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Master Thesis

Framing the referendum question:

How actors framed the referendums on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>CAEUC</b>	Campaign against the EU Constitution (in 2009 “No to Lisbon”)
<b>CPSU</b>	Community and Public Service Union
<b>Dáil</b>	Dáil Éireann, the lower House of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament)
<b>DECLG</b>	Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government
<b>Def.</b>	Defensive
<b>DFA</b>	Department of Foreign Affairs
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FF</b>	Fianna Fáil
<b>FG</b>	Fine Gael
<b>GP</b>	Green Party
<b>Ibec</b>	Irish Business and Employers Confederation
<b>Ictu</b>	Irish Congress of Trade Unions
<b>IFA</b>	Irish Farmers’ Association
<b>Lab</b>	The Labour Party
<b>MEP</b>	Member of the European Parliament
<b>Neg.</b>	Negative
<b>Neu.</b>	Neutral
<b>Off.</b>	Offensive
<b>PANA</b>	Peace and Neutrality Alliance
<b>PD</b>	Progressive Democrats
<b>Pos.</b>	Positive
<b>SF</b>	Sinn Féin
<b>Siptu</b>	Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union
<b>Taoiseach</b>	Prime minister of Ireland
<b>TEEU</b>	Technical Engineering and Electrical Union
<b>UKIP</b>	United Kingdom Independence Party
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization

## ***Abstract***

In this research the framing behavior of different political actors in the two referendums on the Lisbon treaty in Ireland is analyzed based on research hypotheses derived from literature on the behavior of political elites in referendums. The research findings show that the framing behavior of the actors in the referendums on the Lisbon treaty was generally in line with the expectations towards the behavior of political elites in referendums. The Yes side employed less contest frames, more positive frames and used frames of the opposing side more often in a defensive way compared to the No side. As expected, actors on both sides used more defensive frames and contest frames towards the end of the campaign and actors on the Yes side showed a higher tendency to change their framing behavior in the second campaign, after losing the first campaign. Actors who changed their opinion between both referendums used more and different issue frames in the second referendum. However, the research also observed framing behavior that was partially not in line with the expectations of this research. In both referendums, the No side used a higher percentage of issue frames and a smaller variety of issue and generic frames compared to the Yes side. This might show that the Yes side does not need to focus its communication on the issue of the referendum question or on a single issue, but that the Yes side can successfully employ a referendum campaign, which is based on a multitude of different topics. The second unexpected result was the high usage of neutrally valenced issue frames by the No side. This shows the necessity to analyze the long-term ownership and understanding of certain frames, which are likely to occur repeatedly in public deliberation on the issue of European integration.

# **1 Introduction**

In this thesis, the framing behavior of various actors during the two referendums on the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland will be analyzed. Framing refers to the mechanism in which certain aspects of a subject are made more salient “in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the items described.” (Entman, 1993, p.52). After the Lisbon treaty was rejected in a referendum in June 2008 by Irish voters, a second referendum on the Lisbon treaty was held in October 2009. While a few actors changed their basic position towards the referendum issue between the two occasions, most actors changed the way they framed the referendum during each referendum campaign and between the two referendums. In this research, the ways the Yes and the No sides, and their actors, used to frame the issue of the Lisbon treaty referendums in 2008 and 2009 will be described and analyzed. The research question for this research project is: *“How did the actors, which took part in the two referendum campaigns on the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland, frame the referendum?”*

Why is it important to understand how actors framed the referendums on the Lisbon treaty in Ireland? On 12 June 2008, voters had rejected the Treaty of Lisbon in a referendum and stopped the EU's reform process, which aimed to reform the EU's legal framework. This process had already consumed much time and resources of the EU and its member states in the previous years. A reform of the EU's institutional setting was deemed necessary in order to deal more efficiently with new global challenges like climate change or the economic crisis and to allow the EU's framework to adjust to the enlargement of the EU to a group of 27 member states. The most important changes introduced with the Lisbon treaty aimed at simplifying the voting system in the Council of Ministers, enhancing the role of the European Parliament and introducing new institutional actors like the President of the Council or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This reform process had already started seven years earlier with the “Laken declaration on the future of the European Union”. The Lisbon treaty itself reflected the key elements of the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, which was rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands in May and June of 2005 (Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), 2009; Bradly, 2009; Archick & Mix, 2010). In many ways the EU was neither willing to accept a second rejection nor able to start a new effort to modernize its legal framework. A positive outcome in the only referendum held in the Lisbon treaty in Europe was vital to the EU's future.

The Lisbon Treaty was finally ratified by Irish voters in a second referendum on 2 October 2009. After a process that took eight years, the Irish ratification was the last major step in the EU's efforts to reform its legal framework. The ratification of the Lisbon treaty through popular vote in Ireland served as an example for the EU's efforts and difficulties to modernize its structure and in the last consequence to communicate with and convince Europe's citizens to support the process of European integration. In



referendum campaigns like the Irish referendums on the Lisbon treaty, different political and non-political, democratic and non-democratic legitimized actors wage a fight to convince voters to support or reject their cause. But how does one convince voters to decide one way or the other? The literature on voting behavior in referendums regularly divides between mechanisms described as “second-order elections” and “issue voting”. Based on the theory on second-order elections, voting behavior in referendums is based on partisanship and attitudes towards the government (Franklin & Marsh & McLaren, 1994). In theories on issue-voting, voting behavior reflects the voters’ attitudes, values and beliefs towards the issue at stake (Svensson & Siune, 1993; Hobolt, 2009). Within the issue-voting school, the concept of framing is used to explain how to influence the voters’ decision making process by defining the referendum issue, breaking down the basic elements of the referendum question to voters and thereby influencing them to vote one way or the other. Frames, the product of framing vary greatly in their appearance and their impact, depending on the intentions of an actor. As it will be explained below, actors can use different types of frames, give frames different valences or react to frames of the opposing side in offensive or defensive ways (De Vreese & Boomgarden, 2003; Schuck & De Vreese, 2006; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010). When actors could employ frames in various ways, do actors on the Yes and the No side use frames in different ways in order to achieve different their desired effects?

The research on referendums suggests that different political elites use frames differently (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010). In referendum campaigns various dynamics and approaches are used by the Yes side and the No side (LeDuc 2009, 2007; Hobolt & Riseborough, 2005; De Vreese, 2004), and different campaign strategies result in different patterns of framing - or in other words, different framing behavior. Literatures on these findings give a first indication on how different actors may vary in their usage of frames. Still, the understanding of how actors employ frames in referendums is in many respects incomplete.

By identifying what kind of frames are used in both referendums on the Lisbon treaty and how actors changed their framing behavior within and between both referendum campaigns, this research project will attempt to contribute to the understanding of framing behavior in referendum campaigns. The approach to analyze two consecutive referendums on the same issue and to describe changes in the actors’ framing behavior over time might result in additional insight on framing behavior in referendums. A better understanding of the framing behavior of actors on the Yes and the No side in referendums could result in better understanding of public debates on European integration. Finally, this research could help determine the most effective form for handling specific topics or policies in order to win over undecided groups and voter, which are decisive in referendum campaigns or public deliberation in general.

## **2 Theory and Analytic Framework**

The definition of frames or of the process of framing is not accurately and scholars often noted that a precise and consistent definition of this concept is missing (Entman, 1993; Druckman, 2001). The origin of the concept of framing is found in the research of mass communication and the effects of mass media on the public. In 1993, in an attempt to unite different explanations, Entman defined the action of framing as “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the described item” (Entman, 1993, p.52). According to another definition, “Frames shape individual understanding and opinion concerning an issue by stressing specific elements or features of the broader controversy, reducing a usually complex issue down to one or two central aspects” (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997, p.568). In the context of a referendum on a European treaty like the Lisbon treaty, framing means to break down the complex issue of the referendum question - the Lisbon treaty - into sub-issues, or elements of the Lisbon treaty, and to define the referendum controversy based on those specific elements.

### **2.1 Types and Characteristics of Frames**

In this research, the qualitative characteristics of frames will be defined to gain a better understanding of the framing behavior of the different actors. The literature on framing offers different distinctions to characterize the qualitative side of frames. Common distinctions are made among:

- a) Types of frames: Issue frames, generic frames and contest frames;
- b) Valence of frames: positive, negative and neutral valenced frames;
- c) Use of opponent side's frames: offensive and defensive.

The valence of frames and the use of opposing side's frames will be summarized subsequently as characteristics of a frame. In this research, the characteristics of frames will only be determined for issue frames. Thereby, every issue frame has a valence, but only issue frames that were owned by the opponent's side in the referendum debate can be used in an offensive and defensive way. Although this will not be part of this research, it further seems reasonable to assume that generic frames and contest frames can also be valenced and be used in an offensive and defensive way. The “type of frame” refers to the topic of the frame, whereas the other two distinctions, the valence and the use of the opponent's frames, describe how this topic is communicated.

**Table 1: Types and characteristics of frames – summary**

<b>a) Types of frames</b>	<b>b) Valance of frames</b>	<b>c) Use of opponent side's frames</b>
<b>Issue frame</b> (= episodic frame, emphasis frame, substantive frame)	Positive Negative Neutral	Offensive Defensive
<b>Generic frame</b> (= thematic frame)	---	---
<b>Contest frame</b> (= strategic frame)	---	---

**a) Types of frames**

The first distinction is made between issue frames, generic frames and contest frames. Issue frames, also known as episodic frames (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), emphasis frames (Druckman, 2001) or substantive frames (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010), concentrate on a specific element or topic (policy) (De Vreese & Boomgarden, 2003; Lecheler, De Vreese & Slothuus, 2009; De Vreese, Peter & Semetko, 2001), which is directly linked to the referendum issue. As defined by Hobolt, issue frames are “concerned with emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations” (Hobolt, 2009, p.112). In a referendum, an issue frame is based on a referendum-specific consideration, for example, the impact of the treaty on a single policy field.

A generic frame, also known as a thematic frame (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), refers to a “more analytical, contextual, or historical coverage” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95). A generic frame might set the context in which a referendum question is to be understood or might introduce non-referendum-specific elements to the referendum debate. For example, a quote saying that the EU has been good for Ireland constitutes a generic frame, as this frame builds on the context in which the referendum could be understood.

A contest frame, or strategic frame (De Vreese & Semetko, 2004a), focuses on political contests in the referendum debate (politics), like the behavior of actors involved in the referendum. A contest frame could, for example, be a quote in which one actor accuses another of misconduct in some form (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010).

**b) Valence of frames**

A second distinction is made between positively or negatively valenced and neutral frames. “By valenced frame we mean that some frames are indicative of ‘good and bad’ and (implicitly) carry positive and/or negative elements.” (De Vreese & Boomgarden, 2003, p.363). In the context of European politics, a valenced frame does

often include threats or benefits. The ratification of a treaty could, for example, be valenced negatively as a threat to the national sovereignty or be valenced positively as resulting economic gains. In the case of a neutral frame, a frame is mentioned without connecting a specific valence to the frame, for example by saying that the ratification of a treaty has implications for a certain policy field, without specifying these implications (Schuck & De Vreese, 2006).

### **c) Use of opponent side's frames**

A third distinction is the offensive and defensive approach when addressing an issue frame that is owned by the opposing side of the debate. The concept of offensive and defensive frames is based on the idea that each "issue frame category"<sup>1</sup> is owned by one side of the debate. An issue frame category is thereby owned by the side that uses frames from that category more frequently. Addressing the frame of the opposing side in an offensive way means using a frame from that category to the advantage of one's own side. The offensive use is described as rather uncommon, especially in referendum settings. The defensive use of the opposing side's frames - especially of successful frames - is more common. Here, the political actor reacts to a frame of the opposing side by adopting a defensive frame to rebut or counterattack the other side's argument (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010). For example, if the economic consequence frame is owned by the No side – which claims that the ratification of the treaty would constrain short term economic growth, the Yes-side could react with a defensive frame to rebut the No side's argument by saying that the ratification of the treaty would increase future long term economic growth. One early finding of this research was that the concept of issue ownership, introduced by Hänggli and Kriesi (2010), is somewhat problematic. For example, if a frame is introduced by actor A into the debate and proves to be so strong that actor B uses a higher amount of defensive frames to counter or rebut the original frame of actor A, actor B would take over the ownership of the issue. Therefore, the defensive frames of side B would not count as defensive frames anymore, as B would now own the issue. As a result, the research finding would be distorted. To solve this problem, the ownership of frames will not depend on the quantitative usage, but on the qualitative usage of frames. In the example above, if actor B uses the frame predominantly in a defensive way, but actor A uses the frame in a non defensive way, the frame will be attributed to actor A, irrespectively of quantitative usage. If both sides use a frame in an offensive and defensive way, the frame will be attributed to the side that uses the frame more often in an offensive way.

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<sup>1</sup> The concept of frame categories is introduced in the next sub-chapter - 2.2 Categories of frames

## 2.2 Categories of Frames

For each type of frame (issue, generic and contest) different “categories of frames” can be defined. All issue frames do for example address topics, which are inherent to the issue of the debate, in this case, the Lisbon treaty. Different categories of issue frames do refer to different elements of the Lisbon treaty, for example changes in the composition of the Commission or changes in the immigration policy. On the other side, all generic frames refer to elements not directly related to the Lisbon treaty; different categories could refer to government satisfaction or EU attitudes. Two approaches to identify different categories of frames can be distinguished: the inductive and the deductive approach. For the inductive approach frames are identified in a source document, such as a newspaper article, using a wide raster, allowing for a relative big variety of possible frames to be identified. On the other side, in the deductive approach news coverage is scanned for a set of predefined frames. The deductive approach is often used to detect variations in the use of frames between different media outlets and between different kinds of media. The use of a set of predefined frame categories generally allows for bigger sample sizes. Using the inductive approach is in contrast more labor intensive. But it also gives the person coding the frames a bigger margin of discretion and, therefore, allows gathering a more detailed picture of the frames present. However, certain caution has to be taken when using the inductive approach, in order not to create a unique set of frames, which is difficult to replicate (De Vreese, 2004; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

This research will rely on the inductive approach to identify categories of issue frames and generic frames. This methodological choice is based on the fact that no predefined set of frame categories exists in the literature to analyze referendums on European integration. Some authors describe frame categories that are commonly expected to appear in EU referendum campaigns (De Vreese & Semetko, 2004a) and others identify general categories of frames in the media (De Vreese, 2004; De Vreese & Semetko, 2004a; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; De Vreese et al., 2011; De Vreese, Boomgaarden & Semetko, 2011). Even if a broad idea for possible frame categories exists in the literature, there is no predefined set of frame categories for the issue of the Lisbon referendum in the Irish context. Especially the unique national context of both referendums makes it unlikely that a deductive approach could be employed successfully. In order not to create a unique set of frames, the frame categories used in this research should be defined in a universal way and be able to be reproduced by other researchers. In order to do so, four criteria, based on the work of Cappella and Jamieson (1997), should be met:

- a) the frame has identifiable conceptual and linguistic characteristics,
- b) the frame can reliably be distinguish from other frames,
- c) the frame has representational validity (i.e. is recognizable by others) and
- d) the frame is commonly observed in the political (referendum) debate.

The fourth criterion, as defined by Capella and Jamieson, – the frame is commonly observed in journalistic practice – does not apply to this research. As the frames in questions are not created by journalists but by political elites, the fourth criterion was therefore altered.

### **2.3 Identifying Frames of Elites in the Media**

The literature on framing predominantly concentrated on framing in the media (De Vreese et al., 2011; Leecher et al., 2009; Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Schuck & De Vreese, 2009). Few scholars focused on the framing behavior of political elites and the influence of their frames on the public (Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010). Nelson et al. (1997) highlight that political elites use the media as a means to distribute their frames. This is an important observation, as in most literature it is assumed that frames are exclusively introduced and formed by the media.<sup>2</sup> Yet indeed, frames of political elites can be filtered from general media coverage. Some scholars show that the observed framing behavior in the media can be exposed to represent the framing behavior of a certain group in a referendum (De Vreese & Semetko, 2004b; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010). Hänggli and Kriesi (2010) show this in their research, when they analyze the framing behavior of political elites during a Swiss referendum using media coverage. Therefore they identify different issue and contest frames and analyze the usage of issue frames owned by the opponent's sides on their defensive and offensive use (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010). The methodological approach used in this research is similar to the one applied by Hänggli and Kriesi, but generic frames and the valence of issue frames will be part of the analyses, too. Additionally, changes in the framing behavior within each referendum and between both referendums are also part of this research.

It is important to notice, that the framing behavior portrayed in the media is neither the only source for voters, nor the only means for political elites to distribute their frames. Frames found in the media can therefore only represent a part of the overall picture of political elites' framing behavior. However, it can be generally observed that the analysis of media coverage is an established method to gain an understanding of elite's framing behavior. This generalization seems justifiable as long as the researcher keeps the generalization in mind, especially when drawing conclusions on his research.

### **2.4 Framing Behavior of Elites in Referendums**

The framing behavior of elites in referendums and campaign dynamics in referendums is another area of research important to this thesis. LeDuc (2009) argues that the campaign of the No side differs from the campaign of the Yes side, as "those opposed to a proposal do not necessarily have to make a coherent case against it. It is often

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<sup>2</sup> See also the "integrated process model of news framing" in De Vreese (2003).

enough simply to raise doubts about it in the minds of voters, question the motives of the proposers, play upon known fears, or attempt to link the proposal to less popular issues or personalities.” (LeDuc, 2009, p.42). Another example of campaign strategies are observations made by De Vreese and Semetko during the Danish Euro referendum in 2000: “The No camp was successful in its strategy of broadening the topic of the referendum to include issues that were technically and juridical beyond the referendum proposal, but emotionally associated with the issue.” (De Vreese & Semetko, 2004a, p.103).

Research on referendum campaigns often finds various dynamics and strategies commonly observed in referendum campaigns. These can also be expected be present in the referendums on the Lisbon treaty.

A first strategy, commonly found in referendum campaigns, is the “segmentation” of the referendum issue. Segmentation refers to a process in which – usually – the No side picks individual elements from a package deal, like the Lisbon treaty, to attack the referendum proposal from different directions (LeDuc, 2009, 2007; De Vreese & Semetko, 2004b). The Yes side on the other hand has to defend the package as a whole and should focus their campaign communication “on one single, salient, but popular issue” (Qvortrup, 2009, p.64).

The strategy of segmentation is closely linked to the dynamic of “ideological division”, which can be used when a referendum issue does not apply to familiar ideological cleavages. In this case a referendum proposal can be tackled from the left and the right of the political spectrum, which will increase the uncertainty of voters on the referendum issue (LeDuc, 2009, 2007).

The strategy described as “changing the subject”, or redefinition, refers to a tactic in which the campaign debate is turned away from the referendum issue toward a different topic (LeDuc, 2009, 2007; Marsh, 2007; De Vreese & Semetko, 2004b).

Another tactic in referendum campaigns is “anti-establishment rhetoric”. Here the referendum is portrayed as an “elite project” and redefined as a battle of the people against the establishment. As the Yes side includes more and more actors such as parties, big business, unions, academics and media, the No side can redefine a referendum into an anti-establishment movement (LeDuc, 2009, 2007). On the other side, a strategy of the Yes side could be to question the motives of No side actors, especially if those actors are not subjected to the same public scrutiny as other democratically legitimized actors in the campaign like parties or unions (Qvortrup, 2009).

Finally, it is also argued that both camps, and especially the Yes camp, needs to limit “internal conflicts” during the referendum debate in order to be successful in the referendum. (De Vreese & Semetko, 2004b; De Vreese, 2004; Qvortrup, 2009)

## 2.5 Research Hypotheses

In the following, seven hypotheses on framing behavior in referendums are presented. The first four hypotheses describe differences in framing behavior between the Yes and the No side. The fifth hypothesis deals with changes in the framing behavior over time within one referendum. Changes of the framing behavior between the two referendum campaigns are addressed in the sixth research hypothesis. The last hypothesis questions the framing behavior of actors that changed their opinion on the referendum issue between both referendum campaigns.

In the first four hypotheses it is argued that actors on the Yes and the No side portray a certain framing behavior, which is common to the different camps in referendum campaigns and are not based on a specific referendum context. The campaign dynamics described by LeDuc are thereby translated into general concepts of framing behavior for the Yes and the No side. The campaign dynamic of segmentation implies that actors on the No side will pick a variety of themes to challenge the referendum issue, whereas the Yes side will concentrate on a comparably smaller number of issues. The themes of the No side could be based on the treaty in question or on other unrelated themes. The first research hypothesis is:

*The No side will use a greater variety of issue and generic frames than the Yes side. (Hypothesis 1)*

LeDuc suggests that the No side uses attacks on the actors of the Yes side by for example questioning the motives of the Yes side. Another tactic employed is to portray the referendum case as a fight of the political establishment against the common people and by introducing non-referendum related topics into the campaign (LeDuc, 2009). The Yes camp, on the other hand is expected to concentrate their communications on issues that are mentioned in the treaty. The second research hypothesis is:

*Actors on the No side will use contest frames relatively more often as compared to actors on the Yes side and actors on the Yes side will use relatively more often issue frames compared to actors on the No side. (Hypothesis 2)*

If the No camp uses the tactics of “segmentation” or “changing the subject”, it is also likely that the Yes side is under a high pressure to rebuttal or react to some of the arguments of the No side and therefore to use defensive frames (i.e. to use frames owned by the opposing side in a defensive way). The No side is not expected to use a high number of frames defensively on issue frames owned by the opposing side. The third research hypothesis is:

*Actors on the Yes side will use relatively more often defensive frames than actors on the No side. (Hypothesis 3)*

Another framing behavior not explicitly mentioned by the theory is that the No side will portray the implications of the ratification of the treaty as negative, i.e. as a threat or



risk to the status quo. The Yes side on the other hand will portray the treaty as a positive development resulting in benefits. The fourth research hypothesis is:

*Actors on the No side will use relatively more often use negatively valenced frames compared to actors on the Yes side, who will use relatively more often use positively valenced frames compared to the No side. Neutral frames are not expected to be used by either side in high quantities. (Hypothesis 4)*

In relation to the development of the campaign over time, it seems likely that during the first part of the campaign both sides are concerned with pushing their own arguments on the referendum issue. Towards the end of the campaign, when strong frames of the opposing side are identified, it becomes likely that actors will also concentrate on the rebuttal of successful frames of the opposite side. It also appears likely that towards the end of the campaign contest frames become more frequent, as actors of both sides try to discredit the opponents or comment on the campaign development in general. The fifth research hypothesis is:

*In the final two weeks of the referendum campaign, actors on both sides will use relatively more often defensive frames and contest frames than in the earlier phase of the referendum campaign. (Hypothesis 5)*

The sixth hypothesis deals with changes in the framing behavior between two referendums. It is expected that actors change their issue frames used in the second referendum, depending on their success in the first campaign. The winning side of the first referendum – the No side – is more likely to reuse their issue frames in the second campaign, while the actors who lost the first campaign, the Yes side, are more likely to change their issue frames between the campaigns. This consideration is only valid for issue frames, which are not altered by a change in the content or the context of the referendum issue. The sixth research hypothesis is:

*In the second referendum, actors on the No side will use relatively more often reuse their issue frames from the first referendum compared to actors on the Yes side. (Hypothesis 6)*

Actors who changed their position on the referendum issue between both referendums are expected to show changes in their framing behavior. Their change in opinion might be the result of a change in the content of the treaty or the context in which the campaign is fought. In any case, actors who changed their opinion are likely to be under an additional burden to justify the decision of changing their opinion. It is therefore expected that these actors have to adopt more and different issue frames in the second referendum, compared to the issue frames used in the first campaign. The seventh research hypothesis is:

*Actors changing sides for the second referendum will use relatively more often issue framing in the second referendum as compared to the first referendum. The content of their issue frames will change compared to the first referendum. (Hypothesis 7)*

### ***3 Research Design and Case Selection***

This research will be carried out for a period of eight weeks before both referendum dates. The eight-week period is chosen in order to include the actual referendum campaign and parts of the run-up phase before the start of the official campaigns. The starting date of the official campaigns is only a minor factor to be considered, as the positioning of the different actors and the definition of the context of the campaign begin usually before the official referendum campaigns start. For example, at the first referendum on the Lisbon treaty, the date of the referendum was only announced one month before the referendum date, and the official campaign of the main political parties started only three weeks before the referendum date. By this time, actors on the No side had already established the topics and the context of the referendum debate. Both referendums would be divided in a run-up phase of the first six weeks and a final phase of the last two weeks of each campaign, in order to analyze changes in the framing behavior over time. In the first referendum the run-up phase was from the 18<sup>th</sup> of April to the 29<sup>th</sup> of May, 2008, and the final phase was from the 30<sup>th</sup> of May to the 12<sup>th</sup> of June, 2008. For the second referendum the run-up phase was from the 8<sup>th</sup> of August to the 18<sup>th</sup> of September, 2009, and the final phase was from the 19<sup>th</sup> of September to the 2<sup>nd</sup> of October, 2009.

This research will analyze the framing behavior of various actors that took part in the deliberation process of the referendum campaigns, such as political parties, unions, civil society organization and others. In a first step of this research, the relevant actors in both referendums will be identified and labeled depending on their affiliation with the Yes side, the No side or the Neutral side. All actors that are recorded in the media coverage on more than one occasion are included in this research. Actors on the national as well as European level are included. The Referendum Commission was excluded in this research, as its role was limited to a neutral provider of information in the referendum. This limitation didn't allow the Referendum Commission to follow an independent framing behavior, but its framing behavior reflected the frames used by the other actors. By applying these criteria to identify actors in both referendums, the number of actors will be limited to a workable number, while ensuring that no major actors are excluded. Special attention is to be paid to individuals who are affiliated with different actors. Individuals are therefore allocated to actors first, depending on the background information supplied in the article. If no background information is provided, the actor is then associated with the group with which he/she is most commonly recognized. However, this problem is constricted to individuals who held high posts in national politics, i.e. Taoiseach (title of the Irish prime minister) or minister, and later moved on to a European post, i.e. EU commissioner or EU ambassador. Furthermore, different individuals also campaigned on behalf of different groups in both referendums. The relevant actors for both referendum campaigns are identified and described in chapter 4.

The frames, the unit of observation of this research, were identified in articles of the newspapers *Irish Times* and the *Irish Independent* in the time period mentioned above. Each article could thereby carry different frames from different actors of the referendum debate at the same time. The screened newspaper coverage included all newspaper sections. Letters to the editors were included, if they could explicitly be assigned to one actor. Pictures, advertisements and articles in Irish as well as Irish language supplements of both newspapers were excluded. The frames identified were usually in the form of statements concerning the referendum, which could be associated to a specific actor in the referendum debate. During the coding process, special attention had to be paid to eliminate frames that were introduced by journalists. This was especially important for opinion and editorial articles. Therefore frames were only used if they could be identified to belong to one of the relevant actors through the use of direct or indirect speech or another kind of clear reference to one of the relevant actors. In total 3,532 individual frames were identified, 1,812 frames for the first referendum and 1,720 frames for the second referendum.

The observed frames were then coded in a format that would allow for answering the research hypotheses based on the collected data. Frames were first classified as belong to one of the predefined actors.

In the second step, the frames were coded depending on their type as issue frame, generic frame or contest frame, as described in chapter 2.

In the third step, issue frames and generic frames were sorted into one of the different categories of issue frames and generic frames used in this research. As described in chapter 2, the different categories of frames were identified using an inductive approach and by applying the criteria of Capella and Jamieson (1997). The frames categories used in this research could be described as "lines of reasoning", which were used by actors in the referendum campaign to describe or break down the complex controversy of the referendum question. These lines of reasoning were translated into frame categories. A summary of all frame categories, including a more detailed explanation and examples for each category is attached in Annex I. In total, 21 issue frame categories and 11 generic frame categories were used in the first referendum and two additional issue frame categories and six additional generic frame categories were used in the second referendum. It would have been possible to reduce the number of frame categories, for example, by merging the issue frame categories "neutrality", "militarization" and "sovereignty" into an umbrella frame "sovereignty" or the issue frame categories "tax", "foreign investment", "minimum wage" and "economic recovery" into an umbrella frame "economy". However, the reduction into fewer and broader defined frame categories would have resulted in a loss of information in relation to the variety of frames used and on the use of the opponent side's frames.

In the fourth step, all issue frames were coded depending on their valence as negative, positive or neutral frames, as defined in chapter 2.

In the final step, all issue frames, which are identified as frames of the respectively opposing side in the referendum debate, were coded as offensive or defensive frames, following the definition in chapter 2.

The *Irish Times* and *Irish Independent* were chosen as source media as they are the two broadsheet daily titles with the highest readership in Ireland (ABC, 2009). Tabloid newspapers are excluded from this research, as the broadsheet papers are expected to allocate more space for referendum coverage (De Vreese & Semetko, 2004a). Tabloid newspapers in Ireland were also credited to be Eurosceptic and therefore more likely to offer a biased picture of the referendum campaign (Hennessy, 2008; European Commission, n.d.). However, a journalistic bias in the reporting of the referendum also can't be avoided in the *Irish Times* and the *Irish Independent*, but for the print media, the selection of these papers is understood as the best means to reduce journalistic bias. The medium of the print media is chosen over the medium internet and television. The internet is excluded as source, as the coverage on the internet is difficult to monitor, especially as both referendums lie in the past. The print media was preferred over television media, as the newspapers are expected to guarantee a more diverse and broader coverage of the referendum than television. Television coverage on referendums in Ireland is further biased as result of the Coughlan judgment, in which the high court decided that the state broadcaster RTE has to allot equal television and radio air time to both sides of the debate (O'Mahony, 2009). Research findings from the first referendum also indicate that newspapers were, along with television news and national radio news, the most effective source of information. 58 per cent of voters asked in the poll said that newspaper articles were very or somewhat valuable as information source on the referendum, compared to 62 per cent for television news and 59 per cent for national radio news (Millward Brown ISM, 2008).

The dependent variable in this research is the "framing behavior", which is described by the types and characteristics of the frames used by one actor. As described in the research hypotheses, it is expected that different framing behavior can be observed from the actors on different sides of the referendum debate. The affiliation with the different side in the referendum debate constitutes the independent variable of this research.

## **4 Introduction to Referendums and Actors**

### **4.1 The Institutional Context of Referendums in Ireland**

Referendums are known as a direct democratic element used to consult voters directly in a policy decision. Referendums can vary greatly in their institutional context. A common distinction for referendums is made by a matrix on the binding/non-binding nature of the vote and the question if a referendum is legally required/non-required (Hobolt, 2009; Hug, 2002; Hug & Sciarini, 2000). Other categorizations are (1) mandatory (constitutional) referendums, (2) abrogative or rejective referendums, (3) citizen (initiated) or popular referendums and (4) consultative or plebiscite referendums (Schiller, 2005; LeDuc, 2003). LeDuc further distinguishes referendums based on the subject matter of the referendum (LeDuc, 2003). As Hug highlights, the institutional form of referendums is not to be neglected, as different institutional frameworks of referendums has an impact on voting behavior and the outcome of the referendum (Hug, 2000, 2004).

Referendums are a common element in Ireland's democratic framework, which saw 22 referendums on 30 specific issues take place since 1959, with 13 referendums in the last 20 years. Referendums in Ireland are based on Article 46 of the Irish constitution, which "provides that all constitutional amendments proposed by the Dáil (lower house) must be ratified by a majority of voters in a binding referendum." (LeDuc, 2003, p.131). Speaking in the above mentioned characterization, referendums in Ireland are therefore legally required and their outcome is binding. Based on Schiller and LeDuc's characterization, Irish referendums can be described as mandatory constitutional referendums.

So far, Ireland has seen eight referendums on European treaties, starting with the accession referendum in 1972. When the political establishment tried to ratify the Single European Act in 1986 by parliamentary approval, the high court decided in the *Raymond Crotty v. An Taoiseach and others*<sup>3</sup> case, that the Single European Act constituted a change in the Irish constitution and, therefore, needed to be ratified by referendum. Based on this judgment, governments were now understood to be politically obliged to seek the approval of voters on European treaties and did so on each consequent occasion – Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1998), Nice (2001, 2002) and Lisbon (2008, 2009) (O'Mahony, 2009; FitzGibbon, 2009; Sitter, 2009). A special situation occurred in 1992 when, in the wake of the Maastricht referendum, the government announced to hold a separate referendum on the issue of abortion in order to keep the issue out of the Maastricht referendum. The issue of abortion had been subject in a previous referendum in 1983 and a second referendum on abortion

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<sup>3</sup> See further High Court, (1987). *Raymond Crotty v. An Taoiseach and Others* [1986 No. 12036P]

was consequently held five months after the Maastricht treaty was ratified by Irish voters.

## **4.2 The Two Referendums on the Lisbon Treaty**

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of May, 2008, the Irish government announced that the long anticipated referendum on the Lisbon treaty would take place on the 12<sup>th</sup> of June, 2008 (Department for the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2008). From the beginning of 2008 until the 16<sup>th</sup> of May, three weeks before the referendum date, the Yes side had a comfortable lead in the polls, as indicated in a TNS/mrbi poll, in which 35 per cent of the voters were in favor, 18 per cent against and 47 per cent were still undecided (Qvortrup, 2009). The atmosphere of the campaign was influenced by the “Mahon Tribunal”, an investigation into the private finances of former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, who resigned in the context of the tribunal on the 6<sup>th</sup> of May, five weeks before the referendum date. Another important issue during the referendum campaign was the WTO negotiations and the governments possible course of action to veto an WTO deal to protect Irish farmers (Qvortrup, 2009; O’Mahony, 2009). Through the campaign, the No-side was able to set the agenda on issues like the loss of economic and national sovereignty - including the area of tax, trade and military neutrality – the loss of the Irish Commissioner and voting strength in the Council or threat to workers’ rights and the public services. The EU’s democratic deficit, moral issues like abortion and the renegotiation of the treaty were also topics raised by the No side (Qvortrup, 2009; Quinlan, 2009; O’Brennan, 2009; Holmes, 2008; O’Mahony, 2009). Actors on the No side were assisted in their campaigning efforts by a well-financed media campaign made possible by Libertas and by a Eurohostile media (Qvortrup, 2009; European Commission, n.d.). Throughout the campaign, the Yes side focused on countering the arguments and misinformation spread by the No side (O’Mahony, 2009). Qvortrup (2009) highlights that actors on the Yes side made a variety of tactical errors during the referendum campaign. Examples were the failure to concentrate on a single central campaign motive or the political contest, in which the political parties on the Yes side were engaged for large parts of the campaign. Other mistakes commonly quoted were the confession of Taoiseach Brian Cowen and Irish Commissioner Charlie McCreevy not to have read the Lisbon treaty in full and the mediocre campaign material of the Yes side, which was designed to boost the popularity of the parties’ politicians for next year’s local and European elections (Qvortrup, 2009; Quinlan, 2009; O’Mahony, 2009; Holmes, 2008).

On the 13<sup>th</sup> of June, 2008, it was announced that the referendum was rejected by 53.4 per cent of the electorate at a turnout of 53.1 per cent. As part of the government’s reaction, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) soon got involved in studying the reasons for the rejection, resulting in a study by Millward Brown IMS (2008) and a report by Sinnott, Elkins, O’Rourke and McBride (2009). The findings were that, “the defeat was heavily influenced by low levels of knowledge and by specific misperceptions in the areas of abortion, corporate taxation and conscription.” (Sinnott

et al., 2009, p. iv). Other important issues were concerns about losing the Irish Commissioner, changes in the voting system and loss of neutrality and sovereignty (Sinnott et al., 2009, O'Brennan, 2009). Those findings were later confirmed by other scholars (O'Brennan, 2009; Holmes, 2008). The first referendum on the Lisbon treaty is seen to show many similarities with the rejection of the Nice treaty. During the referendum in 2001, low levels of knowledge paired with a perceived threat to Irish neutrality and sovereignty, the loss of voting rights in the Council, the right to nominate a commissioner, as well as fears on abortion had played a crucial role in the defeat of the Nice treaty (Marsh, 2007). Following the rejection of the Lisbon treaty, the Irish government engaged itself into a process that would respect the decision of the voters and the desire of the European partners to implement the Lisbon Treaty.

In November 2008, the "Oireachtas sub-committee on Ireland's future in the European Union" suggested that clarifications on certain issues should be secured from the other member states before a second referendum could be held (Houses of the Oireachtas – Sub-Committee on Ireland's Future in the European Union, 2008). In December 2008, the European Council agreed that Ireland should be given legal guarantees on the issues of taxation, neutrality and as far as the Charter of Fundamental Rights was concerned on the issue of education, the family and the right to life. It was further decided, that each member state would continue to be represented by a member in the European Commission and that the high importance of social progress, the protection of workers' rights and public services was to be reaffirmed by a solemn declaration. These declarations, generally referred to as legal guarantees, were finally agreed upon by the European Council in June 2009 and would take effect on the same date as the Lisbon treaty. The guarantees would be annexed to the current treaties in the form of a protocol with the next accession treaty (DFA 2009; Miller 2009). With the legal guarantees included in the new referendum package, the Taoiseach Brian Cowen announced on the 8<sup>th</sup> of July, 2009, that the concerns of the Irish voters were sufficiently addressed and a new referendum would be held on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of October, 2009 (Mahony, 2009). In the second referendum campaign, the context had changed in some respects. Next to the legal guarantees been added to the referendum package, the impact of the financial crisis on Ireland was the second major change. In the second quarter of 2008 the Irish economy had slipped into recession and would shrink by 9.3 per cent until the third quarter of 2009. The unemployment rate had risen from 5.9 per cent in June 2008 to 12.1 per cent in July 2009. The economic difficulties were accompanied by several budget cuts and an increasing unpopularity of the government (Central Statistic Office, 2010, 2011; Quinlan, 2009).

Similar to the first referendum campaign, the Yes side was able to carry a comfortable lead in the polls into the campaign phase. On the 18<sup>th</sup> of May a TNS-MRBI poll reported 52 per cent of voters in favor, 29 per cent against the treaty and 19 per cent undecided (Collins, 2008). A major difference in the campaign of the second

referendum was the emergence of various new players on the Yes side including different civil society organizations and two multinationals. The campaign on the Yes side was better organized and concentrated on a single message, “the necessary of Ireland passing Lisbon to ensure that the country stayed at the centre of the EU to help solve the economic crisis.” (FitzGibbon, 2010, p.231). Instead of focusing on the merits of the Lisbon treaty, the Yes side played the membership card, building on the traditionally positive attitudes of Irish voters towards the EU. (FitzGibbon, 2010) In the second referendum, the No side lacked the participation of Declan Ganley, the founder and most important actor of Libertas, as a unifying factor, although he reentered the stage on the 12<sup>th</sup> of September. The legal guarantees did eliminate many of the No side’s previous arguments, though some actors highlighted that the legal guarantees would not change an iota of the Lisbon treaty. A new issue, introduced by the No side, was the implications of the Lisbon treaty on the minimum wage in Ireland. The unpopularity of the government was also raised by the No side. (FitzGibbon, 2010)

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October, 2009, the result of the second Lisbon referendum was announced as 67.1 per cent in favor at a turnout of 58 per cent. The success of the Yes side tactic to utilize the positive Irish attitudes towards the EU and to use the economic situation is reflected in the “Lisbon Treaty Referendum Survey” issued by the European Commission (2009). While the research registered, similar to 2008, positive EU attitudes as one major explanation for Yes votes, the economic argument was another major reason to vote Yes in the second referendum. 23 per cent of all voters now said that the ratification of the treaty will help the Irish economy (9 per cent in 2008). On the No side, the most important reason to vote No in the first referendum, the lack of knowledge, plummeted from 22 per cent in 2008 to 4 per cent in 2009. The issue of Irish identity and sovereignty, as well as distrust in politicians and the rerun of the referendum, were major factors to vote No in the second referendum (European Commission, 2009).

### **4.3 The Different Actors in the Two Referendum Campaigns**

The Yes side in the first referendum was made up of the major political parties in Ireland, one civil society organization, one business organizations and one union. In the second referendum a group of new civil society organizations and multinationals joined the Yes camp. The group of political parties included the main government party “Fianna Fáil” (FF) and the minor coalition partner “Progressive Democrats” (PD). The third coalition partner, the “Green Party” (GP) joined the Yes side in the second referendum, when this time around its leadership could guarantee the required 2/3 majority on a party convention to support the Lisbon treaty. The Progressive Democrats did not participate in the second referendum, as the party disintegrated in November 2008. Both opposition parties “Fine Gael” (FG) and “The Labour Party” (Lab) participated on the Yes side in both referendums as well as the “European Commission” representing the European political establishment. It shall be noted that



the government as such did not campaign on the Lisbon treaty as a result of the McKenna<sup>4</sup> judgments, which says that the government is not allowed to use public money to campaign for one side in a referendum.

**Table 2: Actors in the 2008 and 2009 Referendum campaigns** (actors in italics only participated in one referendum, arrows indicate actors switching positions)

	First Referendum 2008	Second Referendum 2009
<b>Yes side</b>	Fianna Fáil Fine Gael The Labour Party <i>Progressive Democrats</i> European Commission <i>Irish Alliance for Europe</i> <i>Business Alliance for Europe</i> Ictu	Fianna Fáil Fine Gael The Labour Party Green Party European Commission <i>Ireland for Europe</i> <i>We Belong</i> <i>Ireland's Future</i> <i>Business for Europe</i> <i>Ryanair</i> <i>Intel</i> <i>Charter Group</i> Ictu Siptu IFA
<b>Neutral side</b>	Green Party Siptu IFA Church	Church <i>European Parliament</i> <i>President</i> <i>Concern</i>
<b>No side</b>	Sinn Féin Socialist Party <i>Workers Party</i> Campaign against the EU Constitution (later: No to Lisbon) Libertas Cóir Unite TEEU	Sinn Féin Socialist Party <i>UKIP</i> No to Lisbon Cóir Libertas Unite TEEU Farmers for No

The only noticeable civil society organization in the first referendum was the “Irish Alliance for Europe”, which in this study will also include the “Women’s Alliance” and only participated in the first referendum. In the second referendum new civil society groups joined the Yes side, most importantly “Ireland for Europe”, which in this study includes Women for Europe, Solicitors for Europe, Lawyers for Europe, Generation Yes and Europe for Ireland. Other new actors on the civil society side include “We Belong”, “Ireland’s Future” and “The Charter Group”.

<sup>4</sup> See further High Court (1995). Patricia McKenna Plaintiff v. An Taoiseach and Others [S.C. Nos. 361 and 366 of 1995]

In the first referendum, the business world was represented by the “Business Alliance for Europe”, including a wide range of different organizations such as the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (Ibec), Chambers Ireland, the American Chambers Ireland, the Small Firms Association, the Irish Exporters Association, the Irish Hoteliers Federation and the Irish Foods and Drinks Association and others. In the second referendum, business was represented by “Business for Europe”, which additionally included the Taxation Institute and the Consumers Association of Ireland. Further, “Intel” and “Ryanair” ran separate campaigns in the second referendum. As a business-related interest group, the “Irish Farmers’ Association” (IFA) campaigned on the Yes-side in the second referendum after being neutral in the first referendum.

On the union side, the “Irish Congress of Trade Unions” (Ictu), including its members of the Irish Municipal, Public and Civil Trade Union (Impact) and the Civil and Public Service Union (CPSU), took part in the Yes campaign in both referendums. The “Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union” (Siptu) joined the Yes side in the second referendum after taking a neutral position in the first referendum.

On the No side, three minor political parties were joined by civil society organizations and unions. As political parties, “Sinn Féin” and the “Socialist Party” participated in both referendum campaigns. Only Sinn Féin was represented in the Dáil (Irish parliament) during both referendums and the Socialist Party held no major mandate during the first referendum. During the second referendum the Socialist Party held a seat in the European Parliament, which was taken over by Sinn Féin in the 2009 European Elections. The “Worker’s Party”, which held a major political mandate, took part in the first referendum. Further, the “United Kingdom Independence Party” (UKIP) joined the Yes side in the second referendum.

For the civil society, two groups and one umbrella group were registered in this research. In both referendums, the most important civil society groups on the No side were “Libertas” and “Cóir”. Other civil society groups were organized under the umbrella organization “Campaign against the EU Constitution” (CAEUC), which was named “No to Lisbon” in the second campaign. The CAEUC includes the People’s Movement, People before Profit, the National Platform, the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) and Afri – Peace and Justice Group. As an umbrella group, the CAEUC did also include Cóir, Sinn Féin, the Socialist Party and the Workers’ Party, which are mentioned separately in this research. Furthermore, a group that split from the IFA on the issue of Lisbon, the “Farmers for No” group joined the No camp in the second campaign.

On the union side, “Unite” and the “Technical Engineering and Electrical Union” (TEEU) campaigned on the No side in both referendums. Both unions are also members of Ictu, which officially campaigned in both referendums on the Yes side.

The number of neutral actors in the referendum campaigns was rather small. The main group associated with this category is the church, including the different

Christian denominations in Ireland. The church was important for the discussion of moral values like abortion, but officially did not favor any side. As mentioned before, the “Green Party” was officially neutral in the first referendum campaign and joined the Yes side in the referendum, although the leading party figures were already asking voters to vote Yes in the first referendum. “Siptu” was also neutral in the first referendum. The case of the “IFA” is somewhat more difficult. As mentioned before, the IFA supported the Yes side in the second referendum and a splinter group “Farmers for No” joined the No camp in the second referendum. In the first referendum the IFA didn’t declare its official support for the Yes side until the 4<sup>th</sup> of June, eight days before the referendum date. Before the 4<sup>th</sup> of June, the IFA had, however, threatened to urge farmers to vote No based on the government’s position towards the WTO negotiations. As the IFA sat between the chairs for most of the campaign, it was, in this research, described as a neutral actor in the first referendum. In the second referendum, the neutral side was further joined by “concern” and the “President of the European Parliament”, Jerzy Buzek.

## 5 Framing the First Lisbon Referendum 2008

The research on the first referendum is based on the media coverage in the *Irish Times* and the *Irish Independent* between the 18<sup>th</sup> of April, 2008, and the referendum date, the 12<sup>th</sup> of June, 2008. During this period an total of 778 articles on the Lisbon referendum were registered, of which 492 articles carried frames relevant for this research. In the first referendum a total of 1,812 frames were identified. 851, or 47.0 per cent, of those frames were issue frames, 421, or 23.2 per cent, were generic frames and 540, or 29.8 per cent, were contest frames. For the Yes side, 1,148 frames, or 63.4 per cent of all frames, were registered, compared to 508 frames, or 28.0 per cent, for the No camp and 157 frames, or 8.7 per cent, for the Neutral camp.

Table 3 shows how the frames were divided within and among each camp. On the Yes side, almost 77 per cent of all shares were registered for the three main political parties, Fianna Fáil (42.7% of all Yes side coverage), Fine Gael (19.5%) and the Labour Party (14.7%). The remaining frames on the Yes side were split between the other organizations in the Yes camp. On the No side, the major actors were Sinn Féin (34.4% of all No side coverage) and the two civil society organization Libertas (26.0%) and the CAEUC (20.1%), accounting for an total of around 80 per cent. On the Neutral side, the Green Party (39.7% of all Neutral side coverage), the IFA (26.3%) and the church (21.8%) accounted for most of the coverage.

**Table 3: Share of frames for Yes, No and Neutral sides and split up for actors on each side**

Yes side – 63,4%		No side – 28.0%		Neutral side – 8.7%	
Fianna Fáil	42.7%	Sinn Féin	34.4%	Green Party	39.7%
Fine Gael	19.5%	Libertas	26.0%	IFA	26.3%
The Labour Party	14.7%	CAEUC	20.1%	Church	21.8%
Irish Alliance for Europe	8.4%	Cóir	6.9%	Siptu	12.2%
European Commission	6.9%	Socialist Party	6.1%		
Business Alliance for Europe	5.0%	Unite	3.3%		
Ictu	1.7%	TEEU	1.8%		
Progressive Democrats	1.0%	Workers' Party	1.4%		
	100.0%		100.0%		100.0 %

In the 2008 referendum, the 851 issue frames registered were divided into 21 issue frame categories. Throughout the first referendum the issue frame category “taxation” (13% of all issue frames used) was used most followed by the categories “consequence of a No vote” (7.9%), “neutrality” (7.6%), “workers’ rights” (7.5%) and “democratic development” (7.4%). In the Yes camp, issue frames on “taxation” (15.5% of all Yes side issue frames), the “consequence of No vote” (11.8%), “neutrality” (8.6%), “efficiency” (8.4%) and “voting strength” (6.1%) were used most. These five

frames constituted an aggregate 50.4 per cent of the Yes side's issue frames. In the No camp the issue frames on "workers' rights" (10.9% of all No side issue frames), "militarization" (10.2%), "taxation" (9.9%), "democratic development" (9.2%) and "voting strength" (8.9%) were most popular and accounted for 45.4 per cent of the No side's issue frames.

The 421 generic frames identified in this research were divided into 11 categories. Most commonly used throughout the referendum were the generic frames on "WTO talks" (22.4% of all generic frames), "benefits of membership" (14.9%) and "renegotiation" (13%). The Yes side focused on the generic frames on "benefits of membership" (19.2% of all Yes side generic frames), "national interest" (12.5%) and "WTO Talks" (18.5%), amounting to 50.2 per cent of all generic frames used by the Yes camp. The first two issue frames do thereby focus on EU attitudes and partisanship. On the No side, the generic frames on "renegotiation" (47.7% of all No side generic frames) was used predominantly, followed by generic frames on "lack of information" (18.5%) and "WTO talks" (10.8%). Frames from those three categories accounted for a total of 77 per cent of all No side's generic frames. More information on the categories of issue frames and generic frames in the first referendum can be found in Annex I. In Table 19 of Annex II, a complete overview of the usage of all issue and generic frame categories by the Yes and the No side is portrayed.

## 5.1 Did the Yes Side Concentrate on A Few Core Issues?

The first research hypothesis implies that the No side uses a greater variety of issue and generic frames compared to the Yes side. In order to answer this question, the usage of the different categories of issue and generic frames by both sides needs to be reviewed.

To measure the variety in the usage of frames, the formula of Laakso & Taagepera (1979) can be used as "a framework to express concentration, fractionalization, and effective number of components which differ in size." (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979, p.23). The formula is also known to be used in the measurement of "effective number of parties" in a political system. In the formula by Laakso & Taagepera (1), the variety coefficient ( $N_2$ ) is measured as the sum of the squared shares ( $p_i$ ) of the total number of variables ( $n$ ):

$$(1) N_2 = \left( \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2 \right)^{-1}$$

In this research the variety coefficient in the usage of frames is the sum of the squared shares of the individual issue and generic frame categories.

$$(2) \text{Variance} = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{\text{frame categories}=32} \text{squared share for each frame category} \right)^{-1}$$

The variety coefficient has to carry a value between 1 and  $N_{\max}$ , the absolute number of the frame categories. A variety coefficient with the value of 1 expresses a situation

in which all coverage concentrates on one single frame, i.e. one frame category consumes 100 per cent of all coverage and all other categories have no coverage.

A variety coefficient with a value  $N_{max}$  expresses a setting in which all coverage is in exactly equal shares between all available frame categories ( $n$ ), i.e. all frame categories have the same share of coverage. A small variety coefficient does therefore, indicates a concentration of the usage of frames on a small number of issue and generic frame categories, whereas a high variety coefficient indicates a stronger fractionalization between the different issue and generic frame categories. Following the research hypothesis, the Yes side is expected to have a lower variety coefficient compared to the No side.

**Table 4: Variance coefficient for the 2008 referendum**

	<b>Yes side</b>	<b>No side</b>	<b>Nmax</b>
<b>Issue frames</b>	13.18	13.17	21
<b>Generic frames</b>	8.08	3.43	11
<b>All frames</b>	<b>21.20</b>	<b>16.50</b>	<b>32</b>

The results portrayed in Table 4 show that the No side concentrated in their framing behavior on a smaller number of frames than the Yes side did. If the variety coefficient for issue frames is measured, the Yes and the No side show a similar variance their usage of issue frames. In the usage of generic frames, the No side showed a strong concentration, resulting in a variety coefficient of 3.4 compared to the Yes side with a variety coefficient of 8. If all frames are considered, the Yes side showed a higher variety in their usage of different frame categories compared to the No side. An overview of the usage of the different issue and generic frame categories in the first referendum is provided in Annex II, Table 19.

The conclusion on the first research hypothesis is that the No side did not use a greater variety of frames compared to the Yes side in the first referendum. While both sides used a similar variety of issue frames, the Yes side showed a considerable higher use of generic frames. This also resulted in a higher variety in the usage of issue and generic frames. Qvortrup (2009) confirms this observation, as he highlights that one error of the Yes side in the first referendum was the failure to have a “narrow focus” on one “symbolic issue”. This research shows that the Yes side failed to concentrate their communication on a single issue or a small number of issues, compared to the No side. (Qvortup, 2009) The rejection of the first research hypothesis might therefore be the result of campaigning errors on the Yes side.

## 5.2 Did the Yes Side Talk About the Issue and the No Side Talk Around?

The second research hypothesis asks for differences in the use of issue and contest frames between actors in the Yes and the No camp. It is expected that the No side uses relatively more contest frames and the Yes side uses relatively more issue frames.

As portrayed in Table 5, the data on the usage of issue and contest frames shows that the framing behavior in the first referendum was not in line with the expectations. The Yes side used 30.5 per cent of its frames as contest frames, while the No side employed 28.1 per cent of their frames as contest frames. This result is reflected by the differing allocation of contest frames within the Yes and No camp. On the Yes side, the political parties, and especially the opposition parties, showed a relatively high usage of contest frames (FF 29.2%, FG 40.6%, Lab 37.9%). The other actors on the Yes side showed a relative lower usage of contest frames (EC 11.9%, Irish Alliance for Europe 19.6%, Business Alliance for Europe 19.3%). On the No side, the use of contest frames varied between 21 per cent and 28 per cent and only Libertas (40.1%) and the TEEU (33.3%) used higher rates of contest frames. This detailed analysis suggests that the high amount of contest frames used in the first referendum by the Yes camp is caused by an issue within the sphere of the political parties on the Yes side. Indeed, the campaign was, in parts, dominated by discord among the different political parties on the Yes side on their performance in the referendum campaign, or more generally by domestic party competition (Quinlan, 2009; FitzGibbon, 2009).

**Table 5: Usage of types and characteristics of frames in the 2008 referendum** (in absolute numbers and percentage of frames; percentages on valence of frame and use of opponent side's frame relation to number of issue frames)

Actors \ Frames	Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame	
	Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neu.	Off.	Def.
<b>Yes side</b>	487	311	350	203	53	233	46	183
	<b>42.4%</b>	<b>27.1%</b>	<b>30.5%</b>	<b>41.7%</b>	<b>10.9%</b>	<b>47.8%</b>	<b>9.4%</b>	<b>37.6%</b>
<b>No side</b>	301	64	143	6	234	61	39	6
	<b>59.2%</b>	<b>12.6%</b>	<b>28.2%</b>	<b>2.0%</b>	<b>78.0 %</b>	<b>20.0%</b>	<b>13.0%</b>	<b>2.0%</b>
<b>Referendum – overall (including neutral actors)</b>	851	421	540	227	299	327	85	194
	<b>46.9%</b>	<b>23.2%</b>	<b>29.8%</b>	<b>26.7%</b>	<b>35.2%</b>	<b>38.5%</b>	<b>10 %</b>	<b>22.8%</b>

The use of issue frames is also contrary to the expectations raised in the second research hypothesis. The Yes side utilized 42.2 per cent of their frames as issue frames, but 59.2 per cent of the No side's frames were found to be issue frames. Again, differences within each side are visible. The non-political actors on the Yes side had a ratio of 47 per cent to 75 per cent of issue frames. The main political parties on the Yes side showed much lower usage of issue frames (FF 39.2%, FG 32.6%, Lab 45.6%), than the No side, where all actors except Libertas (43.2%) and Unite (47.1%) used between 55 per cent and 74 per cent of their frames as issue frames. The detailed data on the use of issue frames and contest frames by the different actors of on both sides is given in Annex II, Table 20.

In summary, both expectation from the second research hypothesis on the use of issue frames and contest frames are rejected by the data on the first referendum. The high use of contest frames by political parties on the Yes side is explained by domestic party competition. This result would also reflect research findings by Hänggeli and Kriesi (2010), who showed that during a Swiss referendum the Yes side employed a higher share of contest frames compared to the No side. However, based on methodological differences of their data collection compared to this research, their finding could be viewed with caution. On the usage of issue frames, in this research, almost all actors on the Yes side, taken especially the political parties, failed to reach the average percentage of issue frame usage registered for the No side. Overall, the framing behavior of political parties on the Yes side seems to be the decisive factor in the rejection of the second research hypothesis.

### **5.3 How Does the Yes Side Handle the No side's Frames?**

The third research hypothesis concerns the handling of issue frames, which are owned by the opposite side in the debate. The research hypothesis states: "*Actors on the Yes side will use relatively more often defensive frames than actors on the No side.*"

As mentioned in chapter 2, the ownership of issue frame categories is based on a qualitative measurement, compared to a quantitative measurement as suggested by Hänggeli and Kriesi (2010). The ownership of the issue frame categories registered in the first referendum is mentioned in Annex II, Table 19. If the measurement by Hänggeli and Kriesi had been used, the issue frames on "taxation", "neutrality", "voting strength", "moral values" and "democratic development" would have been owned by the respective opposing side in the campaign.

As shown in Table 5, the data on the usage of the opponent side's frames is in line with expectations of the third research hypothesis. The Yes side used a total of 183 defensive frames, representing 37.6 per cent of the Yes side's issue frames. The No side used the marginal number of 6 defensive frames, representing 2 per cent of their overall number of issue frames. Once again, the political parties on the Yes side show a different framing behavior than the other actors in the Yes camp. Fianna Fáil



(40.0%), Fine Gael (56.2%) and the Labour Party (36.8%) employed a higher ration of defensive frames compared to the other actors on the Yes side (PD 33.3%, EC 24.4%, Irish Alliance for Europe 29.1%, Business Alliance for Europe 28.6%, Ictu 6.7%). Actors on the Yes side concentrated their defensive frames on “taxation”, “neutrality”, “moral values”, “voting strength” and “militarization”, all issues that proved to be decisive in the outcome of the referendum (Sinnott et al., 2009). On the No side, the Socialist Party (13.0%) was the only actor employing defensive frames in a wider scope, concentrating on the issue frame “Charter of Fundamental Rights”. The usage of defensive frames in the No camp is also lower than could have been expected, compared to the results of Hänggli and Kriesi’s (2010) research.

Another interesting observation is that both sides used a considerable amount of offensive frames. The Yes side used 9.4 per cent of their issues frames in an offensive way, concentrating on the issue “Commissioner”, “workers’ rights” and “voting strength”. The No side used 13 per cent of their issue frames in an offensive way, concentrating on the issues “democratic development” and “Charter of Fundamental Rights”. The use of offensive frames shows that both sides pushed their own arguments on the respective issues and did not surrender those issues to the other side in the campaign. Detailed data on the usage of offensive and defensive frames by the different actors is portrayed in Annex II, Table 20.

To sum up, the third research hypothesis is confirmed by the data from the first referendum. The actors on the Yes side used more defensive frames compared to the actors on the No side. Again, the political parties on the Yes side show a distinct different framing behavior than other actors in the Yes camp, this time using relatively more defensive frames. Further, a high amount of offensive frames used by both sides was registered.

#### **5.4 Is It All Positive on the Yes Side and All Negative on the No Side?**

The fourth research hypothesis concerns the valence different actors attach to their issue frames. The question is, if actors on the Yes side use more often positively valenced issue frames, and if actors on the No side use more often negatively valenced issue frames.

The research hypothesis on the valence of frames is confirmed by the data. On the Yes side, 41.7 per cent of all issue frames were valenced positively, 10.9 per cent were valenced negatively and 47.8 per cent were valenced neutrally. On the No side, 2 per cent of all issue frames had a positive valence, an overwhelming 78 per cent was valenced negatively and 20.3 per cent were valenced neutral. This result shows that the Yes side concentrated strongly on sending positive frames. This observation is even reconfirmed when the use of and neutral frames is analyzed. All negatively valenced frames on the Yes side were made on the issue frame category “consequence of No vote”, which was also the only frame on which the No side used

positive frames. The issue frame “consequence of No vote” refers to the revision point of the referendum issue, which is what happens if a referendum is rejected. The definition of the revision point is an important element in a referendum debate (Hobolt, 2009). The Yes side would therefore valence the revision point negatively as a threat, while the No side would valence it as a positive event or a chance. The data also shows that issue frames used in a defensive way are in most cases neutrally valenced. This can be explained by the categories on which defensive frames were used. The Yes side used most defensive frames on the issues of “taxation”, “neutrality”, “moral values”, “voting strength” and “militarization”. Only for the last category did the Yes camp also use offensive frames. On the other categories, the Yes side rejected the claims made by the No side, but did not give those issues their own spin – i.e. using them in an offensive way. For example, the Yes side was not able to claim that Irish neutrality would be strengthened or that the Irish tax regime would be further safeguarded, but only rejected claims made by the No side. On the Yes side, the high number of neutrally valenced frames is therefore linked to the high number of defensive frames.

On the No side, the framing behavior with respect to the valence of frames is also clear cut. The small amount of positively valenced frames (2%) resulted from the use of offensive frames on the “consequence of No vote”. The share of neutral frames, however, can’t be explained in a similar way as the neutral frames on the Yes side, as the No side barely used defensive frames. The No side sent neutrally valenced frames on the issues of “taxation”, “workers’ rights”, “neutrality” and “Charter of Fundamental Rights”. The first three issue frames were already linked to the No side early in the campaign. Also, the issues of “neutrality”, “moral values”, “militarization” and “sovereignty”, had been used by the No side – in most cases by the same actors – in previous referendums on European integration in Ireland, such as the two referendums on the Nice treaty (O’Brennan, 2009). It might therefore be possible that these frames categories used by the No camp could be understood by voters in the context of the campaign as negatively valenced. Voters could associate here these frames with the negative valence that was defined earlier in the campaign or even in previous referendum campaigns. Detailed data on the valence of issue frames by the different actors is portrayed in Annex II, Table 20.

In summary, the fourth research hypothesis is confirmed by the data of the first referendum. Actors on the No side valenced issue frames relatively more often negatively and actors on the Yes side valenced issue frames relatively more often positively. Negative frames on the Yes side and positive frames on the No side are explained by the framing of the revision point of the referendum issue. The high amount of neutrally valenced frames on the Yes side is linked to the high number of defensive frames used by the Yes camp and the high number of neutral frames on the No side could be explained by the voters’ familiarization with certain No side frames.

## 5.5 How Does the Campaign Look in the Last Two Weeks?

The fifth research hypothesis focuses on changes in the framing behavior over the course of the two referendum campaign. It is expected that in the final two weeks of the campaign, actors on both sides used relatively more often defensive frames and contest frames compared to the earlier phase of the campaign.

A first observation on changes in the framing behavior over time is that the number of frames was relatively higher in the last two weeks – 828 frames in the final phase – compared to the first six weeks – 983 frames in the run-up phase. The share of the Yes side decreased from 66 per cent of all frames in the run-up phase to 60 per cent of all frames in the final phase. The No camp's share shrank from 29 per cent in the run-up phase to 27 per cent in the final phase and correspondingly the Neutral side increased their share from 5 per cent to 13 per cent.

**Table 6: Usage of different types and characteristics of frames over time in the 2008 referendum** (in absolute numbers and percentage of frames; percentages on valence of frame and use of opponent side's frame relation to number of issue frames)

Actors \ Frames		Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame	
		Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neu.	Off.	Def.
Yes side	run-up phase	290	178	181	126	17	137	32	119
		<b>44.7%</b>	<b>27.4%</b>	<b>27.9%</b>	<b>46.9%</b>	<b>5.9%</b>	<b>47.2%</b>	<b>10.7%</b>	<b>41.0%</b>
	final phase	199	133	169	67	36	96	16	64
		<b>39.5%</b>	<b>26.7%</b>	<b>33.9%</b>	<b>34.0%</b>	<b>18.3%</b>	<b>48.7%</b>	<b>7.6%</b>	<b>32.5%</b>
No side	run-up phase	167	34	84	1	145	21	21	3
		<b>58.5%</b>	<b>12.0%</b>	<b>29.6%</b>	<b>0.6%</b>	<b>87.3%</b>	<b>12.7%</b>	<b>12.0%</b>	<b>1.8%</b>
	final phase	134	30	59	5	89	40	26	3
		<b>60.1%</b>	<b>13.5%</b>	<b>26.5%</b>	<b>3.7%</b>	<b>66.4%</b>	<b>29.9%</b>	<b>14.2%</b>	<b>2.2%</b>
Referendum overall (including neutral actors)	run-up phase	473	236	275	139	169	165	53	122
		<b>48.0%</b>	<b>24.0%</b>	<b>28.0%</b>	<b>29.4%</b>	<b>35.7%</b>	<b>34.9%</b>	<b>10.8%</b>	<b>25.8%</b>
	final phase	378	185	265	80	133	164	42	72
		<b>45.7%</b>	<b>22.3%</b>	<b>32.0%</b>	<b>21.4%</b>	<b>35.4%</b>	<b>43.7%</b>	<b>9.0%</b>	<b>19.0%</b>

As portrayed in Table 6, the data on the fifth research hypothesis is ambiguous. The usage of defensive frames by the Yes side decreased from 41 per cent in the run-up phase to 32.5 per cent in the final phase. On the No side, the usage of defensive frames increased from 1.8 per cent to 2.2 per cent. However, the numbers on the No side might not be representative due to the extremely low number of defensive frames. The usage of contest frames on the Yes side increased from 27.9 per cent in the run-up phase to 33.9 per cent in the final phase, but on the No side, the usage of contest frames decreased from 29.6 per cent to 26.5 per cent. The changes in the framing behavior over time are the same in tendency, if the actors on both sides are reviewed individually.

Still, other observations can be drawn from a comparison of the framing behavior over time. On the Yes side, the usage of issue frames and generic frames decreased towards the later part of the referendum, while the development on the No side was contrary. On the Yes side fewer defensive and fewer offensive frames were used in the second part of the campaign, contrary to the No side where more offensive and defensive frames were employed. In the Yes camp the usage of negatively valenced issue frames increased and the number of positively valenced frames decreased respectively. Those changes could translate to an adopted tactics on the Yes side to promote the argument on the revision point of the referendum more strongly.

On the No side, the number of positively valenced frames and neutrally valenced frames increases, while the number of negatively valenced frames decreased. This shift could be linked to a dynamic described above, in which frames of the No side are recognized by voters in their negative meaning, even if no negative valence is attached to those frames. The detailed overview of changes in the framing behavior over time for the different actors of the Yes and No side is portrayed in Annex II, Table 21.

To sum up, the results for the fifth research hypothesis are undetermined. As the Yes camp increased its relative share of contest frames in the final phase of the campaign, the No camp used fewer contest frames. And while the No side used a higher share of defensive frames in the later part of the campaign, the Yes side reduced its relative share of defensive frames.

## **5.6 Conclusion on the First Referendum**

The observations of the framing behavior of the different actors in the first referendum campaign offer a diverse picture. The first two research hypotheses, on the variety in the usage of frames and the usage of issue and contest frames, are not confirmed by the presented data. The third and fourth hypotheses on the usage of defensive frames and the valence of frames are confirmed by the data from the first referendum. The fifth research hypothesis is also to be rejected by the presented data, as not all expectations raised in the research hypothesis are confirmed. One observation to be made so far is that the framing behavior of the political parties on the Yes side varies

considerably from the framing behavior of the other actors in the Yes camp. This is expressed by a higher relative use of contest frames and defensive frames and a lower use of issue frames. The No side on the other hand seems to be more homogeneous in their framing behavior, with the exception of Libertas, which steps out of the average compared to the other actors on the No camp. However, a heterogeneous framing behavior could be expected from the No side, as different actors are likely to concentrate on different issue and employ different tactics in order to increase the overall effectiveness of the No side campaign. The collected data did also confirm observations, made by other researchers, especially in regards to the failure of the Yes camp to keep a narrow focus on a single “winning” topic and the observation of political party contest within the parties on the Yes side.

In many respects, the campaign on the first referendum on the Lisbon treaty had a few unique characteristics, which were likely to influence the data collected on the referendum. The data collected on the second referendum will therefore be decisive to confirm or challenge the trends evaluated in the first referendum.

## 6 Framing the Second Lisbon Referendum 2009

This chapter reviews the framing behavior of the different actors in the second Lisbon referendum in 2009 and is based on data collected between the 8<sup>th</sup> of August, 2009, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> of October, 2009. During this time 630 articles on the Lisbon Treaty were identified in the *Irish Times* and *Irish Independent*, of which 380 articles carried frames relevant for this research. A total of 1,720 frames were identified, of which 829 were issue frames (48.2%), 451 generic frames (26.3%) and 440 contest frames (25.6%). The breakdown of frames between the different camps is comparable to the first referendum. The Yes side accounted for an aggregate share of 64 per cent of all frames identified in the second referendum compared to 31.5 per cent for the No side and 4.5 per cent for the Neutral side.

Table 7 portrays how the frames were divided between and within each side participating in the referendum debate. On the Yes side new actors joined the campaign, resulting in smaller shares for the individual actors. The political parties reached an aggregate share of 64.9 per cent. The group of civil society organization now includes three actors and had an aggregate share of 12.9 per cent, followed by the business sector (9.2%), the European Commission (7.8%), the Unions (3.7%) and the IFA (1.6%). In the No camp, the allocation of shares between the different groups was similar to the first referendum. The political parties accounted for an aggregate of 43.2 per cent of No side frames, the civil society groups accumulate a share of 48.2

**Table 7: Share of frames for Yes, No and Neutral sides and split up for actors on each side**

Yes side – 64%		No side – 31.5%		Neutral side – 4.5%	
Fianna Fáil	34.2%	Sinn Féin	27.9%	Church	59.7%
Fine Gael	13.3%	No to Lisbon	22.5%	EP President	31.2%
The Labour Party	13.1%	Libertas	13.5%	Concern	9.1%
Ireland for Europe	10.4%	Cóir	12.2%		
European Commission	7.8%	Socialist Party	11.8%		
Business Europe	5.7%	Farmers for No	4.8%		
Green Party	4.3%	UKIP	3.5%		
Charter Group	2.4%	Unite	2.6%		
Ryanair	2.1%	TEEU	1.3%		
We belong	1.9%				
Irish Farmers Association	1.6%				
Intel	1.4%				
Ictu	1.4%				
Ireland's future	0.6%				
Siptu	0.1%				
	100.0%		100.0 %		100.0%

per cent, whereas Farmers for No (4.9%) and the unions (3.9%) had rather marginal shares of coverage.

In the second referendum campaign the total of 829 issue frames were divided between 22 issue frame categories. The category “development policy” was abandoned and the new categories “economic recovery” and “minimum wage” are introduced. The five issue frame categories obtaining most coverage in the referendum were “consequence of No vote” (10.1%), “economic recovery” (9%), “workers’ rights” (8.3%), “moral values” (6.9%) and “neutrality” (6.6%). The five most important issue frames on the Yes side were “consequence of a No vote” (13.2%), “economic recovery” (11.7%), “workers’ rights” (7.3%), “minimum wage” (7.1%) and “neutrality” (6.5%), represented an aggregate 45.8 per cent of all issue frames used by the Yes side. On the No side, the top 5 issue frames were “workers’ rights” (11.2%), “transfer of power” (10.1%), “militarization” (8.6%), “voting strength” (7.6%) and “neutrality” (7.6%) resulting in an aggregate share of 45.1 per cent of the No side’s issue frames. The presentation of the favorite issue frames on both sides shows that especially the issues of “workers’ rights” and “neutrality” were strongly disputed between both sides.

The 451 registered generic frames were divided into 15 generic frame categories, now also including “legal guarantees”, “position within the EU”, “change/rerun”, “future EU”, “farm succession” and “right wing agenda”, replacing the categories of “WTO talks” and “Yes to Europe”. The Yes side’s top generic frames were “position within the EU” (17.5%), “legal guarantees” (16.9%) and “benefits of membership” (14.8%), adding up to an aggregate share of 49.2 per cent of the Yes side’s generic frames. The Yes side’s generic frames do again highlight EU membership attitudes to the voters and the change in context, in which the referendum is held. The favorite generic frames in the No camp were “change/rerun” (36.1%), “government support” (13.9%) and “legal guarantees” (13%) accounting for 63 per cent of the No side’s issue frames. The No side’s favorite generic frames suggest that the No side also addresses the change in the context of the referendum and did additionally link the referendum issue to the unpopular government.

## **6.1 Did the Yes Side Concentrate on A Few Core Issues?**

The first research hypothesis addresses the variety in usage of different issue and generic frames by the Yes and No side in the referendum. For the analyses of the variance, the formula of Laakso & Taagepera (1979) as described in chapter 5.1 is used. The variety coefficients for the use of different frame types in the second referendum are portrayed in Table 8.

The data shows that in the second referendum, the Yes side used a smaller variety of issue frames than the No side, although only by a small margin. Compared to the first referendum, the variety coefficients for both sides increased even stronger than the  $N_{max}$  indicating that both sides actually used a bigger variety of issue frame categories.

**Table 8: Variance coefficient for the 2009 referendum**

	<b>Yes side</b>	<b>No side</b>	<b>Nmax</b>
<b>Issue frames</b>	14.21	14.81	22
<b>Generic frames</b>	8.48	5.37	15
<b>All frames</b>	<b>22.6</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>37</b>

The use of generic frames shows that the Yes side again employed a greater variety of generic frames than the No side. However, the gap in the usage of generic frames narrowed and the Yes side kept their variety coefficients for generic frames almost stable at 8.48 (+0.4), while the No side's coefficient increased to 5.37 (+1.94), while the  $N_{max}$  increased to 15 (+4). The same observation can be made on the variety, if issue and generic frame categories are combined. The Yes side still employs a greater variety of frames compared to the No side, but the gap between the Yes and the No side's variety coefficients closed from 4.7 to 2.4. On overview of the use of issue and contest frame categories by the Yes and the No side is provided in Annex III, Table 22.

The conclusion on the first research hypothesis is that it is again not confirmed from the data in the second referendum. Although the distance in the variety coefficients closed between both camps compared to the first referendum, the Yes side is found to use a similar variety of issue frames and a greater variety of generic frames compared with the No side. Similar as in the first referendum, the No side concentrated their communications on fewer topics, while the Yes side did again seem to not have managed to present a clear focused case in the second referendum campaign. However, the gap between both camps narrowed, but this development is only in some parts related to efforts in Yes camp to use a smaller variety of frames, especially generic frames. It is also the result of a tendency in the No camp to widen their focus and to employ a greater variety of frames, especially generic frames. It can therefore be said that the Yes camp again did not follow the recommendation of Qvortrup (2009) to campaign only on a small number of highly relevant frames.

## **6.2 Did the Yes Side Talk About the Issue and the No Side Talk Around?**

The second research hypothesis asks, which kinds of frames are used by the Yes and the No side in the referendum campaign and implies that the Yes side uses relatively more issue frames, while the No side uses relatively more contest frames.

As portrayed in Table 9, the No side again used a higher relative share of issue frames, 51.3 per cent of all frames used by the No side, compared to the Yes side, which used 46.0 per cent of their frames as issue frames. On the Yes side, the usage



of issue frames on the Yes side is thereby very heterogeneous with some actors using high share of issue frames (Business for Europe 64.2%, GP 57.4% EC 57.0%) and other actors using a comparably low share of issue frames (FG 36.6%, Ryanair 13.0%, IFA 22.2%, Siptu 25.0%). On the No side the framing behavior in relation to the use of issue frames is more homogenous. Farmers for No (73.1%), Unite (71.4%), UKIP (68.4%) and C  ir (62.1%) employ a particular high share of issue frames, while Libertas (28.8%) again shows a particular low interest in issue frames. Farmers for No and C  ir did thereby focused their campaign communication on single issues, migration for the former and moral values and minimum wage for the later. Libertas on the other side seemed to lack a clear focus on a single issue frames and as shown later did also focus their communication on contest frames.

**Table 9: Usage of types and characteristics of frames in the 2009 referendum**  
(in absolute numbers and percentage of frames; percentages on valence of frame and use of opponent side's frame relation to number of issue frames)

Actors \ Frames	Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame	
	Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neu.	Off.	Def.
<b>Yes side</b>	506	329	266	235	69	202	15	100
	46.0%	29.9%	24.2%	46.4%	13.6%	39.9%	3.0%	19.8%
<b>No side</b>	278	108	156	4	200	74	40	28
	51.3%	19.9%	28.8%	1.4%	71.9%	26.6%	14.4%	10.1%
<b>Referendum – overall</b>	<b>829</b>	<b>451</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>141</b>
(including neutral actors)	<b>48.2%</b>	<b>26.2%</b>	<b>25.6%</b>	<b>33.9%</b>	<b>33.9%</b>	<b>35.7%</b>	<b>6.9%</b>	<b>17.0%</b>

The situation on the use of contest frames on the other side has changed compared to the first referendum. In the second referendum, the Yes side used 24.2 per cent of their frames as contest frames, while the No side employed 28.8 per cent of their frames as contest frames. While the No side kept their share of contest frames similar compared to the first referendum, the Yes decreased their share of contest frames from 30.5 per cent in the first referendum to 24.2 per cent in the second referendum. In the first referendum, the political parties on the Yes side had a particular high share of contest frames. In the second referendum they are in line with the rest of the Yes camp (FF 21.5%, FG 27.4%, Lab 27.1%). Business for Europe (9.4%), and the European Commission (17.4%) showed a particular low use of contest frames. On the No side, Libertas (47.9%) used a greater share of contest frames than anyone else in the No camp, whereas Sinn F  in (20.8%) and Farmers for No (7.7%) had a relative

low use for contest frames in the second referendum. A detailed overview of the usage of different types of frames by all actors is presented in Annex III, Table 23.

To sum up, the data on the second referendum gives an ambiguous, but different picture compares to the first referendum. In the second referendum the No side used a higher relative amount of contest frames, as predicted in the research hypothesis, but also used a relative higher amount of issue frames, contrary to the prediction of the research hypothesis. On the use of contest frames, the No side kept their share of contest frames stable, whereas the Yes side decreased their share of contest frames by about 6.3 per cent. Compared to the first referendum, the political parties on the Yes side lowered their share of contest frames considerably. As the high usage of contest frames by the political parties on the Yes side in the first referendum was described as unusual and caused by party competition, it can be assumed that the framing behavior in relation to contest frames in the second referendum reflects the norm. The assumption on the use of contest frames in referendums can therefore be seen as confirmed. On the part of the usage of issue frames, the gap of 17.0 per cent in the usage of issue frames between both sides in the first referendum narrowed to 5.3 per cent in the second referendum, resulting from both a higher use of issue frames on the Yes side and a lower used of issue frames by the No side. While the gap narrowed, the No side still employed a considerably higher share of issue frames compared to the No side. The assumption on the framing behavior in relation to issue frames as described in the research hypothesis is therefore not confirmed by the data on the two Lisbon referendums.

### **6.3 How Does the Yes Side Handle the No side's Frames?**

The usage of opponent side's frames is addressed in the third research hypothesis. The third research hypothesis implies: *"Actors on the Yes-side will use relatively more often defensive frames than actors on the No side."*

The ownership of issue frame categories in the second referendum is noted in Annex III, Table 22. Compared to the first referendum the ownership of the categories "workers' rights", "commissioner" and "foreign investment" switched from the No side to the Yes side. Those changes are likely to be prompted by the appearance of the legal guarantees for the first two categories and the financial crisis in the later case. The issue on "immigration" switched from the Yes side to the No side in the second referendum and was particularly promoted by UKIP and Farmers for No.

As portrayed in Table 9, the data on the second referendum does again verify the research hypothesis on the use of the opponent side's frames. The Yes side used 19.8 per cent of its issue frames in a defensive way, whereas the No side employed 10.1 per cent of its issue frames in a defensive manner. With the exception of the Green Party (7.4%), the political parties on the Yes side showed once again a relatively high usage of defensive frames (FG 30.2%, GP 29.6%, FF 22.8%). On the No side, the Socialist Party (20.0%), Sinn Féin (15.0%) and Libertas (14.3%) showed

the highest rates of defensive frames, concentrating on the issues frame categories “economic recovery” and “foreign investment”. It is also surprising that two of the bigger actors in the No camp, C oir and Farmers for No, did not use any defensive frames at all, while the second biggest actor on the No side, No to Lisbon, only employed 5.5 per cent of their issue frames in a defensive way.

In the second referendum, the Yes side used a smaller number of their frames in an offensive way (3.0%) compared to the first referendum (9.4%). This probably results from the switch of issue ownership of the categories “commissioner” and “workers’ rights”, which were the main issues the Yes side addresses by offensive frames in the first referendum. In the No camp, the usage of offensive frames increased slightly compared to the first referendum. The actors in the No camp focused their offensive frames on “workers’ rights”, which had switched ownership in the second referendum, but also – similar as in the first referendum – on the categories “democratic development” and “Charter of Fundamental Rights”. A detailed overview on the use of offensive and defensive frames by the different actors is presented in Annex III, Table 23.

So sum up, the data on the framing behavior in relation to the use of the opponent side’s frames in the second referendum, again, verifies the research hypothesis. The Yes side employed a higher relative amount of defensive frames, compared to the No side. Changes in the use of offensive frames - the decreasing usage on the Yes side and the increasing usage on the No side – can be explained by changes in the ownership of issue frame categories. The increase in defensive frames by the No side in the second referendum, shows that the dynamic of the referendum debate had changed. While in the first referendum, the No side set the issues of the campaign and the Yes side reacted by countering arguments of the No side with defensive frames, the No side in the second referendum was also involved in rebutting arguments from the Yes camp. Additionally to the possibility that the No side was not longer able to dominate the topic of the debate, this change could be the result of the Yes side being able to present stronger frames in the second referendum, for example the frame on “economic consequences”.

#### **6.4 Is It All Positive on the Yes Side and All Negative on the No Side?**

The fourth research hypothesis on the valence of frames implies that actors on the Yes side are inclined to valence their frames positively, whereas actors on the No side valence their frames negatively.

Similar as in the first referendum, the data on the second referendum verifies the fourth research hypothesis, as shown in Table 9. The Yes side valenced 45.8 per cent of their issue frames positively, 14.6 per cent negatively and 39.5 per cent neutrally. Similar as in the first referendum, frames employed in a negative way, almost exclusively referred to the revision point of the referendum debate. Similar to the first

referendum, half of the neutrally valenced frames are used as defensive counterframes. The link between neutrally valenced frames and defensive frames was described above. If defensive frames were excluded, a high number of neutrally valenced issue frames are left. A closer glance shows that most of those neutral frames are used on the issues frame categories “taxation”, “neutrality”, “moral values” or “workers’ rights” – all issues addressed by the legal guarantees. Issue frames from these categories were often used in connection to the generic frame “legal guarantees”. The connection of neutrally valenced frames on “taxation”, “neutrality”, “moral values” and “workers’ rights” with the generic frame “legal guarantee” creates a context in which these frames are used similar to defensive frame. In both cases frames issued by the No side are rebutted. In the case of defensive frames by actual referring to the No side’s arguments and rejecting it, and in the case of the connection with the generic frame “legal guarantees” by highlighting that the topic had already been addressed by the legal guarantees. This dynamic would also help to explain the sharp decline of defensive frames on the Yes side between both referendums from 37.6 per cent to 19.8 per cent. Fiance Fáil and Fine Gael showed a particular low use of positively valenced frames and therefore focused on neutrally valenced frames in connection with the frame on “legal guarantees”.

The No side in the second referendum had a share of 1.4 per cent positively valenced issue frames, 71.9 per cent negatively valenced issue frames and 26.6 per cent neutrally valenced issue frames. Similar to the first referendum, the positive frames on the No side concerned the revision point of the referendum issue. The number of neutral frames split between defensive counterframes and frames of the issue frame categories “neutrality”, “taxation”, “moral values” and “Commissioner”. In the first referendum, those frames were associated with the “negative” context defined by the No side early in the campaign, and even in previous referendum campaigns. In the second referendum, the context of those frames had changed as result of the legal guarantees. The usage of those frames, which are now linked to the legal guarantees, by the No side do therefore seem questionable. However, Sinn Féin, for example, claimed – using the generic frame on “change/rerun” – that the content and the context of the treaty had not changed. (McGreevy, 2009, 19 May; O’Regan, 2009, 01 October) If this logic is applied, Sinn Féin could still use neutral frames and in connection with the “change/rerun” frame, assume that the issues addressed in the legal guarantees would still be associated with the negative context defined in the first referendum. Even though this logic might not play with the majority of voters, it could have been worked on the target audience of Sinn Féin, including partisans, Eurosceptics or people opposing and distrusting the government. If the framing behavior of the actors on the No side is reviewed in more detail, some additional observations can be made. The Socialist Party and Unite both showed a considerably lower share of negative frames and a higher share of neutral frames. In the case of Unite this behavior can be explained by a high share of neutral frames on “workers’ rights”. On the other side, Cóir, Farmers for No and UKIP showed a very high share of

negatively valenced frames. This can be explained by a high share of negative frames on “moral values” and “minimum wage” in the case of C  ir and “immigration” in the case of UKIP and Farmers for No. More detailed data on the valence of issue frames by the different actors in the referendum are portrayed in Annex III, Table 23.

To sum up, the fourth research hypothesis is again verified by the data from the second referendum. Actors on the Yes side show a high affinity to positively valenced issue frames, while actors on the No side concentrated on negatively valenced issue frames. The high amount of neutrally valenced issue frames on both sides in somehow unexpected. For the Yes side the linkage of the generic frame “legal guarantees” to certain frames categories could be the solution. This would also offer an explanation on the decreasing use of defensive frames by the Yes side in the second referendum. On the No side, the high amount of neutrally valenced issue is also a surprise, as the previous negative “inherited” context of many issue frames was altered by the legal guarantees. One possible explanation is that the No side – and particularly Sinn F  in – employed a framing strategy, which highlighted that the legal guarantees had no relevance and therefore assumed that the frames addressed by the legal guarantees were still associated with the negative context established earlier. Sinn F  in could probably at least expect that this logic would work within the core group of its addressees.

## **6.5 How Does the Campaign Look in the Last Two Weeks?**

The fourth research hypothesis concerns changes in the framing behavior over time within the referendum campaign. The research question is: *“In the final two weeks of the referendum campaign, actors on both sides will use relatively more often defensive frames and contest frames than in the earlier phase of the referendum campaign.”*

Again, in the final two weeks the number of frames registered– 796 frames – was relatively higher than the number of frames registered in the first six weeks of the campaign – 924 frames. Between the run-up phase and the final phase of the campaign, the No camp was able to increase its share of published frames from 29.8 per cent to 33.5 per cent. The coverage for the Yes side fell from 65.5 per cent to 62.3 per cent.

As portrayed in Table 10, the changes in the framing behavior over time in respect to contest frames and defensive frames are in line with the expectations. The Yes camp increased its share of contest frames from 22.5 per cent in the run up phase to 26.2 per cent in the final phase of the referendum. On the No side, a share of 32.2 per cent of contest frames was registered in the final phase compared to 25.5 per cent in the run up phase. On the Yes side, the increase in the share of contest frames was once more carried by the political parties (FF +4.8%, FG +13.5%, Lab +7.5%). In the No camp, the increase of contest frames is mainly carried by No to Lisbon (+19%) and C  ir (+6%).

**Table 10: Usage of different types and characteristics of frames over time in the 2009 referendum** (in absolute numbers and percentage of frames; percentages on valence of frame and use of opponent side's frame relation to number of issue frames)

Actors \ Frames		Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame	
		Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neu.	Off.	Def.
Yes side	run-up phase	281	188	136	138	35	108	13	50
		<b>46.4%</b>	<b>31.1%</b>	<b>22.5%</b>	<b>49.1%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>38.4%</b>	<b>4.6%</b>	<b>17.8%</b>
	final phase	225	141	130	94	39	92	2	50
		<b>45.4%</b>	<b>28.4%</b>	<b>26.2%</b>	<b>41.8%</b>	<b>17.3%</b>	<b>40.9%</b>	<b>0.9%</b>	<b>22.2%</b>
No side	run-up phase	141	64	70	0	108	33	19	13
		<b>51.3%</b>	<b>23.3%</b>	<b>25.5%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>76.6%</b>	<b>23.4%</b>	<b>13.5%</b>	<b>9.2%</b>
	final phase	137	44	86	4	92	41	21	15
		<b>51.3%</b>	<b>16.5%</b>	<b>32.2%</b>	<b>1.4%</b>	<b>71.9%</b>	<b>26.6%</b>	<b>14.4%</b>	<b>10.1%</b>
Referendum overall (including neutral actors)	run-up phase	447	261	216	149	148	150	32	72
		<b>48.4%</b>	<b>28.2%</b>	<b>23.4%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>33.1%</b>	<b>33.6%</b>	<b>7.2%</b>	<b>16.1%</b>
	final phase	382	190	224	103	133	146	24	69
		<b>48.0%</b>	<b>23.9%</b>	<b>28.1%</b>	<b>27.0%</b>	<b>34.8%</b>	<b>38.2%</b>	<b>6.3 %</b>	<b>18.1%</b>

The observations on defensive frames are also in line with the expectations raised in the research hypothesis. The Yes camp increased its relative share of defensive frames from 17.8 per cent to 22.2 per cent in the final phase, while the No camp increases its share on defensive frames from 9.2 per cent to 10.9 per cent. The increase on the Yes side results from changes triggered by the political parties (FF +15.6%, FG +15.8%, GP +11.1%) and Business for Europe (+17.6%) and the Charter Group (+42.3%), whereas the Labour Party (-8.4%) and the European Commission (-37.7%) decreased their share of defensive frames. On the No side, the increase results from a moderate increase in Sinn Féin's share of defensive frames (+5.2 %).

Other trends can be extracted from the data on the development of framing behavior over time. Within the Yes camp, there was a shift towards the group of political parties and the European Commission, which gained an aggregate share of about 14.5 per cent, while the civil society organization (-9.6%) and the other organizations (- 4.9%)

lost coverage in the final phase of the referendum. On the No side Sinn Féin (+17.4%) and Libertas (+11.9%) gained the biggest relative shares of coverage between both phases of the campaign, while No to Lisbon (-19.3%) and Farmers for No (-6.5%) lost the biggest relative shares. Based on this observation, the political parties on both sides of the campaign gained considerable share on coverage from the other organization – especially civil society organizations. Another trend, comparable to the first referendum, is the reduction of the Yes side's share of positive frames and the No camp's share of negative frames towards the final phase of the referendum. As mentioned above, a possible explanation is that during the early phase of the campaign, or previous referendum campaigns, certain issue frame categories are deliberated in specific – valence – contexts, which, if not challenged by the opposing side, are established in the debate and can be reverted to by the actors of the Yes and the No side. More information on the changes in the framing behavior of the different actors over time in the second referendum is portrayed in Annex III, Table 24.

To sum up, the fifth research hypothesis is this time confirmed by the data on the second referendum. The Yes and No sides do both increase their usage of contest frames and defensive frames in the final phase of the campaign. This indicates that for both sides the focus in the later part of the campaign is to contest the opponent side's frames and to call the opposite actors and their motives into question. An interesting observation is also that the political organizations on the Yes and the No side gain relative coverage from the civil society organizations in the final phase of the campaign. This might cast a shadow over the common perception that the second campaign was won by the newly emerged civil society organizations and shows that referendum campaigns might be the playing field of political groups after all.

## **6.5 Conclusion on the Second Referendum**

The data on the second referendum add to the results gained from the research on the first referendum. The Yes side used a greater variety of generic frames compared to the No side in both referendums and only by a small margin showed a smaller variety in the use of issue frames in the second referendum. If issue and generic frames are combined, the Yes side used a greater variety of frames in both referendums, although the difference between both sides got smaller in the second referendum. Based on these results it has to be assumed that the Yes side uses a higher variety of different topics and arguments in referendum campaigns, whereas the No side does a better job in picking their battles in referendum campaigns. The finding that the Yes side uses a greater variety of issue and generic frames in the two Lisbon referendums in Ireland is not in line with the literature on dynamics in referendum campaigns, which generally assumes that the Yes side in a campaign concentrates on a small number of specific issues (Qvortrup, 2009), while the No camp uses a greater variety of frames to address the referendum issue from different directions, as suggested by the campaign dynamics of segmentation and ideological division (LeDuc, 2009, 2007).

**Table 11: Overview on conclusion of research hypotheses**

First Referendum	Second Referendum
<b>Research Hypothesis 1:</b> <i>The No side will use a greater variety of issue and generic frames than the Yes side.</i>	
<p><b>Not confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Yes side shows a greater variety in usage of issue frames, generic frames and the combined usage of issue and contest frames</li> </ul>	<p><b>Not confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– No side uses a greater variety of issue frames</li> <li>– Yes side shows a greater variety in the usage of generic frames and the combined usage of issue and contest frames</li> </ul>
<b>Research Hypothesis 2:</b> <i>Actors on the No side will use contest frames relatively more often as compared to actors on the Yes side and actors on the Yes side will use relatively more often issue frames compared to actors on the No side.</i>	
<p><b>Not confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– No side uses a higher share of issue frames</li> <li>– Yes side uses a higher share of contest frames</li> </ul>	<p><b>Partly confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– No side uses a higher share of contest frames</li> <li>– No side uses a higher share of contest frames</li> </ul>
<b>Research Hypothesis 3:</b> <i>Actors on the Yes side will use relatively more often defensive frames than actors on the No side.</i>	
<p><b>Confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Yes side uses a higher share of defensive frames</li> </ul>	<p><b>Confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Yes side uses a higher share of defensive frames</li> </ul>
<b>Research Hypothesis 4:</b> <i>Actors on the No side will use relatively more often use negatively valenced frames compared to actors on the Yes side, who will use relatively more often use positively valenced frames compared to the No side. Neutral frames are not expected to be used by either side in high quantities.</i>	
<p><b>Confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Yes side uses predominantly positive frames</li> <li>– No side uses predominantly negative frames</li> </ul>	<p><b>Confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Yes side uses predominantly positive frames</li> <li>– No side uses predominantly negative frames</li> </ul>
<b>Research Hypothesis 5:</b> <i>In the final two weeks of the referendum campaign, actors on both sides will use relatively more often defensive frames and contest frames than in the earlier phase of the referendum campaign.</i>	
<p><b>Not Confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Yes side uses more contest frames, but less defensive frames</li> <li>– No side uses less contest frames, but more defensive frames</li> </ul>	<p><b>Confirmed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Yes and No side use more contest frames and more defensive frames</li> </ul>



The second research hypothesis is partially confirmed by the data on the second referendum, as the No side employs a higher number of contest frames than the Yes side. However, the No side also uses again a higher share of issue frames, similar to what had been observed in the first referendum. Therefore the first part of the second research hypothesis on the use of issue frames seems to be flawed in the case of both Irish referendums on the Lisbon treaty. In both campaigns, the No side concentrated stronger on issues directly related to the referendum question. This finding might trigger the objection that the main arguments of the No side – relating to taxation, neutrality, moral values and militarization – were not part of the referendum question on the Lisbon treaty in the first place, but introduced by the No side through the dynamic of changing the subject (LeDuc, 2009, 2007). In the first campaign the Yes side argued that the Lisbon treaty didn't include these issues raised by the No camp. The view, that those issues were not part of the Lisbon package, was also confirmed by most experts and the Referendum Commission (Sinnott et al., 2009; Houses of the Oireachtas, 2008; Mac Cormaic, 2008, May 14; Hennessy, 2008, April 29). If those issues had not been coded as issue frames in this research, the result on this research would most likely be different. However, as the referendum debate was carried out on those issues and as the Yes side, and especially the government, acknowledged the implications – or at least the perceived implications – of the Lisbon Treaty on these issues by negotiating the legal guarantees, these issues certainly became part of the referendum question.

As far as contest frames were concerned, the No side used a higher amount of contest frames in the second referendum compared to the Yes side. The data on the first referendum were different, but most likely biased by party competition between the political parties of the Yes camp. If this bias were to be excluded, it seems likely that the No side would have had a higher usage of contest frames in the first referendum, too. Therefore the result on the usage of contest frames allows assuming that the No side is likely to use a higher amount of contest frames in referendums.

The data on the use of the opponent side's frames also confirms the research hypothesis. In the second referendum the Yes side, again, employed a higher amount of defensive frames compared to the No side. This shows that the Yes side was more engaged in countering or rebutting arguments of the No camp. In the second referendum the No camp showed a five times higher share of defensive frames than in the first referendum. At the same time the use of offensive frames decreased on the Yes side. These findings result from the change in issue ownership of the issue frame categories "workers' rights", "commissioner" and "foreign investment", which were in the second referendum owned by the Yes side. In the first referendum, the Yes side had used most of its offensive frames on the issue "commissioner" and "workers' rights". As the Yes side owned those issues in the second campaign, the Yes side was observed to employ three times less offensive frames in the second referendum compared to the first referendum. On the No side both issues frames were addressed

as well in both referendums. When the issue ownership on these issues switched in the second campaign, the No side was therefore observed to use a higher amount of offensive frames on these issue frame categories in the second referendum.

The fourth research hypothesis is also confirmed by the data presented on the second referendum. The Yes side concentrated on positive frames, whereas the No side valenced their frames negatively. Negative frames on the Yes side and positive frames on the No side resulted from framing of the revision point. The high amount of neutrally valenced frames on the Yes side is surprising at first. In the first referendum, the high amount of neutral frames was related to defensive frames. In the second referendum the ratio of defensive frames decreases stronger than the ratio of neutral frames. This is on the Yes side explained by the linkage of neutral frames to the generic frame “legal guarantees”. The amount of neutral frames on the No side can also partly be explained by the link between neutral frames and defensive frames. A second explanation emerges on the No side. In the first referendum it was argued that certain frames were inherently linked to a negative valence as the result of a previous definition of certain issues by the No side. These frames did later not require a negative valence as they were received by voters in the previously established negative context. At first glance, this link between certain frames and a negative context seemed to be loosened in the second referendum by the introduction of the legal guarantees. However, as Sinn Féin did argue that the legal guarantees did not change the context of the referendum, it appears logical that No camp still presented frames with a neutral valence and indicating a negative context as established in previous referendums.

The fifth research hypothesis is also confirmed by the data presented in this research for the second referendum. The Yes and No sides both use a higher share of contest and defensive frames in the final phase of the referendum. This shows that the assumption holds that in the final phase of the referendum actors on both sides shift more attention to counter the arguments of the other sides and to comment on the referendum contest as such. However, the data of the first referendum campaign does not confirm the fifth research hypothesis and there seems to be no obvious explanation, why the framing behavior in the first referendum is not in line with the expectations raised in the fifth research hypothesis.

## ***7 Changes in the Framing Behavior between Both Referendums***

This chapter deals with changes in the framing behavior of both sides between the two referendum campaigns. Do the actors on the Yes and the No side frame the second referendum in the second referendum in a different way? To answer this question, general differences between both referendums will be identified first before the last two research hypotheses will be addressed.

### **7.1 General Differences between Both Referendums**

In chapter 4, two developments, which changed the context of the second referendum were discussed: The economic crisis in Ireland and the provision of the legal guarantees. The later addressed the understanding of the issues frame categories “taxation”, “neutrality”, “militarization”, “moral values”, “Charter of Fundamental Rights”, “Commissioner”, “workers’ rights”, “public services” and “social dimension”. Another major change was the composition of the Yes and the No camp. New actors from the civil society and business world emerged on the Yes side and formerly neutral actors joined the Yes and the No camp in the second referendum.

In both referendums, the Yes side held a share of 64 per cent of the registered coverage, while a shift of coverage from the political parties (-13%) towards civil society organizations and business organizations was visible in the second referendum. The No side increased their share of coverage from 28 per cent in the first referendum to 31.5 per cent in the second referendum with the Farmers for No picking up the shares lost by civil society organizations and in particular Libertas.

In both referendums a similar number of frames were registered, 1,812 frames in the first referendum and 1,720 frames in the second referendum. In the second referendum, the absolute share of issue frames (+1.2%) and generic frames (+3.0%) increased, a trend also observed on the Yes side (issue frames +3.6% and generic frames +2.7%). The No side increased their share of generic frames (+7.3%) and contest frames (+0.7%) on the cost of issue frames. In the second referendum, the Yes side used more positively (+4.3%) and negatively (+3.7%) valenced frames and decreased their usage of offensive and defensive frames. On the No side the use of neutrally valenced frames increase (+6.3%) on the cost of negatively valenced frames (-5.8%) in the second referendum. The No camp also increased the usage of offensive and defensive frames. Details on changes in the usage of different types and characteristics of frames in both referendums are portrayed in Table 12.

Variations in the use of frame categories between both referendums are important, as they show how actors changed their framing of the referendum debate. On the Yes side the issue frames on “taxation” (-9.7%), “voting strength” (-4.8%), “efficiency” (-4.3%) and “democratic development” (-2.7%) showed the highest decrease in absolute share, while the two newly introduced categories “economic recovery” (+11.7%) and

“minimum wage” (+7.1%) showed the biggest increases. On the No side, the categories “taxation” (-7.1%), “democratic development” (-6.0%) and “commissioner” (-3.3%) were used less often, while the categories “minimum wage” (+6.1%), “economic recovery (+5.8%), “immigration” (+4.7%) and “transfer of power” (+4.5%) were used more frequently. Within the group of generic frames the Yes side shifted their usage from the categories “WTO talks” (-18.6%), “Yes to Europe” (-9.0%), “lack of information” (-6.5%) and “renegotiation” (-5.8%) towards the categories “position within EU” (+17.6%), “legal guarantees (+17.0%) and “government satisfaction” (+9.2%). On the No side, the generic frame categories “renegotiation” (-45.6%) and “lack of information” (-17.9%) were almost completely abandoned, while the categories “change/rerun” (+36.1%) and “government satisfaction” (+13.9%) had the highest increases in their total share.

The changes in the use of types and categories of frames reflect the changes in the context between both referendums. The Yes side highlighted the legal guarantees, using the new generic frame category “legal guarantee”, and called upon the positive EU attitudes of Irish voters, using generic frames on “position within Europe” and “benefits of membership”. The usage of the issue frame categories “consequence of No vote” and the “economic recovery” highlights that the Yes side used the financial crisis and the fear of negative implications in the case of a second No vote. The issues addressed by the legal guarantees drew less attention in the second referendum, with the exception of the issues “commissioner” and “workers’ rights”, both frames newly owned by the Yes side in the second referendum. The No camp showed a heterogeneous picture in relation to the issue addressed in the legal guarantees. The categories of the issue frames on “commissioner”, “taxation”, Charter of Fundamental Rights” “militarization” and “public services” were used less, while the share of the category “moral values” increased. Additionally, the No side introduced the issue “minimum wage” into the campaign and took ownership over the issue of “immigration”. On the usage of generic frames, the No side dropped the category “lack of information” and “renegotiation”, but in the second referendum asked if the context of the treaty had changed and if the rerun of the referendum was democratic legitimate, showed by the usage of the frames “rerun/change” and “legal guarantees”. The No side further asked voters to draw a connection between their satisfaction with the government and the voting behavior in the referendum (“government satisfaction”). Details on changes in the usage of issue frames and generic frames in both referendums are portrayed in Annex IV, Table 25 and Table 26.

**Table 12: Changes in use of types and characteristics of frames for Yes side, No side and Referendum overall in 2008 and in 2009 (in absolute numbers and per cent)**

	Yes				No				Total			
	2008		2009		2008		2009		2008		2009	
	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%
<b>Issue Frame</b>	487	42.4%	506	46.0%	301	59.3%	278	51.3%	851	47.0%	829	48.2%
<b>Generic frame</b>	311	27.1%	329	29.8%	64	12.6%	108	19.9%	421	23.2%	451	26.2%
<b>Contest frame</b>	350	30.5%	266	24.2%	143	28.1%	156	28.8%	540	29.8%	440	25.6%
<b>Positiv</b>	202	41.5%	232	45.8%	6	2.0%	4	1.4%	227	26.7%	252	30.4%
<b>Negativ</b>	53	10.9%	74	14.6%	234	77.7%	200	71.9%	298	35.0%	281	33.9%
<b>Neutral</b>	232	47.6%	200	39.5%	61	20.3%	74	26.6%	326	38.3%	296	35.7%
<b>Offensive</b>	46	9.4%	15	3.0%	39	13.0%	40	14.4%	85	9.9%	56	6.8%
<b>Defensive</b>	183	37.6%	100	19.8%	6	2.0%	28	10.1%	194	22.6%	141	17.0%

## **7.2 Does the Yes Side Use Different Frames in the Second Referendum?**

When comparing two referendums, which were focused on the same issue, the question arises, if the actors on the No and the Yes side in the referendum show specific patterns in the second referendum to reuse their arguments from the first referendum campaign. Research hypothesis six suggests that actors on the winning side in the first referendum – the No side – are more likely to reuse their issue frames from the first referendum. The actors losing the first referendum – the Yes side – are expected to change their usage of issue frames stronger. This assumption is valid for frames, which were not altered between both referendum debates. In the case of the referendums on the Lisbon treaty, the introduction of the legal guarantees changed the context of the issue frame categories “commissioner”, “taxation”, “neutrality”, “moral values”, “Charter of Fundamental Rights”, “workers’ rights”, “militarization”, “public service” and “social dimension”. If the issue frame categories changed by the legal guarantees are excluded, 15 issue frame categories remain to be reviewed in this research. Furthermore this comparison includes only actors, which participated in both referendums as portrayed in Table 2. On the Yes side, the groups “Business Alliance for Europe” and the “Business for Europe” group are included, as the later represents as successor of the “Business Alliance for Europe” the economic interests on the Yes side. On the No side, the “CAEUC” is supplemented by “No to Lisbon” in the second referendum. The actors Ictu, Unite and TEEU are excluded, as their low number of issue frames does not allow drawing reliable conclusions.

As portrayed in table 13 and 14, the Yes side shows a stonger change in their usage of issue frames between both referendums. The three political parties changed between 51 per cent and 62 per cent of their issue frames between the campaigns (FF 51%, FG 62%, Lab 56%). Business for Europe changed 58 per cent of its issue frames compared to the issue frames used by the “Business for Europe”. On the Yes side, only the European Commission showed a high reliance on their issue frames from the first referendum changing only 28 per cent of their issue frames. Changes in the use of issue frames between both referendums on the No side is more heterogeneous. Sinn Féin (45% change in issue frames) Libertas (24%) and No to Lisbon (30%) changed only a small margin of their issue frames from the first referendum. Cóir (77%) and the Socialist Party (92%) showed a high amount of change in the usage of their issue frames. However, the high percentage of change in their usage is caused by the strong increase of the overall amount of issue frames by both actors in the second referendum. In the case of Cóir the high margin of change results from the introduction and usage of the frame on “minimum wage”.

If the issue frame categories covered by the legal guarantees were included in this comparison, the margin of change in the usage of issue frames between the Yes camp and the No camp would be smaller, but still significant. This observation is even

**Table 13: Changes in the use of issue frames for actors on the Yes side in 2008 and 2009** (in absolute numbers and per cent)

	Fianna Fáil		Fine Gael		Labour		EC		Business Alliance											
	2008		2009		2008		2009		2008		2009									
	Abs	%	Abs	%	Abs	%	Abs	%	Abs	%	Abs	%								
Democratic dev.	8	7.7	1	1.2	4	12.5	2	7.1	5	16.7	4	10.0	5	15.2	3	7.9	1	6.3	1	3.4
Voting Strength	10	9.6	1	1.2	6	18.8	2	7.1	6	20.0	0	0.0	3	9.1	3	7.9	1	6.3	0	0.0
Crime	8	7.7	2	2.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.5	1	3.0	1	2.6	1	6.3	0	0.0
EU on world stage	6	5.8	2	2.4	1	3.1	1	3.6	1	3.3	0	0.0	3	9.1	2	5.3	1	6.3	0	0.0
Efficiency	18	17.3	5	6.0	2	6.3	4	14.3	5	16.7	5	12.5	5	15.2	4	10.5	6	37.5	1	3.4
Foreign Investment	4	3.8	5	6.0	1	3.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	10.0	0	0.0	1	2.6	3	18.8	8	27.6
Sovereignty	3	2.9	0	0.0	2	6.3	0	0.0	3	10.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Common challenges	13	12.5	4	4.8	3	9.4	1	3.6	2	6.7	2	5.0	2	6.1	5	13.2	2	12.5	3	10.3
Immigration	4	3.8	2	2.4	0	0.0	2	7.1	5	16.7	0	0.0	1	3.0	4	10.5	0	0.0	0	0.0
Consequence of No	25	24.0	27	32.1	10	31.3	3	10.7	2	6.7	11	27.5	11	33.3	10	26.3	1	6.3	8	27.6
Transfer of power	4	3.8	1	1.2	3	9.4	0	0.0	1	3.3	0	0.0	2	6.1	1	2.6	0	0.0	0	0.0
Development policy	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Economic recovery	0	0.0	19	22.6	0	0.0	8	28.6	0	0.0	8	20.0	0	0.0	2	5.3	0	0.0	8	27.6
Minimum wage	0	0.0	15	17.9	0	0.0	5	17.9	0	0.0	5	12.5	0	0.0	2	5.3	0	0.0	0	0.0

**Table 14: Changes in the use of issue frames for actors on the No side in 2008 and 2009** (in absolute numbers and per cent)

	Sinn Féin		Socialist Party		Libertas		Cóir		CAEUC											
	2008		2009		2008		2009		2008		2009									
	Abs	%	Abs	%	Abs	%	Abs	%	Abs	%	Abs	%								
Democratic dev.	7	18.9	1	2.6	1	50.0	1	7.7	9	36.0	5	31.3	3	42.9	0	0.0	6	20.7	5	22.7
Ireland's influence	14	37.8	9	23.1	1	50.0	0	0.0	8	32.0	2	12.5	0	0.0	1	4.5	3	10.3	5	22.7
Crime	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
EU on world stage	1	2.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	3.4	0	0.0
Efficiency	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Foreign Investment	1	2.7	3	7.7	0	0.0	3	23.1	4	16.0	1	6.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	4.5
Sovereignty	0	0.0	1	2.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	4.0	1	6.3	3	42.9	3	13.6	5	17.2	5	22.7
Common challenges	4	10.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	10.3	1	4.5
Immigration	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Consequence of No	2	5.4	6	15.4	0	0.0	1	7.7	1	4.0	1	6.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	6.9	0	0.0
Transfer of power	8	21.6	12	30.8	0	0.0	3	23.1	2	8.0	3	18.8	1	14.3	2	9.1	5	17.2	4	18.2
Development policy	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	13.8	0	0.0
Economic recovery	0	0.0	6	15.4	0	0.0	3	23.1	0	0.0	3	18.8	0	0.0	2	9.1	0	0.0	1	4.5
Minimum wage	0	0.0	1	2.6	0	0.0	2	15.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	14	63.6	0	0.0	0	0.0



more pronounced, if the seize of the different actors on both sides is considered. On the Yes side Fianna Fáil (38% change of all issue frames), Fine Gael (36%), the Labour Party (48%), the European Commission (34%) and Business for Europe (63%) portrayed a pattern of change, which was lower compared to the one before, but is still high compared to the changes on the No side. On the No side, the changes in the framing behavior of the two biggest actors, Sinn Féin (30%) and No to Lisbon (22%) accumulating more than half of No side's frames is quite low. The changes in the framing behavior of the smaller actors on the No side, Socialist Party (41%), Libertas (39%) and Cóir (46%), is comparable to the changes observed on the Yes side.

To sum up, the comparison of the usage of issue frames by actors participating in both referendums shows that actors of the Yes camp change their framing behavior by a bigger margin than the actors of the No coma. This observation holds whether or not the issue frames addressed by the legal guarantees are included or excluded.

### **7.3 How Do Actors Frame the Referendum Differently After Changing Their Opinion?**

The seventh research hypothesis deals with actors switching sides between both referendum campaigns. Will these actors use different types of frames and different categories of issue frames in the second referendum compared to the first referendum? As mentioned in chapter 4, the Green Party and Siptu switched from the neutral side to the Yes side between both referendums. The IFA switched from the neutral side to the Yes side, whereas a splinter group of the IFA, "Farmers for No", campaigned on the No side in the second referendum.

The framing behavior of the first actor to be analyzed, the Green Party, is portrayed in Table 15. The comparison of the types and characteristics of frames used by the Green Party shows an increase in the use of issue frames (+7.4%) and generic frames (+4.6%) on the cost of contest frames. The share of negatively valenced issue frames decreased (-18.9%) and the number of neutrally valenced issue frames increased (+21.8%). 53.1 per cent of their issue frames used by the Green Party in the second referendum were different to those used in the first referendum. Of the 46.9 per cent of issue frames not changed between both referendums most frames were on "common challenges". The category "common challenge" includes, for example, climate change, which is a core issue of the Green Party and is therefore unlikely to be affected by any change of the parties positioning.

**Table 15: Changes in the use of types of frames, issue frames and contest frames for the Green Party in 2008 and 2009 (in absolute numbers and per cent)**

Green Party		First Referendum		Second Referendum	
		Abs.	%	Abs.	%
Types and characteristics of frames	issue frames	31	50.0%	27	57.4%
	generic frames	9	14.5%	9	19.1%
	contest frames	22	35.5%	11	23.4%
	positiv	17	54.8%	14	51.9%
	negativ	7	22.6%	1	3.7%
	neutral	7	22.6%	12	44.4%
	offensive	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	defensive	4	12.9%	8	29.6%
Issue frames	Democratic development	6	19.4%	0	0.0%
	Taxation	2	6.5%	0	0.0%
	Neutrality	1	3.2%	4	14.8%
	Crime	0	0.0%	1	3.7%
	EU on world stage	0	0.0%	1	3.7%
	Efficiency	2	6.5%	0	0.0%
	Moral values	2	6.5%	0	0.0%
	Militarization	1	3.2%	5	18.5%
	Common challenges	14	45.2%	10	37.0%
	Consequence of No vote	3	9.7%	1	3.7%
	Minimum wage	0	0.0%	2	7.4%
	Economic recovery	0	0.0%	3	11.1%
Generic Frames	Lack of information	1	11.1%	0	0.0%
	Renegotiation	2	22.2%	0	0.0%
	Ireland's influence	1	11.1%	0	0.0%
	Benefits of membership	2	22.2%	2	22.2%
	Government satisfaction	0	0.0%	1	11.1%
	Economy	1	11.1%	1	11.1%
	WTO Talks	2	22.2%	0	0.0%
	Legal guarantees	0	0.0%	4	44.4%
	Position within EU	0	0.0%	1	11.1%

The second actor to be analyzed is Siptu. As portrayed in Table 16, only two issue and generic frames were registered for Siptu in the second referendum compared to 14 issue and generic frames in the first referendum. The data is therefore hardly sufficient to make a meaningful observation. The issue frame category "Charter of

Fundamental Rights” used in the second referendum was also used in the first referendum. It also appears that the mainly neutral and negative valence of issue frames in the first referendum has switched to a positive valence in the second referendum. The actor also deserted the formerly used generic frame category “renegotiation”, using the generic frame category “national interest” in the second referendum. However, a meaningful evaluation of changes in Siptu’s framing behavior does not seem possible based on the low number of frames in the second referendum.

**Table 16: Changes in the use of types of frames, issue frames and contest frames for Siptu in 2008 and 2009** (in absolute numbers and per cent)

Siptu		First Referendum		Second Referendum	
		Abs.	%	Abs.	%
Types and characteristics of frames	issue frames	10	52.6%	1	25.0%
	generic frames	4	21.1%	1	25.0%
	contest frames	5	26.3%	2	50.0%
	positiv	1	10.0%	1	100.0%
	negativ	2	20.0%	0	0.0%
	neutral	7	70.0%	0	0.0%
	offensive	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	defensive	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Issue frames	Charter of Fundamental Rights	4	40.0%	1	100.0%
	Worker’s right	6	60.0%	0	0.0%
Generic Frames	Renegotiation	3	75.0%	0	0.0%
	National interest	0	0.0%	1	100.0%
	History	1	25.0%	0	0.0%

The third actor to be analyzed is the IFA. First, changes in the framing behavior of the main group of the IFA, which switched to the Yes side, will be described, based on the data portrayed in Table 17. The first observations shows that in the second referendum, the IFA increase the usage of issue frames (+12.4%) and contest frames (+8.9%) on the cost of generic frames (-21.5 %). This change results mainly from the desertion of the generic frame category “WTO talk”, which in the first referendum accounted for 66 per cent of all IFA’s frames. In the first referendum, the four issue frames employed were on “taxation”, while in the second referendum two frames each were employed on each “foreign investment” and “consequence of No vote”. It can be noted that in the first referendum all frames were valenced neutrally, while in the second referendum the four issue frames were valenced accordingly to framing behavior observed on the Yes side. In the second referendum, the IFA employed a variety of five different generic frame categories, compared to the concentration on the

generic frame category “WTO talk” in the first referendum. To sum up, the analyses of changes in the IFA’s framing behavior between both referendums shows that the IFA portrayed a framing behavior that is in line with the framing behavior employed by other actors on the Yes side in the second referendum. The changes in the framing behavior observed for the IFA result almost solely from the concentration on the generic frame category “WTO talks” in the first referendum, which then reflected about 66 per cent of all of IFA’s frames. Based on the one-sided framing behavior in the first referendum, the observations made for changes in the framing behavior of the IFA can therefore hardly represent a reliable test for changes in the framing behavior of actors who switch sides between different referendums.

**Table 17: Changes in the use of types of frames, issue frames and contest frames for the IFA in 2008 and 2009** (in absolute numbers and per cent)

IFA		First Referendum		Second Referendum	
		Abs.	%	Abs.	%
Types and characteristics of frames	issue frames	4	9.8%	4	22.2%
	generic frames	27	65.9%	8	44.4%
	contest frames	10	24.4%	6	33.3%
	positiv	0	0.0%	2	50.0%
	negativ	0	0.0%	2	50.0%
	neutral	4	100.0%	0	0.0%
	offensive	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	defensive	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Issue frames	Taxation	4	100.0%	0	0.0%
	Consequence of No vote	0	0.0%	2	50.0%
	Foreign investment	0	0.0%	2	50.0%
Generic Frames	Benefits of membership	0	0.0%	3	37.5%
	National interest	0	0.0%	2	25.0%
	Economy	0	0.0%	1	12.5%
	WTO talks	27	100.0%	0	0.0%
	Position within EU	0	0.0%	1	12.5%
	Ireland's influence	0	0.0%	1	12.5%

This conclusion also sheds a bad spell on the observations made on changes in the framing behavior between the IFA in the first referendum and its splinter group “Farmers for No” in the second referendum, which are portrayed in Table 18. “Farmers for No” showed in some respects a classical No side framing behavior, as portrayed before. A, even for the No side, unusually high number of issue frames (73.1 %) goes along with an unusually low number contest frames (7.7 %). 17 out of 19 issue frames

are negatively valenced and the positively valenced issue frame is used on the revision point. Farmers for No's issue frames concentrate on the issue frame categories "immigration" (47.4%), "voting strength" (21.1%) and "transfer of power" (21.1 %). The five generic frames are on the category "farm succession". The issues "farm succession" and "immigration" were thereby initiated by the "Farmers for No" group in the second referendum. "Farmers for No" did therefore show a framing behavior that is, with the exception of the high number of issue frames and the low number of contest frames, exemplary for the No side. The changes in the framing behavior portrayed are in line with the expectations made in the seventh research hypothesis. However, based on the single-focused framing behavior of the IFA in the first referendum, no meaningful results can be made for the change in the framing behavior between both referendums.

**Table 18: Changes in the use of types of frames, issue frames and contest frames for Farmers for No in 2008 and 2009 (in absolute numbers and per cent)**

Farmers for No		First Referendum		Second Referendum	
		Abs.	%	Abs.	%
Types and characteristics of frames	issue frames	4	9.8%	19	73.1%
	generic frames	27	65.9%	5	19.2%
	contest frames	10	24.4%	2	7.7%
	positiv	0	0.0%	1	5.3%
	negativ	0	0.0%	17	89.5%
	neutral	4	100.0%	1	5.3%
	offensive	0	0.0%	1	5.3%
	defensive	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Issue frames	Taxation	4	100.0%	0	0.0%
	Moral Values	0	0.0%	1	5.3%
	Consequence of No vote	0	0.0%	1	5.3%
	Immigration	0	0.0%	9	47.4%
	Voting strength	0	0.0%	4	21.1%
	Transfer of power	0	0.0%	4	21.1%
Generic Frames	WTO talks	27	100.0%	0	0.0%
	Farm succession	0	0.0%	5	100.0%

The research on the seventh research hypothesis shows ambiguous results due to unusual framing behavior of three out of the four opinion switchers in one of both referendums. The changes in the framing behavior observed for the Green Party are in line with the research hypothesis. An increasing share of issue frames is combined

with a high amount of change between the used issue frame categories. The changes in the framing behavior of Siptu is inconclusive, as Siptu almost vanished from the campaign in the second referendum and only one issue frame was registered in the second referendum. The IFA and Farmers for No both show a framing behavior that is in line with the framing behavior portrayed by other actors in the Yes and No camps in the second referendum. The analysis of changes of their framing behavior is, however, inconclusive as a result of the IFA's framing behavior in the first referendum, which was one-sided on the generic frame category "WTO-talk" and not focused on the referendum issue at all.

#### **7.4 Conclusion on Changes in the Framing Behavior between Both Referendums**

The observations on changes in the framing behavior of different actors between both Irish referendums on the Lisbon treaty confirm the corresponding research hypotheses. The sixth research hypothesis, on the difference between the Yes and the No side when reusing issue frames from the first referendum in the second referendum, is confirmed. The actors on the Yes side, which lost the first referendum campaign, changed their used issue frames between both referendums more often compared to the No camp, which won the controversy in the first referendum. Some other interesting observations can also be made, when observing changes between both referendum campaigns. While both camps kept their overall share of registered frames on similar levels in both referendums, the political parties in the Yes camp lost shares of their coverage to the non-political actors like civil society groups and business organizations. The second referendum campaign saw less contest frames and more issue frames on the Yes side, whereas the No side used less issue frames. The changes in the use of different categories of issue and generic frames reflect changes in the referendum context. Issue frame categories addressed by the legal guarantees lost importance and new topics, like the minimum wage on the No side and the economic recovery and consequences of a second No vote on the Yes side gained importance in the second referendum. The No side stopped asking for a renegotiation of the treaty and concentrated on highlighting that nothing had changed since the first referendum and also linked the referendum to the government satisfaction. The Yes side on the other hand relied strongly on the traditionally positive EU attitudes of Irish voters and claimed that with the legal guarantees a better deal than in the first referendum was presented.

The results on the seventh research hypothesis are ambiguous. Of four actors switching sides between both referendums only the Green Party allowed to gather a set of data in order to answer the research hypothesis in a meaningful way. The framing behavior of the Green Party in the second referendum showed a higher share of issue frames and a high changes in the employed issue frame categories, as expected in the research hypothesis. Siptu, on the other side, almost disappeared from the campaign in the second referendum and the data on its framing behavior was

therefore not useable. However, the absence of Siptu in the referendum debate could also be understood as strategic behavior. Siptu could have decided to officially support the Yes side, but practically stay out of the referendum debate in order to deal with internal conflicts between groups of Siptu supporting the treaty and parts rejecting the treaty. Finally, the IFA was difficult to analyze as a result of its one sided framing behavior in the first referendum, which was focused on the WTO talks. In the second referendum, the IFA portrayed a framing behavior that was in line with the Yes side framing behavior and the IFA's splinter group Farmers for No portrayed a framing behavior in line with No side framing behavior. The IFA therefore could serve as an example of a group that used the first referendum to make political gains on an issue that was not related to the referendum question. Being neutral in the first referendum was therefore not the result of voicing a political opinion on the referendum, but of using the referendum to profit in a different policy field. The framing behavior of the IFA in the first referendum and Siptu in the second referendum therefore probably portray different campaign tactics that can be employed in referendums: In the case of the IFA, to use a referendum to make political gains on a different issue and in the case of to avoid internal conflict by disappearing from the referendum debate.

## **8 Conclusion**

In order to answer the research question of this thesis, how actors framed the two referendums on the Lisbon treaty in Ireland, seven research hypotheses on framing behavior of Yes and No side actors were established. The research hypotheses were tested, using data sets on the usage of frames by various actors involved in both referendums. The data were collected by coding the news coverage of the *Irish Times* and the *Irish Independent* during an eight week period before each referendum.

The research showed that the Yes side concentrated on framing the referendum positive as a chance or a benefit to Ireland, while the No side concentrated on negative frames, describing the Lisbon treaty as a threat. In the final part of the campaign, actors on the Yes and the No side used a higher share of contest frames and defensive frames, portraying a pattern of countering the arguments and challenging the motives and the campaign conducts of the opposing side of the referendum debate. Defensive frames were more often used by the Yes side, which is in line with the theory, as the No side is expected to concentrate on frames discrediting the treaty and the Yes side is expected to rebut those frames. The No side, on the other hand, does not have to spend resources on rebutting frames, as spreading confusion and raising doubts on the treaty is part of the No side tactic. The No side was found to use a higher share of contest frames, showing a greater tendency to comment on the referendum debate and to question the personalities and motives of the Yes side. The higher use of contest frames by the Yes side in the first referendum was caused by party competition between the political parties on the Yes side, a behavior which was broadly observed and is in conflict with the framing behavior recommended for the Yes side (Quinlan, 2009; FitzGibbon, 2009). The changes in the framing behavior between both referendums are also in line with the expectations. Actors of the Yes camp, who lost the debate on the first referendum, made more changes to their usage of issue frames between both referendums compared to actors in the No camp. This implies that the actors on the Yes side adjusted their framing behavior by using different issue frame categories to be more successful in the second referendum. Actors, who changed their position between both referendums, did also show a high tendency to change their use of issue frames and to employ a higher share of issue frames in the second referendum.

However, some observations were not in line with the expectations. A first surprise was that the No side used the higher share of issue frames and a smaller variety of issue and generic frames compared to the Yes side. Based on the campaign dynamics of segmentation and ideological division (LeDuc, 2009, 2007; De Vreese & Semetko, 2004b) and Qvortrup's (2009) recommendations that the Yes side should focus their campaign communication, it was expected that the Yes side would concentrate their communication on a small number of issue related to the Lisbon treaty, while the No side would introduce different non treaty related issues into the



debate and spread their communication over more issue and generic frame categories to attack the referendum issue from as many different directions as possible.

The findings of this research go mainly in line with theories on behavior of political elites in referendum campaigns as described by various scholars. (LeDuc 2009, 2007; Hobolt & Riseborough, 2005; De Vreese, 2004) Further, observations in the literature on the first Lisbon referendum, for example on the failure of the Yes side to concentrate on a small number of topics or on the party competition within the political parties on the Yes side in the first referendum (Qvortrup, 2009; FitzGibbon, 2009), were confirmed by the data collected in this research. This research also adds to the existing body of framing research, as it portrays the feasibility to analyze the framing behavior of political elites in referendums, an approach that is yet not common to the research on framing. (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010) This research could further be a first step in creating a set of frames to be used when analyzing referendum on European integration. The existence of an established set of frames, for the research of framing behavior in debates on European integration, would allow scholars to simplify their research design by following a deductive approach when conducting research. This would also allow for a better comparability of research on different referendums.

When relating the findings of this research to the wider body of literature some possible shortcomings of this research become apparent. The main limit of this research project is the coding process. As pointed out by different scholars, the coding process of frames is a highly sensitive kind of work. Scholars often find a great variance in the process of coding, when different researchers are involved, even if the researchers received a comprehensive introduction to the coding process. These variations in the coding process are usually addressed by a supervisor within the coding process (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010; De Vreese & Semetko, 2004b; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010). In this research project, the coding process was carried out by one person, without an external quality control and a bias in the coding process can't be eliminated for this research. The definition of the different categories of issue frames and generic frames could also be subjected to further scrutiny. While criteria for the identification of frame categories by Cappella and Jamieson (1997) were used to identify the different issue and generic frame categories in this research, other researchers might have chosen different sets of categories. The relatively high number of different categories might also be cause for further discussion, but it would not change the results of this research in relation to the use of different types of frames or the valence of frames. As argued before, the high number of different categories was allowed in order to gain a more detailed picture of the referendum debate and to gain a better understanding of defensive and offensive frames. If the use of defensive and offensive frames was not included in the research, the reduction of the number of categories would have been recommended. A reduction in different frame categories would also improve the possibility to establish a set of categories to

be used in other research projects. On the other hand, reducing the number of frame categories could prevent researchers to cover a detailed picture of the campaign, to incorporate the specific context in which each referendum debate is carried out and thereby to lose important information on the referendum.

Finally, this research raises new questions, which need to be answered in order to gain a better understanding of the framing behavior of political elites in referendums. One issue raised in this research is on the high usage of neutrally valenced frames on both sides of the referendum. In this research it was argued that the usage of neutrally valenced frames on the No side could be explained by the context in which some frames were understood and which would have been established earlier in the campaign or in previous referendum campaigns. This raised the question of the impact of the political environment during a campaign and the inherent context of certain issues on the framing behavior of political elites. For example, the No side argued that the harmonization of the corporate tax rate were a threat to Ireland, as the low corporate tax rate in Ireland was one factor of Ireland's economic success. However, the understanding of this context could change. In the economic recession companies which previously were able to make high profits in Ireland, were firing many of their employees, while at the same time budget cuts and tax increases by the government were loaded on the general public, while businesses were spared the burden, often perceived as due to their close links with the government. In this context, the public could demand that corporate business should carry parts of the burden, too. Increasing the corporate tax rate, by harmonization of corporate tax rates on European level, could here be seen as a positive development.

Another question refers to the impact of different frame categories. It is generally understood that the impact of frames varies, when they stand in contest with each other. In the case of frame competition, strong frames dominate weak frames, and weak frames can even backfire for the side that sends them (Chong & Druckman, 2007a; McCombs, 2004). This raises the question, which frames in the referendum debate were strong frames, and how the different actors changed their framing behavior in relation to strong frames of the own and the opposite side? This point does further link back to the usage of offensive and defensive frames. Did the Yes side concentrate their defensive frames on those categories, which represented strong frames by the No side? And was the rejection of the first referendum maybe related to the Yes side not being able to identify the strong frames of the No camp in time and to properly answer their call? Finally it would be desirable to test the research hypotheses and the research design established in this research on other comparable cases like the two Nice referendums in Ireland, the two Danish referendums on the Maastricht treaty, or, if only the first five research hypotheses were tested, with any other referendums on European integration.

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## ***Annex I: Definition of Frame Categories***

In the following the categories of issue frames and generic frames used in this research will be introduced. For each frame a short definition and different examples will be presented. If possible, different valenced frames and defensive frames will be separately mentioned in the examples.

### **Annex I.I: Issue Frames**

The first type of frames discussed here are issue frames. Issue frames refer to a sub-topic of the referendum question, which is the ratification of the Lisbon treaty. An issue frame does therefore need to be directly linked to the Lisbon treaty. The text book case of an issue frame would be build “If the treaty is ratified, this will result to x-implications in policy fieldy.” A positively valenced frame refers to a positive implication of the ratification of the treaty in a policy field, also describes as “gain or benefit”, while a negatively valenced frame refers to a loss, also seen as a “threat or danger”. A neutral valenced frame mentions an issue, but does not imply a valence to the topic. Defensive frames do in a text book case first refer to the opinion of the opposite side and then react to this interpretation of the issue. An example would be “Actor A says x will happened if the treaty is ratified. He is wrong. If the treaty is ratified y will happened.

#### **Charter of Fundamental Rights**

The issue frame “Charter of Fundamental Rights” deals with implications of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is part of the Lisbon Treaty. The frame is closely linked to the frames on moral values abortion and workers’ rights. The frame was owned by the Yes side in both referendums.

*Positive frame:* “He said that the two key reasons to support the treaty were provisions of additional powers to the European Parliament and the new Charter of Fundamental Rights.” (Wall, 2008, June 4, p.10)

*Negative frame:* “The charter [of Fundamental Rights] specifically allows the detention of children for educational supervision. This is a fact, she said.” (McGee, 2008, June 4, p.10)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “Former Socialist Party TD Joe Higgins said it was false to think the Charter of Fundamental Rights will rule out the exploitation of workers. “What I object to is the overblown claims that have been made by some leaders of the trade unions and the Labour Party to what enshrining the Charter of Fundamental Rights means. The idea that this will somehow lead to a situation where, for example, the exploitation of migrant workers is automatically ruled out – that is false,” he said.” (Carroll, 2008, May 28, p. 8)

## **Commissioner**

The issue frame “commissioner” is based on arguments on changes of the composition of the European Commission. The discussion thereby refers to provision made in the Nice Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty and the legal guarantees. The frame was owned by the No side in the first referendum and by the Yes side in the second referendum.

*Negative Frame:* “The leaflet, headlined “Protect your business – Vote no to Lisbon”, argues that the treaty “undermines efforts to ensure that Ireland is economically successful by removing our right to a permanent Irish commissioner [...]” (Fitzgerald, 2008, May 27, p.8)

*Positive Frame:* “He said the loss of a commissioner for five out of every 15 years represented a triumph for small states, as all countries would have to forego their commissioner irrespective of their size.” (McGreevy, 2008, May 31, p.6)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “Elsewhere, Mr Cowen challenged the arguments advanced by anti-treaty groups about Ireland’s representation at the European Commission and European Council in the event of the Lisbon Treaty being passed. In a statement, he said that Ireland, with four million people, would have the exact same representation on the commission as Germany.” (McGee & O’Reagan, 2008, June 2, p.1)

## **Common Challenges**

The issue frame “common challenges” refers to different policies that are described as common challenges to be tackled on EU level as result of the Lisbon treaty. Those challenges include climate change, energy security, food security, nuclear power, environment protection and the handling of the financial crisis. The frame was owned by the Yes side in both referendums.

*Positive frame:* “The Lisbon Treats is taking it one step further to improve the environment. There is a direct reference for the first time to the combating of climate change, and there is also an article specifically dealing with energy security.” (McGee, 2008, May 30, p.10)

*Positive frame:* “Mr Gormley said that the party would be mounting a vigorous campaign showing how Ireland had much to gain from endorsing the treaty. He said that extended from supporting Ireland during the current economic crisis, to tackling climate change, to protecting the environment.” (McGee, 2009, September 5, p.7)

## **Consequence of No vote**

The issue frame “consequence of No vote” refers to the revision point of the referendum issue, the implications of the case that the treaty were rejected. Thereby the frame was often used in combination with other frames, for example “foreign

investment” or “economic recovery”. The frame was owned by the Yes side in both referendums.

*Negative frame:* “The head of the aid agency concern warned yesterday that a second rejection of the Lisbon Treaty would have “serious negative consequences” for the country’s future.” (Brennan, 2009, August 24, p.8)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “The Government and its supporters on the Yes side have stopped talking about the Lisbon Treaty itself. Instead they are making increasingly outrageous claims that a second No vote will result in the loss of jobs, investment and influence. [...] Saying No to Lisbon in 2008 had no impact whatsoever on inward investment. The same will be true if we reject the treaty on Friday.” (Adams, 2009, September 28, p.13)

### **Crime**

The issue frame “crime” refers to implication of the Lisbon Treaty on Ireland’s and the EU’s abilities to deal with crime, drugs and human trafficking. The frame was in both referendums owned by the Yes side.

*Positive frame:* “Justice Minister Dermot Ahern said last night that ratification would make sure that the EU plays a stronger role in combating illegal drug importations, as well as organized crime in Europe”. (Molony, 2008, May 17, p. 19)

*Positive frame:* “Adding her voice to the Yes campaign, Mary Davis of Special Olympics Europe stressed the importance of the charter of fundamental rights and said the treaty would better equip the EU to deal with trafficking of women and children.” (Mac Cormaic, 2009, September 7, p.7)

### **Democratic Development**

The issue frame “democratic development” refers to arguments on the EU’s accountability, legitimacy or the general democratic development as well as the system of checks and balances within the EU. The frame was owned by the Yes side in both referendums.

*Positive frame:* “He said the Lisbon Treaty will bring far greater openness and accountability to European decision-making.” (Brennan, 2008, May 12, p.10)

*Negative frame:* “He said voting No was “opposing the creation of an undemocratic superstate” (Healy, 2008, May 30, p.12)

### **Development policy**

The issue frame “development policy” deals with the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the development policy of the member state and the EU and the general relationship between the EU and developing states. The frame was owned by the No side in the first referendum and did not occur in the second referendum.

*Neutral frame:* “In this context he noted that the EU was the biggest single donor of overseas aid in the world, and urged people to take the opportunity presented by the referendum to have their views heard. “The Lisbon Treaty is an opportunity now for us to have that debate on what direction we want to go,” he said.” (Downes, 2008, May 21, p.11)

*Negative valence:* “The treaty also had major implications for the wider global development agenda, Mr Storey said. EU policy was “aggressively promoting” free-trade agreements and Article 56 of the treaty would prevent any third country from introducing capital controls in their trade negotiations with the EU. This meant poor countries would not be able to implement even temporary selective trade barriers in order to develop their economies.” (Kelly, 2008, May 1, p.6)

### **Economic Recovery**

The issue frame “economic recovery” addresses arguments in the second referendum campaign that the ratification of the Lisbon treaty will result in positive economic consequences for Ireland. The frame was owned by the Yes side in the second referendum.

*Positive frame:* “A Yes vote will send a positive signal to foreign investors and to our economic trading partners in the EU. The successful ratification of the treaty is a vital step on the road to Ireland’s economic recovery” said Mr McCoy.” (Collins, 2009, August 17, p.4)

*Negative and defensive frame:* “We fully expect the Yes side to use the recession as a scare tactic to bully the electorate into voting for this treaty. However, ratifying the Lisbon Treaty will make out present economic crisis worse. The treaty is bad for the Irish and the European economy,” he said.” (Collins, 2009, August 15, p.6)

### **Efficiency**

The issue frame “efficiency” addresses argument that the Lisbon Treaty would allow the EU to work more efficient, following the enlargement of the EU to 27 member states. The frame was owned by the Yes side in both referendums.

*Positive frame:* “Our membership of the European Union allows us to work with our fellow member states, to collectively confront the great challenges of our age. The Lisbon Treaty is designed to ensure that we do so more effectively” (Hennessy & Fitzgerald, 2008, May 12, p.1)

### **EU on world stage**

The issue frame “EU on world stage” deals with the EU’s greater role on international level following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The frame also includes discussions on the External Action Service and the introduction of a High



Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The frame was owned by the Yes side in both referendum campaigns.

*Positive frame:* “This is one of the reasons for the chances proposed in the Lisbon Treaty – to help the EU speak with one voice and to exert greater influence internationally.” (Day, 2008, May 15, p. 18)

*Neutral frame:* “The Government, she [Ms. McDonald, Sinn Féin] said, had failed to make a case for why the EU needed [...] an EU diplomatic service.” (Hennessy, 2008, May, 20, p.9)

## **Foreign Investment**

The issue frame “foreign investment” refers to implications of the Lisbon treaty in Ireland capacity to generate foreign investment. The frame was owned by the No side in the first referendum and by the Yes side in the second referendum.

*Negative frame:* “The leaflet, headlined “Protect your business – Vote no to Lisbon”, argues that the treaty “undermines efforts to ensure that Ireland is economically successful by [...] changing the laws governing foreign direct investment [...]” (Fitzgerald, 2008, May 27, p.8)

*Neutral and defensive frame by the Yes side:* “Brian Geoghegan further states that a Yes vote will result in lower levels of inward investment into Ireland. Yet Ms Paul Rellis, who is both president of Microsoft Ireland and the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland, has said that a No vote will result in lower levels of investment from the US. (Ryan, 2008, April 26, p. 15)

*Positive frame:* “Ireland will almost certainly lose investment to other EU countries if the Lisbon Treaty is not ratified, the managing director of Microsoft Ireland said yesterday.” (Lynch, 2009, September 12, p.8)

## **Immigration**

The issue frame “immigration” addresses links between the Lisbon treaty and immigration into the EU. It does in the second referendum also include arguments on the accession of Turkey into the EU. The frame was owned by the Yes side in the first referendum and by the No side in the second referendum.

*Negative frame:* “The Lisbon Treaty is a proxy vote on Turkish accession. It allows for a country of 75 million people to enter the EU, which would in fact double the number of farmers we have, while retaining the Common Agricultural Policy budget at existing levels.” (Bréadún, 2009, August 21, p.7)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “Mr Smith said it was a complete distraction to raise the issue of Turkey joining the EU as negotiations on this had been going on for many years and had a very long way to go. “The crucial point is that the issue of Turkish membership of the EU will ultimately be decided on its own merits and can only be

agreed with the consent of all current member states. Lisbon will have no impact on that one way to the other,” Mr Smith said.” (Sheehan, 2009, August, 21, p.12)

### **Neutrality**

The issue frame “neutrality” deals with changes from the Lisbon treaty in relation to the Irish political and military neutrality. The frame was owned by the No side in both referendums.

*Negative frame:* “Arguing that the treaty would “further undermine” neutrality, Mr Adams said the text makes clear that the EU will have common foreign and defence policies and that such a policies “must be compatible” with Nato.” (Fitzgerald, 2008, May 3, p.6)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* Opponents of the Lisbon Treaty claim that it prejudices our neutrality by committing us to European defence. This is untrue. First of all, the provision of the four neutral countries outside of NATO is protected by the Lisbon Treaty provision (article 42) [...]” (FitzGerald, 2008, May 31, p.14)

### **Militarization**

The issue frame “militarization” refers to arguments that the Lisbon treaty would lead to a militarization of the EU. It also includes the issue of membership in the European Defence Agency. The issue was owned by the No side in both referendum campaigns.

*Negative frame:* “While acknowledging that the precise detail of such policies is left to a future date and the Government retains its veto, Mr Adams said “the end goal is clearly defined” and Ireland would be “drawn even further into the emerging EU military capacity.” (Fitzgeralds, 2008, May 3, p.6)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “The section on defence [in the treaty] is very clear. It gives a lie to any suggestions that common defence will be imposed to us.” (Smyth, 2008, May 27, p.9)

*Positive and defensive frame:* “European Defence Agency (EDA) chief executive Alexander Weis has rejected claims that the Lisbon Treaty and the agency would lead to the militarization of the EU. [...] “We do not militarize the European Union, we are just enhancing the military capabilities of EU member states’ armed forces. [...] This is for the sake of taxpayers, because co-operating means saving money.” (Smyth, 2008, May 27, p.9)

### **Minimum wage**

The issue frame “minimum wage” deals with arguments that the Lisbon treaty would relate to a lowering of the minimum wage in Ireland. The frame only occurred in the second referendum and was owned by the No side.

*Negative frame:* The group [Cóir] has produced five posters with provocative slogans. The most contentious claim the group makes is that the minimum wage could be lowered to €1.84 per hour if the October referendum is successful. (McGee & Roche, 2009, August 31, p.6)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “He [Micheál Martin] said the claim about the minimum wage rate of €1.84 was a distortion of the facts as the EU does not have the power to set national minimum wage rates.” (McGee & Roche, 2009, August 31, p.6)

### **Moral values**

The issue frame on “moral values” includes arguments that the Lisbon treaty would lead to the introduction of abortion, prostitution or euthanasia in Ireland. It further relates to the protection of the family and on the intrusion of the state into the sphere of the family and also includes the issue of the EU’s Christian heritage. The frame was owned by the No side in both campaigns.

*Negative frame:* “We need to lead this battle against a treaty which would bring about a new empire, where the unborn child has no rights, and God himself is forgotten”, he [Fr John Brady, Cóir] writes.” (Shehan, 2009, August 28, p.6)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “Claims that Ireland would be required to introduce abortion if the treaty was ratified were “completely untrue”. “There will be no change in this country’s stance on abortion”.” (Fitzgerald, 2008, May 14, p.6) 7

### **Public service**

The issue frame “public service” deals with implications of the Lisbon treaty on the provision of public services in Ireland. This frame includes among other things the services on health and education. The frame was owned by the No side in both referendums.

*Negative frame:* “Former Socialist Party TD Joe Higgins said Lisbon would accelerate the privatization of health services – which the Government has already embarked upon.” (Hennessy, 2008, May 23, p.11)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “Next, treaty opponents allege that it will give the Union powers to force us to privatize public services such as education and defence. This has never been an issue, but, recognizing that such fears existed, a protocol was added last year setting out reasons why the shared values of the Union include the preservation of services of general interest, as public services are describes.” (FitzGerald, 2008, May 31, p.14)

### **Social dimension**

The issue frame “social dimension” covers issues relating to the “social progress” in Europe. This does include particular policy fields like social policy, employment policy or sports policy, but also the broader discussion on the social scale of the European

project and the design of its economic system. The frame was owned by the Yes side in both referendums.

*Positive frame:* “Mr Cowen also said the treaty committed the EU to pursuing full employment and social progress as well as social justice, and to combating social exclusion and discrimination”. (Wall & McGee, 2008, May 17, p. 7)

*Negative and defensive frame:* “So let’s be specific, Pat. You mention Lisbon promoting “a social market economy aiming at full employment and social progress”. [...] Look at the reality of what the market has delivered – rocketing unemployment causing major hardship for millions and massive cuts in public services.” (Higgins, 2009, August 29, p.11)

### **Sovereignty**

The issue frame “sovereignty” deals with arguments on the loss of sovereignty as result of the Lisbon treaty. It is closely linked to the frames on neutrality, militarization and transfer of power, but includes arguments that deal specifically with the question of sovereignty. The issue was owned by the No side in both referendums.

*Negative frame:* “Corr told listeners that the treaty will introduce “a scientific technocracy” to Europe which will erode national sovereignty. (unknown author, 2008, May 30, p.10)

*Positive and defensive frame:* “He [Taoiseach Cowen] added: “The Eurosceptic ideology makes much play of the idea that the EU is the enemy of national sovereignty. The truth is that the Union is the greatest enabler of national sovereignty in our history.” (Hennesy, 2008, May 23, p.11)

### **Taxation**

The issue frame “taxation” includes arguments on a change in the tax regime and a European role in the setting of tax rates. The arguments specifically include the issue of the corporate tax rate in Ireland and the harmonization of taxation within the EU. The frame was owned by the No side in both referendums.

*Negative frame:* “The leaflet, headlined “Protect your business – Vote no to Lisbon”, argues that the treaty “undermines efforts to ensure that Ireland is economically successful by [...] and opening the door to tax harmonization” (Fitzgerald, 2008, May 27, p.8)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “The fact is that the demand to clarify the tax status is absurd given the fact that the taxation position is already clarified in the treaty, so there is no single demand that can be put in a renegotiation” (Crosbie, 2008, June 4, p.11)

## **Transfer of power**

The issue frame “transfer of power” deals with the issue of the transfer of power to the European level. It includes the loss of veto powers in the Council of the European Union in certain policy areas and the issue of the Lisbon treaty being a self-amending treaty. The issue was owned by the No side in both referendums.

*Negative frame:* “Speaking during the debate on the legislation to allow for a referendum, Mr Ó Caoláin, said the treaty “includes more than 100 additional powers for the EU institutions, including the loss of vetoes in key areas like the economy.” (O’Halloran, 2008, April 24, p.8)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “Mr Roche said “the suggestion that this is a self-amending treaty and that if the treaty is to be changed in any significant way in the future, the Irish people could simply be ignored, is not true. It is not based on any fact.” (O’Halloran, 2008, May 2, p.10)

## **Voting strength**

The issue frame on “voting strength” addresses arguments on the modified voting system in the Council of the European Union. The issue was owned by the No side in both referendums.

*Negative frame:* “The most important power-political chance is that Lisbon would base lawmaking in the post-Lisbon union primarily on population size. This would double Germany’s relative voting strength on the Council of Ministers from its present 8 per cent to 17 per cent [...] and it would halve Ireland’s weight from 2 per cent to 0.8 per cent.” (Coughlan, 2008, May 16, p.10)

*Neutral and defensive frame:* “The new double majority voting system posed no threat to Ireland’s influence within the EU, he added. “Opponents who claim that Ireland’s vote is halved are wrong. They are only selectively counting one part of the double majority system”. (McGee, 2008, May 16, p.11)

## **Workers’ rights**

The issue frame on “workers’ rights” covers arguments on the implications of the Lisbon treaty on the rights of workers in Ireland. The frame also includes discussions on various judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union on workers’ rights. The frame is closely linked to the frame “Charter of Fundamental Rights”. The frame was owned by the No side in the first referendum and by the Yes side in the second referendum.

*Positive and offensive frame:* Urging trade union members to vote “Yes” to Lisbon, Mr Begg said the Lisbon Treaty would incorporate the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, giving better legal status to workers’ rights.” (Sheahan, 2008, May 17, p.9)

*Negative and offensive frame:* “Mr Higgins has argued that the treaty will erode workers’ rights and promote a market aimed at the interests of corporations and business alone, notwithstanding the guarantees given to the Government at the conclusion of the European Council in June.” (McGee, 2009, August 20, p.8)

## **Annex I.II: Generic Frames**

While issue frames refer to actual sub-issues of the referendum question, generic frames work differently as they set the context of the referendum debate or link a non-related argument to the referendum question. The topics of generic frames can be part of a broader discussion of the referendum issue, but they are not directly related to the referendum question. While the issue frame argues, “if the treaty is ratified x will happen and therefore one should vote a certain way”, generic issues have a different causality: “because of x, you should vote a certain way.” A classic generic frame is for example government satisfaction in which voters are asked to vote a certain way because of their satisfaction with the government. The satisfaction with the government is not linked to the treaty and its implications, but an unrelated topic that however can be linked to the broader referendum debate.

### **Benefits of membership**

The generic frame “benefits of membership” addresses benefits Ireland gained from its membership in the EU. The frame does thereby refer to EU attitudes and a cost benefit analyses and is used to show the positive implications of the EU for Ireland. It thereby sets a context on which votes are asked to decide on the referendum issue.

“Everyone knows how well Ireland has done out of its 35-year membership of the EU – great opportunities were offered to us and we know how to take them. Today Ireland is not only more prosperous because of its EU membership, but also more confident. In one generation, we have gone from beneficiary to role model for newer member states.” (Day, 2008, May 15, p.18)

“Ireland has been by far the greatest beneficiary of EU membership. First of all, it secured us from our 130-year-old total dependence on a British food market [...]. Second, our EU partners have provided Ireland with tens of billions of euro to enable us to expand hugely our education and training system [...].” (FitzGerald, 2008, May 31, p.16)

### **Change/rerun**

The generic frame “change/rerun” addresses the question, if the treaty and its context differ between both referendums. It also raises the question of the legitimacy to ask voters to vote twice on the same issue.

“He said nothing has changed in the Lisbon Treaty since the referendum in June last year, but a “fresh debate” was needed.” (Edwards, 2009, August 19, p.7)

“Speaking at a meeting organized by the Campaign Against the EU Constitution (CAEUC), Ms McDonald said the same treaty rejected by the public last year was being put to them again.” (Carroll, 2009, August 19, p.7)

### **Economy**

The generic frame “economy” refers to the economic context surrounding the referendum question. It is used when no direct link is made between the treaty and the economy, but the economy is used as an argument to vote in a certain way. The frame is to be distinguished from the issue frame on “economic recovery”, in which a direct link is made between the ratification of the treaty and the creation of jobs and economic growth.

“The Irish Exporters’ Association yesterday added its voice to the chorus of Lisbon Treaty supporters, arguing the treaty’s defeat could jeopardize €56bn of EU-bound annual exports” (Noonan, 2008, May 5, p.4)

### **Farm succession**

The generic frame “farm succession” refers to a proposed EU regulation on succession rights in cross-border disputes. It was not related to the Lisbon treaty, but it was claimed that the ratification of the Lisbon treaty would make legislation in that area more likely. The argument is therefore not related to the actual referendum question, which also has not been disputed by the group that created this argument.

“In other words, if a farmer had decided to bequeath or will a family farm to a son or daughter, other family members, even those who have emigrated, can challenge that will under such a proposal by the EU Commission, and the danger is, if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, that will come into effect.”

“Farmers for No claimed an EU move to give all children equal succession entitlements would threaten farm inheritance rights. However, the EU’s Dublin office last night insisted this area would continue to be governed by national rights and traditions. They said the EU had examined issues surrounding cross-border inheritance claims where there were competing national entitlements.” (Sheehan, 2009, August 22, p.13)

### **Future EU**

The generic frame “Future EU” deals with arguments that the Lisbon referendum will in general terms change the future of Ireland and of the EU. It therefore puts the referendum issue in a temporal context and highlights the significance of the referendum issue. It might be used as a rhetoric method to increase the importance of the attached message.

“The Irish people will decide not just on their own future but on the futures of generations to come. We have nothing to fear and we have everything to gain”, he said. (Collins, 2009, October 2, p.1)

“I believe that the people of Ireland see this treaty as being about their future. It is not about a particular issue. People want to look to the future and they want to secure their future”, Mr Cowen said.” (Kerr, 2009, October 1, p.14)

### **Government satisfaction**

The generic frame “government satisfaction” asks voter to consider or not consider their satisfaction with the government in their voting decision. It does therefore introduce a non-related issue into the referendum question.

“Yesterday, Mr Kenny launched his party’s poster campaign on Merrion Street and called for voters to avoid using the referendum as a way of expressing dissatisfaction with the government. “I ask them to vote ‘Yes’ for the treaty and to wait until this time next year to punish the government in the local elections and the European elections”, he said.” (Brennan, 2008, May 14, p.12)

“And he [Mr Gilmore] urged any voter planning to deliver a blow to the Government by voting ‘No’ to reconsider that narrow position.” (O’Connor, 2009, September 1, p.5)

### **History**

The generic frame “history” sets the referendum question in relation to the historic development of the EU. It does portray the referendum on the Lisbon treaty into the context with former treaties. The frame does thereby intend to provide voters with background information on the referendum question.

“The Lisbon Treaty is the constitutional culmination of the federalist project which has been the political dynamic of the European integration ever since the Schumann Declaration of 1950 proclaimed the European Coal and Steel Community to be “the first step in the federation of Europe.” (Coughlan, 2008, May 16, p.10)

### **Ireland’s influence**

The generic frame “Ireland’s influence builds a relation between the referendum decision and the goodwill of the EU partners with Ireland. The frame asks for changes on Ireland’s negotiation position, which is determined by other factors than institutionalized voting procedures. The frame is related to the perception that Ireland traditionally “punches beyond its weight” in the EU.

“Mr Ó Neachtain warned that Ireland would “lose influence and power” if the Lisbon Treaty was not passed, and said it was “the only treaty we can get”.” (Horan, 2008, May 14, p. 7)



“Stressing the Government’s commitment to a balanced WTO agreement, the Minister said that a Yes vote would greatly strengthen Ireland’s negotiating position in the forthcoming Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) “Health Check” later this year.” (Mac Connell, 2008, April 19, p.8)

### **Lack of information**

The generic frame “lack of information/complexity” includes arguments that the treaty is not easily understandable by the broad public and voters have an information deficit to answer the referendum question.

“Voters who have doubts or are not informed were urged to vote No by Mr Adams. “How many people have signed up for big documents to find 10 years later they have lost their farm or their household?” (Carbery, 2008, May 2, p.6)

“Dr Coughlan also criticized what he said was a “complicated” treaty. “As a committed European, I would love to have seen something similar to Bunreacht na hÉireann [Irish constitution] or the US constitution, something that any citizen could pick up, read and understand.” (Fitzgerald, 2008, May 14, p. 7)

### **Legal guarantees**

The generic frame “legal guarantees” refers to the change in the context of the referendum debate caused by the legal guarantees. In this research, the legal guarantees are seen as a generic frame, as they do not alter the Lisbon treaty, but highlight certain issue of the Lisbon treaty. They do therefore alter the understanding of the Lisbon treaty, by providing additional context information, but does not change the legal version of the treaty.

“This means that “in addition to the agreement to retain a commissioner for every state, the legal guarantees now mean that there is absolutely no reason for doubt about the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the areas of greatest concern to the Irish people”.” (McGarry, 2009, August 21, p.7)

“Fianna Fáil MEP Pat ‘the Cope’ Gallagher said the Government had obtained a guarantee that Ireland would retain its European Commissioner and would have its taxation and neutrality policy respected. “Simply put, claims by Joe Higgins MEP that these do not amount to real changes are disingenuous and are wrong,” he said.” (Brennan, 2009, August 19, p.9)

### **National interest**

In the generic frame “national interest” actors in the referendum debate argue that the ratification of the treaty are a matter of “national interest” of the country. The argument therefore applies to the “greater public good” and to the activation of partisan attitudes.

I want us to be a strong team player in the unique league of democratic, like-minded nations that is the European Union. This is why I sincerely believe that a 'Yes' vote is in our best national interest." (Martin, 2009, August 19, p.15)

"Tánaiste Brian Cowen insisted his party would campaign vigorously for a Yes vote in the Lisbon Treaty referendum, which he described as an "important strategic decision for the Irish people". (O'Halloran, 2008, April 30, p. 8)

### **Position within EU**

The generic frame "position within EU" addresses arguments on Ireland's standing as a country at the heart of the EU, contrary to being at the margins of the EU, as indicated by its geographical location. The argument does also include the question, if following a rejection of the Lisbon treaty, a multi-speed Europe could develop in which Ireland would lose out due its position on the margin of the EU.

"A second 'No' vote by Irish voters would also erode Ireland's position at the heart of the European Union." (Shiel, 2009, August 21, p.21)

"John Powers of the Irish Hotels Federation said a Yes vote would send a strong signal that Ireland remained at the centre of the EU during difficult economic times." (Collins, 2009, August 17, p.4)

### **Ratification in other Member states**

The generic frame "ratification in other Member states refers to arguments on the ratification procedures in other member states and the democratic implications on the fact that Ireland is the only member state with a referendum. The frame does create a context, in which Irish voters have a special responsibility towards other European citizens.

"The central question voters should ask themselves in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty is: "Why are all of the people of the EU not being asked to vote?", the Workers' Party said yesterday." (O'Brien, 2008, May 17, p.7)

"Some 85 per cent of national parliamentarians in the EU may have endorsed the Lisbon Treaty. That is not the same as being endorsed by 85 per cent of the people of Europe. In Ireland about 98 per cent of the parliament endorsed it but a majority of the people rejected it. Their fellow Europeans weren't given the opportunity to decide." (Higgins, 2009, August 29, p.11)

### **Renegotiation**

The generic frame "renegotiation" deals with the issue of a renegotiation of the Lisbon treaty in the case of a rejection of the treaty. This frame inclines that a better deal for Ireland could be reached, if the treaty was renegotiated. The frame is closely linked to the issue frame on "consequence of No vote" but is more speculative on the

consequence of a rejection. It does therefore not include policy consequences as the “consequence of No vote” issue frame.

“Responding to the debate on the referendum Bill, which was passed, Mr Roche said it was disingenuous to suggest it would be easy to renegotiate the treaty. Those who had put forward the slogan “Vote No for a better Yes” should indicate what they mean by a “better Yes”. The treaty was Plan B and there was no Plan C.” (Walsh, 2008, May 2, p.10)

“A better deal is possible. If the treaty is rejected EU leaders will be brought back to the negotiating Table. We then need to ensure that the three Government parties negotiate a better deal.” (McDonald, 2008, April 29, p.13)

### **Right wing agenda**

The generic frame “right wing agenda” also defines the context in which the referendum and the Lisbon treaty ought to be understood. In this specific frame, the argument is that the Lisbon treaty is the product of conservative and right wing ideas on the development of a society.

“Mr Ó Caolain claimed the Lisbon Treaty was drafted by right-wing politicians who helped fuel the recession and was riddled with the same economic policies.” (O’Connor, 2009, August, 15, p.5)

“He said the party’s argument that Lisbon was the product of right-wing politicians was negated by the fact that it was ratified by the other 26 EU states. Opposition politicians as well as government ones, representing left-wing parties as well as those on the centre and right – a total of 85 per cent of them – voted in favor of it,” he said.” (Collins, 2009, August 15, p.6)

### **Yes to Europe**

The generic frame “Yes to Europe” addresses general calls to vote Yes in the referendum. The arguments can usually be reduced to the message “Yes to Europe” and appeals to the voter’s attitudes towards the EU. The frame is linked to the “benefits of the membership” frame, but does not link the support of Europe directly to benefits or gains.

“I would urge people to vote Yes to continue to build a peaceful Europe.” (McGowan, 2008, May 22, p.19)

“We need to stand together today, united, on one of the most important issues facing our country, the need to say Yes to the Lisbon Treaty” (McGee, 2008, June 10, p.9)

“We should vote ‘Yes’ because it is the good for Ireland and Europe.” (Mitchell, 2008, May 28, p.15)

## **WTO Talks**

The generic frame “WTO talk” refers to the connection between the Lisbon treaty and the WTO trade talks, which happened in the time during the first referendum. While both issues were not linked to each other, the IFA threatened to recommend a No vote, if the government would not follow the IFA’s line in the WTO negotiations and finally accept to veto the deal if it was against the interest of Irish farmers.

“Separately yesterday, Irish Farmers’ Association president Pádraig Walshe said that if the Government gave a commitment that it was prepared to veto the World Trade Agreement, he would recommend a Yes vote in the referendum. (Hennessy & Mac Connell, 2008, May 16, p.10)

“The Minister has cautioned farmers not to heed calls to vote No he said, over their concerns about the World Trade Organization (WTO) as these Talks will take another year to finish and have nothing to do with the referendum.” (Hennessy, 2008, April 29, p.1)

## Annex II: Data on the 2008 Referendum

**Table 19: Use of issue and generic frame categories by the Yes and No side and issue ownership of issue frame categories in the 2008 referendum** (in absolute numbers and percentage for each side)

Actors \ Issue Frames	Taxation	Consequence of No vote	Neutrality	Workers' right	Democratic development	Voting strength	Charter of Fundamental Rights	Militarization	Common challenges	Moral values	Efficiency
Issue owner	No side	Yes side	No side	No side	Yes side	No side	Yes side	No side	Yes side	No side	Yes side
Yes side	76 – 15.5%	58 – 11.8%	42 – 8.6%	25 – 5.1%	28 – 5.7%	30 – 6.1%	27 – 5.5%	16 – 3.3%	25 – 5.1%	25 – 5.1%	41 -8.4%
No side	30 – 9.9%	6 – 2%	22 – 7.2%	33 – 10.9%	28 -9.2%	27 – 8.9%	18 – 5.9%	31 – 10.2%	7 – 2.3%	12 – 3.9%	0 – 0%
Overall	112 – 13%	68 – 7.9%	65 – 7.6%	64 – 7.5%	63 – 7.4%	58 – 6.8%	50 – 5.8%	48 – 5.6%	48 – 5.6%	47 – 5.5%	44 – 5.1%

Actors \ Issue frames	Commissioner	Transfers of power	Public services	Sovereignty	EU on world stage	Social Dimension	Foreign investment	Crime	Development policy	Immigration
Issue owner	No side	No side	No side	No side	Yes side	Yes side	No side	Yes side	No side	Yes side
Yes side	20 – 4.1%	15 – 3.1%	8 – 1.6%	8 – 1.6%	12 – 2.4%	8 – 1.6%	8 – 1.6%	11 – 2.2%	2 – 0.4%	5 – 1%
No side	23 – 7.6%	18 – 5.9%	22 – 7.2%	10 – 3.3%	2 – 0.7%	6 – 2.0%	5 – 1.6%	0 – 0%	4 – 1.3%	0 – 0%
Overall	43 - 5%	34 - 4%	30 – 3.5%	20 – 2.3%	14 – 1.6%	14 – 1.6%	13 – 1.5%	11 – 1.3%	6 – 0.7%	5 – 0.6%

Actors \ Generic frames	WTO talks	Benefits of membership	Renegotiation	National interest	Lack of information	History	Economy	Yes to Europe	Ireland's influence	Government support	Ratification process in other MS
Yes side	58 – 18.5%	60 – 19.2%	19 – 6.1%	39 – 12.5%	25 – 8%	24 – 7.7%	27 – 8.6%	28 – 8.9%	20 – 6.4%	13 – 4.2%	0 – 0%
No side	7 – 10.8%	0 – 0%	31 – 47.7%	1 – 1.5%	12 – 18.5%	5 – 7.7%	0 – 0%	0 – 0%	2 – 3.1%	0 – 0%	7 – 10.8%
Overall	95 – 22.4%	63 – 14.9%	55 – 13.0%	40 – 9.4%	40 – 9.4%	30 – 6.6%	28 – 6.6%	28 – 6.6%	23 – 5.4%	13 – 3.1%	9 – 2.1%

**Table 20: Usage of different types and characteristics of frames by different actors in the 2008 referendum** (in absolute numbers of frames; aggregate data on type of frame in percentage of all frames for each side; percentages on aggregate data of valence of frame and use of opponent side's frame in relation to number of issue frames)

Actors \ Frames	Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame	
	Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neutral	Off.	Def.
Fianna Fáil	192	155	143	72	22	99	14	77
Fine Gael	73	60	91	17	8	49	4	41
Labour Party	77	28	64	39	8	30	13	28
PD	3	1	8	0	1	2	0	1
EC	45	25	9	18	9	18	0	11
Irish Alliance for Europe	55	23	19	27	4	24	5	16
Business Alliance for Europe	27	19	11	17	1	9	5	8
Ictú	15	0	5	13	0	2	5	1
<b>Yes side – overall</b>	487	311	350	203	53	233	46	183
	<b>42.4%</b>	<b>27.1%</b>	<b>30.5%</b>	<b>41.7%</b>	<b>10.9%</b>	<b>47.8%</b>	<b>9.4 %</b>	<b>37.6%</b>
Sinn Féin	108	29	38	2	85	21	10	1
Socialist Party	23	1	7	0	15	8	0	3
Workers Party	4	1	2	0	1	3	1	0
Libertas	57	21	54	2	48	7	13	0
Cóir	24	0	11	0	23	1	5	0
Unite	8	6	3	1	3	4	1	0
TEEU	5	1	3	0	5	0	0	0
CAEUC -	72	5	25	1	54	17	8	2
<b>No side – overall</b>	301	64	143	6	234	61	39	6
	<b>59.2%</b>	<b>12.6%</b>	<b>28.2%</b>	<b>2.0%</b>	<b>78%</b>	<b>20.0%</b>	<b>13.0%</b>	<b>2.0%</b>
Green Party	31	9	22	17	7	7	0	4
IFA	4	27	10	0	0	4	0	0
Church	18	6	10	0	3	15	0	1
Siptu	10	4	5	1	2	7	0	0
<b>Neutral side – overall</b>	63	46	47	18	12	33	0	5
	<b>40.4%</b>	<b>29.5%</b>	<b>30.1%</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>19 %</b>	<b>52.4%</b>	<b>0.0 %</b>	<b>7.9%</b>
<b>Referendum – overall</b>	<b>851</b>	<b>421</b>	<b>540</b>	<b>227</b>	<b>299</b>	<b>327</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>194</b>
	<b>46.9%</b>	<b>23.2%</b>	<b>29.8%</b>	<b>26.7%</b>	<b>35.2%</b>	<b>38.5%</b>	<b>10.0%</b>	<b>22.8%</b>

**Table 21: Usage of different types and characteristics of frames over time in the 2008 referendum (in absolute numbers)**

Actors \ frames	Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame		
	Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neutral	Off.	Def.	
Fianna Fáil	<i>run-up phase</i>	95	81	76	43	2	51	10	45
	<i>final phase</i>	97	74	67	29	20	48	4	32
Fine Gael		51	36	50	12	4	35	4	29
		22	24	41	5	4	14	0	12
Labour		49	14	28	26	4	19	7	18
		28	14	36	13	4	11	6	10
PD		2	1	3	0	0	2	0	1
		1	0	5	0	1	0	0	0
EC		35	23	6	18	5	12	0	10
		10	2	3	0	4	6	0	1
Irish Alliance for Europe		24	11	9	13	1	10	3	8
		31	12	10	14	3	14	2	8
Business Alliance for Europe		21	12	6	13	1	7	2	7
		6	7	5	4	0	2	3	1
Ictú		12	0	3	11	0	1	5	1
		3	0	2	2	0	1	0	0
<b>Yes side – overall</b>	<i>run-up phase</i>	290	178	181	126	17	137	32	119
	<i>final phase</i>	199	133	169	67	36	96	16	64
Sinn Féin	<i>run-up phase</i>	61	13	22	0	52	9	4	1
	<i>final phase</i>	47	16	16	2	33	12	6	0
Socialist Party		13	1	6	0	12	1	0	1
		10	0	1	0	3	7	0	2
Workers Party		0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
		4	0	1	0	1	3	1	0
Libertas		23	12	25	1	22	0	7	0
		34	9	29	1	26	7	6	0
Cóir		18	0	7	0	18	0	5	0
		6	0	4	0	5	1	0	0
Unite		2	4	2	0	1	1	0	0
		6	2	1	1	2	3	1	0
TEEU		4	1	2	0	4	0	0	0
		1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
CAEUC		46	2	19	0	36	10	4	1
		26	3	6	1	18	7	4	1
<b>No side – overall</b>	<i>run-up phase</i>	167	34	84	1	145	21	21	3
	<i>final phase</i>	134	30	59	5	89	40	26	3

Continuation of Table 21

Actors \ frames	Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame		
	Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neutral	Off.	Def.	
Green Party	<i>run-up phase</i>	12	4	6	9	2	1	0	0
	<i>final phase</i>	19	5	16	8	5	6	0	4
IFA		3	19	3	0	0	3	0	0
		1	8	7	0	0	1	0	0
Church		0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
		18	5	9	0	3	15	0	1
Siptu		1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
		9	4	5	1	1	7	0	0
<b>Neutral side</b> – overall	<i>run-up phase</i>	16	24	10	9	3	4	0	0
	<i>final phase</i>	47	22	37	9	9	29	0	5
<b>Referendum</b> – overall	<i>run-up phase</i>	473	236	275	136	165	162	53	122
	<i>final phase</i>	380	185	265	81	134	165	42	72



### Annex III: Data on the 2009 Referendum

**Table 22: Use of issue and generic frame categories by the Yes and No side and issue ownership of issue frame categories in the 2009 referendum** (in absolute numbers and percentage for each side)

Actors \ Issue Frames	Consequence of No vote	Economic recovery	Workers' rights	Moral values	Neutrality	Minimum wage	Commissioner	Charter of Fundamental Rights	Militarization	Taxation	Foreign investment
Issue owner	Yes side	Yes side	Yes side	No side	No side	No side	Yes side	Yes side	No side	No side	Yes side
Yes side	67 – 13.2%	59 – 11.7%	37 – 7.3%	26 – 5.1%	33 – 6.5%	36 – 7.1%	33 – 6.5%	30 – 5.9%	16 – 3.2%	30 – 5.9%	27 – 5.3%
No side	11 – 4.0%	16 – 5.8%	31 – 11.2%	19 – 6.8%	21 – 7.6%	17 – 6.1%	12 – 4.3%	9 – 3.2%	24 – 8.6%	6 – 2.2%	8 – 2.9%
<b>Overall</b>	<b>84 – 10.1%</b>	<b>75 – 9.0%</b>	<b>69 – 8.3%</b>	<b>57 – 6.9%</b>	<b>55 – 6.6%</b>	<b>54 – 6.5%</b>	<b>46 – 5.5%</b>	<b>41 – 4.9%</b>	<b>40 – 4.8%</b>	<b>38 – 4.6%</b>	<b>36 – 4.3%</b>

Actors \ Issue Frames	Transfer of power	Democratic development	Common challenges	Voting strength	Efficiency	Immigration	Public service	Sovereignty	Social dimension	Crime	EU on world stage
Issue owner	No side	Yes side	Yes side	No side	Yes side	No side	No side	No side	Yes side	Yes side	Yes side
Yes side	5 – 1.0%	15 – 3.0%	26 – 5.1%	7 – 1.4%	22 – 4.3%	10 – 2.0%	3 – 0.6%	1 – 0.2%	9 – 1.8%	8 – 1.6%	6 – 1.2%
No side	28 – 10.1%	12 – 4.3%	1 – 0.4%	21 – 7.6%	0 – 0.0%	13 – 4.7%	14 – 5.0%	12 – 4.3%	3 – 1.1%	0 – 0.0%	0 – 0.0%
<b>Overall</b>	<b>33 – 4.0%</b>	<b>30 – 3.6%</b>	<b>31 – 3.7%</b>	<b>28 – 3.4%</b>	<b>26 – 3.1%</b>	<b>24 – 2.9%</b>	<b>18 – 2.2%</b>	<b>14 – 1.7%</b>	<b>14 – 1.7%</b>	<b>10 – 1.2%</b>	<b>6 – 0.7%</b>

Actors \ Generic Frames	Legal guarantees	Position within EU	Government support	Change/rerun	Benefits of membership	Economy	National interest	Future EU	Ireland's influence	Farm succession	Right wing agenda
Yes side	56 – 16.9%	58 – 17.5%	44 – 13.3%	18 – 5.4%	49 – 14.8%	26 – 7.9%	23 – 6.9%	14 – 4.2%	12 – 3.6%	8 – 2.4%	3 – 0.9%
No side	14 – 13.0%	5 – 4.6%	15 – 13.9%	39 – 36.1%	2 – 1.9%	3 – 2.8%	2 – 1.9%	1 – 0.9%	0 – 0.0%	6 – 5.6%	11 – 10.2%
<b>Overall</b>	<b>75 – 16.6%</b>	<b>63 – 13.9%</b>	<b>62 – 13.7%</b>	<b>58 – 12.8%</b>	<b>51 – 11.3%</b>	<b>29 – 6.4%</b>	<b>25 – 5.5%</b>	<b>18 – 4%</b>	<b>14 – 3.1%</b>	<b>14 – 3.1%</b>	<b>14 – 3.1%</b>

Actors \ Generic Frames	History	Ratification in other MS	Lack of information	Renegotiation
Yes side	10 – 3.0%	4 – 1.2%	5 – 1.5%	1 – 0.3%
No side	2 – 1.9%	4 – 3.7%	1 – 0.9%	3 – 2.8%
<b>Overall</b>	<b>12 – 2.6%</b>	<b>8 – 1.8%</b>	<b>6 – 1.3%</b>	<b>4 – 0.9%</b>

**Table 23: Usage of different types and characteristics of frames by different actors in the 2009 referendum** (in absolute numbers of frames; aggregate data on type of frame in percentage of all frames for each side; percentages on aggregate data of valence of frame and use of opponent side's frame in relation to number of issue frames)

Actors \ Frames	Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame	
	Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neutral	Off.	Def.
Fianna Fáil	167	129	81	54	26	82	8	38
Fine Gael	53	53	40	18	3	32	0	16
Labour	68	37	39	48	10	10	5	5
Green Party	27	9	11	14	1	12	0	8
EC	49	22	15	24	8	17	1	11
Ireland for Europe	51	31	37	25	6	20	1	12
We belong	11	3	7	4	1	6	0	0
Ireland's future	6	0	1	2	0	4	0	3
Business for Europe	34	14	5	19	8	7	0	3
Ryanair	3	10	10	2	0	1	0	0
Intel	6	4	5	3	0	3	0	0
Charter Group	15	5	6	11	2	2	0	2
Ictú	11	3	1	5	2	4	0	2
Siptu	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0
IFA	4	8	6	2	2	0	0	0
<b>Yes side – overall</b>	506	329	266	235	69	202	15	100
	46.0%	29.9%	24.2%	46.4%	13.6%	39.9%	3.0%	19.8%
Sinn Féin	80	40	31	2	54	25	14	12
Socialist Party	35	8	21	0	17	18	3	7
UKIP	13	0	6	0	12	1	3	1
Cóir	41	7	18	0	38	3	4	0
Libertas	21	17	35	1	14	6	7	3
Farmers for No	19	5	2	1	17	1	1	0
No to Lisbon 2	55	26	41	0	45	9	7	3
Unite	10	3	1	0	1	9	0	1
TEEU	4	2	1	0	2	2	1	1
<b>No side – overall</b>	278	108	156	4	200	74	40	28
	51.3%	19.9%	28.8%	1.4%	71.9%	26.6%	14.4%	10.1%
church	25	8	13	3	4	18	1	9
EP Pres	17	3	4	12	1	4	0	4
concern	3	3	1	1	2	0	0	0
<b>Neutral side – overall</b>	45	14	18	16	7	22	1	13
	58.4%	18.2%	23.4%	35.6%	15.6%	48.9%	2.2%	28.9%
<b>Referendum – overall</b>	829	451	440	252	281	296	56	141
	48.2%	26.2%	25.6%	33.9%	33.9%	35.7%	6.9%	17.0%

**Table 24: Usage of different types and characteristics of frames over time in the 2009 referendum (in absolute numbers)**

Actors \ frames	Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame	
	Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neutral	Off.	Def.
Fianna Fáil <i>run-up phase</i>	98	69	40	39	17	42	7	16
<i>final phase</i>	69	60	41	15	14	40	1	22
Fine Gael	33	22	14	11	2	20	0	8
	20	31	26	7	1	12	0	8
Labour	35	18	16	26	3	6	4	4
	33	19	23	22	7	4	1	1
Green Party	9	6	5	5	0	4	0	2
	18	3	6	9	1	8	0	6
EC	17	11	6	9	0	8	1	8
	32	11	9	15	8	9	0	3
Ireland for Europe	30	28	27	16	5	9	1	7
	21	3	10	9	1	11	0	5
We belong	8	2	5	1	1	6	0	0
	3	1	2	3	0	0	0	0
Ireland's future	6	0	1	2	0	4	0	3
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Business for Europe	17	8	3	11	3	3	0	0
	17	6	2	8	5	4	0	3
Ryanair	1	8	4	1	0	0	0	0
	2	2	6	1	0	1	0	0
Intel	6	4	5	3	0	3	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charter Group	13	3	5	10	2	1	0	1
	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	1
Ictu	4	0	0	1	1	2	0	1
	7	3	1	4	1	2	0	1
Siptu	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IFA	3	8	3	2	1	0	0	0
	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	0
<b>Yes side – <i>run-up phase</i></b>	<b>281</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>overall <i>final phase</i></b>	<b>225</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>50</b>

Continuation of Table 24

Actors \ frames	Type of frame			Valence of frame			Use of opponent side's frame		
	Issue frames	Generic frames	Contest frames	Pos.	Neg.	Neutral	Off.	Def.	
Sinn Féi	<i>run-up phase</i>	26	15	12	0	16	11	3	3
	<i>final phase</i>	54	25	19	2	38	14	11	9
Socialist Party		13	7	10	0	9	4	2	3
		22	1	11	0	8	14	1	4
UKIP		9	0	3	0	8	1	2	1
		4	0	3	0	4	0	1	0
Cóir		21	4	8	0	21	0	4	0
		20	3	10	0	17	3	0	0
Libertas		5	6	10	0	4	1	2	1
		16	11	25	1	10	5	5	2
Farmers for No		17	5	0	0	16	1	0	0
		2	0	2	1	1	0	1	0
No to Lisbon 2		40	23	25	0	31	8	5	3
		15	3	16	0	14	1	2	0
Unite		6	2	1	0	1	5	0	1
		4	1	0	0	0	4	0	0
TEEU		4	2	1	0	2	2	1	1
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>No side – overall</b>	<i>run-up phase</i>	<b>141</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>
	<i>final phase</i>	<b>137</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>15</b>
church		8	3	6	1	2	5	0	5
		17	5	7	2	2	13	1	4
EP Pres		14	3	3	9	1	4	0	4
		3	0	1	3	0	0	0	0
concern		3	3	1	1	2	0	0	0
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Neutral side – overall</b>	<i>run-up phase</i>	<b>25</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>
	<i>final phase</i>	<b>20</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Referendum – overall</b>	<i>run-up phase</i>	<b>447</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>72</b>
	<i>final phase</i>	<b>382</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>69</b>

## Annex IV: Differences in the Framing Behavior between Both Referendums

Table 25: Changes in use of issue frames for Yes side, No side and Referendum overall in 2008 and in 2009 (in absolute numbers and per cent)

	Yes				No				Total			
	2008		2009		2008		2009		2008		2009	
	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%
<b>Commissioner</b>	20	4.1%	33	6.5%	23	7.6%	12	4.3%	43	5.0%	48	5.8%
<b>Taxation</b>	76	15.6%	30	5.9%	28	9.3%	6	2.2%	114	13.3%	38	4.6%
<b>Neutrality</b>	42	8.6%	33	6.5%	22	7.3%	21	7.6%	65	7.7%	56	6.8%
<b>Moral values</b>	25	5.1%	26	5.1%	12	4.0%	19	6.8%	45	5.2%	56	6.8%
<b>Efficiency</b>	41	8.4%	22	4.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	44	5.1%	27	3.3%
<b>Consequence of No vote</b>	58	11.9%	67	13.2%	6	2.0%	11	4.0%	68	7.9%	85	10.3%
<b>Charter of FR</b>	27	5.5%	30	5.9%	18	6.0%	9	3.2%	49	5.7%	41	4.9%
<b>Workers' rights</b>	25	5.1%	37	7.3%	33	11.0%	31	11.2%	64	7.4%	69	8.3%
<b>Sovereignty</b>	8	1.6%	1	0.2%	10	3.3%	12	4.3%	20	2.3%	15	1.8%
<b>Transfer of power</b>	15	3.1%	5	1.0%	17	5.6%	28	10.1%	33	4.0%	33	4.0%
<b>Democratic development</b>	28	5.7%	15	3.0%	28	9.3%	12	4.3%	63	7.4%	32	3.9%
<b>Militarization</b>	16	3.3%	16	3.2%	31	10.3%	24	8.6%	48	5.6%	41	4.9%
<b>Foreign Investment</b>	8	1.6%	27	5.3%	5	1.7%	8	2.9%	14	1.6%	36	4.3%
<b>Common challenges</b>	25	5.1%	26	5.1%	7	2.3%	1	0.4%	53	6.2%	31	3.7%
<b>EU on world stage</b>	12	2.5%	6	1.2%	2	0.7%	0	0.0%	14	1.6%	6	0.7%
<b>Social dimension</b>	8	1.6%	9	1.8%	6	2.0%	3	1.1%	10	1.2%	14	1.7%
<b>Immigration</b>	5	1.0%	10	2.0%	0	0.0%	13	4.7%	5	0.6%	23	2.8%
<b>Voting strength</b>	30	6.2%	7	1.4%	27	9.0%	21	7.6%	53	6.3%	28	3.4%

	Yes				No				Total			
	2008		2009		2008		2009		2008		2009	
	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%
<b>Crime</b>	11	2.3%	8	1.6%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	11	1.3%	10	1.2%
<b>Public service</b>	8	1.6%	3	0.6%	22	7.3%	14	5.0%	30	3.5%	17	2.1%
<b>Development policy</b>	2	0.4%	0	0.0%	4	1.3%	0	0.0%	6	0.7%	0	0.0%
<b>Economic recovery</b>	0	0.0%	59	11.7%	0	0.0%	16	5.8%	0	0.0%	74	8.9%
<b>Minimum wage</b>	0	0.0%	36	7.1%	0	0.0%	17	6.1%	0	0.0%	54	6.5%

**Table 26: Changes in use of generic frames for Yes side, No side and Referendum overall in 2008 and 2009 (in absolute numbers and per cent)**

	Yes				No				Total			
	2008		2009		2008		2009		2008		2009	
	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%	Abs.	%
<b>Benefits of membership</b>	60	19.3%	49	14.9%	0	0.0%	2	1.9%	63	14.5%	50	11.1%
<b>National interest</b>	39	12.5%	23	7.0%	1	1.6%	2	1.9%	40	9.2%	25	5.5%
<b>Economy</b>	27	8.7%	26	7.9%	0	0.0%	3	2.8%	29	6.7%	29	6.4%
<b>Government satisfaction</b>	13	4.2%	44	13.4%	0	0.0%	15	13.9%	13	3.0%	61	13.5%
<b>Ireland's influence</b>	20	6.4%	12	3.6%	2	3.1%	0	0.0%	23	5.3%	15	3.3%
<b>History</b>	24	7.7%	10	3.0%	5	7.8%	2	1.9%	31	7.1%	12	2.7%
<b>Renegotiation</b>	19	6.1%	1	0.3%	31	48.4%	3	2.8%	55	12.7%	4	0.9%
<b>Lack of information</b>	25	8.0%	5	1.5%	12	18.8%	1	0.9%	43	9.9%	6	1.3%
<b>Ratification in other MS</b>	0	0.0%	4	1.2%	7	10.9%	4	3.7%	9	2.1%	9	2.0%
<b>WTO talks</b>	58	18.6%	0	0.0%	6	9.4%	0	0.0%	95	22.6%	0	0.0%
<b>Yes to Europe</b>	28	9.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	30	6.9%	0	0.0%
<b>Legal guarantees</b>	0	0.0%	56	17.0%	0	0.0%	14	13.0%	0	0.0%	73	16.2%
<b>Change/rerun</b>	0	0.0%	18	5.5%	0	0.0%	39	36.1%	0	0.0%	58	12.9%
<b>Right wing agenda</b>	0	0.0%	3	0.9%	0	0.0%	11	10.2%	0	0.0%	14	3.1%
<b>Farm succession</b>	0	0.0%	8	2.4%	0	0.0%	6	5.6%	0	0.0%	14	3.1%
<b>Future EU</b>	0	0.0%	14	4.3%	0	0.0%	1	0.9%	0	0.0%	18	4.0%
<b>Position within EU</b>	0	0.0%	58	17.6%	0	0.0%	5	4.6%	0	0.0%	64	14.2%