



SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CIVIC VOLUNTARISM


A socio-political explanation of political participation



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A socio-political explanation of political participation

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Abstract

In this thesis, the key factors of social capital and the civic voluntarism model are merged into an aggregated model to explain variances for two modes of local political participation in the Netherlands in 2001.

A literature review of the key factors of social capital and the civic voluntarism model has been given. Social capital exists of networks, trust and norms, and the civic voluntarism model exists of the key factors resources, engagement and recruitment. Chosen is to focus on contact participation and local action participation, since these are the two modes of political participation which require the most citizen initiative. Every key factor of both elements are incorporated in the final model, although some key factors of civic voluntarism are not recognizable. They are split up and thus to be found under other names. Also, recruitment is ascended in the social capital elements.

The data used in this thesis originate from the 'Size and Local Democracy in Europe' project, which was executed in 2001. Using the literature, eleven hypotheses regarding various variables belonging to the key factors, are formulated. These hypotheses have been tested using multiple regression (in SPSS)

The results differ for the modes of political participation. Contact participation has more predictors than action participation. Also it is shown that both modes of trust have no influence on action participation, but do show negative influence on contact participation. Networks, skills, community embeddedness, perceived impact and a feeling of civic duty showed to be substantial predictors for both modes of participation. The variable skills demonstrates to be a partial interpretation of the effects of network. Social trust, political trust and government satisfaction are predictors for contact participation, but not for action participation. In total, 16,9 percent of the contact participation model was explained, against 18,9 percent of the action participation model.

Overall it is demonstrated that the social capital theory and the civic voluntarism model can complement each other quite successfully in explaining political participation. The key factor resource functions as an interpretation of network, the key factor engagement is restructured with help of the social capital elements and over all provides the civic voluntarism model a better understanding of the relationship between social capital and political participation.

Dutch abstract (Samenvatting)

In deze scriptie zijn de basiselementen van sociaal kapitaal en het 'civic voluntarism'-model samengevoegd in een gezamenlijk model om de variatie met betrekking tot lokale politieke participatie in Nederland in 2001 te verklaren.

Met behulp van literatuur is een overzicht gegeven van de basiselementen van sociaal kapitaal en het civic voluntarism model. Voor sociaal kapitaal zijn netwerken, vertrouwen en normen de basiselementen. Het civic voluntarism model is opgebouwd uit het bezit van middelen en betrokkenheid en de mogelijkheden tot werving. Er is gekozen om contact participatie en actie participatie te verklaren, aangezien deze manieren van participatie het meeste initiatief van de burger verwachten. Alle basiselementen zijn in het model betrokken. Echter, de elementen van het civic voluntarism model zijn niet allemaal zodoende herkenbaar. Dat komt omdat ze opgedeeld kunnen zijn, in verband met sociaal kapitaal voorzien zijn van andere termen, of omdat ze uit theoretisch oogpunt zijn opgegaan in de sociaal kapitaalelementen.

De data die gebruikt zijn voor deze scriptie zijn oorspronkelijk verzameld voor het 'Size and Local Democracy in Europe' project, welke was uitgevoerd in 2001. Met behulp van de literatuur zijn elf hypothesen geformuleerd met betrekking tot verschillende variabelen die bij de basiselementen horen. Deze zijn vervolgens getest door middel van meervoudige regressie (in SPSS).

De resultaten zijn niet gelijk voor de verschillende vormen van politieke participatie. Contact participatie wordt verklaard door meer onafhankelijke variabelen dan actie participatie. Beide vormen van vertrouwen hebben echter een negatieve invloed op contact participatie, terwijl zij geen invloed hebben op actie participatie. Netwerken, vaardigheden, de inbedding in de buurt, verwachting van impact en een gevoel van burgerplicht zijn substantiële en significante voorspellers voor beide vormen van participatie. Vaardigheden interpreteren gedeeltelijk de invloed van netwerken op participatie. Sociaal vertrouwen, politiek vertrouwen en tevredenheid met het openbaar bestuur blijken slechts voorspellers te zijn voor contact participatie. In totaal is 16,9 procent van de variatie in contact participatie verklaard door het model. Van de variatie in actie participatie is 18,9 procent verklaard.

Uiteindelijk is gebleken dat sociaal kapitaal en het civic voluntarism model elkaar succesvol kunnen aanvullen bij het verklaren van politieke participatie. Het basiselement middelen biedt een interpretatie van de oorspronkelijke relatie tussen het sociaal kapitaal element netwerk en politieke participatie. Het basiselement van betrokkenheid uit het civic voluntarism model is herstructureert met gebruik van de elementen van sociaal kapitaal. Uiteindelijk zorgt het civic voluntarism model er vooral voor dat de originele relatie tussen sociaal kapitaal en politieke participatie beter begrepen kan worden.

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Voorwoord

Met deze bachelorscriptie zal er na drie jaar een einde komen aan mijn bachelor bestuurskunde. Een studie die ik in de vierde klas van het vwo heb uitgekozen en die ik tot op heden vol enthousiasme heb doorgezet. Vakken waren leuk of minder leuk, makkelijk of minder makkelijk, maar zijn allemaal binnengehaald om uiteindelijk met deze scriptie (hopelijk) mijn diploma te kunnen behalen.

In totaal ben ik een half jaar bezig geweest met deze opdracht, waarvan drie maanden voltijds. Ik geloof dan ook zeker dat ik alle uren die voor deze opdracht staan heb vol gemaakt, al dan niet meer. Mijn ouders leerden ons thuis altijd dat je best doen het aller belangrijkste is. In navolging van hun credo is dat dus exact wat ik heb gedaan.

Mijn (eerste) begeleider, Prof. Dr. Bas Denters, ben ik daarbij dankbaar voor het zijn van mijn begeleider, het helpen bij het vinden van een onderwerp en formuleren van deze bacheloropdracht. Daarnaast zijn de aanwijzingen die hij gaf bij mijn eerdere, en latere, versies van het verslag van grote waarde. Daarnaast wil ik ook mijn tweede begeleidster, Prof. Dr. Ariana Need, bedanken voor haar opmerkingen op het 'halverwege'-verslag en haar hulp om inzicht te krijgen in de resultaten van de analyse. Rense Nieuwenhuis zou ik willen bedanken voor de crash course statistiek die hij me heeft gegeven. Hij heeft in korte tijd de weggezakte lesstof opgerakeld en uitgelegd hoe ik mijn analyse zou kunnen uitvoeren. Dit was voor mij erg verhelderend en erg nuttig.

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Als laatste rest mij u veel plezier, of succes, te wensen bij het lezen van deze scriptie,

Xandra Maan,
Enschede, augustus 2011

1. Introduction

Social capital is a theoretical term which is assumed to cause a range of positive outcomes. Not just in social science, but also in politics. The popularity of this concept has increased over the past decades. It is the value of the social elements, like networks, trust and norms, which inhere in a certain society or community. Former president of the USA, George W. Bush Junior, used the term in speeches and reports (TheWhiteHouse, 2008). Also, Tony Blair, former premier of Great Britain, used the term social capital while promoting more inter-connections in voluntary associations. This inter-connectedness is supposed to have several positive consequences, including lower crime rates and better education results (Roberts & Devine, 2003). Despite (or because of) its popularity, there is still debate about the meaning, the origins and the effects of social capital.

Our interest is focused on the relationship between social capital and political participation. Numerous articles are concerned with the study of the causes of political participation (Brady, Schlozman, & Verba, 1999; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Kenny, 1992; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Leighley, 1996; McClurg, 2003; Parry, Moyser, & Day, 1992). Those articles are regarding the influences of network size (Jang, 2009; Leighley, 1996; Mutz, 2002; Weatherford, 1982) and the influence of social and political trust. How social capital explains political participation is an unanswered question. As said before, it is often under research, but we would like to know the intervening factors between social capital and political participation. Therefore is the relationship between social capital and political participation elaborated in this study in an effort to strengthen current theory. This is done using the well known Civic Voluntarism model of Verba, Schlozman and Brady. How well these two elements cooperate in explaining political participation is the main focus.

Democracy, as a form of government, relies heavily on political participation of citizen. This central characteristic of democracy is inherent in its name, which consist of the greek words 'demos' and 'kratein' and actually says 'the people rule'. Nowadays there are 116 countries with an electoral democracy according to the operationalisation of Freedom house (2011a). Freedom house tests all countries with regard to four criteria in order to be called a democracy. These include a competitive, multiparty political system, universal adult suffrage for all citizen and other requirements concerning the elections (Freedom house, 2011b). Shively's concept of democracy is consistent with these criteria. According to him, democracy is "*a regime in which all fully qualified citizens vote at regular intervals to choose, from among alternative candidates, the people who will be in charge of setting the state's policies.*" (Shively, 2008, p. 149) Apparently suffrage and voting play a major part in the representative democracies of today.

Voting is indeed a democratic right, but isn't the only way to participate in politics. You can think of many other acts, like donating money for campaigns, working in campaigns or attending political meetings and displaying any partisan item (poster, bumper sticker, buttons) (Brady, et al., 1995; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; McClurg, 2003). All these ways of participating in politics involve citizens in the democratic procedures of their government. Understanding the origins of political participation offers opportunities to make the democracy work better, by including more citizens in governance.

Using the elements of social capital as well as the civic voluntarism model will give a new insight in the extent to which these elements are combinable. For instance, will some elements become superfluous, or occurs an elaboration model? To give a well considered answer to these questions it is necessary to first explain the key-concepts of social capital, civic voluntarism and political participation.

2. Research question

'Why do some people not engage in political participation?' is the standard question asked in most of the political participation studies. According to Verba, Scholzman and Brady(1995) this question is relatively easy to answer; because they can't, because they don't want to or because they haven't been asked to do so. They created their model assuming that each of these questions is connected to something needed, which could be resources, engagement or recruitment.

Social capital is a comprehensive concept which, as will become clear later, exist of different elements and has multiple characters. A lot of positive outcomes are claimed to be the result of social capital. Just as the civic voluntarism model, social capital exists of three main elements. All six elements are being combined in this study.

The study focuses on local politics only. Local politicians are mostly also neighbours, or at least known in the city they live in. This makes them more accessible than national politicians. People thus will prefer contacting local politicians instead of national politicians. Moreover, the vast majority of political participation is conducted at a local level (Parry, et al., 1992). Other more \practical constraints included in the research question are the country, the Netherlands, and time, 2001. These are derived from the conditions under which the used data were collected.

From this perspective, the following research question is compiled;

"How do key factors from social capital and the civic voluntarism model explain action political participation and contact political participation in the Netherlands in 2001?"

Both social capital and civic voluntarism are incorporated in a single model to explain political participation. Therefore it is an explanatory question.

Thesis outline

First, the relevant theories, obtained from literature, are discussed in chapter three. Also the hypotheses and the general model will be given in this chapter. Second, the issues concerning the research design, case selection and operationalisation will be discussed in chapter four. Third, chapter five deals with the actual data analysis. Finally, chapter six contains the conclusion and chapter seven the discussion.

3. Theory/concepts

The main research question links three basic concepts that need to be clarified. Therefore the concepts of political participation, as dependent variable will be discussed first in section one. Second, social capital will be addressed in section two. Thirdly, the civic voluntarism model and the corresponding concepts will be discussed in section three. Finally, some attention is given to the leading model of this study in section four.

3.1 Political participation

Conway (1991) and Verba, et al. (1995) agree on the basis of the definition of political participation. According to them, the term refers to those activities of citizens that have the intent of influencing the structure of government, selection of people who make policies or the policies themselves. Parry, et al. (1992) start out with an even broader definition. They regard almost all action directed at governmental authorities as political. Although they acknowledge that these actions can be purely for individual benefits. Elsinga recognized already a certain subdivision of all definitions of political participation in his dissertation of 1985. This subdivision seems to be still quite applicable today. According to Elsinga (1985) every researcher studying political participation makes choices for the definition. He listed eight of these choices, being: conception of democracy, political process phase, authority, value range, intention, effectiveness, legality and voluntary. These choices which must be made (or deliberately not included in the definition) will now be further explained.

As previously stated, democracy is irrevocably linked to political participation. Taking this into account, it is quite logical to expect that a certain conception of democracy influences the definition of (desirable) political participation. An important distinction pertains to the goal of participation, do various views value participation as an instrument to influence political decisions or do they see it as an activity that contributes to the personal development? Rousseau and Mill are representatives of the developmental vision. According to them, participation was not just for the government, but it also integrates citizens and fosters the development of responsible individuals. According to them, participation has an educative function (Elsinga, 1985). Schumpeter, however, thought that citizens should only be entitled to vote. They would not be capable enough for the rest of participation opportunities. Voting is protecting yourself from arbitrary decisions by elected leaders and is thus one of the necessary institutional arrangements of a representative democracy. In Schumpeter's view Participation is no goal, it is an instrument to achieve the democratic goal: choosing leaders to represent. Participation is thus always a form of influencing, of taking part (Elsinga, 1985).

The second choice to be made concerns the phase of the political process. Mostly we distinguish between the input-, conversion- and output phase. According to Elsinga (1985), most studies focus on participation in the input phase.

The third choice relates to the actors (authorities) addressed by participants. Some scholars focus only on the government. According to them, the government is the only institution dealing with binding values. Participation might be interpreted more broadly. According to others, the judiciary, the army, the police and other socio-economic actors (unions, large companies) are also authorities (Elsinga, 1985).

The value range is not about the sector within which the binding values are decided upon, but about the scope of such decisions. The scope varies from the individual to the society as a whole. Someone contacting an official to get a building license is participation in his capacity as subject, on the individual side of the value range. While participation aimed at influencing governmental regulations is done as a citizen. This distinction is thus based on the amount of people who are affected by the results of the participation (Elsinga, 1985).

The fifth choice of intention is quite understandable. Either one thinks only intentional actions can be seen as political participation, or one also includes unintentional actions in the

definition. The sixth choice of effect is more difficult. On the one hand, only effective participation could be called participation. But on the other hand also ineffective participation might be participation. Involving effect in your definition of political participation results in a retrospective vision on participation. Only after the process is completed, one can determine whether certain 'attempts of participation' have been effective (Elsinga, 1985). A related aspect is the distinction between active and passive participation. Verba, et al., (1995) exclude this passive participation from the general definition, because those activities are not an element of 'doing politics', but rather it's being attentive to politics. Following the news, watching political broadcasts and communication in which the target audience is not a public official are examples of this passive participation (Conway, 1991; Verba, et al., 1995). Most likely, these examples of passive participation would fall in the categories of unintentional and ineffective¹.

Finally the choices regarding legality and voluntary will be explained. Both dichotomies are formulated like 'only legal' and 'only voluntary' activities can be considered participation versus also illegal and obligatory activities can be regarded participation. Conway (1991) uses a slightly other approach to the legality choice. She names it conventional or unconventional political participation. Conventional participation refers to those activities that are accepted as appropriate by the dominant political culture. On the other hand, unconventional participation are forms of participation that are not accepted as appropriate by the dominant political culture. Examples include violent protests or in some cases even normal protest marches. No longer the law, but the culture defines the distinction.

The definition of political participation in this thesis is based on the following answers to the previously addressed choices:

- 1) This first choice to be made is one which will not be included in the actual definition. It only serves to clarify the democratic vision of the author. Elsinga (1985) considers developmental effects of political participation only side effects. Since the focus of this study is on the determinants of political participation, these side effects are not of primary interest. On the other hand, to limit the definition of political participation to just voting is too narrow with regard to the aims of this study. Writing officials or trying to influence the 'ruling elites' in another way are still instrumental actions. Many more actions than just voting might be regarded instrumental. However, also some motivations do not have an instrumental character. One might think of the feeling of civic duty to participate. Since intentions or instrumentality are not included in this study, it is difficult to incorporate either of the visions clearly.
- 2) It is chosen to include all phases of the political process. This is in line with the selected answer of choice 1. Not only voting, the input phase, but also other ways of influencing will be included. Writing an official could happen during the conversion phase and change the mind of the official.
- 3) The authority which is tried to be influenced is only the government. The other possible authorities won't be included in this study, and thus also not in the definition.
- 4) The value range is not included in the definition, because no distinction will be made between the goals different people had when taking political actions. Writing an official could be aimed at either an individual (about his requested planning permission for example), or at a wider interest. The interest of this study is in all participatory actions, whether individual or social.
- 5) The problem with including 'intent' in the definition is that it is rather difficult to operationalize. The abovementioned problem with assessing the actions in retrospect applies here. Therefore, it is chosen to exclude intent of the definition.

¹ However, it could be that someone follows the news to inform himself to write a better letter to an official. Then it is highly questionable whether something would fit in the definition of political participation or not.

- 6) We include both effective and ineffective actions. Since, including only effective actions needs examination of the possible effectiveness of every political actions someone takes. This must be done in retrospect and is thus undesirable. Such a relation is quite unnecessary for this study, while this is not the primary interest.
- 7) Only legal actions will be included in the definition. It was decided to use the term legal rather than the term conventional, since most of the forms that were considered to be unconventional once, are now no longer so. The law poses strict boundaries about what is supposed legal or illegal, whereas the boundary between conventional and unconventional is established by 'the dominant political culture' and thus more prone to discussions and changes.
- 8) Voluntariness will not be a defining item of political participation in this study. Most political actions are voluntary and the small amount of possible non-voluntary actions will not be excluded.

These choices will now be converted into a coherent definition of political participation which will be used in this study. This definition will be:

Political participation refers to the legal activities of citizens aimed at governmental officials or their selection at any moment in the political process.

While voting is probably the most frequently performed type of political participation (Hosch-Dayican, 2010), a wide range of other activities can be regarded political participation according to the abovementioned definition. Verba and Nie (1972) describe four different 'modes of participation'. First of all, they recognise voting as a mode. According to them, it is probably the most influential modus. On the other hand, little information is shared with this modus. Since no distinct opinion about different issues can be distracted. Second, they allocate all activities associated with voting to the mode regarding campaigning. It differs from voting in that it increases one's influence on the electoral process, "by influencing the votes of others, the selection of candidates and/or the formation of campaign issues" (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 46). Within this mode, one might think of the following activities; working for a candidate or party campaign, attending a meeting or rally, putting up a political yard sign, bumper sticker or campaign button or donating money (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; McClurg, 2003). Beside these electoral modes, they also added two other modes. The third mode concerns citizen-initiated contacts. In this case, the citizen acts alone and contacts a (local) official for a private issue. However, it is still possible that the issue at stake also applies to others, for example, when a citizen is complaining about aircraft noise to the local counsellor. The final mode is called cooperative participation. An individual will join with others to influence the actions of government, often aimed at a certain social or political problem (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 47). With these latter two modes they also try to show the importance of non-electoral participation. Whereas the former two modes are bound to content and time and the issues are controlled by candidates and officials, in the latter two the citizen will take own initiative. As a result of this initiative, the citizens have control about time, content and the issues at stake (Verba & Nie, 1972). In this thesis, the focus is placed on the two non-electoral modes of participation, called contact participation and action participation. This because of the initiating position of the citizen.

Finally, this thesis is based on a micro-level explanation of political participation. This means that the study is focussed on the individual behaviour. Personal characteristics and attitudes are thus supposed to be the main determinants of the choice for any of the possible ways of political participation. Another way of analyzing political participation is the macro level. In that case characteristics of the political system, communities, countries or other large units are studied for their effect on the general levels of political participation (Hosch-Dayican, 2010).

3.2 Social capital

Although many definitions of social capital are known and sometimes show similarities, a lot of the discussion about the concept is focused on the conceptual issues. What are to be considered as the main elements which together compose social capital? Or, is it a description of the outcomes? Social capital is indeed a broad term and it might even be seen as a theory within a concept. This way it loses power and the concept is getting weaker (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; 2002). Therefore it is tried to clarify this concept in this section.

Rubenson (2000) also states that the usefulness of social capital in the social sciences is at risk due to the consequences of the confusion that exist over its definition. Nevertheless, some elements can be recognized in multiple definitions. Putnam (1995) defines social capital as an umbrella term for the features of social organization (like networks, norms and social trust) that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Networks or connections constitute what is called the structural part of the social capital, while values, norms, obligations and particularly trust form the cultural aspects of it (Van Deth, 2003). Fukuyama's (2000) definition shows some overlap. He defines social capital as "an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals" or as "social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it." (Fukuyama, 1995). These definitions show exactly the point of the above mentioned discussion. It would be clearer to stick with a definition that emphasizes what social capital actually is. Both Putnam and Fukuyama (at first instance) focus more on the elements that comprise social capital, than on what social capital itself actually is.

The usage of 'capital' to explain certain actions or behavior originates from economics. Capital operates through production or consumption and is, in this case, durable and usable. This implies that 'capital' is involved in the production or consumption and lasts more than one time period (Castle, 2002). Just like other forms of capital, like human capital, social capital is an ability which must be activated and which is best recognizable if it is deployed. This element, the resource-character, should be used in a good definition of social capital. Rostila (2010) did use the term in this sense and defines social capital as follows: "*the social resources that evolve in accessible social networks or social structures characterized by mutual trust*". This definition on the one hand recognizes that social capital is a resource and on the other hand identifies the two main origins of social capital. The second definition by Fukuyama discussed before, also recognizes this and calls social capital 'a capability'. Coleman (1988) suggests that:

"Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors-whether persons or corporate actors-within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible." (Coleman, 1988, p. S98)

A few remarks with regard to this definition are noteworthy. First of all, social capital is called 'a variety of different entities', which is still rather vague. The word 'resource', which Rostila used, is clearer in this aspect. Second, the function of social capital is being emphasized as being 'productive', which fits the economic view on capital. Third, this definition notes that, although retrieved from social structures, it could be individuals or groups to profit the social capital. This implies that while social capital is not a purely individual characteristic, it could still offer benefits to the individual. Finally, the cultural side is not mentioned at all. Drawing upon the definitions of Rostila and Coleman, a definition stressing both elements should be:

"Social capital is a capital which consist of some aspect of social structure and is characterized by trust and norms. It is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends by actors-whether persons or corporate actors within the structure- that in its absence would not be possible."

Having established the actual definition, the focus can be widened to discuss the various components of social capital and their effects on political participation.

3.2.1 Building social capital

As said before, social capital is a broad concept. To unravel this concept, insight must be given in the specific ways in which the elements associated with social capital are connected with each other and the main concept. Using figure 1, the composition of social capital will be explained.




Figure 1: Building social capital.

Social capital consist of three main elements: trust, norms and networks (Adkins, 2008). Van Deth (2003) indicates that most studies make this distinction between structural and cultural elements of social capital. According to him, Bourdieu's work stresses the structural element of 'connections'. Although he also recognizes cultural elements like manners, norms and social obligations. Putnam and Coleman recognize two elements in the cultural side, namely trust and norms (and values) (Van Deth, 2003).

Each of the named elements, networks, trust and norms, has its own characteristics. Therefore they will be discussed separately first.

3.2.1.1 Trust

Trust is a quite common noun, which has many synonyms. Normally we would say that trust is believing that somebody will act as he said or as how can be expected. Different types of trust are distinguished in the social sciences. Hearn underscores the importance of trust in order to create social capital:

"Social capital, those features and practices of cooperation that enable people to work together in pursuit of shared purposes, originates and becomes abundant only where trust prevails." (Hearn, 1997, p. 97)

Trust is thus seen as a necessary part of the origin of social capital. Memberships in networks and social structures would not have a lot of meaning for social capital if trust is absent (Rostila, 2010; Welch et al., 2005). Denters (2002, p. 794) defines trust as "the *expectations* held by one actor (A) that another actor (B) will act in accordance with the normative (role) expectations that from A's perspective are linked to B's social position.". This definition emphasizes the personal character of trust.

A number of components of trust has been identified in the literature. Reciprocity, moral obligation, trustworthiness, solidarity, social relations, cooperation and familiarity are some of them (Welch, et al., 2005). These form a basis for reasoning why somebody would or would not trust somebody. These kind of elements primarily form the basis of 'social trust', trust citizens have in each other.

Newton (2001) makes a distinction between social and political trust. The former shows similarities with definitions already given, it is about someone's trust in other people (which might be familiar or not). The latter indicates someone's trust in public institutions and the government. According to Denters (2002) political trust exists of three elements. First, integrity refers to the character of an elected official; he should represent wide interest, instead of just a narrow or individual interest. Second, responsiveness, 'the idea that the elected officials should be responsive to the represented'. And finally, competence, the ability to meet the normative expectations (Denters, 2002, p. 795). The distinction between social and political trust should be made. This because the level of social and political trust seems to differ between different sorts of people, for different reasons. Also, a relation between these two kinds of trust is therefore not to be taken for granted. Actually, Newton (2001) remarks that there is no evidence of the correlation between social and political trust. Denters, Gabriel and Torcal (2007) reach a rather similar conclusion. They state that political trust is primarily based on political satisfaction of citizen. The level of social trust someone possesses is of lesser influence on political trust (Denters, et al., 2007).

Newton (2001) also claims that the general accepted questions from surveys measuring social and political trust are actually lacking construct validity. He argues that the questions asked regarding social trust are actually measuring someone's perspective on the trustworthiness of the world or, in case of political trust, the government. This instead of their trusting or distrusting nature. According to him, this is proven by the fact that the same people react differently on the questions. They involve their experiences with the world they live in, in their perception of social trustworthiness (K. Newton, 2001). Therefore, scandals and other sensational political events influence someone's level of political trust and, for example, rising crime levels or other personal experiences will influence someone's social trust. That way, trust, in either form, is no longer an immutable asset of the individual. The results of the study of Denters (2002) confirm this vision, where he also admits that political trust is primarily based on political satisfaction (or experiences). However, according to Denters (2002) this proven unidimensionality should not be seen as a lack of construct validity, rather it shows that a good summary measure of political trust may be legitimate.

It has become clear that social trust is an indispensable element of the concept of social capital. People who have a higher level of social trust might experience several benefits of it. With regard to political participation, several components of social trust may be useful. For example moral obligation, solidarity and familiarity in the context of action participation or strikes. People would not participate if they did not believe others to do so too, or to support them on another issue. If people take part in the benefits, but do not contribute to these benefits, they are called 'free riders'. As Gächter, Hermann and Thöni (2004, p. 509) state it:

"Therefore, conditional cooperators who make a contribution decision can gain from cooperation but face the risk of being exploited by the free riders. Consequently, people who contribute apparently trust the others."

Social trust thus gives the opportunity to believe that the other participants are no free riders, while this still might be the case. The relationship between social trust and political participation might be stronger for collective participatory activities, than for individual activities. Therefore, we expect social trust to be more important for action participation, than for contact participation. For contact participation, it is expected that political trust is more influential.

Political trust on the other hand could work both positive and negative for political participation. As said before, it relies on integrity, responsiveness and competence. However, besides having a lot of political trust, or a lack of political trust, people might also be apathetic. Responses could be like positive apathy which implies "abstention [of participation] induced by the idea that even if one

would not personally participate, the results of the decision-making process would be satisfactory” (Denters, Klok, & Visser, 2002, p. 9). Another possibility is called negative apathy; abstention induced by the idea that the results of the decision-making process would be dissatisfactory, even if one would participate. Positive and negative apathy show that in such cases either a positive or a negative attitude is not necessarily positively or negatively correlated to political participation. Gastil and Xenos (2010, p. 325) noted that “there is ample empirical support for political efficacy as a predictor of political participation”. In their article they finally had to conclude that external efficacy (which is rather similar term regarding the competence of the governance) had no effects at all on political participation (including voting, political action and media use). However, Bühlmann and Freitag (2006) consider political trust to be “a prerequisite” of political participation. Also, political trust showed to be a determining factor to the choice to vote or to abstain of voting. It is uncertain if these results transfer to the modes of participation studied in this thesis. The apathy and the mixed prior study results thus lead us to formulate a directionless hypothesis. Since there is no clear reason to expect either a positive nor a negative relationship.

These considerations lead us to the first hypotheses of this study, being:

- 1) *Individuals with a higher level of social trust display higher levels of political participation than individuals with a lower level of social trust.*
- 2) *The level of political participation by an individual is related to the level of political trust of the individual.*

3.2.1.2 Norms

Norms and values are often mentioned together. They form a couple which informally (sometimes with formal support) regulate the society. They provide guidelines how people ought to live; how to be social. Reimer, Lyons, Ferguson and Polanco (2008, p. 259) define it as follows: Norms are “the ‘rules’ by which people coordinate their actions along with systems of sanctions and incentives that ensure consistency in those actions”. Therefore, it is not surprising that norms form an essential element of social capital.

The first distinction which can be made is between formal and informal norms. The former is enforceable through sanctions or other rules (like laws), while the latter is uncommitted and relies more on trust of surrounding people, like colleagues, family, etc. With regard to the motive to be politically active, formal norms will play little or no role, since there are no laws requiring political participation (at least in the Netherlands). The remainder of this study will therefore focus implicitly on informal norms. Civic duty is one of these informal norms. It is mostly a feeling someone has that certain obligations come with living in a certain city (or state). These norms may be passed from father to son, generated in school or exist for other reasons. Political participation is one of those obligations, or your duty, which might be perceived to come with your status as citizen. Bühlmann and Freitag (2006) concluded that having a high level of civic duty, ‘the sense of the duty to vote’, was the strongest influence on the probability of an individual to participate in elections.

Different expectations are associated with either formal or informal norms (Reimer, et al., 2008). For these different sets of expectations Reimer, et al. (2008) came up with the definition of a ‘normative structure’. These structures are “the relatively comprehensive ways in which people organize their interactions, each with its own general set of associated norms that condition the co-ordination of social behaviour” (Reimer, et al., 2008, p. 260). They identified four different normative structures, which sometimes overlap, namely the: *market, bureaucratic, associative and communal structure*.

Market structures refer to both formal and informal relations with classical norms of open and free trade between independent actors. Fair trade, fair information and good negotiation skills are elements that foster this structure. The bureaucratic structure exists mostly of formal ‘rational-legal’ relationships. The distribution of resources is based on guidelines and protocols, with status being more important than productivity. Associative structures are based on common interests and the achievement, or promises of achievement, of the corresponding goals. Clubs, social action groups

and food banks are examples of this structure. The final structure, communal structure, is strongly based on a strong sense of shared identity. This identity might be derived from the location, ethnicity or shared life experiences. Generalized reciprocity, rights and obligations are quite important in this structure (Reimer, et al., 2008). Examples can be positive, like families, but also negative, like cults or gangs. This is one of the ways in which social capital can support negative outcomes.

Cults, as negative example, but also religion in general is based very strongly on the communal structure. The shared identity originates in this case from a common believe in a God. Religion itself is often used in theories explaining political participation (Driskell, Embry, & Lyon, 2008). It is also applied in the civic voluntarism model. Where Verba, et al., (1995) even try to differentiate between the catholic and protestant church. This is not of primary interest in this study, but it does show the relative importance of including religion in explaining political participation. It is one of the most common organised communal structures. The strong feeling of rights and obligations prevailing in this structure is supposed to have a positive outcome on political participation.

Another form of communal stucture which is not formally organised are neighbourhoods. A communal structure may be based on the location someone is living in, as said before. Therefore, neighbourhoods with strong attachment will have a better developed communal structure, based on the shared identity. Especially the generalized reciprocity will be important in the neighbourhood, although obligations might play a role (e.g. paying attention to all the children playing, including those of neighbours. Or to watch a house if the owners are on holiday). Paxton (2002) notes that a "line of research" argues that informal ties to the community increase individual poltiical participation. Beside this influence neighbourhoods have on ones norms, it might also increase the possibility of 'being asked'.

By dividing known norms in different structures we acknowledge that social capital is formed in different manners and has different characteristics, seen from the eye of an organisation or social unit. Social capital formed within a family functions through another normative structure than social capital within a company. Therefore the character of social capital will be variable and depends (among others) on the normative structures. The networks in which these structures are embedded will be the following point of attention.

This paragraph leads to the following hypotheses:

- 3) *Individuals with a higher level of feeling of civic duty display higher levels of political participation than individuals with a lower level of feeling of civic duty.*
- 4) *Individuals with a higher level of church/religious service attendance display higher levels of political participation than individuals with a lower level of church/religious service attendance.*
- 5) *Individuals with a higher level of community embeddedness display higher levels of political participation than individuals with a lower level of community embeddedness.*

3.2.1.3 Networks

A network can be made graphically clear. It actually shows who is connected to who. While doing so, it could make a distinction between strong and weak ties. According to Granovetter (1973, p. 1361) the strength of a tie is determined by the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy and the reciprocal services. Other basic characteristics of networks which might be clear from a graphic are the density and closure. The density is the proportion of people within the network that know each other (Halpern, 2005). This can be calculated by counting the number of ties within a certain network and dividing it by the ratio of possible ones (Granovetter, 1973). The degree of closure indicates if a group is well connected to other groups, or if the ties are really centralized within the group.




Figure 2: A network.

In figure 2 strength is displayed through thicker or thinner lines between the 'people' (the knots). The density within this network can be recognized through the amount of lines between the non-central knot, while the closure is displayed through the lines with small knots on the outside of the network. It shows that this example is a very open network, because everyone has ties outside the network.

In addition to these features which can be displayed graphically, there are other characteristics of networks which will now be discussed.

A network has a formal or informal nature, just like norms. Formal networks can be recognized mostly within businesses, organizations and the government. Informal networks are mostly comprised of family, friends and other acquaintances. The strength, density and closure of a network will greatly depend on this distinction. However, it should be noted that the distinction between formal and informal networks might be blurry (Halpern, 2005). The boss and colleague which are part of the formal network of work, might also be part of the informal network of friends after working hours. All these elements of a network influence the amount of time a member has to invest in the network. Formal networks will manifest in particular during work hours, while informal network will manifest more during leisure time. The strength of a network is, among others, dependent of the amount of time invested in the network.

A second known classification of networks distinguishes bonding, bridging and linking networks. *Bonding* networks are good for underpinning specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity. It occurs mainly between members of a network who see themselves as similar in terms of a shared social identity (Rostila, 2010). Bonding networks tend to be quite closed. *Bridging* networks on the other hand are the links going out of the network, reaching for contact with another network. According to Granovetter (1973) it are mostly the weak ties that fulfil this bridging function. Therefore these weak ties can serve crucial functions in linking otherwise unconnected segments of networks (Granovetter, 1983). These bridging ties raise the potential for information diffusion and cooperation between socially dissimilar people (age, ethnic group, class), and thus the potential stock of social capital (Rostila, 2010). The *linking* networks are the third and latest recognized form. It is actually a sub-category of bridging networks, as it passes the boundaries of the original network. However, this form is a vertical bridge across asymmetrical power and resources. It is supposed to break through the 'club'-resources of an existing network (Halpern, 2005; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). While bridging is mostly on the same (horizontal) level, linking actually gives access to a whole new stock of resources. The norms of mutual respect or moral equality are necessary to counterbalance the rational self-interest of the resource rich, the 'club'-member. This also highlights the fact that social capital is not always a public good. Not every network is accessible for every person (Halpern, 2005; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004).

The kind of networks, bonding, bridging or linking, have their own influence on the growth and maintenance of social capital. Bonding might actually create a very strong community, but this might not be the most 'rich' one. Bridging and linking gives people access to new networks and new potentials, which raises the change to increase social capital. Also, the kind of networks each might have their own influence on the skills someone might gain while being a member. Some bridging member might gain more skills because he is a link in the chain. Otherwise, an extremely bonded network might give equal opportunities to each member.

Apart from being a bonding or bridging network, all networks are expected to have a positive influence on the skill-level of their members. This, because someone's network does not only consist of close family, friends and acquaintances, but also of membership of voluntary associations, like church or sports clubs. Within these clubs members are given a chance to be active and to do committee work or to organize events. While doing this, the member will probably enhance his skill-level by attending meetings, chairing meetings or by other means. From a Tocquevillian perspective, these organisations act as 'schools' where members learn the rules of democratic behaviour. Integration into formal and informal organisations thus trains communication and cooperation skills and causes members to develop more support for the political system (Bühlmann & Freitag, 2006; P., 2002). In such a way, skills are assumed to have a positive influence on political participation.

On the other hand will organizational involvement be time consuming. Whenever one is active in the organization, scarce leisure time is spent. Since time is inherently limited, it seems logical to conclude that the more time spent in voluntary associations, the less time is left for political participation.

The discussed elements of time and skills will subsequently have a direct influence on political participation. This implies that the network starts an indirect effect on political participation, by influencing the resources which are an element of the civic voluntarism model. On top of these indirect effects of network, a direct effect might be observed. This direct effect will be discussed at the section about recruitment, another element of the civic voluntarism model. Since that element supports the argument of the direct effect.

This section leads to the following hypotheses:

- 6) *Individuals with a larger network display lower levels of leisure time than individuals with a smaller network.*
- 7) *Individuals with a larger network display higher levels of skills than individuals with a smaller network.*

3.2.2 Effects of social capital

After discussing the element that comprise social capital, the attention can now shift back to social capital itself. Social capital effects can be divided into main categories, just like the elements which ensure the production of it.

Social capital is supposed to have many benefits. Negative consequences are rarely mentioned, although the interest in it is growing. First, the positive elements will be mentioned, then some attention is paid to the less beneficial elements of social capital

According to Adler and Kwon (2002) three main categories of benefits can be recognized. Social capital is supposed to "facilitate access to broader sources of information and improves information's quality, relevance, and timeliness" (Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 29). Advice or information about better jobs are also forms of information (Adam & Rončević, 2003; Wall, Ferrazzi, & Schryer, 1998). Coleman (1988) said that potential for information which inheres in certain relations is an effect of social capital. The second form of benefits are influence, control and power. Adler and Kwon (2002) refer in this case to Coleman's example of the 'Senate Club'. According to them, power benefits allow the actors to get things done and achieve goals. According to Burt (1992) people functioning as bridge between disconnected groups might experience more power benefits. Social promotion (Adam & Rončević, 2003), higher loans and possible further connections (Wall, et al., 1998) are benefits belonging to this category. The final form of benefits resulting from social capital is solidarity (Adler & Kwon, 2002) or social control (Wall, et al., 1998). Together with a high degree of closure of the social network, the social norms encourage compliance with local rules and customs. The need for formal controls are thus reduced (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Both Coleman and Putnam emphasize this role of norms and standards. They see social capital as a resource which supports a

smooth functioning of society (Wall, et al., 1998). Other benefits mentioned are that social capital is “useful for enhancing other features as learning, social mobility, economic growth, political prominence or community vitality” and the cognitive or social development of children (Wall, et al., 1998).

Although all these effects are suggested, consensus about the effects is not yet reached. What is seen as a consequence by one scholar, is seen as a source of social capital by others. Therefore Adam & Rončević (2003, p. 167) concluded as follows: “Hence any measure of social capital should be interpreted with considerable caution”. Nevertheless some lines may be drawn between these outcomes of social capital and the influence it might have on political participation. Not every named outcome will have a (huge) impact, but some of them will. Increases in someone’s network or income might influence political participation through the elements of the civic voluntarism model. When someone’s network increases, the possibilities of knowing people who ask you to participate in politics (for a certain issue) increases. The ‘recruitment’ element thus plays a role. Also, as mentioned in the network section, the opportunities to acquire skills increase. thus, the resources are being influenced. This is also the case with the increase in income. Money is often involved in specific ways of political participation, like donating. Another result indirectly influencing political participation is solidarity. Solidarity is not just compliance with formal rules, it also includes compliance with social norms. If solidarity increases, so will the level of norms do. On the other hand, if people comply to the (prevailing) norms more, the social trust might increase. Whereas social trust is perceived as mostly a reflection of someone’s perception on the community at that moment.

Negative consequences of social capital are among others restricted access to opportunity’s by people outside the network and excessive claims on group members (and connected to that: restrictions on individual freedom) (Portes, 1998). Adler and Kwon (2002) recognize these elements too. Although they believe social capital to be a certain ‘collective good’ which is (particularly for internal, bonding social capital) non exhaustive, it can be used to exclude people from a given network or relation. On top of that, they refer to the costs to maintain good relations, which might even be higher than the benefits it brings. Also, the higher the density of a network, the less people are dependent on each other and less power is obtained. Also inertia could be the reaction to a strongly closed network, when new information is absent (Adler & Kwon, 2002). What can be concluded of these negative consequences is that they apply mostly to people outside the network, thus the people without the social capital, or with less social capital.

3.2.3 Conclusion

In conclusion; social capital is a resource which is accessible for different members in a certain network. The network, together with levels of trust and prevailing norms, is necessary for the production of social capital. Different characters of the input elements leads to different kinds of social capital. This implies that there is more than one kind of social capital: it is depending on the general setting. The effects of social capital also have their influence on political participation. Partly direct, but partly through the elements of the civic voluntarism model. This model will be discussed in the following section.

Since social capital is such a complex concept, it is almost impossible to incorporate the whole concept in a single study. This is not a problem, as long as researchers emphasize which elements of social capital will be used or highlighted within their work. Each of the elements can have different characteristics, leading to different expected effects. In order to say anything about the impact of social capital with regard to a certain study, it has to be clear which components of trust, norms and networks are considered in the study.

3.3 Civic Voluntarism

The civic voluntarism model is developed by moving beyond the socio-economic-status model, also named the SES-model. The central statement of the SES-model is that people with a higher socio-economic status (which means higher education, higher income and/or higher status job) are more active in politics. According to Verba, et al. (1995) this model is empirically powerful. Still, they move their attention beyond SES, to the resources that the individual possesses. By focusing on these resources, they are able to explain clearer the connection between SES and political participation. They show how “class and status stratification shape individual resources to constrain individual choices about political participation” (Verba, et al., 1995, p. 287).

The civic Voluntarism model is developed by Verba, et al. (1995) by inverting the ‘usual question’ (about participation) to ask why people do *not* become politically active. They believe that three answers cover the biggest range; because they can’t, because they don’t want to or because nobody asked. Said otherwise, people do not participate because they lack resources, engagement and/or any recruitment request (Verba, et al., 1995).

Verba, et al. (Verba, et al., 1995) put less emphasis on being asked. Not because it is unimportant, but because they assume that participation takes place in the absence of specific requests for activity. Most of their attention goes to the resources, because they consider this factor to provide a more reliable and valid explanation than an explanation based on stated motivations.

3.3.1 Resources

The resources which are distinguished by Verba et al. (1995) are time, money and civic skills. In combination they make it more likely for an individual to participate. Moreover they argue that the command over such resources increase the likelihood that participation will be successful. They trace the origin of those resources back to the involvement of individuals in major social institutions like families, school, work, non-political associations and religious institutions. These institutions are supposed to affect the stockpile of time, money and civic skills. Thus, basic life circumstances and choices can be linked to patterns of political activity (Verba, et al., 1995).

Time is limited and more equally distributed than money is. Furthermore they show that free time is not correlated with occupational level, race or gender. Life circumstances are the most important determinant of free time. Here one might think of having a job, having young (pre-school) children and having a spouse with a job. Time is therefore “not differentially available to those who are in other ways privileged by virtue of their education, occupation, race or ethnicity” (Verba, et al., 1995, p. 303). Money on the other hand is especially dependent on education, the level of occupation and having a working spouse. Blacks, Latinos and women will have lower incomes, even when the other variables are the same. Therefore, money distinguishes the advantaged from the disadvantaged in various ways. Participatory systems based on money will thus be more unequal than a system based on time investment (Verba, et al., 1995, pp. 289-303).

Skills (organizing of a meeting, keeping a public presentation, etc) are expected to be the abilities which allow citizen to use time and money effectively in political life (Verba, et al., 1995). By focusing on actual experiences of exercising specific skills, they withdraw possibilities of people to rate their own civic skills. This empowers the reliability of that measure (Verba, et al., 1995). It are not only organisational skills, but also elements like having a well developed vocabulary and education. Possibilities to gain organisational skills arise from the work setting, or other volunteering organisations and churches. These organizational structures are parts of someone’s network, formal or informal. This supports the expectations described in hypothesis six, which assumes that a bigger network results in more skills.

Writing letters, going to (decisive) meetings, planning or chairing meetings and giving presentations or speeches are assumed to be quite representative skills.

The definition of resources used in this study will match to the definition of Verba, et al. (1995). Resources in general are all elements that are needed or are available to achieve a desired goal. In connection with the elements Verba, et al., already described, resources are the time, money and civic skills, needed to achieve a desired goal; namely political participation. Following their theory, it is expected that these resources have a positive effect on political participation. Meaning that more money, more spare time and more skills will increase political participation.

This subparagraph thus leads us to the following hypothesis:

8) *Individuals with higher levels of time, skills and/or money display higher levels of political participation than individuals with lower levels of time, skills and/or money.*

Building on the work of Verba, et al. (1995) it is expected that the resources have their own influence on political participation. Therefore, differentiations can be made from the kind of resource to the mode of participation (as discussed earlier). Voting demands the least use of resources. Verba, et al. (1995) state that family income is the most influencing predictor of campaign contributions, belonging to the second 'campaign'-mode. Above all, donated money is the most unevenly distributed form of participation. Time is another resource used for campaign participation, especially when talking about volunteering (like distributing leaflets etc.). On the other hand, contact participation will require more skills. Partly because the citizen needs to take own initiative, but also because the letter or arguments are supposed to be well put together and should convince the official of the importance of the issue at stake. Writing the letter, or speaking with the official will also be time consuming. Finally the last mode of participation, action participation. This mode will require skills and time, just as contact participation. However, it might be dependent on someone's role in the group if truly a lot of skills are necessary.

For the participation modes used in this thesis we expect no striking differences, since they both are considered to rely heavily on time and skills.

3.3.2 Engagement

Engagement is the term Verba, et al.(1995) gave to describe 'the variety of psychological predispositions'. Those psychological predispositions are things like political interest, political trust and self esteem, identification with a political party, commitment to a specific policy that the individual would like to see implemented and the psychic gratification of having fulfilled a duty.

They acknowledge that this term has to be handled with care. The causal direction might be quite ambiguous. Whereas being interested might increase the likelihood of participation, while participation might increase engagement by making people more informed and interested. Also, some measures might overlap with the actual measure of political participation. Four elements are eventually taken into consideration by Verba, et al. (1995): political interest, political efficacy, political information and partisanship. As Verba, et al. (1995, p. 354) summarize it:

"interest, information, efficacy and partisan intensity provide the desire, knowledge and self-assurance that impel people to be engaged by politics. But time, money and skills provide the wherewithal without which engagement is meaningless."

Engagement thus is about the motivations that explain why people might not want to participate. These so called 'internal stimuli' make clear that those participating will probably care about politics and public issues and believe they can have a voice. This last argument is connected to the term of political self esteem. But also to other elements, like satisfaction and perceived impact. If one would not believe it's vote or activities to be of any influence, he would probably not undertake them. On the other hand, If one is satisfied with the local politics, the trigger to participate will be lower. This will counts especially for the more issue focussed participation.

This element of the Civic voluntarism model is extensive. Quite different elements are taken together under the header of 'engagement'. Verba, et al., do recognise multiple kinds of motivations, but they chose to combine these all in one measure; engagement. It is expected to be theoretically more valuable to split these elements using social capital. This way, a distinction can be made between

normative and instrumental considerations. The normative considerations, like civic duty and identifications with the ideology of a political party could be regarded as norms. They are important for understanding the motives of participation and they fit in the framework of social capital. On the other hand, the instrumental considerations should be seen as a separate set of motivations and they will have their own place in the model. These 'instrumental motivations' are motivations which are rationally relevant to include in the decision to participate or not. One might think about the level of satisfaction, since one will become active quicker when he is dissatisfied with the current state. Also, one would probably not think to participate in local politics, if he wouldn't believe that he can actually accomplish something with it. So elements like commitment to a specific policy (that the individual would like to see implemented), perceived level of impact of the government (the extent to which you believe the local governance to influence your live) and general policy satisfaction belong to these instrumental motivations. This instrumental motivation is expected to have a positive effect on political participation since it are the issues that motivate a citizen to defend their interests. However, if someone is (very) satisfied with the local governance it seems less likely that they will participate in politics. Dissatisfaction, on the other hand, does stimulates to become active. This will count especially for the modes discussed in this study. Since these modes originate most often of dissatisfaction.

These considerations have led to the following hypothesis:

- 9) *Individuals with higher levels of satisfaction display lower levels of political participation than individuals with lower levels of satisfaction.*
- 10) *Individuals with higher levels of expected impact display higher levels of political participation than individuals with lower levels of expected impact.*

3.3.3 Recruitment

Recruitment happens sometimes formally, like getting your ballot-card sent home. But more often requests of participation come from significant relations in work, church or other organizations in which the individual is involved. Besides straightforward asking, organizations might also tribute to someone's engagement by just having to deal with policy as an organization. It is already proven that these requests often lead to participation, but they often only work as a triggering factor (Verba, et al., 1995). Also, just as with engagement, it has an ambiguous direction of causality. Since people asked are mostly the people who have been active in the past. Which indicates that recruitment is (partly) dependent on political participation. In addition, people with higher education and/or a higher level of occupation are more likely to be asked. Based on these assumptions, it is to be expected that the bigger one's network, the more likely it is to be asked by one of the people in the network. Thus, having a bigger network is likely to have a direct effect on political participation. This direct effects comes on top of the indirect effects mentioned in hypotheses six, seven and eight.

Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed on basis of this sub-paragraph:

- 11) *Individuals with a larger network display higher levels of political participation than individuals with a smaller network.*

3.4 Civic voluntarism meets social capital

The Civic Voluntarism model gave an insight in how basic life circumstances influence political participation. All three elements, resources, engagement and recruitment, are traced back to these circumstances. These include, having a job, having children, having a working spouse, the level of education, the level of occupation, and many others.

The combination of social capital as well as the elements of the civic voluntarism model leaves us a fairly comprehensive model with many explanatory factors. In this model, the elements of the civic voluntarism model are connected to the elements of social capital.




Figure 3: The combined model. (The numbers in the model referend to the hypotheses.)

Several comments can be made regarding the model. First, the resource-elements of the civic voluntarism model are used as intervening variables between the network-element of social capital and political participation. This is because it is assumed that these resources are partly dependent on the size of someone's network. Second, other elements of the civic voluntarism model show more overlap with social capital than might be expected. Certainly the element of recruitment is a part of someone's network size, as claimed in hypothesis eleven. As for being recruited, one will need friends, colleagues or other acquaintances to do so. Also, the element of engagement coincides for quite a bit with the cultural elements of social capital. Among others the elements of political trust and the feeling of civic duty, which is part of someone's normative structure. Therefore, engagement is not given an own explicit role in the combined model. Finally, motivation is another element of engagement which is displayed separately. This is done to ensure the involvement of instrumental considerations in the model, besides the cultural aspects.

With this comprehensive list of hypothesis the model can be tested, considering the fact that every relationship in it is converted in a hypothesis. The numbers of the hypotheses are displayed in the model next to the corresponding arrow, to maintain a clear overview.

The operationalization of the concepts used in the model will be discussed in the following chapter.

4. Methodology

The methodological issues will be addressed in this chapter. First, some attention will be given to the research design, and its benefits and drawbacks. Second, the used data will be discussed. Finally, the operationalisation of the used concepts will be given.

4.1 Research design

This thesis will use the approach of secondary data analysis. This is a form of research in which the data set which was collected by the first researcher for his specific research, is reanalyzed by a second researcher for another purpose or study (Babbie, 2007, p. 277; Boslaugh, 2007).

4.1.1 Secondary data analysis

The main advantage of secondary data analysis is obviously the saving of time and resources needed for the research. Retrieving good surveys and enough surveys can take months and requires different resources like papers, stamps, travel costs or telephone costs. Using data which are retrieved already by someone else, makes it possible to skip this first step in starting your research (Babbie, 2007).

Another advantage of secondary analysis is that mostly bigger and more regular surveys are possible by other institutions. This way, even an individual researcher might use big samples which would otherwise be out of reach. Secondary analysis also provides the possibility to benefit from the knowledge and expertise of professionals in a particular research area (Boslaugh, 2007, p. 4).

Validity is assumed to be (possibly) the weakest point of this research method. The data was not specifically retrieved for the specific purpose of one's personal research aims. This might mean that the validity is reduced. The original researcher might have asked the questions in just another way than you would have liked him to, or he might have asked only one questions whereas you would have wanted him to ask at least that other question too. Therefore we need to ask ourselves whether the questions asked are valid enough for our study (Babbie, 2007, p. 280; Boslaugh, 2007, p. 4). Another disadvantage of this method is that the secondary analyzer has not the 'inside knowledge' which the first researcher had. 'Insider knowledge' refers in this case to the elements like low response rate or questions misunderstanding. Boslaugh (2007, p. 5) calls these the "dirty little secrets", which according to her "may not invalidate the data, but should be taken into account by the analyst."

4.1.2 The data

The data are collected through various forms of surveys, ranging from telephone, to face-to-face to postal surveys. Surveys are according to Babbie(2007) "probably the best method available to the social researcher who is interested in collecting original data for describing a population too large to observe directly". In this case the data obtained by Goldsmith, Mouritzen, Ladner, Rose, Geurts and Denters (forthcoming), for their project 'Size and Local Democracy in Europe', will be used. These data were collected in 2001. The data are originally obtained for the study on the relationship between the size of the municipality someone lives in and the quality of the local democracy. For this study they conducted a survey among citizen in 234 municipalities of the four countries. Originally they tried to use a multi-method approach, which combined a personal face-to-face or telephone interview and a follow up, self administered postal questionnaire. In the Netherlands, for financial reasons, the data collection was combined with the personal face-to-face interviews which were conducted as part of the Dutch Citizenship Involvement and Democracy survey (DCID). The overlap between these questionnaires was considerable and the missing (non overlapping) questions were included in a postal questionnaire (Goldsmith, et al., forthcoming).

Questions from the DCID were based on the common core questionnaires from the ESF-networks of Citizenship, involvement and democracy (CID) and Size and local democracy in Europe (SLDE). This

may, to a certain extent, provide a better reliability and validity, than an own aggregated questionnaire. This data is useful for this thesis because a lot of the questions asked are specifically aimed at measuring the same concepts. This will become clear in the section about the operationalisation.

4.2 Case selection

The used data set was obtained using a multi-stage sampling approach. First, the countries had to be sampled, then the municipalities and finally the citizen. The national cases were selected on basis of possibility to collect relevant survey data (Goldsmith, et al., forthcoming).

To make sure that the overall sample was useful for their study, the following steps were performed in a two-stage sampling process. First, the municipalities (ranging from 54 in Netherlands, till 64 in Norway) were selected using a stratification scheme combined with a systematic sampling procedure. It was tried to maximize the range of municipality size. Secondly, a random sample of residents was drawn from each of the selected municipalities (Goldsmith, et al., forthcoming).

Some comments can be made about the randomness of the sample. Originally it is intended as a full random sample of roughly thirty individuals per municipality. Nevertheless some limitations were used “when it was judged to be appropriate” by influencing the sampling frame. An example of such an limitation is an age limit from eighteen till seventy-five years. Also, the focus wasn’t just on (legal) citizen, but on all residents which had the right to participate in local politics.

The data-set suits this thesis because it measured more elements, and in a wider perspective, than those which are used in this thesis. This provides opportunities for an reliable and valid operationalisation. The data were obtained in four different countries. However, only the data from the Netherlands will be used in this study. This is partly because of practical limitations of time.

4.3 Operationalization

In this chapter all the above mentioned concepts are operationalized. A couple of them will be operationalized based on a working paper which belongs to the original project in which the data were collected: Size and local democracy in Europe.

All data were collected using face-to-face and written questionnaires. Originally the target was to obtain thirty complete responses per municipality. In the Netherlands they failed to meet this target for different reasons. A participant had to fulfil a quite lengthy personal interview and subsequently an extensive mail questionnaire (Denters & Rose, 2008). In this thesis, failing to meet the target has its consequences in the size of the sample. However, the representativeness of this study is not heavily affected since it is not (much) concerned with individual municipalities. The citizen are the unit of analysis and the unit of observation. It is tried to find out on individual level what explains political participation. Also, the questions and surveys were conducted on individuals.

4.3.1 Network

A persons network is measured by one question. Associational membership was a single survey item in the written questionnaire. After a question about political party membership, the respondent was asked:

In how many other voluntary associations, clubs, or organisations are you a member in total (not including membership in a political party)? Number ...

The answers were rescaled on a scale of 0 till 100. Zero meaning not being a member of any organisation at all, up to 100, the maximum which occurred, being a member of 15 associations.

This gives us an insight in the extensiveness of the network. However, a comment can be given with regard to the construct validity. The density, closure and strength of the network are not measured. Therefore this leaves us with an incomplete vision on somebody's network. Since one might have a small, but very strong or dense network, or a big but very closed and weak network. In this case it is purely about the amount of different associations they are a part of. Assuming that being part of more associations means a bigger network.

4.3.2 Resources

Three main resources are named in the model, being: money, skills and time. These resources correspond with the civic voluntarism theory of Verba, et al.. It is chosen to add the level of education in this category. For this might have an impact on the skills someone possesses.

4.3.2.1 Money

The money someone possesses is quite difficult to measure. Not from a practical perspective, but from the ethical perspective. People are attached to their privacy and are not always as willing to give information about their earnings and savings. Still, a measure of the income is retrieved by asking the following question:

What is the income of all members of your household together?

To make it easier a respondent was allowed to choose between four ways of answering; annual net income, annual gross income, monthly net income or monthly gross income.

This measurement indicates the incomes and not the value of their entire property. This would be to extensive to do and, as said above, quite unethical. Therefore it is assumed that the income is a good representation of the general value of someone's household. The answers are rescaled into ten deciles ranging from 0, the lowest decile, till 100, earnings in the highest decile.

4.3.2.2 Civic skills

Civic skills are often associated with the ability to express your opinion toward an official. Writing letters or giving speeches are examples of these abilities. Four questions in the written questionnaire focus on this element.

Below we have listed a few things which people sometimes do as part of their activities in organisations and associations or in connection with their work. Please indicate for each of these if you do this a few times a week, a few times a month, a few times a year, or never or almost never as part of your activity in organisations or your occupation. Place a checkmark for each activity.

- *Participate in decisions at a meeting*
- *Plan or chair a meeting*
- *Prepare or give a speech before a meeting*
- *Write a text other than a private letter, at least a few pages long. (alfa = .85)*

The higher a score, the more skills the respondent possesses (Denters & Rose, 2008). Each of the used questions was rescaled on a scale of 0 till 100. For skills this meant that zero represents a low level of skills; or doing little or never any of the mentioned activities. One hundred represented a high level of skills; or performing the mentioned activities a few times a week.

According to Verba, et al., (1995, p. 304) “education enhances participation more or less directly by developing skills that are relevant to politics – the ability to speak and write, the knowledge of how to cope in an organizational setting.” Other effects of education could be an encouraged attitude like a sense of civic responsibility or political efficacy. Therefore it is chosen to incorporate education under the header of ‘skills’. Nevertheless it will not be incorporated in the skills-scale. Since a relation might exist between education and skills, but this is not proven to be unconditionally correlated.

In the face-to-face questionnaire respondents were asked the following question:

What is your highest completed (school) education?

- 0. *None at all completed*
- A. *Primary school*
- B. *VBO, MAVO, vbo, ULO, MULO, etc.*
- C. *HAVO/VWO: HBS, Lyceum, Gymnasium.*
- D. *MBO: intermediate (vocational) education, UTS.*
- E. *HBO: higher vocational education, MTS, HTS, HEAO, PABO, etc.*
- F. *WO: university.*

Education ranges from zero, no school completed, till one hundred, being a postgraduate.

This measure thus reflects someone’s grade of education and its experience with other skills. This increases the construct validity, since someone with less education might have more experience with chairing meetings and thus compensate. Otherwise, just a high education does not mean that the individual uses it to improve its civic skills.

4.3.2.3 Time

Verba, et al., already notice in their work that the distribution of time is inherently more even distributed than money is. This due to the fact that time is bound to a maximum and is not transferable. ‘Time left’ is not passed through to next week, as you might put money on your bank account for in a couple of years (1995).

Because of practical constraint by the used data set, perfect measures in hours of the concept ‘time’ are not possible. The option chosen is to follow Verba, et al., (1995). They conducted several calculations on which variables influence the stock of time the most. Examples of this are having a job, having a working spouse and having children (especially preschoolers). In this case time will still be an approximation of the amount of time someone has left (to participate). However, comprehensive measures of time in hours are not existing. This operationalisation, with its theoretical basis seems thus stronger.

The following questions are used for this measurement:

The corresponding questions were asked as follows in the face-to-face questionnaire:

Do you perform paid work?

- 1) *Yes, a full-time job.*
- 2) *Yes, a part-time job.*

Performs your partner/spouse paid work?

- 0) *Yes, a full-time job.*
- 1) *No.*

Do you have children who are part of this household? Children who live only a portion of the time in the household are also counted. (*alfa* = .60)

Having paid work results in a value of zero, while having no work gives a score of 100. The working spouse also gives a value of zero, while a non-working spouse gives a value of 100. Finally having children gives a value of zero and having no children results in a value of 100. This way, a low score reflects less remained time, and a high value reflects more remained time.

4.3.3 Trust

The operationalization of trust reflects both social as well as political trust. These elements will not be integrated into one value, whereas they are supposed to have different roles in the model.

4.3.3.1 Social trust

For the measurement of social trust a composite index is used of the mean score of two questions of the face-to-face questionnaire. Both are quite standard questions with respect to social trust:

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Indicate your opinion on a scale from 0 ("You can't be too careful") to 10 ("Most people can be trusted").

Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? Indicate your opinion on a scale from 0 ("people mostly look out for themselves") to 10 ("people mostly try to be helpful"). (alfa = .56)

The mean of both answers is rescaled on a scale of 0 till 100 to give one value of social trust (Denters & Rose, 2008). Zero refers to 'no trust at all' and hundred refers to the highest possible score, reflecting a lot of social trust.

4.3.3.2. Political trust

Just as with social trust, political trust is a composite index. Because political trust has three elements, its measurement should reflect them all. Seven questions were used, two for the perceived integrity, one for perceived competence and four for perceived responsiveness.

Perceived integrity:

- *How often do you think that elected representatives in this municipality set their personal interest aside in making local political decisions?*
- *If you consider the situation in the municipality where you live, how many of the elected representatives do you think misuse their power for personal gain? (alfa = .74)*

Perceived competence:

Imagine a situation where two persons (A and B) are discussing municipal politics and they present the two viewpoints below. Please indicate whether you are most in agreement with the viewpoint expressed by A or that expressed by B.

- *Most of the elected representatives in this municipality are competent people who usually know what they are doing.*
- *Most of the elected representatives in this municipality don't seem to know what they are doing.*

Perceived responsiveness: (First two are agree-disagree questions)

- *Local councillors do not care much about the views of the people in this municipality.*
- *Political parties in this municipality are only interested in our votes, [and] not in our opinions.*
- *How much do you feel that having elections makes the municipal council in this municipality pay attention to what the people think. Would you say not at all, very little, somewhat, quite a bit or very much?*
- *Generally speaking how much attention do you feel the mayor and aldermen [council representatives] in this municipality pay to what the people think when they decide what to do? Would you say not at all, very little, somewhat, quite a bit or very much? (alfa = .78)*

These questions are all recoded to make sure that high scores reflect high confidence. This composite scale is developed in two steps. First, scales have been created for each element of political trust. Then these scales were aggregated into one. Furthermore they are rescaled to the scale of 0 till 100 (Denters & Rose, 2008).

4.3.4 Instrumental motivations

As already mentioned, motivation can have different fundamentals. It may be subjective internal elements. Those kind of elements will be included in the measurement of norms and trust. Motivation, as used in this operationalization, is focused more on the instrumental motivation. This motivation will be reasonable dependent on external influences. Two of these influences are included in the measurement of motivation. First, questions measuring local municipality satisfaction are used. Three fairly similar questions cover this item:

How satisfied are you in general with these services in you municipality?

How satisfied are you in general with the facilities in your municipality?

To what extent meets your city council in general your standards of good local governance?
(alfa = .81)

Answers ranging from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning very dissatisfied and 10 meaning very satisfied. Then rescaled on a scale of zero till one hundred.

Second, a question about the perceived impact of the public authorities in the municipality is included. Since it is expected that, from an instrumental view, one would not put a lot of effort in participation if he does not believe that the organisation being addressed has any impact (on the issue at stake).

To what degree would you say that decisions taken by public authorities in this municipality have an impact on your daily life? Would you say to a very large degree, to quite a large degree, to a moderate degree, only to a small degree or not at all?

The questions are asked in the written questionnaire. The answers were recoded and then rescaled from 0 till 100. A high score reflects a low level of satisfaction and a high perceived impact.

4.3.5 Norms

Just like trust, norms won't have an unique operationalization. Both civic duty and community embeddedness are elements which compose norms. Also 'religion' is located under this header, given it is a communal structure. These elements will be discussed separately now.

4.3.5.1 Religion

Most measures of religion focus on either the religion someone belongs to (according to their own perception) or church attendance. It is chosen to incorporate the last one in this operationalization. Since this measurement can give, to a certain extent, an insight in the degree of 'religiousness', whereas perceived belonging to a religion does not give any insight in the extent of involvement. The question asked in the face-to-face survey was as follows:

Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you currently go to church or take part in other religious services?

Answers ranging from one (several times a week) till seven (never). Recoded and rescaled in five categories: 0; never, 25; less than once a year, 50; at least once a year, 75; at least once a month, 100; at least once a week.

4.3.5.2 Civic duty

According to Hendriks (2006) most people acknowledge the importance of democracy. Even 'opponents' are often just proponents of another kind of democracy. Whereas democracy is not one way of governing. Democracy is the basic idea of government by the people bonds, how the people should govern is a discussion which led to different kinds of visions on democracy. How much participation is needed varies with these visions. According to Verhoeven (2004) the modern democratic order relies on two institutions. Political citizenship and political involvement or participation. Both being guaranteed by the democratic rights of citizen. It is thus expected that people who think of active citizenship as a part of a vital democracy are more likely to participate themselves.

In this element it is tried to measure the extent to which people experience being active in politics as being a civic duty. The focus of this element is not put on voting, since the operationalization of

participation does not include voting. The focus is instead on actively participation in local decision making.

People have different views on local democracy. Would you indicate how important you personally suppose the below mentioned items are for the local democracy? On a scale from 1 ("Of little importance") to 5 ("Very important")

- *Citizen taking actively part in decision making about important local issues.*

This item is retrieved using a battery. The answers are rescaled into a index ranging from 0, of little importance, till 100, perceiving active participation as very important.

4.3.5.3 Community embeddedness

Community embeddedness is measured using two elements, one focussing on neighbourhood integration, measured by the following questions:

Some people have a lot of contact with other people living in their neighbourhood. Others have only little contact. How about you? How often do you INT.: Insert items a through d, one at a time. Would you say often, sometimes, rarely or never?

- a) *Talk with neighbours about neighbourhood problems*
- b) *Visit each other*
- c) *Help each other with practical matters. (alfa = .73)*

The second focussing on the strength of local attachment, measured by two questions out of a battery:

Below we have listed several geographical areas. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "No attachment at all" and 10 means "Very strong attachment", please indicate how strongly attached you are to each of these areas.

- *The neighbourhood or village in which you live.*
- *The municipality in which you live. (alfa = .79)*

The answers are recoded into a composite index of 0 till 100, based on the mean scores of the four items. A high score indicating a strong attachment and a high level of neighbourhood integration.

4.3.6 Political Participation

Finally the concept of political participation. This is the dependent variable in the model. It is almost impossible to include all the activities which might be called political participation. Therefore a choice has to be made about the focus. In this case the focus will be on participation through local action and local contacting. These questions are retrieved of a large battery.

Below we have listed various ways in which individuals may attempt to influence municipal authorities during the last two years. Would you indicate which of these activities you performed in the last two years to influence the Place a checkmark for each activity.

Local community action

- *Attended a meeting regarding an issue about your neighbourhood or municipality*
- *Participated in other organised activities regarding a neighbourhood or local issue.*
- *Contacted a local action group, organisation or association.*
- *Participated in activities of an action group, organisation or association regarding a local issue. (alfa = .67)*

Local contacting

- *Contacted an elected municipal politician.*
- *Contacted a municipal civil servant.*
- *Registered [lodged] an official complaint or appeal against your municipality. (alfa = .62)*
(Denters & Rose, 2008)

These items are supposed to be representative, because they require (among others) skills and time. Furthermore they are not the most standard way of participation (i.e. voting), but also they are more common than joining a political party.

All the questions were answered with a 'yes' or 'no' in the written questionnaire. The answers thus may range from 0 (not involved in any of those activities) till 7 (involved in all of the named activities). This scale is rescaled in a scale from 0, having participated in none of these activities, to 100, having participated in all of the abovementioned activities.

4.4 Control factors

The model and the operationalization of the involved concepts are established. What is left is determining what factors will be controlled for. By controlling for certain variables, we rule out the possibility that we have omitted some variable that explains the found relationship. So by controlling for age, we make sure that the found relationship between (e.g.) trust and political participation is not (secretly) caused by someone's age. It is decided to include the following controls: age, gender and citizenship (being Dutch or not).

These controls are operationalized using the following questions:

Age:	<i>In what year were you born? 19...</i>
Woman:	<i>Note the gender of the respondent. 0, male. 1, female.</i>
Citizenship:	<i>Are you a Dutch citizen? Yes, No.</i>

Age and gender are relatively general control factors. Age is rescaled in five categories, on a scale of 0 till 100. Zero represents ages of twenty-six or below, while hundred represents seventy or older. For woman, zero means 'men' (i.e. no.) and one means 'woman' (i.e. yes). Citizenship might be a reason to be more or less connected with the country, and municipality, you live in. It thus might influence the degree of participation. Citizenship is valued 0, being no citizen and 100, being a Dutch citizen.

5. Analysis

After constituting the model and composing the research design, this chapter will deal with the actual analysis. First, the used statistical method is explained briefly. Second, the results will be shown and discussed. Finally the hypotheses will be accepted or rejected on basis of the discussed values.

5.1 Statistical method

Bivariate values give information with regard to the correlation between two variables. The bivariate table will not hold decisive information regarding the hypothesis and the evaluation of the whole model. Therefore, this table is attached in appendix A as background information and will not be extensively discussed here. Instead, multiple regression is chosen to make statements about the given hypotheses, because we propose a model consisting of twelve independent variables (predictors) and two dependent variables. The multiple regression equation is as follows:

$$Y = a + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + \dots + b_nx_n (+ \epsilon)$$

Using SPSS 17, two main regression models have been calculated. Both include the same independent variables, which are represented by X in the equation. However, they differ regarding the dependent value, represented by Y. One model focuses on contact participation and the other explains action participation. As discussed before, these are the two out of four possible modes of political participation which require the most initiative of citizen. To test for the expected partial mediation of network by the resources time and skills, four other regressions have been calculated. For either mode of political participation a regression was calculated with time and subsequently skills as dependent variable (Y). The “a” in the equation represents the intercept, also called the constant. The b-coefficients represent the independent contributions of the independent variables to the prediction of the dependent variable (StatSoft, n.d.). These values will be used to assess the hypotheses of this thesis.

The complete data set of the Netherlands included 1648 respondents, from which 571 filled in all the necessary questions. Only these 571 respondents are included in the regression calculations. Two main reasons are responsible for this attrition. First of all, the drop-off written questionnaire which was left with the respondent requires quite a lot of time and initiative of the respondent. Also, De Heer (1999) noted that the Netherlands already have a typical relatively low respond rate. The second main reason is the incorporation of income (money) in the model. As said before, this is a question people typically are reluctant to answer.

In the following sections the values of the main regressions are shown in the graphical models and inserted in the text when they were relevant. For completeness, the table is also attached in appendix B.

5.2 Regression models

Several hypotheses were formulated in chapter three. These hypotheses were also represented by their numbers in the model (figure 3). The models with the corresponding b-values placed alongside the arrows will be given first. Subsequently the implications for the hypotheses will be discussed.

Significance, the unlikelihood that the found values would have occurred by chance, is represented by asterisks in the model. One asterisk implies a p-value smaller than the alpha of 10% (.1), two asterisks imply a p-value smaller than the alpha of 5% (.05) and finally three asterisks imply a p-value smaller than 0.1% (.01). SPSS provides its output with a two-tailed p-value. Because almost all hypotheses are directional, the associated p-values have been divided by two for a one tailed test. Political trust is an exception in this case, because that hypothesis was formulated directionless.




Figure 4: Results contact participation.




Figure 5: Results action participation.

The results of the regression analyses show that hypothesis two, concerning political trust, hypothesis four, concerning church attendance (*Religion*), and hypothesis six, concerning the influence of network on *time*, cannot be empirically confirmed with regard to both forms of political participation. The other hypotheses will now be discussed.

Hypothesis 1:

"Individuals with a higher level of social trust display higher levels of political participation than individuals with a lower level of social trust."

Hypothesis one shows to be insignificant for action participation. However, for contact participation, social trust has a negative influence ($b = -.150^{**}$, $se = .086$). This points to the opposed direction as was expected. Therefore, the original hypothesis is rejected.

Hypothesis 3:

"Individuals with a higher level of feeling of civic duty display higher levels of political participation than individuals with a lower level of feeling of civic duty."

This hypothesis can be confirmed at five percent ($\alpha=.05$) with a reasonable influence ($b=.105^{**}$, $se=.064$) on contact participation. For action participation it shows to be just as significant and even more substantial ($b=.121^{**}$, $se=.058$). Therefore we can accept the hypothesis and conclude that people with a higher level of feeling of civic duty are more likely to be involved in political participation, than people with a lower level of feeling of civic duty.

Hypothesis 5:

"Individuals with a higher level of community embeddedness display higher levels of political participation than individuals with a lower level of community embeddedness."

This hypothesis is found to be confirmed at one percent ($\alpha=.01$). Beside this strong significance it also holds a very substantial influence on both contact participation ($b=.444^{***}$, $se=.115$) and action participation ($b=.337^{***}$, $se=.104$). From this we can conclude that people who feel more bonded with their neighbourhood (*local attachment*) and who regularly in contact with their neighbours (*neighbourhood integration*), are more likely to be involved in political participation than people who do not feel connected with their neighbourhood and/or do not have regular contact with their neighbours.

Hypothesis 7:

"Individuals with a larger network display higher levels of skills than individuals with a smaller network."

This hypothesis is also found to be confirmed at one percent ($\alpha=.01$) for contact participation ($b=.289^{***}$, $se=.057$) and action participation ($b=.259^{***}$, $se=.057$). We can conclude that people with a larger network, i.e. who are member of more voluntary organisations, are more likely to have a higher level of skills, than people with a smaller network.

Hypothesis 8:

"Individuals with higher levels of time, skills and/or money display higher levels of political participation than individuals with lower levels of time, skills and/or money."

This hypothesis actually refers to three different questions. Does time generally result in a higher level of political participation? For skills and money the same question is formulated. Since all three elements have been incorporated in the regression as an individual independent variable, the answer is also plural.

Concerning time, the hypothesis should be rejected. Its influence was not substantial, nor significant for contact participation. A significant effect was found with regard to action participation ($b=-.101^{***}$, $se=.037$). However, this effect is in the opposite direction than was expected.

Regarding skills, the hypothesis should be accepted. skills has found to be the most substantial and significant resource in both the contact participation model ($b=.245^{***}$, $se=.063$) and the action participation model ($b=.279^{***}$, $se=.057$). In combination with hypothesis 7, this confirms the indirect effect of network on political participation. From this, we can conclude that people with a higher level of skills are more likely to be involved in political participation than people with less skills.

Money shows to be less substantial than skills, but still delivers a significant contribution ($b=.0105^{**}$, $se=.054$) for the contact participation model. However, it seems to be of no influence on action participation since no significant effect is found in that model. Therefore, we conclude that people with a higher family income are more likely to contact an official than people with a lower family income.

Hypothesis 9:

"Individuals with higher levels of satisfaction display lower levels of political participation than individuals with lower levels of satisfaction."

This hypothesis has to be rejected for action participation, since it shows to be insignificant. With regard to contact participations points the significant result ($b = -.224^*$, $se = .139$) indeed to the negative direction. Meaning that individuals that have higher levels of satisfaction are less likely to contact an official than individuals with low levels of satisfaction.

Hypothesis 10:

"Individuals with higher levels of expected impact display higher levels of political participation than individuals with lower levels of expected impact."

As second item of instrumental motivation, perceived impact has showed to be a substantial and significant predictor in both the contact participation model ($b = .209^{***}$, $se = .066$) and the action participation model ($b = .212^{***}$, $se = .060$). Therefore we can conclude that people have a higher level of perceived impact are more likely to be involved in political participation than people who have a lower level of perceived impact.

Hypothesis 11:

"Individuals with a larger network display higher levels of political participation than individuals with a smaller network."

Besides the indirect effect via skills, which is confirmed by hypothesis seven and eight, network shows to have a significant effect on both modes of participation. The effect is somewhat more influential in the action participation model ($b = .285^{***}$, $se = .079$), than in the contact participation model ($b = .175^{**}$, $se = .087$). Nevertheless we can conclude that people who have a larger network, i.e. who are member of more voluntary associations, are more likely to be involved in political participation, than people who have a smaller network.

Of the incorporated control factors, age shows to be the most influential. Although its influence is more substantial (negative) and more significant for action participation ($b = -.153^{***}$, $se = .055$) than for contact participation ($b = -.130^{**}$, $se = .060$). This suggest that older people are less likely to participate than younger people. Citizenship demonstrated to be significant for action participation ($b = .159^*$, $se = .105$) but not for contact participation. Finally, gender (woman) is just significant for contact participation ($b = -.049^{**}$, $se = .024$), indicating that woman generally are less likely to contact an official than men are.

In total 16,9% (Adjusted R square) of the contact participation model is explained by the incorporated variables. The action participation model is explained for 18,9%, even while less of the variables are significant predictors than for contact participation.

	Contact	Action
Hypothese 1	-	-
Hypothese 2	-	-
Hypothese 3	+	+
Hypothese 4	-	-
Hypothese 5	+	+
Hypothese 8_time	-	-
Hypothese 8_money	+	-
Hypothese 8_skills	+	+
Hypothese 9	+	-
Hypothese 10	+	+
Hypothese 11	+	+

+ = accepted hypothesis, - = rejected hypothesis.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this study was to find the answer on the following research question:

“How do key factors from social capital and the civic voluntarism model explain action political participation and contact political participation in the Netherlands in 2001?”

What these key factors from the social capital theory and the civic voluntarism models actually are is first explored in the theory chapter. Several hypotheses have been formulated and a combined model has been designed, using the theories which were discussed. Subsequently, the various variables which compose the key factors were operationalized in chapter four. With the usage of secondary data, these variables were put to the test in a multiple regression. The proposed model and the corresponding hypotheses have been accepted or rejected. In this chapter, we will discuss the implications of the outcomes of the analysis and answer the research question.

For social capital are network, norms and trust the concerning key factors. The key factors of the civic voluntarism model are resources, engagement and recruitment. With use of the graphical models and the multiple regressions, it is showed that both theories are useful and complementary in explaining political participation.

First, the network element of social capital is being partially explained by skills, which is an element of the resources. This shows that complementing a social capital element with a civic voluntarism element adds something to the explanation. Besides, more explanatory power might be retrieved of the civic voluntarism model in this part. The direct influence that network has on political participation could also be explained by recruitment, the civic voluntarism factor of “being asked to participate”. Since people who have bigger networks, who thus know more people, have an increased chance of being asked to participate. This will especially be of interest for the action participation mode. Hereby the civic voluntarism item provides the explanation why the social capital element matters. However, this last explanation is not explicitly measured in this thesis.

From the resources which were incorporated in the regression, only skills showed to be significant for both modes of participation. Education and money were significant predictors of contact participation, while time complemented skills for explaining action participation. Action participation generally includes more meetings and activities than contact participation, which clarifies the difference of significance of time for both modes of participation. Additional regressions (not included) have shown that the influence of education runs indirectly through skills.

Trust, the second key factor of social capital, has showed to be of no influence for action participation. It was expected that especially social capital would be important for action participation. This because of the free riders problem which was discussed earlier. Nevertheless is such a correlation not demonstrated. We did find a negative relation between social capital and contact participation. These findings suggest that the positive relation between political trust and voting, as found by Bühlmann and Freitag, is not applicable to the action and contact participation modes. Instead, having a lot of political trust makes people less likely to contact an official. This may be primarily due to apathetic attitudes. Finally, no clear connection was established between the social capital theory and the civic voluntarism model on this factor.

The civic voluntarism factor of engagement seemed to be an accumulation of various motivational elements. It is chosen to clarify this by dividing engagement in two elements. This way, a distinction is made between the instrumental motivations and the normative motivations. Those normative motivations are related to the normative factor of social capital and are therefore incorporated in

that factor. One might think of the feeling of civic duty, which was originally assigned to engagement by Verba et al. (1995). The other motivations are represented in the model as 'instrumental motivations'. What is thus actually another term for a part of the factor of engagement.

The factor of norms was represented by the measures of civic duty, religion and community embeddedness. This factor showed to be highly influential on both modes of political participation. Community embeddedness is one of the biggest predictors of political participation. This may be the fact due to the multiple ways in which community embeddedness may enhance political participation. Thought from the civic voluntarism model: being better integrated in the neighbourhood increases the chances of 'being asked'. But first of all, it serves its normative function, because it functions through an communal structure. Religion on the other hand showed to be insignificant in either mode of participation.

The level of feeling of civic duty was called the strongest influence on the probability of an individual to participate in elections, by Bühlmann and Freitag (2006). In this model, with regard to the other modes of participation, civic voluntarism is no longer the strongest influence. However, it did showed to be a good and significant predictor for both action and contact participation.

Finally, instrumental motivation is represented by the level of satisfaction with the local government and the level of perceived impact of the local government. It turns out that the level of perceived impact is the most important predictor belonging to this factor. It showed to be a significant and substantial predictor for both modes of participations. This is in accordance with our assumption that people will not participate unless they suppose it to be beneficial. The level of satisfaction on the other hand showed to be insignificant for action participation and significant negatively for contact participation.

Some differences were expected between the modes of participation. It was expected that the resources play a bigger role in the explanation of contact participation than for action participation. Especially skills were expected to be more important. This is not confirmed in the regressions. Skills shows to be a comparable direct effect for both modes of participation. However, education and money did show to be significant predictors of contact participation. In addition it was expected that social trust would be important for action participation (because of the free riders problem) and political trust more of influence on contact participation (because of the trust in the integrity and competence of the one contacted). These assumptions could not be confirmed. Social trust is indeed correlated with action participation, but does not hold in the model as a significant direct effect. For contact participation, social trust shows no significant correlation in the bivariate table, but does show to be a significant predictor in the model. Political trust is indeed not significant for action participation. For contact participation, it does show a negative correlation in the bivariate table, but this disappears when included in the model. The expected differences thus cannot be completely recognized in the findings.

Social factors, like community embeddedness and network, seem to play the biggest role in explaining these modes of political participation. Besides these social factors, perceived impact is a quite important reason for people to participate. This is an element which could be improved by governments claiming lack of participation. Since they might clarify the ways in which they influence daily life and thus heighten the perceived level of impact.

Over all it is demonstrated that the social capital theory and the civic voluntarism model can complement each other quite successfully in explaining political participation. They complement each other through the mediating role of resources (skills), by explaining the found relationship between social capital elements and political participation and by clarifying (reorganizing) the factor of engagement.

7. Discussion

In this discussion we will now discuss some limitations of this study. As for any study, there are limitations to the time-span, to the knowledge and to the possibilities. Therefore, various kinds of limitations are connected to this study.

Regarding social capital, one of the main points of discussion refers to the level of analysis. Although many researchers acknowledge the collective character of the concept, some still suppose it to be measured individually. According to Rostila (2010) the concept was originally defined an individual good, by Bourdieu, Coleman and Portes. According to Brehm and Rahn (1997), social capital is an aggregate concept. Meaning that its basis refers to features of individuals. They argue that effects which are attributed to social capital of communities should be observable on individual level. As they say: "It is not, after all, a 'community' that participates or builds trust, but the people who comprise that community who belong to civic organizations and acquire positive feelings towards others." (Brehm & Rahn, 1997, pp. 1002-1003). In this study it was chosen to treat social capital as an individual's asset. Nevertheless, besides the individual asset, context influences might be found. Because of the scope of this study, this was not chosen to be included. Future research may focus on this distinction and distinguish an individual as well as an contextual asset of social capital.

Religion is assumed to be an element of norms in this thesis. It is operationalized according to church attendance. The results show that religion is no direct effect for either mode of participation. However, the bivariate table shows it is correlated with contact participation. In the bivariate table one can also see that religion is very much associated with political trust and governance satisfaction. This could be the reason why the influence of religion disappears when all independent variables are entered in the regression model. However, these indirect effects could not be proven in this study. More and more specific research will be necessary to get a better understanding of the ways in which religion might influence political participation

Time is the weakest operationalization which is present in this thesis. Also, it was one of the only elements which was not deliberately measured in the original surveys. Therefore we had to choose between an operationalization on basis of two questions regarding hours at work, and hours spent at voluntary associations. However, many more time consuming acts, like commuting, doing the household or leisure activities (sporting, etc.), are of influence of such a measurement of time. These measurements were not available. Therefore it was chosen to go with the theory-based method. Verba et. al., stated and statistically established the importance of work, a working spouse and having (young) children for the amount of available time. These details were available from the original surveys and are thus used in the operationalization of time. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this operationalization too is not ideal. This method might enhance some bias with regard to its correlations in the model. One might think of jobless people being more at home and on the street and thus having more possibilities to notice issues they would like to be improved. Practically all the other variables were explicitly measured by the original surveys and thus seems to be more reliable.

Any model is just a representation of the reality. However the model as has been proposed and tested may be a rather simple representation. Various factors or variables will probably be reciprocally connected. For instance, Bühlmann and Freitag (2006) expect a relation between the integration in organizations and social trust. A more comprehensive model, including several expected reciprocal relations and interconnected variables, was not capable with regard to the time-span of this thesis.

Combining both social capital and civic voluntarism in one model is especially important for developing a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying the social capital and political participation relationship. Especially the reorganization of engagement into two distinct modes of motives clarifies the different ways they influence political participation. Normative motivations show to play a big role, including community embeddedness. It shows that not just instrumental reasons, or satisfaction, lead to participation, but that a good relationship with neighbours is more important. Political trust, which was originally also included under the header of 'engagement', shows to be of no direct influence on participation. While governance satisfaction leads to a negative influence (the more satisfied you are, the less you will participate). Overall, taking together these motivations leads to a loss of understanding of the explanatory power. Also, the addition of the resources gives a partial explanation for the influence of social capital on political participation.

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Appendix A – Bivariate Table

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Network	16.51	13.77													
2. Skills	13.62	19.29	.287**												
3. Education	63.17	15.98	.179**	.231**											
4. Money	59.49	26.78	.168**	.176**	.434**										
5. Time	61.43	35.67	-.009	-.095**	-.309**	.441**									
6. Social trust	58.74	16.50	.112**	.078**	.141**	.118**	-.020								
7. Political trust	56.17	21.07	-.024	.000	.047	.022	.003	.211**							
8. Civic duty	78.71	19.80	.138**	.113**	-.002	-.058	.057	.017	-.062						
9. Religion	36.85	37.70	.014	.016	-.080**	-.099**	.114**	.130**	.435**	.010					
10. Community embeddedness	45.98	11.50	.101**	.051	-.054	.047	-.043	.249**	.129**	.130**	.146**				
11. Satisfaction	59.50	14.69	-.043	-.028	-.035	-.011	.080*	.213**	.613**	-.045	.723**	.141**			
12. Perceived impact	43.97	19.89	.148**	.148**	.158**	.045	.016	.110**	-.034	.171**	-.024	.098**	-.062		
13. Action participation	19.43	27.60	.313**	.288**	.148**	.107**	-.080*	.094**	-.011	.182**	-.021	.204**	-.036	.219**	
14. Contact participation	20.70	29.87	.234**	.273**	.172**	.150**	-.080*	.037	-.117**	.144**	-.082**	.144**	-.149**	.221**	.454**
N.B. N=571. * = p<.05, ** = p<.001, M = Mean, SD = Standard deviation. Two-tailed testing.															

Appendix B – Regression table

Main regression table

Variable	Contact		Action	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
(Constant)	-15.699	16.543	-23.062 *	14.978
Woman	-.049 **	.024	-.013	.022
Citizenship	.140	.115	.159 *	.105
Age	-.130 **	.060	-.153 ***	.055
Network	.175 **	.087	.285 **	.079
Time	-.002	.041	-.101 ***	.037
Skills	.245 ***	.063	.279 ***	.057
Education	.140 *	.090	.098	.081
Money	.105 **	.054	-.024	.049
Social trust	-.150 **	.086	-.023	.078
Political trust	-.094	.072	-.023	.065
Civic duty	.105 **	.064	.121 **	.058
Religion	.016	.048	-.006	.043
Community embeddedness	.444 ***	.115	.337 ***	.104
Perceived impact	.209 ***	.066	.212 ***	.060
Satisfaction	-.224 *	.139	-.069	.126

N = 571, One tailed testing.

* = $p < \alpha = .10$

** = $p < \alpha = .05$

*** = $p < \alpha = .01$