cooperation between organizations succeeds or not, four respondents argue cooperation succeeds to some extent, three respondents think cooperation does not succeed, and two respondents conclude cooperation succeeds. Again, most respondents give an explanation for their choice. According to the respondents who think cooperation succeeds in this project, they argue that all organizations involved are convinced from the common necessity to cooperate. From the respondents who doubt about the success of cooperation or do not think cooperation succeeds here, this opinion is caused by the fact that organizations have too much an eye for their own interests, which is not necessarily equal to the common goal, according to four respondents. One respondent says the political pressure (of the municipality of Geldermalsen) on the project was a risk factor for the cooperation between organizations.

Having seen the results on the indicators for network effectiveness, we can conclude the following. On the one hand, a greater part of the respondents (six of nine respondents) judge the common goal of this project will be achieved. So in terms of goal attainment the network effectiveness will be moderately high. On the other hand, a greater part of respondents (seven of nine respondents) thinks the cooperation between organizations does not succeed, or have doubts about the success of

cooperation. So, in terms of the cooperation between organizations or what we call the process here, the network effectiveness scores moderately low. Based on the respondents' results we might judge network effectiveness to be moderate.

4.4.2 A comparison of expectations

In this section we will compare the results of the expectation of network effectiveness by our theoretical rationale and the assessment of network effectiveness by the respondents.

As indicated in section 4.3.5 of this thesis, the network effectiveness was expected to be moderately low according to our theoretical rationale, instead of moderate seeing the results of the respondents' judgement. On the first face the results may differ. However when we observe only the process side, we see an overlap in the results. Both the results on the various conditions in paragraph 4.3, and the results on the question whether or not the cooperation between organizations succeeds, show low scores. This is consistent since we might expect the success of cooperation to be low, when the conditions trust, the number of participants and goal consensus are moderate to low, and the need for network level competencies is high. As an example the respondents mentioned the focus on own interests as explanation for the failing cooperation between organizations, which is a factor that indicates a low goal consensus.

So, the difference here lays in the assessment of goal attainment. Whereas the theoretical rationale formulates, based on process factors, a moderately low expected extent of network effectiveness, the respondents' estimate a moderate extent of network effectiveness. In the next section we will formulate an explanation for this difference.

4.4.3 Analysis of network effectiveness

As said, in this section we will provide some explanations for the differences in expectation between the theoretical rationale and the assessment by respondents. Furthermore an explanation will be given for the extent of network effectiveness in this project.

Although the respondents judge goal attainment to be moderately high, on the other indicator for network effectiveness, the success of cooperation between organizations, they are more negative. These results lead to a moderate extent of network effectiveness by the respondents, whereas the theoretical rationale expects a moderately low extent of network effectiveness. Below we will pay attention to potential factors that can explain the relatively low expectations of network effectiveness. Therefore we will make substantively use of the results of our data collection as elaborated in both paragraph 4.2 and 4.3.

In the first place, to explain the difference in expectation between the theoretical rationale and the assessment by the respondents we will make use of the explanations for goal attainment, as given by the respondents. In the explanations, respondents who estimate the goals being achieved argue that the organizations indeed look to their own interests. However all organizations involved realize, that they cannot achieve the network goal by their own. So the partners necessarily need each other to achieve the goal. The theoretical rationale by contrast, only measures the scores on the conditions that explain network effectiveness, and does not directly observe this additional explanation of the respondents.

From the data can be derived that the own interests of organizations is high. This reflects the scores on the conditions of both trust and goal consensus. As an indicator of the condition trust, we asked respondents directly to what extent organizations have more attention for their own interests in comparison with the common interests. The extent of own interests was quite high, all eight respondents signal several organizations with a relatively high extent or high extent of own interests. This is in line with the findings on the goal consensus condition. Although the respondents knew the network goal, and endorse this network goal apart from some differences in nuance, the goal consensus was rather low. This was caused by the fact that the organizational goals differ strongly from the network goal. Six respondents were interested in the effects or focus on the roads in their area, and six respondents think about how they can approach the higher authorities, for instance for financial support. So, the own interests are strongly reflected by these results. This seems to be a risk factor for the network effectiveness here, although six out of nine respondents expect it is not a risk for achieving the network goal. They seem to have an argument, how contradictory are the own interests of the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel, since their infrastructural ambitions partially correspond. The new road on the Westside of Tiel connects to the new by-pass to the east of Geldermalsen. Therefore we have to make the nuance here, that the network goals and organizational goals overlap each other. It is possible that the goals are partially the same. Next to it, network members can reach a compromise between network goal and organizational goals.

In the second place the need for network-level competencies was indicated to be high. This was caused on the one hand by the interdependency between organizations in terms of the network goal, to develop a 'common vision agreed by the network members'. On the other hand, organizations asked for a strong leader (six of the respondents answered this question, and all six asked for a strong leader). Furthermore the organizations do not succeed to give each other feedback, and point out to organizations to take responsibility according to three respondents. In addition six respondents (of the six who answered this question) concluded it was difficult to introduce such competencies, due to the unclear division of roles.

We will make this second point more concrete by seeing the comments on the roles of the Region Rivierenland as chairman, and Goudappel Coffeng as substantial supporting organization. The absence of a leader as indicated by the respondents, may be strange against the background that the Region Rivierenland was the chairman of this project and delegated principal to Goudappel Coffeng (on behalf of the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel) according to documents. However, during the process it became clear that some organizations thought the role of process manager was part of the job by consultancy organization Goudappel Coffeng. In the interviews the respondents also reflect the roles of the Region Rivierenland and Goudappel Coffeng. First we will observe the role of the Region Rivierenland as chairman of the process. From the nine respondents, seven respondents argue that the Region Rivierenland restricts her role in the process by coordinating and facilitating issues (such as arranging meetings). However, the Region Rivierenland accomplishes her role not as leading actor, according to the seven respondents.

Furthermore five respondents think the municipality of Tiel fills this leading role. A possible reason for that is that the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel finance (both for 50 percent) the consultancy organization Goudappel Coffeng. However according to three respondents this is a risk factor, because of the own interests of the municipality of Tiel. The vision has to be objective as possible, and not the vision of the municipality of Tiel. Therefore respondents doubt if the

municipality of Tiel – apart from the personal characteristics of the representative – is the best alternative to lead the process. According to most of the seven respondents a leading role for the Region Rivierenland is most logical, seeing the fewest own interests in this project. Therefore the Region Rivierenland is more a representative of the network as a whole, with its network goal.

In addition the combined action between the organizations in the network and Goudappel Coffeng deserves attention. According to the documents, the Region Rivierenland was the central contact point for Goudappel Coffeng to communicate with the other network organizations and vice versa. Three respondents argue that this role of the Region Rivierenland was insufficiently expressed.

As said earlier, some respondents also thought the process side was a task of Goudappel Coffeng, but according to documents, the problem statement in particular, only substantial tasks (such as making calculations, traffic analyses) were formulated. So much the remarkably, that eight of the nine respondents missed a role as process manager of Goudappel Coffeng. Two respondents argue that the problem statement was not clear both from the side of the principal and the agent. In other terms, what are the tasks of the organizations involved on the one hand and of Goudappel Coffeng on the other hand. This is in line with the earlier finding, that roles were unclearly divided.

Concluding our second point, we have to notice that a leading actor was not present. Whether organizations expect it from Goudappel Coffeng, whether from the Region Rivierenland. A first note we have to make here is that based on documents we may have expected this role from the Region Rivierenland. A second note concerns the funding by the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel that made taking the leading role more difficult for the Region Rivierenland. However, apart from it, the Region Rivierenland stayed the delegated principal in the direction of Goudappel Coffeng.

In addition, we have to notice that roles were not clearly defined based on the question which organization(s) had in practice a role in gearing the cooperation between organizations. Here no univocal answers were given by the nine respondents who answered this question. As a consequence this could indicate the misconception of the role of Goudappel Coffeng.

Having seen this, we can conclude in general that a discrepancy can be observed between the formal task of the Region Rivierenland and the informal implementation of this role in practice. Furthermore a more clear division of roles might be practical for several reasons. Firstly, the study of Goudappel Coffeng is financed by the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel. Since the Region Rivierenland is delegated principle, agreements, on the position of the Region Rivierenland and the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel towards Goudappel Coffeng and the other network members, could help to prevent an uncertain attitude of Goudappel Coffeng towards the Region Rivierenland and the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel, and between the Region Rivierenland and the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel. For example, can the Region Rivierenland, from their position as delegated principle, criticize the study of Goudappel Coffeng, or is this a role for Geldermalsen and Tiel as financiers of the study. Secondly, the municipalities of Buren and Neerijnen are added later to the network. It might have been better that the roles were discussed again, when these municipalities entered the network, to avoid the image of dominating the network by the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel.

In the third place, since the goal was to develop a ‘common vision agreed by the network members’, the shared character was subjected to pressure. As seen earlier three respondents said they have the

impression that the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel influence the process, and were dominant in comparison with other organizations in the formal committee. This is in line with the composition of the steering committee, which comprises the aldermen of the municipalities of Buren, Culemborg, Geldermalsen and Tiel, and a civil servant of the province of Gelderland. Chairman of the steering committee is the alderman of the municipality of Geldermalsen. The municipality of Neerijnen, the Region Rivierenland and Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland therefore have no role in the steering committee. This could enhance the feeling of the dominant position of some organizations in the network. However this is not in line with the results on the question which organization(s) were involved in the decision-making process, with answer possibilities 'yes' or 'no'. From the nine respondents, all nine respondents answered this question. Apparently Goudappel Coffeng and the municipality of Culemborg scored high with five times a 'no'. This is not shocking, since the municipality of Culemborg was only 'agendalid', and Goudappel Coffeng was only asked for substantial support. Furthermore the Region Rivierenland and the municipality of Buren scored relatively high with three times a 'no'. This is worrisome for the Region Rivierenland, seeing her task as chairman of the process. The municipality of Buren maybe derives from the fact that this organization was connected later in the process. This would also declare the two times the municipality of Neerijnen was indicated with 'no'.

In the fourth place, the position of the province of Gelderland in the project draws attention. As said earlier in this thesis the province of Gelderland argued that the finished vision of the regional partners, is not necessarily equal to the opinion of the province. The involvement of the province of Gelderland is limited, in such a way that the vision contains no surprising elements for the province. Otherwise, the reaction of the province to the regional partners may also be expected to contain no surprises (Mail provincie Gelderland, 11 december 2009). Although it is a position we could understand by the hierarchical authority of the province of Gelderland, it might be not a logical one when developing a common vision agreed by the network members with all organizations involved. Then a more active role might be expected in the organization of the process, to achieve the network goal of common interest, apart from the resources the province have in terms of approval by the Provincial Executive.

Finally other factors with potential influence, are the political pressure of the municipality council of Geldermalsen concerning the second bridge crossing the Linge river. However not only the political situation in Geldermalsen, but in every organization is of potential influence. The throughput time of the project is that long, that political changes or even administrative changes occurred. This can influence the position (organizational goals) of each organization, and attend to other dynamics in the network. Furthermore the project has developed from the infrastructural desires of the municipalities of Geldermalsen and Tiel. From that background the organizations involved changed, which could have influence on the feelings of participating organizations that some organizations are dominant from this background. This can influence the shared character of the vision.

4.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter we examined the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'-case. In the first part we described the background of the case and formulated the organization of the network. In answer on our second sub question we argue the organization of the network resembles most to a participation governed network.

Furthermore, to answer our third sub question, we showed the scores on the conditions of network effectiveness and formulated an expectation of network effectiveness. All conditions scored partially different in the case in comparison with the ideal typical scores of participation governed networks. Therefore we formulated a moderately low extent of network effectiveness to be expected. In the analysis phase we explained the relatively low expected extent of network effectiveness.

Main difficulties in this case were the focus on own interests by the organizations involved, the need for strong leadership whereas the formulated leader did not fill the role, the unclear division of tasks with as main consequence the misconception of the role of the consultancy organization Goudappel Coffeng. Furthermore the position of the province of Gelderland was a particular one, which can be understand on the one hand, but not logical against the shared based character of the network goal. Apart from these difficulties, the political pressure and / or administrative changes as well as the change of the organizations involved, may enhanced some problems.

Chapter 5: Case ‘A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding’

The next chapter will provide an overview of the second case in this thesis, ‘A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding’. In the first part we will describe the background of the case. Subsequently we will describe the link of this case to network governance. Then we will describe agreements made on coordination of the network in terms of the distribution of tasks and organizational mechanisms of the network. After it, the values on the conditions for network effectiveness are derived. As a consequence we will conclude if the coordination in the network is expected to be effective. In this thesis we will focus on the A1-capacity broadening, because this specific project falls in the field of mobility, whereas the A1-zone as a whole is also a territorial issue. Furthermore the A1-zone as a whole is a too big project to take as a case here in comparison with the more concrete project around the A1-capacity broadening.

5.1 Background of the case

After a discussion of years about a broadening of the state highway A1, the province of Overijssel took the initiative during the year 2007 to start the programme ‘A1-zone’. In 2008 the province of Overijssel organized so called workshops (werkplaatsen). Here various organizations, such as municipalities in the region, central government, private organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), discussed the most important issues around the ‘A1-zone’. The broadening of the A1 was seen as one of those most important issues by the province of Overijssel. Apart from these meetings, the research to a broadening of the A1 continued.

The capacity broadening of the A1 has to be executed on the route Apeldoorn Zuid – Azelo. In the picture below we indicated with the blue line the part Apeldoorn Zuid – Azelo.




Figure 5.1: The route Apeldoorn Zuid – Azelo indicated by the blue line (Folder A1-zone, p. 2 (edited)).

The interim results of the study are presented in the so called ‘BO MIRT’ (Bestuurlijk Overleg - Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport) of October 2008. In this meeting the decision was made, to start a region directed MIRT-exploration of the A1-zone. Then the minister of the former ministry of transport, public works and water management (now: ministry of infrastructure and the environment) pretend that it was only able to do a study (planstudie) to the A1, when there was an obvious choice for a preferred alignment. This preferred alignment may not

conflict with the results of the exploration of the – broader project of the – A1-zone. Therefore the results of the exploration needed incorporation in a study to the capacity of the A1. So far, both explorations are executed separately. In addition both programmes had each an own steering and formal committee.

In the ‘BO MIRT’ of May 2009, the decision was made to integrate the exploration of the A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding with the region directed MIRT-exploration of the A1-zone, since both processes were parallel organized. The formal starting decision, was made on July 15th 2009 (A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding: participatie en uitkomsten, Programmateam A1-zone, 25 mei 2011).

Till September 2009, the exploration of the capacity broadening of the A1 was loosely coupled with the later started MIRT-exploration of the A1-zone and was organized by an own steering committee A1-procedure and a formal committee, which was called ‘kernteam’. In September 2009, the steering committees of the A1-zone and the A1-procedure are combined to one steering committee A1-zone. Whereas the steering committee of the A1-procedure was presided by the province of Overijssel, the steering committee of the A1-zone was a collective assignment with the minister of transport, public works and water management and the Provincial Executive of Overijssel as administrative principals. The formal committees of the A1-procedure and the A1-zone still both stayed apart.

From January 2010 both explorations are also substantially integrated led by the programme manager of the A1-zone. As a consequence the exploration A1-capacity broadening becomes a part of the exploration A1-zone. Furthermore the project manager A1-capacity broadening is accountable to the programme manager of the A1-zone. The documents of the project manager A1-capacity broadening are going directly to the steering committee A1-zone, after alignment with the programme manager. Primarily reason for this, was that the A1-zone partners are represented in the formal committee too.

5.2 Organization of the network

In this paragraph we will observe the organization of the cooperation in the network according to documents primarily. In addition some practical elements are taken into account also. In the end we will conclude which mode of governance in networks fits best with the organization of the project here.

The steering committee of the A1-capacity broadening was presided by the Provincial Executive of Overijssel in the field of mobility. Next to it in the steering committee the provinces of Overijssel and Gelderland, the region Stedendriehoek and the region Twente, the ministry of transport, public works and water management and Rijkswaterstaat Oost Nederland, were represented (A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding: participatie en uitkomsten, Programmateam A1-zone, 25 mei 2011).

In the formal committee, the provinces of Overijssel and Gelderland, the region Stedendriehoek and the region Twente, the ministry of transport, public works and water management, Rijkswaterstaat Oost Nederland, the programme team A1 were represented. In addition we have to notice that the region Stedendriehoek was represented by two persons in contrast to the other organizations, that are represented by only one person. Besides of it an external organization, ‘Royal Haskoning’, was invited by these meetings. The external organization had no role in the process of the network, but was asked to accomplish some technical accompaniment (Agenda vergadering kernteam, 15 juni 2010).

In order to give an overview it could be helpful to provide the context of the programme team A1-zone. The programme team A1-zone was independent and worked on behalf of the steering committee. The team was composed to a great extent by external advisors. The team was responsible for the preparation of the meetings of the steering committee, it made proposals and put decision making to the meeting. After application in the steering committee, the programme team implemented decisions themselves. Besides to it, the team takes care of the communication and participation of the A1-zone. The cooperation between the partners was also one of the tasks of the programme team (Berenschot, 2011, p. 6).

The project around the A1-capacity broadening was led by a project leader, who was able to take care of the facilitation of the process in the formal committee of the A1-capacity broadening. Following the minutes of the meetings of the formal committee, we conclude that the project manager of the A1-capacity broadening presides the meetings of the formal committee. In addition the project manager in cooperation with the other representatives of the programme team A1-procedure are contact point for the formal committee, the steering committee and the external organizations that are involved in the project (Conceptverslag vergadering kernteam 6 april 2010; verslag vergadering kernteam 15 juni 2010). In the first period of the project, the province of Overijssel led the project and in addition the programme team worked then by order of the province of Overijssel. Later on in the project, the programme team (represented by a project leader) was leader and facilitator of the A1-capacity broadening. As a consequence the programme team worked no longer by order of the province of Overijssel, but by order of all participating organizations. Subsequently, the province of Overijssel was one of the partners in the project now. However, the programme team stayed on their location in the provincial government building of Overijssel in Zwolle.

Again the operational and coordinating tasks are distinguished here. The operational tasks are executed by different consultancy organizations, and the central and regional governments itself. Both consultancy organizations and governments studied the intensity of the traffic on the A1 to determine if there is a problem on the A1. Furthermore both parties studied the costs and effects of different routes of the possible capacity broadening.

The coordination of activities is delegated to the programme team A1-zone, represented in the project of the A1-capacity broadening by the project manager. As independent actor, the project leader was left free by the network members. The project leader was accountable to the programme team A1-zone, but partially to the network members too. This seems to be logical, since the contrast between the regional partners and the central government representatives was considerable. With an independent actor, the highest objectivity seems to be realized. The project leader need to reach an agreement on the question, whether or not the capacity broadening on the A1 (Apeldoorn – Azelo) has to be realized, and as a consequence, reach consensus on the preferred route of the capacity broadening. Therefore the project leader presided the discussions around these subjects, and determined to a great extent the frequency of the meetings. Furthermore the results of the discussions in the formal committee A1-capacity broadening are communicated by the project manager to the steering committee A1-zone. This implicates that the meetings of the steering committee A1-zone (in the field of the capacity broadening) are prepared directly by the project leader A1-capacity broadening.

All organizations represented in the formal committee of the A1-capacity broadening are represented in the steering committee A1-zone (based on the period after integration of the two steering committees, red.) too. Next to it, other stakeholders such as private organizations and NGOs are involved in the project. However, these organizations have no place in the formal committee or steering committee. The stakeholders are invited in the project by planned sessions. The goal of these sessions was to involve stakeholders in the construction of the investment programme and the process (Programmateam A1-zone, 2011).

As a consequence we are able to derive a schematic overview of the programme organization. In addition to the existing figure, we added the formal committee of the A1-capacity broadening. According to the documents this committee exists apart from the advisory committee A1-zone (begeleidingsgroep):




Figure 5.2: Schematic overview of the programme organization in Dutch and English (A1-zone (Edited)).

As said, in this thesis we will focus on the capacity broadening part of the project around the A1. Here an improvement of the accessibility of the A1-zone by high road is the goal of the project. It is supposed that the territorial and economical developments in the A1-zone are dependent from a stable and confident infrastructure and a good accessibility. As said in the introduction, the desirable variants are observed by cooperation with governments, private actors and NGOs. As solutions for the capacity broadening the route is distinguished in two parts: the road section Deventer – Azelo and the road section Apeldoorn – Deventer.

In the figure below we present both road sections Apeldoorn – Deventer and Deventer – Azelo. The road section Apeldoorn – Deventer is indicated with the blue colour, and the road section Deventer – Azelo is indicated with the yellow colour:




Figure 5.3: The route Apeldoorn – Deventer and Deventer – Azelo indicated by the blue and yellow line (Folder A1-zone, p. 2 (edited)).

For the road section Deventer – Azelo only one solution is opted, a broadening of two traffic lanes, one in each direction, situated in the central dividing strip.

Concerning the road section Apeldoorn – Deventer three options are examined:

- Integral broadening from two to four traffic lanes
- Construction of parallel lanes (meant for regional traffic)
- Construction of a regional road, close to the current A1

According to the latter two options, the current bridge crossing the IJssel river should be expanded or a new bridge has to be constructed. Apart from these options the participating organizations look also to other solutions concerning the flow rate, such as the use of public transport and a connecting regional network of roads. In the end is chosen for the option with the lowest costs, the integral broadening from two to four traffic lanes (Programmateam A1-zone, 2011).

As described in paragraph 5.2, the process in the network is intended to be lead by an independent programme team. This programme team was accountable for the preparation of the meetings of the steering committee, it made proposals and put decision making to the meeting. Furthermore it was accountable for the cooperation between the participating organizations. Specifically in the A1-capacity broadening project the programme team A1-zone was represented by a project leader, that was accountable to the programme team A1-zone (A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding: participatie en uitkomsten, Programmateam A1-zone, 25 mei 2011; Berenschot, p. 6).

In addition the external organization ‘Royal Haskoning’ has indeed a role in the network, but according to the policy statement, the role is only a substantial one. Royal Haskoning only has to

make some calculations (Conceptverslag vergadering kernteam 6 april 2010; verslag vergadering kernteam 15 juni 2010). In addition we have to make the nuance that other consultancy organizations did equivalent calculations and research.

According to the documents and the operationalization made in chapter three, we can conclude the following based on the two dimensions Provan & Kenis distinguish to categorize process arrangements. On the first dimension, is the network externally governed or not, we argued when the external organization had a role to design, lead or guide the process, then the network is externally governed. The policy statement shows only a substantial role here for Royal Haskoning, and no procedural one.

However the independent programme team A1-zone, represented in the project of the A1-capacity broadening by a project leader, had a role both to lead and guide the process. Therefore, we may conclude that the network is externally governed here.

Concerning the second dimension, is the network brokered or not, we argued when it is the intention to involve all organizations in decision making, the network will be more decentralized. When it is the intention to leave the decision making to a single organization or a few organizations, the network will be more centralized. The policy statement and the minutes of the meetings show us that the process in the network is led by an independent programme team, which is accountable for the coordination. So the network is intended structure the coordination by an independent programme team, and therefore the network will be more centralized.

Having seen this, we might categorize this network as centralized (or brokered) and externally governed. This is in line with the characteristics of a network administrative organizational (NAO) governed network. We need to make a nuance of this categorization. Due to the fact that the network members in the formal committee have regular meetings with each other, we might argue for a more decentralized approach in the form of shared governance. However led by the essential role of the NAO in the coordination of activities, we decided to choose for a NAO governed network.

5.3 Expectation of effectiveness

In this paragraph we will make an expectation of the effectiveness of the network, based on the values on the conditions Provan & Kenis distinguish, as explained in chapter two and three. In this paragraph we will try to come to an expectation of effectiveness based on documents (minutes, mails) and the hold interviews with all representatives of the different organizations in the formal committee, plus the representative of consultancy organization Royal Haskoning, since Royal Haskoning was invited repeatedly as a guest in formal committee meetings. First, we will observe how the project scores on the conditions Provan & Kenis distinguish. In combination with the chosen mode of governance in networks, as derived in paragraph 4.2, we are able to make some expectations in terms of effectiveness in the end. This structure is in line with our assumption that the chosen mode of governance in networks combined with the conditions we distinguish, say something about the effectiveness we may expect.

So far, we looked only to the chosen mode of governance in networks. We will now attend to the values on the conditions trust, number of network participants, goal consensus, and the need for network-level competencies here.

5.3.1 Trust

In order to measure trust in the network we will observe “the willingness to accept vulnerability based on the positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviours” (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9). In this thesis three questions were posed directed towards the condition trust. Firstly, we will attend here to the results on the question, in which we asked respondents to indicate the involved organizations in the formal committee plus Royal Haskoning, to what extent they trust each organization on a four point scale. From the eight respondents, seven respondents give an answer on this question. Four from the seven respondents who answer, indicate a relatively high extent or high extent of trust for all network members. From the remaining three respondents, a relatively low extent of trust was given by all three to the Region Twente. In addition each of the three respondents indicate other organizations a relatively low extent of trust, each of the following organizations is mentioned once within that framework: province of Gelderland, programme team A1-zone, Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland, ministry of ‘Verkeer & Waterstaat’ (V&W).

Secondly, we asked respondents to indicate the extent organizations keep one’s appointments on a four point scale again. From the eight respondents who give an answer on this question, seven respondents noticed a relatively high extent or high extent of keeping one’s appointments. Just one respondent mentioned the Region Twente and Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland indicating a relatively low extent of keeping one’s appointments. Based on this result, we conclude that organizations in the project find each other reliable.

Finally, we asked respondents to indicate whether organizations have an eye for their own interests or for the common interests of the project, again on a four point scale. From the five out of eight respondents who gave an answer on this question, all five respondents signal several organizations with a relatively high extent or high extent of own interests. In general the Regions Twente and Stedendriehoek, Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland, and the ministry of V&W show in four or more cases a relatively high extent or high extent of own interests. The Region Stedendriehoek reveals most (three times) high extent of own interests, whereas also Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland shows a high score (two times) on the high extent of own interests value.

The explanation of the three respondents that did not answer this question, are consistent to each other. All three respondents argue in the first place that it is difficult to give an answer on this question, because every organization is involved due to their own interests, but at the same time the organizations realize that the goal of the project only can be achieved when every organization supports the common goals. In addition two respondents argue that the Region Stedendriehoek has the greatest own interests in this project. One respondent said that also the province of Overijssel has major own interests. The results on the multiple-choice question show a relatively high extent of own interests. This is strengthened by the reactions of the respondents who did not answer the question as a multiple-choice question, but gave an explanation for it. Those respondents categorize the Region Stedendriehoek as most looking at own interests. However simultaneously those respondents argue that despite the own interests, the common goal could only be achieved by support of every individual organization.

In addition we notice here that the Programme team A1-zone, as central and external organizing actor in this network, is categorized as relatively high extent of trust, a relatively high extent of keeping one’s appointments and a relatively low extent of own interests. This results show a high

level of trust in the network administrative organization (NAO) of this network. For NAO governed networks, a high extent of trust in the NAO is essential for a good performance of the network. Even stronger, trusting the other network members is not necessary.

In terms of the condition trust we have seen two indicators, the extent of trust itself and the extent of keeping one's appointments, that reveal relatively positive outcomes (relatively high to high extent) in terms of trust. However the indicator of own interest shows also a relatively high to high extent, but in terms of this indicator it is negatively related to the condition of trust. However, these results are nuanced by the reactions of the non-respondents on these questions, who gave an explanation for it. Having seen this, we might expect indicating the condition trust here as moderately high. However having seen the high level of trust in the NAO, which is essential in NAO governed networks apart from the scores on the other network members, we argue to indicate the condition trust as moderate, but high in the NAO.

5.3.2 Number of participants

The most easy condition to derive is the number of network participants. In this network according to the organization of the formal committee, seven network participants are involved. We distinguish the following seven network participants: provinces of Overijssel and Gelderland, the region Stedendriehoek and the region Twente, the programme team A1-zone, the ministry of transport, public works and water management and Rijkswaterstaat Oost Nederland. According to our operationalization this falls in the category six up to and twelve participants, which is called a moderate number of participants.

5.3.3 Goal consensus

The goal consensus criterion focuses firstly on the set network goal(s) in comparison with the perceptions of network goals by the network members. The set network goal is on the one hand derived from documents here, realize capacity broadening of the A1 on the road section Apeldoorn Zuid – Azelo (A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding: participatie en uitkomsten, Programme team A1-zone, 25 mei 2011). On the other hand we asked respondents what was the network goal in this project and to what extent they agree with it. The seven of eight respondents who gave an answer on this question, show some differences in the perception of the network goal. Whereas two respondents argue the network goal is to realize the capacity broadening on the A1, four respondents said that it is about examining if there is a problem in terms of capacity and potentially designing policy plans to solve it, and one respondent argues that the infrastructure *an sich* is not the network goal, but strengthening the regional economical developments in the area. These differences in perception of the network goal, show a low extent of goal consensus on the first face.

In addition, eight of the eight respondents gave an answer on the question, whether they agree with the network goal or not. From those eight respondents, six agree with the network goal as mentioned in the beginning, based on an overview of the project drawn up by the programme team A1-zone. Two respondents did not agree with the mentioned network goal. One of them argues that if this was the network goal of the process, it was not necessary anymore to examine the usefulness of the capacity broadening. The other respondent said that it was the goal to reach consensus over a preferred variant, not the realization as such.

Secondly, the goal consensus criterion focuses on the organizational goals, and the extent the organizational goals differ from the network goals. We asked respondents what the goals are for their own organization to participate in the network. From the eight respondents, seven respondents answered this question. Seeing the organizational goals of the seven respondents, all seven are referring to goals that differ strongly from the network goal. In the first place, four respondents argue that a more solid accessibility for their area is their most important goal. In the second place, two respondents said that their organizational goal is to direct on their own network of roads. One respondent argues that the main goal was to broaden the project to a more integral vision. However the four respondents that argue that a more solid accessibility for their area is the most important goal, show a high extent of overlap in their interests. The only difference is the prioritized area, which is logical seeing the different areas the organizations represent. For instance the Regio Twente will focus more on the final section of Deventer – Azelo (and further), seeing the geographical area it represents, whereas the Province of Gelderland will focus more on the section Apeldoorn – Deventer.

So, in terms of the goal consensus condition, we have observed a twofold of indicators, the network goal and the extent respondents agree to it, and the potential differences between organizational goals in comparison with the network goal. The first indicator showed us a differentiated perception on the network goal, although in the end six out of eight respondents agree with the mentioned network goal. The second indicator demonstrated differences in organizational goals in comparison with the set network goal to a large extent. However the differences might correspond partially to each other in terms of a more solid accessibility. Therefore we indicate the goal consensus here as moderate.

5.3.4 Need for network-level competencies

Concerning the variable need for network-level competencies, Provan & Kenis argue that the need for network-level competencies strongly depends from the interdependency between network members (2007, p. 12). Firstly, we observed to what extent network members are interdependent, by indicating the set network goal as contained in documents. Due to the fact that the regional partners were strongly dependent from the ministry of V&W as owner of the state highway A1, we might do not speak about interdependency between organizations as such, but more of dependency from the regional partners towards the ministry of V&W. Therefore we conclude that the organizations are not so much interdependent in terms of the substantial result.

Secondly, we asked respondents to what extent they think competencies for cooperation between network members are needed. From the eight respondents, seven respondents answered this question. All seven respondents argue that it is needed to introduce competencies for cooperation between network members. From their perspective, the introduction of competencies was needed in the coordination of activities, the discussions on the whether or not there was a problem and the preferred route. Due to the diverse interests on the one hand, combined with the achievement of the common goal on the other hand. In such processes you need a strong leader and open contact with network members according to five respondents.

Thirdly, we asked respondents how difficult it is to introduce the competencies for cooperation between network members. From the eight respondents, seven respondents answered this question. Four of the seven respondents argue it is not that difficult to introduce such competencies in this

project. According to these four respondents difficulties lay in the field of capacity in terms of persons and time. The remaining three respondents conclude it is rather difficult to introduce such competencies. All three respondents said that it has to do with showing your vulnerability, and personal contacts. Sometimes you need to take a view, that is not necessarily the view of other organizations or the network as a whole. In addition one respondent notices that the technical discussions in the process made it more difficult for the process as such. By discussing the technical, modelling part of the process, organizations came later on the process to the part of revealing the organization's interests and finding a common, binding element. However, the respondent makes the nuance that sometimes a project needs simply some process time.

Having seen this, the need of network-level competencies was measured by three indicators, the interdependency of organizations, the extent competencies for cooperation were needed, and how difficult it was to introduce such competencies for cooperation. The three indicators indicate that the need of network-level competencies is moderately high, and that it is moderately difficult to introduce them. Therefore we will indicate the need of network-level competencies as moderately high.

5.3.5 Expectation of effectiveness

Having seen the (intended) mode of governance in networks and the conditions of network effectiveness, we will conclude this paragraph with an expectation of network effectiveness. As follows from the centralized and externally governed approach, we derived network administrative organizational (NAO) governed network as intended mode of governance in networks. This is partially in line with our current findings on trust, the number of network participants, goal consensus and the need for network-level competencies. In the figure below we show the values on the conditions where NAO governed networks, ideally spoken, seems to be most effective in comparison with the values on the conditions derived from our findings in the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'-case.

Effectiveness criteria	Mode of governance in networks	Network administrative organizational (NAO) governed network	'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'
↓	→		
Network level	Trust	Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	High in NAO
	Number of participants	Moderate to many	Moderate
	Goal consensus	Moderately high	Moderate
	Need for network level competencies	High	Moderately high

Table 5.1: Values on conditions of network effectiveness for the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding' in comparison with the ideal typical situation of NAO governed networks.

In general we see a match in values between the mode of governance in networks and the situation in the project 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'. The differences between the situations are marginal and can be seen in the goal consensus on the network goal, also corrected for the own goals of the organization, and the need for network level competencies. Based on the shown difference between mode of governance in networks and the values on the conditions for network effectiveness, we might expect network effectiveness to be moderately high.

5.4 Analysis

Having seen the expected extent of network effectiveness based on the theoretical rationale in the former paragraph, we will now look to the assessment of network effectiveness by the respondents, looking for potential differences, and analyze the results. Therefore we will first describe the results of the assessment of network effectiveness by the respondents. Then we will determine to what extent the expectation of network effectiveness and the judgement of the respondents match with each other. In the end an explanation is given for the potential differences between the expectation and the judgement, and the extent of effectiveness as a whole.

5.4.1 Assessment of network effectiveness by respondents

In this section we will describe the assessment of network effectiveness by the respondents. Firstly we will attend to network effectiveness as goal attainment, secondly to network effectiveness as process. Finally we will combine these two factors and conclude with a judgement of network effectiveness by respondents.

In interviews we asked respondents if they expect the goal of the project, realizing capacity broadening on the A1, specifically the route Apeldoorn-Zuid – Azelo, will be achieved. All eight respondents answered the question, of which all eight respondents argue to expect the goal will be achieved. Seven respondents give an explanation for their expectation. From them, all seven argue that the financial contribution of the regional organizations was essential for goal attainment. Furthermore the new 'structuurvisie' of the central government with more attention for the infrastructural connections with the hinterland (Germany), the A1 and the A15, has contributed to the achievement of the network goal according to four respondents. In addition, the actualized measurements of the central government, reveal that the A1 was a bottleneck in the network of roads contrary to the older measurements of the central government. According to four respondents this was essential for attainment of the network goal. Finally, two respondents argue that achieving the network goal has not so much to do with the latter two components, but more with the extent of success a convincing report is formulated directed to the minister of V&W.

As a second indicator for effectiveness, we asked respondents to what extent attempts are made to cooperation with other organizations, and to what extent the cooperation between organizations succeeds.

Firstly, we will attend to the question to what extent attempts are made to cooperate with each other, and to what extent the cooperation succeeded. All eight respondents answered both questions. Seven respondents argued that attempts are made to develop cooperation between organizations. Just one respondent said no attempts are made. According to the respondents who think attempts are made in this project, they argue that the process was an open platform, in which every organization had the possibility to express their opinions.

In answer on the question, whether the cooperation between organizations succeed or not, six respondents conclude cooperation succeed, and two respondents argue cooperation succeeds partially. According to four of the six respondents who think cooperation succeeds in this project, this was an effect of the responsibility of the organizations in common. In other terms the fact that the partners need each other strategically to achieve the network goal. Two respondents noticed that the cooperation succeeds increasingly. The representatives of the organizations were at the beginning strongly focussed on their own interests, but trusted each other more and more during the project. In line with that development, the respondents started cooperating more effectively. One respondent argues that attempts are made to cooperate, but cooperation *an sich* is not enough. Sometimes choices have to be made, organizations need to get down to business. In addition, one respondent does not give an explanation.

Having seen the results on the indicators for network effectiveness, we can conclude the following. All eight respondents expect the common goal of this project will be achieved. So in terms of goal attainment the network effectiveness will be high. Furthermore, a greater part of respondents (six of eight respondents) thinks the cooperation between organizations succeeds. So in terms of the cooperation between organizations or what we call the process here, the network effectiveness scores high also. Based on the respondents' results we might expect network effectiveness to be high.

5.4.2 A comparison of expectations

In this section we will compare the results of the expectation of network effectiveness by our theoretical rationale and by the respondents.

As indicated in section 5.3.5 of this thesis, the network effectiveness was expected to be moderately high according to our theoretical rationale, instead of high seeing the results of the respondents' expectations. Seeing the results on the various conditions in paragraph 5.3, and the results on the question whether or not the cooperation between organizations succeeds, the main difference seems to be caused by the relatively low score on the condition goal consensus. The other conditions are consistent since we might expect the success of cooperation to be high, when the conditions trust, the number of participants and goal consensus are moderate to high, and the need for network level competencies is high.

So we conclude here, the difference in expectation of network effectiveness between the theoretical rational and the assessment of network effectiveness by respondents, is caused by the relatively low score of the condition goal consensus in this project. This is not reflected by the respondents in their opinions whether the cooperation between organizations succeeded or not. In the next section we will formulate an explanation for this difference.

5.4.3 Analysis of network effectiveness

As said, in this section we will provide some explanations for the differences in expectation between the theoretical rationale and the respondents. Furthermore an explanation will be given for the extent of network effectiveness in this project.

To explain the difference in expectation between the theoretical rationale and the respondents we will make use of the explanations as given by the respondents and the background of the project.

The moderately low goal consensus is not reflected by the results whether or not the cooperation between organizations in the project succeeds. Main reason for this is the explanation of the two respondents who argued that the cooperation between organizations succeed increasingly, as seen in section 4.4.2. According to their view, representatives of organizations started cooperating more effectively by trusting each other more and more, whereas in the beginning the organizations involved were strongly focussed on their own interests. The latter finding may explain the relatively low goal consensus, whereas the first part of their opinion may explain the success in cooperation between organizations.

In addition the relatively low goal consensus may be declared by the background of the project. In the first stage of the project, the regional partners argued there was a bottleneck on the A1. However the ministry of V&W and Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland argued there was no bottleneck on the A1. Based on these starting positions a low goal consensus may be expected. However, due to several factors such as financial contribution of the regional partners, actualized models of the central government, a new 'structuurvisie' with a prominent place among others for the A1 and the convincing report of the regional partners towards the minister of V&W, we may expect the goal consensus to increase compared with the situation in the beginning.

Below we will pay attention to potential factors that can explain the relatively low expectations of network effectiveness. Therefore we will make substantively use of the results of our data collection as elaborated in both paragraph 5.2 and 5.3.

In the first place, we concluded in paragraph 5.3 the level of trust was moderately high. This may not follow out of the relatively high extent of own interests by both central government and regional partners. However, the organizations showed a relatively high extent of trust towards the independent programme team A1-zone. In the organization of a network administrative organization (NAO) governed network this is essential. As said in our clarification on NAO governed networks, the organizations involved might have contact with each other, might trust each other, but not necessarily. For NAO governed networks it is necessarily that the organizations involved trust the NAO, here the programme team A1-zone. Since this is the case the extent of trust corresponds to the ideal typical value on the condition trust.

In the second place, a moderately low goal consensus is derived. This conflicts with the ideal typical value for NAO governed networks, which intends a moderately high goal consensus. However as explained earlier in this section, the moderate value on goal consensus has no effects for the success of the cooperation between organizations, and can be explained due to the background of the project and the views as given by some respondents. In addition we have seen a corresponding object in the differences by the respondents. Four respondents argue for a more solid accessibility, but only the prioritized area is different. This offers an extra explanation of the moderate value of goal consensus.

In the third place the need for network-level competencies is indicated as moderately high. This result from the diverse interests of the organizations and therefore the intention to have a strong leader. Next to it the NAO has the competencies that are needed to reach consensus on the discussion points for coordination. The project leader has the time and resources to prepare meetings well and to study, in combination with the highest possible objectivity as independent

actor. The organization of NAO governed networks fits well with this intention and the availability of competencies seeing the ideal typical value ('high').

The chosen mode of governance in networks and the values on the conditions that indicate an expectation of network effectiveness, correspond to great extent with each other. We might conclude that the expected network effectiveness is high. In other terms, the organizations involved organized the network adequately.

In spite of this good result, we would like to end this paragraph with some critical remarks to the NAO of the project and the role of the province of Gelderland. The independent NAO in this project, the programme team A1-zone, was located in the provincial government building of Overijssel. This caused the idea of prejudice of the NAO, in the advantage of the province of Overijssel. Having seen the background of the programme team A1-zone it might be practical to be situated in the provincial government building of Overijssel. The programme team A1-zone worked primarily by order of the province of Overijssel, and later on the province of Overijssel was 'just' one of the partners in the cooperation of organizations with the programme team A1-zone as independent facilitator. However as said, it caused the idea of prejudice of the programme team A1-zone by other organizations, whether they argue to prevent the idea of prejudice it was better if the programme team A1-zone was situated elsewhere, according to four respondents out of five who said something about the programme team A1-zone.

In addition three respondents argue that the opinions of the programme team A1-zone and the province of Overijssel were relative closely aligned. Therefore sometimes it seems if the province of Overijssel was taking the lead in the project. This can be declared from the former role of the province of Overijssel as 'pusher' of the project in the beginning, before the network started under the leadership of the programme team A1-zone. This is supported by the results on the question which organization(s) had in practice a role in gearing the cooperation between organizations. According to all eight respondents who answered this question, the province of Overijssel had in practice a role in gearing the cooperation between organizations, whereas other organizations involved, have at least one recognition of not having a role in practice gearing the cooperation between organizations.

In spite of the remarks made above, the organizations are satisfied with the realization of tasks by the programme team A1-zone. Four of the five respondents who said something about the programme team A1-zone argue that, seeing the diverse interests of the organizations, most noticeable the initial differences between the central government and the regional partners, an independent organization as leader of the project was a good choice here. The programme team A1-zone was a conversation partner to every organization involved, thanks to her independent status. In addition the programme team A1-zone had the capacity to observe affairs.

Two respondents opt that the programme team A1-zone should be more composite based on equivalence. The programme team A1-zone exist of employees of the province of Overijssel and hired staff from consultancy organizations now. According to both respondents all organizations involved may have a place in the team.

Secondly, the former Provincial Executive of Gelderland prioritized an expansion of the state highway A15 over the A1. Therefore the province was searching for their role in the network process. It seems to be more easy to make administrative frames explicit in such a situation. Then the NAO has the possibility to formulate a common ambition that – within the framework of the own interests – is acceptable for all organizations involved. However we have to make the nuance, that prioritizing the A15 over the A1 is not necessarily conflicting. This is only the fact if the budget of central government is insufficient for capacity broadening on both the A15 and the A1, and / or the central government prioritizes the A15 over the A1.

Finally, the province of Gelderland was represented in the steering committee by a civil servant instead of a member of the Provincial Executive. This caused some irritation by the other organizations involved (three out of eight). Furthermore, it may be a reason why the variable trust shows a moderately low score among the network partners, except the high extent of trust in the NAO. In this case – with this structure – it has no direct consequences for network effectiveness, but we cannot ignore, this might have consequences in other cases that use other modes of governance in networks.

5.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter we examined the ‘A1-capacity broadening’-case. In the first part we described the background of the case and formulated the organization of the network. In answer on our second sub question we argue the organization of the network resembles most to a network administrative organization (NAO) governed network.

In addition, to answer our third sub question, we showed the scores on the conditions of network effectiveness and formulated an expectation of network effectiveness. The conditions showed only marginal deviations in the case in comparison with the ideal typical scores of NAO governed networks. Therefore we formulated a relatively high extent of network effectiveness to be expected. In the analysis phase we explained the relatively high expected extent of network effectiveness.

As said earlier, the organizations involved organized the network adequately by appointment of an independent programme team (NAO). This organization was appropriate seeing the corresponding values on the conditions for the expectation of network effectiveness compared to the ideal typical values of this mode of governance in networks.

However, from the perspective of an independent programme team and the relatively high extent of own interests of organizations involved, the need for information as objective as possible was desirable. This was possibly better when the programme team A1-zone was physically located apart from the organizations involved. Now the programme team operated from the provincial government building of Overijssel. This prevents the idea of prejudice of the programme team by the other organizations involved.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

In this thesis we evaluated the performance of the networks the province of Gelderland participated in, on network effectiveness in the field of mobility. This evaluation is of practical relevance regarding the characteristics of mobility issues. In the field of mobility we observe highly specific and complex issues. In contrast to networks, hierarchical and market forms of governance are not able to manage these characteristics.

In addition, having seen in the introduction, the administrative framework of the Provincial Executive (Gedeputeerde Staten) of Gelderland formulates that the province has to look for her new administrative role as partner of municipalities in the Province of Gelderland.

Therefore we evaluated in this thesis the performance of the networks the province of Gelderland participated in, on network effectiveness in the field of mobility. In this chapter we will summarize our approach to observe network effectiveness, our most important results, and formulate recommendations to act more effective by using network governance. Finally we present a discussion section, in which we deal with choices and assumptions made in this thesis.

6.1 Approach

In this paragraph we will provide an overview of this thesis. In this thesis we firstly referred to the practical relevance of an evaluation of network effectiveness at the province of Gelderland. In answer to our first sub question we noticed that network governance is embedded as a form of administration between other forms hierarchy and market. After having defined network governance and after having seen its characteristics, the problem of network governance was unravelled.

As mentioned earlier, relationships in networks are not clearly defined in comparison with hierarchies and markets.

In hierarchies procedures and formal regulations define the relationship between actors. In markets the relationship takes place for money, and competition as well as non-fixed relations try to enhance efficiency. However the autonomous actors in networks have no clearly defined exchange mechanisms in contrast to actors within markets and hierarchies. Therefore networks face problems in the adaptation, coordination and safeguarding of activities. As a consequence the organization of governance in networks can be organized in several ways. In this thesis we focussed on the structure of association between network members. For this, we used three modes of governance in networks based on the literature of Provan & Kenis (2007): shared governance, lead organization governed networks, and network administrative organization (NAO) governed networks.

In this theory a relationship between the modes of governance in networks and the conditions of network effectiveness is assumed. The extent of correspondence between the ideal typical scores on the conditions of network effectiveness and the mode of governance, gives us information about the extent of network effectiveness we may expect. Next to this, this relationship can be used by actors to make a decision regarding the mode of governance in networks to use. Similarly, it can be used to explain why a certain mode of governance in networks has been chosen, assuming the relevant actor was regarding the values of the conditions.

The theoretical rationale used above, has been tested by two cases of the province of Gelderland in the field of mobility. The cases are selected based on the accessibility of information on the one hand, and the ex-ante expected difference of the organization of the network on the network level. In this thesis we observed the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden' and the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'. The results are described below.

6.2 Results

In this paragraph we summarize the results of both cases and come to a common analysis in order to give an answer on our fourth sub question. In the first case, 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden', we observed a relatively high to high extent of own interests. In the end this made the difference in the moderately low extent of network effectiveness as expected by the theoretical rationale, and the moderate judgement of network effectiveness as expected by the respondents. Since the respondents expect organizations to realize that the common network goal only could be realized, by conforming to the common goal and less to the own organizational goals. Apart from this explainable difference, the discrepancy between a moderately low expected extent of network effectiveness and moderate judgement of network effectiveness is a minimal discrepancy.

In the second case, 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding', we observed a relatively high extent of own interests. Despite this indication, the organizations had a relatively high extent of trust in the NAO of the network, the programme team A1-zone. Although also in this case a relatively high extent of own interests can be observed, the network is organized in a different way. In this case we see a great overlap between the ideal typical values on the conditions for NAO governed networks, and the values on the conditions in practice. In addition four out of seven respondents' own interests or organizational goals are corresponding with each other, since they all desire the expansion of the road system. Only the preferred area differs, so an overlap in own interests can be distinguished. The expectations of network effectiveness of the theoretical rationale on the one hand, and the judgement of network effectiveness by respondents on the other, are only slightly different. Based on the theoretical rationale we would expect a moderately high extent of network effectiveness, whereas the judgement of network effectiveness by respondents shows a high extent of network effectiveness.

Having seen this, we will now look at the differences between the cases in the extent to which network effectiveness is expected by the theoretical rationale and the extent to which this corresponds with the judgement of the respondents. As we can see, the extent of expected network effectiveness in the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'-case is moderately low to moderate, whereas in the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'-case the extent of expected network effectiveness is relatively high to high. In addition we have seen that the values on the conditions of network effectiveness in the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'-case are much more in proportion in comparison with the ideal typical values on the conditions for the chosen mode of governance in networks, than is the situation for the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'-case.

Based on these results we conclude and answer the fourth sub question of this thesis: the way network governance is structured in the networks the province of Gelderland participated in, in the field of mobility, is related to the extent of network effectiveness. Furthermore we conclude that the chance that a mode of governance in network will be effective on the network level, depends on the correspondence of the actual values with the ideal typical values. So the more the values on the

conditions of network effectiveness differ from the ideal typical values of the mode of governance in networks, the less likely the chance that a mode of governance in networks will be effective on the network level. These findings are in line with our hypothesis at the end of the second chapter, and are therefore providing empirical support for the theory.

We have outlined the confirmed relation between the conditions of network effectiveness and the mode of governance in networks as follows out of this thesis in a graphical representation below:




Figure 6.1: graphical representation of the relation between conditions of network effectiveness and the mode of governance in networks.

However, there are some assumptions made to come to the results, and there are some limitations to the use of these findings, which we will discuss in paragraph 6.4.

6.3 Conclusions

In this paragraph we will draw conclusions from our results and analysis in former stages. Firstly in both cases studied in this thesis, we have seen a main focus on the own interests of organizations involved. Although this reference point was more or less the same in both cases, the organization of the network, or in other terms the chosen mode of governance in networks, was different. In the end the case 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding' shows a much higher extent of network effectiveness than the case 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'. In addition we have seen that this was a result of a greater correspondence between the mode of governance in networks and conditions of network effectiveness in the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding' compared to the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden' case.

We conclude here this effect is anyhow attributed to the correspondence between the mode of governance in networks and the conditions of network effectiveness. It might be an essential relation, but we cannot derive that from our results, because there are other factors that played a role here too. We will attend to those factors later on in this section. However, based on our results we conclude that the higher the correspondence between the mode of governance in networks and the conditions of network effectiveness, the higher the extent of network governance. Therefore the organization of the network contributes to the result in terms of network effectiveness.

Having seen this, an answer can be given on the main research question of this thesis:

Is the province of Gelderland successful to solve issues in the field of mobility by using network governance?

In general, based on the two cases observed here, we might argue that the governance in networks was structured adequately in one of the cases. However this might be jumping to conclusions, since we should not look at the overall network effectiveness only to answer this question, but specifically at the role of the province of Gelderland in these cases.

Therefore we observed in our results and analysis sections the specific role of the province. In general the position of the province of Gelderland is central in the following recommendations. First, in the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'-case, the province of Gelderland argued that they do not want to commit themselves to the final report of the regional partners. According to the province of Gelderland, their involvement in the network should be directed in such a way, that the vision contains no surprising elements for the province on the one hand. On the other hand, the reaction of the province towards the regional partners should not contain surprises for the regional partners either. In the analysis section of this case we said that this is a position we can understand because of the hierarchical authority of the province of Gelderland. However, this position might not be a logical, nor a constructive one when developing a common vision agreed on by all network members.

More in general and against the background of the coalition agreement of the Provincial Executive (Gedeputeerde Staten), we will advise the following. According to the Provincial Executive it is desirable that the province of Gelderland is a partner of the municipalities in the province of Gelderland. The province will stimulate cooperation by taking the leading role or other goal oriented actions. However the traditional supervisory task of the province towards the municipalities will live on, and will have other characteristics than abovementioned partnership (Coalitieakkoord Gelderland, 2011, p. 9). Apart from the traditional supervisory task of the province, in network governance if at all possible the province of Gelderland should commit to the final result. This creates trust at other organizations involved in the first place. In the second place it makes the province of Gelderland more powerful in the discussion and direction of the report, since the province of Gelderland is prepared to put aside a hierarchical instrument. That has to be the intention of the province of Gelderland in a network approach, even though the hierarchical instruments still exist.

Secondly, primarily based on the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'-case, we advise the province of Gelderland if possible to make the administrative framework explicit. An example in the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'-case: the Provincial Executive of Gelderland in the field of mobility prioritized an expansion of the state highway A15 over an expansion of the A1. As a consequence the province was searching for their role in the network process. Because of this, it was extra important for the facilitator of the process (the programme team) to focus on the ambitions of the network as a whole. More in general, it seems to be more easy for the NAO if the own interests of the organizations involved are obvious, just like the political and administrative considerations. Then the NAO has the possibility to formulate a common ambition that – within the framework of the own interests – is acceptable for all organizations involved. However we have to make the nuance, that prioritizing the A15 over the A1 is not necessarily conflicting. This is only the fact if the budget of central government is insufficient for capacity broadening on both the A15 and the A1, and / or if the central government prioritizes the A15 over the A1.

More in general, when the administrative framework or the administrative interests of all organizations involved are obvious, it is more easy for organizations to see the overall framework, and develop a common goal or desirable direction. We have to make the nuance here that the result of the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding' may not be explained by the open position of the province of Gelderland, but by the financial contribution of the regional partners. Moreover a political change took place in both the Provincial Executive of Gelderland and the central government. However, we still think the advice to make the (administrative) framework explicit is important, because this can enhance trust between organizations involved and it makes the extent to which subject are negotiable clear. In addition several respondents (three out of eight) noticed this as desirable.

In addition the province of Gelderland is in both cases represented by a civil servant in the steering committees, instead of by a member of the Provincial Executive. This might create the idea that the province of Gelderland is less interested in the final result than other organizations involved. Primarily in the 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'-case this caused some annoyance at the other organizations involved. In the case 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding', the province of Gelderland was represented in the steering committee by a civil servant instead of by a member of the Provincial Executive, whereas the other organizations involved were administrative represented. This indicated the more passive role of the province of Gelderland in comparison with the other organizations involved. This was caused by the fact that the province of Gelderland prioritized the A15 over the A1. As a consequence the province of Gelderland was searching for their role in the network process. In the 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'-case these annoyances were not observed directly. This can be declared by the way the steering committee was used here. The steering committee discussed on an infrastructural substantive basis, instead of taking administrative decisions. Therefore we advise to represent in the steering committee by a Provincial Executive. In the first place to enhance the connections in the underlying project, and in the second place to enhance the credibility of the province of Gelderland in general.

So, finally we conclude that the province of Gelderland on the one hand can improve the performance of network effectiveness by organizing network governance in such a way that the mode of governance in networks corresponds as much as possible with the conditions of network effectiveness. Next to it, not only in terms of network effectiveness, but also in line with the administrative desires as written in the coalition agreement: the province will stimulate cooperation by taking the leading role or other goal oriented actions (Coalitieakkoord Gelderland, 2011, p. 9).

On the other hand we advise the province of Gelderland to make the administrative framework explicit in order to gain trust of the other organizations involved to come to a common goal more easily. In addition, if possible the province of Gelderland avoids the hierarchical instruments and puts them aside in the network approach. This also is expected to enhance trust at the other organizations. Finally we advised the province of Gelderland to delegate a Provincial Executive instead of a civil servant in the steering committee, in order to enhance the credibility both in the underlying project and of the position of Gelderland in general.

6.4 Discussion

In this final paragraph of the thesis we will attend to assumptions made to derive the results, and discuss some limitations in the use of these findings.

In the first place it is good to realize that, when talking about the organization of network governance, it is questionable to what extent the actors are able to organize and manage networks. To what extent is what actors do determined by the behaviour and choices of actors, and to what extent by structural factors. It is for instance conceivable that outside actors make a choice in mode of governance in networks and / or network actors for you. For example, the province of Gelderland will only receive money from the central government, when it cooperates with a given set of network actors. Another possibility is the availability of organizations. Not always organizations, for instance a network administrative organization (NAO), are available. Furthermore for geographical reasons, network actors have to work with each other. Actors have a regional base; organizations are fixed to a geographical basis. Therefore actors will not always have a choice.

This thesis is organized as a multiple case study. Such a study design has as main advantage that we are able to study a selected case into depth in comparison to more quantitative approaches. However, due to the fact that in case study designs only a limited amount of cases can be considered, generalizing results of these cases to other situations is difficult. Furthermore, in this network theory a restriction has to be made in terms of the policy field. As seen in the introduction the field of mobility is characterized as a highly specific and complex policy area. It is not difficult to imagine that in other policy fields these characteristics can differ. For instance in the social service sector the specificity of goods is less high, the care for person A by a basic homecare service can also be set for person B. In addition the social service sector is partially complex, due to the desirable coordination of the homecare service with for instance family doctors. As a consequence, based on these characteristics, the social service sector might be more appropriate for a controlled market approach in comparison with a network approach. Therefore this results may not be representative for other policy fields per se.

Furthermore, in this thesis we only attend to an evaluation of network effectiveness on network level. As a consequence we do not observe the community level and organizational level of network effectiveness evaluation. We assumed that the goals on community level are accomplished by the projects of the province of Gelderland. This assumption may not be valid in situations in which an organization has a more competitive, less strategic role in comparison to the province. In addition we have to mention that sometimes the issue is broader than the area of Gelderland. In such situation the community will be broader too, as we have seen in the A1-capacity broadening case. Then the community level and organizational level are more different than we assumed here. As a consequence the other levels of network effectiveness evaluation are recommended to use too if possible, in order to create a more complete picture of the case. However community level and organizational level need to be used more urgently when they are more different.

Finally we will emphasize that the results of this thesis are indeed limited in terms of generalization to other cases. However the model as used in this thesis to evaluate the expected extent of network effectiveness can be used more in general. As confirmed in paragraph 6.2 the correspondence between mode of governance in networks and the conditions of network effectiveness gives indeed an expectation of network effectiveness. Therefore, we conclude that this correspondence gives a main expectation of network effectiveness, apart from the findings that also other factors in projects specifically and the role of the province of Gelderland specifically influence the result. In general more research on other cases is needed to confirm the theory, but the theory is promising. Therefore we advise to continue designing network approaches with the help of this theory.

In addition this thesis can be generalized to other provinces. In fact they have the same position as the province of Gelderland here. They have a more strategic role in comparison with the municipalities in the province and we may assume the community level more or less equal to the organizational level. Therefore this thesis can also be used in other provinces to organize governance within networks in the field of mobility.

Furthermore a generalization in terms of mobility issues can be made. This thesis offers a 'manual' to structure governance in networks in the field of mobility, since we examined mobility issues as cases and argued from the characteristics of the field of mobility. However we have to make the nuance that the network members in both cases were only public organizations apart from the consultancy organizations. We need to comment that in a situation with private and public organizations the governance in networks is led by other dynamics. In such a situation, you can opt for an umbrella organization as a representative of private organizations involved. However the private organizations too, like the province of Gelderland, need to realize that the network can only be successful when they clarify their position and their interests.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Questionnaire case 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'

Appendix 2: Questionnaire case 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'

Appendix 1: Questionnaire case 'Wegennetvisie Rivierenland-Midden'

Inleidend:

Interviewer stelt zich voor en vertelt wat voor onderzoek uitgevoerd wordt. In toevoeging geeft hij aan welke focus gelegd daarbij gelegd wordt.

Interviewvragen:

Wat is het doel / zijn de doelen van het project?

Ter inleiding benoemt de interviewer het doel / de doelen zoals vermeld in de opdrachtformulering / vergaderstukken, te weten: 'het ontwerpen van een gezamenlijk gedragen wegennetvisie voor de regio Rivierenland-Midden'.

In hoeverre bent u het eens met het doel / de doelen zoals gesteld in de opdrachtformulering / vergaderstukken van het project?

Wat is het doel / zijn de doelen voor de deelname aan het project van uw eigen organisatie?

Zijn er nog andere redenen voor u (uw organisatie) om deel te nemen?

Verwacht u dat het doel / de doelen van het project bereikt zijn / zullen worden?

Ontbreken er organisaties bij de samenwerking van het project?

Zijn er te veel organisaties betrokken bij de samenwerking van het project?

Worden pogingen ondernomen om samen te werken?

Lukt het om samen te werken?

Welke van onderstaande organisaties is betrokken bij het nemen van besluiten?

Gemeente Buren	ja/nee
Gemeente Culemborg	ja/nee
Gemeente Geldermalsen	ja/nee
Gemeente Neerijnen	ja/nee
Gemeente Tiel	ja/nee
Goudappel Coffeng	ja/nee
Provincie Gelderland	ja/nee
Regio Rivierenland	ja/nee
Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland	ja/nee

Ter inleiding benoemt de interviewer dat de afstemming tussen organisaties verdeeld kan worden in de taakverdeling van de organisaties (zoals voorzitterschap en opdrachtgever) en de taakuitvoering van de organisaties. Hij merkt daarbij op dat de volgende vraag zich richt op de taakuitvoering, de concrete invulling van de taakverdeling.

Welke van onderstaande organisaties heeft een aandeel (dergelijke rol) in de taakuitvoering tussen de organisaties?

Gemeente Buren	wel/niet
Gemeente Culemborg	wel/niet
Gemeente Geldermalsen	wel/niet
Gemeente Neerijnen	wel/niet
Gemeente Tiel	wel/niet
Goudappel Coffeng	wel/niet
Provincie Gelderland	wel/niet
Regio Rivierenland	wel/niet
Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland	wel/niet

Zou u de volgende organisaties willen inschalen op basis van de mate waarin genoemde organisatie denkt aan het eigen belang in vergelijking tot het gezamenlijke belang. We hanteren daarbij de volgende schaal:

- 1 = lage mate van eigen belang
- 2 = relatief lage mate van eigen belang
- 3 = relatief hoge mate van eigen belang
- 4 = hoge mate van eigen belang

Gemeente Buren	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Culemborg	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Geldermalsen	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Neerijnen	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Tiel	1/2/3/4
Goudappel Coffeng	1/2/3/4
Provincie Gelderland	1/2/3/4
Regio Rivierenland	1/2/3/4
Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland	1/2/3/4

Zou u de volgende organisaties willen inschalen op basis van de mate waarin genoemde organisatie de afspraken nakomt. We hanteren daarbij de volgende schaal:

- 1 = lage mate van het nakomen van afspraken
- 2 = relatief lage mate van het nakomen van afspraken
- 3 = relatief hoge mate van het nakomen van afspraken
- 4 = hoge mate van het nakomen van afspraken

Gemeente Buren	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Culemborg	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Geldermalsen	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Neerijnen	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Tiel	1/2/3/4
Goudappel Coffeng	1/2/3/4
Provincie Gelderland	1/2/3/4
Regio Rivierenland	1/2/3/4
Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland	1/2/3/4

Zou u de volgende organisaties willen inschalen op basis van het vertrouwen wat u in de genoemde organisatie heeft. We hanteren daarbij de volgende schaal:

- 1 = lage mate van vertrouwen
- 2 = relatief lage mate van vertrouwen
- 3 = relatief hoge mate van vertrouwen
- 4 = hoge mate van vertrouwen

Gemeente Buren	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Culemborg	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Geldermalsen	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Neerijnen	1/2/3/4
Gemeente Tiel	1/2/3/4
Goudappel Coffeng	1/2/3/4
Provincie Gelderland	1/2/3/4
Regio Rivierenland	1/2/3/4
Rijkswaterstaat Oost-Nederland	1/2/3/4

Is het nodig om vaardigheden voor afstemming van de samenwerking in te zetten?

Hoe moeilijk is het om vaardigheden voor afstemming van de samenwerking in te zetten?

De interviewer vraagt specifiek naar de rol van de Regio Rivierenland als zijnde voorzitter binnen dit proces.

De interviewer vraagt in toevoeging naar de rol van Goudappel Coffeng in het proces.

Zijn er zaken in het project die niet goed lopen?

Zijn er zaken in het project die anders zouden moeten?

Afsluiting:

Interviewer bedankt de respondent en doet de respondent desgewenst het interview toekomen. In toevoeging vertelt de interviewer wat er verder met de informatie gebeurt.

Appendix 2: Questionnaire case 'A1-capaciteitsuitbreiding'

Inleidend:

Interviewer stelt zich voor en vertelt wat voor onderzoek uitgevoerd wordt. In toevoeging geeft hij aan welke focus gelegd daarbij gelegd wordt.

Interviewvragen:

Wat is het doel / zijn de doelen van het project?

Ter inleiding benoemt de interviewer het doel zoals vermeld in de opdrachtformulering, te weten: 'capaciteitsuitbreiding van de A1, op het tracé Apeldoorn-Zuid – Azelo, realiseren'.

In hoeverre bent u het eens met het doel zoals gesteld in de opdrachtformulering van het project?

Wat is het doel / zijn de doelen voor de deelname aan het project van uw eigen organisatie?

Verwacht u dat het doel / de doelen van het project bereikt zijn / zullen worden?

Ontbreken er organisaties bij de samenwerking van het project?

Zijn er te veel organisaties betrokken bij de samenwerking van het project?

Worden pogingen ondernomen om samen te werken?

Lukt het om samen te werken?

Welke van onderstaande organisaties is betrokken bij het nemen van besluiten?

Programmateam A1-zone	ja/nee
Provincie Overijssel	ja/nee
Provincie Gelderland	ja/nee
Regio Twente	ja/nee
Regio Stedendriehoek	ja/nee
Rijkswaterstaat	ja/nee
Royal Haskoning	ja/nee
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat	ja/nee
<i>(nu: Infrastructuur en Milieu)</i>	

Ter inleiding benoemt de interviewer dat de afstemming tussen organisaties verdeeld kan worden in de taakverdeling van de organisaties (zoals voorzitterschap en opdrachtgever) en de taakuitvoering van de organisaties. Hij merkt daarbij op dat de volgende vraag zich richt op de taakuitvoering, de concrete invulling van de taakverdeling.

Welke van onderstaande organisaties heeft in de taakuitvoering een aandeel in de afstemming tussen de organisaties?

Programmateam A1-zone	wel/niet
Provincie Overijssel	wel/niet
Provincie Gelderland	wel/niet

Regio Twente	wel/niet
Regio Stedendriehoek	wel/niet
Rijkswaterstaat	wel/niet
Royal Haskoning	wel/niet
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat	wel/niet

(nu: Infrastructuur en Milieu)

Zou u de volgende organisaties willen inschalen op basis van de mate waarin genoemde organisatie denkt aan het eigen belang in vergelijking tot het gezamenlijke belang. We hanteren daarbij de volgende schaal:

- 1 = lage mate van eigen belang
- 2 = relatief lage mate van eigen belang
- 3 = relatief hoge mate van eigen belang
- 4 = hoge mate van eigen belang

Programmateam A1-zone	1/2/3/4
Provincie Overijssel	1/2/3/4
Provincie Gelderland	1/2/3/4
Regio Twente	1/2/3/4
Regio Stedendriehoek	1/2/3/4
Rijkswaterstaat	1/2/3/4
Royal Haskoning	1/2/3/4
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat	1/2/3/4

(nu: Infrastructuur en Milieu)

Zou u de volgende organisaties willen inschalen op basis van de mate waarin genoemde organisatie de afspraken nakomt. We hanteren daarbij de volgende schaal:

- 1 = lage mate van het nakomen van afspraken
- 2 = relatief lage mate van het nakomen van afspraken
- 3 = relatief hoge mate van het nakomen van afspraken
- 4 = hoge mate van het nakomen van afspraken

Programmateam A1-zone	1/2/3/4
Provincie Overijssel	1/2/3/4
Provincie Gelderland	1/2/3/4
Regio Twente	1/2/3/4
Regio Stedendriehoek	1/2/3/4
Rijkswaterstaat	1/2/3/4
Royal Haskoning	1/2/3/4
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat	1/2/3/4

(nu: Infrastructuur en Milieu)

Zou u de volgende organisaties willen inschalen op basis van het vertrouwen wat u in de genoemde organisatie heeft. We hanteren daarbij de volgende schaal:

- 1 = lage mate van vertrouwen
- 2 = relatief lage mate van vertrouwen
- 3 = relatief hoge mate van vertrouwen
- 4 = hoge mate van vertrouwen

Programmateam A1-zone	1/2/3/4
Provincie Overijssel	1/2/3/4
Provincie Gelderland	1/2/3/4
Regio Twente	1/2/3/4
Regio Stedendriehoek	1/2/3/4
Rijkswaterstaat	1/2/3/4
Royal Haskoning	1/2/3/4
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat	1/2/3/4
<i>(nu: Infrastructuur en Milieu)</i>	

Is het nodig om vaardigheden voor afstemming van samenwerking tussen organisaties in te zetten?

Hoe moeilijk is het om vaardigheden voor afstemming van samenwerking tussen organisaties in te zetten?

De interviewer vraagt naar de rol van en ervaringen met een onafhankelijk programmateam.

Zijn er zaken in het project die niet goed lopen?

Zijn er zaken in het project die anders zouden moeten?

Afsluiting:

Interviewer bedankt de respondent en doet de respondent desgewenst het interview toekomen. In toevoeging vertelt de interviewer wat er verder met de informatie gebeurt.