




MASTER THESIS

**THE ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER**

Municipal cooperation for effective social sector  
policy implementation

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**nautus**  
Adviseren  
Implementeren

*“The strength of the team is each individual member.  
The strength of each member is the team.”*

*-Phil Jackson (former American basketball player and coach)*

## Summary

The Dutch governmental structure is currently subject to many changes. The central government decided to start decentralizing tasks to the local (municipal) level to realize budget cuts and to improve service provision. Among these decentralizations, the Participatiewet is one that draws a lot of attention.<sup>1</sup> Starting from 2015, Dutch municipalities will gain many additional tasks while being confronted with budget cuts at the same time. Many municipalities use cooperation as a means to bear the burden together. This research assesses cooperation for implementing the Wet Werk en Bijstand (2004) to make predictions for future cooperation initiatives in the social domain.

This study aims to provide small municipalities with insights in how to increase effectiveness when cooperating in the public social domain. Theory points out that there are three main forms of network governance that can be opted for: participant governed networks, lead organization governed networks and network administrative organization governed networks. Combinations of scores on four criteria ('contingencies') are related to the effectiveness of these forms. These contingencies are trust, number of participants, goal consensus and need for network-level competencies. Theoretically, when a form is chosen that corresponds to a certain combination of scores, network-level effectiveness will be higher than when a mismatching form is chosen.

## Findings

Analysis of the current data has shown that the assumed relationships between contingency scores, their corresponding governance forms and total network-level effectiveness are not statistically significant. The tested theory is thus falsified on the basis of these data: network-level effectiveness is not significantly higher when network forms are chosen that correspond to the surrounding conditions. On the other hand, data do show that total network effectiveness tends to be higher when the conditions are relatively easy than when these are difficult, as was expected.

Further assessment of the data with a simplified version of the theory indicated that centralized governance forms are chosen more often than shared network forms, even when contingency scores indicate easy conditions. This contradicts the theory, which predicted that shared network forms are more likely to be chosen under easy conditions, whilst centralized networks are more likely to be chosen under difficult conditions. A possible explanation –extracted from the qualitative data- might be that actor size inequality increases the choice for centralized forms, for larger actors tend to have more power than their smaller counterparts and become lead organizations. Though, this fifth contingency is not included in the tested model and should be subjected to future research.

## Recommendations

This study has shown no significant differences between effectiveness of shared and more centralized governed networks. Thus, small municipalities are advised to pick the form that best suits their needs. For settings with high autonomy requirements this could be a participant-governed network, while for settings with high dependency on other actors, lead organization-governed networks or network administrative organization-governed networks are advised. To counter imbalance in centralized networks, the network administrative organization-model might provide a solution to enhance balance within the network and protect the needs of the smaller participants. An ex-ante determination of the contingency scores can help with determining the cooperation strategy. Results have shown that effectiveness for small municipalities under easy conditions is higher than under difficult conditions. Hence, when contingency scores indicate a 'difficult' environment, it might be useful to try to alter these surrounding factors before starting the cooperation. This can, for instance, be done by increasing goal consensus by preliminary determining strategies, decreasing the number of actors involved or increasing inter-actor trust. Theoretical recommendations stress the inclusion of a fifth critical contingency, actor size equality, in the model.

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<sup>1</sup> The Participatiewet is a slightly altered version of the previously announced 'Wet Werken naar Vermogen'.

## Preface

This report covers the research that I have conducted as the final part of the public administration master track 'policy & governance' at the University of Twente, the Netherlands.

The question that is at the core of this research is how new forms of (municipal) cooperation can be designed effectively. After reading this thesis, the reader will have learned the nature of the Participatiewet, the different cooperation forms that are distinguished in scientific literature, the way that municipalities have cooperated for implementing similar social decentralizations, and under which circumstances certain cooperative networks are most effective.

During the time of finishing this report (and while being employed at the sector 'health and wellbeing' of the province North Holland), I observed that many municipalities started to initiate formal and informal cooperation forms to address the current decentralizations. Even though this research focuses on the Participatiewet, two other acts are also rapidly approaching Dutch municipalities: the Jeugdzorg and the AWBZ. Being a mid-level governmental institution, the province supports regional cooperation by connecting municipalities to each other through subsidized social sector projects. Despite these efforts, it has become common knowledge that many Dutch municipalities will not be ready in time to cope with these huge challenges.

An interesting observation is that many national organizations have started to actively encourage the formation of inter-municipal networks. For instance, Platform 31 has published a manifest for municipalities that helps with deciding how to behave when starting regional cooperation.<sup>2</sup> The national government in its turn has formally requested municipalities to appoint regional cooperation partners for all three decentralizations before May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2013. This request has made cooperation not only an option, but even an obligation. Many of the current initiatives request municipalities to act '*good-hearted*' and to support each other when (financial) problems arise.<sup>3</sup> Though this call for social behavior is made regularly, it is yet to be seen how municipalities will act when facing financial deficits themselves.

Obviously, I could not have finished this research without the help of many others. I was lucky to have Peter Verduin and my other colleagues at Nautus to pitch my ideas. Their continuous feedback and comments have been highly valuable and significantly improved the quality of my work. I also wish to thank my supervisors of the faculty 'management and governance' of the University of Twente, Prof. Dr. Ariana Need and Dr. Pieter-Jan Klok. Their fast and constructive feedback and cogitations have helped me greatly in writing the report in a structured manner, and have tested (and improved) my analytical skills whilst writing this research.

A special word of thanks goes out to my parents: their support for, and confidence in, all the decisions that I made during my time as a student was invaluable. Furthermore, I would like to thank my girlfriend Annelies (for her mental support and reflections) and my colleagues Nanou and Jolijn (for their ongoing efforts to make me finish this thesis in time).

Jelle Postma, BSc.

Haarlem, August 20<sup>th</sup>, 2013.

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<sup>2</sup> Platform 31 is an independent national innovation and knowledge institute that focuses on municipal and regional development in the Netherlands.

<sup>3</sup> One of the leading documents that is currently utilized by municipalities is the '*handreiking regionale samenwerking voor gemeenten*', by Platform 31 ([www.platform31.nl](http://www.platform31.nl)).

**Index**

- Summary ..... 3
  - Findings ..... 3
  - Recommendations ..... 3
- Preface..... 4
- 1 Introduction..... 7
  - 1.1 Research Questions ..... 9
  - 1.2 Research framework ..... 10
  - 1.3 Research Relevance..... 10
  - 1.4 Host Organization..... 11
- 2 Theoretical Framework ..... 12
  - 2.1 Market, Hierarchy and Network Forms of Organization ..... 12
  - 2.2 The Network Perspective ..... 15
  - 2.3 Forms of Network Governance ..... 16
  - 2.4 Effectiveness in Network Governance ..... 18
  - 2.5 Network Effectiveness Evaluation..... 20
  - 2.6 Conclusion ..... 23
- 3 Exploration of Current Social Sector Developments ..... 25
  - 3.1 History ..... 25
  - 3.2 Policy Contents..... 26
  - 3.3 Policy Influence ..... 27
  - 3.4 Implications for Municipalities ..... 28
  - 3.5 Exploration of the Current Social Sector Developments: Conclusion ..... 29
- 4 Comparable Legislation ..... 31
  - 4.1 Wet Werk and Bijstand ..... 31
  - 4.2 Similarities and Differences..... 31
  - 4.3 Conclusion ..... 34
- 5 Methodological Framework ..... 35
  - 5.1 Strategy and Framework ..... 35
  - 5.2 Design deliberations and choice ..... 35
  - 5.3 Case Selection..... 37
  - 5.4 Research Design ..... 38

6	Data and Analysis .....	41
6.1	Data Gathering and Data Characteristics .....	41
6.2	Data processing .....	43
6.3	Analysis.....	45
6.4	Additional Testing With Simplified Theory.....	49
6.4	Conclusions.....	52
7	Conclusions.....	53
7.1	Results .....	53
7.2	Recommendations.....	54
7.3	Study Assessment.....	55
	Literature References .....	57
	Reflection .....	61
	Learning Criteria .....	61
	Personal Learning Objectives and Goals .....	62
	Evaluation of goal attainment.....	63
	Appendix 1: Empirical Data – Expert Meeting .....	65
	Appendix 2: Empirical Data – Expert Interviews .....	67
	2.1 Interview Transcription Luuk Seegers (respondent 1) .....	68
	2.2 Interview Transcription Joost Cornielje (respondent 2).....	72
	Appendix 3: Mailing and Survey.....	76
	Survey: Onderzoek Sociale Samenwerking .....	77
	Appendix 4: Concepts and Values .....	84
	Conceptualization and Operationalization.....	84
	Appendix 5: SPSS Data Output .....	87

## 1 Introduction

In current Dutch society, assets as good housing, food, clothing, health care and education are in principle available for all 17 million citizens. The role of the Dutch state that has been developed during the 20<sup>th</sup> century is one of a 'welfare state': the state accounts for the basic needs of its citizens, especially when the citizens cannot account for their own welfare themselves. Since the 1970's, the discussion concerning the exact design of the Dutch state and the role of the government increased, leading to numerous (often incremental) policy adaptations that often increased the tasks and responsibilities of the state. The welfare state is dealing with numerous new challenges since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, just over a decade ago. A new international order, increasingly individualistic citizens as well as economical demise require rigorous adaptations in order to create a state-society relationship that is adapted to these conditions. This new state approach relates to a shift from the traditional welfare state that focused on caring for its citizens, towards a new focus: the modern society requests an increase in *citizen participation* as one of the core values (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2006, pp. 10-13).

A historical analysis of the development of the Dutch welfare state by the WRR (2006, pp. 11-12) shows that there are four basic functions of the state: *caring* (support physical or cognitive limited individuals), *insuring* (citizens are insured for certain forms of income loss), *raising* (current focus on aging of the population) and *connecting* (striving for a society with interconnected citizens). These four values and related policy instruments are constantly changing under pressure of societal changes. Especially the globalization process that started in the 1980's caused a large paradigm shift for the Dutch state. In a political sense the Netherlands became increasingly semi-sovereign, mainly due to EU processes (p. 11). Other factors of influence that are described by the WRR (2006) are national demographic changes (aging of the population) and economic trends (the financial requires cost-cutting over the whole line). Especially insuring, connecting and caring are three factors that are currently addressed in Dutch domestic politics. The connecting character is changing with increasing societal heterogeneity and individualization. Insuring is affected by the financial crisis: in times where job availability decreases and governmental expenditures rise, the state can no longer provide extensive financial insurance (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2006, pp. 11-13).

This change in paradigm affects the Dutch governmental structure. On the one hand there are more external (international) obligations and on the other there is an internal redistribution of power from central government towards local authorities and individuals. This is clearly reflected in the social security sector where politicians propose budget cuts, increase (re-)integration support for unemployed individuals and reform social security policies to make a better fit with this changing paradigm. This research focuses on proposed new policy that corresponds with the previously described 21<sup>st</sup> century-phenomena. This policy that is stressed in this research is called '*Wet Werken naar Vermogen*' (WWnV) and aims to fundamentally change how and by whom the majority of social security services are provided in the Netherlands.

During the conduction of this research, the Dutch cabinet fell, and the WWnV was declared to be controversial. The new VVD-PvdA cabinet included an altered version of the WWnV in their coalition agreement, called the *Participatiewet*. Though there are some differences in terms of contents, the nature of both proposed policies is similar. They focus on (1) integrating social security policies, (2) decentralizing social security-responsibilities from the national government towards municipalities and (3) increasing individual responsibilities of citizens concerning these social security services. The municipal policy discretion (the extent to which municipalities can design and execute policies themselves) increases on the one hand, while a financial stimulus is included to set boundaries to this freedom on the other. Other decentralizations that are currently taking place are those of the *Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning* (WMO) and *Jeugdzorg* (youth care). This research focuses on the participation-related legislation.

Problems that rise with these policies are mainly implementation issues. First of all, municipalities receive new instruments that can be used for re-integration processes. These are a new 'centralized' approach towards employers and a new instrument called 'salary dispensation' that enables employers to pay less than the legal minimum income. Second, the population that needs to be addressed by Dutch municipalities increases: individuals that received entitlements from national social policy (i.e. WIJ and Wajong) will become a municipal responsibility. Third, the budgets change. Total budgets for participation decrease and former budgets become bundled. This requires municipalities to make choices concerning the way that the new bundled budgets are distributed. Last, with more municipal freedom come more responsibilities and financial risks. In case budgets are exceeded, no additional means will be made available by the central government.

The above mentioned points illustrate that municipalities are required to make multiple important choices concerning the design and execution of their (new) social responsibilities. Many municipalities share the thought that cooperation between institutions that fulfill different parts of the re-integration process is required for a good implementation. Also, inter-municipal cooperation might help with sharing resources and experiences. However, is cooperation a good means for implementing this complicated new policy? How does cooperation relate to the individual financial risks? And what are the most important factors that determine successful cooperation? For answering these and other questions, a similar previous policy implementation issue, the Wet Werk and Bijstand, is evaluated.

### **Research Framework**

After having briefly elaborated upon the reasons behind *why* this research is conducted, this section addresses *how* this is done. It contains the research framework: the delimitations, contents and domain of the research. It starts with discussing the different 'levels' of concepts and questions that combined form the research structure (Punch, 2006, pp. 20-23). This structure defines what is exactly to be investigated in this research project. The first levels of concepts are described underneath: the research area, topic, focus and aim.

### **Research Area and Topic**

The area of this research is '*policy implementation*'. The research focuses on a specific situation (the implementation of the Participatiewet, or, in general, cooperation initiatives in the social domain), a specific approach (implementation strategies that are used by municipalities) and a specific timeframe (from 2015 onwards), the research topic is defined to clarify more specific aspects of the broad area of policy implementation. Thus, the research topic is described as: '*effective implementation strategies for future social policy implementation by Dutch municipalities from 2015 onwards.*' The core problem definition that follows from this topic is '*Dutch municipalities do not know which cooperation strategies are appropriate to use for effective conduction of decentralized social tasks.*'

### **Research Focus and Aim**

Focus and aim are used for determining boundaries of the research as well as framing the research domain. Discussions with social security experts concerning the possibility of applying results of previous similar policy implementations on the case showed the Wet Werk & Bijstand (WWB) as most closely resembling the current initiatives.

The act has similar (mandatory) financial incentives and focuses largely on the same population (municipalities in charge of social service provision). The policy core is identical: expensive entitlements are transformed into cheaper ones, and both municipalities and individuals receive additional responsibilities. After comparing these policies, identification of delimitations of the research field is the next step. Although the current initiatives affects *all* Dutch municipalities, this



research focuses its selection on small municipalities, conceptualized as ‘municipalities with less than 50.000 inhabitants’ (SGBO Benchmarking, 2010, p. 6). This delimitation is chosen for two reasons.

First, small municipalities are assumed to lack sufficient in-house knowledge and/or financial means to individually implement extensive policy changes in the social domain. Municipal cooperation leads per definition to shared resources. This resource interdependency creates a situation in which municipalities are likely to opt for cooperation with other municipalities in order to consummate resource shortages. A benchmark analysis shows that small municipalities have been financially affected by (the assumed to be partly similar) WWB social policy changes to a larger extent than medium and large municipalities (SGBO Benchmarking, 2010). The Participatiewet is thus likely to have a significant (financial) impact on municipalities, with small municipalities in particular.

Second, small municipalities form a vast majority of the Dutch municipal landscape, making the results of this research more widely applicable when focusing on small municipalities, than when focusing on medium-sized or large ones. According to the most recent report of Decentraal Bestuur on municipal macro-characteristics, small municipalities add up to 83% of all Dutch municipalities: 361 out of the total of 430 municipalities match the definition of a ‘small municipality’ (2012, p. 4).

Concluding, the research aim is: *“To provide small-sized Dutch municipalities with an evidence-based research on public-sector cooperation strategies that can be used for effective implementation of current social decentralizations initiatives.”*

## **1.1 Research Questions**

The next step in the process of the development of the research framework is the creation of a set of research questions that are used to guide this research.

### **General Research Question**

When integrating the previously discussed research topic, problem and aim into an applied general research question, this general research question is defined as following:

**General Research Question:** *“What lessons can be learned by small municipalities from experiences with the Wet Werk and Bijstand when aiming to effectively implement decentralized social policy by means of cooperation initiatives?”*

### **Specific Research Questions**

After having determined the general research question, it is subdivided into specific research questions. These specific questions each investigate a delimited aspect of the general research question. By means of accumulating and integrating all of these specific answers, the general research question is answered in the final stage of this research.

The first aspect that requires attention is the theoretical background that is used for testing. This theory is used to create a deliberated and consistent system to approach the WWB and current initiatives. Scientific literature on network governance is introduced that helps with analyzing public sector cooperation. The theoretical exploration starts with discussing network governance strategies and critical contingencies. Afterwards, the concept ‘effectiveness’, is operationalized and a coherent framework is developed. This framework is later used for application to (and analysis of) the observed data. **Specific Research Question 1:** *“(a) which forms of organizational cooperation are distinguished in scientific literature, (b) which of these forms are applicable to the WWB case, (c) which conditions influence actor choices for certain governance forms, and (d) when are these forms effective?”*

The second specific research question explores the main aspects of the case that are used to later apply the framework to. This descriptive research question starts with observing policy documents

concerning the history and main aspects of the WWnV and the Participatiewet. Then, current legislation that affects the same social security policy field is introduced and elaborated upon. Afterwards, the influence of the decentralizations on the status quo of the social security field is discussed. **Specific Research Question 2:** *“What are the history, goals and content of the Participatiewet, and how do they affect both the Dutch citizens and the municipal tasks and responsibilities?”*

Third, the WWB (2004) is introduced as a reference policy, due to its focus (providing financial compensation for people with no job and supporting labor integration), affected actors (unemployed individuals), incentives (monetary) and affected bodies (compulsory implementation by municipalities). A comparison is made between the current initiatives and the WWB in terms of similarities and differences concerning critical contingencies, policy contents and implementation incentives. Thus, this specific research question aims to find a basis that can be used to extrapolate the WWB implementation results to future cases. **Specific Research Question 3:** *“To what extent are the contents of the WWB (2004) similar to the contents of the current participation-related decentralizations, what are the similarities and differences concerning coordination and organization for municipalities and to what extent are the municipal contingencies for both policies similar?”*

The fourth and final specific research question assesses the empirical component of the research. For obtaining the data, an expert meeting is organized and questionnaires are sent out to small municipalities. This specific research question provides insights that can be used to get an overview of factors that determine cooperation forms and the relationship between the fit of these factors, the chosen form of cooperation and total effectiveness. **Specific Research Question 4:** *“Which influential factors can be identified for choosing a certain network form for the implementation of the WWB from 2004 onwards, and what is the relation between the scores on these factors, the chosen network form and the total effectiveness of the network?”*

## 1.2 Research framework

The framework of this research is designed as following:

The research starts with the development of a theoretical framework. Specific question 1 is answered by means of a literature analysis of network theories, the assessment of relevant conditions for designing cooperation and evaluation criteria for effectiveness. Afterwards, the nature of the proposed policy (the Participatiewet) is elaborated upon and discussed by means of relevant literature to answer specific question 2. Next, the contents of the WWB as comparable policy are introduced and similarities and differences with the current decentralization are discussed. For this comparison, additional information that has been gathered from an expert panel is introduced. The methodological framework design is discussed afterwards, followed by the gathered empirical data and analysis to answer specific question 4. Last, the general research question is answered in the ‘conclusions and recommendations’ section. This report concludes with a list of literature references, a personal reflection of the researcher and appendices with additional information.

## 1.3 Research Relevance

This section addresses the social and scientific relevance of the research. Afterwards, ethical issues are briefly touched upon.

### Social Relevance

With the introduction of the current decentralizations, national expenses on social security services are cut with 1.85 billion Euros during the 2013-2018 timeframe. People who are most affected by these budget cuts are often suffering from mental or physical handicaps, traumatic experiences or related reasons that limit their ability to join the labor market (Landelijke Cliëntenraad, 2011). The aim of this research is to increase effectiveness of the implementation by municipalities. When

implementation is more effective, municipalities are assumed to have a larger ability to serve and support their inhabitants.

In addition, financial responsibilities for municipalities increase. To avoid possible budget shortages, municipalities need to analyze thoroughly how the implementation is executed. By using cooperation strategies, municipalities have the possibility to pool their resources and achieve better results together. The research provides information on which external contextual factors should be taken into account when deciding on strategies to achieve optimal effectiveness and is thus socially relevant for municipalities.

### **Scientific Relevance**

The scientific relevance of this research is two-fold; on the one hand it evaluates the relation between external contexts, cooperation strategies and effectiveness of the WWB implementation and on the other hand it aims to develop a model that helps with predicting effectiveness of policy networks in general. When misfits between data and current theory are discovered, the utilized theory might need to be adjusted.

### **Knowledge-Creation**

Important motives for conducting this research are found in the development of new (and utilization of existing) theories and insights concerning inter-municipal cooperation. No scientific research has been conducted on this particular integration of four social security laws, the related possible municipal cooperation strategies and their respective effectiveness. Therefore, conducting a research on how municipal cooperation can increase implementation effectiveness might prove to be a valuable asset for future cooperation. With this evidence-based research, possible cooperation alternatives for municipalities are easier to define, evaluate and implement.

### **Ethics**

When conducting research in the social security field, one must be aware that certain ethical aspects are to be taken into account, both during and after the research project. Especially a research after social security legislation that affects a vulnerable societal layer inevitably deals with ethics. Not only might the implications of the results have effects for many people; even obtaining empirical data might have an impact on the way that respondents think and act. Furthermore, for the research results might lead to different decision-making by municipalities, the possibility exists that policy-affected citizens are indirectly influenced by the research outcomes. Although this is not a problem that can be tackled, it is useful to take this into account when conducting the research.

## **1.4 Host Organization**

For conducting this research, a host organization with interest in the social security field is found. This host organization, Nautus BV, is a Hengelo (Overijssel)-based consultancy company that focuses its activities on solving problems in the Dutch public social domain. Nautus works in general for (and together with) municipalities and other Dutch local (semi-)governmental institutions and provides these organizations with both advice and implementation support. Specific focus points are solving different kinds of policy issues in the social domain, making deliberated choices related to these issues and afterwards effectively translating these choices into practice.

An important driver for Nautus to become host for this research is related to its clientele. Due Nautus' focus on the social security sector, a research that helps with guiding municipalities through the implementation process might prove to be useful. Transformations in the policy field inevitably lead to requests from municipalities that require usable knowledge on how to determine their implementation strategies. A second driver is knowledge-creation, which is used to improve competitive advantages. By developing new insights and models in-house, Nautus takes a step ahead of the field and improves its market position.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework. This framework is used throughout the research to analyze previous similar implementation cases and to make predictions for future practices.

The chapter starts with a brief discussion on the leading thoughts among municipalities concerning how implementation is likely to be most successful. This leads to the introduction of different forms of cooperation and the introduction of three governance structures. After these structures are elaborated upon, an argument is presented that determines the focus of this research on networks as the most feasible form of cooperation for the implementation of the Participatiewet. Following this argument, three forms of network governance are introduced and related to key predictors that are likely to explain their effectiveness. The chapter concludes with the evaluation of this effectiveness on three levels: communities, networks and organizations.

**Specific research question 1:** “(a) which forms of organizational cooperation are distinguished in scientific literature, (b) which of these forms are applicable to the WWB case, (c) which conditions influence actor choices for certain governance forms, and (d) when are these forms effective?”

### 2.1 Market, Hierarchy and Network Forms of Organization

To start the development of the framework, it is useful to first assess which strategies are possible. Small municipalities are already making efforts to discuss how effective implementation is to be conducted. The current decentralization case implies that municipalities gain additional tasks and need to deliver more services. A leading thought among small municipalities (as well as the national government) is that *cooperation* is key for effective implementation of the current decentralizations. New relationships between municipalities, employers, employees, regional coordination centers and reintegration institutions need to be created. The regional integration centers need to be used to centrally distribute more employees among employers while total budgets are cut. Thus, municipalities experience difficult changes that require some sort of coordination and organization in order to be implemented effectively. As the editor-in-chief Mark Toet in the special edition of ‘*Sprank magazine*’ on the previously proposed WWnV argues: “(...) *we cannot do this all alone, cooperation is required! Time is short, so let’s get started right away.*” (Toet, 2011).

This chapter describes the main organizational forms and designs that can be opted for. This perspective is chosen because the municipal organization is primarily aimed at serving the general public. When the organization itself operates correctly, the services that are provided by it are likely to be served correctly as well. Therefore, the objectives of both the municipality and the public are closely related. As mentioned before, cooperation is introduced due to observed municipal initiatives as well as inclusion of cooperation in the Participatiewet itself (i.e. regional cooperation centers for approaching employers – this is further elaborated upon in chapter 3).

#### Organizational Forms and Transaction-Cost Economics

Classical literature concerning the nature of organizational forms describes a continuum between markets and firms. The main difference between these organizational forms originates from *Transaction-Cost Economics* (TCE). TCE offers an explanation of why actors choose for cooperating in an enterprise or partnership instead of focusing on bilateral trade through markets (Coase, 1937, pp. 390-397). Transaction costs are ex-ante costs that are made by organizations to establish agreements with other actors, e.g. collecting information, doing research, establishing first contact, maintaining contact and creating contracts. Based on these costs, organizations either choose for a hierarchical structure or join a market: the so-called ‘*market-firm continuum*’. In the early 1990’s, Powell extended this classical view on organizational nature with a third form: networks (Powell, 1990). This third form and shows certain aspects of markets and hierarchies but also has its own unique modes of exchange and logic.

## **Markets & Hierarchies**

The core of the traditional dichotomous market-firm continuum argument is that *'transactions with uncertain outcomes that recur frequently and require substantial transaction-specific investments in the form of money, time or energy'* are likely to take place within hierarchical structured forms of organization (Powell, 1990, pp. 296-297). A hierarchical structure embodies clearly defined departmental boundaries, clear lines of authority, and formal decision-making. The main strengths of a hierarchy are reliability and accountability: hierarchies operate best in situations in which a large number of goods/services of a given quality needs to be provided repeatedly (p. 303).

On the contrary, when exchanges are straightforward, non-recurring and require no investments for transactions, market forms are more appropriate. Whereas in hierarchies inter-actor relationships do matter (for the context of exchange is defined by the position of a certain actor in the hierarchical structure), markets define these relationships as commodities. The main strengths of markets are choice, flexibility and opportunity as well as fast and simple communication between actors (p. 302). When asset specificity (knowledge that relates to a certain transaction) increases, organizations tend to move their transactions out of markets and into hierarchies. In these cases, the inefficient character of the hierarchy is preferred over the costs of market transactions (p. 297).

## **Hierarchical Organization Structure**

The current implementation case using a hierarchical design implies service integration within one single organization or one central governing institution. Upsides of a hierarchical organization are reliability and accountability: two values that are currently highly valued by municipalities because of the high level of economic uncertainty.

In this case, integrating the wide variety of services delivered by the actors (municipalities, UWV, regional coordination centers, employees and employers) seems to be problematic for a number of reasons. First, integrating all services within one hierarchical model conflicts with the character of the actors and the way they are governed. For instance, municipalities can individually determine their policies and goals, while the UWV remains centrally governed by the national government. Second, municipalities need to design and execute their own policies and are required to make individual choices concerning the way that the budgets are utilized. Since municipalities are responsible for their own possible budget shortages, it seems to be problematic to give one institution the power to determine a strategy to which all participants need to comply. Last, the current situation does not require a large number of services of goods needs to be provided repeatedly. On the contrary, policy needs to be developed to streamline the provided services and to distribute the available means while not exceeding the available budgets.

It is thus concluded that the hierarchical approach seems to be unfeasible for the current case. Actors are difficult to unite into one organization, municipalities are responsible for their own performances and budgets and service delivery is not of a rigid nature.

## **Market Organization Structure**

Market forms are specifically appropriate when exchanges are more or less straightforward, non-recurring and require little or no investments for transactions. Products and services are bought in a competitive environment. This seems to contradict the current case: it is not possible to provide all services in a competitive environment. While tasks like re-integration tracks can be put out to tender, the majority of tasks cannot. For instance, municipalities are required to support individuals in search of a job individually, need to determine a new vision concerning new focus groups, are required to get in touch with more local employers, and need to allocate their resources according to these choices. Furthermore, a market stresses short-term relationships between actors (the relationship usually ends after the transaction has been completed), while the current case requires long-term and sustainable relationships between all involved actors.

Thus, a market form of organization seems only feasible for a limited selection of the current requirements. While the distribution of the actual reintegration tracks might be conducted by using a market form, problems arise with policy development, creating sustainable relationships and making high investments for sharing knowledge and experience between the involved actors.

### **Networks**

Both organizational forms originating from the market-firm continuum seem unfeasible to fit the current requirements. The hierarchical model is too rigid and tries to bring actors that are difficult to unite together, whereas the market form is only applicable to a specific selection of tasks. This brings us to a third form of organizational structure that has been described by Powell (1990): *network forms of organization*. The concept of a network comes forth out of the idea that individual parties exist not in solitude, but in relation to others. Networks are defined as ‘*a group of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal*’ (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 3). Networks imply a fundamental dependency of parties on other parties’ resources. Long-term reciprocity and resource exchange makes sure that actors are encouraged to execute tasks more efficiently, improves learning effects and increases knowledge-exchange and trust. Networks tend to arise when long-term cooperation is possible; ideas need to be acted upon in the short term, environmental uncertainty and when tacit knowledge or technological innovation needs to be utilized.

Powell concludes with defining three ‘critical components’ that are required for networks to develop (p. 324-327):

1. *Know-how*: when shared information creates common values throughout the network, and skills are non-exclusive to a limited amount of parties.
2. *Speed*: when responsive innovation and fast action are required.
3. *Trust*: a social context that encourages cooperation, solidarity and reciprocity. Especially when exchange relations are long-term and continuous and there is a high level of future association, networks thrive.

### **Network Organization Structure**

Two important drivers for municipalities to cooperate for the implementation are the possibility to pool resources and to share both information and expertise. The pooling of resources is necessary to utilize the available means as effective as possible. Sharing knowledge and expertise can help actors with designing new policy, deciding how to distribute the available means and choosing target groups to focus the reintegration tracks on.

These requirements are included in the critical network-components ‘know-how’ and ‘trust’. When long-term knowledge sharing through sustainable cooperation is opted for, a context is required that allows these kind relationships to develop. In this sense networks seem to be a more viable way to cooperate in this case than markets and hierarchies. Long-term reciprocity seems to be possible due to the common backgrounds of municipalities and the fact that many municipalities face the same challenges. These communalities increase inter-actor trust. In addition, the ‘speed’ contingency is also to some extent included in the current case. Because the implementation takes place in early 2015, the actors are required to make decisions and start the preparations in the short term.

There are also some possible downsides for using network forms of cooperation in this case. Although shared backgrounds tend to increase trust between actors, not all actors in this case are similar. Though municipalities might face similar implementation challenges, the local situations might differ to a large extent, e.g. there could be differences between municipalities concerning right wing and left-wing coalitions, religious backgrounds or the amount of unemployed inhabitants. Also, re-integration partners and local employers differ between municipalities to a large extent. A possible problem with the contingency ‘speed’ in this case might be that when establishing a

network a lot of negotiation needs to take place. When fast action is required long negotiations before all actors agree on a certain issue can work counterproductive. Concluding, even though there are downsides of using network forms of cooperation for the current case, networks seem to be more feasible than hierarchical or market forms.

## 2.2 The Network Perspective

The network perspective is further analyzed by discussing its main contents, relevance and relation with the public sector. Following the network approach, organizations are dependent on other organizations to execute activities or reach goals. This interdependency originates from the (limited) amount of available resources. Municipal resources come in organizational (e.g. bureaucracy, legislation, expertise), financial (e.g. budgets) and political resources (e.g. legitimacy). Organizational network actors can receive additional resources by making use of their network relations: this takes in general place by means of the exchange. When certain resources' availability is limited, actors may pool resources to increase overall availability and increase their individual capacity to act. This mutual actor-interdependency in combination with relatively stable relationships is argued to be the most important characteristic of networks (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992), (Klok & Van Heffen, 2000, p. 6).

Resource dependency creates structural relations between actors and changes *government* into *governance*. This '*governance through networks*' no longer regards the government as the central actor, but stresses network relationships and shared actions. Network governance is considered to support self-organizing pluricentric networks that resists rigid central government steering and develops own policies and shapes environments (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004, pp. 143, 148-149). Focusing on governance in networks involves utilization of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration for allocation and coordination of resources. This enables the control of joint action across the entire network (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 3).

For evaluating different types of networks, two main perspectives are assessed: *structure* and *agency*. The *structure* perspective considers the network itself as unit of analysis: networks are social organizations rather than the sum of the actors and links. The *agency* perspective contributes to the idea that networks are a set of actors with relationships: networks characteristics vary according to their internal relational pattern (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 4-5). For this research uses a bottom-up approach (municipalities are central actors), it embraces the *agency*-perspective.

### Relevance of the Network Perspective

Networks have globally been recognized as leading forms for inter-organizational governance practices. Networks have many advantages over traditional forms of cooperation, both in public and in private sectors, e.g. they enhance learning processes, form an efficient form of resource allocation, increase planning capacities, increase means for addressing complex problems, and enhance overall service provision towards clients. On the other hand, negative aspects of networks are (amongst others) decreasing actor autonomy, high overhead costs, and slower decision-making. Even though the latter aspects might have a negative influence on the decision-making process concerning whether to join or form a network or not, many actors assume the overall benefits to outweigh these negative aspects, making networks a viable cooperation mechanism. Especially during the past decade, an increasing amount of attention is paid to network governance and research is conducted to assess '*network functioning*': the process by which conditions are related to achieving certain network-level outcomes. In order to better understand why and how networks produce certain outcomes, it is useful to assess this functioning (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 1).

### Public Sector-Networks

Policy networks typically consist of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve both individual and shared goals. In the public sector, these networks are not always self-initiated, but are often subject to mandates or contracts. Especially when collective

action is required to solve a problem, goal-directed networks often function as formal mechanisms that support inter-organizational outcomes. This goes beyond merely achieving goals and requires collective action and activity-based governance. This organizational governance is critical for effectiveness, for public policy networks are often governed without clearly structured hierarchy or ownership.

Additionally, actors in public policy networks have often limited accountability to network-wide goal attainment, and public-sector rule-conformity is often regulated on a voluntary basis. Organizational governance is thus required (if not a prerequisite) to keep the network functioning and obtain effectiveness in network outcomes (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 2-3). In order to ensure that the shared goals are kept in mind, activity-based governance is currently used in cooperative initiatives in social working places (e.g. in the social working place in Almelo, SOWECO and in Zutphen, Delta).

### **2.3 Forms of Network Governance**

To find out what forms of network governance exist the first step is to take a look at the two most important dimensions that are embedded in governed networks: *brokering* and *governance*. The former is the extent of which governance is brokered: on the one extreme all organizations interact with each other, while on the other the network is highly brokered, with very few direct actor-to-actor interactions. The latter dimension stresses the way that networks are governed: either by its participants or by external actors.

Three distinguishable forms of network governance are 'participant-governed', 'lead organization-governed' and 'network administrative organization-governed' networks. These forms all have their own individual characteristics (and respective strengths and weaknesses) and dependent on the levels of brokering and governance. Obviously, these forms are stereotypical. There are many forms of network governance imaginable that can be found in between the mentioned three forms.

#### **Participant-Governed Networks**

The simplest form is the participant-governed network (PGN). It is governed without a separate governance actor by the network members themselves. The network can be created formally (through regular meetings and selected network representatives) or informally (through uncoordinated activities of actors who benefit from network success). PGNs come both in centralized and decentralized forms (Provan & Kenis, 2007, pp. 6-7).

Centralized PGNs often have a few lead organizations from within the network that govern the network structure and activities. Decentralized PGNs have most (or sometimes even all) network members as equal and active participants in the governance processes. This last form is called '*shared participant governance*'. Shared participant networks are solely dependent on the commitment of the majority of the network actors, because these actors are in the end responsible for the management of network relationships and activities. Also, the management of external relationships needs to be taken care of by the network participants themselves. In these networks, participant equality is not critical: even though there are different sizes, resources, knowledge etcetera, the power is distributed in a symmetrical way. Distinctions concerning a single administrative actor are not made formally (although it is possible that a subset of the network takes care of certain administrative tasks). Concluding, PGNs act more or less collectively and do not have a single representative to the network exterior, nor a formal actor that fulfills the role of a network administrator or coordinator.

#### **Lead Organization-Governed Networks**

The second form of network governance as described by Provan & Kenis (2007, pp. 7-8) is the lead organization-governed network (LOGN). This form is more centralized, which leads under certain circumstances to more efficient governance, for not all actors are included in governing the network.



Governance in lead-organized networks implies that all important governance decision-making is conducted by one single party, or by a few 'elite' parties. These parties are the 'lead organizations': network actors that have sufficient key resources as well as legitimacy to elevate themselves above the other actors. In contrary to the PGNs, the power in LOGNs is asymmetrical distributed and the governance is more centralized and brokered. The lead organization may take care of the network administration and the facilitation of member activities that aim to reach goals of the network. For instance, lead organizations can receive resources from members and often regulate attraction of, and access to, external funding. Lead organizations are basically selected in two ways: the first is an election by the network members themselves (often based on deliberations concerning efficiency and effectiveness); the second a mandate (often by an external actor that provides the network with funding).

### **Network Administrative Organization**

The third network form is the network administrative organization (NAO). The NAO model applies when a separate administrative entity is emerged with the primary goal of governing the network. Contrary to the LOGN model, this administrative organization does not originate from within the network: it is an external player (*network broker*) that is appointed by mandate or by the network actors themselves and serves the sole purpose of governing the network itself (and thus not the primary processes that the network focuses on). This does not mean that network actors no longer interact with each other, but rather that network actors cooperate on primary processes while the NAO accounts for the network governance (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 8).


The form of the NAO itself can differ from case to case: in some cases it is just one external individual while in others formal organizations are erected to function as an NAO. In general, when more legitimacy of the NAO is required, the latter form is chosen, for an organization with a board can address complex network-level problems and shared governance problems more easily than individuals. To enhance internal legitimacy in the network, the most important network members are often represented in these types of NAOs. In the public sector, NAOs are often erected at the same time as the network itself is created. The NAO usually internally provides funding and facilitates services to increase chances that the network reaches its goals.

### **Network Governance: Overview**

Concluding, for the PGN, all actors that are involved in the network are involved in its governance as well (internally governed). The LOGN has a few lead organizations (brokered internal governed), while the network-administrative organization-governed network has one external organization in charge of the network governance (externally governed). Figure 2.3 underneath illustrates the differences between the network forms.

**Figure 2.3**

*Distribution of governance and participation in PGN, LOGN and NAO forms of network governance*



*This figure is created to visualize the ‘participant-governed’, ‘lead-organization governed’, and ‘network administrative organization-governed’ network forms, as described in the article ‘Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management and Effectiveness’ by Provan & Kenis (2007).*

The section above the x-axis contains those actors that are actively governing the network (‘network governance’). The section below the x-axis reflects the network actors that form a part of the network, but are not directly involved in governing the network (‘network participation’).

## 2.4 Effectiveness in Network Governance

Up until this point, the discussion focused on the concept of networks itself and the existence of the different governance forms. When effectiveness of network governance is strived for, the conditions that determine effectiveness of these governance forms need to be included. These conditions are to be included in the theoretical model to make predictions concerning the effectiveness that can be reached by means of cooperation.

### Key Predictors for Expected Effectiveness

According to Provan & Kenis (2007), a few key decision makers often decide which form of network governance is utilized. These decisions are often influenced by personal experience and preferences of the decision makers. Obviously, these personal aspects do not always lead to appropriate forms for a situation. For achieving the required network outcomes, a less subjective method for decision-making is necessary. Provan & Kenis (2007) created a model that aims to explain possible effectiveness of network forms based on four structural and relational contingencies. These contingencies are *trust*, *size*, *goal consensus* and *task nature* (p. 9-13):

1. Trust reflects ‘willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviors.’ (p. 9). In networks it is important to assess the distribution of trust, as well as the reciprocation of trust within the network. For networks to operate effectively, the internal governance must be in line with the ‘trust density’ within the network. Trust density is the distribution of trust between the actors: high density means that trust is widely distributed; low density means a narrow distribution, e.g. only between a

few individuals. When trust density is high, the trust-ties between actors become denser, and the possibilities for effective shared governance increase. With low-density trust, a broker is required for achieving effectiveness. For members are required to collectively monitor activities in NAO-networks, trust for NAO governance must be higher than LOGNs (where monitoring is conducted by only a selection of the network actors). The argument is thus that trust is not only a network-level concept, but that the design of a network needs to be chosen in accordance with the general trust-density between the involved actors.

2. Number of participants (size) relates to the accommodation and coordination of needs and activities within the network. With an increase in the number of network actors, the number of inter-actor ties increases exponentially. Although PGNs are often preferred because of the direct influence of the actors, it is unfeasible in large networks for involvement of more organizations leads to more inefficiency. When this problem occurs, a broker organization can help with centralizing activities and stop direct involvement of all network actors (i.e. NAO of a LOGN). In general, shared governance is effective for networks with fewer than six to eight participants. In larger networks, the two centralized forms are opportune.
3. Goal consensus and domain similarity increase actor performance, in contrary to goal conflicts. Collaborative relationships are often erected to fulfill the needs of individual network partners. Actions of organizations are not only guided by organizational goals but also by goals on the network level. Literature on domain similarity shows that with consensus on network-level goals (e.g. contents of these goals and consensus on how to achieve them) and little hierarchy, network actors are likely to become committed to the network. In this situation, cooperation is likely to increase. When network-level goals are agreed upon, PGNs are most effective. With low consensus, network involvement is not likely to occur at all. LOGN or NAO forms are appropriate at intermediate levels of goal consensus. Lead agencies often address strategic and operational decisions and are able to define network goals when the network actors are unable to resolve conflicts themselves. An NAO form requires a larger extent of (sub-level) actor involvement. Some participants might be committed to network-level goals and have strategic involvement, while others are less committed. The NAO is responsible for resolving conflict and increasing network commitment.
4. The need for network-level competencies (task nature) is the fourth contingency. Organizations are driven by a variety of reasons to create or join networks. Regardless of contextual drivers, actors aim to achieve a result that could not be achieved independently. The different forms of network governance place different burdens on the network member competences. There are two critical issues highlighted by Provan & Kenis (p. 12): the *nature of the task performed by the network members* and the *demands and needs that originate from the network exterior*. When internal demands on network members require skills that these members do not have, a lot of internal coordination is required. If the task of a network requires this high level of member interdependency, the need for coordination will be great and shared governance would be most effective. Task conditions might also require LOGNs or NAOs that are more able to develop skills specifically for the required tasks. When external requests require a high level of responsiveness, a centralized network action is required. This implies that shared governance (PGN) would not be effective, but an NAO that forms a single contact point would.

The relationships between the contingencies and governance forms are shown in Table 2.4 below. It forms a theoretical approach for determining the adaptation of one form of network governance over another, based on the possibilities of successfully achieving network-level outcomes (network effectiveness) (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 8). The four contingencies and their respective scores help with explaining the likely effectiveness of a certain form of network governance.

**Table 2.4***Critical Contingencies for Likely Effectiveness of Network Governance Forms*

<b>Governance Form</b>	<b>Trust</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Goal Consensus</b>	<b>Need for Network-level Competencies</b>
<i>Shared governance (PGN)</i>	High density, decentralized	Few	High	Low
<i>Lead organization governance (LOGN)</i>	Low density, highly centralized	Moderate number	Moderately low	Moderate
<i>Network administrative organization (NAO)</i>	Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High

*This table is adapted from the 'Modes of Network Governance' model (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9)*

### **Hypotheses**

Based on these arguments, hypotheses are formulated concerning the relationships between the contingency scores, governance forms and effectiveness, partially based on the propositions of Provan & Kenis (p. 13). Hypotheses 1-3 combine the expected relationship between contingency scores and governance forms with network-level effectiveness. Hypothesis 4 is utilized to generalize the findings of the latter three.

- Hypothesis 1: *"The shared governance form will be most effective in terms of total network-level effectiveness when there is a high trust density, a relatively few number of participants, a high level of goal consensus and a low need for network-level competencies in the network."*
- Hypothesis 2: *"The lead organization governance form will be most effective in terms of total network-level effectiveness when there is a low and centralized trust density, a moderate number of participants, a moderately low level of goal consensus and a moderate need for network-level competencies in the network."*
- Hypothesis 3: *"The network administrative organization governance form will be most effective in terms of total network-level effectiveness when there is a moderate to wide sharing of trust, a moderate to high number of participants, a moderately high level of goal consensus and a high need for network-level competencies in the network."*
- Hypothesis 4: *"The higher the consistency between the critical contingencies and a certain form of governance is, the higher the network-level effectiveness of that form of governance will be."*

## **2.5 Network Effectiveness Evaluation**

The next phase of the operationalization of network effectiveness is the measurement and evaluation of effectiveness. Provan & Milward (2001) proposed three levels of analysis for effectiveness evaluation. Afterwards, the relationships between these levels are integrated into a model that applies to public-sector organizational networks.

### **Levels of Evaluation**

The evaluation of network effectiveness in public networks is necessary for evaluating how networks deliver services to members of a community. It thus examines the relation between network structures and activities in terms of effectiveness. The evaluation of effectiveness helps the formulators of public policy to determine how to allocate funding and how to distribute resources. The main problem with evaluating effectiveness on a network level is the large amount of stakeholders in public policy networks.

To be able to evaluate networks as a whole, three levels of stakeholders analysis are taken into account: *community*, *network* and *organization/participant* (Provan & Milward, 2001, pp. 415-16):


- *Communities'* key stakeholder groups consist of principals and clients, such as client advocacy groups, funders, politicians, regulators and the general public.
- For *networks*, the key stakeholder groups are principals and agents, such as funders and regulators, the NAO and the network member organizations.
- On the *organizational/participant* level of network analysis, the key stakeholder groups are agents and clients (such as a member agency board, management, and individual clients).

### Effectiveness Evaluation in Public Sector Networks

Stakeholder groups (community, network and participants) are mainly interested in fulfilling their needs on their own level. Contrary, the network as a whole can only be effective when the minimal required needs of actors on all three levels of analysis are met. Due to the connections between the three levels of analysis, outcomes on one of these levels influence the outcomes of the other levels. Even though the stakeholder groups are defined as operating separately, these groups do have overlap in practice.

**Figure 2.5**

*Relationships between Effectiveness at Different Levels of Network Analysis and Influence by Key Stakeholders*



*This figure is adapted from the 'Framework of Evaluating Public-Sector Organizational Networks' of Provan & Milward (2001, p. 421).*

Figure 2.5 shows that effectiveness at one level does not ensure effectiveness on other levels, and that success can sometimes be achieved through actions that actually counter the goals of the other stakeholders. This is the case when a large network of small agencies is ineffective: when certain agencies leave the network (by bankruptcy for instance), the network effectiveness increases. The figure has no arrow pointing from community towards the organizational level, pointing out that network success on the community level does not affect the results of the individual organizations. This illustrates a tension in community service networks between the needs and expectations of the three levels of stakeholders and the effectiveness measures valued by them (p. 421).

Provan & Milward (2001, p. 422) further mention that needs of constituent groups are often diverse and politicized in the public sector. Effectiveness of public sector networks is obtained when the organizational capacity to solve problems and to serve the clientele increases. To create a collective that effectively provides services, the needs and interests of the members need to be satisfied. Due to the nature of public networks, the extent to which network members can influence network goals is often politicized.

### **Effectiveness at the Organizational Level**

For this research utilizes the municipalities as central actors, the organizational/participant level of analysis is most interesting. Despite broader value-creation that is derived from networks for the community at large through integrated service delivery, network actors strive for their own success and survival. Networks contribute to individual results, and in its turn individual success is key to achieve effective network outcomes. The importance of network involvement for an individual actor can be determined by evaluating four criteria: *client-level outcomes, legitimacy, resource acquisition and cost* (Provan & Milward, p. 420).

In situations where actors already have acceptable client-level outcomes (e.g. individual results, available resources, contacts etcetera), there is no need to joint or form a network. When actors assume that individual outcomes are likely to improve by means of networking, and that the time and efforts required to join and remain part of the network are feasible, choices are made to become a network partner. Focus is then put on enhancing client outcomes by means of the integration of services. Actors typically join networks to achieve an increase in *legitimacy* in the community and to acquire additional resources, with specific focus on funding. When becoming part of a community network, actors acquire status and acceptability of this community that individually would have taken years of effort. Furthermore, network actors become more legitimized because of the internal communication by means of sharing information, ideas and clients.

Another outcome of affiliation is the *acquisition of resources*. Small actors with limited capacities can join forces and centralized their resources to achieve more efficiency and effectiveness. For small actors, it might also be effective to affiliate with an NAO or lead organization. While funds can often be channeled through this core agent, legitimacy is likely to increase at the same time by the affiliation with larger members. Larger actors themselves may get less out of the network involvement for their individual outcomes, but may use the network for improving information availability and legitimacy as well as to decrease costs (p. 416).

### **Network Evolution**

For the current case, new networks need to be developed by municipalities and chain partners. Hay & Richards (2000) described a network evolution process that uses a strategic-relational approach towards network dynamics. It relates closely to the four evaluation criteria of Provan & Milward. Hay & Richards argue that network formation takes place in a context that consists of strategically acting actors. Strategic actions lead to strategic alliances, based on future scenarios as perceived by the involved players. The four primary evaluation criteria can thus been seen as criteria for effectiveness, but also as factors that determine strategic decision-making by the network actors. Knowing the stages and their respective contents of this process might increase the sustainability of the network for the involved actors are aware of the existence of multiple strategic agendas and the influence of external factors.

The process of network formation is described as following:

1. Pre-network stage: the recognition of future mutual advantages and improved capacities to act.
2. Network formation: resource pooling, establishing conditions for network feasibility.
3. Network practice: networks re-evolve through renegotiations of strategic agendas. External influences might affect individual strategic agendas of involved actors.
4. Network termination: in case the network does not adapt changes, the network is likely to be terminated.

## 2.6 Conclusion

The theoretical framework started with discussing different (inter)organizational forms. After having introduced the network perspective, attention was paid to different levels within networks and their respective effectiveness requirements. Afterwards, three different forms of network governance were introduced and related to a set of four critical contingencies that describe expected effective settings. Now, the first specific research question is answered: “(a) which forms of organizational cooperation are distinguished in scientific literature, (b) which of these forms are applicable to the WWB case, (c) which conditions influence actor choices for certain governance forms, and (d) when are these forms effective?”

(a) Powell (1990) described three forms of organization, starting from the transaction cost economics-approach. The first distinction is made with the definition of the ‘traditional market-firm continuum’ that separates markets from hierarchies. When departmental boundaries are defined, lines of authority are clear and decision-making is done in a formal way, organizations have a hierarchical structure. The other side of the continuum consists of markets that show more straightforward exchanges that are non-recurring and require little transaction investments. A third organizational form is the network, which implies a fundamental dependency of parties on other parties’ resources. Networks enable fast sharing of information, responsive innovation and enhance trust.

(b) For the Participatiewet implementation case, networks seem to be most feasible to utilize. By using governance in networks, institutions and structures of collaboration are used for allocation and coordination of these resources. Networks were described by utilizing a bottom-up approach, with small municipalities as the central actors. This perspective is called the *agency* perspective.

(c) Provan & Kenis (2007) defined three forms of governance within networks: participant-governed networks (PGNs), lead organization-governed networks (LOGNs), and network administrative organization-governed networks (NAOs). PGNs act more or less collectively and do not have a single representative to the network exterior, nor a formal actor that fulfills the role of a network administrator. On the contrary, NAOs have a separate administrative entity that solely governs the network. LOGNs are somewhere in between these two forms; governance in LOGNs implies that important governance decision-making is conducted by either one network actor or a few ‘elite’ network actors together. To be effective, the chosen network form should match contextual scores on ‘critical contingencies’: *trust, size, goal consensus* and *task nature*.

(d) There are three levels of analysis for network evaluation: *community, network* and *organization/participant*. These three levels are interrelated to a large extent. Especially in public sector networks, effectiveness is achieved when organizations solve problems together while the clients receive better services. For municipalities are the central actors in this research, the organizational level is in particular interesting. This level includes four criteria for effectiveness evaluation: *client level outcomes* (actors assume that cooperation can improve individual outcomes), *legitimacy* (the status and level of acceptance by the exterior), *resource acquisition* (the increase the capacities to centralize resources for more effectiveness) and *cost* (the ability to reduce expenses by becoming involved in network initiatives). Obviously, high scores indicate high effectiveness.

Concluding, the theoretical framework that has been developed in this chapter determines the further focus of this research as a bottom-up approach towards networks by using the agency perspective. For cooperating in a network, actors can choose from three designs (PGN, LOGN or NAO), preferably chosen on the basis of scores on four critical contingencies: trust, size, goal consensus and task nature. Obviously, choosing for the option to not join a network at all is also embedded in the decision-making process concerning the network design. However, this option is

not available to many Dutch municipalities, for the central government has formally requested them to cooperate for the three social domain decentralizations that will come into effect in the near future.

Provan & Kenis (2007) described a model that links network-level effectiveness to the extent of the match between the contingency scores and the chosen governance form. For effectiveness evaluation, the 'participant/organization'-level of the model of Provan and Milward (2001) is utilized. Determining effectiveness for individual actors can be achieved by evaluating scores on four aspects that determine overall network-level outcomes.



### 3 Exploration of Current Social Sector Developments

This chapter starts with discussing the content, target groups and affected policy field of the proposed Participatiewet. Second, the influence of the Participatiewet on the legislative status quo of the current social security sector is discussed. The chapter concludes with the analysis of the implications for Dutch municipalities. Due to the nature of this research question, this chapter is of a descriptive nature. **Specific Research Question 2:** *“What are the history, goals and content of the Participatiewet, and how do they affect both the Dutch citizens and the municipal tasks and responsibilities?”*

#### 3.1 History

The previously proposed act, ‘Werken naar Vermogen’ has officially been introduced in 2008. It was a proposed change in the law ‘Arbeidsongeschiktheidsvoorziening Jonggehandicapten’ (Wajong) by the Dutch cabinet ‘Balkenende IV’ (2007-2010). This cabinet consisted of the CDA (Christian-democratic appeal), PvdA (Labor Party) and the CU (Christian Union). The aim was to change the Wajong in such a way that *‘young disabled individuals who, regardless of their chronic disease or limitations, have the possibility to (partly) perform labor activities will be enabled to do so. Governmental support primarily focuses on supporting and maintaining labor performance according to the extent to which these individuals have the ability to perform these activities’* (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst, 2008).

In 2009, pilots started that aimed to map the way individuals with limited labor capabilities work in accordance to their individual ability to perform certain labor tasks. These pilots indicated that adjustment of the ‘Wet sociale werkplaatsen’ (WSW) was required to increase the availability of specialized labor for individuals with limited capabilities at regular employers, stimulate the transit of labor performed at social working companies towards labor development corporations, and test the instrument of salary dispensation to pay employees according to their respective productivity (Commissie fundamentele herbezinning WSW, 2009), (Klijnsma, 2009, pp. 1, 7).

The VVD-CDA cabinet included the WWnV in their coalition agreement, *‘liberty and responsibility’*. Drivers are negative impact of the economic crisis on society as well as the increase of governmental budget deficits. Proposed solutions for these increasing problems are policy reforms and budget cuts: the cabinet chooses for measures that contribute to an increase of overall labor participation in the Netherlands. The main goals are giving individuals a perspective to work and to earn their own income, the creation of a strong basis for Dutch social services provision, and tackling of problems with staff shortages on the labor market whilst decreasing cost of the social safety (2010, p. 44).

After the VVD-CDA cabinet was under resignation, the WWnV was declared controversial. The current VVD-PvdA cabinet decided to replace the WWnV in their coalition agreement *‘building bridges’* with the Participatiewet. This proposed policy is roughly similar to the WWnV. Main differences are that the Participatiewet does not reassess individuals that are shared under the Wajong (which the WWnV initially proposed), endures the WSW (but stops inflow from January 2014), provides municipalities with additional funds to create sheltered jobs and introduces a quota regulation for employers that enforces hiring of incapacitated individuals.

In general, the proposals indicate that incapacitated citizens can no longer be solely dependent on financial entitlements: situations must be avoided where citizens are dependent on the government and remain permanently outside the labor market. Thus, entitlements are transformed from a situation where individuals receive money without providing services in return, into a situation based on the *‘quid pro quo’* principle. Also, the aim is to integrate the multitude of social security laws that affect the foundation of the labor market into one new social security law. 400 million Euros have been reserved to support municipalities with the implementation (VVD-CDA, 2010, p. 45).

## Framework Memorandum

On April 21<sup>st</sup>, 2011, the state secretary of the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, P. de Krom, presented the first framework memorandum that elaborated on the social sector reforms as defined in the coalition agreement. This framework is at the core of the proposed Participatiewet (De Krom, Aanbieding hoofdlijnennotitie 'Werken naar vermogen' aan Tweede Kamer, 2011, pp. 1-2):

- Citizens are required to work according to their respective ability to work, preferably at a regular employer;
- Citizens themselves are responsible for making the arrangements to get a job. The government provides support and guidance whenever necessary;
- Defragmentation of current barriers between municipal reintegration budgets;
- Municipalities are responsible for the execution of the social legal arrangements;
- Introduction of salary dispensation as a new instrument to enable employers to pay employees according to their respective productivity;
- For young disabled individuals (Wajong) and individuals who need to work in sheltered environments, the previous legislation remains in force, but inflow is limited.

## 3.2 Policy Contents

The main contents of the Participatiewet are elaborated upon underneath.

### Policy Integration

Currently, there are multiple regulations for individuals with labor limitations. In order to stimulate these individuals to work as much as possible while at the same time simplifying existing regulations, the cabinet proposes to integrate the WWB, WSW and Wajong. For those individuals who can operate *solely* in a sheltered environment, WSW access is continued until January 2015.

The proposal is aimed at redesigning the approach towards unemployment and increases the role of municipalities in this process. The proposed legislation is based on three core principles:

1. Individuals who are able to work are required to provide their income themselves to the largest extent possible.
2. All individuals who are able to work are treated by only one set of rules. Individuals can request municipalities for additional support and guidance for employment.
3. Employers receive support to hire people with labor limitations more easily.

### Re-integration

From 2015 onwards, municipalities obtain more freedom to reintegrate unemployed individuals into the labor market. To be able to do so, municipalities receive one single reintegration budget from the national government. Precondition is that unemployed individuals are made responsible themselves for becoming employed: an active pursuit of individuals to find a job is thus required. Municipalities offer support (job coaching, adapted workplaces, education and tracks) to all that need it in order to increase chances of becoming employed (e.g. individuals with labor limitations and no financial entitlement).

### Budget Cuts

Due to the fact that a lot of people currently claim financial entitlements, even when they are able to work, the cabinet observes that expenses on entitlements increase rapidly. To counteract this trend, the government aims to reintegrate as many entitlement-claimants into the workforce as possible. Drivers are, on the one hand, the expectation that people with a job are likely to gain additional working experience, recover sooner from trauma and increase their social contacts and network. On the other hand it is argued that when individuals work they earn their own income while making contributions to society. Therefore, the proposal includes integration of social security policies into one comprehensive new policy (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2011).

## **Status Quo**

The social partners and the Dutch cabinet created the new social agreement on April 13th, 2013. This agreement proposes a set of measures to enhance short-term economic growth and to adjust the labour market to the demands and wishes of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The agreement states that 35 'Werkpleinen' (regional coordination centres) are in charge of linking the regional corporate sector to political board members in order to create policy to regulate regional labour markets. 35 'Werkbedrijven' (consisting of the former UWV and CIZ) will become responsible for guiding incapacitated individuals to regular jobs and for making indications. Regional business life and politicians are closely involved in these developments. Thus, the cooperation between municipalities and other regional actors is mandatory in this proposal (Divosa, 2013).

After the agreement was published, the VNG (association of Dutch municipalities) stated that they would not cooperate with these plans, for they were not involved in the decision-making process and are given heavy burdens. How this process will unwind is yet to be seen: it is possible that the current social agreement will not be altered, which implies that the Participatiewet proposal needs to be changed to come into accord with it. It might also be possible that, due to the VNG influence, the social agreement will be changed, which might or might not imply changes in the Participatiewet.

## **3.3 Policy Influence**

The current social security playing field consists of three different policies: the Wajong, the WSW and the WWB. This subsection stresses the implications of the for these social security policies (Rijksoverheid, 2013).

### **Implications for the Wajong**

Under the Participatiewet, several things change for the Wajong:

- As of January 2015 the Wajong only applies to individuals with sustainable and complete working disabilities;
- Reassessments of these disabilities are conducted every 5 years;
- Individuals who are not eligible for a Wajong entitlement can go to a Werkbedrijf, which aims to guide them to a job. If necessary, the municipality provides an entitlement on the basis of the WWB;
- Individuals that currently receive a Wajong entitlement will be reassessed. Everyone who is able to perform labor is redirected to the municipality for an entitlement (on the basis of the WWB) and receives reintegration support.

### **Implications for WSW**

As of January 2015, inflow to social working places will come to a complete stop. From 2015 on, individuals are redirected to the new Werkbedrijf. Individuals that already have a WSW-indication will not be reassessed and will remain in the WSW. The social agreement states that salary subsidies will replace the proposed salary dispensation, which means that the municipality pays the difference between the 'labor value' of an individual and the legal minimum wage. This subsidy will not be higher than 70 percent of the legal minimum wage.

### **Implications for WWB**

WWB policy changes have already started in January 2012 and primarily aim to cut budgets, especially on the participation and reintegration budgets. Thus, the changes aim to limit the amount of new individuals entering the WWB and try to decisively support current WWB-claimants with leaving the WWB. An important change is that municipalities can fine misuse of these services themselves (up to 100% of the received entitlement for a period of three months). Although these changes are to some extent stand-alone initiatives, they contribute to the way that the current developments change the social security policy field (Stimulansz, 2011).

### **3.4 Implications for Municipalities**

Now that the legislative influence on the status quo is known, the implications of this new policy on municipal instruments, duties and responsibilities are elaborated upon.

#### **Instrumental Changes**

The current proposals provide municipalities with new instruments for the execution of social services. The approach towards regular employers that might place clients is no longer regulated by a multitude of small-scaled actors. These actors previously worked on a micro level and consisted of institutions such as employment agencies, municipal employment divisions and the UWV. As of 2015, employers are approached by means of regional coordination centers (Werkpleinen). This simplifies the contacts between municipality and employer, because there is one single institution that functions as a contact point. Municipalities need to make decisions concerning which individual contribution is made for these coordination centers and their efforts on approaching employers themselves.

#### **Budget Cuts**

The Participatiewet creates a 'bundled' reintegration budget of in total 2.6 billion Euros in 2015, which is meant for supporting citizens with finding work in the regular working sector or SW-companies. Of this total amount approximately 1.8 billion is directed towards the SW-companies and 800 million towards reintegration (which is a budget cut when compared with the previous situation). Municipalities do no longer receive separated budgets for different policy arrangements, but get one combined budget. Because of this increase in freedom of municipalities concerning the way they utilize the money, the government assumes that available means are used more effectively.

Research shows that municipalities previously often made use of expensive reintegration instruments with little effectiveness: at present, 25% of all municipal reintegration budgets are spent on long-term subsidized jobs (by means of salary compensation). The previously proposed salary dispensation instrument was introduced to utilize the bundled reintegration budget more effectively (De Krom, Kamerbrief 'middelen gebundeld reïntegratiebudget', 2011, p. 3). Whereas in the previous situation there were multiple budgets that were provided by national and municipal actors, the current proposal provides municipalities with one budget and decentralizes all social security arrangements to the local level.

Results of these changes are that municipalities receive less money for executing more reintegration tasks. Possible financial shortages become the responsibility of the municipalities themselves. On the other hand, when the budget has a surplus, municipalities can transfer that surplus to next year's budget.

#### **Municipal Responsibilities**

With more municipal freedom of choice come more municipal responsibilities. Now that municipalities receive one bundled reintegration budget, they become responsible for their expenses themselves. This creates a strong financial driver for municipalities to become (and remain) active with the reintegration of the population: when more people earn their own salary, the municipal expenses on entitlements decrease. Concluding, municipal freedom and responsibilities increase to a large extent while at the same time the financial risks increase and budgets are cut.

#### **Duty Changes**

Municipalities are relieved from the duty to support citizens with finding a new job from the start of the process. In the new situation, citizens are responsible themselves to find a job for a period of four weeks. The municipality only needs to financially compensate this time when the individual can show that sufficient efforts have been made to apply for a job. Municipalities are only required to uphold individuals in search of a job with their applications after this four-week period.

## **Practical Implications**

When relating the above-discussed implications to practice, municipalities are required to make extensive changes concerning defrayment, organizing tasks and coping with new responsibilities:

*Vision and policy development:* First of all, municipalities are required to make political decisions concerning the determination of targets. For instance, municipalities need to choose between spending money on supporting all citizens (based on the idea that everybody should be made able to work) and focusing on a specific part of this group (based on the idea that investing in citizens with a high probability of getting employed is more cost-efficient). Political stakeholders need to determine this new municipal vision before policy can be developed and action can be taken. After the determination of these new targets, the target population needs to be defined and choices need to be made concerning which instruments will be used to reach the goals.

*Reintegration:* After the targets, affected population and instruments are defined attention needs to be paid to the design of the reintegration process. For the Wajong inflow is limited and the WSW inflow is discontinued, the inflow of citizens that need to be reintegrated is likely to increase. Therefore, cooperation with regular employers needs to be improved. This is on the one hand conducted by collaboration with one of the 35 'Werkpleinen', but municipalities might also want to develop an individual approach towards local employers in order to create additional workplaces.

*Resource allocation:* Municipalities need to develop a vision concerning how the available resources (reintegration and personal budgets) are allocated. Each municipality needs to determine an approach that is most cost-efficient to avoid the financial 'penalty' that is received when budgets are exceeded. Municipalities need to investigate which groups cause the highest costs and how reintegration of these people can be conducted most effective. For the reintegration of individuals with a high 'salary value' leads to most cost reduction for municipalities, this group is likely to be targeted for reintegration first.

Thus, in a nutshell, municipalities are required to develop policy concerning reintegration of people that comply with the WSW and Wajong. Efforts need to be made concerning the creation of suitable jobs at local employers and action needs to be taken concerning participation in the regional coordination centers. Last, the allocation of the combined reintegration budget needs to be determined, based on assumptions on how to distribute the available means to achieve minimal total expenses.

### **3.5 Exploration of the Current Social Sector Developments: Conclusion**

To conclude, the second specific research question is answered: *"What are the history, goals and content of the Participatiewet, and how do they affect both the Dutch citizens and the municipal tasks and responsibilities?"*

The Dutch VVD-CDA cabinet has officially introduced the WWnV in 2011. The traditional Dutch welfare state seems to be losing ground and makes place for a semi-welfare state with more focus on participation of its citizens. Increasing pressure of multinational legislation, increasing individualism and aging of the population create a situation in which the state less independent (semi-sovereign). The concept is derived from attempts of the government to adapt to these 21<sup>st</sup> century societal trends.

After the VVD-PvdA cabinet took office in 2012, the WWnV was slightly altered and named Participatiewet. Current discussions concerning the social agreement of the cabinet and the social

partners might require the current Participatiewet proposal to be altered. This process is still ongoing, so the Participatiewet remains a *proposed* policy for the moment.

The Participatiewet integrates three separate policies that currently focus on social service provision: the WSW, WWB and Wajong. It serves three main interests: social (prevent isolation of individuals), economic (prevent welfare losses) and financial (keep social services affordable). Also, the cabinet aims to simplify the existing legislation and treat all individuals with working limitations (but that are still able to work to *some* extent) equally by using one single set of rights and duties.

Core principle of the social service provision remains the (re)integration of unemployed individuals in the labor market. Individuals who are completely and sustainably unemployed remain reliant on the social safety net. Most important influences of the current proposal are redistribution of labor from SW-companies to regular companies and the limitation of Wajong and WSW access.

Municipalities are given more responsibilities. Municipalities will from 2015 onwards comprehensively manage several new tasks that were traditionally addressed by the national government. Municipalities are provided with one single budget for reintegration of unemployed inhabitants (and reintegration of individuals that work at SW-companies) and can decide for themselves how this budget is distributed.

Municipalities are made accountable for possible budget shortages: possible financial deficits need to be funded by the municipalities themselves. This measure can also function as a reward, because budget surpluses are to be kept by municipalities for future utilization. Economized social security costs are ensured by means of providing the municipalities with more freedom, responsibilities and bonus/malus incentives. In practice, this implies that new policies need to be developed concerning WSW and Wajong reintegration. The creation of suitable jobs needs to be stimulated and efforts need to be made to establish effective regional coordination centers (Werkpleinen). Overall, municipalities need to determine how to allocate the (limited) available means of the integrated reintegration budget.

Concluding, the main impact of the proposal concerns reintegration of unemployed citizens into the working force while diminishing the amount of individuals making use of traditional social security arrangements. It aims to prevent isolation of individuals and welfare losses and tries to safeguard affordable social services. With the Participatiewet, municipal freedom and responsibilities increase to a large extent.

## 4 Comparable Legislation

Because empirical observations concerning the WWnV/Participatiewet cooperation are impossible to make for the policy has yet to come into effect, a comparable policy is introduced: the Wet Werk en Bijstand. This chapter discusses the similarities and differences between these policies. This comparison is valuable for the collection of empirical data that are used to increase understanding on how effective implementation of the future social security policies by means of cooperation can be achieved. It also takes contextual variables into account, for these influence the strategic choices that are made by municipalities, and thus influence final effectiveness.

This chapter starts with an introduction and a summary of the contents of the WWB. Afterwards, data are introduced that are derived from an expert meeting with social security experts. These data are used to analyze the similarities and differences between the WWB and the WWnV/Participatiewet in terms of substance and scores on critical contingencies. **Specific Research Question 3:** *“To what extent are the contents of the WWB (2004) similar to the contents of the current participation-related decentralizations, what are the similarities and differences concerning coordination and organization for municipalities and to what extent are the municipal contingencies for both policies similar?”*

### 4.1 Wet Werk and Bijstand

When searching for a policy that can be used as a reference case, four criteria were used. First, domain similarity: the reference policy needs to address the social sector. Second, municipalities needed to be directly affected by the policy. Third, the reference policy must implicate the performance of certain new tasks and responsibilities by municipalities. Last, the drivers that are used to enforce the new policy must be similar to a certain extent. After discussing these criteria with Peter Verduin, senior consultant and partner at Nautus, the WWB was chosen to analyze more thoroughly to determine the possibility for inclusion in this research.

The WWB is a Dutch law that addresses the social domain. It was introduced in 2004 and at present forms the Dutch social safety net for individuals with little or no income. The WWB provides entitlements for the unavoidable costs of living and offers support for labor engagement. The basic idea of the WWB is that every individual should be employed to earn his or her own income to the largest extent possible. When work is (temporarily) unavailable, individuals are supported with finding a job (by means of the previously discussed Wajong, WIJ and WSW). Until then, the WWB provides for financial means (Rijksoverheid.nl, 2012). Income originating from possible (part-time) work or alimention is deducted from the provided entitlement. Municipalities are responsible for carrying out the WWB and need to finance possible deficits themselves. This ensures that municipalities economize social security expenses as much as possible.

Furthermore, individuals who are eligible for WWB are required to start working as soon as possible. Each individual receiving a financial compensation is obligated to look for employment or participate in a reintegration track by means of enlisting with the entitlement-granting UWV. Employers are eligible for salary indemnifications when a WWB-claimant becomes employed. This indemnification compensates the possible loss in labor productivity and guidance that comes with hiring the employee. Another option is a municipal no-risk insurance policy that compensates the employer when the employee loses his or her ability to perform labor (Rijksoverheid.nl, 2012).

### 4.2 Similarities and Differences

The identification of similarities and differences has taken place by gathering information from an expert panel. Implications for municipalities were stressed in addition to the policy contents during the data gathering process. The outcomes and exact contents of the brainstorm and workshop are to be found in Appendix 1 of this report.

### **Content Similarities**

The goal of both policies is to employ Dutch citizens to the largest extent possible, as well as to support unemployed citizens with finding a way to perform labor activities. Both policies support individuals who cannot provide for their income themselves and consist of a collection of previous policies that relate to supporting people to perform labor activities. Thus, the nature of both policies consists of an integration of social policies that follow an economic and labor-related approach towards the social domain.

Financial implications of both policies are important aspects for municipalities. The financial gains and risks of both policies come forth out of the decentralization of social service provision tasks from the national to the local level. Tasks that were previously executed on behalf of the national government are decentralized and made a municipal responsibility. In addition, budget cuts are embedded in both transitions, for the national government assumes that municipalities are able to perform these tasks more efficient and effective. This translates into similar incentives for both policies: *latent* incentives are budget cuts on the national level, and *explicit* incentives are simplifications through policy integration and decentralization.

In addition to these new responsibilities comes additional freedom. Both policies remove barriers between budgets that were previously separated. By removing these barriers, municipalities are allowed to decide for themselves how to allocate their total budget. This enables municipalities to choose specific focus points that are relevant for the local situation. It thus increases the policy space of municipalities. The direction of accountability also changes in both cases: in the ex-ante situation, the college of B&W is *vertically* accountable towards the national government. In the ex-post situation, a transformation into *horizontal* accountability towards the municipal council is visible.

Concluding, according to the expert panel, many substantial aspects can be considered as being similar. Both policies address labor and labor support, combine multiple social policies into new policy, decentralize tasks and financial risks, increase municipal policy space, and change the direction of accountability (from vertical to horizontal).

### **Content Differences**

The differences that are distinguished by the expert panel are the extent of financial responsibility, the availability of new instruments, the restrictions on budgets and the target population. These aspects are elucidated below.

The first aspect is budget cuts. The national government provides municipalities under the WWB with a participation budget, which includes an income budget. All costs related to the provision of financial entitlements are shared under the income budget. It consists of a fixed amount per entitlement-eligible individual. Possible deficits and gains on the income budget are for municipalities themselves, so providing an incentive to decrease the amount of people with entitlements and increase their re-integration. The participation budget consists of all tasks concerning re-integration, such as WSW, Wajong and further WWB costs. Under the new proposal, more tasks are shared under the participation budget (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2011). The budget is not structurally increased, causing financial risks for municipalities to increase. For many municipalities this implies deficits because too little means are available to support all groups shared under the participation budget. Furthermore, the income budget is cut to stimulate municipalities to increase re-integration efforts (Divosa, 2012).

Last, the target population of both policies differs. The WWnV/Participatiewet addresses a broader target population than the WWB does. In fact, the proposed policy contains the complete WWB population plus the populations of the WSW and a large part of the Wajong.



Concluding, according to the expert panel, there are minor differences between both policies. Even though the substance and aim of both policies is the same, the Participatiewet can be seen as an extension of the WWB. It provides municipalities with even more responsibilities and increases the target population of the policy.

### **Critical Contingency Scores**

For measurement of effectiveness is conducted using the four critical contingencies, it is necessary to assess the status of these contingencies during the implementation stage of the WWB. When the critical contingencies for both policies during the implementation are more or less identical, it is reasonable to assume situational similarity. At this stage, a general assessment of the contingency scores is created. It describes the *general characteristics* of the policy field and the policy itself at the timeframe on or before implementation. The contingencies are thus utilized to draw the global characteristics of both policies to be able to compare them to each other. This same model is later in the research utilized to measure the actual scores for different municipalities during the WWB implementation. This case measurements will be more specific and have more variation than the global assessment underneath.

*Trust:* With the implementation of the WWB, networks that address social security services and re-integration had yet to be formed. However, municipalities, entitlement providers and re-integration partners were already active in the same field. Therefore, the inter-actor trust ties (trust density) with this implementation can be considered as being moderate: even though there was no strong relation between the actors, they were aware of each other's existence and tasks. With the Participatiewet implementation, the WWB networks are addressed. Additionally, new network participants are introduced (e.g. regional reintegration centres, new employers etcetera). For the established trust relationships that were formed during the WWB are likely to co-exist, the density of trust is likely to be higher than at the time that the WWB was introduced. Thus, the current situation shows a moderately high trust density.

*Number of participants:* With the WWB implementation, the networks that formed consisted in general of municipalities, the UWV and employers. With the Participatiewet, regional coordination centers and re-integration entities that specialize in supporting disabled individuals are likely to join these networks. The number of network participants is thus slightly higher in the current situation.

*Goal consensus:* For both policies, network goal consensus scores are moderate. In both cases, the network addresses the entire process from providing entitlements to re-integration and labor provision. In the current situation, more actors are included, but these actors largely aim to achieve the same goals as the previous WWB networks did.

*Need for network-level competencies:* network-level competencies basically consist of the nature of the task performed by the network members and the demands and needs that originate from the network exterior. The nature of the tasks that are to be performed is for both policies almost identical. Both share substantial aspects, including the provision of labor support, re-integration support and financial support. The demand of needs from the network exterior is slightly larger in the current situation, for new additional external groups are added to the target population (WSW, Wajong). However, the nature of these needs is not substantially different: it is mainly the demand of provided services that increases. Therefore, the need for network-level competencies for both policies can be considered as being relatively high.

**Table 4.2***Scores on Critical Contingencies Concerning the Implementation of WWB and Participatiewet*

<b>Policy</b>	<b>Trust</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Goal Consensus</b>	<b>Need for Network-level Competencies</b>
<i>Wet Werk en Bijstand (2004)</i>	Moderate density	Moderate	Moderate	Relatively high
<i>Participatiewet (2015)</i>	Moderately high density	High	Moderate	Relatively High

*Global characteristics of the four critical contingencies during the implementation stage of the WWB (2004) and the Participatiewet (2015).*

### 4.3 Conclusion

To finalize this brief assessment on the comparability of the WWB and the Participatiewet, the third specific research question is answered: *“To what extent are the contents of the WWB (2004) similar to the contents of the current participation-related decentralizations, what are the similarities and differences concerning coordination and organization for municipalities and to what extent are the municipal contingencies for both policies similar?”*

For obtaining data on similarities and differences of the contents of the policies, an expert panel was asked to participate in a workshop on municipal cooperation and networks and provide input in a brainstorm session afterwards. This panel identified labor and labor support, the combination of multiple social policies into a new one, the decentralization of tasks and financial risks, the increase in policy space and the increase in horizontal accountability as key similarities. The panel argued that all of these aspects are substantial parts and at the core of both policies.

The panel also identified several differences: the current initiatives can be seen as an extension of the WWB that provides municipalities with even more responsibilities and increases the target population. These differences are argued to be minor, for they do not interfere with the policy cores and mainly consist of the differences in ‘reach’ of the policies.

A brief analysis of the scores on the four critical contingencies at time of implementation shows similar scores on goal consensus and need for network-level competencies. Scores on number of participants (moderate versus moderately high) and trust (moderate versus moderately high) deviate. However, these deviations are not extreme: in both cases, the scores show only moderate differences. Therefore, it is concluded that the scores on the critical contingencies for both policies at the time of implementation have a high level of similarity.

It is concluded that the previous WWB and the current initiative show more similarities than differences in terms of policy contents and have similar scores on the four critical contingencies at the respective time of implementation of the policies. This implies that the WWB can indeed be used as reference legislation for further evaluation. This enables the possibility to collect data on the WWB and generalize these results to make predictions about the future social sector cooperation initiatives of a similar nature.

## **5 Methodological Framework**

This chapter starts with elaborating on the research strategy and framework. Second, design deliberations are made and both quantitative and qualitative approaches are introduced. Afterwards, the case selection method is discussed. The chapter then continues with the research design itself including the conceptualization and operationalization of the key concepts that are used for the creation of the survey. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the possible threats in terms of reliability and validity, including the tackling of problems that might emerge out of these threats. The combination of the above discussed elements forms the 'action plan' for carrying out this study.

### **5.1 Strategy and Framework**

The design on which this research is based aims to make predictions concerning the implementation of new public policy in the social domain. The main strategy aims to extrapolate lessons on cooperation for the implementation of the WWB to future similar cases. This study does not aim to intervene in a certain research situation, but rather to observe the past, learn from it, and recommend strategies that can be followed in the future. Because the past is observed to learn lessons for the future, this research mainly shows characteristics of a non-interventionist nature.

The conceptual framework that is used for executing this research is retrieved from the analysis of scientific literature on cooperation in the public sector that has been made in chapter 2. Due to the quantitative nature of the research, the construction of the framework is conducted in a well-developed and pre-specified manner. The key concepts that are to be analyzed are derived from this literature review. After operationalization, these concepts are transformed into a survey that measures empirical scores on these concepts. The limited qualitative part of the research aims to obtain additional background information on the key concepts and tries to distill additional influential factors for success (Punch, 2006, pp. 39-49).

### **5.2 Design deliberations and choice**

An adequately selected research approach follows the research problems and the related theoretical framework logically. This section therefore starts with analyzing the way that the research problems are structured and defined.

The main research problem assumes that small municipalities do not know which (cooperative) strategies are to be used to effectively execute public policy in the social sector. After defining the research questions, the theoretical exploration was conducted by introducing theories on forms of cooperation, critical contingencies of effectiveness and effectiveness analysis. Then, a possible future case in the social domain was discussed, as well as a historical case in this domain (the WWB). After this mainly theoretical exploration, empirical data will be gathered to test whether the theoretical framework is reflected in reality.

The core of specific research question 4 shows aspects of an explanatory nature. This implies that the study sets not only out to draw a picture of something in the past, but aims to explain how a situation has come about, and how it possibly will come about in the future (Punch, 2006, pp. 33-34).

#### **Design**

The questions that are studied in this research can be divided into two selections: the theoretical questions (1, 2 and 3 that concern an ex-ante theoretical analysis and introduce the key concepts) and the empirical one (4 aims to gather and analyze empirical data concerning the key concepts).

Data that are relevant for the answering the first selection of questions are found in scientific literature on network forms, contingencies and assessment of network effectiveness. For answering the specific research question 4, empirical data needs to be gathered. To obtain these data, both a

qualitative and a quantitative approach are utilized. Quantitative data are gathered by means of surveys that are sent out to a selection of small Dutch municipalities. The questions in the surveys are based on the operationalization of the research key theoretical concepts.

Analysis of the results is conducted by means of a statistical analysis using SPSS. The scores of the respondents on the different operationalizations are combined in such a way that individual scores on the key concepts are obtained. The key concepts are then related to each other, following the causal relationships that are described in the theoretical background and hypotheses. These hypotheses are then, based on the empirical data, either accepted or rejected. Final conclusions are drawn in line with the results of the acceptance or rejection of these hypotheses.

### **Quantitative Approach**

The quantitative approach of this research consists of a survey research that is used to observe a selection of the target population. For it is unfeasible to interview (representatives of) *all* small Dutch municipalities, surveys are a good approach to collect original data on experiences and orientations of the target population. Representatives are provided with an online questionnaire that contains questions concerning the key concepts of this research. At the time of sending out the questionnaires, the WWnV was still assumed to be implemented. Therefore, the quantitative approach includes characteristics of the WWnV instead of the Participatiewet.

The survey questions are formulated and structured in compliance with the guidelines of Dijkstra & Smit (2005). Specific attention is paid to clarification of the concepts and items: when concepts are introduced in a clear and unambiguous way, the respondents are better able to answer these questions. Second, double-barreled questions are avoided to avoid situations in which a respondent needs to answer two questions with a single answer. This might lead to ambiguity in the research results, for some respondents might focus on one part of the question, while others focus on the other. Third, only relevant questions are asked that relate to real life situations rather than fictitious issues. This increases the possibility that a respondent has thought about (or has feeling with) the issue in question. Last, the standard guidelines for formulating questions are taken into account: using short items, avoiding negative items and avoiding biased items and terms (Babbie, 2004, pp. 243-259).

To be able to process the data easily, the questionnaire mainly consists of close-ended questions. Respondents are required to either choose an answer from a list of fixed answers, or to rate pre-defined statements on a scale from 0 to 10. This method ensures uniformity of responses (for no coding is needed) and easy processing. Using the 0 to 10-scales enables the utilization analysis of variables on an interval scale. For creating the online questionnaire, a tool named Limesurvey is utilized. Respondents are sent out an invitation by means of regular mail. This invitation contains a description of the research, the request to participate, a link to the website where the survey can be filled in and an individual login code. A domain name that is assumed to trigger respondents to participate is bought and utilized for hosting the survey on [www.socialesamenwerking.nl](http://www.socialesamenwerking.nl).

To increase both (construct) validity as well as the response rate, the survey questions are formulated in such a way that they relate to the experiences of the respondents as good as possible. The process of creating the survey questions started with the operationalization of the key concepts and the formulation of the initial set of questions. These questions were discussed at the university with both Dr. P-J Klok and Dr. A. Need and were adapted afterwards. This altered set of questions was checked by three fellow students on structure, understandability and formulation. After processing their comments, a final check was conducted by two consultants who operate in the social security field. Their recommendations concerning certain conflicts between the questions and practice are included in the final version of the survey.

For this research focuses on the behavior of organizations, it must be taken into account that units of observation are civil servants who provide their answers on behalf of the municipality they are employed at. This implies that respondents might provide individual perceptions that do not reflect a factual representation of the organizational point of view. To tackle this possible problem, the questionnaire is sent out twice to departments of social affairs of selected municipalities. One questionnaire is to be answered by a manager, and one by a policy officer. By using this strategy, a good representation of the actual point of view of a municipality is aimed to be obtained. The questionnaire and the invitation letters can be found in Appendix 3 of this research.

### **Qualitative Approach**

While survey research provides a general oversight of the thoughts of the target population, the qualitative part of the data gathering process aims to retrieve more in-depth information. To be able to answer specific research question 4 in a valid way, qualitative data were obtained by means of interviews with consultants who are employed in the social security policy field and work on a day-to-day basis with small municipalities. In addition, a workshop concerning municipal cooperation was given to the experts. Afterwards, a brainstorm session was utilized to gather the required information. The qualitative data that are gathered for this research can be found in Appendix 1 and 2. The qualitative data are utilized to provide that results of the quantitative data analysis with some background information, and are used to critically assess the utilized theories, which might need to be altered depending on the results of the analysis.

As for the quantitative data, the qualitative data were gathered during the WWnV-timeframe and thus focus on the WWnV instead of the Participatiewet. Because the consultants work with a multitude of municipalities and have been involved in the preparatory stage of the WWnV implementation, it is assumed that these consultants are able to see trends in municipal behavior. Using this qualitative approach provides this research with an external view on (future) drivers, cooperative strategies and effectiveness, in addition to the internal perspective of the municipal employees themselves.

### **5.3 Case Selection**

Cases are selected for both the quantitative and the qualitative approach. Emphasis is put on the quantitative approach, for the vast majority of the data are gathered by means of the surveys.

#### **Quantitative Case Selection**

*Finding cases and selection criteria:* the simple random sampling method is utilized to draw a sample of the total population of small Dutch municipalities. These municipalities are defined as '*municipalities that have 50.000 inhabitants or less*' (SGO Benchmarking, 2010). It is assumed that all small municipalities are equally accessible and available for taking part in this research. The target group of 361 is sufficiently large for using this method. Simple random sampling has two key properties: unbiased and independent selection. Unbiased implies an equal chance of being selected; independent implies that individual case selection is independent from selection of other cases. *Sample size:* due to financial constraints (selected cases will receive two letters by regular mail), 150 out of the total of 361 small municipalities are included in the sample. Based on the CBS (2011) facts and figures concerning the number of inhabitants of a municipality, a list of all small Dutch municipalities is created. Each municipality is provided with a number (rating from 1 to 361) and Excel is used to draw 150 random unique numbers between 1 and 361. Contact details of these 150 sampled municipalities are bought from [www.overheidsadressen.nl](http://www.overheidsadressen.nl) afterwards.

The respondents are both managers and policy officers who are employed at the municipal departments of social affairs. Choices for picking these two positions are based on expectations that individuals in these positions were involved in, and are able to report on, the coordination of tasks

and activities within the network. By focusing on more or less identical respondents, a homogeneous sampling strategy is used.

*Response rate:* the letters invite the respondents to fill in the questionnaire online. When a respondent has not filled in the survey within two weeks after sending the letters, a reminder is sent by means of an e-mail or a phone call. The strategy of sending hard-copy letters is opted for, for it is assumed that this will increase the response rate (civil servants receive more mail than letters, making a letter more noticeable). Furthermore, many municipalities register regular mail in a central database system, making follow-up more likely. All letters are signed by hand to increase the feeling of having received a personal letter rather than an anonymously generated one. The response rate is aimed to be as high as possible (to tackle problems with a non-response bias). The aimed response rate is 25% of the total of 150 municipalities.

### **Qualitative Case Selection**

For obtaining the qualitative data, cases are selected on the basis of expertise in the social security field. For the qualitative approach stresses current and future municipal cooperation initiatives rather than previous ones, it is important that for the interviews, the interviewees are currently involved in the social security field. Criteria that define expertise are years of working experience in the social domain as a consultant, and the nature of projects that are currently conducted by the interviewee in this domain. For the workshop and brainstorm session, a date is selected when most social security consultants are available.

For conducting the interviews, consultants who are employed at the host organization are requested to participate. First, a list of the consultants that comply best with the 'past experience' and 'current involvement' criteria is made. The two most qualified candidates are requested to participate. Obviously, the availability of the candidates is taken into account; in case a candidate was not available or not willing to participate, a new qualified candidate is invited as a substitute. One plenary brainstorm and workshop was conducted with all consultants employed at Nautus to gather additional ideas and insights for the interview contents and the creation of the survey.

## **5.4 Research Design**

The research design is used to be able to measure the different variables that are derived from the specific research questions. First, the central phenomena that have been introduced in this research are transformed into concepts. Second, these concepts are operationalized to make the different concepts better distinguishable, which enables measurement of the concepts by using empirical observations. This section finishes with discussing and tackling issues with reliability and validity that relate to the process of data gathering and processing. This discussion aims to enable drawing valid and reliable conclusions based on the results of the data analysis.

### **Conceptualization and Operationalization**

The conceptualization of the key variables stresses the question: *'What is it that needs to be measured, and what dimensions does it consist of?'* The concepts approach the *management* level (coordination and distribution of tasks and activities), rather than the *operational* level of networks (execution of tasks). After the key phenomena of this research are conceptualized, the operationalization of these concepts is conducted to enable measurement of the concepts. The operationalization stresses the question: *'How are the key concepts to be measured by means of empirical observations?'* Appendix 4 contains the tables with the operationalization of the different research concepts.

### **Network Forms**

As discussed in the theoretical exploration concerning networks, there are three general network forms. To be able to determine in what kind of network a responding municipality was or is involved, two key concepts are important: brokering and governance. Based on scores on these key concepts, the form of the network that the responding municipality is part of is distilled. See table 5.4.1 in Appendix 4.

### **Critical Contingencies**

The operationalization of the four critical contingencies that predict likely effectiveness of the network forms are shown in table 5.4.2 in Appendix 4.

### **Effectiveness**

To be able to answer specific research question 4, variables that concern effectiveness need to be operationalized. This is conducted on the basis of the article by Provan & Milward (2001). The concepts for effectiveness evaluation are operationalized in table 5.4.3 in Appendix 4.

### **Reliability and Validity**

The nature of survey research leads in general to a high degree of reliability, but a relatively low degree of (especially construct and internal) validity. A measure to tackle possible validity issues is the inclusion of two expert interviews and a brainstorm session as additional empirical data. To make the final results of this research more reliable and valid, threats concerning the different types of validity are discussed and tackled. This increases the extent to which the findings of this research can be generalized to a larger population and future cases (Cook, Campbell, & Shadish, 2002, pp. 38-102).

### **Statistical Conclusion Validity**

*Heterogeneity of units:* municipalities operate in environments that differ to a large extent, and each municipality has its own unique characteristics. Therefore, the positions (and related tasks and responsibilities) of the respondents within these organizations might differ to a certain extent. Furthermore, backgrounds of respondents might differ, for networks might be judged differently on the operational level than on the decision-making and coordination level.

- ➔ A proposed solution is the measurement of relevant respondent characteristics such as both the current and previous position of the respondents in the organization (to tackle problems with heterogeneity of units). Also, each municipality is sent two surveys: one is to be answered by a manager and one is to be answered by policy officer. By using this strategy, a strong representation of the point of view of the municipality as a whole is obtained. In addition, by receiving answers from an employee on the managerial level and one on the professional level, data is obtained that concerns network management and coordination of tasks, rather than the execution of network tasks.<sup>4</sup>

### **Internal Validity**

*Instrumentation:* The WWB has been implemented eight years ago. Therefore, problems with the instrumentation might arise. This is the case when effectiveness of WWB execution and implementation is affected by societal or organizational changes, rather than by cooperation.

- ➔ The instrumentation threat to internal validity can be tackled by specifically stressing the contents of the WWB in the survey. To make sure that respondents are aware of what the WWB comprises, the main contents of this legislation are discussed as background information in the survey.

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<sup>4</sup> A distinction is made between policy employees, managers and 'others'. It is assumed that policy employees will be represented stronger in the response, for policy employees form a larger part of the target population (due to the fact that there are more employees than managers). Due to the low response (N=30), no additional analyses concerning valuation of network effectiveness for different groups of respondents are conducted.

*Maturation*: efforts that are already made for implementing new social policy (i.e. preparations for the Participatiewet) might affect the way that the previously implemented WWB is perceived. For instance, recent negative experiences with cooperation concerning Participatiewet preparations might affect valuation of the concept cooperation itself in a negative way.

- ➔ A proposed solution for the maturation problem is to aim to obtain data from respondents who were already employed at the municipality at the time when the WWB implementation efforts were made. Questions concerning the time that the respondent is employed at the selected municipality are therefore included in the questionnaire.

### **Construct Validity**

*Inadequate explication of constructs*: when constructs are not adequately explicated, incorrect inferences might be made by the respondents when filling in the survey.

- ➔ Inadequate explication of constructs is countered by characterizing constructs in a way that is not too general, nor too specific. This research comprises ten different concepts that in most cases consist of different dimensions (or 'items'). When constructs are hard to grasp (i.e. the relatively theoretical nature of 'legitimacy', 'network-level competencies', and 'brokering'), additional information is provided, or practical statements with a 0-10 answer scale are utilized to make the concepts easier to grasp and understand. Furthermore, it is taken into account that a single construct does not in fact consist of two or more constructs to avoid ambiguous results.

*Mono-operation bias*: when only one operationalization of a construct is made, certain aspects of the construct might be underrepresented.

- ➔ Making a thorough analysis of the different dimensions that concepts comprise, helps with solving the possible issues with the mono-operation bias. In this way, constructs are measured by means of multiple operationalizations when necessary. In addition, the quality of these measurements is improved by providing the respondents pragmatic questions (statements) that relate to reality rather than to theoretical concepts. This makes it easier for respondents to grasp the research contents.

### **External Validity**

*Generalizability to other UTOS* (units, treatments, outcomes and settings) needs to be taken into account for the gathered data, analysis and conclusions.

- ➔ For it is possible in this study to make use of randomization instead of purposive sampling, randomization is utilized to enhance external validity and generalizability of the results. Furthermore, a literature analysis has been made to compare the WWB and the proposed Participatiewet to be able to draw parallels. This enhances the possibility to generalize the results of this research to future social public policy implementation cases.

Concluding, this chapter has discussed the strategy and framework, design liberations and choices, the case selection and the research design. Together these elements form the methodological framework of this research.



## 6 Data and Analysis

This chapter starts with discussing the process of data gathering, including the response rate, and respondent characteristics. Then, the data are assessed and transformed when required before being analyzed. This chapter concludes with answering specific research question 4.

### 6.1 Data Gathering and Data Characteristics

To gather quantitative data, a questionnaire was created based on the operationalized concepts. This questionnaire was discussed with both supervisors at the university and finally checked by and adjusted according to the comments of Peter Verduin (senior consultant and partner at Nautus). After finalizing the questionnaire, a datasheet of the 150 randomly selected small municipalities was bought at [www.overheidsadressen.nl](http://www.overheidsadressen.nl). Invitation letters were sent by regular mail to the head of the department of social affairs of all selected municipalities. In addition, a letter was sent to a policy employee of this same department. The invitation letters contained a letter which referred to the survey website ([www.socialesamenwerking.nl](http://www.socialesamenwerking.nl)) and a unique login code for each respondent. An example of this letter as well as the utilized survey can be found in Appendix 3: mailing and survey.

Four weeks after sending out the initial letters, only seventeen respondents had filled in the questionnaire. Action was taken in order to increase the response rate. Re-sending a reminder by means of regular mail turned out to be unfeasible due to financial constraints, so the majority of selected municipalities was contacted by phone (a total of 85) and was requested to participate in the research. This led to an increase in total responses with 25 to a total of 42 responses (a response rate of 28%). Unfortunately, twelve of these respondents did not complete the survey, making the total amount of completed responses 30 (which results in a response rate of 20%). This amount is lower than the aimed response rate of 25%, but contacting the respondents for a third time was regarded as being too labor and time intensive. Therefore, the analysis is built based on the thirty responses that have been gathered during this two-month timeframe. As the results will show, the data do not provide conclusive statistical evidence, partially caused by this low response rate. For this sample is small, extreme scores have a high influence on the results. Nevertheless, it is chosen not to omit these extreme values, for a further decrease of N is assumed to be more problematic than weak correlations.

#### Probable Causes for Low Response Rate

The low response rate is assumed to be influenced by several circumstances. First, the WWnV was declared controversial in June 2012 by the Second Chamber of Representatives that was under resignation at that moment. The letters were sent on July 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2012. This is likely to have negatively affected the response rate, for the research is called 'WWnV Onderzoek' and thus could easily be perceived as irrelevant. Furthermore, respondents might have been on holiday during the data gathering timeframe. It was assumed that colleagues of the same department would fill in the questionnaire, but unfortunately this was proven often not to be the case.

A second cause for the low response rate might be the low priority that was given to research participation by the target population. After having sent out reminders by means of an e-mail, several respondents replied that they did not have time or simply did not find this research important enough to participate. Some respondents mentioned an overload with surveys, causing them to decide not to participate in any survey at all. In addition, the departments were occupied with developing plans to implement several policies in the social field (i.e. the Jeugdzorg and AWBZ decentralizations), making them very busy at the time that the letters were sent.

The third cause can be found in the utilized contact details. Some details were outdated, and some municipalities externalized their department of social affairs in an ISD (Intergemeentelijke Sociale Dienst). Letters that were addressed to departments of social affairs were sometimes forwarded to

the ISD and sometimes returned to sender. Contact by phone indicated that it was not clear for many ISDs on the behalf of whom the questionnaire needed to be filled in, nor were data for the determination of individual municipal effectiveness scores available to some ISDs.

**6.1.1 Respondent Characteristics**

Background details are generated concerning the origin of the respondents and their organizations. As is shown in table 6.1.1 underneath, the majority (60 per cent) of the respondents consists of municipal policy employees. 30 per cent of the respondents is a manager and 10 percent originates from elsewhere in the organization (one senior policy analyst, one labor and income consultant and one process manager).

There seems to be an unequal distribution of the respondents’ positions (60%, 30%, 10%), but there is no strong indication for heterogeneity of units. The distribution within the data resembles the expectations, for more policy employees work in the examined field than managers do (which is directly reflected in the response).

**Table 6.1.1**  
*Respondent position within their organization*

Position	Frequency (N)	Percent
Policy Employee	18	60%
Manager	9	30%
Other	3	10%
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 6.1.1: Respondent positions made absolute and in terms of percentage; heterogeneity might have negatively affected the statistical conclusion validity of the research.

**Figure 6.1.2**  
Pie chart of respondent sector involvement

REPRESENTATION OF SECTOR INVOLVEMENT





Figure 6.1.2 shows the involvement of the respondents in the different social sectors. Respondents were requested to select all sectors in which they were involved at the time of participating in the research. As is clearly visible, the sectors re-integration (25), social employment (24) and regular employment (18) were picked most often. Welfare (6), care of the disabled (5) and youth care (2) are less represented among the respondents. The graph shows that the respondents are mainly involved in sectors that are affected by the WWB. This ensures that instrumentation threats to internal validity (and, to some extent, construct validity) are tackled: those requested to provide input concerning the WWB are indeed aware of what it comprises.

**Figure 6.1.3**

Pie chart of the size of responding municipalities



The size of the municipalities is checked to avoid that respondents are included in the analysis that are not part of the research population, which would negatively affect the internal validity. The pie chart shows the distribution of the sizes of the responding municipalities. One municipality mentioned to have more than 50.000 inhabitants, which implied that this respondent needed to be omitted from the sample. However, a background check with the CBS learned that this municipality actually has less than 50.000 inhabitants and is thus to be included. The graph shows a good representation of the target population. It comprises a majority of very small municipalities, but 'small to medium' municipalities are included to a large extent as well.

Hence, it is concluded that the data that were collected indicate no threats to internal, construct and statistical conclusion validity. The distribution of the respondents among municipalities and sector involvement matches the expectations of a more or less equal distribution. It should be noted that threats to external validity are present due to the relatively low amount of respondents (N=30).

## 6.2 Data processing

The gathered quantitative data were downloaded from Limesurvey and imported in SPSS for adjustment and analysis. SPSS tables and figures that are referred to as "A.xx" can be found in Appendix 5: SPSS Data Output. The qualitative data were recorded and interview transcripts were made afterwards. These interview transcripts can be found in Appendix 2: empirical data - expert interviews.

### 6.2.1 Data Assessment

The first step in the data assessment stage is screening and cleaning the data, to check for possible errors and to find and correct these in the data file. This is conducted for all categorical and continuous variables by assessing the descriptive outcomes of all variables (Pallant, 2007, pp. 44-49) In order to be able to process the gathered data correctly, several data transformations need to be made. First, the wording of particular items has been reversed to help prevent response bias during the data gathering process. The scores on these negatively formulated items are deducted from the maximum score of 10 and recoded into the same variable, making all statements measure the same (positive) direction (Pallant, pp. 82-85). This concerns the items NVNL2, BROK1, BROK2 and BROK3. Reliability of the contingency variables is analyzed next. To be able to determine the internal consistency of the scales that are used, Cronbach's Alpha is determined for all concepts that are

measured by means of statements (Pallant, pp. 96-99). Combining the used items into a new variable is a form of data reduction.

In the current study, two contingency variables were measured by means of statements: *need for network-level competencies* and *trust*. Reliability statistics show a Chronbach's Alpha of 0,729 for trust and 0,424 for need for network-level competencies. Due to this latter value being lower than 0,7, the item-total statistics of NLVL were calculated. The results indicated that statement NLVL\_NLVL2 was to be removed. After this removal, Chronbach's Alpha of NLVL increased to 0,664 (0,687 based on standardized items). This is still lower than the aimed 0,7 but the highest value achievable with the current data. Results are shown in tables A1.1 - A1.3.

### **6.2.2 Network Data Transformation**

After having assessed the data, the next step is transformation in order to make them applicable to the theoretical model. The data that concern the variables brokering and governance are combined and transformed into the three concepts of governance forms (PGN, LOGN and NAO). This transformation is conducted on the basis of scores on governance form (shared, lead organization or network administrative) and the matching combination with the respective form of brokering (PGN: shared-low; LOGN: lead-moderate/high; NAO: network administrative-moderate/high). Scores from 0-3 are recoded into 'low', scores 4-6 into 'moderate' and 7-10 into 'high'. For four entries, conflicting matches showed up between governance form and level of brokering. For these four cases, additional background information that was provided under question GOV2 was assessed to make the final determination of the governance form. The governance form variable has an ordinal nature and a distribution of 11;13;6 among the three governance forms. These scores show a high level of variation. Descriptive statistics can be found in table A2.

### **6.2.3 Contingency Data Transformation**

The contingency variables were measured in two different ways: trust and need for network-level competencies were measured using statements, whereas goal consensus and number of participants were measured by means of one single question. The variation of the distribution of scores within the variables trust and the need for network-level competencies is high and indicates a normal distribution for both variables, as was expected. Scores on the latter two variables were measured in a direct manner and show little variation. Results are shown in tables A3.1 – A3.6.

### **6.2.4 Effectiveness Data Transformation**

For assessing the relationship between the contingencies, the chosen governance form and effectiveness, the variables that indicate network effectiveness need to be transformed into a variable that represents total network effectiveness.

First step is to assess the internal consistency of the scales that were used for the four variables for effectiveness. Cronbach's alpha for client-level outcomes (0,845), legitimacy (0,921) and cost (0,895) is higher than the aimed 0,7. Resource acquisition (0,662) is lower than 0,7. Unfortunately, deleting items does not increase Cronbach's alpha for this variable. Thus, it is decided to take this relatively low value into account and use all measured statements to calculate the total score. Results are shown in tables A4.1 – A4.4.

Next, total scale scores are calculated for each variable. During the operationalization process of the effectiveness variables, no additional weight was given to certain statements (due to the lack of supporting theory). The statements are thus weighted equally when transformed into effectiveness variable scores. Finally, these four effectiveness variables are integrated to form a variable for total effectiveness. This variable shows a normal distribution with a tendency to the right and has a mean of 5,85 and a standard deviation of 1,16. Characteristics are shown in figure A4.5 and table A4.6.

### 6.3 Analysis

The first part of this analysis assesses whether combinations of governance form and individual contingencies as described by Provan & Kenis (2007) have indeed a higher level of effectiveness when compared to the same governance forms under other conditions. For testing this theory, three separate analyses are conducted. For each governance form it is tested whether the dependent variable (effectiveness) changes for different scores on the independent variable. However, it is impossible to compare individual effectiveness scores of a case to effectiveness scores of this same case when another governance form would have been chosen. Therefore, the analysis utilizes the *extent of the match between the contingencies and the governance form* as independent variable, rather than either the contingency scores or the governance form. Following, a comparison between network effectiveness scores of cases that match the model to a certain extent ('matching cases') and cases that deviate from the expected combination ('deviant cases') is made. Matching cases are cases that closely resemble the model (with a maximum score of 4, where all contingency scores form a perfect match with the model expectations). The number of matching contingencies to be 'matching' is discussed per network form.

#### 6.3.1 Contingency Scores, Forms of Governance and Effectiveness

As discussed before, the 'total effectiveness' variable has a normal distribution. Both case groups originate from this population, so it is safe to assume that the difference in means between both case groups is normally distributed. Thus, an independent samples T-test can be conducted on the means of the effectiveness scores of both groups. The hypotheses underneath are tested in the following manner:  $H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2$ ;  $H_a: \mu_1 > \mu_2$ ;  $p < \alpha$ .

#### Effectiveness for Shared Governance Forms

For the analysis of effectiveness of shared governance forms, hypothesis 1 is utilized: *"The shared governance form will be most effective in terms of total network-level effectiveness when there is a high trust density, a relatively few number of participants, a high level of goal consensus and a low need for network-level competencies in the network."*

Table 6.3.1 shows the amount of matching scores with the model expectations, the respective scores on the four effectiveness criteria and the total effectiveness score for each respondent. The actual scores on the critical contingencies for shared governance networks are shown in table A5.1.

**Table 6.3.1**  
*Matching Scores and Effectiveness Scores of the Shared Governance Form*

Respondent Number	Amount of Matching Scores with Expected Scores	Client-Level outcome Score	Legitimacy Score	Cost Score	Resource Acquisition Score	Total Effectiveness Score
1	1	6,6	3	3	8	5,15
2	0	6,4	5	5	7	5,85
3	3	6,6	5,2	5,5	6	5,83
4	0	5,4	5	4,25	3,67	4,58
5	2	9,2	7,6	4,5	10	7,82
6	3	6,6	6,4	5	6	6
7	3	7	5,4	4	5,33	5,58
8	2	6,6	7	6	7,33	6,83
9	0	6,4	6	4,75	6,33	5,92
10	3	6,4	6,4	5,75	5,67	6,05
11	3	5,8	6	3	4	4,7

*Scores of the number of empirical matches with the model expectations and effectiveness scores for the shared governance form.*

Cases with three or four matching scores are chosen to form the matching cases-group (N=5) and cases with two or fewer matching scores form the deviant cases-group (N=6). Total effectiveness of this governance form as has an average score of 5,85 with a standard deviation of 0,92 (table A5.2).

H<sub>0</sub>: the mean of the effectiveness score of the matching cases-group is equal to the mean of the effectiveness score of the deviant cases-group for shared network cases.

H<sub>a</sub>: the mean of the effectiveness score of the matching cases-group is higher than the mean of the effectiveness score of the deviant cases-group for shared network cases.

$\alpha = 0,05$ .

H<sub>0</sub> is rejected when the one-tailed sig-value (P) <  $\alpha$ .

The Levene's test for equality of variances has a value of 0,901, which is higher than the  $\alpha$  of 0,05. Thus, equal variances for both groups are assumed. The T-test for equality of means shows a mean difference of 0,885, a t-value of 1,747, a Df of 9 and a two-tailed P-value of 0,115. The P-value is thus  $0,115/2 = 0,0575$ , which is only slightly higher than  $\alpha$ , so the current data show insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is thus not rejected and it is concluded that there is no statistically significant difference between the effectiveness scores of the matching cases-group and the deviant-cases group for the shared governance network form. The data do in fact show a higher mean for the matching cases (6,33) compared to the deviant cases (5,44), but this difference is statistically insignificant. See tables A5.3 and A5.4.

### Effectiveness for Lead Organization Governance Forms

Hypothesis 2: *"The lead organization governance form will be most effective in terms of total network-level effectiveness when there is a low and centralized trust density, a moderate number of participants, a moderately low level of goal consensus and a moderate need for network-level competencies in the network."*

Table 6.3.2 shows the amount of matching scores with the model expectations, the respective scores on the four effectiveness criteria and the total effectiveness score for each respondent. The actual scores on the critical contingencies for lead organized networks are shown in table A6.1.

**Table 6.3.2**

*Matching Scores and Effectiveness Scores of the Lead Organization Governance Form*

<b>Respondent Number</b>	<b>Amount of Matching Scores with Expected Scores</b>	<b>Client-Level outcome Score</b>	<b>Legitimacy Score</b>	<b>Cost Score</b>	<b>Resource Acquisition Score</b>	<b>Total Effectiveness Score</b>
12	1	6,8	6	6,25	7	<b>6,51</b>
13	0	6,8	5	0,5	6,33	<b>4,66</b>
14	0	7	7	8,75	7,67	<b>7,6</b>
15	0	5,8	5	3	5	<b>4,7</b>
16	1	5,8	5,2	6	7	<b>6</b>
17	0	5,4	5,4	6,5	5,33	<b>5,66</b>
18	1	6,6	6	5	4,33	<b>5,48</b>
19	0	5	2	2,25	4	<b>3,31</b>
20	0	7,2	6	4,75	8,33	<b>6,57</b>
21	0	1,8	3,2	6,75	4,67	<b>4,1</b>
22	0	2,4	3	7,5	3,33	<b>4,06</b>
23	1	8,2	5,6	5,5	6,33	<b>6,41</b>
24	1	6,8	5	7,5	5	<b>6,08</b>

*Scores of the number of empirical matches with the model expectations and effectiveness scores for the lead organization governance form.*

For no cases are present with two or more matches, cases with one or more matching scores are chosen to form the matching cases-group (N=5) and cases with no matching scores form the deviant cases-group (N=8). Otherwise, a comparison between both groups would be impossible. Total effectiveness of this governance form has an average score of 5,48 with a standard deviation of 1,23 (table A6.2).

H<sub>0</sub>: the mean of the effectiveness score of the matching cases-group is equal to the mean of the effectiveness score of the deviant cases-group for lead organization governance cases.

H<sub>a</sub>: the mean of the effectiveness score of the matching cases-group is higher than the mean of the effectiveness score of the deviant cases-group for lead organization governance cases.

$\alpha = 0,05$ .

H<sub>0</sub> is rejected when the one-tailed sig-value (P) <  $\alpha$ .

The Levene's test for equality of variances has a value of 0,032, which is lower than the  $\alpha$  of 0,05. Equal variances of both groups are not assumed. The T-test for inequality of means shows a mean difference of 1,013, a t-value of 1,882, a Df of 11 and a two-tailed P-value of 0,094. The P-value is thus  $0,094/2 = 0,047$ , which is slightly below  $\alpha$  (0,05), so the current data show sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Also see tables A6.3 and A6.4.

The alternative hypothesis is thus accepted and it is concluded that there is a statistically significant positive difference between the effectiveness scores of the matching cases-group and the deviant-cases group for lead organization governance cases. However, it should be noted that these results are unlikely to indicate a strong relationship between matching cases and effectiveness, due to the weak criterion that is used to label cases as being 'matching'. Otherwise, no comparison would have been possible, so this form with a low level of statistical conclusion validity is opted for.

### **Effectiveness for Network Administrative Organization Governance Forms**

Hypothesis 3: *"The NAO governance form will be most effective in terms of total network-level effectiveness when there is a moderate to wide sharing of trust, a moderate to high number of participants, a moderately high level of goal consensus and a high need for network-level competencies in the network."*

Table 6.3.3 shows the amount of matching scores with the model expectations, the respective scores on the four effectiveness criteria and the total effectiveness score for each respondent. The actual scores on the critical contingencies for NAO-organized networks are shown in table A7.1.

**Table 6.3.3**

*Matching Scores and Effectiveness Scores of the Network Administrative Organization Governance Form*

<b>Respondent Number</b>	<b>Amount of Matching Scores with Expected Scores</b>	<b>Client-Level outcome Score</b>	<b>Legitimacy Score</b>	<b>Cost Score</b>	<b>Resource Acquisition Score</b>	<b>Total Effectiveness Score</b>
25	1	6	4	5,75	6	<b>5,44</b>
26	1	7,8	6,8	7,75	8	<b>7,59</b>
27	1	8	8	7	8	<b>7,75</b>
28	3	4,4	6	6,25	4	<b>5,16</b>
29	1	9	9	5,75	7	<b>7,69</b>
30	3	7,4	6,6	5	6,33	<b>6,33</b>

*Scores of the number of empirical matches with the model expectations and effectiveness scores for the network administrative organization governance form.*

Cases with three or four matching scores are chosen to form the matching cases-group (N=2) and cases with two or fewer matching scores form the deviant cases-group (N=4). Total effectiveness of this governance form as has an average score of 6,66 with a standard deviation of 1,18 (see table A7.2).

H<sub>0</sub>: the mean of the effectiveness score of the matching cases-group is equal to the mean of the effectiveness score of the deviant cases-group for network administrative organization-cases.

H<sub>a</sub>: the mean of the effectiveness score of the matching cases-group is higher than the mean of the effectiveness score of the deviant cases-group for network administrative organization-cases.

$\alpha = 0,05$ .

H<sub>0</sub> is rejected when the one-tailed sig-value (P) <  $\alpha$ .

The Levene's test for equality of variances has a value of 0,581, which is higher than the  $\alpha$  of 0,05. Equal variances of both groups are assumed. The T-test for assumed equality of means shows a mean difference of -1,37, a t-value of 0,209, a Df of 4 and a two-tailed P-value of 0,209. The P-value is thus  $0,209/2 = 0,105$ , which is higher than  $\alpha$  (0,05), so the current data show insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. See tables A7.3 and A7.4.

The null hypothesis is thus not rejected and it is concluded that there is no statistically significant difference between the effectiveness scores of the matching cases-group and the deviant-cases group for network administrative organization-cases. Furthermore, it is striking that the deviant cases have higher average scores than the matching cases. This is assumed to be caused by the low N (N=6) of cases for this governance form. This decreases the statistical conclusion validity due to the high influence of extreme values and little statistical power.

### 6.3.2 Preliminary Results

**Table 6.3.4**

*Number of Matching Competency Scores with Model Expectations and Respective Effectiveness Score*

Number of Matching Competencies	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
0	5,33	1,39	10
1	6,4	0,97	10
2	4,95	0,55	3
3	6,16	0,82	7
4	N/A	N/A	0
Total	5,8475	1,16	6,6

*Effectiveness Characteristics for Numbers of Matching Competencies with Model Expectations*

Table 6.3.4 shows the mean effectiveness score, the standard deviation and the N for the number of matching competency scores with the model expectations. No 'perfect matches' with a score of 4 are present within these data. It is evident that the model expectations are not reflected in these data: effectiveness scores do not increase when the independent variable increases. This might be affected by the relatively low N (especially for matching competencies with a score of 2, where the low mean is based on 3 cases).

#### **Relationship between Governance Form, Matching Competencies and Effectiveness**

The second part of the analysis assesses the relationship between the amount of matching variables and total effectiveness by testing hypothesis 4. Final step of this analysis is to assess hypothesis 4: *"The higher the consistency between the critical contingencies and a certain form of governance is, the higher the network-level effectiveness of that form of governance will be."*

The conclusion that an increasing independent variable does not tend to increase the dependent variable is not taken at face value. For assessing the fourth hypothesis, the matching (3 or more



matches with the model expectations; N=7) and deviant groups (2 or less matches with the model expectations; N=23) are compared for the entire population.

H<sub>0</sub>: the mean of the effectiveness score of the matching cases-group is equal to the mean of the effectiveness score of the deviant cases-group.

H<sub>a</sub>: the mean of the effectiveness score of the matching cases-group is higher than the mean of the effectiveness score of the deviant cases-group.

$\alpha = 0,05$ .

H<sub>0</sub> is rejected when the one-tailed sig-value (P) <  $\alpha$ .

The Levene's test for equality of variances has a value of 0,113, which is higher than the  $\alpha$  of 0,05. Equal variances of both groups are assumed. The T-test for assumed equality of means shows a mean difference of 0,412, a t-value of 0,422, a Df of 28 and a two-tailed P-value of 0,422. The P-value is thus  $0,422/2 = 0,211$ , which is higher than  $\alpha$  (0,05), so the current data show insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. See tables A8.1 and A8.2.

The null hypothesis is not rejected and it is concluded that there is no statistically significant difference between the effectiveness scores of the matching cases-group and the deviant-cases group. Although there seems to be a limited positive relationship between cases that more closely match the model expectations and effectiveness, this relationship is not statistically significant.

#### **6.4 Additional Testing With Simplified Theory**

To take this analysis one step further than solely concluding that there is no statistically significant relationship, the theory is simplified for additional analysis. At the essence of the theory lies the assumption that there are four conditions (contingencies) that make governance (and effectiveness) more difficult. Certain scores on these contingencies create a *difficult* setting (i.e. low trust, many participants, low goal consensus and a high need for network-level competencies), whereas other scores create an *easy* setting (i.e. high trust, few participants, high goal consensus and a low need for network-level competencies).

In general, the theory states that shared governance will be effective in easy conditions, while difficult conditions require a governance form that is more brokered and centralized (PGN and NAO forms). This simplified theory that shared governance is unlikely to be effective under difficult conditions is tested next. To be able to do this testing, several data transformations need to be made. First, the contingency scores are made dichotomous with a value of 0 for 'easy' values and 1 for 'difficult' conditions. Second, a new variable is created that contains the sum of these conditions (the minimum score being 0 when all conditions are easy, and the maximum being 4 when all conditions are difficult). Third, this new contingency variable is made dichotomous: easy conditions (sum scores of 0 or 1) are transformed into 0 ('easy') and difficult conditions (sum scores of 2 or higher) are transformed into 1 ('difficult'). Final step is to transform the governance forms-variable into a dichotomous variable consisting of 'shared governance' and 'centralized governance' (LOGN and NAO governance forms are integrated in the latter one).

The table on the next page provides insight in the mean effectiveness of shared and centralized governance in easy and difficult conditions. There are 11 shared governance cases and 19 centralized ones, divided among 18 easy and 12 difficult conditions.

**Table 6.4***Effectiveness of Shared and Centralized Governance Forms under Easy and Difficult Settings*

<b>Difficulty of Conditions</b>	<b>Governance Form</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>N</b>
Easy	Shared	5,89	0,91	8
	Centralized	6,44	1,21	10
	<b>Total</b>	<b>6,20</b>	<b>1,10</b>	<b>18</b>
Difficult	Shared	5,75	1,13	3
	Centralized	5,19	1,12	9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5,32</b>	<b>1,10</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Total</b>	Shared	5,85	0,92	11
	Centralized	5,85	1,31	19
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5,85</b>	<b>1,16</b>	<b>30</b>

*Mean effectiveness, standard deviations and N scores for shared and centralized governance under easy and difficult settings of conditions. Easy conditions are cases with 0 or 1 contingency scores that make shared governance difficult. Difficult conditions are cases with 2 or more contingency scores that make shared governance difficult. Shared governance consist of all cases that are a participant-governed network. Centralized governance consists of all cases that either are a lead-organization governed network or a network-administrative organization governed network.*

Contrary to the simplified models' expectations, the shared governance form seems to be more effective in difficult situations than the centralized governance form (though it is based on 3 observations). It is striking that the centralized governance form is on the other hand more effective in easy situations. In general, effectiveness scores in easy settings are higher than those in difficult settings (6,20 versus 5,32). The data do not show a difference in total effectiveness when assessing both forms in general (both have a score of 5,85).

When assessing the relationship between sets of conditions as independent variable and the choice for a certain form of governance as dependent variable, centralized governance forms are chosen more often in difficult situations than shared governance forms are (N=9 versus N=3). This is in line with the theory. This difference is smaller for easy conditions (N=10 versus N=8), but it is striking that centralized forms are opted for most often under both sets of conditions.

### **Qualitative Data Assessment**

To be able to provide a background to these results, the qualitative data are utilized (see Appendix 1 for interview transcripts). Respondent 1 indicates that when more actors are involved in a network, the inter-actor ties become increasingly complex.

More interests must be accounted for, and the control of the network over itself becomes more difficult: *"The larger the network, the more complex the relationships within this network will become. More interests are at stake and control becomes increasingly difficult"*.<sup>5</sup> This is especially important for small municipalities when cooperating with larger actors. Large actors tend to take the lead in the network, decreasing the influence that smaller actors have in network control: *"This is clearly apparent in situations where one small municipality cooperates with multiple smaller counterparts. The former one tends to automatically take a leading role, causing the latter ones to feel that a certain will is imposed"*.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Original transcription in Dutch: *"Hoe groter het verband, hoe complexer de verhoudingen worden. Er spelen dan meer belangen en de sturing wordt lastiger."*

<sup>6</sup> Original transcription in Dutch: *"Dit zie je duidelijk in situaties waarin één grote gemeente samenwerkt met meerdere kleine gemeenten. De grote neemt vaak automatisch een leidende rol aan, waardoor de kleine gemeenten het idee hebben dat er een bepaalde wil wordt opgelegd."*

Respondent 2 also stresses the influence of the size of the network participants, rather than the amount of actors involved.<sup>7</sup> Inequality in actor size is often translated into inequality in network influence. Small actors tend to lose their sovereign character and lose influence in the network when cooperating with larger actors. This causes trust problems: *“The influence of the loss of sovereignty is often underestimated by small municipalities. During the time that the cooperation is starting, there is a high level of trust among the participants, but when a large actor starts executing tasks on behalf of one or more smaller municipalities, trust problems arise”*.<sup>8</sup>

When asked about the relationship between actor size and the choice for a certain network form, respondent 2 identifies a strong relationship. With large inequalities in size, hierarchical systems are more apparent, e.g. Intergemeentelijke Sociale Diensten (‘Inter-municipal Social Facilities’), with many NAO characteristics: *“There are forms of cooperation that feature the externalization of complete departments into inter-municipal social facilities”*.<sup>9</sup> This might also relate to the relatively low NAO response to the questionnaire. ISDs formally represent all municipalities that are part of the network, but in practice are not able to represent individual actors. This *might* imply alienation (and decreasing process adhesion) between the network actors and the administrative organization.

On the other hand, when actors are more or less equal in size, other forms of cooperation are chosen, such as formal acquisition networks: *“When parties are equal, relationships that stress purchasing services together is opted for more often, regardless of risks that come with these relationships, for service-delivering actors are not formally obligated to execute specified tasks”*.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the qualitative data provide the insight that centralized forms of governance are often more apparent to be chosen, for size-inequality of actors is often present and is deemed an important influential factor. In practice, centralized forms of governance seem to be opted for most often. Both respondents point out that when conditions become more complex, shared governance forms are less likely to be chosen (and are thus seen as less effective). This last statement is in line with theory, which states that with few participants shared governance would be most effective, while in large networks centralized governance should be opted for.

Thus, in addition to the theory, both interviewees point out that actor size inequality might be an important factor that affects the chosen network form and thus total network effectiveness. Actor size homogeneity is presumed to lead to shared forms of governance, while actor size heterogeneity would lead to more centralized forms.

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<sup>7</sup> In addition, Peter Verduin argued in a later discussion that ‘actor size’ is to be operationalized as *“the size of the organizational actor itself in terms of the amount of employees and the extent to which these employees cover the range of required competencies to influence other network participants”*. The size of actors thus embodies the organizational actor itself, rather than the amount of inhabitants that is represented by this actor.

<sup>8</sup> Original transcription in Dutch: *“Vaak wordt onderschat wat de invloed van het verlies aan soevereiniteit betekent voor kleine gemeenten. Als samenwerkingen worden gestart is er veel onderling vertrouwen, maar wanneer een grote gemeente taken uit gaat voeren voor één of meerdere kleine, dan ontstaan er vertrouwensproblemen.”*

<sup>9</sup> Original transcription in Dutch: *“Er zijn samenwerkingsvormen zichtbaar waarbij hele afdelingen extern geplaatst worden, in intergemeentelijke sociale diensten.”*

<sup>10</sup> Original transcription in Dutch: *“Bij gelijke partijen wordt vaker gekozen voor een inkooprelatie, hoewel dit risico’s met zich meebrengt omdat leverende partijen niet verplicht zijn om bepaalde taken uit te voeren.”*

## 6.4 Conclusions

**Specific Research Question 4:** “Which influential factors can be identified for choosing a certain network form for the implementation of the WWB from 2004 onwards, and what is the relation between the scores on these factors, the chosen network form and the total effectiveness of the network?”

Statistical analyses have shown no statistically significant relationships between matching scores of contingencies and governance forms, and the total effectiveness as perceived by small municipalities. The analysis of the LOGN network form has indeed shown a limited positive relationship, but this relationship mainly came forth out of a decreased number of ‘matching’ criteria, making this outcome highly debatable. Thus, it is concluded that the current data provide no evidence that the four contingencies in combination with their respective governance form positively affect total network-level effectiveness. Further assessment of the data with a simplified version of the Provan and Kenis’ theory indicated that centralized governance forms (LOGN, NAO) are chosen more frequently than the shared network form (PGN), even when contingency scores indicate easy conditions. This is surprising, for these results directly contradict the theory, which predicted that shared network forms are more often chosen under easy conditions, whilst centralized networks are chosen more often under difficult conditions.

When assessing network-level effectiveness in relation to the difficulty of conditions surrounding the network, data indicate that centralized networks score higher than shared ones when conditions are easy. It is striking that shared networks on the other hand have higher scores than centralized networks when conditions are difficult. These outcomes both contradict the underlying assumptions of the theory. The final analysis related network-level effectiveness directly to the difficulty of the surrounding conditions. The data have shown that overall effectiveness is higher when these conditions are easy than when these are difficult. This conclusion matches the expectation that effectiveness is more likely to be high when the network surroundings are easier.

It is further interesting to remark that the representation of NAO network forms in the current data is relatively low (N=6 in the total of 30 respondents). This low response might be caused by a) the fact that there are only little NAO networks in practice, or b) NAO’s are not able to respond on behalf of individual network members, which might indicate a *loss of control* of these individual actors in NAO network forms. This latter cause might be interesting for further assessment in future studies, for NAO’s are in general utilized to protect the needs of small network participants.

Overall, it is surprising that the relationships that are described in the model do not simply *mismatch* the data; in several cases the results seem to *directly contradict* the main assumptions of the model. There is a possible explanation for this observation. Qualitative data assessment indicates that *actor size equality* might be a fifth critical contingency that could be added to the model. Inequality of actor size is likely to increase the choice for centralized forms, for larger actors tend to have more power than their smaller counterparts and become lead organizations. This large influence of large actors might cause a decrease in required efforts and competencies of the smaller network participants, making centralized network forms likely to be opted for. This assumed relationship might also explain the deviant results of the data analysis, for a new dimension is added to the independent variable.<sup>11</sup>

Concluding, this fifth contingency might be added to the model in order to explain why centralized forms are chosen more often than shared forms. Unfortunately it was not possible to gather these additional data for inclusion in this report, so it is recommended that this fifth contingency should be included in future research.

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<sup>11</sup> An example of how this fifth dimension can be included in the model is provided in table 7.1 on page 56 of this research.

## 7 Conclusions

In this final chapter, the answers to the specific research questions of this study are brought together to answer the general research question. Based on the results, recommendations for small municipalities concerning social sector-cooperation strategies are provided. Then, strengths and weaknesses of this study are identified and the contribution to the scientific field is discussed. Last, a proposal for follow-up research is described. **General Research Question:** “*What lessons can be learned by small municipalities from experiences with the Wet Werk and Bijstand when aiming to effectively implement decentralized social policy by means of cooperation initiatives?*”

### 7.1 Results

The first step towards answering the general research question was the conduction of a literature review, resulting in a theoretical framework. This framework identified three types of network forms of governance: *participant-governed networks (PGN)*, *lead organization-governed networks (LOGN)* and *network administrative organization-governed networks (NAO)*. For assessing effectiveness of these network forms, *critical contingencies* for likely effectiveness were introduced. These contingencies are *trust*, *number of participants*, *goal consensus* and the *need for network-level competencies*. The model expects that when network forms are chosen in correspondence with scores on these contingencies, these networks will be effective (Provan & Kenis, 2007). For measuring effectiveness of the networks as seen from the organizational level, four evaluation criteria were utilized: *client-level outcomes*, *legitimacy*, *resource acquisition* and *cost* (Provan & Milward, 2001).

The second part of the process consisted of a descriptive analysis of the legislation that is at the core of this research. The Participatiewet integrates three separate social security policies and serves three main purposes: *social* (prevent isolation of individuals), *economic* (prevent welfare losses) and *financial* (keep social services affordable). These social sector reforms aim to achieve cost-reduction on social expenses by decentralizing tasks to the local level. In addition, the state aims to simplify existing legislation, to provide municipalities with additional policy space and to give municipalities more responsibilities. Effective utilization of available financial means by municipalities is ensured by means of these new responsibilities, which function as drivers using a bonus/malus approach.

For obtaining empirical information to test the theory and to be able to make predictions for future social sector implementation, a previous social policy was assessed as a third step. The already implemented Wet Werk en Bijstand (2004) proved to have more or less similar scores as the currently proposed Participatiewet on the critical contingencies of the model. Furthermore, the contents of the WWB closely resemble the current proposals in terms of policy field and include the decentralization of tasks and financial incentives for municipalities. The data gathering process thus focused on the WWB implementation case. These results were afterwards utilized to make predictions concerning future municipal cooperation in the social sector.

After having gathered data in both a quantitative and a qualitative way, the fourth step was analyzing these data. The current data have shown that there are no statistically significant relationships between the contingency scores, their corresponding governance forms and effectiveness. Further assessment of the data with a simplified version of the theory indicated that shared governance has higher effectiveness scores in difficult settings than centralized governance, and that shared network forms on the other hand score higher in easy settings. These findings contradict the theory. Furthermore, it can be stated in general that overall network-level effectiveness is higher when the surrounding conditions are easier. As for the choice for a governance form, centralized governance forms seem to be chosen more often than shared ones. A possible explanation for this observation might be that actor size inequality increases the choice for centralized forms, for larger actors tend to have more power than their smaller counterparts.

## 7.2 Recommendations

Lessons that can be drawn from this research for small municipalities when aiming to effectively implement new social policy by means of future cooperation initiatives are described underneath.

Small municipalities are advised to make a thorough assessment to ensure that cooperation is the right means to achieve individual municipal goals before starting cooperation for implementing policy. The Participatiewet makes cooperation mandatory for municipalities are required to participate in the regional cooperation centers ('Werkpleinen'). When determining a strategy for designing this regional cooperation (and the individual role of the municipality), the results of this research are useful to take into account. Qualitative results show that cooperation might be effective under certain circumstances, but implications for small municipalities might be a low degree of influence in the network, becoming overruled by large actors and/or having to submit to network-level goals that conflict with individual goals.

Following this research, when cooperation is a feasible (or, in this case, mandatory) means for policy implementation, small municipalities should give due consideration to the following three factors:

- This study has shown no significant differences between effectiveness of shared and more centralized governed networks. Thus, small municipalities are advised to pick the form that best suits their needs. For settings with high autonomy requirements this could be a participant-governed network, while for settings with high dependency on other actors, lead organization-governed networks or network administrative organization-governed networks are advised.
- An ex-ante determination of the contingency scores can help with choosing this specific cooperation strategy. Results have shown that effectiveness for small municipalities under easy conditions is higher than under difficult conditions. Hence, when contingency scores indicate a 'difficult' environment, it might be useful to try to alter these contingency scores before starting the cooperation. This can, for instance, be done by increasing goal consensus by preliminary determining strategies, decreasing the number of actors involved or increasing inter-actor trust.
- As relative size is mentioned to be a factor of influence for determining network forms, take into account the size of your own municipality relative to the size (and influence) of the cooperating partners. In cases where there is a large inequality between actors, larger actors tend to take control and act as a lead organization. To counter this, the network administrative organization-model might provide a solution to enhance balance within the network.

Recommendations concerning the utilized theories focus on the inclusion of a fifth critical contingency in the model. It is thus recommended to alter the Provan & Kenis model by including this extra contingency. Qualitative data assessment indicated that this *actor size equality* might be an important influential factor that could be added to the model. Larger actors are argued to have more power than their smaller counterparts and tend to become lead organizations. The high level of influence of these large actors might cause a decrease in required efforts and competencies of the smaller network participants. Thus, when a high level of heterogeneity in size is present, centralized network forms are argued to be most effective.

This assumed relationship might also explain the deviant results of the data analysis, for a new dimension is added to the independent variable. Concluding, it is recommended to alter the Provan & Kenis model in such a way that it includes this fifth critical contingency. Actor size equality is then expected to operate in cohesion with the other four contingencies.

## 7.3 Study Assessment

### Study Strengths

The major strength of this research is that a very similar implementation case is utilized to obtain the empirical data. By focusing on a policy that already has come into effect, data are obtained that describe actual effectiveness results instead of respondent expectations of future effectiveness. Furthermore, using the WWB serves not only the purpose of being generalizable to a single future case such as the Participatiewet, but it has many aspects in common with current other decentralizations in the local-level social policy field, i.e. the Jeugdzorg and the AWBZ.

The current tendency of the national government is to increase the amount of tasks that is to be executed on the local level. For many municipalities are too small (or have to limited capacity) to conduct these tasks alone, many seek cooperation to be able to cope with these new tasks. As seen from this scope, this research is very relevant at this time in the process with as little as 1,5 year to go until the Participatiewet comes into effect.

### Study Weaknesses

The major weakness of the research is the low degree of validity. Although problems with statistical conclusion validity, internal validity and construct validity are tackled to a certain extent, the external validity is very low due to the low response rate. Therefore, the study shows characteristics of an exploratory nature instead of a being a conclusive research. It does however form the basis for further in-depth research on the same subject.

Another weakness is that only small municipalities have been assessed in this research. It might be the case that small actors perceive effectiveness in a different manner than the network as a whole does. In other words, low effectiveness for individual actors might be present in networks that as a whole are very effective. This might especially be the case in centralized networks with limited influence for small actors.

### Contribution to the Scientific Field

This study started from the basis of transaction-cost economics and the market-firm continuum, and directed the research scope towards cooperation through networks. A theoretical model for the relationship between four contingencies and network forms in order to determine likely effectiveness was empirically tested. This research links this predictive model to scientific theory concerning the measurement of network effectiveness. This combination enables an assessment of the actual relationship between the four contingencies and the chosen network forms and their influence on total network effectiveness.

This study provides small municipalities with a set of four contingencies that are useful to take into account when starting network cooperation for implementation of social security policies. In addition, the four evaluation criteria for likely effectiveness are introduced that can be used throughout the cooperation process to make evaluations of network-effectiveness scores. Based on these evaluations, the network form might be altered by the participants to improve overall network effectiveness. The other way around, scores on the contingencies might be assessed ex-ante and altered to create 'easier' conditions for developing a network.

Findings indicate that current model is not valid, for the model expectations are not (statistically significant) reflected in the data. Interviews indicate a possible fifth contingency that might be included in the model of Provan & Kenis: the level of equality in actor size. It is expected that when networks consist of actors that are roughly homogeneous in terms of size, shared governance will be most effective. On the other hand, when sizes are heterogeneous, centralized forms are expected to be more effective.

It is recommended that the utilized Provan & Kenis model, consisting of four critical contingencies, is altered by adding actor size equality. The contribution to the scientific field consists thus of a) linking the model for likely effectiveness to the Provan & Milward model for effectiveness measurement, b) testing the model by means of empirically gathered data, and c) recommendations that concern an adjustment of the utilized model (adding a fifth contingency) for further testing.

### Proposals for Follow-up Research

The first proposal for follow-up research assesses the same expected relationships as this study does, but uses a larger target population than solely small municipalities. A case study is proposed that specifically assesses policy networks as a whole, and obtains data from different kinds of actors within these networks (e.g. network administrative organizations, lead organizations and other participants). Then, the effectiveness of the network as a whole can be compared to the perceived effectiveness by these individual groups of participants. In addition, the current research can be repeated with a larger target population that includes medium-sized to large municipalities, NGO's and corporations. This is assumed to have a positive effect on the gathered response, which increases the research (external) validity.

The second proposal stresses the inclusion of a fifth critical contingency, the level of equality in actor size, can be introduced to assess its relation with network forms and total effectiveness. It works in cohesion with the other four contingencies. An example of how it can be embedded in the existing model is presented in table 7.1 underneath.

**Table 7.1**

*Critical Contingency Scores for the Network Administrative Organization Network Form*

<b>Governance Form</b>	<b>Trust</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Goal Consensus</b>	<b>Need for Network-level Competencies</b>	<b>Actor Size Equality</b>
<i>Shared governance (PGN)</i>	High density, decentralized	Few	High	Low	High (homogeneous actor sizes)
<i>Lead organization governance (LOGN)</i>	Low density, highly centralized	Moderate number	Moderately low	Moderate	Moderate to low (moderately heterogeneous actor sizes)
<i>Network administrative organization (NAO)</i>	Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High	Low (heterogeneous actor sizes)

*Empirical score distribution for the shared governance form applied to the 'Modes of Network Governance' model (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9). Underlined scores are represented most often in the current data.*

The third and final proposal consists of a more practical approach that slightly alters the theory and utilizes effectiveness as the independent variable. When monetizing effectiveness, it is easier to compare the situation before cooperation was started to the situation afterwards. This approach might be able to assess *if* and *how* effectiveness is an important criterion for small municipalities to cooperate or not. Such an approach assumes that (financial) effectiveness is not controlled sufficiently by municipalities and the responsible civil servants. This lack of financial control might be caused by financial prosperity during the past two decades, when financial deficits would only have minor consequences. Currently, these financial consequences have a higher impact, for fewer means are available due to the recession while municipal behaviour might not have been altered accordingly (yet).



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## Reflection

This section of the research is used to reflect on the delivered work, improved skills, personal learning objectives and personal goal attainment of the author. The first part of this section consists of the learning criteria as formulated in the Public Administration assessment documents of the University of Twente. These learning criteria are used by the supervisors to critically assess the final report and personal performance before making their final judgment. The second part of this section describes further personal objectives and goals. These goals have been defined by the author himself and are based on personal preferences regarding the development of skills and competences during the research period.

## Learning Criteria

**Identifying research problems:** demonstrate the capability of independently formulating a relevant research problem for a relatively complex research or design assignment. This includes research questions and a corresponding strategy or line of approach. Further, provide systematic motivation of the choices made, based on identification of the objective, the core problem and the solution parameters on the one hand, and theory and empirical considerations on the other.

**Literature review and theoretical framework:** demonstrate the capability of compiling representative scientific and professional sources, which are relevant to the assignment. Show the ability to conduct a critical study and in-depth analysis of the relevant sections of the selected sources and, by means of broadening, integrating or comparing theories, concepts and models to develop own ideas for clarification and operationalization of the research question. Incorporate recent developments in the field relevant to the research.

**Research design/approach:** demonstrate the capability of independently drawing up an action plan for carrying out the research. Show capability of developing an own conceptual apparatus and of specifying general abstract concepts in a valid manner for the empirical domain. Provide adequate motivation for the approach selected and ensure that it follows logically from the research problem and theoretical framework.

**Data collection and analysis:** demonstrate the capability of independently handling the instruments for data collection and analysis in a valid and reliable manner, resulting in a data set and corresponding analysis results as well as the validity of which it has ascertained and that enables answering the research question.

**Conclusions and recommendations:** demonstrate the capability of describing research and design results and relate them to the research problem, research and design questions and relevant literature. Also demonstrate the ability to critically reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the carried out research and the contribution to the scientific field. When forming an opinion on the results, consider social, societal and ethical aspects in both the immediate context as well as the wider context.

**Written reporting:** demonstrate the ability of presenting the qualitative data clearly and according to accepted scientific convention and in English. The argument is structured, logical, to the point and linguistically correct. Literature references are incorporated to a scientific standard.

**Colloquium:** demonstrate the capability of giving a presentation in English which is clear, structured, satisfactorily illustrated with visual aids, and comprehensible to listeners of various levels and from different backgrounds. Hereby, due consideration is given to both the design and key results of the assignment and argumentation is given to support the most important choices.

**Independence and professional skills:** demonstrate a high degree of independence in preparing and executing the assignment and capability of planning and managing the research or design process within a time limit. Also, demonstrate the skills needed to cooperate effectively and show the capacity to function adequately within an organizational context. Finally, demonstrate the ability to reflect in a critical manner on own performance and learning skills, including the capacity to distil specific clues for future scientific or professional development.

### **Personal Learning Objectives and Goals**

For being able to critically reflect on my own working abilities, reporting skills and operating in a business environment in general, I decided to determine a specific set of learning goals before starting the research. An approach to designing this set of goals is described in literature in the psychology field and distinguishes cognitive, affective and skill-based goals (Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993). When relating these three categorizations to my personal situation before starting the research, three different learning objectives emerge in my mind. These are discussed underneath:

**(Meta) cognitive goals** relate to knowledge, understanding, application and analysis of data or theories. By writing this thesis I want to develop focus on my skills of knowledge collection and selection as well as combining different theoretical concepts into one new model. I am planning on collecting a large quantity of scientific research (on cooperative strategies, external contexts and effectiveness). This quantity then needs to be transformed (by means of determining the most important variables and looking for relations between those) into a new theoretical framework that will fit the purposes of the research best. By thoroughly analyzing papers that have combined multiple models into a new one, I will try to get a better understanding on how to conduct such a process. At the end of this research, I want to have a more sophisticated skill of integrating and combining concepts in order to come to new insights.

**Affective goals** are personal goals that relate to emotional wellbeing. Examples are attention, interest, valuation, empathy and attitude. My affective learning goal during this research is the creation of a professional attitude. I have been a student for almost seven years now and am aware of the fact that the behavior of a student does not fit business life. By working in an entrepreneurial organization (and interviewing civil servants) I try to get knowledge on how to act in both environments (and get to know similarities and differences between working in the public and private sector). After this research I want to be able to describe differences and similarities (if present at all) between both sectors. I also want to be able to adjust myself according to the environment that I operate in. I assume that when I have obtained these skills, I will be able to express myself as a professional and be treated by my environment accordingly.

**Skill-based and social goals** are related to cooperation and one's role within an institution, for instance contact, appointments, relationship management, cooperation and working in teams. My personal social learning objective is to use the business environment to learn how to cooperate (and deal) with consultants and project managers. I assume that there is a lot to be learned from these employees, for they have a combination of management skills, autonomy and a lot of practical knowledge of the social security policy field. By using these people to get information that helps with obtaining a good view on the practice before actually entering it (by means of conducting interviews), I will be likely to improve my professional skills and knowledge in advance.

In addition, I try to combine the execution of my research with supporting existing projects at Nautus. By supporting consultants with their regular practices (e.g. by conducting some background research) I will try to increase my perspective and get more know-how on how processes run in such a business environment. At the end of the research, I want to know how to act in a professional way when interacting with clients such as municipalities. Also, I want to increase my knowledge on the

social security field and learn to independently manage my own project and distribute the available time between both conducting my own research and supporting other projects.

### **Evaluation of goal attainment**

**(Meta) cognitive goals:** During the first stage of the research, I started with selecting relevant articles on networks and public-sector cooperation forms. I found that it was quite difficult to select which theories to utilize, so I decided to start from scratch with discussing the broader perspective. I commenced with refreshing my knowledge on transaction-cost economics and the market-firm continuum. I used this general framework to be able to determine my focus step by step from the concept of networks in general via public-sector networks to different network forms and contingencies for choosing network forms. I wanted to be able to make an assessment whether certain forms of network cooperation under certain conditions were more effective than others. To conduct this assessment, I searched and found theories that enable effectiveness measurement and linked these to the more general network forms model.

I feel that the utilized approach (from general to specific) provided me with a good overview on the subject. During my weekly appointments with Peter Verduin, I checked if my line of thought was logically constructed and fitted the research purpose and topic. Cogitations were utilized to alter the framework when deemed necessary. After having finished this thesis, I feel that I have become able to make a thorough selection when a multitude of information is available concerning a subject.

I found it confronting during the first stage of the research how hard it was to determine where to start and which direction to follow, given the large amount of available information. Albeit these start-up problems, I feel that I have learned to combine theories in such a way that I was able to obtain and analyze the exact information that was required to answer the research questions.

**Affective goals:** This research took quite some additional time to finish, for I found a job as a trainee/policy employee at the department of healthcare and wellbeing at the province Noord-Holland. I started applying for this vacancy whilst not having finished my thesis yet. I aimed to complete the thesis during the first few months of working, but this turned out to be quite challenging. I felt that it took more time than I had realized to adapt to living in another city, building up social life and working a 40+ hour workweek. The longer it took to finish the thesis, the more I felt that *"Damocles' sword" hanging over my head* (Cicero, around 40 B.C.). This caused me quite some stress and sleepless nights, but I finally managed to finish it within the first year of working.

When I started this research I emphasized that I wanted to learn how to operate in a professional setting. Whilst working at Nautus, I was quite assured that my professional skills were quite well-developed and starting working 'for real' would be quite similar in terms of behavior to the student life that I was used to. Now, one year after leaving Nautus, I feel that the way I felt back then was quite naïve. For working in a professional environment, self-reflection and effective communication (both verbal and written) are of key importance. During this first year of working, I have put a lot of time and effort in improving communicative skills. Amongst others, I learned how to use discussion techniques such as listening, summarizing and questioning, decreasing my speed when talking and providing stronger arguments.

Furthermore, I learned during the research timeframe to be more interested in people whom I am having discussions with. The substance of arguments always goes beyond the argument itself and extends to the personal paradigm of the person one has a conversation with. By being interested in other people, deeper feelings, drives and needs of those can become part of the discussing. This enables a better understanding of their point of view (and enables my own argument to be adjusted accordingly). When I conduct future interviews I am going to use these techniques to get a better understanding of my counterpart and thus improve the quality of my interviewing skills.

To summarize my affective goal attainment during the research timeframe, I would argue that I have grown significantly. At first I thought that my development would be finished (more or less) when graduated. I adapted this thought rapidly after I started working and found out that it takes two to tango (implying that I am reliant on my (relationship with) colleagues to a larger extent than I had assumed). I feel that my development of the last two years exceeds any social/emotional development that I have had during the 8 years of going to university.

**Skill-based and social goals:** The contacts that I had with my colleagues at Nautus were very good. I could get along with everyone, knew everyone quite well and was invited to corporate social events such as lunches, dinners, trainings and workshops and a fun weekend to Scheveningen and The Hague. Nautus' partners encouraged me to share my knowledge with the rest of the company, resulting in two presentations concerning network cooperation in the public sector and a workshop concerning this subject. During the 8 months that I worked at Nautus I feel that I have worked autonomous on my research whilst being challenged to venture in other tasks as well. For instance, I conducted a small research on how the Nautus library could be put to use most effectively, and I worked at the reception desk one or two days a week. In addition, Peter Verduin granted me the possibility to support some regular projects (such as applications for European subsidies by different Dutch municipalities).

Obviously, not everything worked out the way that I had expected. I found it really hard to be working on my own for such a long time on a single report. This resulted quite often in a lack of motivation and a hunger for conducting other project than my thesis. Looking back at that time, I think that I should have stayed in touch with my fellow students more regularly. This might have given me the feeling that I was not the only one struggling to finish a thesis, but that other students suffered from the same problems as well.

Concerning skill-based goals I feel that I have learned a lot. I have proven to be able to complete a research on my own and I have gained quite some expertise on the Dutch social sector. This proved to be very useful during my first assignment at the province Noord-Holland, which involved me in assessing and monitoring regional social projects in which at least 6 municipalities participated each. When I started working, I provided my sector with a presentation concerning my research whereabouts and way that network effectiveness can be measured. I was a co-writer of the social monitoring report 2012, which was approved by Provinciale Staten in early 2013.

Furthermore, I am currently working on a project to improve overall scientific knowledge and abstract thinking of policy employees. This project is called the *back to college-track* and aims at provincial policy employees. This tour replenishes the theoretical knowledge of the participants with up-to-date sociological and political theories. Participants are required to write papers and conclude the course with a presentation in which they apply the learned materials to their own working field. I started this project because I felt the gap between science (my time as a student) and practice (my time as a policy employee) is too wide. I feel that many colleagues never consult scientific models and recent research anymore after having been graduated, and I think that there is a world to gain in terms of good, efficient and effective policy-making when this gap is closed.



## Appendix 1: Empirical Data – Expert Meeting

On Friday March 30<sup>th</sup> 2012, I provided seven social security experts with a one-hour presentation and workshop on network theories and policy comparability. These experts employed at the host organization, Nautus, and conduct consultancy-related activities in the social security sector for Dutch municipalities. The consultants who participated in the workshop were Peter Verduin, Kosha Schipper, Chris-Jan Geugies, Léon Beernink, Janine Rebel, Dieger ten Berge and Tineke Lantink.

### Aim and Contents

The aim of the workshop is twofold: first, I wanted to share my (preliminary) findings concerning ‘effective cooperation’ with the experts and receive feedback to get more feeling with the subject and to be better able to relate theory to practice. Second, I wanted to use the experience and insights of the participants to get new ideas for the WWB-WWnV comparison.

After having presented and discussed the first part of the workshop, I requested the group to share their thoughts concerning the discussed theories and insights in networks with me. After this discussion, I proposed a brainstorming session on WWB-WWnV-comparability. I had already developed my own ideas concerning the grounds that can be seen as ‘similar’ or ‘comparable’, but by using the input of the group of experts I aimed to find more extensive grounds for the policy comparison chapter of this research. Note: this session took place *before* the Participatiewet was introduced, and thus stressed the WWnV.

### Presentation: Municipal Cooperation and Networks

During first part of the presentation, which concerned the theoretical framework, some items were stressed specifically in order to make them clear to all participants. These were the transaction-cost economics, hierarchies, markets and networks (Powell), the structure versus agency debate, dimensions in networks (brokering and governance), types of networks (participant-, lead organization-, and network-administrative-governed), the critical contingencies for likely effectiveness (trust, size, consensus and competences) and effectiveness evaluation (Provan & Milward).

### Brainstorm Session

For the brainstorm session I stressed the importance to focus on the question ‘*What are similarities and differences between WWB and the WWnV as seen from a coordination and organization perspective?*’ These perspectives are chosen for it is interesting to explore what the municipal implications are in terms of service delivery, target groups, tasks, required competencies, budgets etcetera. It is not interesting to evaluate the exact contents of both policies, but rather how the coordination and organization of cooperation is conducted by the actors.

The expert panel used the brainstorm session to provide me with the following remarks on similarities and differences:

Similarities:

- *Policy integration*: both policies aim to combine several previous policies into a new one.
- *Topic*: the policy topic is similar: both policies address the social domain and use an economic approach towards this domain.
- *Risk model*: the risk model that was embedded in the WWB (which redirected the financial gains and risks towards the municipalities) is also included in the WWnV. The target population increases with the WWnV for the Wajong and WSW are included.
- *Decentralization of financial risks*: financial risks are partly coming forth out of decentralization of social service provision from national to local government.

- *Focus on labor support:* both policies focus on maintenance of supporting people to perform labor activities.
- *Increase in policy space:* due to the combination of budgets that used to be separated, municipalities gain additional possibilities concerning how to use this combined budget by means of the development of new policy.
- In general, the cores of the policies are similar and many substantial aspects of the WWB and the WWnV can be seen as being similar.

Differences:

- *WSW-targets:* the WSW targets that survived the introduction of the WWB will disappear with the introduction of the WWnV.
- *Affected population:* the target population of the WWnV is an extension of the target population of the WWB.
- *Cooperative history:* with the introduction of the WWB, municipalities started cooperating and transaction costs to create these cooperative initiatives have been made. Therefore, many municipalities have already experience with cooperation in the social security field. Thus, the history of cooperation for both policies is different.
- In general, the differences between these policies are found in the extent to which the policies reach. Differences are thus not found between the cores of the policies.

## Appendix 2: Empirical Data – Expert Interviews

This appendix contains the draught transcriptions of two interviews with experts. These interviews form, in combination with the brainstorm session, the qualitative selection of data for this research.

On Friday August 3<sup>rd</sup> 2012 I interviewed Luuk Seegers, consultant at Nautus. Luuk graduated this studies Public Administration in 2007 in Nijmegen (Radboud University) and has a minor in Labor and Organization Psychology. He has worked on several projects in the social security sector. He was involved in projects concerning municipal poverty, absence in reintegration tracks and the development and implementation of a ‘Werkplein’. These projects were conducted for several small and medium-sized municipalities, namely Heerenveen, Soest, Medemblik, Dronten, Gouda, Zutphen, Velsen, Skasterlân and Peel & Maas.

On Friday August 10<sup>th</sup> 2012 I interviewed Joost Cornielje, director and senior consultant at Nautus. Joost graduated from the studies Political Science (Maastricht) and Public Management and Policy (Open Universiteit Nederland). After his graduation, Joost participated in the trainee program of the municipality of Amsterdam, before getting employed at Nautus as a consultant. Joost worked on many projects in the social security sector for, amongst others, the municipalities of Almelo, Nieuwegein, Opsterland, Almere, Amstelveen, Haarlemmermeer, Hilversum, Amsterdam, Zwolle, Culemborg, Alkmaar, Skasterlan, Velsen and Noordoostpolder. Furthermore, Joost was an elected CDA municipal council member in Hilversum from 2006-2010. As a council member, he was responsible for social affairs, education, youth, housing and welfare.

Both interviewees were selected based on their scores on the requested extensive experience in the social security field as well as their current involvement in projects that concern municipal cooperation in the social field. The selection criteria for selecting the interviewees are further elaborated in the methodological chapter of this research.

The interviews are used to retrieve more in-depth information on the key concepts. The interviews provide this research with an external view on drivers, cooperative strategies and effectiveness, in addition to the internal perspective of the municipal employees themselves. The interviews are conducted in Dutch, for both the interviewer and the interviewees have the Dutch language as a mother tongue. The interviews followed an unstructured design in order to increase the learning effect and to be able to retrieve more in-depth information about municipal cooperation. Both interviews took approximately one hour.

The unstructured interviews were guided by the following questions/topics:

- What factors are main determinants for municipal cooperation strategies?
- What kind of partners are preferred by small municipalities?
- What are the most common problems that emerge when small municipalities cooperate?
- What are the most important results that small municipalities strive for when cooperating?
- When is cooperation seen as ‘effective’?
- Which factors are most important for determining whether cooperation is perceived as effective?

## 2.1 Interview Transcription Luuk Seegers (respondent 1)

*Buiten de succesfactoren die in de literatuur gegeven zijn voor goede samenwerking, wil ik het graag hebben over zaken die van invloed zijn op effectieve samenwerking, zoals gezien van jouw werkervaring. Vanuit welke rol opereer je in het sociale veld?*

Ik werk in dienst van Nautus als adviseur voor gemeenten die problemen hebben in het sociale domein. De diensten van Nautus worden onder andere ingeschakeld als er problemen bestaan met samenwerking. Vaak zie je dat men gaat samenwerken vanuit het idee dat samenwerken goed is, zonder te hebben bepaald wat gemeenten er precies uit willen halen. Samenwerking heeft snel veel voorstanders en wordt als 'goed' gezien. De initiatie van samenwerking tussen gemeenten vloeit meestal voort uit enkele individuen die een goede onderlinge band hebben. Zolang dat het geval blijft dan gaat de samenwerking goed. Echter, als er nieuwe wethouders komen, er een andere raad wordt verkozen of er problemen (tekorten) ontstaan, dan ontstaan er tijdens het samenwerkingstraject veranderingen in de belangen. Deze veranderende individuele belangen botsen vaak met de samenwerkingsbelangen. Zolang men het eens is over het collectieve doel dan gaat het veelal goed. Deze doelen zijn vaak in het begin vastgesteld, maar worden gaandeweg het traject niet aangepast aan ontwikkelingen. In dergelijke situaties wordt onze hulp ingeschakeld om te kijken welke stappen de cliëntgemeente het best kan zetten.

*Waarom wordt er in beginsel gekozen om samen te werken? Je geeft net aan dat er gezamenlijke doelen bestaan, maar waarop worden deze gebaseerd en wat willen gemeenten hier uit halen?*

Efficiëntie, effectiviteit en het delen van kennis worden gezien als de belangrijkste drivers voor samenwerking. Vaak wordt echter vergeten dat er eerst moet worden geïnvesteerd voor er wat uit een samenwerking wordt gehaald: dit kost energie, tijd en geld. De cyclus van vier jaar in de politiek is betrekkelijk kort voor een brede steun voor samenwerking. De samenwerking wordt dan een doel op zich, in plaats van dat de samenwerking wordt gebruikt om een doel te bereiken. De fundamentele vraag: "wat streven we gezamenlijk na?" wordt vaak niet gesteld. Als doelen van individuele partijen veranderen gaandeweg het traject, dan ontstaan er problemen.

*Welke fasen zijn er te onderscheiden qua tijdsduur voor nieuwe samenwerkingsverbanden?*

Er zijn verschillende fasen te onderscheiden in samenwerking. In het begin zijn de deelnemende partijen vaak erg enthousiast, omdat ze het zien als dé oplossing voor problemen waar ze zelf niet uit komen. Er worden halfslachtige keuzes gemaakt waardoor de uitwerking van de samenwerking niet zo goed loopt als verwacht. Zodra een verband is gestart zijn partijen vaak huiverig om de samenwerking te beëindigen omdat er al veel geïnvesteerd is om de samenwerking op te starten. Hierdoor zie je dat samenwerkingsverbanden vaak opereren in een suboptimale setting. Een laatste fase is vaak een her-bepaling van de samenwerkingsdoelen. In sommige gevallen wordt zo'n verband weer snel opgeheven, in andere gevallen wordt er doorgemodderd en in weer andere gevallen ontstaat er een duurzame relatie.

*Hoe zien gemeenten de verhouding tussen het beperken van hun eigen invloed en de voordelen die kunnen worden gehaald uit samenwerking?*

De meeste partijen realiseren zich dat niet als ze gaan samenwerken. Partijen gaan met hun eigen gedachten er in en luisteren niet goed naar elkaar. De fundamentele vraag "streven wij wel dezelfde doelen na en is samenwerking de juiste manier om deze doelen te bereiken?" wordt vaak niet, of niet tijdig, gesteld. Schaalgrootte wordt geacht voordelen te brengen zoals gezamenlijke inkoopkracht, legitimiteit, meer capaciteit enzovoorts. Ik zie dat gemeenten vaak direct duiken in de juridische structuren en formalisatie om de samenwerking vorm te geven, voordat de doelen zijn vastgesteld.

*Wat is de invloed van de omvang van een samenwerkingsverband op de stabiliteit en effectiviteit hiervan?*

Hoe groter het verband, hoe complexer de verhoudingen worden. Er spelen dan meer belangen en de sturing wordt lastiger. Dit zie je duidelijk in situaties waarin één grote gemeente samenwerkt met meerdere kleine gemeenten. De grote neemt vaak automatisch een leidende rol aan, waardoor de kleine gemeenten het idee hebben dat er een bepaalde wil wordt opgelegd. Dit heeft te maken met een duidelijke verdeling van de taken en het bepalen van het gemeenschappelijke doel, zoals zojuist besproken.

*Zou samenwerking effectiever zijn als de deelnemende partijen dezelfde schaalgrootte hebben?*

Niet per definitie, er wordt simpelweg vaak voor een verkeerde manier van samenwerking gekozen. Het is in het sociale zekerheidsveld voor kleine partijen over het algemeen aantrekkelijker om een inkooprelatie aan te gaan met een grote gemeente dan om samen te gaan werken. Bij een inkooprelatie voert de grote gemeente het beleid van de kleine uit. Zo blijft de kleine gemeente in staat om eigen beleid te maken. Wel is het zo dat bij gemeenten met gelijke schaalgrootte er meer incentives zijn om de krachten te bundelen. Er zijn dan makkelijker voordelen te halen door als collectief te handelen, omdat de invloed die de individuele partijen hebben in het verband ongeveer gelijk is en de voordelen vooral op schaalgrootte en bundeling van krachten zijn te behalen.

*Wat zijn de grootste problemen die ontstaan bij samenwerking tussen grote en kleine samenwerkingspartners?*

Dit soort samenwerkingen start vaak omdat grote gemeenten zien dat ze met weinig moeite kleine gemeenten uit de regio uit de brand kunnen helpen en tegelijkertijd extra inkomsten kunnen genereren. Ze vragen hier dan een vast tarief voor, maar willen zich niet op contractniveau binden aan de kleinere partners. Hier is een inkooprelatie niet mogelijk en wordt er gekozen voor samenwerking op basis van onderling vertrouwen. De uitvoering van sociaal beleid geschiedt dan door de grote gemeente en het beleid wordt vastgesteld door de kleine. Echter, de uiteindelijke verantwoordelijkheid blijft bij de kleine gemeente liggen, zonder dat er duidelijke contractuele prestatieafspraken zijn gemaakt (bonus-malus). Als er geen tekorten zijn dan werkt dit goed; zodra er echter financiële problemen ontstaan dan werken deze problemen door in de samenwerking. Dergelijke afspraken worden veelal geïnitieerd door enkele wethouders onderling met een hoge mate van onderling vertrouwen. Het is vaak erg lastig om hard af te rekenen met onvoldoende prestaties, omdat de afspraken niet zijn geformaliseerd.

*Op welk niveau en op welk moment is vertrouwen aanwezig? En hoe ontwikkelt dit vertrouwen zich na verloop van tijd?*

Trajecten van samenwerking worden vaak opgestart door personen die elkaar vertrouwen en het goed met elkaar kunnen vinden. Als deze initiërende personen wegvallen, dan heeft dat direct invloed op de gehele samenwerking. Persoonlijke relaties zijn essentieel voor effectieve samenwerking. Wat betreft de ontwikkeling van vertrouwen na verloop van tijd: het valt op dat het vertrouwen in het begin hoog is, maar daarna snel afzwakt. Dit heeft aan de ene kant te maken met tegenvallende resultaten ten opzichte van de eerste verwachtingen, maar is ook onderhevig aan het wisselen van belangrijke individuen die betrokken zijn bij de samenwerking. Daarnaast wordt vertrouwen negatief beïnvloed door divergerende doelen van samenwerkingspartners of een gebrek aan transparantie.

*Hoe verhoudt het vertrouwen op persoonlijk niveau zich tot historische samenwerkingsrelaties tussen gemeenten?*

Het is voor organisaties als gemeenten vaak erg lastig om in te schatten wat het toekomstige gedrag van de partners zal zijn. Ik denk dat persoonlijk vertrouwen van groter belang is dan onderling vertrouwen op organisatieniveau. Het is erg lastig om vertrouwen tussen organisaties te creëren. Voorbeelden zijn fusiegemeenten: bij het merendeel van de gemeenten die (gedwongen) zijn

gefuseerd zie je zelfs na tien jaar dat er nog in termen van de oude scheiding wordt gesproken. Als er een natuurlijke samenhang is dan ontstaat er vaak meer vertrouwen, bijvoorbeeld door gelijke cultuur of omvang, maar vaak wordt ook dit opgestart door enkele kopstukken met veel invloed.

*Wat is de invloed van samenwerkingsgeschiedenis tussen gemeenten en lokale partners op toekomstige samenwerking?*

Effectiviteit is afhankelijk van hoe tevreden enkele leidende personen zijn met de samenwerking. Dit is een stuk bepalender voor de beoordeling van effectiviteit dan de daadwerkelijke resultaten die worden behaald of ervaringen met eerdere samenwerking. Natuurlijk is het wel zo dat partijen die succesvol samen hebben gewerkt in het verleden in de toekomst eerst zullen kijken naar deze eerdere partners. Ik heb echter het idee dat de beoordeling van effectiviteit en de tevredenheid van invloedrijke individuen die betrokken zijn bij de samenwerking belangrijker is dan de invloed van eerdere samenwerking.

*Hoe worden resultaten van onderlinge samenwerking dan gemonitord?*

Resultaatmonitoring is zelden aan de orde in 'gemeenteland'. Zoals al aangegeven ontstaan problemen in de samenwerking meestal pas op het moment dat er tekorten dreigen te ontstaan. Omdat samenwerking vaak niet goed formeel is geregeld en op basis van vertrouwen geschiedt, zijn er veelal geen contracten over te leveren prestaties. Bij samenwerkingsrelaties met tekorten proberen individuele partijen invloed uit te oefenen, maar wegens gebrek aan aansturingsbevoegdheid blijkt dit in praktijk schier onmogelijk. Het monitoren van resultaten gaat vaak dan ook niet verder dan het uitbesteden van taken aan elkaar, zonder dat er wordt bijgehouden of deze taken daadwerkelijk worden uitgevoerd. Laat staan dat wordt gekeken of de afspraken conform de eisen worden uitgevoerd.

*Op welke wijze is bijsturen het meest effectief in situaties waarin dergelijke conflicten optreden?*

De beste manier van sturing is het (opnieuw) bepalen van de individuele én de gemeenschappelijke doelen. Als daar geen consensus over kan worden gevonden, dan kan er beter met de samenwerking worden gestopt. Daarnaast zijn de instrumenten voor bijsturing belangrijk. Er worden vaak bij de start van de samenwerking geen instrumenten gedefinieerd die kunnen worden gebruikt voor bijsturing. Dit wordt veroorzaakt doordat iedereen de sfeer goed wil houden bij het starten van de samenwerking. Ik pleit er voor dat partijen dit punt toch serieus nemen om effectiviteit te bevorderen. Wat dat betreft zou er een parallel getrokken kunnen worden met een relatie tussen twee mensen met een samenlevingscontract. In het begin is men vol van vertrouwen en duikt men de relatie in. Echter, als er op den duur scheurtjes ontstaan en hier wordt niet aan gewerkt, dan ontstaan er problemen. Werken met een bijsturing- of beëindigingscontract zorgt er voor dat alle partijen weten waar ze aan toe zijn als zo'n situatie zich voordoet. Afspraken en doelen moeten tevoren worden vastgesteld, ook al hoopt men dat het niet nodig is en dat dit zijn natuurlijke gang wel zal gaan. De praktijk wijst uit dat dit laatste vaak niet het geval is.

*Begrijp ik het goed als ik stel dat er een balans moet zijn tussen vertrouwen en realisme?*

Ik zou het eerder stellen dat wanneer vertrouwen afneemt, er meer behoefte bestaat aan controle. Objectivering van geleverd werk is belangrijk om de kwaliteit van dit werk vast te kunnen stellen wanneer dit niet op vertrouwensbasis mogelijk is. Wanneer vertrouwen toeneemt, is minder controle nodig. Indien dit vertrouwen echter afneemt, dan willen gemeenten hun grip op de situatie verbeteren door middel van meer controle.

*Wordt er niet voorbijgegaan aan het feit dat prestaties die als 'goed' worden beoordeeld op basis van vertrouwen wellicht veel efficiënter zouden kunnen?*

In de praktijk blijkt dat wanneer het gevoel heerst dat het 'goed' gaat, er weinig vragen gesteld worden. Ik heb eigenlijk nog nooit meegemaakt dat samenwerkingen worden geanalyseerd als de stemming heerst dat de resultaten voldoende zijn. Het is zelfs zo dat samenwerkingen vaak voort

worden gezet terwijl de resultaten niet als 'voldoende' worden aangemerkt. Men gaat er vanuit dat, gezien het probleem een 'gezamenlijk' probleem is, zich wel oplost.

*Welke redenen zijn er om samenwerking voort te zetten als de resultaten niet naar verwachting zijn?*  
In gevallen waar samenwerking diep verankerd is geraakt in de deelnemende organisaties, zijn er hoge kosten en ingewikkelde trajecten die gepaard gaan met een mogelijke uittreding. Dit schrikt vaak al dusdanig af dat men er eigenlijk niet bij stilstaat dat de samenwerking eventueel kan worden beëindigd. Deze consequenties worden vaak niet meegenomen in het besluit om te starten met een samenwerking. Dit zie je ook terug bij Intergemeentelijke Sociale Diensten (ISD's) die worden gevormd door middel van een Gemeenschappelijke Regeling (GR), waarbij hele interne afdelingen worden opgeheven en samengevoegd in een extern orgaan. Bijkomend probleem is dat gemeenten er vaak niet voor kiezen om hun sterkste ambtenaren in deze organen te plaatsen, waardoor de capaciteit van de personen in de samenwerking niet hoog is. Dit heeft een negatieve invloed op de effectiviteit van deze externe samenwerkingsorganen.

*Wordt er dan niet bijgestuurd door de betrokken gemeenteraden en colleges?*

Het bestuur van ISD's wordt uitgevoerd door de colleges van de deelnemende gemeenten. Echter, omdat gemeenten en instanties samenwerken is vertegenwoordiging van alle partijen in dit bestuur vereist. Hierdoor is het lastig om te kunnen sturen op problematiek door voor één van de partijen relevant is, maar voor de rest minder. Soms leidt dit er toe dat één of enkele partijen uit de samenwerking stappen om toch hun eigen problemen op te lossen. Ook komt het voor dat de visie van de deelnemende partijen uiteenloopt, waardoor divergentie in doelovereenstemming ontstaat waardoor de effectiviteit van de samenwerking vermindert.

*Met de voorgestelde Wet Werken naar Vermogen werden er meer taken naar gemeenten overgeheveld. Welke situatie ontstond er toen?*

Ik zag dat veel gemeenten 'vluchtten' naar samenwerking omdat er ineens erg veel op ze afkwam. Ze hadden het idee dat ze zelf de kennis en capaciteit niet bezaten om de WWnV zelfstandig in te voeren. Vanuit de gedachte 'samen staan we sterker' ontstond er al snel een situatie waarbij zoveel mogelijk zaken zouden moeten worden gebundeld in één GR. In mijn ogen is dit geen goede zet: meerdere onzekere partners vormen samen niet per definitie één sterke. Opvallend was dat juist de gemeenten die al veel samenwerkten eerst binnenshuis gingen kijken om het zelfstandig op te lossen, omdat zij zich beter bewust zijn van de mogelijke nadelen van samenwerking.

*Hoe is dit gedrag te verklaren?*

Ik zie het zelf als het kiezen voor de makkelijkste weg. Kleine gemeenten hebben vaak gelimiteerde capaciteit, waardoor de hoeveelheid aan nieuwe taken overweldigend kan lijken. Waar een sterke analyse van hoe deze zaken zelfstandig aangepakt kunnen worden het meest effectief zou zijn, wordt snel gekeken naar buurgemeenten om te zien of de lasten te delen zijn. In praktijk is dit onhandig, want gemeenten zijn zowel bij de WWB als de WWnV zelf verantwoordelijk voor eventuele tekorten.

*Zijn er verder nog zaken die van invloed zijn bij het maken van keuzes door gemeenten om samen te werken?*

Ja, ik denk dat de mate van communicatie tussen het ambtelijk apparaat en de politiek binnen een gemeente ook van belang is. Afdelingen sociale zaken geven vaak aan de politieke vertegenwoordigers signalen af dat de taken te omvangrijk zijn, terwijl deze angst lang niet altijd gegrond is. Hierdoor worden snel ingrijpende keuzes gemaakt om dan maar te kiezen voor samenwerking. Achteraf blijkt vaak dat de capaciteit best aanwezig was, maar het schortte in de communicatie. Als de communicatie goed is kunnen objectievere keuzes worden gemaakt.

## 2.2 Interview Transcription Joost Cornielje (respondent 2)

*Buiten de succesfactoren die in de literatuur gegeven zijn voor goede samenwerking, wil ik het graag hebben over zaken die van invloed zijn op effectieve samenwerking. Naast het kijken naar welke factoren de strategie van een gemeente bepalen wil ik het graag hebben over de beoordeling van effectiviteit in de praktijk. Allereerst zou ik graag willen weten welke factoren er in praktijk toe leiden dat gemeenten samen gaan werken.*

In de praktijk wordt samenwerking veelal gezien als een middel om efficiënter te werken en tegelijk kosten te besparen. Daarnaast speelt kennis een rol: ik zie ik de praktijk vaak dat kleine gemeenten bij een grote aankloppen om gebruik te maken van kennis en capaciteit die ze zelf niet hebben. Dit zijn dan ook de twee voornaamste argumenten voor gemeenten om samen te gaan werken: kostenbesparing en betere uitvoering.

*Blijkt in praktijk dan ook dat dit de twee punten zijn waar de meeste winst op wordt behaald?*

Nee, zeker niet. Deze argumenten worden vaak gebruikt in het besluitvormingsproces, maar resultaten vallen zeker in de eerste periode meestal erg tegen. Het starten van samenwerking kost tijd, moeite en geld. Hier wordt onvoldoende rekening mee gehouden, waarna de eerste tekenen van teleurstelling zichtbaar zijn. De verwachtingen zijn vaak hoger dan wat waargemaakt kan worden. Voornamelijk ten aanzien van efficiëntie wordt een veel te rooskleurig beeld geschetst. Dit doet men vaak om het besluit door het besluitvormingsproces te krijgen. Ook wordt het opgevoerd als tegenargument tegenover het verlies aan soevereiniteit en eigen invloed. Dit is voornamelijk een belangrijk onderdeel van de besluitvorming bij samenwerkingen tussen kleine en grote gemeenten. Hier is verlies van de eigen invloed van de kleine gemeenten een belangrijk onderdeel van de overweging.

*Waar ontstaan mogelijke problemen in zulke samenwerkingen tussen kleine en grote gemeenten?*

Vaak wordt onderschat wat de invloed van het verlies aan soevereiniteit betekent voor kleine gemeenten. Als samenwerkingen worden gestart is er veel onderling vertrouwen, maar wanneer een grote gemeente taken uit gaat voeren voor één of meerdere kleine, dan ontstaan er vertrouwensproblemen. Omdat de invloed van de kleine gemeente afneemt, is het moeilijker te controleren of afspraken correct worden nageleefd. Als er vertrouwensproblemen ontstaan, dan is het hierna erg moeilijk om deze weg te nemen. Ook wordt er vaak te gemakkelijk gedacht dat alle deelnemende partijen dezelfde doelen hebben. Als de doelen vaker zouden worden herijkt dan zou de transparantie van de samenwerking verbeteren, waardoor de intenties van de partijen duidelijker zijn en het vertrouwen stijgt. Het herijken van doelen is van groot belang voor effectiviteit van samenwerking. Voornamelijk ook omdat de situatie in de werkelijkheid van dag tot dag kan verschillen. Hierdoor veranderen de doelen en wensen van partijen continu.

*Vloeit dit vertrouwensprobleem voort uit te hoge verwachtingen van kleine gemeenten of uit het feit dat er te weinig gemonitord wordt wat de daadwerkelijke resultaten zijn?*

Ik denk allebei. De verwachtingen worden op hoge mate van vertrouwen vastgesteld. Wat vaak niet wordt ingeregeld is de wijze waarop dat vertrouwen kan worden onderbouwd op basis van harde cijfers. In praktijk blijkt het vertrouwen waarop samenwerkingen worden gestart onvoldoende om een duurzame relatie op te bouwen. Bij dergelijke uitbestedingen van taken aan een andere gemeente is het erg moeilijk om bij te houden of deze wel goed werk levert. Bij uitbesteding ben je namelijk niet alleen de uitvoering kwijt, maar mis ook eigen kennis om te controleren of de uitvoering wel goed geschiedt. Hierom zouden er in mijn ogen duidelijke afspraken over monitoring moeten worden gemaakt bij het starten van de samenwerking. Objectieve meetbaarheid is belangrijk!



*Heb je voorbeelden van succesvolle instrumenten om deze monitoring uit te voeren?*

Een klanttevredenheidsonderzoek in combinatie met een gedegen analyse van de samenwerkingsovereenkomst en de wijze waarop deze afspraken zijn geconcretiseerd. Zo is het mogelijk om regelingen aan te passen na verloop van tijd om de uitvoering te optimaliseren. Op deze wijze wordt er een concreet en objectief beeld gevormd van zowel de manier waarop de samenwerking is ingericht als de daadwerkelijke effecten van de samenwerking in de praktijk.

*Om nog even terug te grijpen op het vertrouwen, waar zie je vertrouwensproblemen het meest terug? Is dit op individueel niveau of op organisatieniveau?*

Het vertrouwen ontstaat voornamelijk op individueel niveau: wethouders die elkaar mogen of hoofden sociale zaken hebben een 'klik' en beginnen samen te werken. Dit maakt samenwerking kwetsbaar, want individueel vertrouwen kan gemakkelijk worden beschadigd. Daarom bestaan er in praktijk situaties waarin er op bestuurlijk niveau nog veel vertrouwen is, maar waar kopstukken elkaar niet vertrouwen. Ook dan wordt samenwerking problematisch.

*Er zijn eens in de vier jaar verkiezingen voor gemeenteraden, waardoor belangrijke spelers weg kunnen vallen. Levert dit problemen op als vertrouwen op individueel niveau het belangrijkste is?*

Samenwerkingen worden meestal opgesteld om langer dan een paar jaar mee te gaan. Je ziet dan ook de zwakte in systemen die voornamelijk op vertrouwen zijn gebaseerd. De doelen zijn dan enkel aan het begin van het samenwerkingstraject en er is vaak geen duidelijke monitoring geregeld. Een dergelijke samenwerking is zo sterk als dat de verkiezingsuitslag lang duurt. Zodra de samenstelling van de deelnemende partijen verandert dan komt de samenwerking direct onder druk te staan.

*Kiezen gemeenten er voor om 'sterke' karakters uit de eigen organisatie af te vaardigen in dergelijke samenwerkingsverbanden om hun grip te versterken?*

Dat valt eigenlijk wel mee. Sterker nog, soms kiezen gemeenten er juist voor om personen die gemakkelijk te beïnvloeden zijn in te zetten op de samenwerking. Dit heeft te maken met het feit dat de gemeente dan altijd zelf invloed op die persoon uit kan blijven oefenen, ook al veranderen de bestuurlijke spelers na verkiezingen. Daarnaast willen de 'sterke' ambtenaren de taken en verantwoordelijkheden het liefst binnen de eigen organisatie houden om zelf direct te kunnen sturen zonder invloed van andere gemeenten of samenwerkingspartners. Gemeenten houden personele kwaliteit het liefst binnenshuis. Dit druist gek genoeg in tegen samenwerkingsargumenten als het bundelen van kennis en kwaliteit. Uiteindelijk wordt het belang van de eigen organisatie voorop gezet.

*Zouden samenwerkingen gebaseerd op vertrouwen niet beter kunnen worden vervangen door samenwerkingen op basis van duidelijke contractuele afspraken?*

Er moet denk ik een goede balans zijn tussen vertrouwen en vastlegging van afspraken in contracten. Het heeft te maken met welke taken deel precies uitmaken van een samenwerkingsverband. Contracten hebben het grote risico dat ze perverse effecten kunnen hebben. Als er bijvoorbeeld wordt afgesproken dat gemeente A de uitkeringen voor gemeente B verstrekt en dat gemeente A per uitkering een vergoeding aan B betaalt, dan heeft B er baat bij om zoveel mogelijk uitkeringen te verstrekken. Hier zie je dat B geen prikkel heeft om te re-integreren of om uitkeringen van A over te nemen en dat de afspraken eigenlijk averechts werken. Bij contracten is het lastig om goed te bepalen welke activiteiten worden uitgevoerd en hoe deze worden beloond. Vanwege de grilligheid van het sociale domein is dit erg lastig.

*Wat is de relatie tussen de verschillen in omvang van samenwerkingspartners en de structuur die wordt gekozen voor een samenwerkingsverband?*

Er zijn in de praktijk duidelijke verschillen zichtbaar. Wanneer partijen van dezelfde grootte samenwerken dan levert dat andere vormen op dan wanneer kleine partijen willen samenwerken met een grote. Het is afhankelijk van wat de gemeenten willen met hun samenwerking om een

stuuringsmechanisme te kiezen. Bij ongelijke grootte van partijen wordt vaak gewerkt met een hiërarchisch systeem. Bij gelijke partijen wordt vaker gekozen voor een inkooprelatie, hoewel dit risico's met zich meebrengt omdat leverende partijen niet *verplicht* zijn om bepaalde taken uit te voeren. Ook zijn er samenwerkingsvormen zichtbaar waarbij hele afdelingen extern geplaatst worden, in intergemeentelijke sociale diensten (ISD's).

*Hoe gaan gemeenten om met het buitenshuis plaatsen van hele afdelingen waar uiteindelijk toch eigen verantwoordelijkheid over moet worden afgelegd?*

Er bestaat zeker onvrede in situaties waar afdelingen extern zijn geplaatst, maar in andere situaties gaat het juist wel weer goed. Gemeenteraden zijn veelal kritisch op samenwerking in het kader van een gemeenschappelijke regeling, omdat ze er weinig democratische invloed op uit kunnen oefenen. Aan de andere kant zie je dat wethouders die dergelijke samenwerkingen hebben geïnitieerd er vaak juist wel tevreden mee zijn. Ambtelijk ligt het aan persoonlijke voorkeuren: er zijn managers die het prettig vinden om deze zaken extern te hebben geregeld, maar ook managers die er liever zelf grip op hebben. Vooral de laatste tijd zie ik dat afdelingen hun eigen grip en invloed graag willen versterken. Gemeenten hebben het idee dat er heel veel op ze af komt door de hervormingen waarna wordt besloten sociale zaken extern te plaatsen. Is dit echter gebeurd, dan vindt men al snel dat er te weinig invloed uitgeoefend kan worden en wordt (een deel van) sociale zaken weer intern geplaatst. Zo is de beleidseffectiviteit beter te beoordelen en te beïnvloeden.

*Hoe wordt effectiviteit beoordeeld?*

Dit verschilt per situatie, maar ik zie vaak dat er niet goed is nagedacht over hoe en wanneer beleidsuitvoering effectief is. Hierdoor zie je vaak dat zolang er geen alarmbellen rinkelen en er binnen budget wordt gebleven, de samenwerking effectief als gezien wordt. Als budgetten onder druk staan en de politiek zich druk maakt, dan wordt er beter nagedacht over welke resultaten geboekt moeten worden. Er kan worden besloten om budgettair effectief te zijn, maar het kan ook mogelijk zijn dat er wordt gestuurd op het re-integreren van zoveel mogelijk mensen. Ik zie veel dat er óf geen effectiviteitsafspraken zijn gemaakt, óf dat deze zo strikt zijn opgelegd dat het maatschappelijke effect verloren gaat en er alleen maar naar de cijfers wordt gekeken. Bij begeleiding van gemeenten probeer ik altijd van tevoren duidelijke afspraken te maken over hoe de doelen ook tijdens de samenwerking worden bijgehouden. Ook heeft het te maken met de individuele belangen van personen in de organisatie: soms wil men binnen de organisatie niet horen of weten dat de effectiviteit laag is. Denk hierbij bijvoorbeeld aan een wethouder die zich hard heeft gemaakt om een samenwerkingsverband te starten en hier geen kritiek op wenst.

*Wat kan je vertellen over de invloed van historische samenwerking op het kiezen voor nieuwe samenwerking?*

De invloed van het verleden is zeker van belang. Wat opvalt, is dat gemeenten die niet eerder hebben samengewerkt in het sociale domein al snel actief op zoek gaan naar samenwerkingspartners. Dit was duidelijk zichtbaar toen de Wet Werken naar Vermogen werd voorgesteld. Aan de andere kant zie ik ook dat gemeenten die al in een samenwerkingsverband zitten de mogelijkheid juist aangrijpen om te kijken of ze hier uit kunnen stappen. Vaak worden er voorbeelden van andere gemeenten gehaald waarmee aangetoond zou worden dat de keuze om wél of níet samen te gaan werken beter zou zijn dan de huidige situatie is.

*In hoeverre zijn deze 'best practices' goede voorspellers voor hoe het er in een specifieke situatie van een gemeente aan toe zal gaan?*

Ze worden te veel als blauwdruk gebruikt, wat verstorend werkt. Plannen worden vaak één op één vertaald naar nieuwe situaties. Er wordt te weinig gekeken naar specifieke elementen die handig zijn om in een nieuwe situatie toe te passen. Resultaten op plek A hoeven niet ook op plek B realiteit te worden. Er zijn veel omgevingsafhankelijke factoren die van invloed zijn op het lukken of mislukken van samenwerking.

*In het geval dat samenwerking mislukt, hoe gaan de deelnemende partijen hier dan mee om?*

Het valt op dat er veel te lang wordt doorgemodderd in situaties die niet bevredigend zijn. Het argument 'we stoppen er niet mee, want dat kost ons te veel geld' wordt vaak gebruikt. Dit argument zie je ook terug in de landelijke politiek, bijvoorbeeld bij de aanschaf van de Joint Strike Fighter. Gemeenten zijn huiverig om ergens de stekker uit te trekken, omdat er gesteld wordt dat de samenwerking niet voor niets is gestart en flink in is geïnvesteerd. Toekomstresultaten worden dan simpelweg wat rooskleuriger geschetst om de samenwerking nog even in stand te kunnen houden, ondanks dat veel partijen ontevreden zijn. Daarnaast vindt men het ingewikkeld om afdelingen die extern geplaatst zijn organisatorisch gezien weer intern te plaatsen en het bijbehorende takenpakket zelfstandig uit te voeren. Kennis gaat verloren als dergelijke afdelingen gedurende een lange periode extern hebben geopereerd.

*Om even samen te vatten, wat zijn in de praktijk de meest relevante factoren voor effectieve samenwerking?*

Ik kom dan uit op overeenstemming en herijking van doelen en vertrouwen op persoonlijk niveau. Hoe bepaalde mensen op bepaalde functies het met elkaar kunnen vinden bepaalt voor een groot gedeelte of de samenwerking een succes wordt. Wisselen deze personen dan na verloop van tijd, dan ontstaan er haarscheurtjes. Er moeten dan snel nieuwe afspraken worden gemaakt en de gezamenlijke doelen moeten opnieuw worden vastgesteld. Anders is de kans groot dat men door blijft modderen met de samenwerking waardoor er een suboptimale situatie ontstaat. Dit laatste wordt ook gevoed door de angst om een samenwerking weer op te zeggen. Objectieve verankering van afspraken zou kunnen worden gebruikt om zowel de duurzaamheid als de effectiviteit van samenwerking te verbeteren.

## Appendix 3: Mailing and Survey

UNIVERSITEIT TWENTE.



Gemeente Zandvoort  
t.a.v. Hoofd Sociale Zaken / Werk en Inkomen  
Postbus 2  
2040 AA Zandvoort

Uw kenmerk	Ons kenmerk	Betreft	Datum
----	OSS-JP01	Onderzoek sociale samenwerking	Hengelo, 2 juli 2012

Geachte heer/mevrouw,

Naar aanleiding van recente ontwikkelingen in het sociale domein zijn Nautus en de Universiteit Twente een onderzoek gestart naar publieke samenwerking in dit domein. Uw gemeente is geselecteerd voor deelname aan dit onderzoek. Wij zijn geïnteresseerd in uw ervaringen met samenwerking tussen gemeenten en ketenpartners voor de in- en uitvoering van beleid in voornoemd domein.

Het doel van het onderzoek is het in kaart brengen van effectieve (inter)gemeentelijke samenwerking en het analyseren van de effecten hiervan. Op basis van de resultaten zal in worden onderzocht welke vormen van samenwerking onder welke condities het meest succesvol zijn.

Wij verzoeken u om, namens uw gemeente, uw ideeën en ervaringen met ons te delen. Dit kunt u doen door een vragenlijst in te vullen die zich specifiek richt op de in- en uitvoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand vanaf 2004.

Om deel te nemen aan dit onderzoek, kunt u met de onderstaande code inloggen op [www.socialesamenwerking.nl](http://www.socialesamenwerking.nl).

**Uw persoonlijke inlogcode: 9r8xj8b2btdmzie**

Het invullen van de vragenlijst zal ongeveer 20 minuten van uw tijd kosten. Als u uw contactgegevens achterlaat op de website dan zullen de resultaten van het onderzoek na afronding met u worden gedeeld. De door u verstrekte gegevens worden vertrouwelijk behandeld en uitsluitend anoniem gepubliceerd.

Alvast onze hartelijke dank voor uw deelname aan dit onderzoek.

Met vriendelijke groet,

  
J. (Jelle) Postma, onderzoeker

## Survey: Onderzoek Sociale Samenwerking

*'Een onderzoek naar de effectiviteit van (inter)gemeentelijke samenwerking in het sociale domein.'*

Welkom, {TOKEN:FUNCTIENAAM} van de {TOKEN:GEMEENTENAAM}, bij dit onderzoek naar (inter)gemeentelijke samenwerking in het sociale domein. Dit onderzoek wordt uitgevoerd door Nautus, in samenwerking met de Universiteit Twente.

De vragen die gesteld worden gaan over uw persoonlijke situatie, de situatie van uw gemeente en uw ervaringen met de invoering en uitvoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand. Tenzij anders vermeld is het mogelijk om slechts één antwoord per vraag te geven. Indien u twijfelt, kies dan voor het antwoord dat voor u het meest van toepassing is.

Indien u interesse heeft om de resultaten van het onderzoek te ontvangen, dan wordt u verzocht na afronding van de vragenlijst uw contactgegevens in te vullen.

Het invullen van de vragenlijst duurt ongeveer 20 minuten. U wordt alvast vriendelijk bedankt voor uw deelname! Deze enquête bevat 24 vragen.

### Achtergronden Persoonlijk

De volgende vragen gaan over uw persoonlijke achtergrond en de achtergrond van de gemeente waarin u werkzaam bent. Kies telkens de mogelijkheid die het meest van toepassing is op uw situatie.

#### 1 [AG01] (Municipal number of inhabitants)

Hoeveel inwoners heeft de gemeente waarin u werkzaam bent?

Kies a.u.b. een van de volgende mogelijkheden:

- Minder dan 25.000
- Tussen de 25.000 en 50.000
- Meer dan 50.000

#### 2 [AP01] (Respondent current position)

Welk soort functie vervult u momenteel binnen uw gemeente?

Kies a.u.b. een van de volgende mogelijkheden:

- Beleidsinhoudelijke functie
- Managementfunctie
- Politiek/bestuurlijke functie
- Anders, namelijk:

#### 3 [AP02] (Respondent sector involvement)

Op welke beleidsterreinen bent u voornamelijk werkzaam?\*

Selecteer één of meerdere opties:

- Jeugdzorg
- Gehandicaptenzorg
- Re-integratie
- Sociale werkgelegenheid
- Werkgelegenheid
- Welzijn
- Ander(e) beleidsterrein(en), namelijk:

\*Meerdere antwoorden mogelijk. Indien u 'ander(e) beleidsterrein(en)' kiest, vul dan een omschrijving van dit terrein of deze terreinen in.

#### 4 [AP03] (Respondent commencement current position)

In welk jaar bent u begonnen in de functie die u momenteel vervult?

Vul uw antwoord hier in:

[JAARTAL]

#### 5 [AP04] (Respondent nature of WWB involvement)

Was u betrokken bij de invoering van de Wet Werk Bijstand in 2004? Zo ja, was dit in een coördinerende, een uitvoerende of een bestuurlijke rol?

Kies a.u.b. een van de volgende mogelijkheden:

- Ja, in een coördinerende rol
- Ja, in een uitvoerende rol
- Ja, in een bestuurlijke rol
- Nee, ik was hier niet bij betrokken

#### Introductie Wet Werk en Bijstand

#### 6 [WWB] (Introduction Wet Werk en Bijstand)

De sociale zekerheidswet 'Wet Werk en Bijstand' is ingevoerd in 2004.

Deze wet stelt gemeenten verantwoordelijk voor het aanbieden van voorzieningen aan inwoners die niet op eigen kracht aan de slag komen. Binnen deze voorzieningen worden twee onderdelen onderscheiden: uitkeringen (budget inkomensdeel) en re-integratieactiviteiten (budget werkdeel).

Dit onderzoek richt zich op geheel van taken en verantwoordelijkheden die voortvloeien uit beide onderdelen van de Wet Werk en Bijstand.

#### Achtergronden Gemeente

In dit deel van de vragenlijst wordt de samenwerking van uw gemeente bij de uitvoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand vanaf 2004 in kaart gebracht. Hierbij gaat het niet alleen om samenwerking met andere gemeenten, maar ook om samenwerking met ketenpartners. Deze samenwerking hoeft niet formeel te zijn vastgelegd.

#### 7 [AG02] (Municipal network partners)

Met welk soort organisaties werkt uw gemeente momenteel samen, of heeft uw gemeente in het verleden samengewerkt in het kader van de uitvoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand? \*

Selecteer één of meerdere opties:

- Het UWV
- Re-integratiebureaus
- Lokale werkgevers
- Sociale werkbedrijven
- Andere gemeenten
- Provinciale overheid
- Nationale overheid
- Geen samenwerkingspartners
- Andere organisatie(s):

\* Meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

### 8 [AG03] (Municipal commencement of network involvement)

Wanneer startte uw gemeente met deze samenwerking?

Kies a.u.b. een van de volgende mogelijkheden:

- Vóór de invoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand (vóór 2004).
- Tijdens de invoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand (vanaf 2004).
- Ná de invoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand (ná 2004).

### Netwerkvormen

De volgende vragen hebben betrekking op de samenwerking met álle samenwerkingspartners voor de gehele uitvoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand. Indien uw gemeente meerdere samenwerkingsverbanden heeft binnen het kader van deze wetgeving, kiest u dan het verband dat voor uw gemeente het meest relevant is voor de uitvoering van de wet om de vragen te beantwoorden.

Geef van de uitspraken met behulp van de 'schuifbalk' aan in hoeverre deze bij de samenwerking van uw gemeente passen. U kunt hierbij een cijfer geven op een schaal van 0 (absoluut mee oneens, deze uitspraak past niet bij de situatie van de samenwerking) tot en met 10 (absoluut mee eens, deze uitspraak past volledig bij de situatie van de samenwerking). Kies de mogelijkheid die het meest van toepassing is op de situatie van de samenwerking van uw gemeente.

### 9 [BROK] (Brokering)

De onderstaande stellingen hebben betrekking op de mate van communicatie binnen het samenwerkingsverband.

Vul uw antwoord(en) hier in:

- De mate van communicatie tussen de samenwerkingspartners over het **besturen van het samenwerkingsverband** is hoog. [0-10]
- De mate van communicatie tussen de samenwerkingspartners over de **verdeling van taken en activiteiten** binnen het samenwerkingsverband is hoog. [0-10]
- De mate van communicatie tussen de samenwerkingspartners over de **coördinatie van de uitvoering van taken en activiteiten** binnen het samenwerkingsverband is hoog. [0-10]

### 10 [GOV1] (Governance 1)

Hoe worden besluiten binnen het samenwerkingsverband over het algemeen genomen?

Kies a.u.b. een van de volgende mogelijkheden:

- Besluiten worden genomen door alle deelnemende gemeenten en ketenpartners op basis van gelijkheid.
- Besluiten worden genomen door één of enkele samenwerkingspartners die een groot deel van de taken en verantwoordelijkheden binnen het samenwerkingsverband vervult/vervullen.
- Besluiten worden genomen door één centrale organisatie of raad. Deze is speciaal aangesteld of opgericht om besluiten voor het samenwerkingsverband als geheel te maken.

\*Kies het antwoord dat het best aansluit bij de situatie van de samenwerking van uw gemeente.

### 11 [GOV2] (Governance 2)

Indien de situatie van uw gemeente ten aanzien van het nemen van besluiten sterk afwijkt van de hierboven geschetste situaties, dan kunt u de situatie van uw gemeente hieronder toelichten.

Vul uw antwoord hier in:

[TEKSTVAK]

### Voorspellers

De volgende vragen gaan over het onderling vertrouwen tussen de samenwerkingspartners, het aantal deelnemers aan de samenwerking, de overeenstemming over de gemeenschappelijke doelen

en de benodigde organisationele kwaliteiten van partners voor coördinatie en sturing van de samenwerking.

### **12 [TRUS] (Trust)**

De onderstaande stellingen gaan over het onderling vertrouwen tussen de partijen die samenwerken in het kader van de uitvoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand.\*

Vul uw antwoord(en) hier in:

- Het vertrouwen dat de samenwerkingspartners in elkaar hebben is hoog. [0-10]
- Het vertrouwen dat de samenwerkingspartners hebben in de organisatie(s) die het samenwerkingsverband bestuurt/besturen is hoog. [0-10]

\*Geef bij elk van de uitspraken aan in hoeverre deze bij het de samenwerking van uw gemeente past. U kunt hierbij een cijfer geven op een schaal van 0 (absoluut mee oneens, deze uitspraak past niet bij de situatie van de samenwerking) tot en met 10 (absoluut mee eens, deze uitspraak past volledig bij de situatie van de samenwerking).

### **13 [NLVL] (Need for network-level competencies)**

De onderstaande stellingen gaan over de benodigde kwaliteiten van samenwerkingspartners voor de coördinatie en sturing van de samenwerking.

Vul uw antwoord(en) hier in:

- De situatie vraagt specifieke coördinerende en sturende vaardigheden van de partijen die belast zijn met de coördinatie van de samenwerking. [0-10]
- Het afstemmen van welke samenwerkingspartner welke activiteit(en) voor zijn rekening neemt is gemakkelijk. [0-10]
- De mate van verantwoording die door het samenwerkingsverband als geheel moet worden afgelegd aan personen of organisaties buiten het samenwerkingsverband is hoog. [0-10]
- Het samenwerkingsverband als geheel moet snel kunnen reageren op veranderingen die plaatsvinden buiten het samenwerkingsverband. (Denk aan vragen van andere gemeenten, het Rijk, belangengroepen of burgers) [0-10]

### **14 [PARTIC] (Number of participants)**

Hoeveel gemeenten en/of ketenpartners maken, en maakten, in totaal deel uit van het samenwerkingsverband in het kader van de Wet Werk en Bijstand?

Kies a.u.b. een van de volgende mogelijkheden:

- Zeven of minder gemeenten en/of ketenpartners.
- Tussen de acht en veertien gemeenten en/of ketenpartners.
- Vijftien of meer gemeenten en/of ketenpartners.



### 15 [GOALC] (Network goal consensus)

Geef aan welke van de onderstaande situaties van overeenstemming over gemeenschappelijke doelen het meest van toepassing is op uw situatie.\*

Kies a.u.b. een van de volgende mogelijkheden:

- Alle samenwerkingspartners zijn het in hoofdlijnen eens over welke doelen er door het samenwerkingsverband als geheel worden nagestreefd.
- Een meerderheid van de samenwerkingspartners is het eens over de doelen die door het samenwerkingsverband als geheel worden nagestreefd. Een minderheid is het oneens met deze doelen.
- De samenwerkingspartners zijn het in hoge mate oneens over de doelen die door het samenwerkingsverband als geheel worden nagestreefd.

\*Kies het antwoord dat het best aansluit bij de situatie van de samenwerking van uw gemeente.

### Effectiviteit

Dit onderdeel van de vragenlijst heeft betrekking op **de resultaten voor uw eigen gemeente**. De stellingen gaan over de effecten van de samenwerking op uw gemeentelijke dienstverlening en resultaten. 'Cliënten' zijn inwoners van uw gemeente die een beroep doen op één of meerdere voorzieningen van de Wet Werk en Bijstand.

### 16 [CLO] (Client-level outcomes)

De volgende stellingen gaan over de effecten van de samenwerking op de kwaliteit van uw dienstverlening in het kader van de Wet Werk en Bijstand.\*

Vul uw antwoord(en) hier in:

- Door de samenwerking is er een hogere uitstroom van uitkeringsontvangers gerealiseerd dan wanneer wij de Wet Werk en Bijstand zelfstandig zouden hebben uitgevoerd. [0-10]
- Door de samenwerking worden de cliënten van mijn gemeente sneller geholpen. [0-10]
- De samenwerking heeft geleid tot integratie van taken en diensten, zodat er minder sprake is van 'dubbel werk'. [0-10]
- Mijn gemeente is door de samenwerking beter in staat om het totaalpakket van taken en diensten in het kader van de Wet Werk en Bijstand te leveren aan de cliënten. [0-10]

\*Geef voor elk van de uitspraken aan in hoeverre deze bij uw gemeente past. U kunt hierbij een cijfer geven op een schaal van 0 (absoluut mee oneens, deze uitspraak past niet bij de situatie in mijn gemeente) tot en met 10 (absoluut mee eens, deze uitspraak past volledig bij de situatie in mijn gemeente).

### 17 [LEG] (Legitimacy)

De volgende stellingen gaan over de effecten van de samenwerking op de waardering van uw dienstverlening in het kader van de Wet Werk en Bijstand.

Vul uw antwoord(en) hier in:

- Door de samenwerking waarderen de cliënten de snelheid waarmee ze worden geholpen meer. [0-10]
- Door de samenwerking waarderen de cliënten het totaalpakket van voorzieningen dat wordt aangeboden door mijn gemeente meer. [0-10]
- De algehele tevredenheid van de cliënten is gestegen door de samenwerking van mijn gemeente. [0-10]

### 18 [RSCS] (Resource acquisition)

De volgende stellingen gaan over de effecten van uw samenwerking op de beschikbaarheid van kennis, diensten en financiële middelen.\*

Vul uw antwoord(en) hier in:

- De samenwerking zorgt voor een betere toegang tot kennis over het uitvoeren van taken en diensten gerelateerd aan de Wet Werk en Bijstand. [0-10]
- Mijn gemeente heeft de mogelijkheid om (delen van) de dienstverlening in het kader van de Wet Werk en Bijstand uit te laten voeren door samenwerkingspartners. [0-10]
- Mijn gemeente heeft de beschikking over financiële middelen van samenwerkingspartners voor de uitvoering van de Wet Werk en Bijstand. [0-10]

\*Geef voor elk van de uitspraken aan in hoeverre deze bij uw gemeente past. U kunt hierbij een cijfer geven op een schaal van 0 (absoluut mee oneens, deze uitspraak past niet bij de situatie in mijn gemeente) tot en met 10 (absoluut mee eens, deze uitspraak past volledig bij de situatie in mijn gemeente).

### 19 [COST] (Cost)

De volgende stellingen gaan over de kosten die de samenwerking in het kader van de Wet Werk en Bijstand met zich meebrengt voor uw gemeente.

Vul uw antwoord(en) hier in:

- De kosten om de samenwerking te starten waren hoog. [0-10]
- De kosten van de coördinatie van de uitvoering van taken en activiteiten binnen het samenwerkingsverband zijn hoog. [0-10]
- De kosten van overleg met de samenwerkingspartners zijn hoog. [0-10]
- De kosten van het leveren van kennis, diensten en financiële middelen aan de samenwerkingspartners zijn hoog. [0-10]

### Besparingen

Het laatste onderdeel van deze vragenlijst gaat over de resultaten op het **inkomensdeel** van de Wet Werk en Bijstand (sinds 2010 budget BUIG: bundeling uitkeringen en inkomensvoorzieningen gemeenten). Uit het inkomensdeel betalen gemeenten de uitkeringen.

### 20 [BSP1] (Savings on entitlements)

Heeft uw gemeente door de samenwerking besparingen op de uitgaven aan het inkomensdeel van de Wet Werk en Bijstand gerealiseerd?

Kies a.u.b. een van de volgende mogelijkheden:

- Ja  
 Nee

### 21 [BSP2] (Savings realization timeframe)

Hoeveel jaren van samenwerking in het kader van de Wet Werk en Bestuur waren er nodig om deze besparingen te realiseren?\*

Kies a.u.b. een van de volgende mogelijkheden:

- 1 jaar  
 2 jaren  
 3 jaren  
 4 jaren  
 5 jaren  
 6 jaren  
 7 jaren  
 8 jaren

\*Toon deze vraag alleen als aan de volgende voorwaarden is voldaan: (ANTWOORD20='JA')

**22 [BSP3] (Amount of municipal savings)**

Schat hoeveel procent uw gemeente jaarlijks bespaart op de uitgaven aan het inkomensdeel van de Wet Werk en Bijstand door uw samenwerkingsactiviteiten. Licht uw antwoord toe.

Vul uw antwoord hier in:

[TEKSTVAK]

\*Toon deze vraag alleen als aan de volgende voorwaarden is voldaan: (ANTWOORD20='JA')

**Vragen en Opmerkingen**

**23 [COMMENTS] (Respondent comments)**

Dit was de laatste vraag van dit onderzoek naar (inter)gemeentelijke samenwerking in het sociale domein. Indien u nog vragen en/of opmerkingen heeft, dan kunt u deze hieronder invullen.

Vul uw antwoord hier in:

[TEKSTVAK]

**Afsluiting**

**24 [RESPMAIL] (Respondent contact details)**

Vriendelijk bedankt voor het invullen van de vragenlijst.

Indien u op de hoogte gehouden wilt worden van de resultaten van dit onderzoek, dan kunt u hieronder uw e-mailadres invullen. Wanneer de resultaten van het onderzoek bekend zijn, dan zullen deze met u worden gedeeld.

[MAILADRESVAK]

Mocht u naar aanleiding van dit onderzoek nog vragen of opmerkingen hebben, dan kunt u contact opnemen met de onderzoeker door een e-mail te sturen naar [j.postma@nautus.nl](mailto:j.postma@nautus.nl).

**Slotpagina**

Vriendelijk bedankt voor het invullen van de vragenlijst. Uw deelname wordt zeer op prijs gesteld.

U kunt dit venster nu sluiten.

## Appendix 4: Concepts and Values

### Conceptualization and Operationalization

Concept	Dimension	Conceptualization / Operationalization
Brokering		The level of direct actor-to-actor communications concerning the governance, coordination and tuning of tasks and responsibilities in the network. <i>(The amount of deliberation between the municipality and the other network participants concerning the governance and coordination of social services and the distribution of tasks and responsibilities for the WWB).</i>
	Communication concerning network governance	The level of communication between the network partners concerning the governance of the network. Scale: 0-10.
	Communication concerning network coordination	The level of communication concerning the distribution of tasks and activities within the network. Scale: 0-10.
	Communication concerning tasks and responsibilities	The level of communication between the network partner concerning the coordination of the execution of tasks and activities within the network. Scale: 0-10.
Governance		The degree to which the network is governed by the network participants themselves. <i>(The structure of the internal decision-making process within the network).</i>
	Shared	The collective of municipalities and chain partners makes network-wide decisions on the basis of equality.
	Lead	Network-wide decisions are made by a few network partners who fulfill a large proportion of the tasks and responsibilities of the network.
	External	Network-wide decisions are made by one central organization or board that has specifically been appointed or erected to make these decisions.

Table 5.4.1: Conceptualization and operationalization of brokering and governance

Concept	Dimension	Conceptualization / Operationalization
Trust		The willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about another's intentions and behaviors. <i>(The expectations of municipalities and chain partners of each other's reliability).</i>
	Level of trust that the network has in all involved organizations.	The level of trust amongst all network partners that comprise the network. Scale: 0-10.
	The level of trust of the network in central organizations	The extent to which the network central governing organizations are trusted by the other network partners. Scale: 0-10.
Number of Participants		The accommodation and coordination of needs by a certain number of network members. <i>(The accommodation and coordination of needs concerning network activities by a certain amount of municipalities, the UWV, regional coordination centers, reintegration partners and employers concerning the WWB).</i>
	Few	The network consists of seven or less municipalities and/or organizational chain partners.
	Moderate	The network consists of eight to fourteen municipalities and/or organizational chain partners.
	Moderate to many	The network consists of fifteen or more municipalities and/or organizational chain partners.
Network goal consensus		The level of consensus concerning goals on the network level among the organizational network participants.

		<i>(The extent to which the municipalities and chain partners agree on the goals that are to be reached collectively concerning the WWB).</i>
	High	All municipalities and chain partners agree on the collective goals that are strived for by the network.
	Moderately high	A majority of the municipalities and chain parties agree on general collective goals. A minority of the municipalities and chain partners disagrees with these general collective goals.
	Moderately low	The municipalities and chain partners disagree to a large extent on the collective goals that are strived for by the network.
Need for network level competencies		Individual competencies of the organizational network members that are required to manage the network. <i>(Unique abilities that are specific for a municipality or chain partner that are required for proper coordination and guidance of the network).</i>
	The level of agreement on network coordination	The situation requires specific coordination and guidance skills of those actors that are in charge of the coordination within the network. Scale: 0-10.
	The difficulty to distribute operational tasks	The amount of efforts that is required for the distribution of the operational network tasks among the network partners. Scale: 0-10.
	Level of accountability of the network to the exterior	The level of accountability of the network as a whole towards external parties (such as organizations and the public). Scale: 0-10.
	Level of required responsiveness	The demanded level of network responsiveness towards suggestions, influences, appeals or efforts of external parties. Scale: 0-10.

Table 5.4.2: Conceptualization and operationalization of critical contingencies

<b>Concept</b>	<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Conceptualization / Operationalization</b>
Client-level outcomes		Individual benefits to network partners' clientele that come forth out of network involvement. <i>(Individual benefits for citizens coming forth out of activities that were organized by the network for executing WWB-related services).</i>
	Increase in WWB entitlement outflow	The increase in outflow of citizens receiving a financial WWB-related entitlement as caused by the cooperation involvement. Scale: 0-10.
	Faster service delivery	Clients are served with WWB-related services faster under the influence of the cooperation involvement. Scale: 0-10.
	Task and service integration for more efficiency	Integration of WWB-related tasks and services that leads to increased efficiency. Scale: 0-10.
	WWB clients receive the services that are required	The improvements in the ability to deliver the total package of WWB-related services to the clients under the influence of the cooperation involvement. Scale: 0-10.
Legitimacy		Additional status and acceptance of the network clients that is derived from network involvement by a network participant. <i>(The effects of the cooperation on the valuation of the municipal service delivery by the clients).</i>
	Improvements in speed delivery appreciation	Due to network involvement, the clients appreciate the speed with which they were served higher. Scale: 0-10.
	Improvements in client service appreciation	Due to network involvement, the clients appreciate the total package of services they were provided with higher. Scale: 0-10.

	Improvements in client satisfaction due to network involvement	The overall client satisfaction of the WWB clients improved due to the network involvement. Scale: 0-10.
Resource acquisition		The centralization of network-wide resources for more effective distribution and utilization of these resources for the delivery of services. <i>(The effects of the cooperation on the availability of the knowledge, services and financial means of network partners).</i>
	Availability of knowledge	The network improves the availability of knowledge concerning WWB tasks and services for the municipality. Scale: 0-10.
	Availability of reintegration services	The municipality has the possibility to make network partners deliver WWB-related services to its citizens. Scale: 0-10.
	Availability of financial means	The municipality has the availability of certain financial means of network partners to use for WWB-related activities. Scale: 0-10.
Cost		Investments that are made for the formation and maintenance of the network involvement (management tasks) and the execution of tasks and services that relate to the network (operational tasks). <i>(The amount of costs that is made for forming, coordinating, governing the network and sharing resources with the network partners)</i>
	Costs for formal commitment	The amount of costs that are made by a municipality for joining or forming the network were: Scale: 0-10.
	Costs for network coordination	The amount of costs that a municipality makes for the coordination of the network tasks and activities. Scale: 0-10.
	Costs for network governance	The amount of costs that a municipality makes for making agreements with network partners. Scale: 0-10.
	Costs for resources provided to the network	The amount of costs that a municipality makes for providing services, sharing knowledge and financially supporting network partners. Scale: 0-10.

Table 5.4.3: Conceptualization and operationalization of effectiveness

## Appendix 5: SPSS Data Output

**Reliability Statistics<sup>a</sup>**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,729	2

a. Scale: Trust

Table A1.1: Reliability statistics for the variable trust

**Item-Total Statistics<sup>a</sup>**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
[NLVL_NLVL1]	17,37	12,999	,284	,232	,293
[NLVL_NLVL2]	20,07	18,271	-,084	,259	,664
[NLVL_NLVL3]	18,20	12,166	,334	,463	,232
[NLVL_NLVL4]	17,17	13,040	,564	,395	,083

a. Scale: Network-level competencies

Table A1.2: item-total statistics for the scales used to measure variable NLVL

**Reliability Statistics<sup>a</sup>**

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items <sup>a</sup>
,664	,687	3

a. Scale: Network-level competencies

Table A1.3: Reliability statistics for variable NLVL with NLVL\_NLVL2 omitted

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Participant-Governed (PGN)	11	36,7	36,7
Lead Organization-Governed (LOGN)	13	43,3	80,0
Network Administrative-Governed (NAO)	6	20,0	100,0
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100,0</b>	

Table A2: Frequency distribution of the three network forms

**Level of trust within the network**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1,50	1	3,3	3,3	3,3
3,00	1	3,3	3,3	6,7
3,50	1	3,3	3,3	10,0
4,50	1	3,3	3,3	13,3
5,00	4	13,3	13,3	26,7
5,50	3	10,0	10,0	36,7
6,00	6	20,0	20,0	56,7
6,50	1	3,3	3,3	60,0
7,00	5	16,7	16,7	76,7
7,50	2	6,7	6,7	83,3
8,00	4	13,3	13,3	96,7
9,00	1	3,3	3,3	100,0
Total	30	100,0	100,0	

Table A3.1: Score distribution for Trust

**Need for network-level competencies**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 3,00	1	3,3	3,3	3,3
4,67	2	6,7	6,7	10,0
5,00	2	6,7	6,7	16,7
5,33	2	6,7	6,7	23,3
6,00	3	10,0	10,0	33,3
6,33	2	6,7	6,7	40,0
6,67	2	6,7	6,7	46,7
7,00	3	10,0	10,0	56,7
7,33	5	16,7	16,7	73,3
7,67	2	6,7	6,7	80,0
8,00	4	13,3	13,3	93,3
8,67	1	3,3	3,3	96,7
10,00	1	3,3	3,3	100,0
Total	30	100,0	100,0	

Table A3.2: Score distribution for Need for network-level competencies

**Hoeveel gemeenten en/of ketenpartners maken, en maakten, in totaal deel uit van het samenwerkingsverband in het kader van de Wet Werk en Bijstand?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Zeven of minder gemeenten en/of ketenpartners.	23	76,6	76,6	76,6
Tussen de acht en veertien gemeenten en/of ketenpartners.	7	23,3	23,3	100,0
Total	30	100,0	100,0	

Table A3.3: Score distribution for Number of participants



Geef aan welke van de onderstaande situaties van overeenstemming over gemeenschappelijke doelen het meest van toepassing is op uw situatie.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Alle samenwerkingspartners zijn het in hoofdlijnen eens over welke doelen er door het samenwerkingsverband als geheel wo	24	80,0	80,0	80,0
Een meerderheid van de samenwerkingspartners is het eens over de doelen die door het samenwerkingsverband als geheel wordt	4	13,3	13,3	93,3
De samenwerkingspartners zijn het in hoge mate oneens over de samenwerkingsdoelen.	2	6,7	6,7	100,0
Total	30	100,0	100,0	

Table A3.4: Score distribution for Goal consensus




Figure A3.5: Score distribution for Need for network-level competencies with normality




Figure A3.6: Score distribution for Trust with normality

**Reliability Statistics<sup>a</sup>**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items <sup>a</sup>
,845	4

a. Scale: Client-level outcomes

Table A4.1: Reliability statistics for Client-level outcomes

**Reliability Statistics<sup>a</sup>**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,921	3

a. Scale: Legitimacy

Table A4.2: Reliability statistics for Legitimacy

**Reliability Statistics<sup>a</sup>**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items <sup>a</sup>
,895	4

a. Scale: Cost

Table A4.3: Reliability statistics for Cost effectiveness

**Reliability Statistics<sup>a</sup>**

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items <sup>a</sup>
,662	,696	3

a. Scale: Resource acquisition

Table A4.4: Reliability statistics for Resource acquisition




Figure A4.5: Score distribution Total effectiveness with normality

**Statistics**

Total Effectiveness

N	Valid	30
	Missing	0
Mean		5,8475
Std. Deviation		1,16484

Table A4.6: Descriptive statistics of variable Total Effectiveness

*Critical Contingency Scores for the Shared Governance Network Form*

Governance Form	Trust (TRU)	Number of Participants (PARTIC)	Goal Consensus (GOALC)	Need for Network-level Competencies (NLVL)
<i>Shared governance (PGN; N = 11)</i>	<u>(5) High density, decentralized</u>	<u>(7) Few</u>	<u>(9) High</u>	(1) Low
	(2) Low density, highly centralized	(4) Moderate number	(1) Moderately low	<u>(6) Moderate</u>
	(4) Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	(0) Moderate to many	(1) Moderately high	(4) High

Table A5.1: Empirical score distribution for the shared governance form applied to the 'Modes of Network Governance' model (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9). Underlined scores are represented most often in the current data.

**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Total Effectiveness of Shared Governance	11	4,58	7,82	5,8473	,91847
Valid N (listwise)	11				

Table A5.2: Descriptive Statistics of Total Effectiveness of the Shared Governance Network Form

**Group Statistics**

Shared Governance Effectiveness Scores		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Total Effectiveness	Matching Cases	5	6,3300	,83932	,37535
	Deviant Cases	6	5,4451	,83459	,34072

Table A5.3: Group statistics for shared governance effectiveness scores of matching and deviant cases

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Total Effectiveness	Equal variances assumed	,016	,901	1,747	9	,115	,88486	,50664	-,26125	2,03097
	Equal variances not assumed			1,746	8,624	,116	,88486	,50693	-,26958	2,03930

Table A5.4: Independent samples t-test for mean differences of matching cases and deviant cases for shared governance

*Critical Contingency Scores for the Lead Organization Network Form*

Governance Form	Trust (TRU)	Number of Participants (PARTIC)	Goal Consensus (GOALC)	Need for Network-level Competencies (NLVL)
	(4) High density, decentralized	<u>(11) Few</u>	<u>(12) High</u>	(0) Low
<i>Lead organization (LOGN; N = 13)</i>	(0) Low density, highly centralized	(2) Moderate number	(0) Moderately low	(3) Moderate
	<u>(9) Moderate density, NAO monitored by members</u>	(0) Moderate to many	(1) Moderately high	<u>(10) High</u>

Table A6.1: Empirical score distribution for the shared governance form applied to the 'Modes of Network Governance' model (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9). Underlined scores are represented most often in the current data.

**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Total Effectiveness of Lead Organization Governance	13	3,31	7,60	5,4728	1,23089
Valid N (listwise)	13				

Table A6.2: Descriptive Statistics of Total Effectiveness of the Lead Organization Governance Network Form

**Group Statistics**

Lead Organization Governance Effectiveness Scores		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Total Effectiveness	Matching Cases	5	6,0958	,40498	,18111
	Deviant Cases	8	5,0833	1,43281	,50658

Table A6.3: Group statistics for shared governance effectiveness scores of matching and deviant cases

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Total Effectiveness	Equal variances assumed	6,026	,032	1,520	11	,157	1,01250	,66631	-,45404	2,47904
	Equal variances not assumed			1,882	8,656	,094	1,01250	,53798	-,21190	2,23690

Table A6.4: Independent samples t-test for mean differences of matching cases and deviant cases for lead organization governed networks

*Critical Contingency Scores for the Network Administrative Organization Network Form*

Governance Form	Trust (TRU)	Number of Participants (PARTIC)	Goal Consensus (GOALC)	Need for Network-level Competencies (NLVL)
	(2) High density, decentralized	<u>(5) Few</u>	<u>(3) High</u>	(0) Low
	(1) Low density, highly centralized	(1) Moderate number	(1) Moderately low	(0) Moderate
<i>Network administrative organization (NAO; N = 6)</i>	<u>(3) Moderate density, NAO monitored by members</u>	(0) Moderate to many	(2) Moderately high	<u>(6) High</u>

Table A7.1: Empirical score distribution for the shared governance form applied to the 'Modes of Network Governance' model (Provan & Kenis, 2007, p. 9). Underlined scores are represented most often in the current data.

**Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Total Effectiveness of Network Administrative Organization Governance	6	5,16	7,75	6,6597	1,17880
Valid N (listwise)	6				

Table A7.2: Descriptive Statistics of Total Effectiveness of the Network Administrative Organization Governance Form

**Group Statistics**

Network Administrative Organization Governance Effectiveness Scores		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Total Effectiveness	Matching Cases	2	5,7479	,82790	,58542
	Deviant Cases	4	7,1156	1,12075	,56038

Table A7.3: Group statistics for network administrative organization governed network effectiveness scores of matching and deviant cases

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Total Effectiveness	Equal variances assumed	,360	,581	-1,497	4	,209	-1,36771	,91382	-3,90487	1,16946
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,688	2,869	,194	-1,36771	,81039	-4,01455	1,27914

Table A7.4: Independent samples t-test for mean differences of matching cases and deviant cases for network administrative organization governed networks

**Group Statistics**

Total Network Effectiveness Scores		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Total Effectiveness	Matching Cases	7	6,1637	,81520	,30812
	Deviant Cases	23	5,7513	1,25134	,26092

Table A8.1: Group statistics for all network effectiveness scores of matching and deviant cases

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Total Effectiveness	Equal variances assumed	2,683	,113	,815	28	,422	,41242	,50575	-,62356	1,44841
	Equal variances not assumed			1,021	15,515	,323	,41242	,40375	-,44567	1,27052

Table A8.2: Group statistics for all network effectiveness scores of matching and deviant cases