HELPFUL ALLY OR POLICY-IMPOSING MASTER?

AN ANALYSIS OF THE IRISH PERCEPTION

OF GERMANY'S ROLE IN THE EUROPEAN

FINANCIAL CRISIS

Larissa Bauschen

UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

WESTFÄLISCHE WILHELMS-UNIVERSITÄT MÜNSTER
INSTITUT FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT

EXAMINATION COMMITTEE
Dr. Kostas Gemenis
Prof'in Dr. Christiane Frantz

UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.

'I have come to think about my nationality in much the same way that I think about my hair: an enduring, unremarkable and rapidly diminishing aspect of who I am. It requires less and less upkeep these days, and I tend to notice it only when other people do.'

(Carl Dolan, Policy officer with Transparency International, in Brussels, and guitarist with the band Toy Division, tit501)

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# 1.	Introduction

The German government – 'pioneering role'[1] (Deutschlandfunk, 2012, September 18), 'stability anchor and growth locomotive in Europe' (Bundesregierung, 2012, September 17), in 'friendly relationships' (Bundesregierung, 2012, September 6) with other EU member states.

The European financial crisis has apparently revived national judgment among the member states of the EU. National roles are being questioned and reconsidered. At the same time, the crisis awakens thoughts about role assessment in respect to crisis management and solutions. In a time when member states redefine their traditional roles and define new ones, Germany seemingly constructs its role as a moderate and amicable role model.

Given the crisis context and that of the EU as a 'community of destiny' (Van Rompuy & Barroso, 2012, December 10, p. 4), governmental communication seems not only relevant with national people, but also with foreign ones, especially those under the bailout fund. If the German government was successful in communicating its role construction, then one would expect other member states to have a similar view. However, incidents such as the burning of swastika flags in Greece, or the Italian philosoper's Agamben's call for a Latin empire of Europe without Germany (Agamben, 2013, March 24) seem to falsify this expectation. By contrast, a recent poll commissioned by the BBC ("BBC Poll", 2013, May 23) indicates Germany as the 'most popular country in the world'. However, crisis struck countries are ambiguous: 68% of the Spaniards view Germany positively, whereas Greece mainly has a negative perception of Germany. (PIPA & GLOBESCAN, 2013, May 22).[2]

Given such a distorted image of the German role in the EU, it is interesting to see how other member states that sought help under the bailout fund see Germany. Being aware that an analysis of all member states or bailout states would go beyond the scope of this bachelor thesis, this thesis conducts a case study analysing the Irish perception of the German role. Since polls and surveys of Irish people are – to present knowledge – not existent, articles of the Irish newspapers with the highest circulation, Irish Independent and The Irish Times, are content-analysed. Being mass media, newspapers are likely to mirror the view of the public and may therefore allow conclusion of the Irish perception of the German government. The articles will be interpreted for their manifest and latent content by coders. This will be done – in accordance with Krippendorff (2004) and Neuendorf (2004) – by quantitative content analysis.

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[1] The original phrase 'Vorreiterrolle' was translated by me to facilitate the readability. For this reason, all hereafter quoted German expressions will be translated.
[2] See also Figure 1, 2 in the appendix.

According to Canel and Sanders, the meaning of governmental reputation, i.e. the difference between performed and perceived public policies (2012, pp. 90-91), is lacking in political communication research. Analysing Irish public perceptions of the German government should support the development of policies and research towards image and reality about government performance. Consequently, strong indicators of a 'match between perception and experience' (Canel & Sanders, 2012, pp. 92-93) could be derived. This research aims at getting insight into the bigger context of the German government's reputation and role in the EU. The Irish case might help to get a first idea of this topic, which is why this bachelor thesis employs an explorative research design. The thesis questions the reconstructed role of the German government by the Irish media from a political communication's perspective. Specifically the research enquires (1) how the German government's role is perceived and reconstructed by the Irish media and (2) whether there is an altered perception between different newspapers.

To answer these questions the first section will illustrate the communication of governments, whereas the second one will depict the role concept of governments from an international relations' point of view. Afterwards the construction of national images will be analysed from a political psychological point of view. The fourth section operationalises the research question, whereas section 5 deals with the data selection. Afterwards the research design of this bachelor thesis will be described by outlining the research methodology and the measurement of national images (section 6). Additionally, a short section discussing intercoder reliability will be introduced. Section 7 describes the results of the research, on whose basis the following sections will draw conclusions and illustrate the limitations of the conducted research.

2. Communication of Governmental Actors

This bachelor thesis analyses the Irish perception of the German role in the European crisis employing a political communication approach. That means that the role perception is considered a response to the 'message' of the German government, i.e. its own role construction and actions. Given this theoretical background, it seems sensible to get an idea of the message of the German government, the image it wants Irish people to have, first. This is why this section will describe general communication strategies and specifically address governmental crisis communication.

2.1 Communication Strategies of Governments

'[T]rust, competence, and consistency are [...] three dimensions of the space in which governmental communication operates' (Canel & Sanders, 2010, p. 451). The potential risk of losing these qualities and thus weakening political leaders is omnipresent (Canel & Sanders, 2010, p. 451; Coombs, 2010, p. 21). Consequently, communication is essential for governments, if they want to avoid people starting 'to doubt the leader's competence and trustworthiness' (Canel & Sanders, 2010, p. 451). The EU has increased this risk of weakened political leadership for the German government because as 'community of destiny' (Van Rompuy & Barroso, 2012, December 10, p. 4) its member states are closely linked and inter-dependent.

If governments want to be able to deal with political problems proactively rather than reac-tively, they will apply political strategies to their public relations work (Sarcinelli, 2011, p. 329). In a minimalistic sense, political strategies indicate the 'political entity's purpose and the scheme through which that purpose will be achieved' (Nielsen, 2012, p. 294). In their de-tailed definition strategies are 'distinct, context- and actor-oriented [and] are based on situa-tion overlapping aim-mean-environment-calculations' (Raschke & Tils, 2008, January, p. 12). Thus, strategic politics entail a long-term function for pursuing political aims calculating given resources and the specific restrictions of the institutional (party government, media democracy, public adminstration) and public environment (e.g. influence of the opposition or sensitivity of the public) (Sarcinelli, 2011, pp. 338-349). These limitations shape the choice and design of strategies. The application of political communication strategies is important for political actors as solving problems and preserving power constellations are closely related (Kamps, 2007). This derives from the fact that media represent and shape reality, which means that influencing them secures predominance and legitimacy. According to Jarren and Donges (2011), politics seek to create positive media coverage, that is descriptions of political action as good and successful. In this context public relations' instrument of crisis communication[3] is applied and Sarcinelli's idea of symbolic politics becomes important. (Jarren & Donges, 2011, pp. 181-189)

Since media coverage is perceived as being erratic and selective by political actors, the objective of getting media attention draws politics to be less strategic and more up-to-date. Jarren and Donges (2011, pp. 125-133, 345) think of communication logic as being opposed

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[3] see the following section

by the normative aim of strategic politics, i.e. fulfilling and shaping communicative expectations.

As the authors note, there is no coherent agenda or personality strategy of the German government because of coalitions being the rule rather than the exception in German politics, but politicians nontheless try to pursue strategies. (Jarren & Donges, 2011, p. 184)

Consequently, the German government is likely to aim at sending a positive image of its work to the Irish people. Mass media seem to be an addressee of particular importance because they influence public perception and secure political power and reputation.

2.2   Governmental Crisis Communication

Given the current economic and financial crisis in Europe, crisis communication appears to be an important aspect of today's governmental communication. Approaching the field of crisis communication, three key words are important for understanding it: crisis, crisis management and crisis communication. As for crisis, there is no unitarily accepted defintion (Coombs, 2010, p. 17). Since the subject of this work is governmental communication, only crisis definitions that can be transferred to the political environment shall be presented. Barton (2001, p. 2) defines crisis rather broadly, when he states that it was an 'unexpected, negative, and overwhelming' event. Coombs, on the other hand, underlines the socio-psycho-logical aspect of crises. According to him, crisis is 'the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization's performance and generate negative outcomes' (Coombs, 2007a, pp. 2-3). This means that a crisis may threaten the government's reputation and legitimacy because the people do not see their expectations being met and might perceive the government's actions as immoral. Consequently, the European financial and economic crisis is likely to threaten the reputation of the German government and make the expectations and responses of the Irish people as part of a European audience central.

These threats can be minimised or even diminished by crisis management which is 'a set of factors designed to combat crisis and to lessen the actual damages inflicted' (Coombs, 2007a, p. 5). The content and rhetoric of crisis management 'has a significant effect on the outcomes of the crisis' (Coombs, 2010, p. 28). Thus, crisis management is not only applied reactively, but also pre-emptively (Coombs, 2010, p. 19). Accordingly there are three application fields: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. Only the second field seems to be applicable to the present EU-wide crisis and will therefore be explained. If a government or organisation was in a

crisis, it would have to identify trigger events and act in response to them. (Coombs, 2010. pp. 20-22) The 'critical element in effective crisis management' (Coombs, 2010, p. 21) is crisis communication which Coombs defines as 'the collection, processing, and dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation' (Coombs, 2010, p. 20). Communication in times of crisis was essential because crises created a need for information which crisis communication met (Coombs, 2010, p. 21).

The literature identifies an abundance of crisis communication theories for the different phases of crises (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis), considering informal, transitive and formal research approaches. Simultaneously, there are two strands of crisis communication: risk knowledge and stakeholder reaction management. (Coombs, 2010, pp. 21-47) The theory that has predominantly been used in research (Fediuk, Pace & Botero, 2010, p. 224) is the *Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT)* by Coombs. As SCCT covers all phases of crises, is both sender- and audience-oriented and provides guidelines for practice, it seems to be a good choice for explaining the governmental communication on which this paper is based. Although crisis communication approaches have mainly been applied for companies, there is a tendency to broaden their application. They are now being used to explain governmental communication as well although there is still a need for further research (see for example Canel & Sanders, 2010, 2012). SCCT links the effects of crises with the behaviour of the stakeholders, the people. Accordingly, the situational individual factors of a crisis posed a reputational threat and elicited an 'affective reaction' (Coombs, 2007b, p. 169) of the public, that is anger, resentment or sympathy. Reputation is thereby understood as the attribution of responsibility: the more political actors are considered responsible for a crisis, the more their reputations are at stake. Thus, reputational damage might lead to decreasing voter turnout, less legitimacy or public protest and disobedience. In this context mass media played a crucial role because they illustrated events with positive or negative frames that influenced political judgement. This was the reason for political actors being in need of presenting 'their side of the story' in the media. (Coombs, 2007b, pp. 167-170, 171)

Coombs identifies three types of crises that help to understand 'how much crisis responsibility stakeholders will attribute to the organization' (2007b, p.168)[4]: (1) Natural disasters, rumors and malevolence create a *victim cluster* with a very weak attribution of responsibility. The government is viewed as the victim of the crisis. (2) In an *accidental crisis* stakeholders

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[4] In the following, crisis clusters are of described and interpreted in terms of governmental not organisational communication.

attribute little responsibility, the crisis is perceived as unintentional or uncontrollable. Examples are challenges where stakeholders declare the political action improper, morally or technically. (3) *Intentional crises* pose a '[s]evere reputational threat' (Coombs, 2007b, p. 168) because the government is strongly held responsible for the crisis. Deceiving the public or endangering it as well as misdemenour of the government might fall under this category. (Coombs, 2007b, pp. 167-169)

It is questionable which cluster would fit the current financial and economic crisis in Europe. Although the German government is not responsible for triggering the crisis it nevertheless shares political responsibility for solving it.

To resolve and manage crises, governments have to adopt rhetorical strategies to instruct information (Coombs, 2010, p. 41). In order to frame public responses to a crisis governments have to adjust information in a second step for which Coombs suggests the following strategies[5]: rebuild, dimish and deny strategies. With *rebuild strategies* politicians accept responsibility for the crisis, offering compensation or apologising for the crisis. *Deny strategies* negate the existence of a crisis or blaim it on other actors. Lastly, *diminish strategies* present the crisis as being less negative than people think or cast a more positive light on the involvement of the government. (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 283; Claeys, Cauberghe & Vyncke, 2010, pp. 257-258) Coombs and Holladay (2006, p. 134) note that politicians have to show 'greater concern for the victims and intensify perceptions of taking responsibility for the crisis', as the crisis poses greater reputational threat. Also crisis history and prior reputation of the government are considered when applying response strategies (Coombs, 2010, pp. 38-45).

Consequently, the German government might use a combination of *diminish* and *concern strategies* to depict itself positively. It would highlight its willingness and ability to help others and simultaneously show sympathy for those countries that have to implement drastic reforms. Should the Irish media respond to the German role construction with a similar perception of its role, one might expect a positive image of the German government to be presented that emphasises the political efforts and help of Germany.

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[5] For a more detailed list see Coombs, 2007b.

3. The Role of Governments

If one wishes to analyse the role perception of the German government by the Irish media, one has to understand the concept of role first. As there is a magnitude of connotations of governmental roles[6], this section will approach this subject by drawing on international relations' role theory for role expectations and role conception and using image theory in political psychology for understanding out-group images.

According to role theory in international relations, roles are defined as 'social positions [...] that are constituted by ego and alter expectations' (Harnisch, 2011, p. 8). As such, roles are socially constructed by expectations from the actors themselves (*ego expectations*) as well as from *alter expectations*, i.e. 'implicit or explicit demands by others (counter-roles or complementary roles, audience cues)' (Harnisch, 2011, p. 8). Harnisch (2011, p. 14) understands national roles in terms of power relations and considers arising expectations to bear a latent conflict potential within roles (*alter* vs. *ego expectation*) and between them. This is especially true with institutionalised roles. As the ESM seemingly bears the institutionalised roles of countries that support the ESM financially and those who receive monetary help from it, inter-role conflicts between Ireland and Germany might occur. In this context the role of leadership might be relevant. Leaders can set the agenda, are able to solve problems efficiently by utilising 'coercion and persuasion' (Nabers, 2011, p. 90). In the light of the latter Nabers asserts that 'language matters' (2011, p. 92). The role of leaders is constituted by *role senders*, i.e. significant actors as the people or other governments. The appearance and influence of *role senders* is 'often tied to crisis or (external) shock situations' (Harnisch, 2011, p. 12).

Harnisch (2011, p. 8) conceptualises roles by contrasting juxtapositions between the actor's ego expectations and the perception of that role by others (alter expectations). Perceptions and behaviour of others are considered essential for identity[7] and image formation. Identity and role of governments influence each other, are reciprocal in nature, as 'reason and judgement lie at the core of roles' (Nabers, 2011, p. 91). As such, role conception, social identity and self-image are closely linked (Breuning, 2011).

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[6] Role theory in international relations understands national roles in terms of power relations; political psychology's notion is linked with the concepts of national images and stereotypes, whereas political communication considers media coverage and public perception to be vital parts of role definition.
[7] Contrasting its psychological definition, identity is here understood as the 'actors' ideas about their own position in society' (Nabers, 2011, p. 83).

4. The Construction of National Images

To understand the construction of national images, theories of international relations which are predominantly characterised by power relations do not seem sufficient. They omit stereotypical and emotional views on nations that Irish people might have of Germany. After all, a nation that has to implement restrictive policies to cope with the crisis is likely to consider Germany not only in terms of power relations. It might additionally fear possible consequences in case of non-compliance with demands for budget cuts. Therefore, this bachelor thesis draws on political psychology to get a deeper insight into image construction. In the following the image theory as developed by Alexander et al. (2005a, 2005b) will be used as they constructed a detailed list of different images.

Political psychology's image theory considers images as 'patterns or configurations of coherent beliefs about the character, intentions, motives, and emotions [...] associated with [another nation] as a whole' (Alexander et al., 2005a, p. 782). It thus illuminates the creation and interdependence of mutual images of nations that are linked in a particular international environment. This structure of international relations assigns specific national images, i.e. that images are the result of the perceived relationship between the nation itself and another nation (the out-group). National images are important as they replicate the character of international relationships and justify intergroup views and behaviour. (Alexander et al., 2005a, p. 782-783) According to Alexander et al., there are three dimensions along which images are created and shaped: (1) *goal compatibility*, (2) *relative power or capability* (e.g. military or economic differences) and (3) *relative cultural status or sophistication*, i.e. the general value of a nation in internationl relations. From different compositions of these features arise five general images (see table 1). (Alexander et al., 2005a, p. 783; 2005b, p. 29)

Table 1: Generic National Images as a Result of Perceived Intergroup Relations

Out-Group Image	Behavioural Orientation	Inter-Group Relationship
enemy image	containment or attack	• incompatible goals • equal power • equal status
ally image	cooperation	• compatible goals • equal power • equal status

barbarian image	defensive protection	• incompatible goals • lower status of out-group • higher power of out-group
dependent image	exploitation or paternalism	• incompatible goals • lower power of out-group • lower status of out-group
imperialist image	resistance or rebellion	• incompatible goals • higher power of out-group • higher status of out-group

based on: Alexander et al., 2005a, p. 4

If a nation has an *enemy image* towards another nation, the out-group is seen as 'evil, opportunistic, and motivated by self-interest' (Alexander et al., 2005b, p. 29), which results from irreconcilable aims, comparable power and status of the nations. The opposing *ally image* eases cooperation as similar objectives are pursued by equally powerful and sophisticated governments. Here the out-group is perceived as 'good, altruistic, noble with full public support for its leaders' (Alexander et al., 2005b, p. 29). However, should the out-group have a lower status, but higher capability than the in-group and should the states pursue diverging goals, a *barbarian image* of the out-group evolves. According to Alexander et al., the other nation is 'destructive, intimidating, and irrational' (2005b, p. 29). A nation with irreconcilable goals that is both higher in power and status than the out-group will see the other nation as *dependent*. '[V]ulnerable, disorganized, [...] in strong need of guidance and direction' might be used to characterise the out-group. Should however the out-group be in a more powerful and sophisticated position, it will be perceived as *imperialistic*, i.e. 'controlling, exploitative, and dominating' (Alexander et al., 2005b, p. 29).

The out-group image is closely connected with the national government's strategic policy choice in respect to that nation (Herrmann & Fischerkeller, 1995, pp. 429-433), simultaneously a positive self-image is sought to be established (Alexander et al., 2005b, p. 34). Next to the perceived images there are also media-generated ones that are equally important since mass media take a critical role. They project and contribute to national image formation with their own news and issue frames. According to Li and Chitty (2009), media are capable of shaping international images the strongest, to which Liu, Horseley and Yang (2012, p. 598) add that media coverage is closely related to the image of governments, public trust and political legitimacy.

5. Operationalising the Research Question

The research question was sub-divided into two dimensions that were mentioned earlier: the perception of the German government's role perception by Irish media and possible differences in perceptions of the two analysed Irish newspapers. To get a detailed overview it seems plausible to utilise the dimensions of images mentioned by Alexander et al. (2005a, 2005b). Around these axes the attributions concerning role perception will be analysed.

Role Perception by Irish Media

The Irish media may represent the *volonté générale* of the Irish people (Schulz, 2011). Since Ireland is under the bailout fund and Germany is one of the countries financing it, the German government is likely to be perceived as a leader for solving the crisis as it is more powerful than Ireland in that institution. For the same reason and in line with image theory, the Irish media might present an *imperialist image* of Germany. The study will analyse the German image in respect to attributions made. Possible attributions that derive from image theory are controlling, exploitative and dominant. Here implicit and explicit implications of power (from which dependence relations might stem), reputation, responsibility and aims seem relevant.

As Ireland might depict itself in a dependent relation towards Germany and see the German government in a leading role, it might according to SCCT perceive the crisis in an *accidental cluster*, i.e. that the crisis was unintentional, but German policy inappropriate. The qualitative content analysis is thereby open for further denominations for analysis.

Differences in Media Coverage

As *The Irish Times* and *Irish Independent* are affiliated with different political parties, we expect a differentiated media image of the German government's role (National Newspapers of Ireland, 2013). Consequently, a comparison of the different newspapers' perception, i.e. the results of the previous content analysis, seems constructive.

6. Case Selection/Data Selection

This bachelor thesis analyses the definition of German government's role in the light of the European crisis management, more specifically the Irish perception of it. The role perception of this particular government was chosen as subject of this work because there has apparently been a recurring call for leadership of the German government in solving the crisis (Friedman, 2012, January 31). During past year's discussion of the possible unconstitutionality of the

ESM this view became obvious. This is why the period of time for this analysis covers the period from 1ˢᵗ January 2012 until 23ʳᵈ May 2013.

Ireland is one of the countries receiving financial help from the euro bailout fund. As such it is likely to be interested in and have a close look at the German role in the financial crisis. For this reason the case of Ireland was selected for examination.

As for the Irish media data was collected from *Irish Independent*, the highest circulating paper in Ireland, and *The Irish Times* with the second highest circulation in Ireland. The relevant data was obtained by searching the archives of the newspapers for the keywords *Germ!* AND *governm!* AND *bailout*.

For the *Irish Independent* this search generated 390 articles, whereas 709 documents could be obtained from *The Irish Times*.[8] Accordingly, the population comprises 1099 articles. To generate a managable sample size, a simple random sampling was conducted as follows: the articles were transferred to an Excel-table and randomly ordered (order '=RAND()'). The assigned random values were ordered from smallest to largest values and the first 100 cases were selected for analysis.

7.   Research Design

This research investigates the extent to which the German role assignment is consistent with its perception by the Irish media. To answer this question an explorative, qualitative design was chosen following the research strategy of an inductive case-oriented study[9]. This strategy allows for a profound, holistic and in-context study of the subject at hand (Yin, 2012, pp. 1-6; Punch, 2006, p. 164; Hartley, 2004). Gerring (2004, p. 348) highlights the profoundness of such a study as one of its 'primary virtues'. The unit of analysis shall be the newspaper articles of the two Irish newspapers as a whole article can better portray a picture of a country than natural sentences could do.

The data is content-analysed in a combined qualitative and quantitative way, enabling the analysis of both manifest and latent content.[10] This will be done by human coders since com-

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[8] These numbers represent the corrected amount of data. As several articles were listed twice in the original population, those documents concerned were omitted from the research to give every article a fair chance to be sampled. Originally, 472 articles were obtained from *Irish Independent* and 796 from *The Irish Times*.
[9] This concept draws on the work of Blatter (2007) who negates the existence of a difference between case studies and comparative ones. Instead the author emphasises a difference between case- and variable-centred approaches. In this research the term case-centred study is deliberately chosen in contrast to case-study because the aim is to get a 'deep of description and interpretation of social and political structures' (Blatter, 2007, p. 127).
[10] For more information see section *7.1 Research Method*.

puters 'process character strings, not meanings' (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 214). However, Krippendorff (2004, p. 124) emphasises that with human coding the major concern for researchers was to ensure significant reliability of the research. This is mainly understood in terms of reproducibility, i.e. 'the degree to which a process can be replicated by different analysts' (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 215). Therefore, detailed descriptions were included into the codebook and intercoder reliability is measured. As one needs to know the degree of deviation of the data from 'perfect' reliability, this work will use Krippendorff's alpha to assess intercoder reliability. The coefficient bears the advantage that 'it can be used regardless of the number of observers, levels of measurement, sample sizes, and presence or absence of missing data' (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007, p. 77). For more detailed considerations of intercoder reliability see section 7.3 in this work.

7.1   Research Method

To answer the research question a qualitative content analysis was chosen as an explorative method that allows for an open investigation of the material, but nevertheless generates a profound comprehension of the subject. The data is content-analysed, i.e. 'the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics' (Neuendorf, 2004, p. 1). With this approach the research of this bachelor thesis is in line with Neuendorf's remark that case-oriented studies were typically used amongst others in the field of political communication (2004, pp. 205-206). Since this thesis aims to examine the German image in an explorative and holistic way, it seems constructive to not only analyse manifest, but also latent content. Although most scholars consider content analysis to mainly examine manifest content, Mayring (2000) emphasises content analysis 'analyzes not only the manifest content of the material'. To examine latent content, Gray and Densten (1998, p. 420) encourage combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. However, to stay in line with the research criteria of Krippendorff and Neuendorf (2004) a quantitative design was chosen. This, nevertheless, includes the coder's interpretation of the articles for their latent content, but counts these interpretations quantitatively.

This bachelor thesis enquires the perception of the German government's role by the Irish media. To answer this question, it was sub-divided into the following two questions: (1) how is the German government's role perceived by the Irish media? (2) Is there an altered perception between the different Irish media?

The material at hand was analysed in respect to these questions. Additionally in the first question notions of power/leadership, dependence, reputation/responsibility and aims were considered, giving credit to the theoretical introduction of governmental role. The material was examined and interpreted in terms of these categories.

Previous research on the role construction of the German government and its perception by the Irish media from a political communication's perspective is unknown. In fact, the literature indicates a scientific gap to which this study aims to contribute (See introduction; Canel & Sanders, 2012, pp. 90-93).

7.2 Measuring National Images

According to Neuendorf (2004, p. 14), the aim of content analysis is the 'numerically based summary of a chosen message set'. The following coding scheme presents such a message set by utilising the image categories of image theory. It thus draws on the works of Alexander et al. who have measured the prevalence of such images among different ethnic groups or nations (Alexander et al., 2005a, 2005b). However, their work was measured by asking representatives of the groups of interest (e.g. Blacks and Whites) to voice their view. An analysis of national images applying content analysis has not been conducted so far. These scientifically uncharted waters are tried to be accommodated with a slightly altered coding scheme.

7.2.1 Coding Scheme

In their research, Alexander et al. used five statements for each image to which participants had to assign a value on a 7-point Likert-type response scale to estimate their (dis-)agreement with these statements. The values ranged from 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong agreement).

As the works of Alexander et al. were conducted to study a context differing from the German government's role in the European financial crisis, the statements were altered to match the current research. For example the original statement 'White/Black people say they want to better race relations, but they don't really mean it' (Alexander et al., 2005b, p. 793) was changed into 'The German government says it wants to overcome the crisis and debt problems, but it does not really mean it'. For a list of all statements see the coding instructions listed in the appendix (Table 2, 5).

Some statements that did not match this bachelor thesis' research could not be translated or changed accordingly because they were mainly dealing with employment and work-related

aspects: 'It is difficult to supervise Black/White employees on the job because they're always trying to avoid working', 'Whites/Blacks use Blacks/Whites for cheap labor and keep all the profits for themselves', 'Whites/Blacks discriminate on purpose to prevent Black/White people from taking their jobs' (Alexander et al, 2005b, p. 793). These statements were not included into the coding scheme. They were replaced by the following statements to ensure that five variables could be assigned for each image: 'The German government wants to do better, but lacks resources and does not know how to solve the crisis', 'Germany uses Ireland as a scapegoat for crisis evolution and employs radical policies for its own profits', 'The German government discriminates Ireland on purpose to prevent it from having a say in crisis management'. From this process a list of statements evolved that can be found in the appendix (Table 2: Statements for Pilot Study Coding Scheme).

Furthermore, the 7-point Likert-type response scale was reduced to a 5-point Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagrees) to 5 (strongly agrees). The reason for this was that it seemed easier for coders to assign one of five instead of seven values to an article. Also having to choose between two positive (4, 5) or negative (1, 2) values instead of three was thought to ease the coding process for coders. As an uneven scale was maintained, a neutral mean (here 3, originally 4) remained applicable.

Next to the different images, the genre of articles was assigned to give insight into the nature of sample and population. Coders could choose between informational and commentary coverage. The first one omitting any kind of personal opinion, mainly stating facts, the second one being essentially about subjective opinions and feelings[11].

Lastly, a category about the importance or argumentative strength of the articles was included. The idea was that if only a slight number of the randomly selected articles actually dealt with the subject of interest, one could weigh the suitable articles. Depending on the number of explicit and implicit arguments an article contained, coders were asked to assign a value from 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very important). If no arguments were mentioned, the coders could assign a missing value (9).

To test whether the constructed coding scheme measured what was to be measured (the images) and was understood by various independent coders, a pilot study with a sub-sample of 10 randomly selected articles was conducted by three independent coders (see section 6.2). If divergent interpretations or understandings of coding instructions appeared, the coding in-

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[11] For a detailed of description see the coding instructions listed in the appendix.

structions and categories were specified accordingly. Also intercoder reliability was measured with Krippendorff's alpha (see section 6.3).

7.2.2 Pilot study and Revised Coding Scheme

The pilot study was conducted by two independently working coders. They were given a random selection of ten articles, the coding instructions, the coding form and a (non-exclusive) list of Irish actors[12].

During the pilot study it became apparent that it was difficult for coders to assign values of disagreement (1, 2) to the images' statements. To assign the value 1 (strongly disagrees) to a statement, one needed the article to have an explicit argument against that particular statement. However, such explicit negations were rarely presented. Furthermore, coders showed problems of differentiating between applying neutral values (3) and the values 2, 4. Therefore, the coding scheme was altered as follows.

The main problem seemed to lie in the fact that by applying a value from 1 (strongly disagrees) to 5 (strongly agrees) coders measured two aspects: agreement and disagreement. Since the latter produced inconveniences, it was omitted from the research. Now only the agreement of the articles was measured by assigning a value from 1 (article does not agree with the statement) to 5 (article completely agrees with the statement). If coders felt unable to give an answer and/or the article did not say anything about or hint at a statement, the value 9 (cannot say) was indicated. The missing value was owed to informational coverage, e.g. information on stock market trends.

Furthermore, coders found the assignment of the article's importance quite difficult, resulting in diverse outcomes. Since the disadvantages and inconveniences seemingly outweighed the advantages of this category, it was dropped from the coding scheme.

The altered coding scheme can be found in the appendix of this thesis (table 5). On this basis the actual test of the sampled 100 articles was conducted, again with two independently working coders.

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[12] The Irish political system bears some genuine Gaelic names which may not be known by coders unfamiliar with Ireland's politics, e.g. Taoiseach. To ensure that the coders were able to understand the articles on a similar level, the most prominent examples of names were listed (see table 3 in the appendix for a list of Irish actors). As such the only criterion for coders was the ability to read and understand English.

7.3. Intercoder Reliability

To determine the reliability of the content analysis, the reproducibility of value assignment is calculated with Krippendorff's alpha to assess the quality of the coding schemes. This procedure is especially necessary as this thesis uses human coding (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 124). Krippendorff requires the concept of reproducibility to have 'at least two independently working observers' (2004, p. 217). Therefore, two independently working coders were deployed to code the articles. Krippendorff's alpha was calculated using the SPSS macro by Hayes and Krippendorff.[13]

At first, a pilot study was conducted with ten articles randomly selected from the sample. After the conduction of the pilot study by two independent coders, the intercoder reliability was measured for each image. The results for the pilot study can be found in the table below.

Table 3: Krippendorff's Alpha of Pilot Study

image	Krippendorff's α	N (units*coders)
ally		
statement 1	0.159	10
statement 2	0.2	10
statement 3	-0.117	10
statement 4	0.2	10
statement 5	0.293	10
aggregated	0.352	50
enemy		
statement 1	0.0	10
statement 2	-0.056	10
statement 3	0.12	10
statement 4	0.317	10
statement 5	-0.076	10
aggregated	0.151	50
barbarian		
statement 1	0.0	10
statement 2	*[14]	10
statement 3	-0.044	10
statement 4	0.0	10
statement 5	0.0	10
aggregated	-0.13	50
dependent		
statement 1	0.0	10
statement 2	0.0	10
statement 3	0.0	10
statement 4	-0.247	10
statement 5	-0.08	10
aggregated	0.131	50
imperialist		
statement 1	0.863	10
statement 2	0.04	10
statement 3	0.889	10

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[13] available on http://afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html
[14] The input reliability data exhibited no variation. Therefore, Krippendorff's alpha could not be calculated.

statement 4	*	10
statement 5	-0.056	10
aggregated	0.556	50
importance	0.498	10
genre	0.548	10
$\sum$	0.356	320

(Number of bootstrap samples: 1000)

The highest Krippendorff's alpha was estimated for the imperialist image. The first and third statements generated an alpha of 0.863 and 0.889. However, their confidence intervals reveal a great deal of uncertainty for this claim. Also the average Krippendorff's alpha value of the imperialist image turned out to be one of the highest values observed (0.556 within a 95% confidence interval [0.128, 0.901]). The lowest Krippendorff's alpha was found for the dependent image: -0.247 was obtained for the different coder's evaluation of the statement 'Germany needs to be protected from the crisis'. Nonetheless, on average the barbarian image proved to produce the lowest Krippendorff's alpha (-0.13 within a 95% confidence interval [-1.0, 0.816]). The negative value Krippendorff's alpha indicates a systematic misunderstanding between the coders. In any case the resulting Krippendorff's alphas were too low to be accepted. Although Krippendorff (2004, pp. 242-243) is unwilling to name a clear cut-off point, the minimum $\alpha = .667$ is apparently needed for reliable instructions. In the light of these results and the difficulties the coders faced, the coding scheme was reviewed and changed as mentioned in section 6.2.2 to obtain a higher Krippendorff's alpha. The resulting final coding scheme can be found in table 5 of the appendix.

After these revisions, a different set of ten randomly chosen articles was given to the coders for analysis. This was done to avoid a repetition of the pilot study's results as coders might remember their previous answers otherwise. Again Krippendorff's alpha was measured for this final coding scheme.

Table 4: Krippendorff's Alpha of Final Test

image	Krippendorff's α	N (units*coders)
ally		
statement 1	0.835	10
statement 2	0.762	10
statement 3	0.255	10
statement 4	0.323	10
statement 5	0.767	10
average	0.606	50
enemy		
statement 1	0.688	10
statement 2	0.3	10
statement 3	0.025	10

statement 4	*[15]	10
statement 5	0.727	10
average	0.348	50
barbarian		
statement 1	0.546	10
statement 2	0.3	10
statement 3	-0.342	10
statement 4	0.167	10
statement 5	*	10
average	0.134	50
dependent		
statement 1	0.25	10
statement 2	*	10
statement 3	0.138	10
statement 4	0.156	10
statement 5	0.109	10
average	0.17	50
imperialist		
statement 1	0.25	10
statement 2	0.792	10
statement 3	0.535	10
statement 4	1.0	10
statement 5	1.0	10
average	0.702	50
genre	1.0	10
Σ	0.376	320

(Number of bootstrap samples: 1000)

The imperialist image turned out to produce the highest Krippendorff's alphass with a maximum value of 1.0, and a lowest of 0.25. To be in line with Krippendorff (2004, p. 242), we have to not that the latter is not high enough to be accepted. Despite that, the imperialist image received an average Krippendorff's alpha of 0.702, i.e. acceptable. Another image that produced significantly high values was the ally image (upper value 0.835, lowest value 0.255). On average a Krippendorff's alpha of 0.606 was estimated, quite closely to Krippendorff's cut-off point. The last image that turned out to have significantly high alpha values was the enemy image with an average Krippendorff's alpha of 0.348. Its values ranged from a maximum of 0.727 to a minimal 0.025.

The lowest Krippendorff's alpha was observed for the barbarian image (-0.34, upper limit 0.546). In comparison, however, the dependent image (0.17) proved to be the lowest value on average (average value of barbarian: 0.134). The dependent image obtained a minimal value of 0.109 and a maximum one of 0.25.

Unfortunately, most of the categories did not turn out to have a significant Krippendorff's alpha. In spite of that, the category genre (with a reliability of 1.0) as well as the ally (an aver-

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[15] The input reliability data exhibited no variation. Therefore, Krippendorff's alpha could not be calculated.

age 0.606) and imperialist image (an average 0.702) show significantly high values for Krippendorff's alpha.

The other values were not acceptable according to Krippendorff (2004, p.242). The author notes that 'for multivariate data, the lowest α among the variables is the joint reliability of the data as a whole' (2004, p.243). Thus, every variable above Krippendorff's alpha = 0.376 would have to be deleted from further research. In accordance with this procedure, we would have to delete all categories but the following three from further research: ally image, imperialist image and genre. Another approach would be to change the coding scheme accordingly. However, this was not or could not be done for several reasons.

Firstly, another test phase would have been outside the scope and resources of this bachelor thesis. Secondly, when having a closer look at the coders' disagreements, we noted that most of them were the result of the coders' interpretation and understanding of the articles. For example one coder indicated the value '2' for an enemy statement, whereas the other coder assigned the value '3' for the same statement and case. Such differences seem to lie within the characters and thoughts of the individual coders and can therefore not be significantly erased by altering the coding scheme. The only way to do so would be to reduce the ordinal scale to a nominal one, indicating whether the statements were mentioned in an article or not. However, this approach is questionable and should only be used cautiously because '[i]n the pursuit of high reliability, validity tends to get lost' (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 213). Above that, it should be noted that the final coding scheme did manage to erase the systematic error of the pilot study (barbarian image) and improve the Krippendorff's alphas. For all variables a higher value was measured (see Table 4: Krippendorff's Alpha of Final Test).

8. Findings

Before the obtained data was evaluated, the values for the different statements were aggregated for each image to a scale from 1-5. This was done because the subjects of interest are the images, not the single statements and the aggregation was thought to facilitate the interpretation.

Before the findings for the different images are presented, it should be noted that most articles did not present the German government with any image at all or only in respect to one of the listed images (see table 7, 8 in the appendix). For example an article dealt only slightly with the German government's role and described it solely in terms of alliance. Thus, for the other images missing values had to be attributed. This lead to maximal 56% of the cases being valid

for the ally image and a minimum of 48% of valid cases for the dependent image. At total, 39% of the data was valid and processed for analysis (see table 8 in the appendix). Yet, this seems natural when being confronted with content analysis. We could hardly expect the articles sampled to be written in a way that perfectly matched our research interest. Instead it seemed likely that the newspapers would deal with e.g. a European Council meeting, describing the Irish government's actions and only casually mentioning Germany.

Another reason why the images could not be assigned to some articles was that the search for the keywords *Germ!* AND *govern!* AND *bailout* also generated articles that did not deal with the German government, but the Irish one, the German people or stock market developments. These actors were not of interest for our research and were not coded.

22.81% of the articles agree with Germany being an ally, which makes this image the one with the most frequent application. Remembering the highest observed agreement value of $M = 1.507$, we can conclude that when being illustrated, the ally image is portrayed as the most explicit and drastic image. The enemy image is assigned less strongly to the German government, although being used very frequently (21.29%). The imperialist (19.01%) and barbarian image (18.63%) as well as the dependent one (18.25%) are found the least likely to be assigned to the German government. Apparently Germany is seldom perceived as being in need of help (dependent image) or acting irrationally with an uncultivated attitude (barbarian image). These images are rarely positively mentioned as they had the lowest means. Also their difference in mean does not turn out to be statistically significant.[16] Additionally, the observed frequencies are quite close to each other, indicating that there was little bias towards one image in the sample.

The strongest and most frequently used image for the valid data is the ally image ($M = 1.507$, $SD = 0.936$), followed by an imperialist role conception of the German government ($M = 0.676$, $SD = 0.850$). On a scale from 1-5, an average of 0.640 is ascribed to the enemy image ($SD = 0.790$). The articles are least likely to agree with a dependent ($M = 0.514$, $SD = 0.656$) or barbarian image ($M = 0.476$, $SD = 0.611$) of Germany. Combining frequency and strength of the images, we can generally observe a constant divergence between frequency and qualitative strength of image description: those images that are more frequently employed are weaker than those less frequently used. For example the dependent image is the least frequent

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[16] Therefore, these images will not be analysed in detail in the following sections. If you should be interested in further details, see tables 7 and 8 in the appendix. Additional information on Cronbach's alpha, item statistics and scale statistics can be found in tables 9-11 of the appendix.

image, yet the weakest image is the barbarian one ($M = 0.476$). Although the enemy image is attributed quite frequently, articles do not present the German government strongly with it. Instead friendly and cooperative characteristics of Germany are displayed stronger. This might hint at the political correctness of politicians of both nationalities and/or objective news coverage of the newspapers. As Ireland is under the bailout fund, it might seem inappropriate to deny any friendly or helpful intentions of Germany which is financing the bailout fund. The same logic might apply to the imperialist image. Despite it being assigned rather seldomly, the data generally agrees quite strongly with an imperial German government. Generally, all means observed are quite low, indicating that the article present a weak illustration of the German government for each and every image.

To prove whether the observed differences are significant, i.e. that they are not the result of chance, the standard deviations are converted to 95% confidence intervals of the mean. When comparing them, it becomes evident that only the minority of differences of the mean are statistically significant: nearly all confidence intervals overlap. Only the ally image's confidence interval does not overlap with the confidence interval of any other image. This indicates that the ally image is the strongest one. However, the otherwise observed relationships are not statistically significant and are likely to be obsolete in the population. With these results, the general order of images that was derived from the data could neither be falsified nor verified and remains questionable. However, there are some clues that indicate that the ally image is indeed the strongest image.

As was to be expected, the sampled articles were predominantly written without conveying any opinion at all, but objectively (76%). Less than one third of the articles were of commentary coverage. Furthermore, all data proved to be highly skewed with the exception of the ally image that is nearly normally distributed.[17] The data seems too skewed for random chance to be an explanation. Therefore, the population is likely to be skewed as well, although we cannot say in which direction or how much.

Both Pearson's ρ and Kendall's τ are calculated to allow comparison and further correlation analysis. The presentation of the German government as an ally does not correlate significantly with another image. Conversely, when articles depicted Germany as an enemy they often used aspects of the barbarian image as well ($\rho = 0.814, \tau = 0.595$). This constitutes the highest correlation found among the data. According to Kühnel and Krebs (2010, pp. 404-

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[17] See table 8 in the appendix.

405), a correlation is very high, if $|\rho_{xy}| \geq 0.7$. Thus, we could generate that whenever Germany is portrayed as an antagonist, it is also illustrated with barbarian attributes. The same logic might apply to the relationship between the enemy and imperialist image which mutually shows a very high correlation ($\rho = 0.773, \tau = 0.550$). In line with these findings, articles that present the German government as barbarian correlate also revealed an imperialist connotation of Germany ($\rho = 0.66, \tau = 0.524$). Yet, this correlation is weaker those between the individual images and the enemy one. This indicates that some articles omit barbarian or imperialist attributes when presenting the German government as an opponent. Not all three images are used at the same time. A low correlation is found for the enemy and dependent image ($\rho = 0.484, \tau = 0.345$), as well as for the dependent image and the imperialist ($\rho = 0.417, \tau = 0.410$) and barbarian one ($\rho = 0.629, \tau = 0.427$). However, if we control for the dependent image, no significant correlation is found for the enemy, imperialist and barbarian image.

In the following sections the findings for the ally, enemy and imperialist image and the different use of images within the newspapers will be illustrated in greater detail.

8.1   Ally Image

If the German government was depicted, it was mainly described as an ally in comparison to other roles (22.81% of the cases). Only 5% of the data agreed nearly completely with a cooperative role of the German government. An unusually high recognition of an ally image is produced by article ii278 which indicates a value of 4.0 on an aggregated scale from 1-5. The outlier describes the Euro crisis and especially the ECB's policies as an 'endgame'. In a negative, rather pessimistic scenario the German government appears as a rational actor that knows what to do in contrast to the aforementioned protagonists.

The centre of the positive assignments for the ally image is 1.507 within a 95% confidence interval [1.265, 1.748]. Although this value does not represent the possible maximum of the scale, i.e. a value of 5, it seems significant as it constitutes the highest mean obtained and proved to be statistically significant in contrast to other means. This implies that the ally image is the most frequently used, when describing the German government and is also the most explicit and drastic image. It hints at a differentiated Irish presentation of the German government. The Irish might be aware that their economic recession and financial situation is not or not only the responsibility and fault of Germany. The average high and explicit presenta-

tion of a cooperative government might also be the result of trying to avoid defaming Germany by the public.

The data deviates, on average, 0.936 scale points around the mean. Again, this emphasises high direct agreement with an ally image of the German government. A skewness of 0.826 and a kurtosis value of 0.173 support this interpretation as they indicate a distribution that is moderately skewed to the right and quite similar to a normal distribution's peak and height.

8.2   Enemy Image

In total 56 articles utilised an enemy image to illustrate the policies of the German government. However, in most cases a weak enemy image was indicated (76.8%). The attribution of an antagonistic role of Germany is highly skewed to the right with a sharp peak and long tails of the distribution (*kurtosis* = 1.658). Accordingly, the distribution is leptokurtic. With a standardised value of 3.592 the population is very likely to be skewed, too, when it comes to presenting Germany as an enemy. On top of that, the articles present Germany rather weakly as a rival with a mean of 0.640 [0.483, 0.797]. This general trend does not turn out to be statistically significant in contrast to the other means. However, it should be noted that two articles present an outlying score: the article tit588 obtains a 3.60 on a scale from 1-5. A score of 3.20 is generated for the case ii379.

The first outlier is a commentary piece, dealing with the trivialisation of the crisis when policies against it were urgent and time pressing. The German government is herein presented in line with EU institutions that share this view. Although the increase of the amount of the bailout 'firewall' was needed, these actors acted rather slowly. They apparently ignored the situation of the bailout countries: 'Germany is not ready [...] for an increase, [...] so everyone else must wait' (tit588). Doing so, German politicians contradicted the aim of combating speculations, as their actions were actually 'fanning' (tit588) them.

The second outlier is written in a commentary style. It criticises the European crisis management for being messy because Germany and France defended their imperial, powerful status and held 'tight control over the EU purse' (ii379). Ireland is portrayed as a dependent country, not having a voice in this process. Actors leading the EU appear to have lost sight of the people's will and act in a way that counteracts effective crisis management. The author concludes that Ireland's 'once-blissful, convivial relationship with the EU has turned into a nightmare of epic proportions' (ii379).

8.3 Imperialist Image

As mentioned previously, an imperialist role is the third most frequently attributed image with a total of 50 cases. Its strength of description, however, ranks second among the images ($M = 0.676$). Yet, this rank is not likely to be found in the population as well because the differences in mean are not statistically significant. Around this centre the data shows a distribution that is highly skewed right (*skewness* = 1.218) with a central peak that is approximately similar to that of a normal distribution (*kurtosis* = 0.892). Similar to the enemy image, the standardised value of skewness ($Z_{g1} = 3.312$) indicates a relatively high probability that the population will be skewed as well.

Despite its relatively frequent use, very low values of agreement were indicated the most for the imperialist image (80%). The highest value was indicated for the articles tit588 and ii379 which seem to be special, outlying cases for a lot of images. Interestingly, for the imperialist image no values were attributed that showed a very strong presentation of Germany as an imperialist. This indicates an ambiguous perception of German politics: although they are often viewed as dominant these views do not reveal a great strength. However, as the difference in mean for this image was not statistically significant, we cannot be certain that the population will show the same relationship.

8.5 Images and Irish Newspapers

The result that the ally image is the most frequently depicted image continues for the newspapers: the *Irish Independent* illustrates Germany as a friend in 22.11% of the total cases, *The Irish Times* in 23.64%. Surprisingly, the *Irish Independent* uses the barbarian image the second most frequently (20.62%), whereas this image is the least likely to be attributed to German politics by *The Irish Times* (17.58%). The other images only vary in one rank or none (see table below), making the barbarian image score an outlying case.

Table 5: Frequencies of Different Newspapers

	ally	enemy	imperialist	dependent	barbarian
Irish Independent (100%)	22.11%	19.59%	19.59%	18.56%	20.62%
The Irish Times (100%)	23.64%	21.82%	18.79%	18.18%	17.58%

Percentages are those of the total of cases.

Articles of the *Irish Independent* characterise the German government the strongest as impe-rialist ($M = 1.621$). Although being quite seldom mentioned (rank 3), the image is strongly depicted when being used whereas *The Irish Times* presents friendly features the strongest and most frequently (see table 6 above). The second strongest image of the *Irish Independent* is the ally image ($M = 1.524$), followed by the enemy image ($M = 1.474$). The latter image ranks third in both frequency and strength. However, articles of *The Irish Times* rank the en-emy image as a weaker image ($M = 0.989$). For the *Irish Independent* this rank applies to the dependent image with an average value of 1.078. Although *The Irish Times* underlines an-tagonistic aspects of the German government with weak values, it does so very frequently (see table 5 above)[18]. The same relationship applies to the *Irish Independent*'s use of the barbarian image: although being the second most frequently used by the *Irish Independent* to present the German government, the barbarian image shows the weakest values (see table 6).

Table 6: Mean Scores and Confidence Intervals of the Newspapers

N valid		ally	enemy	imperialist	dependent	barbarian
Irish Independent	M	1.524	1.474	1.621	1.078	1.020
	CI	[1.122,1.925]	[1.149, 1.799]	[1.252, 1.990]	[1.000, 1.156]	[0.817, 1.224]
The Irish Times	M	1.497	0.989	0. 890	1.067	0.890
	CI	[1.182, 1.813]	[0.746, 1.232]	[0.946, 1.430]	[0.657, 1.122]	[0.657, 1.122]

When taking the mean values of table 6 into account, we can observe the following common features of the newspapers: both indicate ally and imperialist image as the strongest ones, fol-lowed by presenting the German government as a dependent and an antagonist actor (ranks 3 and 4). The weakest image for both newspapers is the barbarian one, although this is not the least frequently used in the case of the *Irish Independent*. Articles of the *Irish Independent* are quite often hinting at unlawful and irrational German characteristics, but do not depict them strongly. On the contrary, *The Irish Times* presents the German government seldom and the most weakly with a barbarian image. This resembles the findings of the general trend of the data, analysed in sections 8-8.3. The coverage of the *Irish Independent* seems to be distorted. The same applies to *The Irish Times*' depiction of Germany as an enemy. Whether these find-ings are mirroring the public opinion or the editorial one cannot be said for certain, since the confidence intervals indicate all relationships between images to be insignificant for the *Irish Independent* (see next paragraph).

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[18] For further information please see tables 12-14 in the appendix.

To assess the differences of mean between the images in each newspaper as well as those differences between the values of an individual image in the two newspapers, the statistical significance is tested. Again this is done by converting the standard deviations into 95% confidence intervals. The images presented in the *Irish Independent* do all overlap which means that the observed order is not statistically significant and the result of chance. Additionally, differences in mean for the images presented in articles of *The Irish Times* are by and large falsified by overlapping confidence intervals. However, the intervals of the ally image and the dependent one as well as the difference between ally and barbarian image are likely to be found in the population as well. They show statistical significance. Accordingly, we can conclude that article published by *The Irish Times* present the German government more strongly as an ally than a dependent or barbarian actor.

Consequently, the image means overlap within the newspapers, i.e. that they do not show statistical significance across images. The differences in mean between ally and dependent as well as ally and barbarian image in *The Irish Times*, however, pose an exception as they do not overlap. By comparing the confidence intervals of the means we are also able to get an idea about the different presentation of one image in both newspapers. We can observe an overlap of the newspapers' confidence intervals for each individual image. Thus, there observed differences for the newspapers are void as they are not statistically significant.[19]

We should also keep in mind that most of the data obtained did not present an image at all. This is supported by the fact that 72.7% of the articles from *Irish Independent* and 77.6% of *The Irish Times'* articles did not present any personal opinion or comment, but were written objectively.

9.   Conclusions

As we have seen in the previous sections, Germany is hardly described in terms of one of the images this thesis studied (61% missing values). This is firstly owed to the nature of content analysis. Its specific scientific interest and design is not likely to be exactly replicated by the newspapers' articles. For example articles mainly tend to analyse the Irish government's policies or the EU in general instead of focusing on the role of the German government. Secondly, most of the articles use informational coverage (76%) and all images are mentioned.

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[19] Also both newspapers showed the same correlation results that are observed for the whole data and are analysed in section 8.

Thus, the data indicates a broad and objective coverage on the German government's role in the European crisis.

If an image is indicated, Germany is predominantly and the most strongly perceived as an ally. According to their frequencies, the enemy image is the second most often assigned image, followed by an imperial and barbarian role of the German government. The dependent image was the least frequently presented. As all frequencies are quite similar, we can conclude that there is little bias towards one image. This is supported by the fact that the ally image is the only one for whose mean a statistical significance could be estimated. The other images' means do not differ significantly and are generally rather low. This indicates a weak illustration of Germany with these images. It also proves the observance of a divergence between frequency and strength of images to be insignificant. The population is likely to be indifferent for the imperialist, enemy, barbarian and dependent image.

Generally, the analysed newspapers report rather objectively on German politics: there is a mixture of agreement with various roles that do not lead to one certain notion of Germany being presented. The most frequently and strongest image is the ally image for both newspapers. Yet, the *Irish Independent* emphasises barbarian features of Germany recurrently, whereas *The Irish Times* depicts the German government more frequently as an enemy. However, articles of the *Irish Independent* do not present the German government differently with images as the confidence intervals of the images' means did not overlap. Contrary, when articles are published by *The Irish Times*, they present Germany by indicating an ally rather than barbarian and dependent image. These images show statistical significance.

Comparing the different presentation of one image across newspapers, no difference in mean turns out to be statistically significant. Consequently, the *Irish Independent* and *The Irish Times* present Germany alike, favouring an illustration as an ally and being mostly objective. Therefore, we can assume a positive depiction of Germany in the population as well, emphasising Germany's helpful and friendly characteristics.

From these findings we can conclude that the Irish do not actively study the role of the German government in the European crisis. Still, the German government is made the subject of many articles. The fact that Germany is mentioned indicates that a certain role of the country is perceived. The articles presented indicators that allowed making inferences about the perception of the German government. The Irish seemingly report on the German government primarily objectively and view it as an ally in the crisis management.

Although a plenitude of researches has shown a negativism bias for media coverage (Schulz, 2011), a primarily negative image of the German government was not found. With this in mind, the presentation of Germany as an ally seems even more striking and should be valued accordingly. From these conclusions we can hypothesise that the Irish media deliberately presented the German government positively because of the salient contradiction to the negativism bias. One possible reason for this may be that the Irish public might have prejudices against Germany which the analysed newspapers tried to correct.

10. Limitations

As a case study was conducted, research results may not be generalised over other cases, but only for the case at hand. This means that the results and conclusions presented above do only apply for articles of the *Irish Independent* and *The Irish Times*. They only apply to the perception of the German government, not the German people or other actors. Also for other bailout countries we might find differing results. Consequently, the resulting implications for the theory and practice of government communication should be considered guidelines.

Furthermore, to evaluate the success of the German government's communication a content analysis of the own role perception would be needed (extent of consistency). However, this was beyond the scope of this bachelor thesis. Having said that, one should note that resources were scarce for this research. Consequently, a detailed coder training, coders unaffiliated with the researcher (strangers that are paid) and more pilot studies were impossible to obtain. For example further research might want to use purposive sampling to avoid large numbers of missing values. On the other hand, this presented a finding and seemed typical of a content analysis.

Lastly, our research is limited to quality papers as tabloid ones were not available for us, at least not in a way that would have exceeded our resources. However, in further studies tabloid newspapers should be included to get a more comprehensive idea about the Irish perception of the German government. Our explorative study may lay the groundwork on which further research can build.

11. Outlook

This bachelor thesis questioned the Irish perception of the German government in solving the European financial crisis. The research question was explored in a two-fold way: firstly, the research investigated which image was used by Irish media to present Germany. Secondly, the

question was raised whether there was a different perception between the *Irish Independent* and *The Irish Times*. To answer these questions the first section dealt with the theory of political communication, more specifically crisis communication. Afterwards, the role of governments was illustrated, the different images that were analysed in the successive sections of this work were introduced. The articles from the above mentioned newspapers were content-analysed in accordance with Neuendorf and Krippendorff.

Overall, the different newspapers presented similar images of the German government. Especially their order was almost identical: the most frequently deployed image was the ally image, the dependent image the least frequently used one. Both newspapers presented the German government predominantly objectively, covering all available images. However, there was one difference: *The Irish Times* used the enemy image very frequently, whereas the *Irish Independent* emphasised barbarian features recurrently.

The ally image turned out to be the strongest portray of the German government. All differences of mean between the other images were statistically insignificant. The *Irish Independent* and *The Irish Times* presented Germany equally, primarily depicting it in terms of alliance and in light of objectivity. Therefore, we can assume a positive depiction of Germany in the population as well, emphasising Germany's helpful and friendly characteristics. Each and every image does not differ across newspapers.

Accordingly, the political communication of the German government seems to have been effective in that the Irish perceive it in the role it wants to be perceived in: a helpful ally. However, even if being viewed as an ally, this friendly perception of Germany might abruptly change as the European financial crisis has revived nationalisms. Thus, the German government might be well-advised to keep communicating with the Irish government and people as well as observing their response.

From these findings we can draw four hypotheses that will have to be falsified in further research: (1) In general, the Irish people are indifferent towards the German government and do not study its role actively. (2) If a view on Germany is offered, it uses the ally image. (3) There is no difference in presenting the German government between the *Irish Independent* and *The Irish Times*, neither across images nor across newspapers. (4) All qualitative Irish newspapers will illustrate the German government's role alike.

To generate more specific guidelines and test the hypotheses, additional research is needed as our study was the first, exploratory step. It should be interesting to get an idea of the reasons

for the Irish perception of the German government. Also the current research could be improved by including other actors, e.g. EU institutions, especially the ECB, into consideration. During the conduction of our research, we found that France was often mentioned in combination with Germany, indicating an Irish role perception of this country, too. Therefore, it should be interesting to investigate the French role as well.

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13. Appendix: Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Perceived Influence of Different Countries in the World

Views of Different Countries' Influence
Average of 22 Tracking Countries, 2012–2013

Country	Mainly positive	Mainly negative	Change in positive since 2012	Change in negative since 2012
Germany*	59	15	3	-1
Canada*	55	13	2	-1
UK*	55	18	4	-2
Japan*	51	27	-7	6
France*	49	21	1	-1
EU	49	24	1	-1
Brazil*	46	21	1	3
USA*	45	34	-2	1
China*	42	39	-8	8
South Korea*	36	31	-1	4
South Africa	35	30	-2	5
India*	34	35	-6	8
Russia*	30	40	-1	4
Israel	21	52	0	2
North Korea	19	54	0	4
Pakistan*	15	55	-1	4
Iran	15	59	-1	4

Note: average ratings exclude the target country's rating of itself, meaning some of the averages are based on 21 and not 22 countries.

*Average of 21 tracking countries

The white space in this chart represents "Depends," "Neither/neutral," and "DK/NA."

Asked of half of sample

source: PIPA & GLOBESCAN, 2013,May 22, p. 3

Figure 2: International Views on Germany's Influence

Views of Germany's Influence
By Country, 2013

	Mainly positive	Mainly negative
USA	71	13
Canada	69	13
Chile	58	14
Mexico	54	24
Brazil	53	15
Peru	43	20
France	81	11
UK	78	12
Spain	68	13
Poland	67	8
Germany	64	8
Russia	55	10
Turkey	46	28
Greece	25	52
Ghana	84	6
Nigeria	69	18
Kenya	52	14
Egypt	43	21
Australia	76	10
South Korea	76	8
Indonesia	60	21
China	48	23
Japan	47	3
Pakistan	29	26
India	27	14
Global average (Germany excluded)	57	17

BBC2531_M2gt_ctry

The white space in this chart represents "Depends," "Neither/neutral," and "DK/NA."
Asked of half of sample

source: PIPA & GLOBESCAN, 2013, May 22, p. 19

Table 1: Statements for Pilot Study Coding Scheme

Ally image:
1. Irish/German people/government value cooperative solutions to crisis-related problems.
2. German politicians are good leaders who have the best intentions of Ireland at heart.
3. Most German politicians work hard to overcome the crisis.
4. The German government acts equally with other governments.
5. German concerns about the crisis and its management in the EU are legitimate and reasonable.

Enemy image:
1. The German government cannot be trusted because it knows how to trick people/politicians.
2. The German government says it wants to overcome the crisis and debt problems, but it does not really mean it.
3. Germany takes as much as much as it can get away with at the disadvantage of other EU members.
4. Germany is at an advantage because it has leaders in the highest positions of EU institutions.
5. The German government has hostile intentions towards Ireland.

Barbarian image:
1. The majority of German politicians in the government are uncontrollable and act irrationally.
2. The German government generally enjoys intimidating other EU members.
3. Germany has been trying to get ahead economically/politically in an illegal, treacherous way rather than by earning it.
4. German politicians would rather use violence than cooperation when solving conflicts.
5. The German government has no respect for the Irish culture.

Dependent image:
1. The German government wants to do better, but lacks resources and does not know how to solve the crisis.
2. Most politicians of the German government are okay, but a few bad apples make the whole government look bad.
3. German politicians mean well, but they need help to adopt effective policies.
4. Germany needs to be protected from the crisis.
5. The German government has no idea what it should do to solve the crisis and needs guidance.

Imperialist image:
1. The German government discriminates Ireland on purpose to prevent it from having a say in crisis management.
2. To be successful in the EU you have to have good relations with the German government.
3. The German government is arrogant and convinced it is superior to other countries/ governments.
4. Germany uses Ireland as a scapegoat for crisis evolution and employs radical policies for its own profits.
5. German politicians use coercion to impose of desired policies.

Table 2: Coding Instructions for Pilot Study Coding Scheme

general instructions

Coder ID	Each coder indicates his/her work by assigning his/her coder ID on every coding sheet. The coder ID consists of the capital initials of each coder (e.g.: Larissa Bauschen → LB).
Article ID	Each coder has to fill in the article ID as indicated in the article ID list.

Unit of Analysis	Articles shall be analysed regarding the listed categories. To determine whether an article fits into a category the main impression/majority of arguments of the article is to be considered. When an article presents different views, these differing opinions are not taken into account where they are the minority, seem unimportant compared to the main argumentation. For example an author may list an opposing argument to falsify it or as an interesting introduction. Should however the article be written in a dialectic way, i.e. the equal weighing of pros and cons, the divergent opinions are taken into account. Generally, the impression of the whole article as such is important, not so much each and every sentence.
German government	The following notions will be considered to represent the German government: ministers (e.g. Wolfgang Schäuble), head of government, references to the person Angela Merkel as the embodiment of the government, abstract remarks that represent the German government (e.g. 'Germany's approach in today's Council meeting')
Ireland	The following notions will be considered to represent Ireland: political actors of Ireland (e.g. prime minister, deputy prime minister), national banks and their actors, Central Bank of Ireland, parties, Irish people (e.g. individual who expresses his/her opinion in a letter to the editor), general expressions such as 'the Irish people' or 'the Irish', abstract remarks that represent Ireland (e.g. 'Irish economy came to a halt when the German Constitutional Court announced...')

Ally image:	*For this image five statements are presented. Estimate to what extent the article agrees with each of them on a scale from 1 (strongly disagrees) to 5 (strongly agrees). Should an article express no or a neutral view on the subject, indicate the value 3 (neutral).*

1. Irish/German people/government value cooperative solutions to crisis-related problems.

   The Irish and German government/people work together to solve the crisis. This category also contains the willingness of the German government to be helpful and do as the Ireland and/or other countries ask. Crisis-related problems may be debt deficits, constraints in financial and monetary policies, economic recession etc.

2. German politicians are good leaders who have the best intentions of Ireland at heart.

   The term 'Good leaders' is understood in an economic, moral, social and political way. Germany may have a role model function and its policies are thought (by Ireland or Germany itself) to have the best possible outcome for Ireland (socially, politically or economically).

3. Most German politicians work hard to overcome the crisis.

   German politicians are ambitious in helping and cooperating with Ireland. They seem to do everything they can to solve the crisis and/or minimise its consequences.

4. The German government acts equally with other governments.

   In international relations the German government is perceived as an equal partner, i.e. it acts and is treated neither inferior nor superior to other EU members.

5. German concerns about the crisis and its management in the EU are legitimate and reasonable.

   Ireland respects German policies and values them and/or their aims. The reasons for such policies are understood whether they have negative or positive consequences for Ireland, the EU or other countries.

Enemy image:	*For this image five statements are presented. Estimate to what extent the article agrees with each of them on a scale from 1 (strongly disagrees) to 5 (strongly agrees). Should an article express no or a neutral view on the subject, indicate the value 3 (neutral).*

1. The German government cannot be trusted because it knows how to trick people/politicians.

   German politicians use their power and intelligence for tactic purposes. Ireland is the plaything in German strategies.

2. The German government says it wants to overcome the crisis and debt problems, but it does not really mean it.

   German political actions and the statements of the German government/ promised aims are perceived as contradicting.

3. Germany takes as much as much as it can get away with at the disadvantage of other EU members.

The German government ignores wishes and circumstantial constraints of other governments when pursuing its aims.

4. Germany is at an advantage because it has leaders in the highest positions of EU institutions.

EU institutions are perceived as being in the hands of or mainly led by Germans, which puts the German government at an unfair advantage.

5. The German government has hostile intentions towards Ireland.

Malevolence marks German political actions. The German government wishes for a decrease in the political, economic and/or social performance of Ireland.

Barbarian image:	*For this image five statements are presented. Estimate to what extent the article agrees with each of them on a scale from 1 (strongly disagrees) to 5 (strongly agrees). Should an article express no or a neutral view on the subject, indicate the value 3 (neutral).*

1. The majority of German politicians in the government are uncontrollable and act irrationally.

Tactics or strategic action cannot be identified in German politics. Rather German policies are unpredictable which makes them potentially harmful.

2. The German government generally enjoys intimidating other EU members.

The general attitude of the German government is to frighten or threaten other EU members so that they are likely to do what the German government wants. This makes other countries feel less confident.

3. Germany has been trying to get ahead economically/politically in an illegal, treacherous way rather than by earning it.

The German government does not trick other states, but ignores any conventions and treaties. Also a breach of moral behaviour may be coded in this category.

4. German politicians would rather use violence than cooperation when solving conflicts.

When the slightest conflict (seemingly) occurs, the German government reacts with behaviour that is intended to hurt the Irish people.

5. The German government has no respect for the Irish culture.

The specific conditions in Ireland (e.g. culture, society, economic structure, history) are ignored and/or dealt ill with.

Dependent image:	*For this image five statements are presented. Estimate to what extent the article agrees with each of them on a scale from 1 (strongly disagrees) to 5 (strongly agrees). Should an article express no or a neutral view on the subject, indicate the value 3 (neutral).*

1. The German government wants to do better, but lacks resources and does not know how to solve the crisis.

Know-how and resources the Irish have are absent in Germany. That is why, despite their efforts, German politicians are unfit to solve the crisis.

2. Most politicians of the German government are okay, but a few bad apples make the whole government look bad.

The German government is treated as if it was lower in (economic, social, political, cultural) status. However, Ireland recognises German efforts and is able to differentiate between different politicians, i.e. that it knows that negative actions may not represent the whole government but the minority. As a result, pity or regret may appear. Note that in this statement the differentiated Irish view is not shared by (most of) other countries, of which Ireland is aware ('the whole government look[s] bad').

3. German politicians mean well, but they need help to adopt effective policies.

The German government has good intentions (e.g. in a moral, economic or political sense). Intended policies may aim at reducing the crisis impact, solving the crisis as such or preventing its reoccurrence. However, because Germany lacks the necessary organisation and vision/far-sightedness its policies are ineffective or unsuccessful.

4. Germany needs to be protected from the crisis.

   Germany is perceived as being unable to survive the crisis on its own. Therefore it needs the help of others.

5. The German government has no idea what it should do to solve the crisis and needs guidance.

   German policies are uncoordinated because national politicians do not know better. Ireland is perceived as being able to show them the right direction.

Imperialist image:	*For this image five statements are presented. Estimate to what extent the article agrees with each of them on a scale from 1 (strongly disagrees) to 5 (strongly agrees). Should an article express no or a neutral view on the subject, indicate the value 3 (neutral).*

1. The German government discriminates Ireland on purpose to prevent it from having a say in crisis management.

   Due to Germany's high power (e.g. economic prosperity, political influence), it aims at gagging the Irish government. As a consequence, Ireland might not be able to express its view bilaterally or in EU institutions.

2. To be successful in the EU you have to have good relations with the German government.

   Germany seemingly controls EU institutions. It apparently has European politics in the palm of its hands.

3. The German government is arrogant and convinced it is superior to other countries/governments.

   Germany claims a leading role which is in some way naturally given as other countries are considered inferior (politically, economically and/or socially).

4. Germany uses Ireland as a scapegoat for crisis evolution and employs radical policies for its own profits.

   Ireland is seen as being one of the reasons for the crisis and/or responsible for its financial, economic etc. bad performance. Therefore, the German government seeks policies that set Ireland straight.

5. German politicians use coercion to impose desired policies.

   To ensure that Ireland follows German policies, Germany conditions its help, policies etc. Disobedience by Ireland will be sanctioned.

Importance of Articles	*Indicate the importance of the article by assigning a value from 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very important) to it, depending on the number of arguments mentioned in the article. Arguments are hereby understood as statements in the article that the coders considered when signing values to the images above. Thus, they incited coders to judge the opinion of the articles. Should the article contain no arguments at all, assign a missing value (9).*

1. very unimportant

   article does neither contain explicit not implicit arguments

2. unimportant

   article does not contain explicit arguments, but 1 implicit argument

3. neutral

   article does not contain explicit, but various implicit argument

4. important

   article does not contain implicit arguments, but 1 explicit argument

5. very important

   article contains more than 1 explicit and implicit arguments

Genre:	*Indicate whether the article at hand is informational (1) or commentary (2) in nature by assigning the appropriate value.*

1. informational coverage

   news, report; feature, portray, interview, reportage (in the latter four facts may be added with impressions of the setting, but DO NOT reveal any opinion or judgement), factual writing that is objective

2. commentary coverage

leading article, comment, review/critique, ironic commentary, column (opinion piece of usually one well-known author), essay, letter to the editor

Contrary to informational styles of news coverage, the expression of the author's/authors' opinion is typical of commentary styles. They consist of remarks of the author on certain events, texts, etc. They are written one-sidedly or in a fashion that compares pros and cons of a subject. They do not have to entail the opinion of only one person (e.g. the author), but can also express the views of more people (e.g. the whole editorial department). Additionally, an article that falls into this category does not have to commit itself to one clear position.

Table 3: List of Irish Actors

Possible Irish actors:	*This is not an exclusive list. Please consider this list a help with certain specific Irish terms that you may not be familiar with.*
AIB	Allied Irish Banks
Attorney General	Máire Whelan, advisor of Irish government, unofficial member of the government
Bruton, Richard	Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation
Burton, Joan	Minister for Social Protection
Chief Whip	see Government Chief Whip
Conveney, Simon	Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine
Creighton, Lucinda	Minister for European Affairs
Dáil Éireann	lower house of the Irish parliament
Deenihan, Jimmy	Minister for Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht
Fianna Fáil	Irish party
Fine Gael	Irish party
Fitzgerald, Frances	Minister for Children and Youth Affairs
Gilmore, Eamon	Tánaiste, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade
Government Chief Whip	Paul Kehoe, the most senior Minister of State to attend government meetings
Higgins, Michael D.	President of Ireland
Hogan, Phil	Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government
Howlin, Brendan	Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform
Kehoe, Paul	Government Chief Whip
Kenny, Enda	Taoiseach
Minister of State for Housing and Planning	Jan O'Sullivan, assists ministers
NTMA	National Treasury Management Agency
Noonan, Michael	Minister for Finance
Oireachtas/Oireachtas Éireann	Irish parliament; consists of president of Ireland, Seanad and Dáil Éireann
O'Sullivan, Jan	Minister for State for Housing and Planning
Quinn, Ruairi	Minister for Education and Skills
Rabbitte, Pat	Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources
Reilly, James	Minister for Health
Seanad Éireann	upper house of the Irish parliament
Shatter, Alan	Minister for Justice and Equality, Minister for Defence
Sinn Féin	Irish party
Tánaiste	Eamon Gilmore, Deputy Prime Minister
Taoiseach	Enda Kenny, Head of Government, Prime Minister
Varadkar, Leo	Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport
Whelan, Máire	Attorney General

Table 4: Krippendorff's Alpha of Pilot Study

image	Krippendorff's α	N (units*coders)
ally		
statement 1	0.159	10
statement 2	0.2	10
statement 3	-0.117	10
statement 4	0.2	10
statement 5	0.293	10
average	0.304	50
enemy		
statement 1	0.0	10
statement 2	-0.056	10
statement 3	0.12	10
statement 4	0.317	10
statement 5	-0.076	10
average	0.079	50
barbarian		
statement 1	0.0	10
statement 2	*[20]	10
statement 3	-0.044	10
statement 4	0.0	10
statement 5	0.0	10
average	-0.0	50
dependent		
statement 1	0.0	10
statement 2	0.0	10
statement 3	0.0	10
statement 4	-0.247	10
statement 5	-0.08	10
average	0.131	50
imperialist		
statement 1	0.863	10
statement 2	0.04	10
statement 3	0.889	10
statement 4	*	10
statement 5	-0.056	10
average	0.556	50
importance	0.498	10
genre	0.548	10
∑	0.356	320

(Number of bootstrap samples: 1000)

Table 5: Coding Instructions for Final Coding Scheme

general instructions

Coder ID	Each coder indicates his/her work by assigning his/her coder ID on every coding sheet. The coder ID consists of the capital initials of each coder (e.g.: Larissa Bauschen → LB).
Article ID	Each coder has to fill in the article ID as indicated in the article ID list.

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[20] The input reliability data exhibited no variation. Therefore, KALPHA could not be calculated.

Unit of Analysis	Articles shall be analysed regarding the listed categories. To determine whether an article fits into a category the main impression/majority of arguments of the article is to be considered. When an article presents different views, these differing opinions are not taken into account where they are the minority, seem unimportant compared to the main argumentation. For example an author may list an opposing argument to falsify it or as an interesting introduction. Should however the article be written in a dialectic way, i.e. the equal weighing of pros and cons, the divergent opinions are taken into account. Generally, the impression of the whole article as such is important, not so much each and every sentence.
German government	The following notions will be considered to represent the German government: ministers (e.g. Wolfgang Schäuble), head of government, references to the person Angela Merkel as the embodiment of the government, abstract remarks that represent the German government (e.g. 'Germany's approach in today's Council meeting')
Ireland	The following notions will be considered to represent Ireland: political actors of Ireland (e.g. prime minister, deputy prime minister), national banks and their actors, Central Bank of Ireland, parties, Irish people (e.g. individual who expresses his/her opinion in a letter to the editor), general expressions such as 'the Irish people' or 'the Irish', abstract remarks that represent Ireland (e.g. 'Irish economy came to a halt when the German Constitutional Court announced...')

Ally image:	*For this image five statements are presented. Estimate to what extent the article agrees with each of them by assigning one of the following values: 1 (article does not agree with the statement) to 5 (article completely agrees with the statement). If you feel unable to give an answer and/or the article does not say anything about or hint at a statement, indicate the value 9 (cannot say).*

1. Irish/German people/government value cooperative solutions to crisis-related problems.

   The Irish and German government/people work together to solve the crisis. This category also contains the willingness of the German government to be helpful and do as the Ireland and/or other countries ask. Crisis-related problems may be debt deficits, constraints in financial and monetary policies, economic recession etc.

2. German politicians are good leaders who have the best intentions of Ireland at heart.

   The term 'Good leaders' is understood in an economic, moral, social and political way. Germany may have a role model function and its policies are thought (by Ireland or Germany itself) to have the best possible outcome for Ireland (socially, politically or economically).

3. Most German politicians work hard to overcome the crisis.

   German politicians are ambitious in helping and cooperating with Ireland. They seem to do everything they can to solve the crisis and/or minimise its consequences.

4. The German government acts equally with other governments.

   In international relations the German government is perceived as an equal partner, i.e. it acts and is treated neither inferior nor superior to other EU members.

5. German concerns about the crisis and its management in the EU are legitimate and reasonable.

   Ireland respects German policies and values them and/or their aims. The reasons for such policies are understood whether they have negative or positive consequences for Ireland, the EU or other countries.

Enemy image:	*For this image five statements are presented. Estimate to what extent the article agrees with each of them by assigning one of the following values: 1 (article does not agree with the statement) to 5 (article completely agrees with the statement). If you feel unable to give an answer and/or the article does not say anything about or hint at a statement, indicate the value 9 (cannot say).*

1. The German government cannot be trusted because it knows how to trick people/politicians.

   German politicians use their power and intelligence for tactic purposes. Ireland is the plaything in German strategies.

2. The German government says it wants to overcome the crisis and debt problems, but it does not really mean

it.

German political actions and the statements of the German government/ promised aims are perceived as contradicting.

3. Germany takes as much as much as it can get away with at the disadvantage of other EU members.

   The German government ignores wishes and circumstantial constraints of other governments when pursuing its aims.

4. Germany is at an advantage because it has leaders in the highest positions of EU institutions.

   EU institutions are perceived as being in the hands of or mainly led by Germans, which puts the German government at an unfair advantage.

5. The German government has hostile intentions towards Ireland.

   Malevolence marks German political actions. The German government wishes for a decrease in the political, economic and/or social performance of Ireland.

Barbarian image:	*For this image five statements are presented. Estimate to what extent the article agrees with each of them by assigning one of the following values: 1 (article does not agree with the statement) to 5 (article completely agrees with the statement). If you feel unable to give an answer and/or the article does not say anything about or hint at a statement, indicate the value 9 (cannot say).*

1. The majority of German politicians in the government are uncontrollable and act irrationally.

   Tactics or strategic action cannot be identified in German politics. Rather German policies are unpredictable which makes them potentially harmful.

2. The German government generally enjoys intimidating other EU members.

   The general attitude of the German government is to frighten or threaten other EU members so that they are likely to do what the German government wants. This makes other countries feel less confident.

3. Germany has been trying to get ahead economically/politically in an illegal, treacherous way rather than by earning it.

   The German government does not trick other states, but ignores any conventions and treaties. Also a breach of moral behaviour may be coded in this category.

4. German politicians would rather use violence than cooperation when solving conflicts.

   When the slightest conflict (seemingly) occurs, the German government reacts with behaviour that is intended to hurt the Irish people.

5. The German government has no respect for the Irish culture.

   The specific conditions in Ireland (e.g. culture, society, economic structure, history) are ignored and/or dealt ill with.

Dependent image:	*For this image five statements are presented. Estimate to what extent the article agrees with each of them by assigning one of the following values: 1 (article does not agree with the statement) to 5 (article completely agrees with the statement). If you feel unable to give an answer and/or the article does not say anything about or hint at a statement, indicate the value 9 (cannot say).*

1. The German government wants to do better, but lacks resources and does not know how to solve the crisis.

   Know-how and resources the Irish have are absent in Germany. That is why, despite their efforts, German politicians are unfit to solve the crisis.

2. Most politicians of the German government are okay, but a few bad apples make the whole government look bad.

   The German government is treated as if it was lower in (economic, social, political, cultural) status. However, Ireland recognises German efforts and is able to differentiate between different politicians, i.e. that it knows that negative actions may not represent the whole government but the minority. As a result, pity or regret may appear. Note that in this statement the differentiated Irish view is not shared by (most of) other

countries, of which Ireland is aware ('the whole government look[s] bad').

3. German politicians mean well, but they need help to adopt effective policies.

    The German government has good intentions (e.g. in a moral, economic or political sense). Intended policies may aim at reducing the crisis impact, solving the crisis as such or preventing its reoccurrence. However, because Germany lacks the necessary organisation and vision/far-sightedness its policies are ineffective or unsuccessful.

4. Germany needs to be protected from the crisis.

    Germany is perceived as being unable to survive the crisis on its own. Therefore it needs the help of others.

5. The German government has no idea what it should do to solve the crisis and needs guidance.

    German policies are uncoordinated because national politicians do not know better. Ireland is perceived as being able to show them the right direction.

1. The German government discriminates Ireland on purpose to prevent it from having a say in crisis management.

    Due to Germany's high power (e.g. economic prosperity, political influence), it aims at gagging the Irish government. As a consequence, Ireland might not be able to express its view bilaterally or in EU institutions.

2. To be successful in the EU you have to have good relations with the German government.

    Germany seemingly controls EU institutions. It apparently has European politics in the palm of its hands.

3. The German government is arrogant and convinced it is superior to other countries/governments.

    Germany claims a leading role which is in some way naturally given as other countries are considered inferior (politically, economically and/or socially).

4. Germany uses Ireland as a scapegoat for crisis evolution and employs radical policies for its own profits.

    Ireland is seen as being one of the reasons for the crisis and/or responsible for its financial, economic etc. bad performance. Therefore, the German government seeks policies that set Ireland straight.

5. German politicians use coercion to impose desired policies.

    To ensure that Ireland follows German policies, Germany conditions its help, policies etc. Disobedience by Ireland will be sanctioned.

1   informational coverage

news, report; feature, portray, interview, reportage (in the latter four facts may be added with impressions of the setting, but DO NOT reveal any opinion or judgement), factual writing that is objective

The author does not express his /her feelings on the subject at all. Opinions are only stated as facts with direct or indirect quotes.

2   commentary coverage

leading article, comment, review/critique, ironic commentary, column (opinion piece of usually one well-known author), essay, letter to the editor

Contrary to informational styles of news coverage, the expression of the author's/authors' opinion is typical

of commentary styles. They consist of remarks of the author on certain events, texts, etc. They are written one-sidedly or in a fashion that compares pros and cons of a subject. They do not have to entail the opinion of only one person (e.g. the author), but can also express the views of more people (e.g. the whole editorial department). Additionally, an article that falls into this category does not have to commit itself to one clear position.

9   unable to determine

Table 6: Krippendorff's Alpha of Final Test

image	Krippendorff's α	N (units*coders)
ally		
statement 1	0.835	10
statement 2	0.762	10
statement 3	0.255	10
statement 4	0.323	10
statement 5	0.767	10
average	0.606	50
enemy		
statement 1	0.688	10
statement 2	0.3	10
statement 3	0.025	10
statement 4	*[21]	10
statement 5	0.727	10
average	0.315	50
barbarian		
statement 1	0.546	10
statement 2	0.3	10
statement 3	-0.342	10
statement 4	0.167	10
statement 5	*	10
average	0.134	50
dependent		
statement 1	0.25	10
statement 2	*	10
statement 3	0.138	10
statement 4	0.156	10
statement 5	0.109	10
average	0.355	50
imperialist		
statement 1	0.25	10
statement 2	0.792	10
statement 3	0.535	10
statement 4	1.0	10
statement 5	1.0	10
average	0.702	50
genre	1.0	10
Σ	0.376	320

(Number of bootstrap samples: 1000)

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[21] Theiput reliability data exhibited no variation. Therefore, KALPHA could not be calculated.

Table 7: Frequencies

		ally	enemy	imperialist	dependent	barbarian
N	valid	60	56	50	48	49
	missing	40	44	50	52	51

Table 8: Processed Cases

	cases					
	valid		missing		total	
	N	percent	N	percent	N	percent
ally	60	60.0%	40	40.0%	100	100.0%
enemy	100	100.0%	0	0%	100	100.0%
imperialist	100	100.0%	0	0%	100	100.0%
dependent	100	100.0%	0	0%	100	100.0%
barbarian	97	97.0%	3	3.0%	100	100.0%

Table 9: Valid Percents

	ally	enemy	imperialist	dependent	barbarian
p (valid) = 100	22.81	21.29	19.01	18.25	18.63

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics

			statistics	standard error
ally	mean		1.507	0.121
	95% confidence interval for the mean	LL	1.265	
		UL	1.748	
	5% trimmed mean		1.452	
	median		1.400	
	variance		0.875	
	standard deviation		0.936	
	minimum		0.200	
	maximum		4.000	
	range		3.800	
	interquartile range		1.400	
	skewness		0.826	0.309

	kurtosis		0.173	0.608
enemy	mean		0.640	0.079
	95% confidence interval for the mean	LL	0.483	
		UL	0.797	
	5% trimmed mean		0.558	
	median		0.400	
	variance		0.625	
	standard deviation		0.790	
	minimum		0.000	
	maximum		3.600	
	range		3.600	
	interquartile range		1.150	
	skewness		1.344	0.241
	kurtosis		1.682	0.478
imperialist	mean		0.676	0.085
	95% confidence interval for the mean	LL	0.507	
		UL	0.845	
	5% trimmed mean		0.587	
	median		0.200	
	variance		0.723	
	standard deviation		0.850	
	minimum		0.000	
	maximum		3.200	
	range		3.200	
	interquartile range		1.200	
	skewness		1.218	0.241
	kurtosis		0.892	0.478
dependent	mean		0.514	0.066
	95% confidence interval for the mean	LL	0.384	
		UL	0.644	
	5% trimmed mean		0.442	
	median		0.000	
	variance		0.430	
	standard deviation		0.656	
	minimum		0.000	
	maximum		3.000	
	range		3.000	
	interquartile range		1.000	
	skewness		1.408	0.241

	kurtosis		2.530	0.478
barbarian	mean		0.476	0.062
	95% confidence interval for the mean	LL	0.353	
		UL	0.599	
	5% trimmed mean		0.413	
	median		0.200	
	variance		0.373	
	standard deviation		0.611	
	minimum		0.000	
	maximum		3.400	
	range		3.400	
	interquartile range		1.000	
	skewness		1.593	0.245
	kurtosis		4.114	0.485

Table 9: Cronbach's Alpha

	Cronbach's alpha	Cronbach's alpha for standardised items	N (items)
ally	0.860	0.865	5
enemy	0.748	0.796	5
barbarian	0.868	0.863	5
dependent	0.730	0.733	5
imperialist	0.758	0.755	5

Table 10: Item Statistics

	mean	standard deviation	N
ally_1	2.476	1.167	21
ally_2	1.905	0.944	21
ally_3	2.238	1.044	21
ally_4	2.000	1.183	21
ally_5	2.048	1.203	21
enemy_1	1.300	0.733	20
enemy_2	1.750	1.164	20
enemy_3	1.950	1.146	20
enemy_4	2.550	1.356	20
enemy_5	1.200	0.523	20
barbarian_1	1.286	0.463	21

barbarian_2	1.286	0.717	21
barbarian_3	1.381	0.805	21
barbarian_4	1.190	0.680	21
barbarian_5	1.333	0,730	21
dependent_1	1.115	0,432	26
dependent_2	1.308	0.679	26
dependent_3	1.385	1.098	26
dependent_4	1.308	0.884	26
dependent_5	1.423	0.856	26
imperialistic_1	1.280	0.678	25
imperialistic_2	2.680	1.435	25
imperialistic_3	2.240	1.363	25
imperialistic_4	1.240	0.597	25
imperialistic_5	1.400	0.913	25

Table 11: Scale Statistics

Allly image

	mean of scale, if item deleted	variance of scale, if item deleted	corrected item-scale-correlation	square multiple correlation	Cronbach's alpha, if item deleted
ally_1	8.190	13.462	0.585	0.465	0.855
ally_2	8.762	13.890	0.718	0.709	0.825
ally_3	8.429	12.857	0.786	0.777	0.804
ally_4	8.667	12.733	0.675	0.646	0.832
ally_5	8.619	12.748	0.656	0.491	0.837

Enemy Image

	mean of scale, if item deleted	variance of scale, if item deleted	corrected item-scale-correlation	square multiple correlation	Cronbach's alpha, if item deleted
enemy_1	7.450	9.629	0.678	0.652	0.671
enemy_2	7.000	9.263	0.371	0.420	0.763
enemy_3	6.800	7.326	0.743	0.644	0.604
enemy_4	6.200	7.747	0.485	0.516	0.735
enemy_5	7.550	11.103	0.537	0.633	0.728

Barbarian Image

	mean of scale, if item deleted	variance of scale, if item deleted	corrected item-scale-correlation	square multiple correlation	Cronbach's alpha, if item deleted
barbarian_1	5.190	6.562	0.416	0.238	0.895
barbarian_2	5.190	4.862	0.754	0.664	0.824
barbarian_3	5.095	4.490	0.769	0.632	0.821
barbarian_4	5.286	4.814	0.833	0.778	0.804
barbarian_5	5.143	4.929	0.709	0.529	0.836

Dependent Image

	mean of scale, if item deleted	variance of scale, if item deleted	corrected item-scale-correlation	square multiple correlation	Cronbach's alpha, if item deleted
dependent_1	5.423	6.574	0.605	0.707	0.688
dependent_2	5.231	6.985	0.182	0.480	0.778
dependent_3	5.154	3.495	0.827	0.921	0.508
dependent_4	5.231	4.345	0.807	0.909	0.539
dependent_5	5.115	6.266	0.256	0.426	0.773

Imperialist Image

	mean of scale, if item deleted	variance of scale, if item deleted	corrected item-scale-correlation	square multiple correlation	Cronbach's alpha, if item deleted
imperialistic_1	7.560	11.090	0.573	0.576	0.719
imperialistic_2	6.160	6.723	0.720	0.632	0.638
imperialistic_3	6.600	7.167	0.701	0.682	0.643
imperialistic_4	7.600	12.750	0.242	0.139	0.788
imperialistic_5	7.440	10.257	0.522	0.483	0.718

Table 12: Frequencies of Different Newspapers

	ally	enemy	imperialist	dependent	barbarian
Irish Independent (100%)	22.11%	19.59%	19.59%	18.56%	20.62%
The Irish Times (100%)	23.64%	21.82%	18.79%	18.18%	17.58%

Table 13: Mean Scores and Confidence Intervals of the Newspapers

N valid		ally	enemy	imperialist	dependent	barbarian
Irish Independent	M	1.524	1.474	1.621	1.078	1.020
	CI	[1.122,1.925]	[1.149, 1.799]	[1.252, 1.990]	[1.000, 1.156]	[0.817, 1.224]
The Irish Times	M	1.497	0.989	0. 890	1.067	0.890
	CI	[1.182, 1.813]	[0.746, 1.232]	[0.946, 1.430]	[0.657, 1.122]	[0.657, 1.122]

Table 14: Detailed Descriptive Analysis of the Newspapers

Irish Independent

		ally	enemy	barbarian	imperialist	dependent	valid values (listwise)
N		21	19	20	19	18	18
range		3.800	2.800	1.600	2.600	0.600	
	minimum	0.200	0.400	0.200	0.600	0.800	
	maximum	4.000	3,20	1,80	3,20	1,40	
mean	statistics	1.524	1.474	1.020	1.621	1.078	
	standard error	0.192	0.155	0.097	0.176	0.037	
SD		0.882	0.674	0.435	0.766	0.156	
variance		0.778	0.454	0.189	0.586	0.024	
skewness	statistics	0.874	0.899	0.234	0.793	0.838	
	standard error	0.501	0.524	0.512	0.524	0.536	
kurtosis	statistics	1.719	0.935	0.290	-0.632	0.517	
	standard error	0.972	1.014	0.992	1.014	1.038	

The Irish Times

		ally	enemy	barbarian	imperialist	dependent	valid values (listwise)
N		39	36	29	30	31	24
range		3.600	3.400	3,20	2,80	2,80	
	minimum	0.200	0.200	1.000	0.200	0.400	
	maximum	3.800	3.600	3.400	3.000	3.200	
mean	statistics	1.497	0.989	0.890	1.067	1.187	
	standard error	0.156	0.120	0.113	0.125	0.119	
SD		0.974	0.717	0.611	0.683	0.661	
variance		0.949	0.514	0. 373	0.467	0.437	

skewness	statistics	0.838	1.616	2.506	1.633	1.499	
	standard error	0.378	0.393	0.434	0.427	0.421	
kurtosis	statistics	-0.194	3.786	9.694	2.831	3.018	
	standard error	0.741	0.768	0.845	0.833	0.821	

Table 15: List of Sampled Articles

Irish Independent

ii001   Keenan, B. (2013, May 16). Ingrained inertia will kill off any attempt at meaningful reform [Business]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 4. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii009   Evans-Pritchard, A. (2013, April 16). Germans eye wealth tax to bail out the Pigs [Sport]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 33. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii021   Kelpie, C. (2013, April 5). Draghi signals support for debt deal after push by IMF [News]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 3. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii023   Brennan, M., & O'Donovan, D. (2013, April 4). IMF's grim warning on recovery is aimed at EU hawks; 10 more years of austerity predicted? Extra judges for repossession cases; IMF's grim warnings aimed at EU hawks [News, Front Page]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 1, 4. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii040   Flanagan, P. (2013, March 16). Markets retreat as EU leaders strive to ignite growth [Business]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 34. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii044   Kelpie, C. (2013, March 12). Irish markets buck downward trend; MARKETS [Business]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 32. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii059   O'Donovan, D. (2013, February 19). How to separate financial fact from fiction [News]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 27. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii068   Keenan, B. (2013, January 26). As optimism slowly returns, is it time to invest in Ireland Inc?; If foreign money is correct, there's a wealth of bargains to be had in the post-bust economy, but the average investor should continue with an air of caution, writes Economics Editor Brendan Keenan [Business]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 38, 39. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii072   Flanagan, P. (2013, January 18). Irish growth will be only 1pc this year, says Merrill [Business]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 36. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii088   Donohoe, M. (2013, January 1). Forget the doom and gloom - we still have lots to be cheerful about; 2013 will be a great year [News]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 22. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii100   Kinsella, S. (2012, December 11) Promissory notes deal should be on everyone's Christmas list [News]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 31. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii102   O'Donovan, D. (2012, December 12) Noonan clings to hope that ECB will still cut deal on Anglo debt; No 'monetary financing' to ease (EURO) 30bn burden – Draghi [Business]. *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.), p. 38. Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii108   Investors pile in as Irish bonds are the hottest ticket in town [Business, Irish Business]. (2012, November 12). *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.). Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii109   Weidmanm insists EU regulator won't help cut Irish debt [Business, European Business]. (2012, November 20). *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.). Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.

ii114	Bad decisions [Letters]. (2012, November 12). *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.). Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.
ii136	Kenny and Merkel muddy the waters rather than clear them [Analysis]. (2012, October 22). *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.). Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.
ii152	Taoiseach gains ground on deal for bank bailout [Business, European Business]. (2012, October 4). *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.). Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.
ii165	EU bourses nervous ahead of Fed [Business]. (2012, September 4). *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.). Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.
ii173	Ireland to miss troika targets by two years as pace of growth stalls [Business, Irish Business]. (2012, September 13). *Irish Independent* (ed. 3, national ed.). Retrieved June 15, 2013, from http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/search/homesubmitForm.do.
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