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Bachelor Thesis

Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Cyprus

A Comparison of Constructivism and Realism

With an Empirical Focus on the Events of 1974

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Date of Submission: October 31, 2012

Word count: 12,454 (excluding tables)

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Abstract

Im Rahmen dieser Bachelorarbeit wird die Frage beantwortet, welche Theorie der Internationalen Beziehungen, Konstruktivismus oder Realismus, die türkische Position im Zypernkonflikt besser erklärt. Ein besonderer Fokus liegt dabei auf den Ereignissen des Jahres 1974, als die türkische Armee in Zypern einmarschierte. Zunächst wird mittels eines historischen Überblicks gezeigt, dass der gesamte Konflikt hauptsächlich durch externe Interessen ins Rollen gebracht wurde, weniger durch ethnische Spannungen auf der Insel selbst. Nach einem kurzen Blick auf die Wurzeln und Grundannahmen der beiden Großtheorien, widmet sich die Arbeit dem Kemalismus, dessen Einfluss als türkische Staatsideologie im konstruktivistischen Teil der Analyse herausgearbeitet wird. Aufgrund mangelnder Spezifität kann der Kemalismus für eine konstruktivistische Analyse jedoch genauso wenig genutzt werden, wie andere sozietales oder internationale Normen. In der Folge wird deswegen untersucht, inwieweit der Realismus mithilfe seiner zentralen Annahme der Macht als Ziel und gleichzeitig als Mittel das Handeln von Staaten in einem System der Anarchie erklären kann. Die Hypothese, dass Realismus die Lücken des Konstruktivismus zu füllen vermag, wird dahingehend beantwortet, dass der Realismus die Ereignisse von 1974 am besten erklären kann. Der rational handelnde türkische Premierminister, Bülent Ecevit, hat mit dem Einmarsch zum einen das Überleben des türkischen Staates im Kontext innenpolitischer Spannungen abgesichert indem er nationale Einheit herstellte und sein Machtmonopol stärkte. Zum anderen verbesserte sich durch die militärische Vorherrschaft auf der Insel die Verhandlungsposition der Türkei im Zypernkonflikt, sowie ihre Stellung im internationalen Kontext. In derartigen Situationen ist aus realistischer Perspektive der Einsatz unmoralischer Mittel gerechtfertigt, soweit er der Macht des jeweiligen Staates dient. Paradoxe Weise wird am Ende der Arbeit deutlich, dass genau dies für die damalige türkische Regierung – zumindest kurzfristig gesehen – friedenssichernd wirkte.

Declaration of Authorship

I certify that the work presented here is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original and the result of my own investigations, except as acknowledged, and has not been submitted, either in part or whole, for a degree at this or any other University.

Münster, October 31, 2012

Acknowledgements

In writing this thesis, there have been people who have guided and supported me in various ways and so deserve mention and credit. In particular, I am very grateful to my first supervisor, Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhard Meyers, not only for his very insightful and encouraging comments and suggestions on the thesis, but also for his time to discuss certain issues in detail, even though he was not obliged to do so after the beginning of his retirement. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to my second supervisor, Sedef Turper M.A., for her support even over the long distance.

List of abbreviations

(EOKA) Greek: Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston
English: National Organization of Cypriot Fighters

(EU) European Union

(GB) Great Britain

(NATO) North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NSP) National Salvation Party

(RPP) Republican People's Party

(tba) Translation by the Author

(USA) United States of America

(USSR) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1. Introduction

1.1. Motivation and Research Objective

The Cyprus Conflict has been one of the longest lasting since the end of the Second World War: 2012 will be its 50th ‘anniversary’. It is one of the established, almost forgotten conflicts, which has not been in the headlines lately (Richter, 2009). Only in the case of new peace negotiations does it arouse short-term attention. It is characterized by the interests of external forces like Greece, Turkey, GB or the USA. Cypriot people are still suffering from the division of the island. But instead of giving up hope of solving the conflict an attempt should be made to understand the reasons behind allegedly ethnic disputes.

As conflicts often start in peoples’ minds at first sight a Constructivist approach seems helpful. Definitions of “self” and the “other”, diverging ideas or ideologies can shape actions and thus the international system (Barnett, 2008)¹. Turkey is one principal actor in the conflict and the prime ideology influencing her foreign policy² decisions is Kemalism. Consequently, it shall be analyzed to what extent Kemalist ideology can be considered the independent variable influencing decisions concerning Cyprus.

However, in a globalized world even peace building is frequently regarded as a technical task. Decisions and recommendations focus on states’ interests and securing or enlarging their sphere of influence. For this reason a Realist approach might also be suitable to understand the Cyprus problem. Not only in recent issues like the struggle over energy resources can the Turkish or the Greek behavior be explained by rational motivation (e.g. the current discussions about gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean (Reuters, 2012). Already during the Cold War decisions

¹ The latest edition was out of stock in the library when the assignment was written

² Even though Turkey considers Cyprus as a “national cause” (Demirtaş, 2008, p. 3) and treats it as if it was her own territory, I will mostly refer to Turkish policy towards Cyprus as ‘foreign’ policy because Turkey has officially given up all rights to territory outside of its borders in the Treaty of Lausanne (Yennaris, 2003) and also the Treaty of Guarantee gave her only a very limited responsibility concerning the maintenance of the status quo (Gürle, 2004)

appear to accommodate Turkey's state interests rather than the Turkish Cypriot people's. Not so long ago Turkey threatened to annex the Northern part of the island in case the Republic of Cyprus should join the European Union (EU) (Faustmann, 2009). Even though it has meanwhile accessed the EU Turkey did not realize this threat after all. These are only examples from the history of the conflict but I expect that this behavior of deterrence might be well explained by Realism.

1.2. Structure of the Assignment

For the purpose of comprehending and comparing two International Relations (IR) theories in the context of the causes that lie behind the Cyprus Conflict this paper is divided into a theoretical and an empirical part. Though, this does not mean that it follows a purely positivist approach attempting to create theoretical generalizations. The dispute between scientist and traditionalist IR scholars (Meyers, 1977, p. 60-72) will be taken into account by combining elements of both: The aim is to comprehend the motivation of the Turkish side by applying a hermeneutic approach and conducting a qualitative analysis of secondary literature. At the same time precise definitions of the sampling units will be provided in the beginning of each thread, e.g. the terms 'Communality', 'Specificity', 'Ideology', 'Kemalism', etc. This is more typical of a scientist approach (Meyers, 1977, p. 63). A multicausal pattern of explanation suits the facts that the two theories themselves use dissimilar methods.

First, a historical overview of the evolvement of the Cyprus Conflict compiles relevant events. Then, the paper will point out the basic assumptions of Realism, Constructivism and Kemalist principles. In the empirical part, I will investigate the Turkish motivation for its Cyprus policy more closely focusing on the Turkish intervention in 1974 as the most significant moment in the conflict's history.

The ultimate aim of the paper is to find out which IR-theory - Realism or Constructivism - has more explanatory power in the context of Turkey's Cyprus intervention.

1.3. Academic Relevance

In terms of IR-theories, the paper is a contribution to the ongoing IR debate about which theory might be superior to others or even the one all-encompassing. I doubt that there is one such theory. Instead of continuing this dispute with another purely theoretical discussion, this paper aims to apply the two very different theories empirically and thenceforth judge which specific element of each is more useful.

On the empirical side the paper is relevant because Turkey has recently gained tremendous importance as a regional power. Her interest shifted away from EU-membership to a more intensive cooperation with major Arab countries where Turkey has served as a role model during the latest developments such as the ‘Arab Spring’. It has become a country of international strategic interest. Thus, the conclusions of this paper are supposed to help understand the factors influential for Turkish Foreign Policy, especially in the context of conflicts. Cyprus is not the only conflict region where Turkey is involved. Understanding her position can be useful e.g. in Turkey’s disputes with Syria about Hatay, with Armenia about Nagorno-Karabakh or with Greece about the Aegean Islands. It can serve as an analogy even for other regions of the world where dominant external forces interfere in the periphery like in the case of the Falkland Islands or Israel and Palestine.

By regrouping and reconstructing the wide range of Greek, Turkish and international literature it will be possible to give a more sophisticated statement about the reasons for the conflict instead of imputations of pure hatred or lust for violence that one side tends to make about the other even on the academic level.

1.4. Literature Review

Studies about the shaping factors of Turkey’s behavior in the Cyprus Conflict (Kammel, 2006) can be divided into two groups: Some are concerned purely with domestic variables, e.g. Ozkececi-Taner argues that while “*the role of domestic ideas has also received increasing attention in the past decade or so [...], theorizing about the causal relationship between them and state action is still a formidable task in the discipline [...] the role of domestic ideas is also an undertheorized [...] phenomenon*” (Ozkececi-Taner, 2005, p. 250). From a more qualitative

methodological perspective Adamson contends, “too little attention has been paid to structured case studies that explore the domestic sources of foreign policy” (Adamson, 2001, p. 280). Adamson rejects the idea that states don’t go to war against each other solely because they are officially organized as democracies (Adamson, 2001). Demirtaş’ “Poststructuralist Approach to Ideology and Foreign Policy: Kemalism in the Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse” is a very innovative contribution in order to understand Turkish Foreign Policy because it deconstructs the foreign policy discourse which Demirtaş regards as the independent variable in the matter.

The second group of scholars constitutes the majority: Referring to a “multidimensional quality” of the Turkish policy (Meyer, 2000, p. 3) they combine international and domestic aspects: Meyer discusses the international scene and especially Turkish-American relations before 1974, which were, according to him, leading to the intervention. Umut Uzer gives a Realist analysis of the international scene on the one hand, including domestic factors such as Nationalism on the other.

In ordinary historical accounts³ usually two reasons are indicated for the Turkish interest in Cyprus: First, Turkey’s geographically and politically endangered position and this (perceived) threat combined with the alleged gain in security once the strategically important Cyprus would be under Turkish control and secondly, the hostile relations towards Greece (Vlachos, 2007) combined with a (partly constructed) identity between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots that lets the need to protect them seem self evident.

Most of these arguments will be reflected in my work as well. However, the conflict will be analysed from the traditional theoretical perspectives instead of using the above-mentioned division of explanations because I expect that those clear-cut theories provide the best possible frame to understand Turkish Foreign Policy towards Cyprus.

3 Aydin, 2004, Firat, 2011 or Hale, 2000

2. Chronology of the Conflict

The following table shows events of the Conflicts' history that matter in the context of the research question. Greek, Turkish or alternative views of one event will be given and if relevant I will mention the Turkish position explicitly.

2.1. Pre-Independence Era

Year	Event
1571-1878	Cyprus under the Rule of the Ottoman Empire - 'Millet' system allows cultural autonomy, restoration of Greek-orthodox church, settling of mainland Turks ¹
1821	Greek independence war: "Megali Idea" (unification of all Greek populated territories) first sign of the <i>Enosis</i> idea ²
1869	Suez Canal opened, Cyprus attractive for Great Britain (GB) ²
1878	Cyprus comes under British domination ³ but nominally remains under Ottoman rule ¹
1914	GB annexes Cyprus ¹
1920	Dictate of Peace of Sèvres ¹³
1922	Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's (Atatürk) victory over Greece after 2 years of brutal war; enormous population exchange ¹
1923	Treaty of Lausanne: British annexation officially acknowledged, Turkey gives up all claims ²
Oct. 29, 1923	Proclamation of the Turkish Republic ¹³
1925	Cyprus British Crown Colony, "divide et impera" policy facilitates governing, e.g. separate education for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots ³
1918-1938	Eleftherios Venizelos and Atatürk agree on a 'hands-off-policy' towards Cyprus ³ , appeasement politics ¹³ . This demonstrated a "temporary truce" ²
1930	Education put under British control leads to the start of Turkish and Greek elites splitting ¹
1931	Civil uprisings against the British and for the unification with Greece ¹³ . Constitution suspended ¹ and legislative council closed down. British rule without any form of representation until 1960 ²
1948-1960	Turkey: willing to compromise as long as it can save face, 'reactive' policy, Turkish less pronounced than Greek Nationalism, for Turkey Cyprus issue 'not existing' ³
1945	With the beginning of the Cold War Cyprus gains importance as a military base ³
1950	Archbishop Makarios III elected, symbol of the <i>Enosis</i> (unifying Cyprus with Greece) movement ³ , 95,7% of Greek Cypriot pro <i>Enosis</i> ¹³

1952	Makarios blocks Grivas' plan for military action and asks Greece to advocate the unification with Greece in the United Nations (UN). Turkey and Greece become members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), good relations between Greece and Turkey ¹
1954	British minister for colonies, Henry Hopkinson, says that some colonies will never become independent, e.g. Cyprus, famous as "Hopkinson's never" ⁵
1955	Greek Cypriots begin guerrilla war against the British rule. The guerrilla movement, <i>EOKA</i> (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, Greek for: National Organization of Cypriot Fighters,) under Greorgios Grivas wants <i>Enosis</i> . British authorities arm a paramilitary police force made up of Turkish Cypriots ³ called TMT (<i>Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı</i> , Turkish for: Turkish Resistance Organization) TMT is aiming for <i>Taksim</i> ⁵ , the separation of Cyprus
1956	Makarios III goes into exile on the Seychelles ⁴ – Radcliffe Plan for self-governance for Cyprus denied ¹
1956	Suez Crisis, official end of British and beginning of American dominance in the Mediterranean
1958	Macmillan Plan originally "brought together several ideas for increasing self-governance" ¹⁶ , but eventually draws Greece and Turkey into the conflict, too ¹ , violent clashes between EOKA and TMT lead to inner Cypriot civil war ¹³
1959	Makrios III returns from exile and is elected president ⁴ , secret negotiations between Turkish and Greek Ministers of Foreign Affairs about Cyprus ¹³
Feb. 1959	Conferences of London and Zurich ¹³ as a basis for Cyprus' constitution
Aug. 15, 1959	Commission working out a constitution for Cyprus, end of emergency rule ¹³ , Makarios winner of elections, Fazıl Küçük vice president from Turkish side
Feb. 19, 1959	Turkey and Greece at first unwilling to accept an independent and non-committal Cypriot state, dominance of Greek and Turkish Nationalism instead of mutual trust and goodwill ³ , Turkey: affirms support and affection for Turkish Cypriots ¹ but eventually also signs of the London and Zurich Agreements which include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreement about the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus • Guarantee Agreement between Cyprus, GB, Greece, Turkey. Unification with other country or division explicitly prohibited. Guarantee forces have the right to re-establish the status quo ante in case of disruption (namely Enosis) • Treaty of Alliance regulates Greek and Turkish military presence¹³
Aug. 16, 1960	Eventual 'Independence' and Foundation of the Republic of Cyprus ¹³ , Cyprus joining the UN, Commonwealth, and Council of Europe

2.2. Post-Independence Era

1960-1963	Power sharing works out relatively well ³ , Turkey: after 1960s coup rather liberal atmosphere ⁶
1963	State administration paralyzed due to ethnic polarization and complicated constitution, most problematic from the Greek Cypriot point of view: Turkish right of veto, Makarios' '13 points' cutting Turkish rights ³ , Turkey: Unstable coalition government, discontent in the army, Turkish Foreign Policy shaken by the Cuban Missile Crisis, but Turkey would never accept unilateral amendments that alter relative balance established between the communities by the Cypriot Constitution ⁶
Dec. 1963	'Akritas-Plan' or 'Bloody Christmas Massacre': Turkish Cypriots withdraw from powersharing ² (alternative view: Turkish are forced to withdraw ¹), Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration established as a step towards Taksim ³ , Turkey: supporting the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots in order to induce ethnic division ⁵
Dec. 27, 1963	Interim peacekeeping force, Joint Truce Force, put together by Britain, Greece and Turkey ²
Feb. 1964	Moscow announces that it can't stay neutral in the case of a Turkish intervention ¹³ on the island
Apr. 1964	Makarios unilaterally cancels the Alliance Treaty with Turkey, Turkey threatens military intervention on Cyprus ¹³
Mar. 4, 1964	UN Security Council Resolution 186 passed forming the UNFICYP ² Turkish minority (18%) moving back to enclaves in only 3% of the territory At the same time: Greece secretly begins to send soldiers to Cyprus, increasing the total number to 20.000 which leads to a de-facto control by Greece ²
Jun. 5, 1964	Johnson letter pressuring Turkey to refrain from an intervention on Cyprus, which provides an official pretext for the internally discordant government (opposition of foreign minister Feridun Cemal Erkin) and disgruntled Turkish Army, together this leads to tremendous changes in Turkey's Cyprus and general foreign policy ⁶
Aug. 1964	Turkey bombs the Northwest of Cyprus during 2 days ¹³
Sep. 1964	Acheson-Plan (<i>double enosis</i>) intends to satisfy demands for both partition and Enosis, wants to put island under NATO control. This would have met Turkey's strategic concerns ⁶ but is eventually denied by the Greek side. In the preparatory talks for the two Cypriot groups and their leaders had not been included ¹³

Apr. 21, 1967	Coup d'état in Greece and beginning of military dictatorship ⁸ , so called the Colonels, trying to achieve <i>Enosis</i> by negotiating with Turkey in the talks of Keşan and Dedeağaç, when no agreement can be reached, the Turkish villages Boğaziçi and Geçitkale are attacked and occupied by Greek Cypriot forces under the command of General Grivas ¹⁷ , Turkey threatens to use the right under Guarantee Treaty to intervene, UN forces Greece to withdraw troops ⁹
Nov. 1967	Under Grivas the National Guard attacks the Turkish Cypriot villages Kophinou and Aylos (Kophinou crisis) ¹³
Dec. 28, 1967	Proclamation of provisional Turkish Cypriot administration ⁵
1968	Makarios gives up hopes for “Enosis”, reelected by 95% of Cypriots, chances for reconciliation high, only 4% for opponent who advocates “Enosis” ⁵ , rift between Makarios and EOKA grows visibly ⁹ , start of talks between Klerides and Denktaş ¹³
1970	Plan “Hermes” by the extremist Taxiarkhos Dimitrios Ioannides (assassination of Makarios and <i>Enosis</i> of Cyprus with fascist Greece) fails ¹⁰
1971	Greek and Turkish representatives decide to “solve” the situation, General Grivas (<i>Enosis</i> supporter) returns from supervision in Athens and founds EOKA-B (terror organization) supported by Greek Colonels, Athens’ demands for Makarios to resign ushered by the conservative wing of the orthodox church ¹⁰
1972	Cypriot police finds plans of EOKA-B to organize anti-Makarios demonstrations in order to provoke a civil-war like situation that would justify an intervention of the National Guard ¹⁰
1973	Another 3 attempts to assassinate Makarios (EOKA-B and conservative bishops) In Turkey: unstable coalition government ¹⁰
Jul. 15, 1974	“Aphrodite”: Coup of the Cyprus National Guard led by Ioannides aiming to overthrow Makarios, supported by the USA, Makarios flees and survives ⁶ , Sampson proclaimed new Cypriot President, Turkey surprised by coup, rather concerned with domestic debates, Ecevit described as ‘risk taker’ ³ but not particularly aggressive ¹¹
Jul. 15-20, 1974	Ethnic ‘cleansing’ of Cypriot communists, socialists, and Makarios supporters ¹⁰
Jul. 17, 1974	London crisis meeting: USA reassure military aid to Turkey as a broad hint that they would support Turkey ¹¹ and begin talks with Sampson who they favor over Makarios (“Castro of the Mediterranean”) ¹⁵
Jul. 18, 1974	Turkey extends territorial waters in the Aegean Sea into an area over which Greece claims sovereignty and begins military buildup on its south coast, approx. 50,000 troops assembling near Mersin ¹⁵
Jul. 19, 1974	US Undersecretary of State Sisco flies to Ankara to prevent Turkish intervention but Ecevit answers that he will not repeat the ‘mistakes’ made by the governments of 1964 and 1967 ¹⁵

Jul. 20, 1974	'Operation Attila I': Turkey occupies a corridor around Kyrenia (Girne) ¹³ , Turkish Foreign Policy of those days for the first time described by Greeks with the term "Neo-Ottomanism" ¹² , public response in Turkey overwhelmingly supportive ¹⁵
Jul. 21, 1974	Agreement on ceasefire ¹⁵
Jul. 23, 1974	Greek junta ruling in Athens collapses because of the events on Cyprus
Jul. 24, 1974	Karamanlis called back from exile and resumes leadership ¹³ , in Cyprus Glafkos Klerides assumes presidential responsibilities, return to constitutional order, status quo ante achieved ¹⁵
Jul. 25-30, 1974	First round of Geneva negotiations
Jul. 25, 1974	Multinational peacekeeping force consisting of British, Swedish, Canadian, Danish, Austrian, and Finnish troops takes command over the island's main airport Nicosia ¹⁵ , Turkey shipping 1,000 men to Kyrenia, Cypriot authorities complain to UN that Turkey unloads more and more weapons of destruction ¹⁵
Jul. 29, 1974	Turkish helicopters, merchant ships and naval landing craft land more troops and armor on Cyprus one week after the ceasefire, disagreements between Turkish and Greek negotiators over Turkish troop withdrawal and Turkey asking for revision of the structure of the Constitution ¹⁵
Jul. 30, 1974	Turkey, Greece and Britain sign accord over new ceasefire: Turkish troops remain on the island until acceptable agreement is reached. Turkey moving every day to establish a quasi-independent self-sufficient area in Cyprus ¹⁵
Jul. 31, 1974	Turkish troops reported to have shelled and seized two towns in Northern Cyprus, meanwhile Soviet Union which has maintained consistent support of Turkey vetoes a measure for broader powers of UN peacekeepers ¹⁵
Aug. 1, 1974	Turkish troops occupy two more towns west of the Kyrenia-Nicosia corridor, after long gun fire Greek Cypriot National Guard retreats ¹⁵
Aug. 2-8, 1974	Turkish troops advancing occupying land, expelling Greek Cypriot inhabitants, bombarding villages with heavy artillery, on Aug. 8, President Richard Nixon in the United States of America (USA) resigns and is replaced by Gerald R. Ford ¹⁵
Aug. 10, 1974	Turkey demanding new political boundaries on Cyprus and replacement of the Republic with two federated, but autonomous states. Turkish and Greek roles now completely reversed: Turkey advocating overthrow of 1960 accords and Greece defending them ¹⁵
Aug. 12, 1974	Güneş-plan revealed, proposing that Cyprus be divided into a number of separate cantons, negotiations between Greece and Turkey are brought to a standstill when Turkey demands an immediate yes-or-no answer to its proposals. Turkey is reported to now have approx. 40,000 soldiers on Cyprus ¹⁵
Aug. 8-14, 1974	Second round of Geneva negotiations without success, so, Turkey launches second intervention, eventually occupying 37% of the island's territory ¹³
Aug. 15,	Karamanlis withdraws Greece from NATO as a protest against the USA who let

1974	Turkey invade Cyprus ⁶
Aug. 18, 1974	Last ceasefire agreed, 10,000 Greek Cypriots behind the Turkish lines, mainly on the Karpass peninsula, Turkish Cypriots forced to gather in the British base at Akrotiri
Sep. 1974	Greek foreign minister Mavros explains that Greece renounces Enosis but now defends sovereignty and territorial integrity for Cyprus

2.3. Post-1974 Era

Feb. 1975	Denktaş proclaims Turkish Cypriot federal state
1975	Intercommunal talks in Vienna; Vienna III agreement, partial implementation. ¹¹ Denktaş and Klerides agree to exchange population ⁶ , peace talks hosted by UN in New York ¹²
1977	Framework Agreement ¹¹ between Denktaş and Makarios ¹³ parameters for a bi-communal federation. Death of Makarios; Kyprianou becomes president
1978	12-points-plan proposed by USA, GB and Canada but rejected by Cypriots because of missing rights for refugees, establishment and property which is <i>conditio sine qua non</i> for Greek Cypriots, all of which are vehemently refused by the Turkish. But idea of parliament consisting of members proportional to population persists ¹³
1979	High-Level agreements regulating basic principles for negotiation: Cyprus shall be a bi-zonal, bi-communal, demilitarized, reunited federation including 3 fundamental freedoms: right of establishment, mobility and property ¹³
1980-1983	251 Turkish-Greek meetings, no agreement ¹³
1980	Coup d'état in Turkey leads to a standstill in peace negotiations about Cyprus ¹³
Nov. 15, 1983	Rauf Denktaş proclaims the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus recognised only by Turkey
1986	Exposure of Turkish military buildup triggers Greek Cypriot military build-up
1989	UN secretary Perez de Cuellar presents ' <i>set of ideas</i> ' rejected by Denktaş ¹³
1990	Republic of Cyprus applies for European Union (EU) membership, Denktaş cancels talks as a reaction ¹³
Apr. 1992	UN secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali presents an extended ' <i>set of ideas</i> ' accepted by the Greek side, Denktaş first persisting on his 1989 position, later accepting 'Ghali-set of ideas' ¹³
1992	Talks re-start and fail again ¹³
1993	Glafcos Klerides new Cypriot president ¹³ , Turkey: Özal's sudden death causes domestic crisis, short-lived governments of Ciller, Yılmaz, Erbakan and Ecevit ¹³

1994	After 2 years of talks Denктаş rejects reunification on the basis of 'Ghali plan'
1996	'Imia/Kardak Crisis' brings Turkey and Greece to the brink of war ¹³ , violent actions along buffer zone ⁴ , US intervention calms situation ¹³
1997	Klerides orders Russian S-300 missiles; Turkey makes threats against deployment, violent protests by Greek Cypriots, peace talks backed by UN between Klerides and Denктаş fail ⁴
1998	Klerides re-elected, Cyprus candidate for EU membership, EU accession negotiations opened. Klerides agrees not to deploy Russian missiles but to send them to Crete instead ¹¹ , military intervention threatened by Turkey in case of Republic of Cyprus' EU accession ⁴
1999	Earthquakes in Turkey and Greece lead to warming of relations. UN-sponsored indirect talks in New York without progress. Turkey is given candidate status for EU; must change its relations with Cyprus to achieve full membership ¹¹ , start of 'proximity talks' ¹⁸ in New York (Annan and his Special Advisor Alvaro de Soto began proximity talks with Klerides and Denктаş in December 1999. Five rounds of talks would be held through November 2000) ¹⁸
Jun. 2001	UN Security Council renews its 36-year mission. 2,400 strong UN force guard buffer zone between Greek and Turkish Cypriots ⁴
Jul. 2001	Inhabitants of Akrotiri violently protest against plans to build telecommunications masts, British police officers injured ⁴
Nov. 2001	Turkey argues that Cyprus' moving to join the EU before any reunification negotiations constitutes violation of the 1960 treaty and it might answer by annexing the north if the Republic of Cyprus joins the EU ⁴
Jan. 2002	EU membership seems possible despite conflict, new UN-led negotiations aiming to create a plan that comprises all aspects, certain progress because of new Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) government that tries to improve Turkey's chances for admission ¹²
Nov. 2002	Annan-Plan (UN Secretary General Kofi Annan), intending to establish a federation consisting of two parts, with rotating presidency, introduced ⁴
Dec. 2002	EU summit in Copenhagen agrees that Cyprus might join in 2004 if the two communities agree to UN plan by 2003. Failing reunification, only internationally recognized Greek Cypriot part of the island will become EU member ⁴
Feb. 2003	Hardliner Tassos Papadopoulos ¹² defeats Klerides in presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus ⁴
Mar. 2003	UN deadline for agreement on reunification plan passes. Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledges that the plan has failed ⁴
Apr. 2003	Turkish Cypriot authorities partially lift restrictions, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots cross "green line" for first time in 30 years ⁴
Apr. 2004	Twin referendums on whether to accept UN reunification plan in last-minute bid to achieve united EU entry. The Annan Plan rejected in the Greek south, with 70% voting against it; in the Turkish north, 65% voted

	in favor of the plan despite official opposition ¹¹ EU agrees to take steps to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community ⁴
May 2004	The Republic of Cyprus enters the European Union, Turkish north declines to join ¹¹
2005	Denktaş resigns ¹¹
2008	Dimitris Christofias of the left elected president of Republic of Cyprus, abrupt change of climate, begin of direct negotiations for the first time in modern history with Mehmet Ali Talat on the Turkish Cypriot side ¹²
2010	Hardliner Dervis Eroglu wins Turkish Cypriot leadership election against leftist incumbent Talat ¹²
Jan. 2012	Denktaş dies ¹²
2012	Cyprus becomes fifth Eurozone country to ask for outside financial help after it is caught in backwash of Greek crisis

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(Internet sources accessed last on August 5, 2012, 2.28 pm). For reference details, see Bibliography.

3. Theoretical Part

In this paragraph, the functions of a theory will be named. Later, relevant assumptions and potentially problematic aspects will be presented. In the end, a hypothesis will be drawn, a theoretical supposition on a meta-level, declaring from which theory I expect a better result.

Theories are systems of general scientific phrases (connected if-then conditional statements), which are supposed to explain a certain aspect of reality consistently (Meyers, 2000). They help to “*structure portions of complex phenomenons*” and “*orientate oneself in reality*”⁴ (Meyers, 2000, p. 480). For this reason, a useful theory should fulfill certain requirements: According to positivist thinking, it should

⁴ translation by the author (tba)

describe, explain and predict phenomena while from a critical-rationalist position theories aim at verifying or (better) falsifying statements (of observations) by confronting our collected knowledge with “*reality*”⁵ (ibid.). Moreover, theories should be consistent, complete and implicit. Theories can be ontological (trying to find out “*what actually is*”⁶ (ibid.)), explanative (trying to find out “*the reasons of what is*”⁷ (ibid.)) or validating which means trying to find out if the explanation of what is can be considered appropriate/valid.

In the current study it shall be seen which theory better fulfills which function while the most important requirement in both sections is to ‘explain’ the evolvement of the events. Both theories apply different methods to find out what is and why it is, this will be also be a topic in the respective sections. Accordingly, the hypothesis will not relate to the actual reasons of the intervention but to the virtues of the theories.

3.1. Constructivism

This part is dedicated to understanding the theoretical assumptions of Constructivism.

It has its roots in the 1980s and gained importance in the 1990s when Realism, Neorealism and Institutionalism were neither able to predict nor to explain the end of the Cold War (Barnett, 2008). This “*countermovement*” (Barnett, 2008, p. 151) was first initiated by John Ruggie and further advanced by authors such as Nicolas Onuf who “*backed up its bark with some empirical bite*” (Barnett, 2008, p. 153). The author of the article “*Anarchy is What States Make of it*”, Alexander Wendt, aimed “*to build a bridge between these two traditions [Neorealism vs. Neoliberalism] [...] by developing a constructivist argument*” (1992, p. 394).

“The post-Cold War wave of culturalism in security studies is a broad research program with a wide range of research focuses [...] embracing a diverse range of epistemologies (from the avowedly positivistic to the explicitly antipositivistic) and

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utilizing a broad array⁸ of explanatory variables” (Desch, 1998, p. 2). In this paper the focus will be on political, domestic, and societal factors on the one hand and transnational or global norms on the other.

Constructivism explains states’ behavior in the international system by applying sociological categories. Despite many ways to distinguish Constructivist approaches (methodologically, epistemologically, etc.) they usually agree on a minimal ontological consensus saying that the world is constructed socially and actions in this process are not power induced but governed by ideas and norms (Kissolewski, 2005). Constructivists *“share a common concern with how ideas define the international structure; how this structure shapes identities, interests, and foreign policies of states; and how state and non-state actors reproduce that structure [...]”* (Barnett, 2008, p. 150). Interactions of autonomous actors can construct, deconstruct or transform structures as we witnessed at the end of the Cold War when American and Soviet leaders started interacting and thus completely restructured the international system.

While scholars use varying terms⁹ for it, they define the independent variable of international politics outcomes in a similar way: For example, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 891) use the term “ideas” for a *“standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”* while [...] and Wagner (1999, p. 1) describe the term “norms” as *“value-based, shared expectations about appropriate behavior”*¹⁰. This so-called *logic of appropriateness* highlights that *“actors are rule-following [and] worrying about whether their actions are legitimate”* (Barnett, 2008, p. 155). Ideas are held collectively e.g. in the form of symbols, knowledge or language and on the international level there are also institutionalized norms in the form of treaties and agreements. Important is intersubjectivity that distinguishes norms from individual beliefs (Boekle, et al., 1999).

⁸ There are four different strands of social theorizing focusing on: organizational (e.g. Jeffrey Legro), political (e.g. Elizabeth Kier, Peter Katzenstein, Noburo Okawara, and Thomas Berger), strategic (e.g. Iain Johnston), and global (Martha Finnemore, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Michael Barnett) factors. They all reject the Realist view that international politics are shaped by competition among states for power and security (Desch, 1998).

⁹ moral concepts, images, ideas, norms

¹⁰ Because of this identic definition I will use the words ideas and norms synonymously

Constructivist foreign policy analysis can be distinguished into a transnational and a societal research tradition. None of the two possesses a theory-immanent superiority and both could be useful for analyzing the empirical case¹¹:

Transnational Constructivism focuses on the influence of “*norms that are shared by the international society or by subsets of that society as embodied by regional or function-specific international organizations*” (Boekle, et al., 1999, p. 2). Indicators for such norms can be “*international law, resolutions of international organizations and final acts of international conferences*” (Boekle, et al., 1999, p. 2). Here, the constitutive units are the states that act as socializers and shape norms.

Societal Constructivism considers the socialization processes inside of society as decisive factors for foreign policy outcomes. In this trait the “*constitutional and legal order, party programs and election platforms, parliamentary debates, and public opinion*” (Boekle, et al., 1999, p. 2) reflect relevant norms.

Seeking to avoid ex-post explanations, criteria to measure the intensity of a norm should be employed: communality and specificity. Communality depends on how many actors in a system share one norm: the more actors, the higher communality is given. Specificity means the degree of accuracy distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate behavior (Boekle, et al., 1999, p. 5).

As mentioned above, non-state actors are relevant in this theory as well, so that especially societal Constructivism considers society as a whole as well as groups of it – called “*advocacy coalitions*” (Boekle, et al., 1999, p. 8) – the influential forces socializing the respective decision makers. The chance to investigate different domestic forces might be useful in a fragmented society like the Turkish one (Karakas, 2007). Certain positions in the literature claim that Turkish decision makers must have been influenced tremendously by societal forces (Riemer & Korkisch, 2003).

Following the famous Constructivist Katzenstein, “*identity was mainly a domestic attribute arising from national ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose*

¹¹ Despite their work dating back to 1999 I chose Boekle, Rittberger & Wagner's conceptualization because the transnational/societal division is helpful to structure and reduce the great variety of influential factors

that in turn shaped states' perceptions of interest and thus state policy" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 399). If the Turkish state ideology is considered an important, action-guiding idea (Uzer, 2011), Constructivism can relate this to the eventual behavior of the state and it can thus be assumed influential in the Cyprus Conflict. As the quote shows, Katzenstein adheres rather to the societal approach by emphasizing domestic ideology as determining factor for states' actions.

In this matter Yucel Bozdağlıoğlu's (2007) critique of Alexander Wendt's State Constructivism is helpful. Systemic approaches would deny the international relations theory "*a clear test of their relative predictive power [...] without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international relations can be fully adequate*" (Keohane, 1993, p. 285). As the predictive power also is an important function of a theory, I will follow Bozdağlıoğlu and assume that states construct their identities before systemic interaction and those identities inform them about who is friend and who is enemy. According to Bozdağlıoğlu "*states form their preferences based on their corporate identities and start their interaction in accordance with those identities*" (2007, p. 142).

To summarize, Constructivism investigates the influence of international or societal norms, e.g. ideology as independent variables for state action in the international system.

3.1.2. Kemalism as Domestic Ideology

If ideology is defined as a "*fixed set of ideas that direct policies in a certain direction*" (Demirtaş, 2008, p. 9), Kemalism¹² is regarded as the most dominant

¹² Kemalism dates back to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who founded the Turkish Republic in 1923. He built up a modern nation state out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. His ultimate aim was to realize a secular state, leaving behind traditional and Muslim culture. With radical reforms, like abolishing the caliphate, outlawing the Tarikats, omitting Islam from the constitution as the state religion and replacing Islamic Law with an adaptation of the Swiss Civil Code, secularizing and monopolizing education, abolishing religious and traditional dress (e.g. the Fez), and replacing the Arab with the Latin alphabet (Erdoğan, 1999). He campaigned for Westernization with a positivist vision of the enlightenment. For some people this era was a 'cultural revolution' and the only way to achieve a 'civilized' Turkey, but for others it was rather 'modernity from above' running completely against their traditions, ideas and habits.

Turkish ideology (Uzer, 2011). It is referred to by almost every actor in Turkish politics and especially perpetuated through education, the media and the public (Hale, 2000). Precisely because of this alleged unanimity and omnipresence, however, its definition(s) should be carefully checked in terms of specificity.

Kemalism consists of six basic principles: Republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik), Nationalism (Milliyetçilik), Populism (Halkçılık), Laicism (Laiklik), Etatism (İnkılapçılık), and Revolutionism (Devletçilik) (Karakas, 2007).

Particularly the nationalism element is relevant for the Cyprus issue since “linking Kemalist state identity with nationalism” permits to “*explain certain political decisions that seem inexplicable at first glance*” (Uzer, 2011, p. 34). Therefore, a closer look into Turkish Nationalism will be useful. It is regarded as a mix of territorial-civic, ethnic and conservative nationalism (Uzer, 2011) and began to emerge in the late nineteenth century. But even into the early 1920s ordinary people still defined themselves as Ottoman or Muslim rather than Turkish (Karpas, 2002). This is also true for Turkish Cypriots who were rather reluctant to adopt this ideology in the beginning (Beckingham, 1957 and Yennaris, 2003). The ethnic aspect of Kemalism and the definition of Turkish citizens as Sunni Muslims exclude ethnic minorities such as Kurds or religious minorities such as Alawis.

This raises the suspicion that Kemalism was more of an elite ideology not shared by the population as a whole and implemented in a top-down way (Vlachos, 2007).

Some figures suggest that e.g. in terms of the ethnic ideal “only less than 0,8% of the population” (Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 2009) would not fulfill the religious ideals of ‘Turkishness’ and that during the time which is analyzed in this paper the ideology would have been successfully spread. But this does not correspond to the reality of the people who live on Turkish territory. On the one hand, scholars argue that there is a much higher number of minorities. On the other hand, not all Muslims are Sunnis, which is the purported ideal.

Furthermore, it needs to be pointed out that Kemalist principles are also diametrically opposed to the ancient cultural heritage of the different ethnic and

religious subgroups in the region. Especially the Kurdish people still struggles to maintain own traditions against the ‘culture of Turkishness’ and to exercise their right of self-determination. For this reason the communality of Kemalism as a Constructivist variable can only be considered given among the political leaders, namely of course, Atatürk’s party, the RPP, ruling the country at the time.

For the purpose of this paper it is important to see what Kemalism means in terms of foreign policy: Other than the Ottoman antecessors,

“Kemalists adjusted their foreign policy to reflect this new and changing national identity, which meant showing concern for the affairs of external Turks, albeit in a limited manner” (Uzer, 2011, p. 36).

Atatürk is reported to have said:

“Although our nationalism loves all Turks with a feeling of deep fraternity, and although it desires with all its soul their fullest development, it recognises that its political activity must stop at the borders of the Turkish Republic” (Yennaris, 2003, p. 34).

Under Atatürk Turkey had given up all rights to territory outside of the borders of Turkey by signing the Treaty of Lausanne (Yennaris, 2003) and promoting the principle of *“peace at home, peace in the world”* (Uzer, 2011, p. 43). According to Yennaris, though, Atatürk had an essentially expansionist foreign policy in mind. He proves his point by quoting Atatürk with statements like *“Cyprus turn has not yet come”* (2003, p. 25) and by saying that *“the Turks still noted Atatürk’s aspirations in this direction, an expression of the chauvinistic, expansionist ideological machinery of the Turkish Republic”* (2003, p. 24)¹³. Uzer supports this argument:

“Turkish analysts quite often dismissed the role of nationalism as irrelevant in Turkish Foreign Policy, which was characterized as peaceful, extremely prudent and somewhat passive and non-expansionist. [...] Kemalism

¹³ In spite of an supposedly academic background, Yennaris is an example for a very extreme view and judgement of the Turkish behavior, and thus should not to be used isolatedly.

articulated and propagated a specific form of ethnic-territorial nationalism
[...]" (Uzer, 2011, p. 185).

What these quotes undeniably show, is that Kemalism is interpreted in many different ways, which makes it difficult to regard it as a constant variable for Turkish Foreign Policy behavior. The required specificity for a Constructivist analysis is not given. Kemalism is not only an ideal foundation of the Turkish Republic but includes and at the same time disguises typical Realist, and rather material goals: The fact that it was installed in a top-down manner serving as an instrument for nationalist ends, leads to the realization that it did have a certain influence which, can however not be measured and operationalized exactly enough for Constructivism. For this reason, Kemalism could rather be considered an intervening variable. The action-guiding motive of the leader in the 1970's was to build a modern society, which was necessary after the second coup d'état in order to ensure the survival of the Turkish Republic.

3.2. Realism

In this chapter, I will present those aspects of Realism that seem favorable compared to Constructivism and subsequently contrast them in order to articulate a hypothesis for the empirical analysis.

Realism is the most influential and widespread IR theory to which supporters as well as critics frequently refer (Krell, 2011). It emerged in the 1930s and 1940s, a time marked by ideologies like Fascism, National Socialism, and Stalinism or, though unregarded, Turkish Kemalism. In view of experiences from World War I, the failure of the League of Nations, and the beginning of the Second World War scholars started to challenge the preceding paradigm of 'idealism'. In times of leaders obsessed with power all over Europe this quite optimistic IR theory just could not pass the test of reality (Krell, 2011). With a focus on understanding the causes of war power became the central category in the Realist analysis of international politics as summarized in this famous statement: "*International politics, like all politics is a struggle for power*" (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 29). Historically, Realist thinking dates back to important classical works like the "History of the Peloponnesian War" by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides (460-406 BC) or "The Prince" by Niccolò

Machiavelli (1469-1527). Also Thomas Hobbes' (1588-1679) Leviathan and texts from Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) or Max Weber (1864-1920) are mentioned as sources by Realists (Krell, 2011).

In his pioneer work "Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace" which was published in 1948, Hans Morgenthau was the first to name the Idealist critique "*Realism*"¹⁴. Morgenthau, born in Germany but migrated to the USA combined a specific American background of experience with a German understanding of science. He analyzed his own propositions in his works of the 1950s and 1960s (Jacobs, 2006) where he criticized American foreign policy for depending on its anti-communist allies and acting against its own genuine national interest. Morgenthau influenced many US politicians, amongst others Henry Kissinger or Dean Acheson (Rohde, 2004) who are considered Realists and both played an important role also in the Cyprus Conflict. In modern Realism there is no more talk of power in the ruthless, Machiavellian sense but Max Weber distinguished power as an end in itself as opposed to functional power. Even Thucydides had not sung the praises of power politics but had realized that Athens collapsed due to its own exorbitance (Krell, 2011). It will be interesting to see if the Turkish intervention of Cyprus was based on functional or ruthless power politics.

The idea that states are the dominant actors in IR "*leads to a focus on the capabilities of the state*" (Williams, 2005, p. 3) and is sometimes termed the "*billiard ball approach, [...] elaborated most succinctly by Arnold Wolfers [...]*" (ibid.). "*Every state represents a closed, impermeable and sovereign unit, completely separated from all other states*" (Wolfers, 1962, p. 19).

Based on this Hobbesian idea of men Morgenthau (1963) mentions six basic principles of political Realism: the belief that politics and society are governed by objective laws, power and interests as the basis of politics, the national interest as an objective category, the limitation of universal moral, the difference between national

¹⁴ This approach is also called Modern or Political Realism (and even Classical or Anthropological Realism in contrast to offensive/defensive, structural/Neorealism, liberal, neoclassical or symbiotic Realism which are not relevant in this paper)

and universal moral and politics in an autonomous sphere. Due to the constraints of this assignment I will focus on the assumptions essential for the Cyprus Conflict, namely on the national interest.

As the second principle of Realism Morgenthau defines interest “*in terms of power*”¹⁵ (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 5). “*Power is the rule of people over people*” (Morgenthau, 1963, p. 71). He subsumes all “*social relations that serve this goal be it by physical violence or psychological bonds through which a mental will can rule over others*”¹⁶ (Jacobs, 2006, p. 49). Defining power as rule remains rather vague and thus prone to criticism. Such reproaches are easily invalidated by the fact that for him the concept of power is “*a link between reason and the facts*”¹⁷ (Jacobs, 2006, p. 50) in order to understand international politics. Thus, it is not only a constitutive element of human behavior but more importantly provides a way to understand it. It is an aim and a means of foreign policy at the same time (Wolf, 2005). Morgenthau understands power in relative terms (Rohde, 2004), which implies that the accumulation of power by one actor leads to the loss of power by another (Meyers, 2000) constituting a zero-sum-game. In his definition of power it can neither be measured nor compared (Jacobs, 2006) and the balance of interests can only be temporal (Wolf, 2005).

The content of a long-term national interest is “*culture-specific*”¹⁸ (Rohde, 2004, p. 159) and “*determined by political traditions*”¹⁹ (Rohde, 2004, p. 159). Morgenthau makes no explicit statement about the eventual, concrete interest. Following Jacobs (2006), the concrete interest can change and assume different shapes, but it eventually serves the purpose of power, too.

Although sometimes criticized for treating states as black boxes²⁰, Morgenthau’s Realism allows comparing states’ foreign policy behavior despite their very different internal features. Furthermore, he does not deny the existence of internal variables

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²⁰ which is originally a behaviorist model

but “*demands a profound autonomy of the state vis-à-vis societal forces*”²¹ (Rohde, 2004, p. 160). By conceptualizing Realism as a first image theory he advances the view that there should be an autonomous executive that is independent of society and provided with a high internal sovereignty. He holds the statesmen dear because they are supposed to use their power to shape the international system in a constructive way.

How are statesmen supposed to pursue the national interest? If the action is free from moral or ideology but conducted rationally with the aim to maintain or improve the state’s power one important condition is that the state disposes of sufficient military capacity (e.g. Rohde). In order to do so immoral behavior (lying, cheating, etc.) is acceptable according to the belief “*Sometimes it’s Kind to be Cruel*” (Desch, 2003). Rationality is what Morgenthau regards as highly moral (Roskin, 1994) because if states pursue the national self-interest “*they will collide with other states only minimally*” (Roskin, 1994, p. 57). This view is shared by Clausewitz’ “national interest” approach demanding states to go to war only for rational reasons and condemning ‘unlimited war’ for reasons of expansion (Roskin, 1994). “*A policy of ‘improving’ the state’s power is not to be confused with territorial expansion, which is the hallmark of dangerous and disruptive imperialist powers, against whom prudent statesman is always on guard*” (Roskin, 1994, p. 57). Morgenthau blames three potential causes: Firstly, if national interests are defined too broadly, secondly if excessive nationalism is prevailing, and thirdly, if national politics is exceedingly ideologized (Rohde, 2004, p. 67).

Another important element of Realist theory is the “*security dilemma*”²² (e.g. Meyers, 1979, p. 75). It is based on a primary psychological moment: “*The intentions one international actor anticipates or perceives from his antagonist are influenced by suspicion*”²³ (Meyers, 1979, p. 75) which leads to defensive measures against a maybe even peacefully tuned vis-à-vis. Like a vicious circle, the other will

²¹ tba

²² tba

²³ tba

feel threatened and start defending himself, too. The result can be arms-buildup, competition for power and the actual use of force.

In the empirical part it has to be investigated if – particularly the second phase of Turkey’s intervention– demonstrates expansionist behavior, condemned by Realists or if it can still be considered rational.

3.3. Hypothesis

As a result of the theoretical examination of the two theories I have discerned tremendous disadvantages in the Constructivist concept. While Realism has its weaknesses in terms of the theory-immanent “*negligence of processes within society*”²⁴ (Rohde, 2004, p. 242) it can be argued that this is exactly what allows analyzing similar foreign policies (like conflict or war) even though states feature profoundly different domestic settings (Roskin, 1994).

Constructivism can be reproached firstly for its inability to make predictions (Hagemann, 2012), a criticism frequently neutralized by claiming that this is not its purpose. Yet, it just does not fulfil the above-mentioned requirement for a theory and is especially detrimental in the case of a conflict where predictions would be necessary for discussions about its settlement. Secondly, it does not provide an explanation why values should be more important for military action than material interests. Thirdly, Constructivism is a social theory “*not a substantive theory of international politics*“ (Barnett, 2008) they are “*sometimes useful as a supplement to realist theories*” (Desch, 1998, p. 141).

In addition to this rather minor criticism on the formal level, several other aspects are problematic with respect to their explanatory function: If ideology is supposed to be the independent variable for the behavior of states it should be clearly defined. However, this might not always be possible as the degree of the ideology’s specificity might be too low, so that it is not altogether clear what constitutes appropriate vs. inappropriate behavior. Ideologies might be interpreted in various ways, thus becoming difficult as independent variables.

²⁴ tba

The Constructivists Boekle, et al. (2000) accept that Constructivism cannot explain when the decision makers are exposed to diverging expectations of appropriate behavior because societal and international norms contradict each other. In this case a Constructivist approach is “*under-determined*” (Boekle, et al., 1999, p. 8) since decision makers are free to choose whichever norm they wish to refer to. Hence, in this case Constructivism cannot rule out the possibility that a non-norm-guided interest – “*post factum justified with the respective norm*” (Boekle, et al., 2000, p. 9) – could have been action guiding. If norms are not considered the basis of actions power-striving rationality could represent an alternative. Although some scholars “*use Constructivism to identify how identity shapes the state’s interests and then turn to rational choice for understanding strategic behaviour*” (Barnett, 2008, p. 159), Constructivism alone cannot comprehensively explain rational action. For the analysis of behavior that is not norm-guided but rather power oriented, a Realist perspective is definitely more suitable. I have come to this conclusion also because I observed that norms, perceptions and ideologies can be constructed in a top-down way (through media, education, etc.). Hence, I disagree with the apparent Constructivist ‘optimism’ that societal forces socialize the leaders (Boekle, et al., 2000). In Turkey I expect the opposite. It is true that the Constructivist focus on norms permits to detect the existence of norms and their intensity, which can be measured with the tools of communality and specificity. However, the question remains why those norms have been constructed. Assuming that anarchy and perceived threats are constructed by humans (Stuckatz, 2011) in a deliberate way, Constructivism does not provide a tool to explain the motives. But if a theory is supposed to help understand the motives of political decisions, Realism – which starts out right on the topic of political leaders and their interests – seems to provide a more conclusive explanation.

Therefore the hypothesis can be formulated that Realism can fill the blank positions of Constructivism and is thus the more appropriate theory to explain Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus.

3.4. Methodology

“How to evaluate and compare [...] [a] theoretical framework” (Kurki & Wight, 2007, p. 29)? Positivists and interpretivists answer this question quite differently. While the latter, and many other postpositivists “insist that there is no easy or conclusive way of comparing theories” (Kurki & Wight, 2007, p. 29) some even argue that “a discussion about the subject between proponents of different weltbilder is not possible”²⁵ (Meyers, 2000, p. 423) because scientific views of the world are “incommensurable”²⁶ (ibid.) and “the grounds for their knowledge claims are so different” (Kurki & Wight, 2007, p. 29). Positivists, on the contrary, think that theories can be compared under certain conditions:

“Systemic empirical observation guided by clear methodological procedures can provide us with valid knowledge of international politics and we must test theories against the empirical patterns in order to compare theories”
(Kurki & Wight, 2007, p. 29).

Realism and Constructivism will be tested in the empirical context of the Cyprus Conflict precisely along the lines of this definition. Nevertheless, I am aware of the weaknesses of the positivist method, for example the risk of applying theories in isolation, using narrowing criteria, or lacking critical reflection. For this reason the assignment does not claim a high degree of generalization.

The test of Constructivism and Realism against reality²⁷ will be the basis of a secondary literature analysis. As the entire theory cannot be applied due to the limitation of the assignment, I will test the most relevant aspects. This means exploring the influence of transnational and societal norms by using a process-tracing method (Adamson, 2001) in the Constructivist analysis, and contrasting norms with the actual behavior of the Turkish government. Considering transnational as well as domestic norms allows ascertaining their consistency, which is also called the “degree of cultural match” (Checkel, 1999, p. 91). The stronger the cultural

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²⁶ tba

²⁷ The exact course of action with all its consequences for the Cypriots cannot be presented exhaustingly but is summarized in the historical overview.

match, the more influential the norm-variable can be considered. Taking into account the different interpretations of Kemalism, especially in terms of foreign policy enables me to check in how far it can be used as the independent variable explaining the Cyprus intervention or which other role it might have played.

In a next step I will deal only with those assumptions of Realism that help understand the blank positions of Constructivism, namely the idea of states rationally striving for survival and power. This means the Turkish national interest, on an abstract as well as on a concrete level will be worked out by a critical review of different historical sources. Then, it will show if these interests could have been pursued by Turkey's military action of 1974. If so, the Realist assumption of rational state action could be regarded as given. Special focuses will be on the question if the second phase was an act of 'unlimited war', which Realists condemn (Roskin, 1994) or if it served to consolidate Turkey's power.

When comparing the results in the juxtaposition chapter special emphasis will be on their explanatory power of the theory in order to assess them.

4. Empirical part

4.1. Context of the Intervention

4.1.1. Conflict on Cyprus

In this chapter I will summarize the course of events of 1974, which is essential for the understanding of the following line of arguments.

In 1967, when the Regime of the Colonels took over Greece, Enosis became the most important foreign policy interest of the motherland (Historisches Institut Aachen, 2002/2003). When Makarios and the Greek Cypriots intended a more moderate policy on Cyprus, tensions with Athens slowly arose. In 1971, the crisis was fuelled by the return of General Grivas to Cyprus. He was the most extreme supporter of Enosis gathering all the Greek Cypriot rightwing elements in the EOKA-B (the follow up organization of EOKA) and planning to get rid of Makarios. At the same time Athens and Ankara were negotiating again, aiming at an Acheson plan for 'double enosis', amounting to the partition of the island an outcome Makarios had

always tried to prevent. The cooperation between the Greek military regime and EOKA-B became increasingly obvious and Makarios' reaction to the interference more resolute. In a letter from July 2, 1974 he demanded the withdrawal of all Greek officials from Cyprus and criticised the dictatorship in Greece, which resembled a declaration of war. Greece supported Grivas in overthrowing Makarios. This was tantamount to inviting Turkey to start an intervention (Historisches Institut Aachen, 2002/2003). This coup was a "*violation of the 1960 Zurich and London accords, of which Turkey was a guarantor, and there appeared to be the legitimate reason to believe that the Turkish Cypriot minority of the island was in danger*" (Adamson, 2001, p. 288). The Turkish Cypriots were endangered by Sampson's "*murderous attacks on Turkish Cypriots en masse*" (Hitchens, 1997, p. 102). There is broad academic consensus that their security was re-established with the first phase of the Turkish intervention (e.g. Uzer, 2011).

4.1.2. Domestic Situation in Turkey

Subsequently, I will briefly describe the domestic situation in Turkey before and after the intervention. Even though neither classical Constructivist nor Realist approaches usually focus much on domestic concerns, they should still be mentioned in order to judge whether the theories match.

Turkey has traditionally been a very fragmented society with cleavages along the constitutional (laicist vs. islamist), the ethnic (Turkish vs. Kurdish nationalists) and the confessional line (Sunnis vs. Alawis) (Karakas, 2007).

Changes on the social, economic and political level starting in the 1960s (Karpas, 2002) led to a widened party spectrum, including especially new left, islamist and extreme nationalist parties (Adamson, 2001). This process occurred (because) even though the democratic institutions in Turkey were marked by historical "*top-down patterns*" (Adamson, 2001, p. 282). They were unable to incorporate those new social groups. Consequently, "*increased radicalism, political violence, and overall weakening and fractionalization of the party system*" (Adamson, 2001, p. 282) determined the climate. Although "*electoral democracy had been restored in 1973 after a brief period of military rule (...) democratic institutions were weak, coalitions were unstable, and the domestic power concentration in the new regime was very low*" (Adamson, 2001, p. 280). In 1974, the extreme fragmentation was "*at*

an all-time high” (Adamson, 2001, p. 284) and thus manifested even in the government coalition between Bülent Ecevit from the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (RPP) that helped Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP) to come to power (Karakas, 2007). The only unifying element in this coalition of opposites was *“the stated desire to stand up to American hegemony in matters of both foreign and domestic policy”* (Adamson, 2001, p. 284). This materialized for example in the lift of the American-imposed ban on poppy production (Aydin, 2004) and by placing Turkish-American bases under Turkish control (Adamson, 2001). The following bill granting amnesty for political prisoners was highly unpopular with Erbakan, *“who started to act more ideologically and began to distance himself from Ecevit’s policies. Erbakan started to take up conservative issues of public morality, which were antithetical to Ecevit’s liberalism. In July 1974, the coalition was in a deep crisis, and Ecevit was forced to the very brink of resignation”* (Adamson, 2001, p. 288).

Suddenly, after Turkey’s first intervention in Cyprus on July 20, 1974 Ecevit received massive popular support and a celebratory mood prevailed in the country.

“Young men and women sang, clapped and almost pranced in marches [...] brandishing Turkish flags. Crowds gathered wherever the premier went, shouting ‘People’s Ecevit! People’s Ecevit!’” (New York Times, 1974).

However, Ecevit also received tremendous pressure from the Turkish military, which was *“dizzy from success and still retained a veto over Premier Bülent Ecevit, forcing him to insist that Turkey’s right to maintain and reinforce its units on Cyprus was irrevocable”* (Adamson, 2001, p. 293).

From the revision of Turkish history sources it became clear that the main threat Turkey was facing in those days stemmed from internal problems rather than from external ones.

4.2. Constructivist Analysis

The Constructivist analysis of the invasion will be divided into the transnational and societal determinants, namely Kemalism. In the first part I will apply the state-centric Constructivist approach focusing on Turkey as one acting unit, thereafter societal and ideological influences will be considered.

Assuming that Turkey acted according to a logic of appropriateness means that the intervention would have had to follow norms. From the transnational Constructivist point of view one possible norm could have been the Treaty of Guarantee²⁸. The fact that Turkey did not intervene in the Cyprus crisis of 1963 or 1967 (Uzer, 2011) where Turkish Cypriots were threatened in a similar way, shows that the responsibility arising from the Guarantee Treaty had not been causal for Turkish policy towards Cyprus but the particular situation in 1974 must have provided the motives. In terms of appropriateness Mustafa Aydin claims that “*the legality of actions in the international arena*” (Aydin, 1999, p. 181) has been essential for Turkey.

“*In Turkey it is honourable to comply with international commitments*”
(Aydin, 1999, p. 181).

This description cannot at all bear up against reality: Starting with Turkey’s ignorance of territorial promises made to the Kurdish in the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 (Washington Post, 1999) over the intervention of Cyprus which was conducted knowing that the second phase violated the Treaty of Guarantee, and the EG would not approve of this step (Demirtaş, 2008) until today’s human rights violations, Turkey has regularly been denying international commitments. A recent example is that Turkey’s “*failing to comply with the terms of the Association Agreement could lead to the suspension of Turkey’s EU membership negotiations*” (Demirtaş, 2008, p. 1). In 1974, the consequent international condemnation of the intervention of Cyprus and the American arms embargo did not seem to bother Turkey either as there is no evidence that this embargo led to a softer Turkish policy on Cyprus (Hale, 2000). So, neither the behavior in history nor the specific actions of 1974 were guided by international norms but much more by the will to maintain an independent and strong Turkish nation (Aydin, 1999). Still most political measures were of course justified with international norms (Cumhuriyet, 1963, Meyer, 2000 and Yennaris, 2003).

²⁸ for more information see historical overview

Turning to the societal part of the analysis, domestic ideology, namely Kemalism needs to be investigated. As we have seen it does not fulfill the Constructivist condition of specificity. Yet, the political elite referred to it during the Cyprus crisis (Demirtaş, 2008). For this reason, I will briefly present the peaceful and then the expansionist interpretation:

Most people in Turkey see in Kemalism a “*departure from militant expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire*” (Aydin, 2004, p. 156) and a peaceful, non-interventionist ideology. This understanding actually does not permit to violently intervene anywhere unless the necessity for an intervention is justified in terms of self-defense. This justification was achieved by considering Cyprus a national concern from the 1950s on (Riemer & Korkisch, 2003). While Turkish Cypriots were rather skeptical towards Kemalism in the beginning (Beckingham, 1957) and their nationalist aspirations were far less articulated than on the Greek Cypriot side (Riemer & Korkisch, 2003), the introduction of a Turkish ruled system of education slowly led to the acknowledgement and adoption of a Kemalist identity (Yennaris, 2003) and thus helped to create an identity with the mainland Turks. Repeatedly declaring Cyprus a matter of “*national concern*” (Demirtaş, 2008) led to the fact that:

“Turkish citizens certainly do not like seeing their fellow Turks outside of Turkey treated badly” (James Meyers, 2000, p. 7).

The shortcoming of this peace centered interpretation of Kemalism is that it cannot answer the question why Turkey did not care more about her Turkish Cypriot kinsmen until GB reminded them of their interest in Cyprus the 1950s (Richter, 2009). Assuming a strong influence of the nationalist Kemalist element, “*Turkey would have been involved in the fate of the Turks in Cyprus ever since the independence of Turkey and would have promoted their cause domestically and internationally. In other words, Turkey would have intervened in Cyprus earlier than it actually did. As a matter of fact Turkey was reluctant to get involved in the fate of Turks living outside its borders.*” (Uzer, 2011, p. 4). And although there were air raids in the crisis of 1963 and 1964 the worst-case scenario was averted by the Johnson letter. The following quote gives the impression that Kemalist identity and

Turkish nationalism rather served the political elite as a disguise for a rationally calculated, expansionist foreign policy (Demirtaş, 2008).

“Ankara which, always acting alone, has taken all the decisions, even against the will of the Turkish Cypriots, whose interests it has neglected in order to serve its own military interests“ (Yennaris, 2003, p. 12).

By creating a feeling of kinsmanship and a suggested need to protect the kinsmen the Turkish government could instrumentalize state ideology in order to manipulate the public. This means there must have been other motives than norms. Kızılyürek supports the view that *“the construction of national identities in Cyprus [...] [is] to be understood in the context of nation building processes in Greece and Turkey”* (2003, p. 198). This behavior fits to the original purposes of Atatürk who first employed and spread strong nationalism as an instrument to build a modern society (Bagci, 1999). Here again, interests other than norms were action guiding. Excessive nationalism can be observed also in other young nations, usually in those with a colonial past (e.g. in Latin America) that have similar goals as Turkey: territorial integrity and independence (Bagci, 1999, Aydin 1999 or Mufti, 1998). Having its origin in the founding years of the Republic, nationalism served the same purpose also in other moments when the modern, secular nation needed to be strengthened (Karakas, 2007), for example during or after military regimes.

These are rather Realist aims make ideology seem like a means to achieve them but not like a driving force. Kemalist ideology and Turkish Nationalism, thus, need to be taken into account in a Realist analysis, too, and cannot stand alone as ideological explanations for Turkish Foreign Policy behavior. Constructivism cannot trace back such actions, as it does not analyze behavior motivated by power aspirations.

In conclusion Kemalism is problematic as the independent variable for several reasons: According to the theoretical part of my work there is no unanimous definition of what Kemalism or Kemalist foreign policy principles are supposed to be. The divergence seems to be between the Turkish public and the above-quoted scholars and politicians. Either way, this illustrates once more that the specificity-requirement for a proper Constructivist analysis according to Boekle, et al. is not given. This indetermination allows political actors from the left to the right, and even

religiously focused parties like Erbakan's National Salvation Party or the AKP, to instrumentalize Kemalism for their various purposes.

The official discourse designed by political elites and the military, which justifies any kind of policy with the nebulous term Kemalism that Atatürk himself might not have called "Kemalist". In this case, Constructivism is useful as a first step: One has to realize that the discourse over a topic including certain slogans can form ideas, which materialize in social structures. The answer to the question if Kemalism influenced Turkish behavior in the Cyprus Conflict largely depends on the particular definition employed. Therefore, in the Turkish context Wendt's famous quote should be reformulated: Kemalism is what politicians make of it.

In the next paragraph, the focus is on societal factors other than ideology as their relevance has been stressed, too (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007). For the Constructivist analysis the public discourse is important (Demirtaş, 2008) because it is held to socialize the decision makers (Boekle, et al., 2000). In the light of the empirical evidence, however, the initial assumption that the conflict materialized due to hatred between the peoples concerned needs to be revoked (Vlachos, 2007).

"The crisis did not grow out of tension between them, which was slowly waning. It grew out of the policies of those who did not want Cypriot harmony" (Hitchens, 1997, p. 86).

The Turkish public had demanded an intervention of the Turkish army already in 1963 (which prime minister İnönü refused due to the Johnson letter) and strongly supported it again in 1974 (Aydin, 2004). Public support even of the second phase of Turkey's intervention is contradictory to the international norm, the Treaty of Guarantee, which allows an intervention only in order to maintain the status quo, thus justifying only the first phase (Richter, 2009). For this reason it has to be noted that the societal and international norms contradicted each other in the Cyprus Conflict, which enabled the prime minister to take an autonomous decision, regardless of any norm.

When reflecting on the roots of this strong public determination, authors frequently refer to Turkey's history which needs to be considered especially in a Constructivist

analysis: Yennaris (2003) argues the Cyprus Conflict can be compared to the annexation of Alexandretta since both are explained with Turkey's inability to accept that it does not possess the same size of territory that the Ottoman Empire used to control. This is what Kirişci (1997) called Sèvres-phobia: The conviction that the external world is conspiring to weaken and divide up Turkey means that

“Turks looked beyond their borders and perceived an environment marked by Greek aggression, American unreliability, and global indifference“
(Mufti, 1998, p. 42).

This explanation matches with what Hitchens describes as Turks feeling a *“culturally and historically biased”* (1997, p. 102) attitude against them. He mentions the *“memories of Lepanto and the gates of Vienna”*, catchphrases like *“little Turk”* or *“terrible Turk”*, the *“strangeness of Islam to Europeans”* and of course, the national memory of the Greeks *“of Ottoman subjugation”* (Hitchens, 1997, p. 102). However, this perceived weakness does not correspond to Turkey's military capacity (Riemer & Korkisch, 2003 and Historisches Institut Aachen, 2002/2003) neither can it serve as an excuse for defensive measures:

“There is no need to draw upon ancient prejudice in examining what the Turkish army did in Cyprus in August 1974. The record is a clear one [...] and it shows that Turkey employed deliberate means of terror and indiscriminate cruelty. It did not do so because of something in its nature or because of the inheritance of some presumed streak of barbarism. It did so for the very modern and cold-blooded reason that it wanted territory without inhabitants” (Hitchens, 1997, p. 102-103).

All this certainly needs to be considered in order to understand the fact that the Turkish public was highly supportive of an intervention. Of course, the public and the political elite might have mutually incited each other at the very last stage. But the feeling of being threatened had been established a long time ago. It did not match with the material reality, as we will see later.

Hitchens remarks that before the second phase of the intervention the *“public that was still drunk with its nationalist revolution [...] in which the fear of a threat from the north had been successfully cultivated”* (1997, p. 54). This fear has consequently

been nurtured “*by using psychology to keep the country convinced of the existence of danger from external and internal enemies, the army could act undeterred by the political bodies of the government*” (Vlachos, 2007, p. 57). This proves that the feeling of threat did not arise due to external dangers but had been created for a specific purpose.

Adamson underlines once more that especially democratizing countries such as Turkey at this time tended to “*resort to populist tactics and employ nationalist or other unifying ideologies as a means of mobilizing the public, forging stable coalitions, and amassing enough support to remain in power*” (2001, p. 279). The Constructivist assumption of leaders being socialized by other actors is invalid in this case. This reinforces the need to examine the intervention from a Realist perspective in order to shed light on the factors of rationality and power.

The expected advantage of Constructivism, namely its ability to take into account the variety of societal forces does not take effect in the decision on Cyprus. After successful and yearlong manipulation, by 1974 most actors shared the view that an intervention is the only way to save Turkish Cypriots. Ecevit – who ultimately took the decision – received broad support by the military, the public and international actors.

In the second phase of the intervention Turkey did not act according to international norms, which would have been explainable by Constructivism. Neither is Kemalist ideology a reliable variable to explain Turkey’s behavior as it lacks specificity. The Kemalist element of Nationalism was rather an instrument for achieving potentially rational interests. Due to the theory-immanent disadvantage when societal and international norms collide, which was the case in 1974, Constructivism is underdetermined. It became clear that Turkey perceived herself as threatened but also, that this perception was deliberately perpetuated and reproduced in order to justify policies (Demirtaş, 2008). Constructivism can detect this by discourse analysis such as in Demirtaş work, however the reasons for this kind of state behavior cannot be explained.

4.3. Realist Analysis

In the Realist part it shall be seen if instead of norms and ideology power political motives played the crucial role in Turkey's decision to intervene on Cyprus. As the Realist approach "takes defending the national interest as the independent variable" (Demirtaş, 2008, p. 6) the national interest of Turkey in 1974 should be thoroughly determined before contrasting it with the empirical facts and concluding if it could be achieved by the intervention. In the table below possible theoretical distinctions of the national interest are summarized and practically applied to the Turkish case.

Types of National Interests applied in the case of Turkey in 1974		
Criteria	Distinction	Turkey's interest
Importance ²⁵	Vital	No Greek controlled Cyprus
	Secondary	Economic advantages: e.g. control of the maritime economy (shipping, resources, etc.)
Duration ²⁶	Temporary	Strengthening the coalition government
	Permanent	Securing Turkey's strategic position
Specificity ²⁷	Specific	Creating national unity in Turkey through the intervention
	General	Securing the survival of the Turkish state
Compatibility ²⁸	Complementary	Acting independently from hegemonial powers
	Conflicting	Maintaining good relations with the West
Perception ²⁹	Objective	Intervention serves the existential concern nation building
	Subjective	Ecevit judges that Cyprus intervention is best for Turkey in 1974
Scale ³⁰	Broad	Turkey's survival inside of her borders
	Narrow	Spreading principles essential for Turkey, Pan-Turkism
Concision ³¹	Abstract	Survival and therefore national integrity, independence
	Concrete	Invade Cyprus for strategic gains and to create national unity

Own illustration based on: 25 Roskin, 1994, 26 Ibid., 27 Ibid., 28 Ibid., 29 Kindermann, 1963, 30 Meyers, 1979, 31 Rohde, 2004

The further analysis focuses on abstract and concrete interests. Abstractly, the aim of any state is always its survival and therefore power, which constitutes both a means and an aim (Rohde, 2004). This assumption clearly applies as Turkey defined national integrity and independence as main goals not only in the founding years (Bagci, 1999, Aydin 1999 or Mufti, 1998) but also during the Cold War (Ozkececi-

Taner, 2005). Recalling what constitutes a state in the first place, shows that Turkey's principles are essential:

From a legal perspective Georg Jellinek (1922) defines 3 constitutive elements²⁹ for a state while Max Weber (1980) emphasizes the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a certain territory, meaning the domestic authority of the leader. Those elements need to be given for the existence and survival of a state. Turkey's concrete interest that led Ecevit to intervene in Cyprus divides into obvious strategic and territorial concerns, presented in the following. It will also be reflected about how far the aim of re-establishing the domestic power monopoly of the Turkish government was a decisive factor.

It is assumed that statesmen act rationally for realizing their interests. An action is rational if it serves the national interest, namely the nation's power³⁰. In other words, if a statesman achieves to maintain or increase the state's power the costs incurred are of minor importance. The pivotal actor observed in the case of Turkey is Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (Riemer & Korkisch, 2003). To see if his action was rational, the costs and possible obstacles will be named and afterwards benefits the military action brought about.

Despite military spending for the intervention, despite the fact that the newly annexed Cypriot territory was expensive in maintenance (Aydin, 2004), especially since infrastructural costs on the island were high, and despite economic losses, most Realists agree that the power increase outweighs those costs (Roskin, 1994). Turkey also accepted diplomatic disadvantages such as international condemnation. This materialized e.g. in the UN-Resolution 367 of 1975 and an American arms embargo imposed on Turkey from 1975 to 1978. This also meant economic disadvantages amounting to 170 million US dollars less military aid per year (Adamson, 2001). In this point the calculation was not a long-term one, neither did it strengthen the relationship with Turkey's Western allies (Adamson, 2001).

²⁹ territory, population, and governmental authority

³⁰ Realism also considers immaterial factors like honor in the cost-benefit analysis (Roskin, 1994)

Another counter evidence for rationality might have been if the intervention had been based on a purely expansionist intention. Was the second phase an act of ‘unlimited war’, which Realists condemn (Roskin, 1994) or did it serve the national interest and improve Turkey’s power? The distinction between power striving and expansionist constitutes a tightrope walk, because the pursuit of interests abroad always features a certain expansionist moment. But as long as national interests are kept in perspective and balanced unemotionally, state action can be explained by Realism well.

Recalling Morgenthau’s three possible causes of expansionist foreign policy, it has already become clear that Nationalism was simply an instrument to achieve Turkey’s national interest. This interest was officially defined as survival of kinsmen (and unofficially of the own nation), thus in no way too broadly. The assertion that Turkey did not pursue a purely expansionist policy is frequently mentioned in the literature e.g. by Umut Uzer (2011)³¹ and can be supported by the fact that Turkey had neither interfered in other regions like Sandschak Novi Pazar nor in bordering states like Bulgaria or Syria even though Turks used to live there as well (Adamson, 2001).

Thirdly, it cannot be proven that the national policy was ideologized because there was not even a unitary definition of what Turkish ideology actually meant and the coalition, too, was deeply divided in terms of ideology. If defining Kemalism as peaceful ideology that also means orientation towards the West the intervention was not driven by this dogma (Uzer, 2011, p. 43) since ‘the West’ strongly opposed military action. Even though the second intervention is considered cruel or exaggerated in the literature and therefore condemned, it does not fulfill the criteria which Morgenthau set up for expansionist policies³². In the next paragraph it remains to be seen why even the second phase served to improve Turkey’s power.

The ‘need to intervene’ and to ‘save dear compatriots’ seems like just another unwelcome threat to the ‘endangered Turkish’ state. Surprisingly, the intervention served Turkey’s interest, letting her end up in an even better situation than before. I

³¹ From all the sources consulted, only the notoriously rather anti-Turkish author Yennaris (2003) attributes to the Turkish Foreign Policy a generally expansionist attitude. Yet, he is not the only scholar saying that Turkish Foreign Policy was not always peaceful, which has to be differentiated from expansionsm, though.

³² However, this high level of abstraction allows to justify a very wide range of (violent) foreign policies, as has become evident in the Vietnam war whose supporters also argued with the national interest (Roskin, 1994) while Morgenthau was strongly opposing it.

agree with scholars who argue that the external aspects made it rational (Ayata 2007, Aydin 1999 or Karpat 2002), but I would like to stress that it was a twofold story:

The Cyprus incident can even be regarded as a blessing in disguise relating to Turkey's national interest: It allowed Turkey to (re-)create national unity. Statesmen should always possess sufficient domestic authority to be able to ensure the survival of their state in the international system. Hence, first of all Ecevit's power monopoly and Turkey's domestic reunification were indispensable requirements from his point of view. As shown in chapter 4.1.2., the Turkish government faced severe problems immediately before the Cyprus intervention (Karakas, 2007 or Riemer & Korkisch, 2003). Turkey's foreign policies followed "*a well-prepared, methodical, and continuous tactic, based on the consideration that the country's survivability relied on its ability to expand, secure the coherence of the state, and mollify the impetuosity caused by internal ethnic tensions*" (Vlachos, 2007).

The military intervention can thus be interpreted as a perfect means to distract from internal problems. It created exactly what was missing: "*a sense of national unity to the country which cut across political, economic, and social lines*" (Adamson, 2001, p. 289). This behavior is common in international relations and brings to mind cases like the war on the Falkland Islands when Argentine's military dictatorship was facing internal instability. From this perspective, recreation of national unity by adhering to Ecevit's decision served to fulfill the Weberian criterion of a power monopoly as essential element of a modern state, and so to secure Turkey's survival as a whole.

Having outlined the domestic benefits of the intervention I would like to show that Turkey acted rationally also in terms of feasibility of relative geo-strategic gains: This means a state should only start war if it possesses the necessary military capacity (Rohde, 2004) so that it can win this war. This "*window of opportunity*" was not given for Turkey in similar cases such as Kirkuk or Mousouli³³ as "*circumstances [were] not favourable to Turkey*" (Yennaris, 2003, p. 26). Several reasons led to the opening of this window in 1974:

³³ Kirkuk and Mousouli were also populated by Turks and given up by Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne and administered by GB until it came under Iraqi rule. Some people in Turkey considered this a mistake and wished to regain this oil-rich area (Yennaris, 2003).

Firstly, the international situation seemed favorable with a relaxed attitude of the USA (Riemer & Korkisch, 2003), GB's reluctance to get involved and the recently improved relationship with the USSR (Aydin, 2004). The unilateral action of Turkey also symbolized a more mature policy, regardless of the USA or other big powers. It thus fulfilled the abstract aim of Turkey to be independent (Adamson, 2001).

Secondly, according to the former foreign minister of Turkey, Ihsan Caglayangil, Cyprus is an *"oil-rich area of vital importance"* (Yennaris, 2003, p. 26). Subsequently, controlling this part of the Mediterranean would bring about economic benefits.

Thirdly, *"the coup [of the Greek Cypriot National Guard] gave Turkey the opportunity to achieve its ambition of creating a permanent bridgehead on the island"* (Yennaris, 2003, p. 213). Among other reasons Turkey did not intervene in the Cyprus crisis of 1964 because *"its military was inadequately prepared, so it built more than 120 attack boats to be ready for an eventual war"* (Uzer, 2011, p. 135).

In addition to Turkey's military and economic strength, it had a simple geographic advantage: Cyprus is only *"forty miles of water"* (Tachau, 1959, p. 3) away from the Turkish mainland whereas Greece *"has hundreds of poorly defended islands located within one hundred miles of the Turkish coast"* (Tachau, 1959, p. 3).



The map shows the amount of Greek islands and the small distance between Turkey and Cyprus. Source: Wordpress, 2011.

Not only was the opportunity to win the war an important factor for the decision to intervene but also that Turkey could successfully sell the intervention as a *"Peace*

Operation” (Hitchens, 1997, p. 105) to its own population and as a “*necessary counter-stroke*” (Hitchens, 1997, p. 101) to the international community. According to the result of my Constructivist analysis, Turkey’s feeling of being threatened was largely constructed and fuelling the Realist “*security dilemma*” (e.g. Meyers, 1979, p. 75) as it was based on wrong perceptions about Greece’s actual capacity and the long-standing and well nurtured hostility between the two peoples.

“Turkey’s primary interest in Cyprus stems from the nearly 150 miles of Cypriot coastline located just seventy miles to the south of Turkey’s ‘soft underbelly’ in the East Mediterranean [see map] [...] Indeed, there is no Aegean Turkish city which would not be vulnerable to Greek blockade in the event that war broke out between the two countries” (Meyer, 2000, p. 6).

Numerous scholars have stressed the strategic position of Cyprus as main reason for Turkey’s action but considering Greece’s obvious military inferiority (Meyer, 2000) a war between the two countries was not actually very likely. This is further evidence for the existence of a security dilemma.

The Realist assumption that states’ actions in the international system lead to a balance of power can be proven when the foreign policy of a country diverges from its own cultural or ideological parameters. As seen in the last chapter, the situation in the Aegean should be kept in the status quo and the balance of power, which had been threatened by the Greek coup, should be safeguarded (Karpas, 1975). The status quo could be re-established by the first phase of the intervention and could be regarded matching with a peaceful ideology (e.g. Richter, 2009). The fact that power politics in the international system went beyond variables like norms or identity, however, is proven by the following quote of Ecevit. Not even mentioning Turkish Cypriots or their well being neither attempting to disguise his intentions any longer, he stated:

“Today there is a new Cyprus and Turkey has taken up a new position in the world [...]. No one can question Turkey’s rights in Cyprus. [...] [O]ur main aim is to make Turkey’s presence in Cyprus so strong that it will be impossible to turn things back” (Yennaris, 2003, p. 213).

When deciding in favor of the intervention Turkey was willing to accept the costs of the operation because the ultimate ‘success’ would clearly outweigh the costs incurred. Although Ecevit was known as a risk-taker (Riemer & Korkisch, 2003), Turkish Foreign Policy featured “*a high degree of rationality and sobriety*” (Mustafa Aydin, p. 181)³⁴. It improved Turkey’s position in several ways: Ecevit achieved an increase in relative power compared to Greece. This permitted Turkey to take up a more dominant position in the Geneva negotiations (Hitchens, 1997, p. 105), which boosted Turkey’s self-esteem and last but not least pacified the nation internally (Adamson, 2001).

5. Juxtaposition of the Theories

Concluding this paper, I don’t think theories such as Realism and Constructivism can be combined into a synthetical entity, for they start from far too different assumptions. I agree with the following quote that there is no such thing as the one perfect theory.

“The theory-wonderland featuring one empirically saturated universal theory promised by the positivist mainstream of the discipline remains unreachable” (Meyers, 1994, p. 135).

The attempt made in the case of Turkey by authors like Umut Uzer to create harmony between the two theories has to be criticized. He took “*ideational-material factors and domestic–external spheres into account*” (2011, p. 191) which certainly allows a comprehensive analysis of Turkey. But it undermines the original Realist purpose, i. e. to explain why states with different domestic circumstances behave similarly on the international level.

From my analysis, I can conclude that acknowledging ideology, identity and norms as done in Constructivism can be useful only to a certain degree. The focus on norms and discourse allows to trace back processes of manipulation and to unveil instruments like nationalist ideology or peace rhetoric (Adamson, 2001). However,

³⁴ The fact that he was not reelected despite the public praise for his Cyprus policy stems from other reasons like global developments and the economic situation which Turkey was facing in the 1970s (Aydin, 2004)

Constructivism cannot explain the motivation that lies behind the statesmen's decisions to employ these means. Neither does the main Constructivist assumption of norms or ideologies being the influential variable for foreign policy decisions apply in the case of Turkey. Kemalism is not specific enough. This inappropriateness is especially striking in the light of the omnipresence of the Kemalist ideology in Turkey. Neither were international norms relevant for the decision makers.

Realism cannot only fill in the blank spots as I expected in my hypothesis. By focusing on security, state survival and power achieved by rationally acting statesmen it becomes possible to understand the intervention entirely. Despite some criticism it is still the strongest and most clear-cut IR theory. Strictly speaking, Constructivism is not even necessary for the analysis of Turkey's behavior and decisions made in the Cyprus Conflict. Realism, too, recognizes the instrument of Nationalism and includes the idea that leaders need to deceive their population according to the principle sometimes "Its Kind to be Cruel" (Desch, 2003).

Statesmen guarantee the survival of their state and thereby ideally reach peace also on an international level. For Turkey the Cyprus intervention led to national unity which was badly needed in a fragmented society right after the military regime and in order to prevent another one. Thus, internal peace was created for the time being, and a temporal balance of power just like Morgenthau had predicted. For Cyprus the Realist idea is applicable as there has been no more full-scale war since the 1974 intervention (Faustmann, 2009) when Turkey achieved a new balance that was basically maintained until the Republic of Cyprus' acceptance into the EU³⁵. Of course, positive peace could not be made either, because Turkey – exactly according to the Realist logic – has been digging in her heel ever since it has achieved the territorial and strategic advantages for the negotiations.

Regarding the Cypriots themselves, the chronology showed that the main obstacle to peace is not division in people's minds, e.g. due to cultural, religious or ethnic differences. The existing hatred has been perpetuated through the media and educational means by those imperial forces that have had vested interests in the

³⁵ apart from minor violent clashes

island. Indeed, it should not be ignored that over the decades there has come to exist a certain antipathy between the two peoples. Yet, Greek and Turkish initially had more in common than the authorities have always wanted to make them believe. The material consequences resulting from the partition of 1974 are much more problematic for solving the conflict: Around one third of Cypriots have become refugees, there has not been freedom of travel and settlement and many have lost their property which has led to tremendous humanitarian problems (Gürel, 2009). Those are not constructions but real circumstances.

While Constructivism cannot make predictions at all, Realism permits to predict state behavior in a limited manner and to make a prognosis for the future of Cyprus at least on an abstract level. With states as principal actors, international organizations are too weak to pacify Cyprus (Richter, 2009). Surrounded by a perceived hostile environment, states try to secure their survival. Thus, both Turkey and Greece will continue to insist in their positions – which have been antipodal in the central questions³⁶ – and none of the two wants to risk giving up their status quo position in negotiations. Logically, no agreement can be expected (Faustmann, 2009). However, it should be questioned if any IR theory is able to make precise predictions about what will happen in the future³⁷.

6. Result

In this paper several new insights could be won: The Cyprus Conflict emerged not mainly due to the hostility in people's minds. It was set up, nurtured and geared towards an escalation by external, power political interests. National interests outweighed the influence of norms or ideology, particularly in the Turkish intervention of 1974. For this reason, Realism is the more appropriate theory to comprehend Turkey's behavior.

³⁶ Which are discussed excessively by Richter (2009) or Faustmann (2009) but cannot be mentioned here due to the limitation of the assignment

³⁷ This became especially striking at the end of the Cold War which none of the theorists could foresee and although Constructivism only emerged afterwards, and criticized this shortcoming it can neither predict the developments.

Still, Realism and consequently the above conducted analysis have their weaknesses which need to be addressed: By using a very abstract definition of social interest, it allows to explain almost any national policy and even worse, it can be used for the justification of foreign policies like the Turkish one in 1974. In this context, a more detailed debate about the notion of national interest on a theoretical level seems desirable. A more precise framework and clear limits of the national interest should be set up to make sure that Realism cannot be used for the political justification of unlimited wars like Vietnam or the violent and brutal intervention in Cyprus. Morgenthau should not face the same destiny as Atatürk and end up being interpreted by most different actors who try to justify their policies by (mis-)using a popular name.

All that remains to say is that neither one of the theories provides compensation for the victim's sorrow nor a solution of the Conflict.

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