



Cosmopolitan realism and the role of the European Union in international climate politics



A case study of the Copenhagen Climate Conference

by Anna Roß

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Bachelor Thesis

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1. Introduction

We all live on the same earth and we all are exposed to the same climate. But we have caused the climate to change¹. The first consequences can already be seen and they are predicted to intensify: Temperatures rise, glaciers melt, sea levels rise, rainfall patterns shift and hazards like floods and droughts become more common. These dangers put life on earth at risk. Scientists predict that in case the temperature would increase to more than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the risk that severe and catastrophic environmental changes will occur will be much higher (European Commission, 2010; IPCC, 2007).

But as we have caused the climate change, we are also able to prevent it and its related impacts from worsening². This fact makes humans worldwide to be a "community of fate" (Beck, 2002, p. 42). But do we also feel and correspondingly act like a 'community of fate'? The sociologist Ulrich Beck holds that according to the geographically unlimited, uncalculable and un-compensable nature of climate change, interdependencies would be created that make unilateral actions of nation-states ineffective and would make them to include the interests of other actors in the calculation of their own interests. The result would be international cooperation of states that are united in their will to combat climate change. Thus, the negative-sum game of national realism would become a positive-sum game of cosmopolitan realism that makes all actors to benefit from cooperation.

But the story would not be that simple. According to Beck, states would differ in their risk perceptions and the resulting anticipated necessity to cooperate. The United States of America (USA) and China, for example could stick to national realism to defend their national interests and thus prevent international cooperation.

Nevertheless, this resistance by national realism could be overcome by cosmopolitan realism that is promoted by the European Union (EU). By acting as a pioneering coalition and by referring to its cosmopolitan values, the EU could successfully introduce a paradigm shift from national realism to cosmopolitan realism in international climate politics. Because global capitalism would worsen the climate change, Beck even claims that neo-liberalism could be overcome by cosmopolitan realism, too.

In case the logic, as described by Beck's theories would indeed hold for reality- then climate change could be held up and the nightmares of the disastrous consequences would not come true. Despite the importance of the implications of climate change for humans³ and although Beck's contributions on cosmopolitanism in relation to the EU are influential in the contemporary academic debate, it was however not researched yet to what extent Beck's claims hold for reality. That is why I aim at a comprehensive empirical research of his theories.

¹ "Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperature since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic [human-caused] greenhouse gas concentrations." (IPCC, 2007, p. 39); annotation: 'very likely' translates to 90 % probability.

² The IPCC concluded that though 2050 the increase of global temperature should be limited to 2 degrees and to have 50% chance to achieve this objective, emission increase has to be stopped by 2015 and emissions would have to be reduced by 25-40% by 2020 and by 50-85% by 2050 (IPCC, 2007).

³ i.e. Europeans ranked the climate change to be among the three most serious problems of the world (Eurobarometer, 2008, 2009)

Hereby, the 2009 international UN Climate Conference of Copenhagen (CCC), will serve as the case for my observations. For a comprehensive analysis of all of the above outlined theoretical arguments, the following research questions will be asked:

(1) *To what extent did the European Union foster cosmopolitan realpolitik in international climate politics at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009?* To answer this question, in a first step the following sub-research question will be answered: (1a) *To what extent did the EU promote cosmopolitan realpolitik?* Furthermore, as already stated, different risk perceptions of the climate change could create boundaries that hinder cosmopolitan realpolitik. To evaluate the impact of different risk perceptions on the outcome of international climate politics, the following second question will be asked: (2) *How can the outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Conference be explained in terms of divergent risk perceptions of its major participants?* To give a final evaluation of the power of Beck's theoretical assumptions, this third research question will be asked: (3) *Given the answers to the research questions one and two, to what extent is the theory of cosmopolitan realism powerful in explaining international climate negotiations, compared to the theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism?* To answer this question, the findings resulting from researching the first two questions will be used to compare the applicability of Beck's theories with the theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. How the thesis is structured to answer the research questions is outlined in the following.

The next and second chapter will outline the theories used for this paper. The first two research questions are explanatory questions and therefore aim at the investigation of whether theoretical causal relationships prove true for reality, too. Therefore, it is necessary to explain how the concepts of my questions might relate to each other. First of all, however I will provide a deeper insight in the meaning of the concept 'cosmopolitanism' as it is used in this thesis. Then, because Beck argues that the characteristics of global risks create a world risk society, the theory of world risk society will be outlined. This theory serves as the basis to understand how global risks can make cosmopolitan realism to overcome neo-realism. Because risk perceptions may differ across actors, this relationship might be weakened, but the EU would be the powerful actor to resolve this problem. This causal relationship, with the EU as the concept that causes the breakthrough of cosmopolitan realism will be explored through the first research question. Because risk perceptions may differ across actors, international cooperation may be hampered. This relationship is explored through the second research question. The third research question is a more complex question that aims at a comprehensive evaluation of Beck's theory. That is why no theoretical causal relations can be tested to answer this question. Therefore, in dependence on Beck's argument that cosmopolitan realism may also overcome neo-liberalism, only the theory of neo-liberalism will be outlined.

The third chapter describes the research methodology. Here, the method of analysis and the methods of data collection will be described. The method of data collection will be desk research by analysing secondary data. Then, it will be explained how the concepts of the research questions are identified and measured. The indicators for the different concepts will be derived from the theories. Finally, the case selection and the units of analysis will be introduced.

The fourth chapter will be the chapter on the analysis. To answer the sub-research question of the first question, I will conduct an in-depth analysis of the EU's common statement of purposes for the CCC. The resulted findings will then be related to the final outcome of the CCC, which is the Copenhagen Accord (CA). The second research question will put focus on the impact of the different risk perceptions on the possible breakthrough of cosmopolitan realism. Here, the different motivations for the objectives of the CCC's major participants as an indicator of the risk perceptions will be outlined. In a next step, I will have a closer look on how the process of negotiation ended up in the CA. Thereby, I will be able to give the answer for the research question and at the same time, this analysis allows me to further elaborate on the role of the EU, too. Here, official policy documents, press releases, as well as scientific articles, and survey data will be analysed. The insights from the first two research questions provide the necessary data to answer the third research question.

In the last chapter - the conclusion, the findings for the research questions will be summarized. Then I will evaluate the scientific relevance of these findings by discussing the wider related literature. In addition, I will propose practical policy implications for EU's politicians. Finally, I will discuss the limits of my research and future research possibilities.

2. Theory

The key idea of this chapter is to explain the necessary concepts used in this thesis and how and why the concepts of the research questions relate to each other. With respect to the selected topic, the theories represent the contemporary state of knowledge. The concept 'cosmopolitanism' is often assigned with different meanings. To prevent confusion of the reader, it is therefore necessary to first of all describe the concept as used by Beck. Because I want to test whether the causal relationships as described in the theoretical assumptions hold for reality, it will carefully explain the underlying theory. Since, for the last research question, the power of cosmopolitan realism will be assessed in comparison to neo-liberalism, finally the theory of neo-liberalism will be described.

2.1 Cosmopolitanism & Cosmopolitan EU

The vision of Cosmopolitanism can be traced back to Ancient Greece when Diogenes the Cynic stated that he would be a citizen of the world (412-323 BC). Later (from around 300 BC) the Stoics advocated cosmopolitanism as a political tradition. The most important source for scholars writing about cosmopolitanism is the Kantian (Immanuel Kant 1724-1804) perception of cosmopolitanism, who favoured cosmopolitan law that limits the action of nation states and fosters a universal civic society (Boon & Delanty, 2005). The concept Cosmopolitanism is not homogeneously defined. Its meaning steadily changed over time and in contemporary scientific literature it has many different connotations. Most contemporary definitions, however state at least the following characteristics: humankind is put to the fore and humans have a common fate; citizenship is not limited to one territory anymore but it became transnational; all human beings are perceived as being equal; commitment to universal human rights; solidarity with every human being in the world; inclusion of others despite differences.

Because, the theory that builds the ground for this thesis is based on the definition of cosmopolitanism as put forward by the sociologist Ulrich Beck, his conceptualization of cosmopolitanism and the Cosmopolitan EU will be outlined in more detail. Beck's understanding of cosmopolitanism expressively draws on the institutional/governance strand of cosmopolitanism. He narrows this concept down by focusing mainly on the question how difference is dealt with. According to him, the strategy of nationalism to deal with difference would be to follow the either/or logic. This means that it dissolves internal (in the nation-state) difference by promoting uniform norms and emphasizes and strengthens difference to the external (other societies). Individuals and communities are either a member of the nation-state or they are different and do not belong to it.

Contrary, cosmopolitanism would rest on the recognition of difference, following the both/and logic. This means that others, no matter whether they are from the 'own' society or from other societies, are seen as different but at the same time as equal. Others are not excluded because they are perceived as dangerous but they are integrated because they are perceived as enriching. - To integrate others would allow individuals as well as collectives to learn more about themselves and others. This acceptance and tolerance of otherness should be based on universal, institutionalized norms. According to Beck, the EU institutionalized cosmopolitanism already from its very beginnings with diversity probably as its main source of self-understanding. Through the constitution of the EU's supranational institutions (European Commission, Council of Ministers, European Court of Justice, European Parliament) that transformed the national sovereignties, the EU would be the first example of an international project that implemented the both/and principle. By handing over national sovereignty to the supranational level, the nation-states would not have lost power but their power would be increased, since the various sovereignties would complement and reinforce each other (Beck & Grande, 2007). How this EU's cosmopolitanism relates to cosmopolitan realism is outlined in the fourth section of this chapter.

In the following, the theory of world risk society and how it can lead to the breakthrough of cosmopolitan realism will be outlined. Then it will be shown how the EU could foster this cosmopolitan realpolitik in international climate politics. The theory of world risk society argues that the nature of global risks, like environmental, terrorist and financial risks shape modern societies. These global risks have the following three characteristics in common:

1. *Delocalization*: The causes and effects of these risks are not geographically limited. They are delocalized on the spatial level, which means that they and especially the climate change do not stop at borders but spread over nations and continents. Furthermore, they are delocalized on the temporal level because they have a "long latency period" (Beck, 2008b, p. 6). Consequently, the anticipation of them changes over time and no certain predictions and measures can be taken for the future. Finally, they are delocalized on the social level because their social causes and consequences are too complex that they could be sufficiently defined.
2. *Un-calculability*: Despite the efforts of climate scientists, the consequences of global risks are hardly predictable. Because the destructive consequences of these risks may hit everybody in the world, nation-states can no longer rely on their used rationality and experiences.
3. *Non-compensability*: In the past it was anticipated that catastrophes could be compensated, but these global risks may be too disastrous to be

compensable. If for example, low-lying countries like Bangladesh and the Netherlands would largely be flooded due to increased sea levels, this catastrophe could hardly be compensated. Therefore, the idea of compensation should be replaced by the principle of precaution through prevention.

Because for the first time in history, every human being would be threatened by these risks, they create a world risk society which is a "community of fate" (Beck, 2002, p. 42). These global risks would affect modern societies because they would make cosmopolitan realism necessary, as outlined in the next section.

2.2 From national realism to cosmopolitan realism

The anticipation of global risks would lead to the new key logic that no nation state can master its problems alone and that national neo-realism would no longer work. Global risks could rather overcome the resistance of nationalism and could lead to the breakthrough of cosmopolitan realism. To understand this argument, in the following the basic propositions of national neo-realism and cosmopolitan realism will be outlined:

National neo-realism

"National neo-realism characterizes the international system of states through defining the following propositions: First, states are perceived to be the primary actors in international relations. Second, states are considered to be rational. This means that states are self-interested and want to enhance their own utility by calculating how other states would behave. The preference for enhancing the own utility, is stable over time. Third, the international system of states is anarchic. This means that there is no central authority that might have influence on other states. Fourth, neo-realism presumes that states are preoccupied with their desire to survive in the anarchic system. That is why their major goal is to maximise their power and thus also their security. Finally, it is a fundamental pre-assumption of neo-realism that states are always uncertain about what the other states are going to do. Therefore, they are in particular concerned with relative gains. Like in a zero-sum game, the reachable gains are like a big power-cake. If one state would gain a certain piece of power and therefore security, another state would lose this piece of the cake and is worse off. Following the logic of the so-called Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) which presumes that one state never knows whether the counterpart would also cooperate if it did, it is only rational to not cooperate because when the counterpart would defect the concerned state would lose relative power and so the other state could eradicate it. Finally, neo-realism presumes that international institutions only have a marginal effect on international relations and do not promote cooperation. In general, cooperation is hardly possible and could only result from considerations about relative gains which would make it rational to temporarily cooperate in order to balance power (De Mesquita, 2009)." (Roß, 2010, p. 1)

Applied to international climate change politics, neo-realism would mean that states still seek to be relatively better off than other states. They would not aim at international cooperation but only seek to decrease their own risk vulnerability by national measures because they fear that in case of agreements, the other states would not stick to their mitigation commitments. Such measures could for example be the building up of dikes or a restructuring of vulnerable economic sectors like the national agriculture. So, finally they prefer ineffective unilateral

national action against climate change instead of effective international cooperation to combat it. The described features of climate change however, could have the power to overcome this irrationality of neo-realism as described in the next section.

Cosmopolitan realism

Cosmopolitan realism also considers states to be the primary actors in international politics who act according to rational calculation for their need of survival. The anticipation of global risks, however would establish the basic principle of interdependence because no nation could master its problem on its own any more. Unilateral, national actions to cope with the causes and consequences of global risks would become unrealistic and ineffective and only those who would cooperate could survive. Thus, cosmopolitan realism means that actors recognize and include the interests of other actors in the calculation of their own interests. In this context, international organizations gain importance as they would transform the negative zero-sum game played by nations that strive for autonomy into a positive-sum game. In a positive-sum game, states do not only strive for their national interests but their interests are transformed into transnational interests, because actors recognize and include the interests of other actors in the calculation of their own interests. This would facilitate effective and beneficial outcomes for all parties involved. Finally, cosmopolitan realism would also mean economic realism because shared responsibility and sovereignty would mean that they could also share their costs. Thus, cooperation would be a good economic deal for all states involved (Beck, 2009).

With respect to international climate politics, this would mean that states ultimately could only protect themselves by including the other, the poor in a fair and equal manner in their political decisions. Cosmopolitan realpolitik would therefore be politics of trans-national cooperation, solidarity and responsibility that supports the most vulnerable actors. Furthermore, climate change would empower states and civic movement actors because it would legitimize and create chances for new actions. Thereby, it would even weaken global capitalism and thus neo-liberalism because its investment decisions would worsen the climate crisis.

However, still national neo-realism would dominate international (climate) politics and only the premise of the perceived danger of global risks could not be enough to overcome the resistance of national neo-realism. Contrary, different perceptions about the seriousness of global risks could even create new boundaries. So, the USA would have become sensitive to terrorist risks since the 11 September 2001, but its society would still dismiss environmental risks as irrational. Furthermore, with respect to international binding agreements against climate change, it could be decisive but difficult to gain the commitment of the superpowers USA and China. In order to free its archrival China from carbon-dioxin, the US would have made considerable economic contributions in a time that China would become a world-power and they both would still believe in autonomy (Beck, 2008b). How the European Union could mitigate the resistance of nationalism is explained in the next section.

2.3 The role of the EU

To overcome national neo-realism, a pioneering coalition and a value strategy would be needed. A pioneering coalition would have to promote and create transnational cooperation. Furthermore, the resistance to cosmopolitan realism could be broken down through the

power of ideas. When a pioneering and a blocking coalition would be opposed to each other, the reference to cosmopolitan values and norms could overcome their differences. According to Beck and Grande, in the past 50 years, the member-states of the EC/EU would have replaced the either/or logic of national realism by the both/and logic of cosmopolitan realism. They would have renounced power to realize their own interests by recognizing the interests of the others and by integrating them into their own rational calculations. In sum, the EU's member-states would be a historic example of the cosmopolitan form of statehood that believe in cooperation and interdependence.

With respect to climate change politics, Beck claims that the EU as a pioneering coalition could use its power and strategic skills to promote its cosmopolitan values to initiate global-cosmopolitan regulations. Beck argued that, "The EU deserves praise for its groundbreaking efforts against climate change. It can take on a global leadership role and has the possibility to bring about a paradigm shift in world politics." Furthermore, he stated that "Europe has the chance to develop a paradigm that shows how to approach climate change and other global dangers through cross-national cooperation which enriches national identities and sovereignties by winning them over to cosmopolitan *realpolitik*." (Beck, 2008a, para.2 & para.13)

2.4 Neo-liberalism

Beck claimed that cosmopolitan realism could also overcome neo-liberalism. For a comprehensive analysis of the power of cosmopolitan realism (research question three) in explaining international climate negotiations, I will compare and contrast it to neo-liberalism, too. Therefore this theory is outlined in the next paragraphs:

"As a response to neo-realism, neo-liberalism emerged. Like neo-realism, it considers states to be the primary actors in international politics. Furthermore, it shares the propositions that states are rational actors and that the international system of states is anarchic. However, it significantly differs from neo-liberalism because it is not concerned with security and the survival of the state but with international economics. Furthermore, it claims that states are only interested in absolute gains. This means, that states are only interested in what they can gain and they do not care about what other states gain or lose. Furthermore, neo-liberalism considers states to be highly interdependent. Finally, it is presumed that contrary to neo-realism, international regimes may have an important impact on world politics because they could facilitate cooperation. Like neo-realists, neoliberals perceive cheating and distrust as an obstacle to cooperation. But they argue that international regimes⁴ can help to overcome the PD. According to neoliberals, the PD resembles the collective action problem which means that although the actors have a common interest, they follow their individual incentives and end up in an inefficient outcome. To overcome the collective action problem, the problem of cheating must be restricted. In the following the strategies to achieve this objective, as proposed by the theory of neo-liberalism will be laid out:

⁴ To explain how the term regime is perceived in this thesis, the definition of De Mesquita is used "Regimes are sets of international laws, rules and organizations designed to promote coordination among nations with shared interests." (De Mesquita, 2009, pp. 134)

The problem of cheating could be restricted through the so-called tit-for-tat strategy which means that the actors do-onto-others-what-they-have-just-did-to-you. Thus, when the actor sticks to the agreement, he will be rewarded with the compliance of the other actor. When an actor does not fulfil its tasks, the other actor will also not comply with the agreement. Here, the underlying idea is reciprocity. Further conditions that must be fulfilled to make the strategy work are called the 'shadow of the future': When states plan to cooperate for an indefinite period of time and when they iterate their meetings, the most important conditions are met to make states believe that cooperation might be successful. Further important aspects of the 'shadow of future' are that all actors have reliable information about what the other states do and that they are able to response quickly to the actions of the states. This would considerably decrease the states' fear that they are vulnerable and powerless against cheating. Besides the 'shadow of the future', cooperation also depends on the external context in which actors deal with each other. For example, after wars states may be so aware of the disastrous consequences of conflict that they might be particularly interested in cooperation. Another aspect that can influence the success of cooperation is the number of actors involved in the negotiation. When the negotiations are bilateral, it is feasible to play the tit-for-tat strategy because it is quite easy to identify the state that defects and to punish it. But for multilateral agreements, the reciprocity-strategy is at stake and the cooperation may collapse. Another approach to facilitate cooperation is engagement in international regimes. These may strengthen the reciprocity-strategy by reinforcing and institutionalizing it (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Regimes can for example, support the 'shadow of the future' by providing information in a quick and cost-efficient manner. Through monitoring mechanisms, they strengthen the feeling of being secure because defectors can faster be detected. Furthermore regimes can provide the space for forums where linked issues can be negotiated. All in all, regimes might provide a good ground for states to prove that they have a good reputation and that distrust can be overcome. So they eradicate the uncertainty that lead to the collective action problem and make a change in world politics (Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger, 1997)." (Roß, 2010, p. 3)

2.5 Summary

This chapter delivered a description of the theories that will subsequently be tested. They established the causal relationships that will be investigated through the explanatory research questions and they provide the information that is necessary to conceptualize the concepts in the next chapter. The theoretical key insights can be best summarized by hypotheses that describe the expected answers for the research questions in relation to the case that was chosen (Richards, 1998): (1) *"When the EU acts as a pioneering coalition and promotes cosmopolitan realpolitik, it can bring about a paradigm shift to cosmopolitan realpolitik, making an international binding agreement at the CCC possible."* (2) *"Different risk perceptions of the major participants involved in the CCC negotiations can impede an international binding agreement as the outcome of the CCC. When the EU fulfils the conditions as mentioned in the first hypothesis, it could overcome this problem."* Because the last research question will evaluate the theories as a whole and is explorative in nature and

relies on the findings for the first two research questions, no hypothesis can be formulated for it.

3. Methodology

The aim of this chapter is to describe how the analysis will be conducted and to introduce the case as well as the units of analysis. First, the method of analysis will be described. Second, it will be detailed how the data will be collected. Third, for being able to operationalize the concepts of the research questions, it is important to carefully conceptualize them as used in this thesis. That means it will be explained how their presence will be detected and measured. The indicators and assumptions necessary to do that will be derived from the theories as explained in the previous chapter. Fourth, the CCC and its major participants will be introduced. To follow these steps, is what makes this thesis scientific and reliable. Scientific means to apply certain rules and procedures and reliable means that other researchers should come to the same conclusion as I will, when they would repeat the study (Babbie, 2007).

3.1 Method of data analysis

The method of analysis is non-experimental qualitative research, which means that themes are discussed and analyzed in depth. The research is conducted by collecting unobtrusive data. That means that I will do desk research by using secondary sources. I have chosen the CCC to empirically test the theories of Beck. The reason for choosing the CCC is that it is extreme on the central variables of the theory. So, it was largely titled as the deadline for cooperation resulting in a binding international agreement and the EU wanted to push such an agreement that would outline how the increase of the temperature can be limited to two degrees in the 21st century forward. Because this case was chosen to answer explanatory research questions that test theories, this research can be titled a deductive explanatory case study. In general, case studies suffer from low generalizability. The findings of this research cannot be extrapolated to current international climate politics, too because climate politics are no static event but a process that changes over time. So, in between several meetings took place to proceed on the target to mitigate climate change.

3.2 Data collection

When conducting case studies, it is of critical importance that the researcher observes and interprets the data objectively. This is an important criterion for the reliability of case studies (Lee, Mishna, Brennenstuhl, 2010). That is why to avoid that I did unconsciously collected data that affirmed my expectations, I thought about the theoretical and about my personal expectations and value judgements in advance. To avoid selection bias, I only applied information that I read in at least two further scientific sources. Furthermore, I did not want to take subjective views of other authors over. This was a challenge because a lot of evaluations of the CCC were written by governments or environmental organisations that, dependent on how their individual aims were achieved at the CCC, incorporated their subjective judgements in their writings. To accomplish a high level of objectivity, I therefore

only used sources of *independent* authors. Finally, to study how the negotiation process at the CCC produced the CA, I choose three reports that just described how the CA was reached by its major negotiation blocs. By focusing only on three descriptive and independent sources that confirmed each other, I further diminished the risk to just pick descriptions of further literature that might have strengthened certain data in an inadequate fashion.

Moreover, I realized that my research also has an ethical dimension, although it is unobtrusive. I found out that the 'Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility', that already played a significant role from the very beginnings of international climate change negotiations, is a very sensitive and central argument in international climate negotiations and that it is divergently interpreted by developing and developed parties. According to the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, this principle says that based on the assumption of equality, all states have the common responsibility to act against global environmental problems. At the same time it recognizes that developed states and developing countries differed in their contributions to these problems and their capabilities to deal with them. In practice, this principle would thus call for international collective cooperation to mitigate environmental problems and the imposing of differentiated duties on states (CISDL, 2002). This principle seems to ideally represents the cosmopolitan both/and principle and is of central importance for this research. As explained later in the analysis, I faced the problem that the theory not clearly implies how the term 'and', which refers to equality, could empirically be observed. But just this meaning was the bone of contestation between developing and developed countries. To prevent myself of taking position for or against one side, I therefore avoided any own interpretation of what equality should mean in practice but just described how the different parties used it for their reasoning.

The main sources that will be used for the data analysis are the following: As already stated for the first research question, the official policy documents called the 'EU's common statement of purposes for the CCC' and the CA will be analysed. To answer the second research question, I will primarily use three comprehensive sources: The article '*The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem.*' (Bodansky, 2010), the report '*Post-Copenhagen Report: Copenhagen De-briefing: An Analysis of COP15 for Long-term Cooperation.*' (Climatico, 2010) and the report '*Copenhagen Accord faces first test*' (IISS, 2010). I consider these reports as independent and objective descriptions⁵ of the CCC negotiations that led to the CA. Next to these reports, I will use further scientific literature to adequately research the motivations and risk perceptions of the major participants of the CCC. For every major participant, I chose sources that analysed the determinants of the countries' position at the CCC in depth. Again, I used data that was backed by further articles and/or by original data from the country itself. So, for China, for example I read its most recent national climate action programme (National Development and Reform Commission People's Republic of China, 2007) to control the correctness of the scientific

⁵ Climatico is an independent network of researchers and experts that analyse climate change policies.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is an independent membership organization that publishes research on in particular political-military issues.

report on China's position in climate politics for the German parliament (Donner, 2010) and I checked some relevant references of the report.

In general, these methods of data collection increased the reliability of the research because they might well represent a commonly accepted anticipation of the countries positions and a repeated study using even different scientific literature should come to the same insights as I will in this research. To answer the third research question, the insights of the first two research question and the theories as described in the theory-chapter, will be the data used for the analysis.

3.3 Conceptualization

The concepts of the research questions are abstract and vague. To operationalize them it is therefore necessary to detail them to specify their "essential qualities" (Universiteit Twente, 2010). (1) The independent concept of the first research question is the EU. In this thesis 'EU' stands for the delegation representing the 27 member states of the EU at the CCC. For the sub-research question the EU's promotion of cosmopolitan realpolitik will be observed by observing whether it presented itself as a pioneering, leading coalition and by examining whether it called for cosmopolitan values as described for the dependent concept. The dependent concept is 'cosmopolitan realpolitik'. Its meaning is derived from the outlined theory of cosmopolitan realism and has the following indicators: First, 'international cooperation resulting in a binding international agreement' is the indicator showing the most ideal appearance of cosmopolitan realpolitik. Secondly, the both/and principle is the core of cosmopolitan realism from which the indicator 'all states are treated as different and equal' is derived. Having the underlying principles of cosmopolitan realism with respect to the treatment of the poor in mind, this indicator has to be sensitively understood. Here, 'different' means that the actors recognize and take into account the different contexts of other states, like particular vulnerability to climate change and restricted possibilities to take actions against it. Because, as already indicated, the practical meaning of 'equality' is not sufficiently clarified by Beck's theories and because it was interpreted very divergently, I will not propose an own 'just' indicator that would point to the presence of this aspect, but I will just describe the reasoning of the different parties. The third and final indicator is 'promotion of cooperation as a positive-sum game' which will be observed by looking for references to the increase of benefits for all actors by cooperation.

(2) The independent concept of the second research question is 'divergent risk perceptions of its major participants'. Because it cannot be assumed that the units of analysis necessarily directly refer to their risk perceptions with respect to climate change, the indicator of this concept are the 'motivations for their objectives with respect to the CCC'. This allows to judge on the degree of their risk perceptions in relation to their other motives for their objectives. The dependent concept is 'outcome of the CCC', which stands for the so-called 'Copenhagen Accord'. The relation between these two concepts will be observed by having a close look at the negotiations of the summit. A negotiation is defined as follows: "It is a process by which the involved parties or group resolve matters of dispute by holding discussions and coming to an agreement which can be mutually agreed by them." (Legal-Explanations.com., n.d.) (3) The third research question aims at exploring the usefulness of

the theory of cosmopolitan realism in explaining the negotiations of international climate negotiations. The term 'powerful' stands for the scope that the assumptions of the theory, as tested by the previous questions, are fulfilled. How the concepts of the research questions will be operationalized/measured is outlined in the next section.

3.4 Operationalization

There are several techniques available to discover and measure concepts in literature. In general, using and combining several techniques makes the analysis more powerful. In the following I will outline the techniques that are most appropriate to analyse the data that I will use for this paper.

(1) To answer the first research question, an in depth-analysis of the EU's common statement of purposes for the CCC and the CA will be conducted. To understand the importance of specific themes, it is a useful tool to look for word repetitions and frequencies that indicate cosmopolitan realpolitik as described in the foregoing section. Furthermore, it will be examined how certain key words in the related context are understood in these documents (search for 'key-words in context'). Finally, to explore the extent the EU fostered cosmopolitan realpolitik, the themes of the two documents are compared and contrasted. Because the CA was negotiated by several parties that might have similar purposes like the EU, it is not possible to definitely retrace the EU's Unions impact in the document. Therefore also emphasis will be put on what the EU *did not* achieve by searching for information given in the first document but missing in the second one. (2) To answer the second research question, I will examine literature that provides information about the motivations of the participants' objectives. Hereby, the focus is on so called connectors, which are words such as because, as a result, etc. that indicate a causal relationship. In a next step, the found motivations will be compared and contrasted, too (Ryan & Bernard, n.d.). (3) The last research question will be answered by evaluating the findings resulting from researching the first two research questions. Compared to the theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, these findings will inform about the power of cosmopolitan realism in explaining international climate negotiations. Derived from theory, theme detection will focus on the basic assumptions of these theories that distinguish them from cosmopolitan realism (table, p. 27).

3.5 Case and units of analysis

To test Beck's theory of world risk society and cosmopolitan realism it is necessary to observe the implications of a global risk as mentioned in the theory. Climate change is one of these three global risks. It was chosen as the risk for this thesis because it seems to fit the characterization of global risks as laid out in the context of the theory of world risk society best. The related selected case that serves as the setting for the observations is the Climate Conference of Copenhagen, which met from December the 7th until December the 18th in 2009. This conference concluded the third phase of the international climate change regime that started in 1991 with the agreement on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)⁶. This framework for cooperation *encouraged* developed countries

⁶ The UNFCCC was signed by 192 signatories; it was adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994.

to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The second phase, from 1995-2001, produced the Kyoto protocol that *committed* the agreeing developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions though 1012⁷. From 2001 onwards, the Copenhagen Conference as the deadline to reach the objective of an international binding agreement that sets the goals for the post-1212 period was prepared (Bodansky, 2010).

The CCC is often also called the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15). These parties are the decision-making authority of the UNFCCC and they are represented by the delegations of one or more officials of the 192 countries that signed the UNFCCC. Usually these parties are attributed to one of the following negotiations blocs: The Group77 represents the developing countries and comprises about 130 states. Often China is counted to this group, whereas it has to be highlighted that China as well as the sub-groups that make up the Group77 often differ in their preferences and objectives. The sub-groups that are commonly counted to the G77 are the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the least developed countries (LDCs). The AOSIS represents 43 small islands that are particularly vulnerable to a rising sea level because they lie low. The LDCs comprise 50, mostly African countries. The EU comprises 27 developed countries and the head of state holding the EU presidency is its chief negotiator (Anders Turesson, EU Presidency-Sweden). The Umbrella Group is a loose negotiation bloc that usually includes Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the USA. The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) includes Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland. (UNFCCC, n.d.) The units of analysis of this thesis are negotiations blocs called the 'major participants of the CCC'. The following major participants were selected: The EU was selected because the role it played in the CCC is a major concern of this thesis. Furthermore, the USA and China were chosen because Beck highlights their impact for the success of climate change negotiations and because they are the world's major GHG emitters. Finally, the Group77 is chosen as the actor representing the developing countries in contrast to the developed countries.

In sum, this chapter provided the information necessary to conduct this research in a clear and systematic manner. Given the input of the previous sections, the next chapter is dedicated to present the analysis about the observations to be done.

4. Analysis

In this chapter, I will present my findings that will enable me to test the hypotheses and to answer the third research question. The structure will be determined by the successive questions. First of all, the first sub-research question will be analysed and then the overall first research question. To answer the second research question, I will firstly present the motivations for the objectives of the major participants of the CCC and then, by examining the negotiation process, I will show how these positions paved the way to the CA. This will allow me to complement the findings for the first research question because when I

⁷ The Kyoto protocol was signed by 189 countries, it was adopted in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan and entered into force in 2005 and bound industrialized countries to reduce their GHG emissions by 5.2 % by 1212 compared with the level of 1990.

understand the dynamics of the negotiation process, I can make a more comprehensive judgement on the role that the EU played in this process, too. Finally, based upon the findings for the first two questions I will be able to answer the third research question.

4.1 Extent to which the EU promoted cosmopolitan realpolitik

This section aims at answering the sub-research question of the first research question. Therefore, as described in the section on the conceptualization and operationalization, it will be analyzed to what extent the EU appeared to be a pioneering/leading coalition and to what extent it called for cosmopolitan values. Therefore, I will firstly give a brief description of the document on the EU position for the CCC. Then I will present the results that the search for key words in context and the numerical theme identification delivered. Here, I will firstly describe the extent to which the EU presented itself as a pioneering/leading coalition. Secondly, I will outline to what extent the EU promoted cosmopolitan values by focusing on the promotion of 'international cooperation resulting in a binding international agreement', the 'both/and principle' and the 'anticipation of a positive-sum game'.

The EU position for the CCC is an official document published on behalf of the European Council of the EU, representing its 27 member-states. It has 23 pages and comprises 61 paragraphs. It was the general objective of the EU that the increase in temperature should not increase to more than 2 degrees in comparison to its pre-industrial level. To achieve this, the global GHG emissions should peak by 2020 and they should be reduced by 50% compared to 1990 by 2050.

With respect to the extent to whether the EU appeared to be a pioneering/leading coalition the following insights were gained: In particular addressing developed countries, the EU very explicitly demanded them to comply with the targets it set and it even announced that it will control their compliance. So, 8 times it claimed for its 2 degree goal by using phrases like "CALLS upon all Parties, as part of a Copenhagen agreement, to embrace the 2°C objective (..)" (para.9), "UNDERLINES that the analysis of comparability of commitments, actions and contributions will be conducted *also using the 2°C objective as yardstick*" (para.14); "STRESSES that *the EU will conduct further analysis of all other Parties' proposed commitments / actions and contributions.*"(para.14) Furthermore, it stressed its achievements with respect to the implementation of (international) climate legislation (i.e. para.12) and it reprehended developed countries for their insufficient proposals for midterm emission reductions (para.11). Finally, the EU offered to reduce its GHG emission by 30 % compared to 1990 levels, "(...) provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions (...)" (para.13).

In sum, the EU very explicitly demanded all other parties to commit themselves to the targets it set; it even announced that it will control their compliance; it praised itself for its achievements and it presented its own targets as an incentive for other developed countries to follow the EU's ambitions. That is why, I can well be argued that the EU presented itself a leading/pioneering coalition. According to theory, this is one condition that would enable the EU to overcome national realism. Whether the other criterion which is that the EU promoted cosmopolitan values is also satisfied will be examined in the next paragraphs.

Firstly, it will be answered whether the EU promoted international cooperation resulting in a binding international agreement: The EU very strongly argued in favour of a global legally binding agreement (32 times) and supported its argument by stating that such a cooperation would be necessary "in preventing dangerous climate change" (para.1) and by referring 4 times to the authority of the scientific findings of the fourth report of the IPCC. These findings show that the EU explicitly promoted cosmopolitan realism, indicated by the claim for international cooperation and an international binding agreement.

Secondly, I will show whether the EU called for the both/and principle: The EU explicitly differentiated between developed countries (23 times mentioned) and developing countries (50 times mentioned) and formulated different demands based upon the different levels of development of the parties. The developing countries were further differentiated into more advanced developing countries, Africa and Latin American countries, Least Developed Countries and small island developing states.

The EU called the developed countries to reduce their aggregated GHG emissions by 25-40 % by 2020 and by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. The developing countries, the EU called to deviate "(...) below the currently predicted emissions growth rate, in the order of 15-30% by 2020." (para.7-9). 17 times the EU mentioned that the developing countries should be supported in fulfilling the demands as described in the position document. Furthermore, through different phrasings, the EU several times stressed that developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and that their contributions should be adequate and in line with their respective capabilities. In this context, the EU mentioned that it "WISHES TO CLARIFY its view that, in accordance with the *principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, all countries, except LDCs*, should commit themselves to preparing ambitious, credible and country-owned low-carbon development strategies/growth plans (LCDS/LCGP) (para.37); (Doc. 14790/09).

In sum, the EU explicitly differentiated between developed countries and developing countries and their respective capabilities in taking mitigation action. It aligned its requests to that acknowledgement and called for support for the developing countries. Thus, it clearly treated developed and developing states as different. By referring to the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (PCDR) that rests on the notion of equality, it furthermore implied that developing countries should take equal duties in the form of adequate commitments to mitigation actions, too. Thus, it treated the states as different and at the same time as equal and therefore promoted the both/and principle as an indicator of cosmopolitan realism. As mentioned earlier, developed and developing countries differently interpreted the PCDR to push divergent interests forward. How the developing countries interpreted the PCDR is explained when I outline their position and the negotiation process in the context of the second research question.

Finally, I examined whether the EU referred to an increase of benefits of all actors that would result from cooperation (cooperation as a positive-sum game): I found one phrase that indicated the promotion of 'cooperation as a positive-sum game': "*STRESSES the mutual co-benefits* for developed and developing countries of reaching such an agreement;" (para.4) meaning with "such an agreement", "(..) *its commitment to reaching a global, ambitious and*

comprehensive climate agreement in Copenhagen in December 2009" (para.3) Because the EU emphasized the co-benefits for all parties only once, this phrasing is seen as weak proof for the promotion of cooperation as a positive-sum game.

All in all, it can be stated that the EU acted like a pioneering/leading coalition and that it strongly promoted cooperation to achieve a binding international agreement. In addition, it explicitly differentiated between developed and developing countries and thus applied the both/and principle. Finally, it weakly promoted cooperation as a positive sum-game. In sum, it is possible to conclude that the EU fulfilled the conditions (acting as a pioneering/leading coalition and promotion of cosmopolitan values) that, according to the theory of Beck would have been sufficient to make the EU capable of overcoming national realism by facilitating the breakthrough of cosmopolitan realpolitik in international climate negotiations.

Now, I will continue with the document analysis, this time focusing on the CA, searching for information that indicates the extent to which the EU was successful in promoting the above-mentioned cosmopolitan values.

4.2 Extent to which the EU fostered cosmopolitan realpolitik

The answer to the sub-research question of the first research question was that the EU fulfilled all theoretical assumptions necessary to successfully promote cosmopolitan realpolitik. Whether, these assumptions hold for reality is now tested by analyzing the CA as the outcome of the CCC. Again, I will firstly introduce the document and then I will compare its content with the analyzed content of the EU's position to determine similarities and differences. This analysis will indicate to what extent the EU was capable to foster cosmopolitan realpolitik at the CCC.

The CA was drafted in the last night of the Conference and the parties did only 'take note' of it because no consensus was reached on it. That is why it gained no legal status that would imply a certain future status. The CA is a three pages document of general principles with three core elements: In general, the increase of global temperature should not exceed 2 degrees; developed as well as developing countries will make individual mitigation commitments and agree to a differentiated extent to international scrutiny; financial resources will be provided to support the developing countries.

Like the EU's position, this document refers to the challenges of climate change in its opening paragraph but different to the EU, it directly relates it to the PCDR in the second sentence, whereas the EU linked the claim for an international binding agreement to the challenges of climate change. These differences can be seen as typical differences between the documents, with the EU stressing the importance of a legally binding outcome and the CA stressing the necessary adaption to different capabilities of developed countries and developing countries. Both documents are too different in length and directions that the importance of key themes could directly be detected by comparing their counts.

Nevertheless, it was striking that the CA does not have any legal status and that it does not mention an agreement at any time and mentions cooperation only once. This divergence from the EU's position shows that the EU was obviously not able to foster cosmopolitan realpolitik by an international binding agreement. Furthermore, no common targets with short-term and long-term goals as well as deadlines though which these goals should be

achieved, were incorporated in this document. What the CA well does is that it distinguishes between developed and developing countries 26 times. This shows that it puts most emphasis on the both/and principle. The last indicator, namely references to cooperation as a positive-sum game was not found at all in the CA. (Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7)

In sum, with all indicators present, the EU promoted more indicators of cosmopolitan realpolitik than the CA that actually only included the both/and principle did. What *cannot* be concluded is that the EU can be rewarded for the inclusion of the both/and principle in the CA because several parties drafted the CA and the EU did not take part in this drafting (Climatico, 2010). What *can* be concluded is what the EU did not achieve with respect to the promotion of cosmopolitan realpolitik. This is most obviously cooperation that resulted in an ambitious international binding agreement. That is why, so far it can be stated that the EU did not foster cosmopolitan realpolitik at the CCC to a remarkable extent, although according to theory, all necessary preconditions to do so were fulfilled. This already indicates that Beck's theory with respect to the role and the impact of the EU in international climate politics does not coincide with the empirical insights. The next section will focus on the different risk perceptions of the CCC's major participants for explaining how they arrived at the CA. By this, it will also become clearer why the EU was not able to foster cosmopolitan realpolitik at the CCC.

4.3 Different risk perceptions of major participants

As described in the theory, Beck expected that different risk perceptions may hinder the breakthrough of cosmopolitan realpolitik and that the EU would be able to nevertheless facilitate cosmopolitan realpolitik. That the EU was not successful in facilitating cosmopolitan realpolitik was already concluded in the previous section. This section illustrates how different risk perceptions hindered an international binding agreement and why the impact of the EU was too weak that it could have been successful. To describe the findings, I will first of all outline the major objectives of each major participant and its respective motivation for that objective. This allows me to judge on the risk perception of the particular country that is then compared with the theoretical assumptions of Beck. Then, I will outline how these actors proceeded in pushing their objectives forward by examining the negotiation process that led to the CA.

In general, to understand the negotiations at the CCC, it has to be mentioned that since the Kyoto protocol the negotiations proceeded in two tracks. On the one hand, the Kyoto track represents the working group of developing countries that wants the Annex I countries (developed countries) to make further commitments in line with the Kyoto protocol. Under the Kyoto protocol the developing countries did not have to take climate change mitigation actions, at all but only the developed countries. And on the other hand, the convention track represents developed countries that have the mandate to pursue long-term goals, mitigation commitments and actions by developed countries, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) by developing countries, financial support, respective measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), adaption and technology cooperation. (Bodansky, 2010)

4.3.1 Motivations and objectives of major participants

The USA

The GHG emissions of the USA, the EU and China rank highest compared to all other states. Because the USA did not adopt the Kyoto protocol, it did not bind itself to any emission reduction targets. That is why its possible commitments played a crucial role in the negotiations. Like the convention track, the USA proposed a global binding agreement that could however exist next to an advanced Kyoto protocol. Its long-term objective was to limit temperature increase to 2 degrees. To achieve this it was willing to reduce its own emissions by 17% below the 2005 level by 2020, "in the context of an overall deal in Copenhagen that includes robust mitigation contributions from China and the other emerging economies." (The White House, 2009)

This emission reduction target was subject of a bill, called 'the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009' and was approved by a tenuous majority in the House of Representatives in summer 2009. At the time of the CCC the president of the USA Barack Obama, however already knew that the Senate which had the final say in passing the bill would most probably not adopt it. Obama would have had to take enormous political efforts that would come along with a loss of political power to convince the needed two-thirds majority of the Senate to pass the bill. For this reason, scholars concluded that it would be very unlikely that Obama would agree to legally binding quantified emission reduction targets at the CCC.⁸ In general, Barack Obama had made climate change a key topic in his election campaign. By emphasizing its growth-driving implications he tried to alter the, to that date prevailing public opinion that climate change is an issue threatening the more important economic growth of the country. (Christoff, 2010)

In sum, it can be stated that the risk perception of climate change is historically low in the USA, although climate change became a more central issue. The USA's perception of the importance of domestic economic growth and the fact of ratification constraints were therefore the main determinants of the USA's objectives at the CCC (Climatico, 2009; (CoveringCopenhagen.org., n.d.). The theory of cosmopolitan realism holds that the major concern of states is their survival but not in line with the theory of cosmopolitan realism the USA seems to concern more about economic issues than about by climate change caused threats to survival. Whether, the USA and China stuck to national realism to defend their major concerns will be answered in the section on the negotiation process.

China

China was not committed by the Kyoto protocol to reduce its emissions but short before the CCC it announced that it wanted to reduce its GHG 'emissions intensity'⁹ by 40-45% compared to 2005 levels by 2020. It justified this upper emission limit with the remark that this emission targets would not threaten the economic growth of the country. But China opposed any new legal agreement that would bind it to this reduction purpose. It made it very clear that it did not want other states to interfere in its domestic policies through a binding agreement and a respective international system of MRV because this would question its

⁸ In 1998, the ratification of the Kyoto protocol as an international binding climate change agreement already failed with 95 to 0 votes against it.

⁹ Emission intensity means 'emissions produced per unit of emissions per unit GDP'.

national sovereignty. Instead, as a member of the Kyoto track it insisted on a second period of the Kyoto protocol. To reason its arguments, it stressed the PCDR, stating that the developing countries have the main responsibility for the climate change and that they therefore should commit themselves to financial support¹⁰ for the developing countries and to significant emission reduction targets. Presenting itself as a developing country, it furthermore emphasized its freedom of development.

In general, the highest priority for China seems to be the economic development and the modernisation of its country, although it stresses that climate change needs to be addressed by global efforts, highlighting cooperation on technology progress as a central tool to combat climate change (Donner, 2010; Bodansky, 2010; Christoff, 2010). In sum, it can be concluded that because China put priority on its economic growth, its risk perception of climate change is not that strong. Its negotiation strategy was characterized by its insistence on its national autonomy and its claim that only the developed countries should pay for and take action against climate change. As it was the case for the USA, the major concern of China with respect to climate change thus does not seem to be its survival but its economic development.

G77/ Developing countries

Because the G77 did not want to lose their status they had under the Kyoto protocol, they were united in their defence of the PCDR and their claim that their Kyoto track should make equal process as the convention track. They however differed in their views on the goals of the convention track. On the one hand, the so-called BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) reaffirmed their position that a new agreement in line with the Kyoto protocol should only request developed countries to reduce their GHG emission, leaving they themselves unaddressed. On the other hand, Small Island States (SISs) wanted to complement the Kyoto protocol by a new legally binding agreement that would include the USA and the members of the BASIC group. Most (about 100) developing countries allied with the SISs and insisted on a temperature rise limit of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and their supportive funding. Like the BASIC group, they referred to the PCDR and stressed their high vulnerability. Especially the SISs and the African countries emphasized that they were the victims of climate change which would even threaten their survival. They supported their claims by the scientific findings of the IPCC. (Corneloup, 2011; IISS, 2010; Bodansky, 2010). In sum, it can be stated that in particular the SISs and the LDCs emphasized the urgent need to arrive at an ambitious global agreement because they saw their integrity and their survival at risk. That is why, it can be concluded that their risk perceptions of climate change were the strongest compared to the other parties. This finding is in line with the theory of cosmopolitan realism because for the developing countries it supports the assumption that the primary concern of states is their survival.

The EU

The position of the EU was already outlined in the first chapter of the analysis. An important motivation for its ambitious objectives might be that in 2008, 62% of the Europeans said that climate change is the second most serious problem of the world. In 2009, due to increased

¹⁰ Industrialized countries should pay 0.5-1% of their GDP into a fund for LDC and SISs.

concerns about global economy, 62 % of the Europeans ranked climate change third (Eurobarometer, 2008, 2009). In general, it can be stated that although the EU comprises only developed countries that are less affected by the adverse effects of climate change than many developing countries, its risk perception of the climate change is quite high.

So far, it became clear that the objectives of the major participants of the CCC and their respective motivations and risk perceptions differed significantly. For the USA and China economic growth has a higher priority than mitigation actions against climate change, the USA is strongly limited through domestic ratification constraints and in particular China watched out not to lose any national sovereignty. The countries that are most vulnerable to climate change and that are constrained in their capabilities to adapt to it, held the most far-reaching view. How these positions finally constituted the CA, can best be understood by a review of the process of negotiation that led to the CA. By this, the different parties are put in relation to each other what allows to judge on their different power in pushing their claims forward. That is why, I will analyse the CA by its process of negotiation in the next section.

4.3.2 Process of negotiation

Until almost the end of the CCC, the negotiations seemed to be deadlocked because throughout the two weeks the two tracks kept on insisting upon their initial positions. Hereby, the root of their split was the divergent interpretation of the PCDR: On the one hand developed countries used it to convince the developing countries that they have the duty of taking mitigation actions, too (i.e. position of the EU para.37, section 4.1) and on the other hand most developing countries used it to underline that the developed countries have the sole responsibility to take mitigation actions. The key topics of discontent were whether (concrete) emission reduction thresholds should be part of a (legally binding) agreement, how much financial support and under which conditions should be granted to developing countries and how emission reduction commitments should be measured, reported and verified (IISS, 2010).

The USA and China agreed with the EU on the 2 degrees long-term goal, whilst the USA and China agreed that they did not want to include any emission reduction thresholds in an agreement. The major source of conflict between the USA and China was the discontent about a system of international review in the form of MRV. Referring to its national sovereignty, China opposed any international review and finally the USA and China agreed on a compromise as described in paragraph 5 of the CA. According to this, on the one hand *developed countries will report on their mitigation actions "in a defined format" to the UNFCCC secretariat*. On the other hand, the *mitigation actions of Non-Annex I parties* (they include China) "(...) will be *subject to domestic MRV* (...)". These results will be reported "in biennial national communications, with provisions for international consultation and analysis *under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.*" (Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7). Thus, for the first time in international climate politics, in particular reached by a compromise between the USA and China, mitigation actions by developed as well as by developing countries became subject to some form of MRV.

The G77 were to some extent able to manifest their claim for financial support in the CA. They would receive a fast start support of "USD 30 billion for the period 2010 - 2012 with

balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation" and "USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020" (para.8). For the first time and in break to the Kyoto protocol, the CA declares that developing countries will take, in line with the PCDR, mitigation actions against climate change. Until the very end of the negotiations, the SISs fought for the 1.5 degrees baseline and achieved that the last paragraph of the CA stated that a temperature rise to 1.5 degrees will be considered by 2015 when the implementation of the CA should be assessed. (Corneloup, 2011)

Throughout the conference, the EU was resolutely united in promoting its position as described in the first section of this chapter. When one week had passed, the EU tried to increase its pressure on especially the USA and China when it announced that it would provide 2.4 billion Euros per year for the period of 2010 to 2012 for fast financial adaption support of LDCs, SISs and African States. But contrary to a boosting effect it was criticized by the G77 and China who judged this amount as insignificant and who concerned about long-term support. Furthermore, the EU did not cede to oppose the deletion of emission reduction thresholds in the CA (Climatico, 2010).

Finally, however at the last day of the conference when the heads of states arrived, the CA was drawn by only the USA and the BASIC group, formulating it as a compromise that respects their respective central claims and allows each state to take its individual mitigation actions. Later, representatives of the EU agreed on it in as subsequent meeting of 28 states¹¹, too and labeled the CA, against its announcements prior to the conference¹², 'a first step' to tackle climate change. But many developing countries felt ignored by the developed countries and dismissed the CA. Because five countries (Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Sudan) who likened the agreement with Holocaust opposed the CA, no consensus was reached and the COP only took note of it. In sum, the developing countries were more present and assertive than ever but the USA and China turned out to be the most important and influential actors at the CCC. (IISS, 2010; Climatico, 2010; Bodanky, 2010) Hereby, "the EU played a less central role." (Bodanky, 2010, p.10; Christoff, 2010) because it was marginalized by the USA and the BASIC group. (Afionis, 2010).

The analysis of the different motives and objectives as an indicator of different risk perceptions has revealed that the different risk perceptions and the resulting objectives explained the outcome of the CCC. Because those players (USA and China) with the lowest risk perceptions turned out to be most influential they were able to prevent an international binding agreement that could effectively¹³ limit climate change. This caused the players with

¹¹ "(...) United States, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, the UK, France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Japan, Russia, Grenada (on behalf of AOSIS), Ethiopia (on behalf of the African group), Saudi Arabia, Colombia, the Maldives, and Mexico" (Bodansky, 2010, p. 4)

¹² Like Fogh Rasmussen (initiator of the CCC and former Danish Prime) who argued that "the world has a responsibility to act in common" and that "December 2009 is the deadline for reaching a post-Kyoto arrangement that will effectively engage all major emitting countries in the global effort to combat man-made climate change." (Rasmussen, 2008, p. 11-12), some representatives of the EU emphasized that the CCC is the deadline for reaching an international binding agreement

¹³ Here, 'effectively' means that climate change could be mitigated, according to the findings of the IPCC (see footnote1).

the highest risk perception (LDCs, SISs, African States) to dismiss the CA and five of them even prevented it from gaining any legal status. These findings strongly support the theoretical assumption that different risk perceptions could create boundaries that inhibit the breakthrough of cosmopolitan realpolitik. Beck was especially right with his fear that the USA and China could stick to national realism and would thus prevent an ambitious binding agreement.

As announced, the forgoing section also complements the analysis on the role of the EU that was done to answer the first research question. The first research question showed what the EU did not reach its (cosmopolitan) goals, although it fulfilled all assumptions of the theory that would have made it successful. The findings of this section have shown that China and the USA played the most central role in drafting the CA and so the relative impact of the EU became less decisive. This strengthens the argument that it was not sufficient that the EU promoted cosmopolitan realpolitik and behaved like a leading, pioneering coalition to foster cosmopolitan realpolitik at the CCC. That is why, in sum it can be stated that the theoretical assumptions with respect to the role of the EU were not supported by the findings of this thesis. The insights of the analysis, so far will now serve as the input for the next analysis, where I will judge on the theory of cosmopolitan realism in comparison to the theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism.

4.4 Evaluation of the theory of cosmopolitan realism

This section aims at answering the third research question. The analysis is based on the findings of the previous analysis. Because I will consider and compare several aspects of three different theories, it makes sense to illustrate this analysis by a table. This allows a clear overview and a better understanding. The first column of the table lists the assumptions of the theory of cosmopolitan realism that I analysed. Left to this column, the corresponding features of neo-realism and neo-liberalism are listed. Whenever the analysis indicated that a feature of a neo-realism or/and neo-liberalism was present that was not or differently covered by cosmopolitan realism, I indicated this by bordering the respective cells red. The right-most column then summarizes the findings of the conducted analysis. I will proceed with the presentation of the findings as they were listed in the table, too. Thus, the table illustrates the underlying structure of the analysis of this section.

First of all, cosmopolitan realism, in line with neo-realism assumes that the state's primary concern is survival. The analysis proved that the states that are most vulnerable to climate change indeed fear their survival but it became also clear that the major concern of, in particular China were economic considerations. This shows that the cosmopolitan realism's exclusive reference to survival may be incomplete.

Furthermore, cosmopolitan realism that is based on the theory of world risk society holds that trans-national cooperation would be the logic response to the delocalized, incalculable and un-compensable nature of global risks. This assumption was Beck's major advancement of the theory of national neo-realism. The paradox is that the analysis showed that the observed parties pursued their national interests just in reference to the PCDR that actually perfectly outlines the cosmopolitanism's basic both/and principle. However, as a result of the divergent use and interpretation of the PCDR, no cooperation that resulted in an ambitious

binding agreement was reached. The theory of cosmopolitan realism does not offer a clear possibility to interpret the PCDR because it is not clear about what equality should mean in practice. Does the 'and' that stands for equality, mean that all states have the same duties and rights?! This argument would strengthen the position of the Convention track parties. Or must this term be understood in context of the other cosmopolitan values like solidarity, justice and responsibility? Hence, should vulnerable and poor countries not bear the duty to take mitigation actions because they would have the equal and same right to development as it was enjoyed by the developed countries?! Furthermore, should only the developed countries take mitigation actions because they were responsible for the current climate change?! This argument would strengthen the position of the Kyoto track parties.

Moreover, the CA did not foster collective targets and efforts to combat climate change. These would have decreased the mitigation costs of climate change. The status and the vague ambitions of the CA, rather affirm the assumption of neo-realism and neo-liberalism that the collective action problem might cause inefficient outcomes that do not decrease individual costs, since the actually desired collective action was not achieved. With respect to the EU, the analysis revealed that it indeed promoted cosmopolitan realism, although it cannot be stated that the EU promoted this values as *its* values. But, the analysis of the CA and the negotiation process indicated that the EU did not have enough influence to succeed in fostering cosmopolitan realpolitik at the CCC. Thus, Beck was wrong with his expectation that the EU could successfully promote cosmopolitan realpolitik if it would act like a pioneering/leading coalition that would promote cosmopolitan values. The actors of the CCC rather tried to overcome the problem of collective agreement by following the strategies of neo-liberalism. So, the USA and also the EU called for reciprocity by announcing that they would only make commitments depending on comparable commitments of other key players (tit-for-tat strategy). Furthermore, it seems as if the EU learned from the CCC that it might be disadvantageous to set a deadline for the negotiations because, contrary to its claims prior the conference, it judged afterwards the CCC that the CA would be a first step towards the dealing of climate change (shadow of the future). The argument of neo-liberalism that the external context matters is also supported by the finding that all parties referred to the IPCC's report that emphasized the accelerated climate change. The claim that the involvement of too many actors might hinder cooperation is supported by the finding that the CA did not entail the, by the EU desired far-reaching content. Next to this, it was not assigned a legal status due to its rejection of five parties.

All the above mentioned strategies were not included in the description of the theory of cosmopolitan realism. Perhaps Beck did not include them because he anticipated that the global risk of climate change and the power of the EU would be enough to foster the breakthrough of cosmopolitan realism (overcoming thereby neo-realism as well as neo-liberalism) in international climate negotiations. What he well mentioned is that climate change would make international regimes possible. Because the UNFCCC as a framework for the CCC negotiations can be considered to be an international regime, he was therefore right with this argument. Neo-liberalism, however adds that such regimes could facilitate cooperation because they could provide forums, they could support the reciprocity-strategy and they could pave the ground for the 'shadow of the future' by MRV. The case of the CCC

and the CA are evidence enough to state that this argument is true. So, it can be stated that Beck correctly stated that international cooperation in the appearance of international regimes would be the consequence of climate change. He could have empowered his theory by admitting that next to the impact of the climate change as a global risk as such and the influence of the EU, the importance of the strategies for cooperation as put forward by neo-liberalism may become central, too.

In sum, it can be stated that cosmopolitan realism neglects that survival might not be the major concern of all states and that economic concerns may still prevail. Furthermore, it does not sufficiently clarify what the both/and principle would mean in practice. Moreover, collective action problems were not included in the theory of cosmopolitan realism. Finally, the theory of cosmopolitan realism did not mention the importance of strategies to facilitate cooperation like they were presented by neo-liberalism.

Cosmopolitan realism	Neo - realism	Neo-liberalism	Findings of analysis for RQ 1 and RQ 2
Actors are concerned with survival	Actors are concerned with survival	Actors are concerned with international economics	Some actors concern about survival (i.e. SISs), other actors (i.e. China) are rather concerned with economics
Cooperation is necessarily facilitated by the nature of global risks	Collective action/cooperation problem (PD)	Collective action/cooperation problem (PD)	Especially developing countries, the USA and China followed their individual incentives referring to the PCDR, ending up in an inefficient outcome
In case of non-cooperation due to divergent risk perceptions, the EU may foster cooperation through the promotion of cosmopolitan realpolitik	Collective action problem can only temporarily be interrupted	Collective action/cooperation problem resulting from the problem of cheating can be influenced through the following strategies/assumptions:	The EU promoted cosmopolitan realism but it did not successfully overcome the divergent risk perceptions and was therefore not able to foster cosmopolitan realism in the form of cooperation
		tit-for-tat strategy (reciprocity)	Applied by the USA and the EU
		→ 'shadow of the future' (indefinite period of time and iterated meetings)	- now followed by the EU
		→ reliable information about what the other states do and ability of quick response	The CA introduced MRV
		-external context matters	States all refer to IPCC report that indicates a worsened climate change
		number of actors matters	192 parties at the CCC and 5 prevented legal status of CA
International regimes emerge due to the logic of global risks		International regimes can strengthen reciprocity-strategy, support the 'shadow of the future' by MRV, and provide forums to facilitate cooperation	UNFCCC made the CA possible by facilitating these aspects, the CA includes a system of MRV but falls short of manifested ambitious cooperation

4.5 Summary

All in all, this chapter described a comprehensive analysis of the theory of cosmopolitan realism and the role of the EU. It became clear, that the EU promoted cosmopolitan realism but that it did not succeed in fostering in at the CCC. The risk perceptions of the observed players were too divergent that the parties could have reached an ambitious international binding agreement. Of all things, the PCDR proved to be the justification of most participants to push their national interests forward. By this, many parties made use of a cosmopolitan core value to pursue their interests in line with national neo-realism. The possibilities of the USA were restricted by domestic ratification constraints and China was in particular concerned with economics and the defense of its national sovereignty. Because they were the most powerful actors, they were able to override the ambitious objectives of those parties that were most concerned with their survival. As a consequence, a small group of states prevented consensus on the un-ambitious CA and so the CA did not gain legal status. The strategies of neo-liberalism all proved to be useful tools to understand the negotiations at the CCC. In the conclusion, I will give the answers to the research questions. To do that, I will summarize whether and how my findings supported the expectations as described by the hypothesis.

5. Conclusion

This thesis revealed whether Beck's theories with respect to cosmopolitan realism and the role of the EU hold for reality. The case, that I studied for this purpose was the CCC. The theoretical expectation for the first research question was that if the EU would act as a pioneering coalition and would promote cosmopolitan realpolitik, it could bring about a paradigm shift to cosmopolitan realpolitik, making an international binding agreement in climate politics possible. The analysis of the EU's position for the CCC proved that the EU behaved like a pioneering/leading coalition. With respect to the promotion of cosmopolitan values, the research revealed that it promoted international cooperation to arrive at a binding international agreement. Moreover, it supported the both/and principle because it differentiated between developed countries and developing countries and it called for nationally appropriate support and responsibilities. It also referred to cooperation as a positive-sum game because all actors would mutually co-benefit. That is why, it can be concluded that the EU promoted cosmopolitan realism and appeared to be a pioneering coalition. The analysis of the CA however indicated that the EU did not succeed with its objectives. That is why, the hypothesis was not verified. The first research question can thus be answered by concluding that the EU did not foster cosmopolitan realpolitik at the CCC to a remarkable extent.

The hypothesis for the second research question was that different risk perceptions of the major participants involved in the CCC negotiations may prevent an international binding agreement as the outcome of the CCC but that the EU could nevertheless foster cosmopolitan realpolitik. The analysis revealed that divergent risk perceptions indeed created boundaries that prevented any ambitious, binding agreement. The USA were restricted by

domestic ratification constrains and its risk perception of climate change was alleviated due to its anticipated importance of economic wealth. China was most strongly bent on defending its national sovereignty and economic interests. Correspondingly, these states were not apt to agree on common binding emission reduction targets. Contrary, the developing countries were more concerned about their survival and demanded ambitious actions. The BASIC-group with China as its member and the USA turned out to be the most influential actors, whereas the EU only played a minor role. The cleavages that arose from the conflicts between the parties finally prevented an international binding agreement. Thus, the second research question can be answered by stating that the outcome of the CCC can, to a decisive extent be explained by the divergent risk perceptions of its major participants. By reviewing the dynamics of the negotiation process it became clear that the EU was not able to foster cosmopolitan *realpolitik* because it was marginalized by the other dominant actors. So, the findings for this research question complement the first insight that the EU was not able to foster cosmopolitan *realpolitik* to a remarkable extent.

The third research question asked to what extent the theory of cosmopolitan realism is powerful in explaining international climate negotiations, compared to the theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, given the answers to the research questions one and two. The theory of cosmopolitan realism claims that global risks would bring about a paradigm shift from national realism to cosmopolitan cooperation that would make a global deal possible and that the EU would be able to push the breakthrough of cosmopolitan realism forward. Speaking against this anticipations, the comparative analysis, however demonstrated that the central assumption of neo-realism and neo-liberalism that cooperation is hampered through a collective action problem was affirmed. This limits the power of cosmopolitan realism in explaining the negotiations of the CCC. Furthermore, all strategies and assumptions as described by neo-liberalism to overcome the collective action problem proved to be right. On the other hand, the theory of cosmopolitan realism also assumes that states are concerned with survival and that climate change brings about international regimes. These assumptions were supported by the findings that the developing countries fear their survival and by the fact that climate change brought about the UNFCCC which is a framework for international cooperation on climate change. In sum, for the case of the CCC, it can be concluded that central assumptions of neo-realism and in particular of neo-liberalism were affirmed by this research and that cosmopolitan realism explained the CCC only to a limited extent.

Once, prior the year of the conference, Beck stated that the "(...) optimistic construction (...)" that cosmopolitan realism could overcome neo-realism and neo-liberalism "(...)could easily collapse under its own weight", because "(...) cosmopolitan *realpolitik*, of course, is less attractive for superpowers, which believe in autonomy, and attractive for European powers, which believe in cooperation and interdependence. The consequences are evident: The crisis deepens, and so does the gap between words and capability." (Beck, 2008b, p. 12) Nevertheless, he expected the implications of global risks and the power of the EU to be powerful enough to bring about the paradigm shift. Perhaps Beck did not take collective action problems into account because he too much trusted in his theory or/and because he, like many EU officials, was absorbed by hopeful forecasts of the public media that dangled

that the CCC could result in an ambitious international binding agreement. There exists no published literature that describes how Beck interprets the outcomes of the CCC and whether he thinks that "the gap between words and capabilities deepened", but perhaps he became less optimistic that cosmopolitan realism could overcome national realism and neo-liberalism and that the EU could facilitate this breakthrough.

Authors like Beck, Grande (2007) and Habermas (2003) conceptualize the European Union as a cosmopolitan project. Whether these theoretical conceptualizations hold for reality was however almost not researched so far and only the cultural strand of cosmopolitanism was empirically researched to a larger extent. Here, the research focused on whether the Europeans perceive themselves as Cosmopolitans (i.e. Pichler, 2009; Rumford, 2005). The research of this thesis made a start to research whether the EU might successfully promote cosmopolitan values in international negotiations. By this it also added a further research dimension to the well existing literature that examined the leadership role of the EU in international climate negotiations (i.e. Kilian, & Elgstrom, 2010; Afionis, 2010).

What became clear through the analysis is that cosmopolitan values like the both/and principle are not necessarily interpreted homogenously and that their divergent interpretation might even result in non-cooperation. This indicates that the conceptualizations of the institutional strand of cosmopolitanism could be further specified and tested in reality. Moreover, the gained insights showed that the central logic of cosmopolitan realism that the risk of climate change could overcome national realism as well as neo-liberalism and facilitate the breakthrough of cosmopolitan realpolitik, did not come true in reality. The analysis rather indicated that states strive for pushing (only) their national interests forward and end up in a collective action problem that makes binding international cooperation impossible. This strengthens the arguments of scholars that emphasize the still present importance of nationalism as opposed to cosmopolitanism. So, Calhoun criticizes the immoderate strong reliance on wished ideals by the advocates of cosmopolitanism like this: "Even if we wish for a more cosmopolitan world order, we should be realistic enough not to act on mere wishes." (Calhoun, 2007, p. 1) In line with this argument, the research of this thesis implies that advocates of the institutional strand of cosmopolitan realism could stronger acknowledge the theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism because the empirical evidence indicated that these theories might better match current realities than cosmopolitan realism does. So, the theory of cosmopolitan realism could, for example be complemented by incorporating the neo-liberalist assumptions and strategies of Axelrod and Keohane (1985) that explain how collective action problems can be resolved.

With respect to the leadership role of the European Union the study of Saul and Seidel (2011) indicated that for the period of 1995-2008, an increased 'leadership of the EU by example' correlated with an increased degree of cooperation in international climate politics. In line with my findings, western media and scholars (i.e. Kilian, & Elgstrom, 2010; Afionis, 2010), however judged that the EU failed to promote cooperation by leadership at the CCC. The EU thus lost some degree of its reputation as an influential actor in climate politics (Kilian, & Elgstrom, 2010) and because statements of EU officials prior to the CCC and the EU position indicated that the EU well perceived itself to be powerful enough to bring about an international binding agreement at the CCC, the EU might even be taken less seriously by

the public and its negotiation partners. For future climate negotiations I would therefore propose the European Institutions that prepare and represent the EU's position in international climate politics (European Commission, European Parliament, European Council of the EU, official negotiators) to adjust their objectives to the facts of reality. This means for example that they should not publicly strive for the inclusion of emission reduction thresholds in an international binding agreement when they know that the USA, due to domestic constraints, would not agree with such an agreement anyway.

Furthermore, for the purpose of further promotion of cooperation by being a role model for other states, EU's policy makers could adjust the EU's own environmental policies to the insight of this thesis that the USA and China are in particular concerned with their economic development. So, for the formulation of environmental policies, it could use strategic papers¹⁴ that outline how climate change mitigation actions can be implemented that they boost the domestic economy. The European Commission could propose a directive for climate change mitigation that sets economic growth targets and how they could be achieved by a restructuring of industries in line with climate change mitigation objectives. A directive has the advantage that it sets clear measureable objectives but leaves the methods to achieve these goals to the discretion of the member states. In comparison to regulations, directives thus have a higher chance to be adopted via the co-decision procedure. In case, the EU would consequently successfully boost its economic growth by climate change mitigation action this could be a strong signal to the USA and China. When the citizens and the government of these states would perceive the EU as a successful model for the successful combination of economic development and climate change adaption this could motivate them to stronger cooperate in future climate change negotiations.

In general, the insights of this paper suggest that the time for a paradigm shift to cosmopolitan realism is not yet ripe. However, Beck did not specify a time period in that the paradigm shift might become realized. My research is limited due to the constraint that I only researched the case of the CCC. In between, several further meetings took place that progressed on some procedural targets. This might shed another light on my findings. Furthermore, since I tested almost all assumptions of the theory, I could also have researched whether the EU indeed is a "historic example of" a "cosmopolitan form of statehood" (Beck, 2008b, p. 12). Because this would have gone beyond the scope of the observed case and this thesis, I neglected this aspect. Possible future research could test whether the implications of climate change might bring about a paradigm shift to cosmopolitan realism in the long term. Moreover, it could be researched to what extent cosmopolitan realpolitik with respect to global financial and terrorists risks proves true in reality.

¹⁴ i.e. the paper 'Auf dem Weg zu einem Green New Deal Die Klima- und die Wirtschaftskrise als transatlantische Herausforderungen' by French, Renner & Gardner, 2009)

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List of Abbreviations

AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
BASIC group	Group of Brazil, South Africa, India and China
CCC	Climate Conference in Copenhagen
CA	Copenhagen Accord
COP15	15th Conference of the Parties
EIG	Environmental Integrity Group
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
PCDR	Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
PD	Prisoners Dilemma
RQ	Research Question
SISs	Small Island States
UN	United Nations
UNFCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USA	United States of America