Master Thesis

Dutch municipal brothel policies: Temporal and substantive policy diffusion.

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Foreword

Here I would like to thank everyone that somehow helped me or supported me in finishing my master thesis. First, I want to thank my two supervisors, Minna van Gerven and Wouter Jans who helped me develop my research question and the theory behind it, kept me on course and always provided me with helpful feedback when needed. My thanks go out especially to Wouter, who allowed me to use a part of the data from his PhD project and who taught me more about SPSS in an hour than I learned in my entire school career. I would also like to thank my family for providing me with the moral and financial support that enabled me to go to school and finish my Master's degree. And last, but certainly not least, I want to thank Yvonne, Imke and Loraine whose great company and friendship managed to lure me to class most days and whose motivation to do well in school motivated me in turn.

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List of Abbreviations

APV	Algemene Plaatselijke Verordening
EU	European Union
VNG	Vereninging van Nederlandse Gemeenten

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1. Introduction

The internal market of the European Union is one of the most important aspects of cooperation in the EU, in which the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons is ensured (European Commission, 2003). Since its creation in 1993 it has proven to be of great benefit as it has created more jobs and billions of euros of extra prosperity for the European citizens, as well as dismantling barriers to trade (Hix, 2008). Because of the internal market Europeans can now live, study, work or retire wherever they like in the EU (European Commission, 2003). While it sounds like this could be nothing but positive it could also lead to problems, as the growing exchange of goods and the free movement of people, labor and services particularly affect the European border and cross-border regions within the EU (Niebuhr, 2006). Because of the freedoms enjoyed within the internal market, national policies no longer only affect the individual Member State but can also affect the Member States that surround it. Citizens of the EU are allowed to travel freely anywhere within the internal market to obtain the services they want. This means that if in Member State A certain services are legal, EU citizens are free to travel there and obtain those services even if it is illegal in Member States B and C. It also means that the residents of Member States B and C are free to travel to Member State A and offer their services. Therefore, national policies can greatly affect the rest of the EU Member States and particularly the border regions. This can be especially prominent when a Member State legalizes something that is not yet legal in its neighboring Member States, which could even result into attracting unwanted problems, like increased criminal activity (Scott & Dedel, 2006). So not only do the freedoms of the internal market affect national policies, they also affect local policies.

Because of this, regulating prostitution may have become an issue of concern for some Dutch municipalities. When the Netherlands, in 2000, was the first European country to legalize prostitution and brothels (Outshoorn, 2004), German and Belgian citizens were free to cross the border to make use of these services. Unsurprisingly, in the Netherlands there is a geographic concentration of prostitution in the big cities and in the border areas of the provinces of Groningen, Limburg and Zeeland and in the border areas of the regions of Twente and West Brabant (Venicz & Nencel, 2000). *The intent of this thesis is to look whether Dutch border and non-border municipalities regulated their brothel policies*

differently in reaction to the fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs and the problems surrounding brothels in border areas.

While prostitution is often referred to as the oldest profession in the world, it has nevertheless remained a controversial issue worldwide. Opinions on how to deal with it vary widely and go from criminalizing all aspects of prostitution to controlling it through legalization (Procon, 2011). But even in the countries that fully legalized it, prostitution seems to remain a contested issue. In the Netherlands, where prostitution and brothels were legalized in 2000, it is repeatedly put back on the agenda to make the laws more strict or to criminalize certain aspects of it (Ministry of Justice, 2013; NOS, 2013). However, prostitution in the Netherlands is still legal and thus the legalization approach to prostitution of 2000 is still the same. This approach not only legalizes prostitution but also aims to regulate it through criminal law, labor law and other regulations and treats it like a legal occupation, while at the same time trying to control it through regulation (Barnett, Casavant, & Nicol, 2011). In the Netherlands its primarily the municipalities who are responsible for drafting the legislation, incorporating it into their General Local Act (called Algemene Plaatselijke Verordening in Dutch and will from now on be referred to as APV) and monitoring its compliance (Flight, Hulshof, Soomeren, & Soorsma, 2006). However, they are not required by law to adopt a policy on prostitution, so it could be that some municipalities decided not to adopt a prostitution policy. Nonetheless, most municipalities have a prostitution policy in place by now. In general, when a sex-entrepreneur wants to start and operate a brothel in a municipality they have to apply for a permit at the town council. These permits are subject to certain local regulations and the most frequent ones include: restricting the number and location of brothels, imposing criminal background checks on prospective owners and managers, introducing stringent health, hygiene and safety requirements and limiting whom owners can employ" (Barnett et al., 2011).

In Belgium and Germany in 2000, the Netherlands' geographic neighbors, a different approach to prostitution policy was taken (Crofts, n.d.; U.S. State Department, 2007). This approach is called abolitionism and generally involves the criminalization of public solicitation. The thought behind this approach is that even though prostitution is seen as immoral, governments should "take the necessary steps to allow prostitution to take place only as long as it does not infringe on public safety and order" (Barnett et al., 2011). In

Germany prostitution was not fully legalized until the Prostitution Act in 2002. Before that prostitution itself was already legal under the German Constitution, but it was also considered a violation of Germany's moral code, which caused a restriction on the legal and social welfare rights of prostitutes (Crofts, n.d.). Because of the violation of Germany's moral code brothel owners were constantly in danger of legal action being brought against them, since they could be viewed as promoters of prostitution (Crofts, n.d.). In Belgium prostitution itself is legal but any form of pimping, including operating a brothel, are illegal (U.S. State Department, 2007).

Aside from prostitution there are also other examples of the European freedoms affecting local policies, like the legalization of soft drugs in the Netherlands. Many of the Dutch border municipalities attract so called drug tourists, since soft drugs are legal in the Netherlands while they are not in its geographic neighbors. Drug tourism causes a lot problems for these municipalities that range from antisocial behavior in public to increased criminal activity (Rovers & Fijnaut, 2011; Centrum Criminaliteitspreventie en Veiligheid, 2011). Drugs, human trafficking and (forced) prostitution are often closely linked (Scott & Dedel, 2006; U.S. State Department, 2007). A lot of the time "sex trafficking and drugs-related organized crime go hand-in-hand" (Catharine, 2011; U.S. State Department, 2007) as "the bulk of prostitution rings are financed and managed by underground groups whose main source of revenue is drugs" (Catharine, 2011; U.S. State Department, 2007). Because of this close link between prostitution, drugs and human trafficking, prostitution may provide the seedbed for organized crime (Scott & Dedel, 2006). Other problems associated with prostitution include offending some citizens' moral standards, violence against the prostitute, either by pimps or clients (Brents & Hausbeck, 2005), rowdiness and drunken behavior which generally causes public nuisance in the surrounding neighborhood (Outshoorn, 2004) and attracting strangers and criminals to a neighborhood (Scott & Dedel, 2006). It would therefore not be strange to assume that when prostitution was legalized in the Netherlands it led to extra problems in Dutch border municipalities, by attracting not only prostitutes but also the underground illegal activities that are often associated with it.

The freedom of services and people provided by the European internal market, affected the border municipalities by helping them become an interesting place for brothel owners,

prostitutes and brothel clients. Not only could they offer their services to locals but also to brothel tourists. This in turn may have affected the way in which Dutch border municipalities handled the adoption and creation of their brothel policy. This might even distinguish them from Dutch non-border municipalities, where these problems and the fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs should be less prevalent. The Dutch border municipalities might have been quicker than the non-border municipalities in adopting a brothel policy in an effort to control prostitution as quickly as possible. This in turn could cause brothel policies to diffuse quicker among the border municipalities. Different policy diffusion mechanisms might have also been at work in the two different groups, resulting in different brothel policy content. Which of these mechanisms caused brothel policies to diffuse will not be examined; however they will provide certain expectations of how brothel policies diffused among Dutch municipalities in terms of policy substance. Temporal and substantial policy diffusion are therefore important aspects.

Like mentioned earlier, the intent of this thesis is to look whether Dutch border and non-border municipalities regulated their brothel policies differently, by focusing on the timing and content of these policies. This will be done by looking at 1) the timing of the adoption of brothel policies, and 2) the differences in the content of these policies. In this thesis it is assumed that these differences have been a reaction to the fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs and the problems surrounding brothels, like public nuisances and increased criminal activity, in the border areas. Temporal and substantial policy diffusion are an integral part of this thesis as they are connected to the timing and the content of the brothel policies. Spatial policy diffusion is another important aspect as it deals with the geographic differences between the two units of analysis, meaning the location of the municipalities (border or non-border). This research paper will answer the following research question:

> *To what extent are there differences between Dutch border and Dutch non-border municipalities regarding timing and substance of brothel regulations after the repeal of the brothel ban in 2000?*

A lot of research has been done about policy diffusion, starting in the early 60s. One important focus in the policy diffusion literature is the timing aspect, which focusses on the timing of policy adoptions and how states are more likely to adopt a new policy if other

states have already adopted it (Rogers, 1962; Rogers, 2003). Basically, it examines how certain policies spread over time. Another aspect of policy diffusion that is frequently found in the policy diffusion literature is the spatial one, which focuses on the geographic location of states and how states are more likely to adopt a new policy if their geographic neighbors have already adopted the it (Walker, 1969). This aspect is mainly concerned with how certain policies geographically spread across countries. This research paper will add to the policy diffusion literature by not only looking at the timing of the adoption of brothel policies but also at the content of these policies. Secondly, prostitution policy remains a contested and sensitive issue, it will therefore be interesting to see the theories of policy diffusion applied to this issue. Thirdly, it will also take into account the affects of the internal market of the EU on local policies.

This research paper has been divided into several chapters. In chapter two an overview of the most important theories and concepts, that are relevant to the research question, will be given. Then in chapter three the methodology will be outlined, followed by chapter four with a description of the results. The research paper will end in a conclusion/discussion where the central research question will be answered.

2. Theory / Concepts

In this section the most important concepts, theories and models that are relevant with regard to the research question will be discussed and explained, which are policy diffusion and its different aspects. First the concept of policy diffusion will be discussed. After that, the different aspects or dimensions of policy diffusion will be examined, which are spatial, temporal and substantive policy diffusion.

2.1 Policy diffusion

Policy diffusion describes the process “by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Simply put it means that policy makers are influenced in one way or another by other policies when creating their own. This theory

corresponds to the social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), which posits that people learn in a social context. Policy diffusion has several dimensions, three of which are important in order to answer the proposed research question. The two most prevalent dimensions in the literature are time and space; policies "diffuse over time and across countries" (Mooney & Lee, 1995; Sluiter, 2012). The third dimension is the substantive aspect; the driving mechanism behind policy diffusion, meaning the incentives behind policy decisions (Volden, 2008). All three dimensions will be closer examined below.

2.1.1 Spatial policy diffusion

The first dimension of policy diffusion is the spatial one. The way policies diffuse is often influenced by the geographic location of the policy actors involved. An important theory in the field of spatial diffusion theory is that spatial policy diffusion, when presented on a map, takes the shape of an inkblot like pattern with the trendsetting country in the middle, with policy adoptions spreading from neighboring country to neighboring country (Walker, 1969, 1973). Countries seem to be more likely to adopt policies that their neighbors have already adopted because there is a relatively large amount of interaction between them, which causes them to notice each other's policy changes (Weyland, 2005). For the research proposed here, the spatial aspect of policy diffusion will be different however, as it serves more like an arena where the research takes place. This study is not interested in how prostitution policy spread over the Netherlands as a whole. Instead, it focusses on the substantive differences and the temporal spread across two units that are geographically different. The units that will be compared, the Dutch border municipalities and the non-border municipalities, obviously differ from each other geographically speaking, with one group situated along a border and the other group not situated along a border. The border municipalities are expected to have a higher prostitution prevalence than the non-border municipalities as was mentioned in the introduction. This is most likely the result of their geographic location. Thanks to the four freedoms of the internal market the Dutch border municipalities might have become an attractive place for brothel owners and operators, prostitutes and their solicitors. The spatial aspect of policy diffusion is thus an integral part of the research question, as it examines the differences between two units that are

geographically different from each other. It serves as an overarching part of the diffusion theory in which the temporal and substantive aspects of policy diffusion will be examined.

2.1.2 Temporal policy diffusion

The second dimension of policy diffusion is the temporal one, which has its roots in the theory about the diffusion of innovations proposed by Rogers (2003). He theorized that the diffusion of innovations might follow systematic patterns that would result in some sort of bell shaped curve and an S-shaped cumulative curve of the adoption rates of most innovations (see figure 1 below). This theory and the resulting S-shaped and bell shaped curves can also be applied to the diffusion of policies. But what exactly does this S-shaped cumulative adoption curve mean? Weyland (2005) describes the temporal dimension of policy diffusion as a wave like process that occurs when a new policy approach sweeps across important regions of the world (Weyland, 2005). It starts out slow with just one country adopting a new and innovative policy. After a while another country notices the new policy and decides to adopt it as well, followed by an increasing number of other countries who do the same. The adoption rate gains momentum and more and more countries want to join and adopt the new policy approach. After a while the adoption rate slows down again when most countries have already adopted the change or are unable to do so. This process creates a wave like effect as the new policy approach spreads quickly to other countries that want to follow the trendsetter (Weyland, 2005). This can be illustrated by creating a graph with the cumulative number of adoptions over time which results in an S-shaped curve (see figure 1).



Figure 1: An example of an S-curve of the cumulative amount of adoptions over time

Source: Jans, Denters, van Gerven, & Need, 2013, page 4.

Sometimes the content of a policy can influence the shape of its adoption curve. Morality policies for example often do not result in an S-shape but in an R-shape (Sluiter, 2012). Policies that are less complex and are highly visible or high on salience diffuse faster than policies that are complex and are less visible or not salient (Makse & Volden, 2011). Because these types of policies diffuse very quickly they are theorized to produce "a sudden boost of policy adoptions in a small time period" (Sluiter, 2012), after which the adoption rate declines rapidly over time. This process results in an r-shaped cumulative adoption curve as can be seen in figure 2 (Boushey, 2010). Not only the shape is different from the S-curve in figure 1, also the cumulative sums differ from each other. The cumulative sum of adoptions of the S-curve in figure 1 counts up to 400, while the cumulative sum of adoption of the R-curve in figure 2 counts up to about 320. This is because of the nature of the morality policy which causes some states or municipalities to not want to adopt the new policy because it's against their moral beliefs for example.



Figure 2: An example of an R-curve of the cumulative amount of adoptions over time
Source: Jans, Denters, van Gerven, & Need, 2013, page 5.

It is interesting to see which of the two adoption curves correspond more with the adoption curve of brothel policies among Dutch municipalities. More importantly, it will help answer the research question by showing the cumulative adoption curves for the border and non-border municipalities. It is expected that adoption curve of the border municipalities will have more of an R-shape because they have to deal with a relatively high prevalence of prostitution and an increased fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs. This would lead to the expectation that the policy will be more visible and more salient than in Dutch non-border municipalities and will therefore diffuse quicker among them. More importantly, it is expected of the border municipalities to feel a more urgent need to act and put a policy in place in order to deal with the problems surrounding a higher prostitution prevalence which might cause them to act more quickly. All of this should result in an R-shaped curve. The adoption curve of the non-border municipalities on the other hand will likely result in more of an S-shape. Because they have a lower prostitution prevalence they will likely feel less urgency in adopting a brothel policy, resulting in a more normal policy diffusion rate. Basically this means that it is expected that the border municipalities will be quicker than the

non-border municipalities in adopting a brothel policy because they have a different prostitution prevalence and an increased fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs. This leads to the first hypothesis that will be tested:

> Hypothesis 1: Dutch border municipalities are quicker than Dutch non-border municipalities in adopting brothel policies.

To summarize, the temporal policy diffusion pattern takes the shape of a cumulative S-curve, that stems from Rogers's (2003) theory about the diffusion of innovations or an R-curve, which stems from the work by Boushey (2010) and Makse & Volden (2011). The curve starts with few municipalities that adopt the new policy initially but when more municipalities decide to join, the movement gains momentum and more and more municipalities also join. Finally the curve tapers off when most municipalities have adopted the new policy. It is expected that the Dutch border municipalities were quicker in adopting a brothel policy than the non-border municipalities because they have a higher prevalence of prostitution and an increased fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs.

2.1.3 Substantive policy diffusion

The third dimension of policy diffusion that will be discussed here is the substantive aspect, meaning the mechanisms that drive policies to diffuse. In the literature several theories or mechanisms can be found that try to explain why policies diffuse. The four most prevalent ones, which are learning, coercion, competition and imitation (Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2007; Volden, 2008), will be discussed here with a special emphasis on learning and imitation.

While competition and coercion are important diffusion mechanism in the literature, they will only be discussed briefly here, since it is unlikely that these two mechanisms are at work when it comes to Dutch municipal brothel policies. Competition happens when countries compete with each other for capital and export markets, causing policies that deal with this to diffuse (Simmons et al., 2007). For example, "when a country's competitors simplify regulatory requirements, ameliorate investment risks, and reduce tax burdens, that country

comes under pressure to follow suit" (Simmons et al., 2007). Most likely the Dutch municipalities are not in competition with each other over the amount of brothels that operate within their borders. Prostitution probably has more downsides than benefits for a municipality. Therefore, even if a municipality adopts a policy that makes itself more attractive to brothel operators, prostitutes or their solicitors other municipalities will not feel pressure to follow suit. Thus, it is highly unlikely that this mechanism is at work when it comes to the diffusion of Dutch brothel policies. The coercion mechanism happens when states are coerced into taking over policies from other countries. An example of this would be one government forcing another government to adopt a policy (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). This mechanism is not at work here either. Even though adopting and monitoring brothel policies are a task of the municipalities they are not obligated to adopt one. Therefore the competition and coercion mechanisms will not be explored further in this research paper.

Learning happens when a government makes a rational decision to emulate the policies of another government when that measure produces more effective policy outcomes than any of the alternatives (Rose, 1991). By carefully "observing the politics of policy adoption and the impact of those policies, policymakers can learn from the experiences of other governments" (Volden, 2008). By making these observations policymakers can, for example, look at what kind of policies worked well in municipalities with different characteristics and take parts of those policies and adapt them to the characteristics of their own municipalities.

Imitation, also described in the literature as social constructivism and mimicry, "explains the process of copying foreign models in terms of symbolic or normative factors, rather than a technical or rational concern with functional efficiency" (Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Simmons et al., 2007). Shipan & Volden (2008) simply describe imitation as trying to copy the policy of another in order to look like that other. A good example of this is presented by Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett (2007) who use the diffusion of mass schooling policies after the Second World War. At that time schooling and education were constructed as integral parts of modernity and democracy, therefore countries adopted mass schooling policies even when they did not really need a big educated workforce and did not have the economic structures in place to support these mass schooling policies. They adopted the mass schooling policies anyway because that was the "advanced, progressive and morally praiseworthy" (Marsh &

Sharman, 2009) thing to do at that time. However, this does not necessarily have to be the reason why policymakers copy other policies. Another reason for example, could be that it is an easy and convenient way to make a new policy.

When these two diffusion mechanisms are applied to Dutch brothel policies it creates two different ways that policies can diffuse. A municipality can create their own brothel policy based on their own experiences and their own situation. They can do this by carefully looking at what other municipalities have done or at the model APV and adjust these policy measures to their own needs. To aid them in creating their own local policies Dutch municipalities can use the model APV created by the Association of Dutch Municipalities (in Dutch: Vereniging van Nederlandse van Gemeenten (VNG), hereafter referred to as VNG). The model APV can be seen as an example or model of what feasible and legally tenable policies look like and covers a wide range of policy areas, including prostitution and brothel policies (VNG, 2012). When in 2000 it became the responsibility of the Dutch municipalities to create a brothel policy they could use the model APV as a frame of reference. They could use or copy the policy measures that fit their own needs, adjust the ones that didn't or add policy measures to deal with their specific prostitution related problems. By observing the model APV and the policies that others have adopted and the kind of impact they had, municipalities can learn from the experiences of others. This is what is expected to have happened in the Dutch border municipalities. Because they have a relatively high prostitution prevalence it is expected that their policies will differ more from the model APV in comparison to the policies of the non-border municipalities. Also, border municipalities might be afraid that sex-entrepreneurs see the border regions as an attractive place to start a brothel and that more of them will settle in their municipality. In order to design their policy to deal effectively with their higher prostitution prevalence, the problems associated with it and the fear of new sex-entrepreneurs, it is expected that the border municipalities made more changes and adaptions than the non-border municipalities with their relatively low prostitution prevalence. The assumption that border municipalities have a higher prostitution prevalence than non-border municipalities will be tested. However, because it is not the main focus of this research paper no hypothesis about it has been formulated and as it is used more to help describe and frame the results of the other hypotheses.

The second way brothel policies can diffuse among Dutch border municipalities is quite different. Instead of carefully picking and choosing the policy measures from the model APV that fit their own situation, a municipality can also simply copy the entire example. On many occasions municipalities either copy the model APV or only make a few small changes (VNG, n.d.). A municipality might do that because it is an easy and convenient way to create a policy. What also might have been at play is that municipalities felt obliged to adopt a brothel policy even when they didn't have any prostitution. Although municipalities are responsible for their own brothel policy they are legally not obligated to adopt one. However, they might still have felt pressure to adopt something. For the municipalities that did not have any prostitution it was probably most convenient to mimic and to simply copy the model APV in its entirety or with a few small changes. Since the non-border municipalities have a lower prostitution prevalence than the border municipalities, the expectation is that they copied more of the model APV than the border municipalities did. If this expectation is combined with the expectations from the learning mechanism, this leads to the expectation that border municipalities made more changes to the model APV in comparison to the non-border municipalities.

Unfortunately it is not possible to find out which mechanisms drove policy diffusion of brothel policies for the border and non-border municipalities due to the limited amount of time and resources of this master thesis. However, the two mechanisms, imitation and learning, do provide certain expectations of how brothel policies diffused among Dutch municipalities in terms of policy substance. This leads to the second hypothesis that will be tested to help answer the central research question of the proposed thesis:

> Hypothesis 2: Dutch border municipalities were more likely to implement more changes to the model APV than Dutch non-border municipalities.

To quickly summarize, substantive policy diffusion deals with mechanisms that try to explain why policies diffuse. The two most important here are learning and imitation. Learning happens when policymakers learn from the policy choices of others by examining what they've done and what would work best for them self. Imitation happens when policymakers simply copy policies from others. These mechanisms lead to the expectation that Dutch

border municipalities made more changes to the model APV than the non-border because they have a higher prostitution prevalence and an increased fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs.

3. Methodology

In this part of the research proposal more will be explained about the methodology that will be used to answer the proposed research question. First, the research question and the research design will be discussed, followed by the case selection and data collection and analysis.

3.1 Research question

To what extent are there differences between Dutch border and Dutch non-border municipalities regarding timing and substance of brothel regulations after the repeal of the brothel ban in 2000?

The proposed research question is an empirical and descriptive-comparative one that will compare Dutch border and non-border municipalities in how they dealt with their new responsibility of creating and adopting a policy on brothels (and prostitution in general). Was one group quicker than the other in adopting a brothel policy and did one group make more changes to the model APV than the other? To help answer the research question the following two hypotheses will be tested:

> Hypothesis 1: Dutch border municipalities are quicker than Dutch non-border municipalities in adopting brothel policies.

> Hypothesis 2: Dutch border municipalities were more likely to implement more changes to the model APV than Dutch non-border municipalities.

3.2 Research design

To answer the first hypothesis the timing of the adoption of brothel policies among the Dutch municipalities will have to be assessed. The timing will be measured by the number of

months that it takes a municipality to adopt a brothel policy after the proposal to lift the brothel ban was accepted by the Dutch parliament on the 28th of October 1999 (Staatsblad, 1999). On the 18th of January 2000 it was determined that the law would come in to effect on the 1st of October 2000. The number of months will be measured from the date that the parliament accepted the new law proposal (28th of October 1999), since this is the date that the municipalities know that it will become their responsibility to regulate prostitution and brothels and that if they want to do so that they should create their own policy on the matter. Because the proposal was accepted at the end of October the counting of the number of months will start from November 1999. However, a small number of municipalities had already adopted a policy on prostitution before that time. These will also be included in the data by assigning them a negative number of months, like -3 for example. So, technically the municipalities have been followed from June 1999 till December 2005 (the last known municipality to adopt a prostitution policy in the dataset) (Jans et al., 2013). The municipalities will be divided in border and non-border municipalities and an average number of months will be calculated for each group so they can be compared for analysis. The independent variable is the municipalities, with the amount of months it takes to adopt a brothel policy after the lifting of the brothel ban as the dependent variable.

To help answer the second hypothesis the amount of changes that the municipalities made to their own brothel policy in comparison to the model APV will have to be determined. This will be done by using Ephorus (Ephorus, 2013), a web based online service that is normally used to check for plagiarism. It will compare the APV's of the municipalities to the model APV and will give a percentage of how much the two texts overlap each other. This will be done for the border municipalities and the non-border municipalities. The mean percentage of overlap will be calculated which will be compared for analysis. Again the independent variable is the municipalities and whether they are a border or non-border municipality, with the amount of changes to the model APV as the dependent variable.

In order to accurately measure the adoption of a brothel policy it is operationalized as an amendment or change to chapter 3 of a municipality's APV. The operationalization of border and non-border municipalities is quite straightforward. A Dutch non-border municipality is a Dutch municipality that does not border on the border of Belgium or Germany, while a

Dutch border municipality is a Dutch municipality that does border on the border of Belgium or Germany.

3.3. Case selection

The proposed study will look at the brothel policies of all Dutch municipalities as they were in 2000. These will be divided in border and non-border municipalities in order to answer the research question. This was done by looking at a map of the Netherlands containing all the municipalities that existed in 2000. On this map it was checked which municipality bordered on Germany, Belgium or both and where categorized accordingly (CBS, 2000a).

3.4. Data collection & analysis

To compare Dutch border and non-border municipalities, data about the moment on which each municipality adopted a brothel policy is needed. This data[1] (Jans et al., 2013) has been collected by accumulating the APV's and/or municipal decrees (called raadsbesluiten in Dutch) from most Dutch municipalities. Besides the month in which the municipalities adopted a prostitution policy, they also contain their actual policy on prostitution, including brothels, in Chapter 3. These APV's and municipal decrees have been collected by sending letters to all Dutch municipalities requesting them to forward this information. Later on, an e-mail was sent with the same request as a reminder. The municipalities that still did not respond after 3 months were contacted by phone with another request to forward the aforementioned information.

Also data from the ProFeit study (Venicz & Nencel, 2000) was used about the prevalence of prostitution in the Dutch municipalities in 1999. This data is not strictly necessary in order to test the hypotheses and answer the research question; however, it does help describe the results by providing the right frame by showing the prostitution prevalence of the border and non-border municipalities.

To help analyze the collected data and to answer the research question different techniques will be used. First, the border and non-border municipalities will be compared in terms of the timing of adopting their brothel policies. This will be done by comparing the average

[1] The data used in this research paper is part of an ongoing PhD project by W. Jans (2013)

number of months that it took to adopt a brothel policy since the repeal of the brothel ban. Are border municipalities indeed quicker in adopting a brothel policy like the theory suggests?

Also an adoption curve, like the ones presented in the theoretical part of this research proposal, will be used. The curve will show if the adoption of brothel policies was a wave like process or not. More importantly however, it will show whether the border and non-border municipalities have similar or different cumulative adopt curve shape which will show at what rate brothel policies diffused among them. This will help answer the first hypothesis about whether Dutch border municipalities are quicker than Dutch non-border municipalities in adopting brothel policies.

Secondly, border and non-border municipalities will be compared by their Ephorus percentage outcomes. Did the border municipalities make more changes to the model APV than the non-border municipalities? So do the border municipalities have a lower Ephorus percentage than the non-border municipalities?

4. Analysis and Results

In this chapter of the research paper the results will be presented. First the data will be described in a general sense in the next paragraph. After that, the results will be separated in two subchapters on timing and substance that correspond with the two hypotheses that were formulated earlier. Both will first carefully describe the results before making a deeper analysis.

In 2000 there were 537 municipalities in de the Netherlands (CBS, 2000b). When the data was gathered in 2012, there were only 415 municipalities due to reclassifications and mergers of certain municipalities (CBS, 2012). Because of this, only the 415 municipalities that existed in 2012 could be approached for data. Some of these municipalities responded by sending data from their own current municipality as well as data from a municipality that existed in 2000. They sent for example the municipal decree from their own municipality as well as the one from the municipality that they merged with between 2001 and 2012.

Of the 415 municipalities that were approached with a request for information about their brothel policies, 381 responded, which accounts for a response rate of 91.8%. The respondents sent 308 municipal decrees which contain the adoption date of their brothel policies. In the chapter below this will be used to calculate the mean amount of months it took the border and non-border municipalities to adopt a brothel policy after the brothel ban was lifted. Also, 322 APV's (chapter 3 on prostitution) were sent, which contain the actual policies that will be used to calculate the percentage of overlap with the model APV. 292 municipalities sent both their municipal decree and their APV.

Because these also contain municipal decrees and APV's of municipalities that did not exist in 2000 this data needed to be filtered out. After this was done it became clear that of the 537 municipalities that existed in 2000, there is data available of 420 municipalities, which accounts for 78.2%. The data consists of 367 municipal decrees and of 371 APV's. For 341 of the municipalities that existed in 2000 both the municipal decree and the APV are available.

In table 1 the number of border and non-border municipalities in 2000 is presented. It also shows how many border municipalities border on Germany, Belgium or both.

Table 1: Number of border and non-border municipalities in the Netherlands in 2000

	N	Borders on Germany	Borders on Belgium	Borders on both Germany and Belgium
All municipalities in 2000	537	43 8% of all municipalities in 2000	30 5.6% of all municipalities in 2000	4 0.7% of all municipalities in 2000
Non-border municipalities	460 85.7% of all municipalities in 2000	-	-	-
Border municipalities	77 14.3% of all municipalities in 2000	43 55.8% of all border municipalities	30 39.0% of all border municipalities	4 5.2% of all border municipalities

Before checking hypothesis 1 and 2 in the next two sections, prostitution prevalence will be examined first. As mentioned earlier, the ProFeit study done in 1999 (Venicz & Nencel, 2000), mentioned that there were clusters of prostitution in the big cities and in the border areas of the provinces of Groningen, Limburg and Zeeland and in the border areas of the

regions of Twente and West Brabant. This led to the expectation that there is a higher prevalence of prostitution in the Dutch border municipalities than in the non-border municipalities due to their geographic position and that this causes them to behave differently from the non-border municipalities. In order to see whether the border municipalities indeed had a higher prostitution prevalence it was checked in SPSS (version 20.0). The results showed that there was prostitution in 36 out of the 77 border municipalities. Which means that in 1999 there was prostitution in 46.8% of the border municipalities. Of the non-border municipalities there was prostitution in 122 out of 460, which means that there was prostitution in only 25,6% of the non-border municipalities in 1999. There is quite a large difference between the two groups so it seems there is indeed a higher prostitution prevalence in the Dutch border municipalities than in the non-border municipalities. This also makes the fear that border municipalities might have about attracting sex-entrepreneurs a realistic one. To test whether this difference is significant a chi-square test was done in SPSS. This resulted in $\chi(1) = 13.001$, $p = 0.000$, which indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between the type of municipality (border or non-border) and the prevalence of prostitution. So there is a relationship between border municipalities and a higher prostitution prevalence. This result validates the hypotheses that have been tested, as they build on the assumption that there is a higher prevalence of prostitution in the border municipalities and that this causes them to behave differently.

4.1 Timing

To find out find out whether border municipalities were indeed faster in adopting a brothel policy than non-border municipalities after the brothel ban was lifted, the adoption dates from the municipal decrees were used. These dates were then used to calculate the amount of months between the lifting of the brothel ban and the date of adoption. As explained in the previous section, some of the municipalities did not sent their complete data by only sending a municipal decree or an APV. In order to make the most of the data and to not waste any of it, all the municipal decrees were used, regardless of whether those municipalities also sent their APV.

First, two cumulative adoption curves were made in SPSS. The first one (figure 3) shows the cumulative adoption rate for all the Dutch municipalities in 2000. As can be seen in figure 3, it closely resembles the adoption curves shown in chapter 2.2. The adoption curve here shows that some municipalities actually already adopted a brothel policy before the brothel ban was lifted in 2000. The curve starts out slow before the brothel ban was lifted with only a few municipalities having adopted a brothel policy. After about 6 months after it was lifted the adoption rate starts to pick up but truly gains momentum around 8 months. The amount of municipalities that adopt a brothel policy grows rapidly between 8 and 11 months after which the adoption rate slows down. By that time most municipalities have already adopted the change or are unwilling to do so. This process creates a wave like effect as the new policy approach spreads quickly to other municipalities. The curve particularly resembles the R-curve that tends to correspond with morality policies. Like most morality policies the brothel policy diffused very rapidly among the municipalities which produced a boost in adoptions between 8 and 11 months after the repeal of the brothel ban. The adoption rate and the cumulative adoption curve correspond well with the predictions of the theory in chapter 2.2. This means that municipalities are more likely to adopt a brothel policy if other municipalities have preceded them. This shows evidence of a temporal pattern in the adoption of brothel policies among Dutch municipalities, which in turn is a strong indicator of policy diffusion.

To see if there is a difference in the cumulative adoption rate between the border and non-border municipalities a cumulative adoption curve was made for each group. The result can be seen in figure 4. It shows that the curves actually resemble each other quite a lot, with no big differences between them. This can be even further illustrated by showing the adoption rates in a frequency polygon. As can be seen in figure 5, there are again no big differences in the distribution of adoption of brothel policies as the lines of the border and non-border municipalities show similar peaks. So, there does not seem to be a substantial difference in the adoption rate of brothel policies between the border and non-border municipalities, as both show a similar cumulative adoption curve and frequency polygon. So, while there is a strong indicator of policy diffusion of brothel policies among Dutch municipalities, there does not appear to be a difference between the border and non-border municipalities in the way these policies diffused over time.



Figure 3: Cumulative adoption curve of brothel policies of all the municipalities of 2000



Figure 4: Cumulative adoption curves of brothel policies of the border and non-border municipalities



Figure 5: Frequency polygon of the adoption of brothel policies of the border and non-border municipalities

The next step is to calculate the mean amount of months it took the border and non-border municipalities to adopt a brothel policy after the brothel ban was lifted. This will show if there was a difference between the two groups and if so, which group was faster.

Table 2: Mean amount of months between the lifting of the brothel ban and the adoption of a brothel policy.

	Mean amount of months	N	Std. Deviation
All municipalities in 2000	11.07	367	7.929
border municipalities	10.39	56	4.163
Non-border municipalities	11.19	311	8.429

The mean amount of months for the border and the non-border groups were calculated in SPSS. The border municipalities had a mean amount of months of 10.39. This means that on average the border municipalities took almost ten and a half months to adopt a brothel policy after the brothel ban was lifted. The non-border municipalities had a mean amount of months of 11.19. Which means that on average the border municipalities took a little more than 11 months to adopt a brothel policy after the brothel ban was lifted. So, there is a difference of less than a month between the border and non-border municipalities. To check whether this difference was significant a one-way ANOVA test was run in SPSS. This resulted in a significance level of 0.488 (p=.488), which is above 0.05 and therefore there is no statistical difference between the mean amount of months it took border and non-border municipalities to adopt a brothel policy after the repeal of the brothel ban. This means that border municipalities were in fact not faster than the non-border municipalities, unlike the theory presented in chapter 2 would suggest. Therefore hypothesis 1*, Dutch border municipalities are quicker than Dutch non-border municipalities in adopting brothel policies*, can be rejected.

To summarize, the first hypothesis has been rejected. There is a clear indicator of policy diffusion among the Dutch municipalities, which can be seen in the r-shaped adoption curve that shows that the number of adopters increases when the number of municipalities that have already adopted a brothel policy also increases. However, there were no big differences in the diffusion rate of brothel policies of the border and non-border municipalities. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the mean amount of months it took the border and non-border municipalities to adopt a brothel policy after the brothel ban was lifted. So, Dutch border municipalities were not faster than non-border municipalities in adopting a brothel policy.

4.2 Substance

To test whether Dutch border municipalities were more likely to implement more changes to the model APV than the non-border municipalities, the APV's from the municipalities were used. Again, to make the most of the available data, all the APV's were used regardless of whether those municipalities had also sent their municipal decree. The APV's were all compared with the model APV created by the VNG, to see how much overlap there is

between the two and thus how much the municipalities copied the model APV. This was done by using the web based software program Ephorus, which compares texts and produces a percentage of overlap between them. These percentages were added to the dataset in SPSS, which was used to calculate the mean percentage of overlap for the border municipalities and the non-border municipalities.

First though, two histograms were constructed of the data in SPSS to illustrate the way the percentage of overlap between the APV's of the municipalities and the model APV is distributed. In figure 6, the distribution for all the municipalities is illustrated. It shows that the distribution is skewed to the left (bigger median than mean) and that most municipalities have copied between 70 and 90 percent of the model APV into their own APV. It also shows that almost all municipalities copied parts of the model APV which is a clear indicator of policy diffusion.



Figure 6: Histogram of the percentage of overlap with the model APV

Figure 7 shows the distribution for both the border and non-border municipalities. As can be seen the distribution of the border and non-border municipalities resemble each other quite a lot with no obvious differences as both show similar peaks. So, there does not seem to be a substantial difference in the amount that border and non-border municipalities copied from the model APV as both show a similar distribution. So, while there is a strong indicator of policy diffusion of brothel policies among Dutch municipalities, there does not appear to be a difference between the border and non-border municipalities in the way these policies diffused in terms of substance. This can be further illustrated by examining the mean percentage of overlap between the model APV and the APV's of the border and non-border municipalities, which will be done in the next paragraph.



Figure 7: Stacked histogram of the percentage of overlap with the model APV for the border and non-border municipalities

Table 3: Mean percentage of overlap between APV and model APV

	Mean percentage of overlap	N	Std. Deviation
All municipalities in 2000	73.77	371	16.708
border municipalities	74.60	58	12.035
Non-border municipalities	73.62	313	17.449

The APV's of the border municipalities had a mean percentage of overlap with the model APV of 74.6%. This means that on average the APV of a border municipality had 74.6% of the same content as the model APV. The APV's of the non-border municipalities had a mean percentage of overlap with the model APV of 73.62%. Which means that on average the APV of a border municipality had 73.62% of the same content as the model APV. So there is about 1% more overlap between the two groups but it is not the kind of difference that was expected given the theory presented in chapter 2.3. According to the theory the non-border municipalities were supposed to have more overlap than the non-border municipalities. Because they have to deal with prostitution less it was theorized that it would be more convenient for them to just copy the model APV. The border municipalities on the other hand were expected to engage more in learning. This means that they would carefully look at the model APV and modify it to fit their own situation in order to effectively deal with prostitution. Thus, the border municipalities were expected to make more changes than the non-border municipalities. The results however, show that the opposite happened and that the border municipalities made slightly more changes to the model APV than the non-border municipalities. To check if this difference was significant a one-way ANOVA test was run in SPSS. This resulted in a significance level of 0.681 (p=.681), which is above 0.05 and therefor there is no statistical difference between the mean percentage of overlap between the APV and the model APV of the border and non-border municipalities. So while non-border municipalities copied slightly less of the model APV than the border municipalities, this difference is not significant. Therefore, the second hypothesis, *Dutch border municipalities were more likely to implement more changes to the model APV than Dutch non-border municipalities*, can be rejected.

To summarize, the second hypothesis has been rejected. There is a clear indicator of policy diffusion among the Dutch municipalities, which has been illustrated by the histogram in

figure 6 that shows that the percentage that municipalities copied from the model APV into their own APV. However, there were no big differences in the diffusion rate of brothel policies of the border and non-border municipalities. More importantly, there was no significant difference in the mean percentage of overlap between the border and non-border municipalities between their own APV's and the model APV. So, Dutch border municipalities did not copy more of the model APV than the non-border municipalities.

5. Discussion & conclusion

What does it mean that there is no difference in the amount of time it took the border and non-border municipalities to adopt a brothel policy? It means that the theory presented earlier in the paper did not accurately predict that border municipalities would be faster and that this theory did not work out in reality. In the introduction it was mentioned how the European internal market, and particularly the freedom of services and people, affected border regions. This is because border regions and municipalities are easily accessed by the residents of its neighboring Member States. This is especially interesting for them if the Netherlands offers a service that is not (legally) offered in their own Member State. This was the situation in 2000 for the border municipalities and the residents of Germany and Belgium, where brothels were not fully legal yet. Because of this it was theorized that national policies, like the legalization of prostitution and operating a brothel, affected especially the border municipalities, since they are located in a region that is easily accessible to brothel tourists. While Dutch border municipalities do have a higher prevalence of prostitution it cannot be said that there's any form of causation between being located on a border of other Member States (that have not legalized prostitution) and an increased prostitution prevalence. It can be said though that border municipalities and a higher prostitution prevalence are related. It was suggested that because of this higher prevalence of prostitution and an increased fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs that the border municipalities would act fast in adopting a brothel policy. They would do so, it was theorized, in order to quickly try to control and deal with the problems that are often associated with prostitution, like causing public nuisance and attracting criminal activity. This would result in the border municipalities being faster in adopting a brothel policy than the non-border

municipalities with their relatively low prostitution prevalence. However, the results showed that this was not the case as there was no significant difference in the amount of months it took the border and non-border municipalities to adopt a brothel policy. A reason for this could be that the higher prevalence of prostitution in the border municipalities either did not cause any problems or that these problems did not drive these municipalities to quickly adopt a brothel policy after the brothel ban was lifted. Also it was found that the diffusion of brothel policies has a similar cumulative adoption curve as morality policies. These policies already diffuse quicker than 'normal' policies. So another possible explanation could be that the nature of brothel policies (high salience and less complexity) caused them to diffuse rapidly, regardless of the prostitution prevalence of the municipalities. So while it seems like the European internal market and its freedoms have had an impact on the Dutch border regions with their increased prostitution prevalence, they do not seem to have affected the speed at which border municipalities adopted brothel policies. Therefore, it seems like the internal market did in fact not, unlike what was suggested in the introduction, have an impact on Dutch local brothel policies (at least in terms of timing).

The situation is largely the same when it comes to the amount of changes that the border and non-border municipalities made between their APV and the model APV. The results showed that there were no significant differences in the percentage that border and non-border municipalities copied from the model APV. So, again it seems like the theory was inaccurate in predicting that the border municipalities would copy less. Because of their location on a border, which might increase their fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs and their higher prostitution prevalence it was thought that this would cause local problems like, public nuisance and increased criminal activity. In order to deal effectively with this it was theorized that the border municipalities would copy less of the model APV and make more changes to it than the non-border municipalities in order to carefully tailor their own APV to their own specific local brothel and prostitution related problems. Non-border municipalities on the other hand might have less fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs due to their geographic position and they have a lower prevalence of prostitution and thus of prostitution related problems. This created the expectation that they would not feel the need to adjust the model APV much and would simply copy (most of) it and would thus have more overlap with the model APV than the border municipalities. However the results

showed that this was not the case, as there was no statistical difference between the percentages of overlap of the two groups. A potential explanation for this could be that the border municipalities were not as concerned with attracting sex-entrepreneurs as was expected and that they therefore did not feel the need to adjust the model APV much. Another possible explanation could be that the increased prostitution prevalence did not cause any problems, which would mean that border municipalities, like non-border municipalities, again did not feel like it was necessary to make a lot of changes to the model APV. What also could have been the case is that the model APV already effectively deals with most of the problems that attracting sex-entrepreneurs and a high prostitution prevalence could cause. If so, border municipalities would not have an extra reason than the non-border municipalities to make changes to the model APV. So, again, while it seems like the European internal market and its freedoms have had an impact on the Dutch border regions with their increased prostitution prevalence, they do not seem to have affected the content of the brothel policies adopted by the border and non-border municipalities. Therefore, it seems like the internal market did in fact not, unlike what was suggested in the introduction, have an impact on Dutch local brothel policies in terms of timing and substance.

To conclude, the intention of this Master thesis was to examine whether Dutch border and non-border municipalities regulated their brothel policies differently, focusing on the timing and content of these policies, in reaction to the fear of attracting sex-entrepreneurs and the problems surrounding brothels in border areas. In order to do this the following research question was formulated: *To what extent are there differences between Dutch border and Dutch non-border municipalities regarding timing and substance of brothel regulations after the repeal of the brothel ban in 2000*? The answer is fairly straightforward as the results showed that there were no significant differences in the brothel regulations after the brothel ban was lifted in 2000 of the border and non-border municipalities in terms of timing and substance. While there were strong signs of policy diffusion when it came to both timing and substance, there were no big differences in the way brothel policies diffused among the border and non-border municipalities. There were also no significant difference in the amount of months it took the border and non-border municipalities to adopt a brothel policy

and the percentage of overlap between the model APV and the APV's of the border and non-border municipalities. In short, the border municipalities did not regulate their brothel policies differently in terms of timing and substance than the non-border municipalities. Thus, it seems like the theory presented in this paper, that border municipalities were quicker in adopting a brothel policy and made more changes to the model APV than non-border municipalities because of their higher prostitution prevalence and their increased fear of sex-entrepreneurs, did not withstand reality and does not seem to be tenable.

While the results did not confirm the hypotheses, this research paper still contributes to the existing literature. This study showed strong signs of temporal policiy diffusion of brothel policies among the Dutch municipalities and that the diffusion pattern resembled that of morality policies. Thus prostitution policies behaved like and diffused as morality policies, regardless of the location of the municipalities. This study also confirmed that there was indeed a higher prostitution prevalence in the Dutch border municipalities in comparison to the non-border municipalities and it showed that there is a relationship between the existence of prostitution in a municipality and being located on a border. This is a sign that the pressures of the internal market of the EU could have influenced the border municipalties. While these internal market pressures did not influence the timing and content of the brothel policies of border municipalities, it does not mean that these market pressures have not influenced other local policies of border municipalities. Especially not because there seems to be a link between border locations and an increased chance that certain services, that are illegal in the surrounding Member States, will be offered. Therefore, this study uncoverd an interesting relation between the prevalence of prostitution and the location of a municipality (border or non-border). This is also one of the strong points of this study, as it treated the influence of the European internal market as a factor in the way local policies diffused and thereby linking the EU to local policymakers.

However, this study also had some limitations. The main one is that the definition of border municipality was rather strict and merely based on whether a municipality was located on a border with Germany, Belgium or both. This classified municipalities that were close to a border but not located on one as non-border municipalities while they might still be very interesting to brothel tourists and thus, might have been under the same 'threats and

pressures' of prostitution as the border municipalities. This means that they might have behaved the same way as the border municipalities and thus they might have been 'misplaced' in the non-border group. This could have negatively affected the results of this study.

For future research it would be interesting to look at the effect of the prevalence of prostitution in municipalities on the timing and substance of prostitution policies. Is there a difference in the timing and substance between the municipalities that have prostitution and the municipalities that have no prostitution? This would be especially interesting since the higher prostitution prevalence of the border municipalities was a one of the reasons why in this study border municipalities were assumed to differ from non-border municipalities in terms of timing and substance of their prostitution policy. This could show whether the prevalence of prostitution has an effect on the timing and substance of Dutch municipal brothel policies. Another interesting topic for future research would be the effect of the EU and its internal market on the soft drugs policies of Dutch border municipalities, to see in what way the EU influenced local soft drugs policies. This topic could build on the relation that was found in this study between the prevalence of prostitution and Dutch border municipalities. Maybe there is also a higher prevalence of coffee shops or a higher amount of coffee shops in border municipalities, as it is illegal to sell marijuana in Germany and Belgium. And maybe this could influence the timing and substance of Dutch policies on soft drugs.

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Annex I

List of border municipalities in 2000

Bordering on Germany	Bordering on Belgium	Bordering on both Germany and Belgium
Eemsmond	Margraten	Echt
Delfzijl	Eijsden	Susteren
Reiderland	Maastricht	Gulpen-Wittem
Bellingwedde	Meerssen	Vaals
Vlagtwedde	Stein	
Emmen	Born	
Coevorden	Maasbracht	
Gramsbergen	Thorn	
Hardenberg	Hunsel	
Vriezenveen	Weert	
Tubbergen	Cranendonck	
Ubbergen	Heeze-Leende	
Denekamp	Valkenswaard	
Losser	Bergeijk	
Enschede	Bladel	
Haaksbergen	Reusel- De Mierden	
Eibergen	Hilvarenbeek	
Winterswijk	Goirle	
Aalten	Alphen-Chaam	
Dinxperlo	Baarle-Nassau	
Gendringen	Breda	
Bergh	Zundert	
Zevenaar	Rucphen	
Rijnwaarden	Roosendaal	
Millingen aan de Rijn	Woensdrecht	
Groesbeek	Reimerswaal	
Gennep	Hulst	
Bergen	Axel	
Arcen en Velden	Sas van Gent	
Venlo	Oostburg	
Tegelen	Sluis-Aardenburg	
Belfeld		
Beesel		
Brunssum		
Swalmen		
Roermond		
Roerdalen		

Bordering on Germany	Bordering on Belgium	Bordering on both Germany and Belgium
Ambt Montfort		
Sittard		
Onderbanken		
Landgraaf		
Kerkrade		
Simpelveld		