



# **Biomass in Veenhuizen, coalition of conflict?**

**Research on coalition behavior in the biomass project  
for the prisons in Veenhuizen**

**S.B.J. Uitdewilligen**

**31-7-2013**



Dienst Landelijk Gebied  
*Ministerie van Economische Zaken,  
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## Abstract

This research is aimed at exploring the prospects of coalition behavior in a innovative biomass project in the prison-village of Veenhuizen. In this unique project the ambition is to use local biomass as resource for energy for the prisons in Veenhuizen. This project entails new ways of working for the government and new perceptions on the use of waste, energy, decentralized energy procurement and more. It appears not to be self-evident that a network forms. The obstacles are not in technological issues but rather it is a question of how to connect the dots in a political setting where different actors have different views and perceptions on the issue.

The starting point of research is the Advocacy Coalition Framework. This framework (first developed by Paul Sabatier in the late-eighties and developed in the decades that followed) is interesting for its focus on policy change. In a policy subsystem various advocacy coalition exist alongside each other. Interactions between advocacy coalition cause policy oriented learning and policy change. Sabatier states that congruent policy beliefs are the glue between coalition. Further elaborations on this framework (especially Fenger Klok 2001) combine beliefs with resource-dependencies in explaining coalition behavior (coordination or conflict).

The research question is as follows;

*What are the prospects of coalition behavior in the case 'Green energy for the prisons in Veenhuizen', when considering belief systems and interdependencies as determinants of coalition behavior?*

This research is set during preliminary stages of the biomass project, decisions are yet to be taken. All to this stage relevant policy actors are involved in this research. These are different governmental organizations and potential biomass suppliers. Data is collected by conducting interviews and, specific for examining beliefs, using a questionnaire.

The interdependencies seem to be to large extend symbiotic. Resources of all involved organizations could add up in positive sum game. Beliefs however appear differ between the respondents. These beliefs do not only concern topics like *biomass* or *sustainability*. Broader underlying topics appear to be just as (or more) decisive in the course of the project.

Two broad clusters of respondents can be distinguished. One are mainly the regional and local governmental organizations, strongly favoring the biomass project (mainly for stimulating regional development). This is a coalition with expected future coordination, caused by high belief congruency symbiotic interdependencies. A second cluster (mainly consisting of national governmental actors) is characterized by rather indifference towards the project and belief-independency.

## **Preface**

This masterthesis is the result of a research that originated from my internship at Dienst Landelijk Gebied. During this six-month internship I got the opportunity to gain experiences in several projects and tasks set in a inter-organizational context. The aim of this research took shape during this internship. The biomass project in Veenhuizen was proven to be an interesting case of research, for both DLG and for this research. To me it was very interesting to gain insight in the political context of the project, and to test academic theories of network governance in practice.

Conducting this research was very interesting and I am content with the result. However, it was not always easy. I would like to thank my supervisors Thomas Hoppe and Herman Oosterwijk for their support in conducting, writing and fine-tuning this research.

I would also like to thank Sipke Castelein and Carla Roghair of Dienst Landelijk Gebied for their support during the internship and for showing me around all layers of their field of work. I have experienced this internship as very interesting , it was a valuable contribution to my study.

This research marks the end of a period. I have studied the Bachelor Bestuurskunde followed by the master Public Administration, both on the University of Twente. Last but not least I would like to thank my friends and family for their support, but during my entire study.

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# 1. Introduction

This research is aimed at exploring the prospects of coalition behavior in a innovative biomass project in the prison-village of Veenhuizen. In this unique project the ambition is to use local biomass as resource for energy for the prisons in Veenhuizen. This ambition means that value would be created out of waste, and it entails new ways of thinking and acting for all involved organizations. In this specific and compact setting all ingredients for a biomass chain are present. There is a potential balance between demand and supply and there is a unique opportunity. This means that this problem is not a technological issue, rather it is a question of finding and organizing a possible mode of cooperation. It however appears not to be self evident that such a network arises. The question in Veenhuizen therefore is a matter of how to connect the dots, in order to arrange a fully functioning chain where all the necessary partners are willing to participate. This approach is addressed using a focus on resource dependencies and perceptions or beliefs of the relevant actors.

In this political setting In a political setting different actors have different views and perceptions on the issue. Different perceptions mean that actors see a particular policy discourse in different ways. In the Veenhuizen biomass project new policies and new ways for the government to work, this forces the involved actors to consider the topics and to take standpoints (from beliefs). A focus on these so-called *belief systems* is interesting for it assumes that actors have different perceptions on the policy reality, an important understanding in such a deliberative policy process (Fischer, 2007). The aim is to find what the possibilities for forming coalitions or networks are, following resource dependency and the belief systems of actors.

The main question in this research is as follows:

What are the prospects of coalition behavior in the case 'Green energy for the prisons in Veenhuizen', when considering belief systems and interdependencies as determinants of coalition behavior?

In the next chapters the theoretical framework will be explained, starting with a general overview of the notion of 'policy networks'. The Advocacy Coalition Framework will be the starting point of building a theoretical framework for gaining insight into coalition behavior in this setting of policy change. A detailed case description will be given including an overview of the relevant actors and their role. A combination of quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (interviews) methods will be used to find resource dependencies and to examine belief systems.

## 2. Theoretical framework

This research can be seen within the broad range of literature concerning network governance. The theoretical framework is largely based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework, first developed by Sabatier in 1988 (and often revised in the decades that have followed). This framework combines the network approach with policy making. It is particularly interesting for its focus on policy change. First some basic elements of network governance (and its implications on policy making) will be discussed. After this, the Advocacy Coalition Framework will be introduced followed by further theoretical elaborations upon this framework (for example Fenger and Klok 2001). With this, a framework for exploring coalitions and giving prospects for further coalition behavior will be formed.

### 2.1 Network Governance

The network approach to governance is often seen and described as a shift from different modes of governance, shifting from a traditional, authoritative approach towards the network approach since the 1990's (Jones et al., 1997, Waarden, 1992, Tonkens 2007, Kickert et al., 1997).

The traditional model of governance is characterized by an authoritative top-down model where the government is the central steering actor in the public domain. This *central steering model* (as it is called by Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997 p8), was the base of the traditional welfare state, as we have known in the twentieth century (Tonkens, 2007, p. 13). During the nineteen eighties and -nineties, governance shifted away from this *central steering model*. The traditional mode of governance was being criticized, for its presupposition that the central agent possesses all relevant information about a certain policy issue. During the eighties, the 'market approach' to governance arose (Hoppe R. , 2011, p. 208). Central in this market approach is the idea that a more local approach was needed, and that the government is not responsible to take care of all the needs of its citizens. Government was decreasing its role in the public domain, through decentralization and privatization (Kickert et al., 1997).

Later, governance took a so-called 'deliberative turn' where citizen participation is seen not as a substitute but as complementary to democracy (Hoppe R. , 2011, p. 208). The network approach to governance was expected to be '*a more realistic alternative for the rational steering model*' (Kickert et al. 1997 p9). Government was not longer aiming at providing all citizens with complete solutions for all their needs, but it is also not retreating from the public domain. The government is supposed to act as a connector between citizens, inviting all to participate (Tonkens, 2007, p. 13). Policy making in this model, takes place in networks in which input from multiple actors is wanted and needed to make and implement policies. The government is no longer the single authority, private or semi-public actors also participate together in networks (Kickert et al. 1997 p9).

The term 'network' can be interpreted on several ways, from informal contacts (exchanging business cards) to formal modes of cooperation. One basic notion of what a network is in the context of policy making, is given by Hay & Richards (2000, p. 12) '*Networks are strategic alliances forged around a common agenda of mutual advantage through collective action*' (Hay & Richard, 2000, p. 12).

A more detailed look on networks in policy making is presented by Van Kersbergen en Van Waarden (2004, pp. 151-152). These authors present three characteristics of networks. Networks are *pluricentric*, consisting of a number of different entities. In networks there is *no hierarchy*. This contributes to the earlier mentioned idea of Kickert et al. (1997) that even a governmental actor is not superior to other (non-governmental) actors. Networks are self-organizing, and are not controlled by a single authority. A third characteristic is that networks are *inter-organizational*, between autonomous but *interdependent* actors.



Resource-dependency is described in almost all literature as pre-condition for networks, interactions are caused by dependencies between actors. The need to exchange resources leads to continuing interactions between actors, based upon trust and social and institutional rules that are the result of negotiations between network participants (for example; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997 p1, Scott & Davis, 2007, pp. 233-244).

One comprehensive definition of a 'policy network' is presented by Borzel (1998).

The minimal common denominator of a policy network, according to Borzel (Borzel, 1998, p. p 254), is it being defined as a;

*'set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals.'*

A policy network, according to Borzel, includes all actors involved in the formulation and implementation of a policy in a certain policy sector. The relations between these actors are mostly informal and non-hierarchical, and can be between public and private actors with different, but interdependent interests.

These definitions indicate policy networks as *pluricentric*, *non-hierarchical* and *strategic* modes of coordination around a common agenda or idea, with ties based upon exchange of resources.

In the various literature, different ways to distinguish types of policy networks are described.<sup>1</sup> Broadly speaking, policy networks can vary anywhere between a *policy community* and an *issue network* (Kim and Roh 2008 p670), (Smith, 1991, p. p235). The differences between these two are in the density of the network, and the way decisions are made<sup>2</sup>.

## 2.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework

The Advocacy Coalition Framework, first developed at the end of the nineteen eighties by Paul Sabatier, is a theory that links the network approach directly to policy making. The ACF was developed to provide a theory of the behavior of elite (legislators, officials, interest groups, researcher's en so on) in complex policy subsystems (Sabatier & Zafonte, 1998, p. 475). This framework has been revised several times during the decades that followed (for example Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, Sabatier & Zafonte 1998, Sabatier 1998, Weible, et al., 2011).

Sabatier rejects the idea that analysis of policy change should be focused on a few dominant governmental institutions, rather he argues that, given the large number of actors in a policy subsystem, a focus on a few 'clusters' (or coalitions) of actors provides better tools for understanding policy change. The core idea of the Advocacy Coalition Framework theory (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, pp. 16 - 17) is that *policy change* is the result of interactions and learning between advocacy coalitions within broader *policy subsystems*.

---

<sup>1</sup> For example, van warden (Waarden, 1992) identifies several types of policy networks along three main dimensions. These are 'the function of the network', 'the number of actors involved' and the 'balance of power'.

<sup>2</sup> In an *issue network*, there is no limited number of actors. Actors are moving in and out the policy arena and there is a wide range of decision making centers. These networks are more pluralistic, with potential conflict between actors over the policy outcomes and differences in commitment and interdependence between actors.

*Policy communities* are defined by having a limited number of participants, who share a common belief concerning policy outcomes, and by having a limited number of decision-making centers. Policy communities are characterized by stability and continuity, with vertical interdependence between actors.

A policy subsystem is defined as *'those actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue'*. (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, p17).

The policy subsystem consists various actors who interact in order to influence policy decisions. The number of actors that a policy subsystem could contain can be large, even up to more than a hundred organizations of different kinds can belong to a subsystem.

Within a policy subsystem, actors can be aggregated into different *advocacy coalitions*. These are clusters of actors who widely share a common idea or belief, about a policy issue and the desired solutions. These actors group together in order to influence policy making according to their beliefs. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith mention that advocacy coalitions not only exist of the formal decision makers, also other stakeholders can be a part of an advocacy coalition. Advocacy coalitions are defined as *'people from a variety of positions who share a particular belief system- that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions- and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time.'* (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993 p18)

The advocacy coalitions are build upon and determined by 'beliefs' and 'resources'. Advocacy coalitions seek to translate their beliefs into policies. The direction in which a coalition will seek to influence policies is determined by their beliefs, their ability to do so is dependent upon the resources the actors in a coalition have. It was already emphasized in the definition of advocacy coalitions that actors in an advocacy coalition *'share a particular belief system'*. In this line of thought Sabatier states that coordination between actors increases with belief congruence and conflict increases with belief divergence. Sabatier argues (Zafonte & Sabatier 1998 p477) that within coalitions, coordination increases with belief congruence and conflict increases with belief divergence. When belief systems of actors match, it contributes to group cohesion (Sabatier & Zafonte, 1998, p. 477).

Policy change, in this model, is caused by a gradual change in the belief systems of actors. This so-called *policy oriented learning* can take place within advocacy coalitions and between advocacy coalitions. Actors within the policy subsystem seek to alter the behavior of governmental institutions in order to achieve their policy goals (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, pp. 41-42).




Figure 2.1; The Advocacy Coalition Framework Sabatier 1998

Figure 2.1 shows that subsystems must be seen within their environmental context. Two sets of exogenous variables could affect constraints and opportunities of subsystem actors (Sabatier Jenkins Smith, Sabatier1998, Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009), *dynamic* (the external system events) and *stable* variables.

Stable exogenous variables include the basic constitutional structur, social and cultural values and the availability of natural resources. These variables are relatively stable and difficult to change and seldom cause for strategical coalition behavior. They however do affact behavior of subsystem actors. Dynamic exogenous variables are more likely to change (over the course of years) and are a potential cause of policy change. These variables could include socio-economic changes, changes in public opinion , changes in systemic governing coalition<sup>3</sup> or policy decisions from other subsystems.

<sup>3</sup> For example 'critical' elections which alter governing coalitions

## 2.3 Policy brokers

In the Advocacy Coalition Framework, so-called *policy brokers* could play a role between advocacy coalitions (see figure 1). In their position *between* coalitions, policy brokers operate as mediators between competing or opposite coalitions in order to find stability and to keep conflict within acceptable limits (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Their goal is to reach compromises, and thereby enhance policy oriented learning. This concept is not extensively discussed in the literature of Sabatier. Other authors elaborate further on the concept of policy brokers. Ingold and Varone (2011) assume that policy brokers are 'rational actors'. In order for a policy broker to invest some of their resources to mediate between coalitions without guarantee for success some self-interest must be at stake. The policy at stake must be a 'fundamental issue' for the broker. Policy brokers act strategically to realize their own interest (Ingold Varone 2011 p322). One interesting feature that Ingold and Varone mention is that policy brokers have belief independence from coalitions (Ingold Varone 2011 p 323).

These assumptions by Ingold and Varone look similar to the often described concept of '*policy entrepreneurs*'. Ingold and Varone suggest that entrepreneurs are a more 'economic' approach to brokers (2011 p321). Mintrom & Vergari (1996) and Mintrom & Norman (2009) describe policy entrepreneurs somewhat different, by claiming that policy entrepreneurs distinguish themselves by their desire for policy change in their field of interest (Mintrom & Norman 2009 p 651). These policy entrepreneurs put efforts in promoting significant policy change, through coalition building or through 'problem definition. The latter means that policy entrepreneurs define problems in such ways that they can maximize opportunities to bring on board coalition partners (framing) (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996)

Although these concepts refer to broadly the same (intermediaries, coalition builders), there are differences. Policy brokers have a position between coalitions (belief independency), and act to solve conflicts and reach compromises. Policy entrepreneurs act to promote policy change and do therefore not necessarily have to be independent (in terms of beliefs) from coalitions. The next chapters will show that some actors in the setting of the biomass project in Veenhuizen can be considered as intermediaries between others (and are self-proclaimed intermediaries). It is interesting to find out to what extent they can be considered as *policy brokers* or maybe as *policy entrepreneurs*.

## 2.4 The role of resources in the Advocacy Coalition Framework

In understanding coalition behavior (coalition formation and coordination), the ACF offers some interesting insights in explaining coalition behavior by its focus on policy belief systems as determinant of advocacy coalitions. However, attention to the role of *interests* (and thus the role of resources) in coalition behavior is minimal. In the earlier outline of the concept of policy networks (p9) interdependencies and the exchange of resources are at the core of networks. Network ties are based upon the exchange of resources and networks consist of interdependent organizations.

Different authors have criticized the ACF on the minimal attention to the role of interests and interdependencies in coalition behavior. Schlager (Schlager, 1995) argues that the Advocacy Coalition Framework is focused too much on the belief systems in explaining policy change. Fenger and Klok (2001) elaborate further on this, after which they try to extend the ACF by focusing more on the role of resources (and resource dependencies). In their article (Fenger & Klok 2001) a combination between belief systems and interdependencies is made, to explain the development and maintenance of various kinds of coalitions.

Interdependencies are considered as important determinates of the behavior of actors in relation with other actors (Fenger & Klok, 2001, p. 158).<sup>4</sup> Fenger and Klok distinguish two types of interdependencies;

- *Competitive interdependency*; when the resources of one conflict with another one's goal achievement.
- *Symbiotic interdependency*; when the resources of one contributes to another one's goal achievement.

Besides these two types of interdependencies, actors can also be *independent* from each other. Following the same line of argument, belief systems of actors can either be;

- *Congruent*; when the belief systems of actors match
- *Divergent*; when the belief systems of actors conflict.

Besides congruency and divergence, actors can be *indifferent* in terms of beliefs. Following the argument of Sabatier, coordination increases with belief congruency. Conflict increases with belief divergence (Zafonte & Sabatier 1998 p477). Table 1 provides an overview of coalition behavior as described by Fenger & Klok (2001).

Interdependency	Beliefs		
	Congruent	Indifferent	Divergent
<b>Symbiotic</b>	1. Strong Coordination	2. Coalitions of convenience	3. Unstable conflict, depolitization, learning
<b>Independent</b>	4. Weak coordination	5. No coalitions	6. Weak conflict
<b>Competitive</b>	7. Coalition with severe collective action problems	8. Weak conflict	9. Strong conflict

Table 2.1; coalition behavior by Fenger & Klok (2001 p164)

*Coordination* (3, 4) is defined as 'the spectrum of activity in which one party alters its own political strategies to accommodate the activity of others in pursuit of similar goals.'

Strong coordination (1) is further explained as the development, acceptance and implementation of a common plan of action. Weak coordination (4) occurs when actors watch each other's political behavior, and then change or adapt their actions to make their own political strategy complementary with respect to a common goal (Sabatier & Zafonte, 1998, p. 480)

*Conflict* (3, 6, 8, 9) is defined, in line with the definition of coordination by Zafonte and Sabatier, by Fenger & Klok (2001 p161) as 'the spectrum of activity in which the political strategies of one party are aimed at preventing other parties from pursuing divergent goals.'

Strong conflict (9) occurs when coalition develop strategies to prevent other parties from pursuing their goals. Weak conflict (6, 8) occurs when actors alter their actions to prevent others from pursuing their goals, as a reaction on the political behavior of the other actor.

<sup>4</sup> The term coalition behavior is used for both coalition formation, as well as for coordination within coalitions (Fenger & Klok 2001 p 159).

Fenger and Klok argue that this framework can be used to help understand the dynamics of coalition formation and coordination. This typology is given without referring to a specific level of analysis. It helps to understand the coalition behavior between actors, and between coalitions.

Kim and Roh (2008) also stress the role of resources to be complementary to beliefs in explaining coalition behavior. *'The ACF does not detail strategic interactions among coalition partners, therefore it fails to distinguish important coalition partners from less important coalition partners'* (Kim & Roh 2008 p669).

A relationship among coalition members is characterized by *policy interests* and *collective action* (see table 2). This understanding can help define relations within coalitions.

	Policy interest	Collective action
<b>Potential collaborator</b>	X	-
<b>Reciprocal collaborator</b>	-	X
<b>Substantial collaborator</b>	X	X

Table 2.2; typology of relationships between coalition members. Source: Kim & Roh 2008 p 682

*Potential collaborators* share policy interests but do not (or cannot) undertake collective action, due to unwillingness or lack of resources/capabilities or authority.

*Reciprocal collaborators* undertake collective action without sharing policy interests, (For example in a long-term relationship when one participates in the expectation of reciprocity of another later or in another setting).

*Substantial collaborators* share policy interests and collective action.

The contributions of Fenger & Klok and Kim & Roh add an understanding about the role resources (and resource dependencies) can play in coalitions or in conflict. Beliefs and resources are central in exploring and explaining coalition behavior in this research. The concept of 'belief systems' will be discussed into more detail in the next section.

## 2.5 Belief systems

In the Advocacy Coalition Framework, belief systems are central in explaining coalition behavior. In the next section an outline of the concept 'belief systems' will be given.

A policy belief consists of ideas about an actual situation of a given policy issue, ideas about the preferred solution and measures that are being used to examine success or failure (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 31). Sabatier states that actors are not primarily driven by economic goals or self-interest. Instead, he assumes that the goals of actors are usually complex and should be ascertained empirically (Sabatier 1998 p 109). Sabatier uses the term 'beliefs' instead of interests as its focus because beliefs are broader and more inclusive than interests. Sabatier offers a useful understanding of belief systems by describing various 'layers' of beliefs. This distinction will help understanding the difference between deep personal abstract beliefs and situation-specific beliefs. This notion of broad beliefs and situational specific beliefs is shared by other authors, for example Hoppe et al. (2004) and Termeer (1993). The latter refers to beliefs as 'reality definitions', and also stresses that these definitions differ from broad topics to specific interpretations of these broad ideas (Termeer, 1993, p. 31).

Belief systems are divided into three layers (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 104-114);

The first and most abstract layer of beliefs are the *deep core beliefs*. These are the 'basic ontological and normative beliefs'. Deep core beliefs are rigid and resistant to change. Deep core beliefs are part of basic personal philosophy of an actor. These beliefs are broader than a single subsystem.

The second and middle layer of beliefs are the *policy core beliefs*. These subsystem-wide beliefs are the basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or subsystem. Normative commitments means that the prioritization of values and the identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern. This layer of beliefs presents the basic strategies and policy positions of an actor. This layer represents the perceived 'seriousness' and causes of the problem, and ideas about the distribution of authority between (and within) government and the market. These beliefs are somewhat less rigid to change as deep core beliefs.

The third and most specific layer of beliefs are called the *secondary aspects*. These beliefs are narrower (not concerning an entire policy subsystem) beliefs than policy core beliefs, and are about the importance of a certain policy issue (a specific aspect in a policy domain) and its causal factors. Secondary beliefs can also be policy preferences and preferred policy instruments, and the way the performance of actors are evaluated. These beliefs present the 'instrumental positions' of an actor towards a given policy issue, so budgetary choices and more. Secondary aspects are more susceptible to change than policy core beliefs, these beliefs can change fairly easily in the process of policy making and policy learning. An actor will be more likely to give up secondary aspects of a belief system before giving up policy core beliefs.

The policy core beliefs are considered to be most important, as determinates of coalitions. As Sabatier argues, policy core beliefs are the 'glue' between coalitions. Policy core beliefs are more salient, more noticeable, than deep core beliefs. Also policy core beliefs serve more as guides to behavior than secondary aspect beliefs (Sabatier, 1998, p. 109). Actors are limited in analyzing information. Policy core beliefs have a general scope, and are therefore more important as guide for behavior for a variety of situations as secondary aspects. However, sometimes secondary aspects can also be considered as the glue in coalitions (Sabatier and Zafonte 1998 p 478).

Knowledge concerning belief systems is dependent upon the situation and the given policy issue. A more specific outline of the process of searching for the beliefs of the respondents will be sketched in the chapter *method* (p25).

## 2.6 Summary

With the Advocacy Coalition Framework, insight is gained in determinants of coalition behavior, and the role of coalitions in policy change. With further elaborations of Fenger and Klok and Kim & Roh beliefs and resource dependency are identified as determinants of coalition behavior. Policy change is the result of policy oriented learning, coalitions try to influence decision makers to alter their behavior. Policy beliefs are to some extent susceptible to change, policy core and secondary beliefs are less rigid than deep core beliefs. The next chapter will introduce the case of Veenhuizen. This theoretical framework is interesting when describing and analyzing this project. The new and innovative character of the project has led to policy oriented learning in practice. This theoretical chapter will provide the base for empirical exploration of coalitions through beliefs and interdependencies.

### 3. Case Description

The Veenhuizen biomass project is an innovative project concerning 'green waste' as potential source of energy (and source of income). This entails new ways of thinking, for example about dealing with decentralized energy production and procurement. This project has some unique features. In a compact setting of this prison-village all ingredients for a biomass chain are ought to be present (supply and consumption). However, when starting to research in this field, it became clear that other interesting aspects and motives play a role. For many actors, this project is not solely about 'biomass' or 'sustainability', this project serves broader goals and motives. The socio-economical and cultural aspects of the village of Veenhuizen are important in the belief systems of the actors. The role the three large prisons (and the threatened future of these prisons) is distinctive for this project.

Before explaining the current state of affairs of the biomass project, a short description of the distinctive historical meaning of Veenhuizen will be given. The cultural historical setting adds and extra dimension to this case, this understanding will play a role in the decision making in the biomass project. See page 23 for a map of Veenhuizen and its surroundings. The distinctive role for the three prisons in the small village can be seen clearly, as well as the natural surroundings of Veenhuizen.

#### 3.1 Historical Development

Early 19<sup>th</sup> century a large part of the Dutch population lived in poverty. It was thought that poverty could be contested by means of re-education and labor. In 1818 the 'Maatschappij van Weldadigheid' (society of benevolence) was founded by General Johannes van den Bosch. Several agricultural communities were founded where families could voluntarily build a live as farmer. However, the willingness to voluntarily live in these camps was low, so the decision to built forced labor camps was made. On the peat-soils in the North, several thousand acres of land was pointed out as location for these camps. In, what would be called Veenhuizen (in the province of Drenthe), thousands of 'paupers' (man, women, children) were forced to live in isolated settlements and were forced into labor and re-education. In these years, a self-sufficient community of man, woman and children arose, isolated from the outside world. The Dutch government took over these 'colonies' in 1859. Thousands of convicted tramps were banned to Veenhuizen in the decades that followed. In the year 1900 new prisons were built, together with supporting facilities and accommodations for personal. Many of these buildings (about 120, including the current prisons Esserheem and Norgerhaven) are still present today. These State-monuments still determine the character of Veenhuizen.

Veenhuizen has always remained a 'prison village'. Till the seventies anti-socials were detained in several complexes in Veenhuizen. It lasted till 1981 for this village to become publicly accessible. Nowadays the relation between Veenhuizen and the ministry of Justice is still strong. Three detention centers are located in Veenhuizen, Groot Bankenbosch, Norgerhaven en Esserheem of which the latter two are State-monuments. The entire village of Veenhuizen was property of the State till late 1980's. During the nineties the government started transferring their possessions (land, buildings and infrastructure) to the municipality of Noordenveld and/or to private actors. Since the nineties large developments have taken place. Veenhuizen grew to be a 'normal' village, with inhabitants that are not necessarily employees of the prisons. Currently Veenhuizen has about 1300 inhabitants including the long-term inmates. The three prisons are important for they are the largest employers in the region.

The presence of the prisons adds to the distinctive character of Veenhuizen as 'prison-village'. The developments in Veenhuizen (and of the brand 'Veenhuizen') have attracted rising numbers of tourists. The 'prison museum Veenhuizen', located in former prisons, attracts over hundred thousand visitors each year. Veenhuizen has even requested UNESCO to become a World Heritage Site.



This history and the still distinctive character of Veenhuizen is does play a role in the biomass project. The ideas of working on the branding of Veenhuizen and stimulating regional developments are motives for some to participate in the biomass project. The cultural-historical context thus could be a catalyst for developments. The opportunity to combine cultural and socio-economical developments with an image of being a 'green' and self-sufficient prison-village is recognized by many involved actors.

## 3.2 Penitentiary Institution Veenhuizen

### 3.2.1 *The PI*

The Penitentiary Institution (**PI**) of Veenhuizen consists of three locations. Norgerhaven is a closed detention centre with a capacity of 270 inmates, for long-term stay. This prison has been built between 1897 and 1901, and extended in 1987. Since this location is extended with facilitative buildings and a farm (including greenhouse) where inmates work. Esserheem is a detention centre for 270 foreigners and has been built between 1897 and 1903. In this institution foreign convicts are detained and prepared for a return to their native country. The third location is Groot-Bankenbosch, a semi-open location. Groot-Bankenbosch is about to close down and is therefore not relevant for the biomass project. The PI Veenhuizen has about 500 employees in total. The Central Custodial Agency (Dienst Justitiele Inrichtingen, **DJI**) is the agency that controls all custodial institutions in the Netherlands, including PI Veenhuizen. The DJI is an agency of the ministry of Safety and Justice. The PI Veenhuizen is dependent upon the policies made by DJI. See image 3.1 (page 23) for a map of Veenhuizen. This map illustrates the central role of the three prisons (Groot-Bankenbosch, Esserheem, Norgerhaven) in the village, and their setting in the rural and natural surroundings. The former peat-moors, cultivated in the nineteenth century by the inmates of Veenhuizen, can be recognized by the systematic design of waterways and roads.

The 'real estate' of the PI (buildings, infrastructure) is rented from the Governmental Buildings Agency (Rijksgebouwendienst, **RGD**). The RGD is responsible for the quality of the buildings (including energy infrastructure). This rental construction is set in long term contracts. The contracts for the PI Veenhuizen are going to end in 2017, so negotiations about (eventual) new contracts need to take place in the coming years. The rent is set on a fixed price and does not include energy costs. Energy efficient buildings have a higher rent, and vice versa. Within these negotiations possible renovations or investments in renewed (energy-) infrastructure can be discussed. The RGD is responsible for eventual necessary renovations or adjustments to the buildings, which could have an effect on the rental price.

### 3.2.2 *Energy procurement*

Energy procurement for the state is arranged on national scale. The energy contracts are divided into gas and electricity, and are put out to tender on national scale. Electricity is divided into four packages (of which one is 'Safety and Justice') Thus, all buildings in the 'safety and justice' sector are combined in one electricity deal, and the entire gas consumption of the government is combined in one large deal. This means that the total energy consumption for the prison-sector is procured by one energy supplier, through public enrollment. The 'safety and justice' package is being dealt with by the ministry of Defense. The PI receives an individual energy bill for their energy consumption (source; interviews DJI, Ministry of Internal Affairs and RGD).

One main question in this project is to what extent decentralized energy procurement is allowed. There seems to be a possibility for this individual PI to purchase their energy individually, the energy-packages have enough bandwidth for individual entities to be excluded from these (source, interviews RGD, MinIA). Besides this, the government has dedicated itself in the Green Deal to make efforts to take away barriers in laws and legislation.

### 3.3 The Veenhuizen biomass project.

In the following section the development of the Veenhuizen biomass project will be described. Section 3.3.1 deals with the policy framework, policies that enhance governments to participate in this particular project. Section 3.3.2 deals with the origins and current state of the project.

#### 3.3.1 Policy framework

Several policies have been formulated that should help reaching the international '2020'<sup>5</sup> agreements. Some relevant approaches will be discussed in this section, to understand the role the government is playing. Especially the '*Green Deal*' is interesting in this setting .

The ministry of Internal Affairs has stated an (government-wide) aim for a 'local orientation', which refers to a government that is looking to closer cooperation with public and private actors. The result must be a coherent and optimal system of measures and techniques for producing and using green energy. (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2012). Biomass and the biobased-economy is one of the main points of attention in governmental sustainability policies. The '*agro covenant Schoon en Zuinige Agrosectoren 2008*' (Agri Covenant Clean and Economical Agri-sectors)<sup>6</sup> is the translation of the changing attitude of the use of biomass. This covenant commits the government to stimulate innovations in this policy field of the bio-based economy. The ministry of Economic affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (current ministry of Economic affairs) has stated in their energy policies that;

*'The Dutch State is in its energy- and sustainability policies explicitly searching for collaborations, both with other governments as with the market and the society'* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2012, p. 1).

One specific policy tool that has resulted from this approach is the *Green Deal*, a tool from the ministry of Economic Affairs and Agriculture (current ministry of Economic Affairs). This Green Deal is meant to be a deal between government and a private initiative concerning innovative and sustainable projects. The idea of the Green Deal program started in 2011 and originated from the energy and climate goals and the evolving idea of a network government. The short term climate goals are the 2020 targets (as described above). On the long term the goal is to stimulate innovation in order to let sustainable energy compete with 'grey' energy (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie, 2011, p. 3).

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<sup>5</sup> The '2020' goals include:

- Cost-effective measures to reduce 2% energy in government buildings each year (cumulating in a total of 25% in 2020).
  - To adapt environmental criteria in procurement and tender procedures
  - Energy neutrality in building and large-scale renovations from 31 December 2008.
  - In 2020 20% less CO<sub>2</sub>-emission
  - In 2020 14% of the energy consumption is produced on a sustainable way.
- (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2012, p. 1)

<sup>6</sup>This covenant was established in June 2008 between the government (i.e. ministers of Agriculture, Environment etc) and representatives of several Agricultural sectors Article nine describes the agreement between the sectors 'forests', 'scenery', 'nature' and the lumber sector. The vast amounts of residuals that come free at preservation of nature and scenery can be used for sustainable energy production. With this agreement, the government and the mentioned sectors will strive to maximize the usage of these biomass flows for energy production. With this covenant the government has committed itself to support innovations and the development of biobased economy through financial incentives as well as other (judicial, facilitative, etc) support.

*'The Government chooses to close a Green Deal with society. The aim of the Green Deal is to clear the path to a green and growing sustainable society through practical actions. A sustainable society doesn't arise spontaneously and can also not be achieved solely by creating a subsidizing government. A sustainable society demands a collective trajectory between society and government. By striving towards shared goals a robust and stable future for a sustainable society will develop. This trajectory will evolve gradually and start by showing joint examples of both economical and sustainable benefits, after which the entire society can be set in motion. With the Green Deal, the government can produce custom-made solutions.'*

(Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie, 2011, pp. 5 - 6)

The Green Deal policy is an example of the changing philosophy of government. It is no longer a top-down approach, the government is creating conditions for others to establish green and economical projects. Green Deals are tools meant to as support for initiatives from society and the private sector. The initiators are responsible for the realization of the project, hence the Green Deal ensures (situation –specific) support from the government. The government's core activities to support initiatives are not in financing or subsidizing projects, but in taking away specific barriers in projects that are 'green' and have economical spin-off. These barriers are often not financial and can be taken away through law and regulations, a good and objective information supply and/or in creating and facilitating collaborations between different actors. With this approach the government would be able to stimulate and promote sustainability project without having to grant subsidies. So far, two rounds of Green Deals have been processed. About 200 out of 475 requests have been granted (Elzenga & Kruitwagen, 2012). Several Green Deals that concern biomass are being supported by DLG. A task given by the ministry of Economic Affairs.

### *3.3.2 Development of the Veenhuizen biomass project.*

The large-scale developments in Veenhuizen (described on page 15-16) led to the establishment of the *Veenhuizen Development Agency* (Ontwikkelbureau Veenhuizen, **OBV**), consisting of representatives of the municipality the province and the national government. The OBV is not a legal entity, it is an informal office in Veenhuizen with the mission to help stimulate the broad developments in Veenhuizen. The 'steer group Veenhuizen' (consisting of the mayor of Noordenveld, a counselor of the Drenthe and an official of the state) is an informal collaboration of different layers of government to formulate a vision on the future of Veenhuizen. From this board, the idea of a permanent office in Veenhuizen came to arise. The municipality and the province founded the OBV. Two or three employees from the province and the municipality are 'stationary' in Veenhuizen in order to promote Veenhuizen to work on 'the future of Veenhuizen' (Ontwikkelbureau Veenhuizen, 2011). This bureau was one of the first driving forces behind the idea of using the abundant local biomass and has played an active role in the project so far.

Because Veenhuizen is surrounded by nature and scenery, the OBV saw opportunities to use the presumably abundant supply of biomass in the Veenhuizen-surroundings for a purpose within Veenhuizen. The original ambition was to link local biomass with local ends, to create a local chain of biomass production and usage.

After some initial meetings the specific idea to combine energy-demand from the prisons with biomass was formed. Primarily because PI is the largest consumer of energy in the region but also other motives played a role. On the background of the project is the threat of the future of the prisons in Veenhuizen. The complexes are old and do not meet modern standards. In current times of austerity the future of the prisons are unsure. DJI and the Ministry of Safety and Justice have announced cutbacks for prison-sector and possible closure of complexes, might choose to close the prisons in Veenhuizen.

It is on the interest of the local and regional organizations to maintain the prisons in Veenhuizen. During the interviews that were held for this research it appeared that this was an underlying motive for regional organizations to stimulate developments concerning the prisons.

In order to explore possibilities of a biomass project, the province of Drenthe (through the OBV) ordered the Government Service of Land and Water Management (Dienst Landelijk Gebied, **DLG**) to conduct feasibility studies. Later DLG also became active in supporting the Green Deal request, a task given by the ministry of Economic affairs.

#### *Feasibility study DLG*

A first feasibility study by DLG for the location Norgerhaven (the initial proposed location for a biomass installation) indicated that a biomass installation based upon wood chips could be realizable and affordable (on a term of about 20 years). This complex uses 775000 cubic metres of natural gas, comparable with about 500 Dutch households. About 9500 cubic meters of timber (wood chips) would be needed to fuel this installation. The presumed investment for an installation with energy-infrastructure would be about 1.4 million euros, with 50.000 euros of exploitation costs each year. A cubic meter of wood chips is presumed to be between ten and eleven euros (Dienst Landelijk Gebied, 2011).

DLG was asked to further facilitate (together with the OBV) the formation of a biomass-network, to find relevant actors and to connect them with each other. Here DLG and OBV acted as bridge between different organizations, bringing together organizations that would otherwise not have been together.

*‘We do not have a mandate, and we do not have physical resources. We have a position as a link, as some kind of broker. (...)Based upon the character of the tasks we invite people from the province, municipalities and/or the state. ’ (respondent 8 OBV)*

On May the 22th 2012, delegates from all involved organizations (National and regional) came together in a seminar guided by DLG to further develop the plans. With this stakeholder dialogue, commitment was created and the actors agreed that a business case need to be conducted.

In October 2012 the Green Deal Veenhuizen was signed by representatives of the Province and the Municipality, the Drentse Energie Organisation and the central government<sup>7</sup>.

The motives are found in sustainability targets and desire to create the bio-based economy, in promoting sustainable maintenance of nature and scenery and in stimulating local developments in Veenhuizen. Table 1 shows (a summary of-) the intended efforts of the actors. DJI and the RGD, are indirect involved in the Green Deal because the ministers of Safety and Justice and the minister of Internal Affairs have signed the Green Deal. DJI and RGD are executive agencies of this ministry, and are involved when having to carry out policies that are set by the ministries.

This deal is special for it practically is a deal between governments<sup>8</sup>. It is agreed that a business case needs to be conducted in to determine the feasibility of different options. The central idea is that tis project is a pilot. If this project succeeds, the experiences could be translated on a wider scale to other situations with comparable conditions.

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<sup>7</sup> The Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of Safety & Justice, the Minister of Environment and Infrastructure and the Minister of Internal Affairs have signed the Green Deal Veenhuizen to represent the ‘central government’.

<sup>8</sup> The Drentse Energie Organisatie is an autonomous foundation, but is founded by the province of Drenthe. Also its activities are coordinated by the province.

Green Deal Veenhuizen	
Organization	Task
Province of Drenthe	Procesmanagement for conducting the business case
	Share general information and experiences
Municipality Noordenveld	Share necessary information on permits, town-planning and biomass supply
	Create support within own organization
Drentse Energie Organisatie	Support Province with conducting legal and financial aspects of the business case
	Share knowledge and experiences
Central Government	Share relevant information of public tender regulations
	Consult owners of nature and landscape to create support
	Try to take away barriers in law and regulations
	Use the agencies <i>RGD</i> , <i>DJI</i> and <i>DLG</i> to actively share information and other input

Table 3.1; Summary of the Green Deal Veenhuizen.

The deal is signed also by the Drentse Energie Organisatie (Drentse Energy Organization or **DEO**). The DEO is a foundation, funded by the Province of Drenthe. The province has committed itself to the ambitious Northern Energy Agreement<sup>9</sup>. To stimulate sustainable initiatives, the provincial council decided some sort of 'provincial energy company' had to be established, which could help finance sustainable initiatives in Drenthe. The DEO is able to finance projects with relative flexible and situation-specific conditions. The DEO has a subsidy relation with the province, which is meant lasts until 2020 and it built upon clear standards and measures. The policy plan 2012-2015 describes that DEO receives 3 million Euros each year in this period and a one-time subsidy of 10 million Euros. For 2013 the DEO must have reached an agreement with at least 15 projects (Drentse Energie Organisatie, 2012, pp. 7- 8). The DEO cannot finance other governments. It can play a role when a private company is willing to built and exploit the installation 'outside the prison wall'.

The interviews for this research were held in September 2012, after the explorative meetings and the seminar but before the signing of the Green Deal. Commitment was created, decisions were yet to be taken.

### 3.4 Interdependencies.

The biomass project has originated by local organizations wanting to contribute to Veenhuizen's developments. The project has gone through different phases, from creating the first initiatives to approaching necessary organizations and creating commitment. This project is a pilot project, and because it is new there is no fixed pattern or protocol to follow.

<sup>9</sup> The northern energy agreement (2007) is an agreement between the three Northern Dutch provinces (Drente, Friesland, Groningen), the ministry of Economical Affairs and the formerly ministry of Public Housing, Planning and Environment (currently Infrastructure and Environment) that pronounces the ambition for the northern provinces to become a main 'energy region' in Northwest Europe

It is a new policy-terrain for all involved actors, it requires new ways of thinking about different topics like (decentralization of-) energy production and procurement. It enhances new and different relations and patterns of interdependencies. The involved organizations were forced to consider what their position in the debate would be. The theoretical framework in chapter 2 showed that beliefs are to some extent susceptible for changes. This project is an example of policy learning in practice. Actors try to alter the behavior of others, all involved actors are forced to take a position on relatively new topic.

As explained, the OBV DLG and local actors have initiated meetings all relevant actors thereby evoking them to think about these innovative ideas. The initiators had to bring together different organizations, of which many had never been in touch with the concept of 'biomass' or with decentralized energy procurement. The initiative was soon supported by local and regional organizations (province of Drenthe, municipality Noordenveld, and the local prison-organization). All of them with their own motives and goals. However additional organizations were needed, in order for this project to be a success

DJI and RGD are decisive for the buildings and the energy infrastructure and consumption. The RGD is not the consumer of the energy, but is responsible for any major improvements of the real estate (see paragraph 3.2) Because of the structure between DJI and the local Penitentiary Institution, there is no formal role for PI.

*'The PI Veenhuizen is directly controlled by the DJI, in this setting the PI is dependent of the policy that is made in The Hague. They are ought to stick to it.'* (Interview respondent 2; DJI)

Because of the original aim to arrange the supply for biomass on a local scale Staatsbosbeheer and Natuurmonumenten were approached as potential suppliers of biomass. Staatsbosbeheer and Natuurmonumenten are two organizations with vast amounts of grounds in the Veenhuizen surroundings. Staatsbosbeheer is a quasi-autonomous governmental organization, responsible for forest and nature conservation and accountable to the Ministry of Economical Affairs.

Natuurmonumenten is an union founded in 1905 in order to preserve valuable nature and landscape in the Netherlands. It possesses vast amounts of nature and landscape in the Netherlands and currently has over 700 000 members. Being an union, Natuurmonumenten has a special position. It is not a governmental organization and it cannot be seen as a pure private company. However Natuurmonumenten receives funds from the government and is working close together with governments.

*'Natuurmonumenten wants to act more as an entrepreneur. We are no entrepreneurs, we do not have the persons to run a company. We are professionals, but with a different focus as a private company.'* (respondent Natuurmonumenten)

All mentioned organizations have (potentially) some resources that could be vital in this project, from legal resources to the supply of biomass or financial resources. The resources of these organizations seem to add up, when all participate a positive sum game seems possible. Within this particular setting there seem to be no competitive interdependencies where the resources of one interfere with another one's goals (except maybe for the biomass supply). The interdependencies thus seem to be to large extend symbiotic.

### 3.5 Summary

The Veenhuizen biomass project has originated bottom-up, originating from the broader developments of the village. All relevant actors in the current phase of the project are identified, and have been involved in the early steps of network formation and exploring the possibilities. Input from several different organizations is needed, to form a network of potential mutual advantage. Different actors have participated with their own goals and motives. Between the involved organizations, there seem to be *symbiotic interdependencies*. All have a piece of the puzzle of realizing the biomass project, combining these will lead to a positive sum game. Many actors seem to be potential collaborators, sharing policy interests and participating in collective action (chapter 5 will discuss this in more detail).

In this case several examples of exogenous variables that have influenced the policy actors can be seen. The current economic crisis and time of austerity caused by this strongly affect the Veenhuizen project. There are few financial resources available for projects as the Veenhuizen biomass project, which caused the urge for the focus on economical development. On the other hand, tools like Green Deal that were developed to support initiatives without direct financial support have made the project as it is now. Also several policies (national, and international standards) and tools have contributed to the project in its current state.







## 4. Method

This research is aimed at describing current events and thereby explore future developments. The project is not yet 'finished', the biomass installation has not been built and the decision to do so has also not been taken yet. The question has a focus on future events, on the expectations of coalition behavior in the near future. Therefore this research has an exploratory character, meaning the research is aimed not only at describing the phenomenon or explaining certain facts. Its purpose is at exploring future events, and finding prospects of coalition behavior.

### 4.1 Main question and the research questions:

Two broad variables are central in this research, based upon the Advocacy Coalition Approach Framework (Sabatier 1993/1998) and additions from Fenger and Klok (2001) and Kim and Roh (2008); 'interdependencies and 'beliefs'. With this, an understanding of coalition behavior can be given.

What are the prospects of coalition behavior in the case 'Green energy for the prisons in Veenhuizen', when considering belief systems and interdependencies as determinants of coalition behavior?

Several steps are needed to find an answer to this questions. The following sub questions have been formulated to guide this research.

*Who are the relevant actors in the case 'Veenhuizen'?*

*What are the main resources of the relevant actors in this setting?*

*What are the belief systems of the relevant stakeholders and how do the belief systems of the stakeholders relate to each other?*

*Which interdependencies between actors can be distinguished?*

### 4.2 The Case Veenhuizen

This research is a single case study, with the biomass project in Veenhuizen as case.

A case study is an empirical enquiry that (Yin, 1994, p. 13):

*'investigates a contemporary phenomenon with its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident'*

The case of the biomass project in Veenhuizen cannot be analyzed without paying attention to the context and the environmental setting it is in. Contextual conditions need to be covered because the actors act within the contemporary reality, their position (defined by beliefs and resources) are influenced by the contextual setting of project.

Different typologies of case studies can be found, to further specify the type of case study. This study can be classified as a so-called '*embedded single case design*' (Yin 1994, p 41 42). This means that one case is being analyzed with attention to multiple levels of analysis.

In the Veenhuizen biomass-case several levels of analysis (individual features like resources and beliefs, network broad view) need to get attention. In this project, each individual respondent represents an unique organizations or departments There can be common features, but differences between them must be ascertained for each respondent individually. Gibbs (in; Analyzing qualitative data 2007) refers to this as being '*idiographic*' (Gibbs, 2007). In this case the respondents will be analyzed individually.

The main strategy to obtain data is through qualitative interviews. Qualitative research is a proper choice for explorative research for its flexible approach and the ability to go in-depth and focus on individual details (Boeije, 2010, p. 32). Besides the qualitative interview, quantitative data will be used in this research to strengthen the value of this research. For this, the respondents were asked to fill out a questionnaire aimed at exploring the beliefs in this project.

### 4.3 Respondents

The unit of analysis for this research is the biomass-project for the penitentiaries in Veenhuizen. A detailed description of this project can be found in the previous chapter (Introduction and case description).

The first step is aimed at identifying all relevant organizations in this project, and the right persons within these organizations able and willing to participate in this research. This will be conducted through purposive sampling. The relevant actors in this project are identified through participant observation (Boeije, 2010, p. 59) during the internship at DLG. At several meetings, the organizations that would play a key role were identified The organizations that signed the Green Deal, and others who are to some extend involved in this project were identified during the internship.

On the biomass-seminar in Veenhuizen (22 may 2012, see section 3.3.2), all relevant (public, semi-public) organizations were present. This helped identifying the right persons, and it helped making contact. Also contacts at DLG helped finding the right persons in these organizations. The respondents in this research are representatives of the organizations that were present at this seminar.

Conducting the first interviews helped to map the situation and identifying some other relevant organizations. This process of 'snowballing' completed the list of respondents. In total fourteen interviews were held with respondents of different organizations. An actor could be organization, department or individual. The respondents are all individually involved, as representatives of their organization. For some organizations a specific department is considered as the actor.

Respondents in analysis	
1. Drentse Energie Organisatie	Accountmanager
2. Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen	Manager department Procurement
3. Dienst Landelijk Gebied	Employee DLG region North
4. Ministry of Internal Affairs	Department 'Sustainable Organisation' Directorate-General Organisation and Operations of the State
5. Natuurmonumenten	Natuurmonumenten project leader region 'North'
6. Noordenveld Environmental Department	
7. Noordenveld Project Veenhuizen	Project leader 'Veenhuizen'
8. Ontwikkelbureau Veenhuizen	Project manager
9. Penitentiary Institution Veenhuizen	Director
10. Province Drenthe	Projectleader Energy Program
11. Rijksgebouwen Dienst	Senior Advisor Comfort and Sustainability
12. Staatsbosbeheer	Staatsbosbeheer Buitenzaken (commercial branche Staatsbosbeheer)

Table 4.1; list of respondents in analysis, alphabetical order.

Twelve respondents were included in the analysis (see table 1). Two respondents are excluded from further analysis. These interviews were interesting as background information.

1. Ministry of Internal Affairs. 'Quartermaster', a broker in resource-management for raw materials of the government. This interview really helped getting insight in the sustainability goals of the government, and the way public procurement laws for raw materials and energy work. It also helped finding other respondents for this research.  
This respondent was involved in the project as 'broker' between ministries. The respondent's focus on 'raw materials', instead of 'energy' (which are separated in this department) lead to the exclusion of this respondent from further analysis.
2. Ministry of Economical affairs, agriculture and innovation (current: ministry of economic affairs), project coordinator Green Deals. This respondent gave interesting insight in the practice of green deals, the motives for the green deal project and the outcomes of green deals (in general). Also it helped in determining the relation between this ministry and its agency DLG. This respondent was not involved in individual green deal projects like Veenhuizen, and is therefore not included in further analysis.

## 4.4 Interviews

All respondents that were approached reacted positively and were willing and able to meet for an interview. The interviews were held face-to-face, at the 'work floor' of the respondent. The interviews lasted approximately one hour. An interview protocol was made to guard the basic lines of the interview. See appendix C for the interview protocol, the questions that have been discussed in every interview. In every interview there is the possibility to improvise or to go into specific situational details.

All interviews were recorded with a voice recorder, after which transcripts are made of the interviews. These transcripts were sent to the respondent in order to check for misinterpretations and to get permission to use the interviews for this research. Some respondents replied with minor adjustments, which made some elements of the text more clear. None of the respondents denied permission regarding the use of the interviews for further analysis. The process of coding the interviews was undertaken using the software program (Atlas.ti). Coding helped structuring the interviews and finding comparable segments in the transcripts.

The interviews were processed anonymously, the organizations and (if necessary) some information about the function of the respondents will be revealed, the names of the respondents will not be revealed. The interviews are labeled by organization name or the number based upon alphabetical order (see table 1).

## 4.5 Analysis of belief systems

To answer the main questions and to map interdependencies (and prospects of conflict and coordination) also a focus on the beliefs of actors is required. The previous chapter already indicates the roles and importance of many of the involved organizations, the next chapter will elaborate further on some details.

### 4.5.1 Theoretical considerations

Mapping the belief systems of the relevant actors is an important element in this research. Sabatier (Sabatier, 1998) argues that it is preferable that actors indicate their belief systems through questionnaires and document analysis than specifying a priori a clear and falsifiable set of interests for most actors in policy conflicts. Hoppe et al. (Hoppe, Jeliaskova, van de Graaf, & Grin, 2004, p. 74) mention two important objections in mapping belief systems. Each individual has its own belief system, each has their personal opinions, viewpoints and frames of the policy discourse (Rein & Schon). Respondents should be considered as representatives of an organization or a subgroup. Second it is impossible to fully ascertain the complete belief system of an actor. This however is not the task in this research. Only the elements that are relevant for this particular policy issue for this project must be mapped. Knowledge concerning belief systems is situational, it is always dependent upon the situation and the given policy issue. Two guidelines for selecting representative respondents are (Hoppe et al 2004 p 72):

- The larger the variety of beliefs the better. The snowball method can help finding respondents.
- At least the most important beliefs must present.

As already depicted in the previous chapter, beliefs can be divided into deep core, policy core and secondary aspects (Sabatier 1998). The distinction between these layers is difficult to grasp, but the notion that beliefs are built of rigid beliefs and more situational and context-dependent beliefs is important. Because of understanding documents like annual reports, strategic reports or other agreements will be used to support the analysis of ideas and positions. Information from documents will support the picture of an organization's backgrounds, its tasks and judicial base. For example sustainability goals of organizations or the role of biomass trade can be found in these documents.

#### *4.5.2 Quantitative analysis of beliefs;*

In order to triangulate the qualitative data on the beliefs a quantitative element for belief systems will be used. This invites respondents to take a position towards on certain topics and evokes reactions. It is not the purpose to find absolute differences in the positioning of actors on these topics, it is the purpose to find relative differences and to present a broad overview of the positions. The respondent was asked to react on each of the statements, using Likert-scale answers: 1, totally disagree. 2, disagree. 3, neutral. 4, agree. 5, totally agree.

The statements are based upon three broad 'ambitions', that were sketched during the seminar on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of May 2012, where representatives of all relevant (public and semi-public) organizations gathered to discuss the biomass project of Veenhuizen. At this seminar, three broad ambitions were formulated that can be translated into;

1 Renewable energy; this project as part of the governmental energy and climate goals.

2 Efficient government; this project as mean to use waste energy source and thereby reducing costs.

3 Green prison; this project as part of developing Veenhuizen as a 'brand'. A 'Green Prison' that is connected with its (historical) region, and by this creating (inter-) national image of being self-sustainable and green. A 'living' monumental village attractive to tourists, this project can contribute to the 'Veenhuizen image'.

These ambitions were used to form three underlying (general) ideas or motives:

- Sustainability
- Profitability
- Regional development and promotion

For each of these arguments, statements are formulated which the respondents were invited to react upon. Constructs will be made by combining statement that concern similar topics. The internal reliability of these constructs will be tested with the Cronbachs Alpha. When the Cronbachs Alpha is low, the statements that harm the reliability will be removed statements. When the effect of removal is less than .05 the statements will remain included for their contextual value.

With these scores the relative differences between actors can be given. These will be visualized and presented in graphs. For the graphs a cumulative score is calculated. The scores on all relevant statements for the mentioned dimensions are added (equally weighed once). The graphs show the relative positions of the actors on the three dimensions. It helps understanding the different approaches of the actors, the scores should not be interpreted as absolute positions (because of the ordinal data). Besides statements concerning these three dimensions, some general statements were formulated. See appendix B for the constructs of statements into three dimensions and the Cronbach's alpha for these.

## 4.6 Validity

This research focuses on one specific case (the biomass project in Veenhuizen). All relevant organizations in the public sector that have participated are included. Within this case, the methods that are proposed should satisfy an extensive and comprehensive analysis on the two variables. It is difficult to generalize these findings. Some basic understandings, theoretical findings and empirical tests of the theories could be generalized. If generalizations are made, the external validity would be threatened. If is, however, not the aim of this project to make generalizations to other biomass projects.

Qualitative interviews can have some downsides. The first is the sender- receiver bias. This is solved by making sound records, however transcribing the records also implies the date gets interpreted. Each transcription is sent to the respondent to check on errors and misinterpretations, but not every transcript has been sent back. Another threat regarding construct validity is in the statements. The statements and underlying motives have been formulated based upon observations but before conducting the in-depth interviews. Attention must be given if perhaps elements in these statements are redundant or if elements are not included that.

Only one respondent is included for each actor. The respondents are seen as representatives for their organization. A threat to validity could be when personal opinions and organizational standpoints are used interchangeably. The data received from one single representative is used to elaborate on the entire organization (or department). This could threaten internal validity. The triangulation method provides confirmatory evidence. The use of qualitative, quantitative analysis together with using documents should strengthen the conclusions.

## 5. Belief systems and coalitions

In the previous chapters the course of the project so far has been sketched. As the case description has shown, the involved organizations could be to high extend complementary to each other. The interdependencies seem to large extend symbiotic, the project could succeed when the actors see mutual advantage in cooperation. The belief systems of actors will be examined in this chapter. The belief systems of the involved respondents will be analyzed based upon a quantitative and a qualitative approach(see chapter 4, Method). The first segment of this chapter elaborates on the quantitative analysis. This provides some basic understanding about the positions of the actors. Out of this analysis, possible coalitions will appear. The second segment deals with the qualitative interviews to gain more detailed insight in a the beliefs of the respondents. With this combination, coalitions can be explored.

### 5.1 Quantitative analysis on beliefs.

All respondents in this research have received a questionnaire with 21 statements about various topics concerning the Veenhuizen biomass project (see appendix A). All statements are weighed equal (once), the scores are added. For detailed description of the method see Chapter 4 and appendix B.

Calculating total scores for these ordinal data implies careful interpretation. The scores are not absolute. Differences between respondents do not show absolute distances, rather it indicates relative differences in beliefs concerning the topics in the statements. The qualitative interviews will provide more detailed background information. It will appear that this combined data nuance quantitative scores somewhat. Table 1 and 2 show the combined scores and the relative distances between the respondents. Figure 1, 2 and 3 show graphs that illustrate the positions of the respondents on the three dimensions and show clusters of respondents that have similar scores.

Respondent	Sustainability	Profitability	Regional Development
<b>Drentse Energy Organisation</b>	21	17	18
<b>DJI</b>	13	29	12
<b>DLG</b>	25	15	20
<b>Ministry of Internal Affairs</b>	15	29	12
<b>Natuurmonumenten</b>	17	19	15
<b>Noordenveld Environmental Department</b>	19	21	18
<b>Noordenveld Project Veenhuizen</b>	21	22	18
<b>OBV</b>	15	21	15
<b>Penitentiary Institution Veenhuizen</b>	16	15	19
<b>Province Drente</b>	19	21	20
<b>RGD</b>	16	24	12
<b>Staatsbosbeheer</b>	21	20	16

Table 5.1; total scores

Respondent		Regional Development	Profitability	Sustainability
1.	Drentse Energy Organisation	Middle	Low	High
2.	DJI	Low	High	Low
3.	DLG	High	Low	High
4.	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Low	High	Low
5.	Natuurmonumenten	Middle	Middle	Middle
6.	Noordenveld Environmental Department	Middle	Middle	Middle
7.	Noordenveld Project Veenhuizen	Middle	Middle	High
8.	OBV	Middle	Middle	Low
9.	Penitentiary Institution Veenhuizen	High	Low	Middle
10.	Province Drente	High	Middle	Middle
11.	RGD	Low	High	Middle
12.	Staatsbosbeheer	Middle	Middle	High

*Table 5.2; Inclusion in the three ambitions*

The classifications are relative, and are meant to sketch the relative positions towards each other. Therefore the lowest three scores are marked as 'low', the middle 6 as 'middle' and the top 3 as 'high', see table 5.2.



Figure 5.1; Sustainability and Profitability




Figure 5.2; Regional Development and Profitability





Figure 5.3; Sustainability and Regional Development



### 5.1.4 Coalitions

The data from the questionnaire provides interesting insights in the positions of the respondents on the three dimensions related to the biomass project. It appears that those with higher scores on sustainability seem to score also high on regional development. Those who score high on profitability seem to score low on the two 'soft' dimensions of sustainability and regional development. The information gathered in the interviews will be used to elaborate on the beliefs into more detail.

Two broad clusters of respondents can be seen. The first cluster consists of the three respondents from the national government<sup>10</sup> (respondent 11; RGD, respondent 4; Ministry of Internal Affairs, and respondent 2; DJI). The scores on the dimensions 'regional development' and 'sustainability' are low. These three score high on the dimension profitability. The second cluster can be seen around the regional actors. It consists at least of the two respondents of the municipality, the province and DEO. These show very similar scores on all three dimensions.

Three other respondents cluster to some extent around these four respondents. Firstly the respondent of the PI. The scores on 'Regional development' and 'Sustainability' are comparable to the four regional respondents. The score on profitability differs some more. The respondent of the PI will be discussed separately. Also the two respondents of the organizations that could play a role in the supply of biomass (NM, SBB) score somewhat comparable. Especially the scores of the respondent from Staatsbosbeheer are similar to the scores of the four mentioned respondents. These two will be discussed separately, because of their special role as potential suppliers of biomass. This enhances different (possible competitive) interdependencies, and the special relation between these and their different beliefs towards this project and towards biomass trade in general.

The next section will, based upon the qualitative interviews, elaborate further on the beliefs of these two groups and the individual respondents. The question is to what extent can they be referred to as coalition, following the framework of Fenger and Klok (2001) and the definition of a advocacy coalition;

*'people from a variety of positions who share a particular belief system- that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions- and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time.'* (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993 p18)

It will appear that the interviews sometimes sketch a different picture concerning beliefs than this quantitative data. Special attention will be on DLG and the OBV, because of their special role as 'facilitative' organizations, functioning as a self-proclaimed 'bridge' between the different actors. In chapter 2 the role of policy brokers is discussed. It would be interesting to find out whether these two can be seen as *policy brokers* (and thus, independent from any coalitions) or maybe more as *policy entrepreneurs* (searching for policy change, not independent from coalitions).

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<sup>10</sup> DLG is a national governmental organization, but its executive tasks are divided into four regional branches. The respondent in this research work at DLG North.

Coalition A	
<b>Respondents</b>	Municipality of Noordenveld, -Projects Veenhuizen Municipality of Noordenveld -Environmental Department Province of Drenthe Drentse Energie Organisatie
<b>Potential coalition members</b>	Penitentiary Institution Natuurmonumenten Staatsbosbeheer

Table 5.3; Coalition A

Coalition B.	
<b>Respondents;</b>	DJI RGD Ministry of Internal Affairs

Tabel 5.4; Coalition B.

## 5.2 Coalition; A

The first coalition that will be discussed is coalition A. This coalition is based around the regional-governmental organizations in this project (municipality and province). The regional (Drenthe, DEO) and local (Municipality of Noordenveld) organizations were already involved in early stages of the biomass project. They are to large extend in favor of the project (at least in favor of exploring the possibilities) and have participated in the early steps of the project. The quantitative analysis shows that these respondents score comparable on the three dimensions. Also the information from the interviews shows a rather similar picture. The biomass project can be seen within the broader setting of the large-scale developments of the Veenhuizen area where province and municipality have already combined their activities. Their aim is broader that only this specific biomass project, the focus of these respondents is on finding ways to stimulate social and economical developments in their region. These organizations have already participated in the earlier phases of the biomass project, and have offered to contribute to the biomass project if necessary. Also these three organizations have signed the Green Deal. Three other organizations seem to cluster around these four organizations, the PI and the two large landowners Natuurmonumenten and Staatsbosbeheer. These will be discussed in section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3

### 5.2.1 Province and municipality

Just like the quantitative data, the interviews show that the two respondents from the municipality share their views on this project. Both respondents have a very positive attitude towards this project for it is assumed to enhance (economical) developments in Veenhuizen. They also recognize that the municipality has to deal with possible downsides of the project (an industrial complex in the monumental village, increasing heavy transportation, and environmental regulations).

At first glance, sustainability seems a motive for the province and the municipality to participate in this biomass project. Both the municipality and Province have formulated sustainability-targets, on top of the national '2020' goals (see p18). Drenthe is involved in the 'Northern Energy Agreement'<sup>11</sup>, thereby having formulated complementary energy goals besides the overall goals of reducing carbon dioxide emission. With this agreement, Drenthe has stated the ambition to become some sort of 'green province'. The focus within this program has shifted however;

*'The old program was more concerned with reducing CO2 emission but that is more to the background now. We now think it has to have economical spin-off as well. (...) That is the starting point in our energy program. It is a positive side-effect that it leads to CO2 reduction.'* (Respondent 10 Province of Drenthe).

The municipality has stated that the municipality should be 'climate-neutral' in 2040 (Gemeente Noordenveld, 2012, p. 11). This ambition however seems to be not more than a guideline in the eyes of the respondents.

*'Off course sustainability is important. But I think it goes too far to state that this project has to be conducted mainly for saving CO2. Sustainability comes together with projects that are necessary, projects that will be realized anyway'* (respondent 6 environmental department)'.

So both the Province and the municipality have to cope with formal sustainability targets, but these seem not to be form main motives for participating in the Veenhuizen project. The energy-targets are nuanced by these respondents and sustainability is seen as vehicle for other (economical) developments. Motives like economical spin-off of sustainable projects are the motives that make the Province and the municipality truly enthusiastic. It are these motives that are the reason that the Veenhuizen project is supported by these organizations.

*'It would be the best if we can arrange regional economical continuity with this project.'* (Respondent 10 Province of Drenthe)

As for most of the respondents, the province and municipality recognize the importance of the prisons for multiple reasons. The unique characteristics of Veenhuizen give this project extra dimension. Both respondents of the municipality emphasize that maintaining the prisons in Veenhuizen is their main interest, for cultural and economical reasons. The combination of lowering exploitation costs and the social and economical developments in this distinctive historical village could play a part in persuading the state to remain in Veenhuizen.

As the respondent from Drenthe explains;

*'If you must make a consideration about which prisons to close, you must surely take the social functions that prisons have in consideration. I think the step to close the prison in Veenhuizen would be more difficult when doing this, also considering the plans that are there now (= the biomass project). There really is some cultural history, out of which we must generate more national and international spin-off. That will not be directly profitable in sheer financial terms, but from a social point of view it will (for example by recreation).'* (Respondent 10 Province of Drenthe).

The respondents from both organizations (municipality and province) appear to have similar beliefs, but could also play a similar role. Both mention they could act as facilitative actor, exploring possibilities and bringing together different organizations. The role of the municipality that appears in the interviews is comparable of that as described in the Green Deal (supplying information, creating support, judicial cooperation) and possibly by playing a role in the biomass supply.

*'We want to try to lure private organizations to invest (...). That is a new thought about the role of the province, to encourage and to unite.'* (Respondent 10 Province of Drenthe).

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<sup>11</sup> The northern energy agreement (2007) is an agreement between the three Northern Dutch provinces (Drenthe, Friesland, Groningen), the ministry of Economical Affairs and the formerly ministry of Public Housing, Planning and Environment (currently Infrastructure and Environment) that pronounces the ambition for the northern provinces to become a main 'energy region' in Northwest Europe.

The respondents of the municipality have stated that their organizations could act corresponding to what is stated in the green Deal (coordinative role, sharing information and helping with legislation). Also the municipality and Province see a role as some 'network facilitator', in this project and in general. Both participate in the OBV, which is taken into regard as separate actor in this research.

Other roles the Province could play are fulfilled by the Drentse Energie Organisatie. The DEO is an interesting organization in this project. It has signed the Green Deal, and could support the project by granting access to capital. The main goal for the DEO, as it is described in their articles of association, is to '*contribute to the realization of the energy transition and the goals of the province of Drenthe*'<sup>12</sup>.

As for all respondents, also the respondent from the DEO argues that the project must be cost-effective or even profitable. However, social benefits can play a role. When the DEO is having to choose between alternatives in which to invest, social benefits will be taken into regard. The biomass project in Veenhuizen is in line with the main goals and sub-goals of the DEO, sustainability regional and economical development.

*'We as Drentse Energy Organization think sustainability is very important. On the other side, the economical opportunities that are present and the social aspects that are in the Veenhuizen project are at least as important.'* (Respondent 1 DEO)

The respondent is ambitious about this project, by claiming that when this project is realized it could be executed on a broader scale (for example by involving other energy-consumers in Veenhuizen). The respondent is clearly aiming to look further than this single project, which is in line with the energy ambitions of the province of Drenthe. The DEO is potentially willing to participate in the project. It has signed the Green Deal and could play a role when a private company is willing to realize the project and the exploitation of a biomass installation. One important remark must be made, the DEO is only allowed to finance projects of the private sector. When a private company gets the order to exploit a biomass installation, DEO can play a supportive role.

The interview and (to lesser extend) the questionnaire both show that the respondent of the DEO has similar beliefs concerning the Veenhuizen biomass project as those in coalition A.

### 5.2.3 PI Veenhuizen

The respondent from the penitentiary institution Veenhuizen seems to have comparable beliefs to the four mentioned respondents from coalition A on two of the three dimensions. The question whether or not this respondent could be considered as part of coalition A will be answered using the information from the interview.

The PI has already been involved in preliminary stages of the project. This PI does not have formal policies concerning such individual projects, it are the personal beliefs and capabilities of the staff that decide the willingness to participate. It is off course also the desire of the PI to remain in Veenhuizen, maybe in a different form (concentrated in Norgervhaven). Several other respondents emphasize the role of the PI (the director) to be drivers of the project, with informal influence.

The respondent acknowledges its important role for the region, both economical and cultural. *'We hope to become World heritage, we have been a self-supplying organization in the past. This could be a nice concept, to maximize the use of the possibilities of the surroundings.'* (Respondent 9 PI Veenhuizen)

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<sup>12</sup> Articles of Association Drentse Energie Organisatie article 2.1.

The future of the prisons in Veenhuizen is threatened by the cutback from the ministry of Justice and Safety. The respondent of the PI emphasized that their energy bills exceed one million Euro every year. The proposed biomass plans are ought to decrease the energy costs. This is also a reason for their support of the business case in order to find out what the effects are.

The respondent also spoke about his view on sustainability. It is not so much the case that the PI has to live up to certain climate goals, but the respondent has an intrinsic (personal) positive attitude towards sustainability. One remarkable outcome of the questionnaire is that this respondent is the only one to score '5' (totally agree) on '*Sustainability is the most important motive to support this project*'.

This intrinsic positive view on sustainability is not shared by the most respondents, most see sustainability as a policy goal or as carrier of positive exposure.

The respondent about their strive for sustainability:

*'They (=RGD) have the task, and we from Veenhuizen think that because of sustainability we should participate. It fits the culture and backgrounds of Veenhuizen. It used to be self-supplying, so it fits the old cultural philosophy.'* (Respondent 9 PI Veenhuizen)

The respondent also did emphasize the role the market should play, the government is not necessarily responsible for investing and taking risks in this project. All others recognize this choice as being a part of the business case, which must include division of roles and tasks.

*'What I mean is that the energy supplier could also cooperate with farmers, so we must look broader. Let the market do as many as possible. Why should the government want to interfere?'* (Respondent 9 PI Veenhuizen)

The PI as organization does not have the authority to make decisions in this project by itself. Despite this, the respondent of the PI has made it clear that they are in favor to investigate the options in this project and has committed itself to support the initiative. Despite some different accents, the beliefs seems to be congruent to the other here mentioned organizations. The role the PI plays could be complementary to the roles of the others in this coalition, these organizations have coordinated actions before with the PI. Their actions could add up and all are needed to realize their individual goals in this project, making the interdependencies *sympiotic*. Based upon this, further coordination is to be expected.

### 5.2.3 Suppliers

The two major nature protection organizations in the region of Veenhuizen are Natuurmonumenten and Staatsbosbeheer, with fast areas of nature and scenery in and around Veenhuizen. Both organizations have been involved in exploring the project, for example at the seminar in May 2012. Biomass trade is a significant and growing activity for both organizations, the way this is organized and the motives behind it appear to differ greatly.

The annual report of Natuurmonumenten in 2011 (Natuurmonumenten, 2011) presents some interesting new guidelines. Natuurmonumenten wants to 'upgrade' their image as independent and as responsible nature conservers, and want to find ways to increase their income. The project in Veenhuizen could help to support these ambitions, by selling biomass waste to a local and 'green' initiative. Also Staatsbosbeheer has official goals considering the use of biomass waste as a source of income (Staatsbosbeheer, 2013). The focus on using biomass as source of income has developed in the past years. This is said to be partially caused by an increasing focus in public opinion and in official policies on sustainability and (especially in the past few years) to large cutbacks from the government.

The idea of using 'waste' to make profits is for Staatsbosbeheer daily practice, the biomass trade is already professional business for Staatsbosbeheer (on a larger scale then it is for Natuurmonumenten).

The biomass trade of Staatsbosbeheer has a positive gain of 2 million Euro in 2011 and expected growth in the years to come (Staatsbosbeheer, 2012). The respondent, working at the biomass-trade department, states that the gains from biomass trade could (and have to) grow significantly. Especially in current times of austerity, the aim to maximize profits is ever more important. The respondent doesn't see this as 'new', but as reinventing old ideas since all forests in the Netherlands were once planted with goals of wood production. In the past 30 years this idea has moved to the background. Harvesting trees for production is therefore not much accepted by the public. Like the respondent from Natuurmonumenten, this respondent stresses that environmental preservation is the reason for harvesting, not the other way around. Yet the way this preservation takes place and the way biomass is dealt with is different. Staatsbosbeheer acts like a private company, trading biomass even outside the Dutch borders. The revenue is said to be the only condition in delivering biomass.

*'I couldn't explain it when I would give my material to Veenhuizen under the market price, when I can deliver it somewhere else for a higher price. It is taxpayer's money that I'm throwing away then.'* (Respondent 12 Staatsbosbeheer).

The biomass trade is for Natuurmonumenten not as 'professional' as for Staatsbosbeheer, however Natuurmonumenten is seeking ways to increase their revenues in the biomass trade. Natuurmonumenten sees this project also as a way to gain experience in the biomass trade, and to learn from it. Natuurmonumenten has not much experience in this trade, and (as stated before) is willing to increase its role in the biomass trade.

When looking at the Veenhuizen project however, the motives whether or not to participate differ from Staatsbosbeheer. The main reason Natuurmonumenten is willing to participate in this project is the positive image this project can create, the use of biomass as income seems to be on the second place. Illustrative for this is that the respondent disagrees on the statement;  
*'Public organizations that possesses biomass should sell this biomass to the highest bidder.'*<sup>13</sup>

Natuurmonumenten wants to show concrete examples of entrepreneurship towards their members and towards a broader public. If the alternative in Veenhuizen would be not the most profitable, it still might be the preferred option for its 'visibility' to the public.

*'Five years ago it (= managing the biomass 'waste') was a huge expense, by participating now in such a project is might still be an expense but it might also be good for our image and exposure. On this way, it could also be profitable. This is one way to approach it, this is how I would want to approach it.'*

(...)

*'Veenhuizen is a case that can hardly be expressed in money, but we pronounce that we want to be part of it.'* (Respondent 5 Natuurmonumenten).

These different attitudes have implications for the original ambition of the project, to form a 'local biomass chain'. Staatsbosbeheer is willing to deliver, but has arranged their biomass trade on a national scale, whereas the local idea could for Natuurmonumenten be a reason to participate.

*'The fact is that with such projects people tend to force themselves to stick to a certain radius out of which the biomass should come from. That is, logically thinking, just nuts. One draws a line on the map and says that it should be organized within that area. It is not dependent on a circle on the map, it is dependent on a lot more things.'* (Respondent 12 Staatsbosbeheer).

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<sup>13</sup> Natuurmonumenten is in this question considered as 'public' by the respondent

The respondent from Staatsbosbeheer acknowledges that this project could be important, by claiming that Staatsbosbeheer has interest in the development of a biomass sector. This project could help to gain knowledge and experience and increasing the market. When asked what role the social benefits and regional development could be, the respondent reacted:

*'The key in this is that they (= advocates of the 'local focus' in Veenhuizen) must be willing to do more work, to think differently and to work differently. It can not mean that they will deliver biomass for a lower price. That cannot be continued on a long term. (Respondent 12 Staatsbosbeheer).*

These two interviews show how exogenous variables can influence beliefs. Current times of austerity and the growing attention for sustainability in the past decade lead to new ways to look at 'green waste'. Since this waste is ever more regarded as a resource, a new way to look at preservation of nature emerges. Do these organizations have to protect and preserve nature, or can nature also be exploited for commercial benefits? The motives and the organization of the biomass trade is very different for these two organizations different, as appeared in the interviews. The basic idea is the same, namely to only harvest what is suitable within the bounds of nature conservation and the biomass trade as complementary to the main policy goals (conserve their grounds). However Staatsbosbeheer has a very different, more commercial approach to it. Natuurmonumenten is lacking behind in this trade, and is aiming to develop their biomass activities. The conditions under which both would be willing to participate differ greatly. The beliefs seem to be divergent. Also there is a potential competitive interdependency, since both could displace each other as supplier. Looking at the framework of Fenger and Klok (2001), potentially a conflict could be expected.

The interviews show that the respondent of Staatsbosbeheer, despite his answers on the questionnaire, does not have beliefs that are congruent to coalition A. The respondent of Natuurmonumenten does show some similar views as those in coalition A.

#### *5.2.4 Conclusion*

The province, the municipality and the DEO have already found each other in their ideas to develop Veenhuizen. Also the PI has coordinated actions and has shown similar beliefs. The biomass project for the prisons can be seen within this idea. The project fits in the larger plans of regional development that have been unfolded in the past decade. It is ought to have regional economical spinoff and national exposure. Profitability is seen as a necessary condition for success, but it is not the reason to participate. They are willing to invest in exploring unknown fields. These organizations however lack the authority and the resources to complete the project. They need the DJI and the RGD for realizing the project. Their ideas differ from the ideas that are dominant in this group. This coalition has coordinated their actions to influence the national (and decisive) governmental institutions. In terms of Fenger & Klok (2001) this cluster can be regarded as a group with *strong coordination*. Beliefs are congruent and interdependencies are symbiotic. Also they have certainly shown a 'non-trivial degree of coordinated activity'.

Staatsbosbeheer has scored similar on the questionnaire, though the interview sketched a different view. The central beliefs that are shared in this coalition are not shared by this respondent. The respondent denies any local view and is not concerned (or, sees it not as his particular task) with secondary developments in Veenhuizen. The respondent of Natuurmonumenten does show a similar view as those in coalition A. However it is too early to really decide whether Natuurmonumenten would be a member of this coalition. The project is not yet in the phase where an exchange of resources (in terms of biomass supply) is taking place. The business case and the realization of the project are yet to be conducted.



### 5.3 National governmental actors

In the next section the remaining respondents will be discussed, the cluster of the three national governmental organizations (DJI, RGD, and Ministry of Internal Affairs). These have similar scores, distinctive from the other respondents. These three have the highest scores on profitability, and relatively low on the other two. The information provided by the respondents in the open interviews tells a similar story, however some differences appear.

The difference between this group and the previous group is that here ‘profitability’ is the starting point of their arguments, instead of the idea itself within the socio-economical setting of Veenhuizen as starting point. These respondents have an attitude of ‘waiting to see what happens’. They are not negative per se, but will not invest much when the risks are yet uncertain.

DJI is, as explained in the previous chapter, the key decisive actor in this project. It is the agency that has to decide on the future of the prisons in Veenhuizen, and the organization to make to call to realize the biomass project or not. The other organizations are needed, but need to follow DJI’s moves.

#### 5.3.1 Dienst Justitiele Inrichtingen (DJI)

DJI has to cope with large cutbacks. The prisons in Veenhuizen are old, inefficient and are situated far from densely populated areas. New prisons could be designed more efficient (meaning less personal per prisoner, more efficient division of space and using less energy). One other important line of argument of this respondent is that he stresses the need to stick to (procurement-) regulations, which seem to be a barrier for the biomass project in his eyes:

*‘It is fine to think about the possibilities in a certain area, but there is the restriction that one has to stick to the public procurement laws. We are, as the ministry of Justice, after all responsible for maintaining the law and regulation so we have to give the right example.’* (Respondent 2 DJI)

This is the starting point of the respondent’s line of thought, clearly bounding DJI’s responsibilities and concerns. The indirect costs for the village and its surroundings when the prisons would be closed are not the responsibility for DJI. These regulations seem to be a possible barrier in this project. The RGD and DGOBR however, nuance this threat somewhat by claiming that there are possibilities also within the current procurement laws<sup>14</sup>.

The original ‘local’ approach of the initiators is not shared by this respondent. The respondent’s personal view is that the government should not use public money for such experimental projects (a deep core belief for the role of the government). Also the respondent argues that it is not the task of the government to promote Veenhuizen. The respondent is clear about what the boundaries of the government’s responsibilities are in his eyes. This is the respondent’s personal view, but it also adds to the attitude of DJI’s only concern is about its own operations.

*‘Also it is not right to take a gamble, a precarious consideration is needed. Even the costs that have been made so far by DLG, the province and the municipality, even for these costs one must be careful.’* (Respondent 2 DJI)

The respondent is not entirely negative, if the business case would show that the project is efficient and profitable the DJI might be in favor. But they seem not willing to conduct the business case themselves.

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<sup>14</sup> There is a dispute to what extent the latitude for arranging this biomass project is within these procurement laws. Some therefore regard the Veenhuizen biomass project as pilot, aiming to find out to what extent these projects are possible

Though the respondent wants the market to take the initiative, when such projects would be profitable 'the market' will find out anyway. It is not up to the government to experiment.

*'One must actually let the market be the market and refrain from steering in it. Staatsbosbeheer really wants the optimal price for its lumber, and DJI has to pay it and we have to invest in an installation. That is not the way it works.'* (Respondent 2 DJI)

This again illustrates DJI as organization that is waiting to see what happens. Not negative per se, but also not very keen to invest in this preliminary stage. DJI is waiting to see what happens, it did not take any initiative so far and still is not without hesitation. Not keen on making investments, because of risks and because of not their role. Market should do it. The prisons are seen as inefficient, DJI is striving to decrease cost and therefore desires more modern facilities

Just like all of the governmental organizations, the DJI has to deal with the national sustainability goals (extrinsic goals, the respondent has no intrinsic focus on sustainability), but the way they try to reach these is by making and renovating the prisons more energy-efficient (insulation etc.). Thus heating an energy-inefficient building like in Veenhuizen doesn't seem logical in the respondent's eyes. This approach is shared by the RGD.

### 5.3.2 Rijksgebouwendienst (RGD)

The waiting attitude of DJI is also to some extent also present at the RGD, this respondent considers the RGD not as a leading organization. The respondent is positive about the project, but this respondent does not see it as his (or the RGD's) particular task. The respondent explained that DJI is the one to decide who and who should invest. The main barrier, in the eyes of this respondent, is the uncertainty about the future of the prisons since the contracts between the RGD and DJI last till 2016. A biomass-installation would need many more years of operation to become affordable.

*'I've heard someone say that the RGD would consume it (=energy from the biomass installation), but we won't. We are a non-profit agency, so therefore we also cannot make losses.'* (Respondent 11 RGD)

The RGD is not likely participate in the biomass chain by own initiative, but is has to participate when the DJI decides to realize the project. The RGD is responsible for the physical adjustments to the building and for the guarantee of continuous energy and heating for the prisons. In the end, the RGD has to give permission for the project. So DJI is dependent on the permission of the RGD, and the RGD is dependent on the decisions DJI will made. The DJI is the decisive actor, RGD cannot decide without DJI on matters of energy or infrastructure that require an investment (and/or higher rent).

In the respondent's eyes, profitability must be a basic condition for such projects in the eyes of the respondent. However respondent does have somewhat more flexible view about this than DJI;

*'The payback-times do change now and then following insight of our management. In principle we do not think that someone should necessarily profit if we can reach another policy goal. If an installation would last for 20 years, the payback-time for the investment could also be 20 years. It is allowed to end at zero. Although there are risks with this, when it doesn't go as planned. A business case doesn't necessarily have to be profitable, by the way it is up to DJI and the PI here, but it has to be affordable within the contract period. That is the bottleneck.'* (Respondent 11 RGD)

The RGD however is responsible for the quality of the buildings, including the energy-efficiency of the buildings. Because of this the RGD is actually working on reaching the climate goals. This however is not done by various clean-energy projects (biomass, solar power etc.) but 'simply' by improving buildings and energy systems in buildings so that energy is used more efficient. With clever renovations, it is expected the sustainability goals will be reached to large extend. This is also in line with previous comment of the respondent of DJI.

Sustainability does play a role for the RGD, because of the national sustainability guidelines. However, the actual reductions do not 'belong' to the RGD;<sup>15</sup>

*'The RGD does not use the energy, the climate-goals are thus not our goals. We give advices on this topic, but DJI is paying the bills.'* (Respondent 11 RGD)

### 5.3.3 Ministry of internal affairs, Directorate-General OBR

This Directorate-General concerned with organization and operations of the state. The department the respondent works for is aimed at facility management, housing and procurement policies. In the national sustainable energy-policy ('the 2020 agenda') there is a special emphasis on the role of this DG. This department has the role to invite ministries, state services, other governments and external organizations to announce their energy ambitions. Besides this, DGOBR must help ministries and State services by uniting relevant governmental and non-governmental actors. Also DGOBR must take lead in conducting a business cases and in preparing decision making.

The statements show a clear focus on profitability, comparable with DJI (both score 29). In the interview however, this score is somewhat nuanced. Profitability is seen as precondition, necessary for any similar project to succeed. Yet, the motives behind participating in this project are broader. Whereas for example DJI is only concerned about the profitability for their own organization, the DG OBR has (and must have because of its task) eyes for a broader picture.

*'We clearly emphasize – affordable*  
*- reliable*  
*- clean*

*Affordable come first, otherwise you can't speak of a sustainable business model. Although I can imagine that some small funds are needed for development and for realizing the project. Also 'clean' is important, otherwise it won't be sustainable. Reliability means that the energy supply is guaranteed which can also be expressed financially (what does it cost to use help generators for energy assurance?).'* (Respondent 4 ministry of Internal Affairs)

The respondent is not without criticism, which is supported by some others (for example Staatsbosbeheer and DJI). The project does however fit the ideas of the respondent.

*'Our approach is from large to small. We start with the general question 'what do we want?' Well, we want cheaper, clean and reliable energy. Then it is time to think about a concrete project. We have the impression that in Veenhuizen it was the other way around, it has started with the idea of a concrete project. A view from supply to demand, like 'we think we can offer biomass, where is the demand and can we make a business case?'* (Respondent 4 ministry of Internal Affairs)

The respondent emphasizes his preference for sustainable energy, but states that in order for a project to be sustainable it has to be affordable. The respondent does however not have clear measurements when something should be considered as 'affordable'. This nuances the high score on the profitability dimension somewhat.

*'It is the total image. If it would be very complex and the cost reduction is small we should maybe not do it. Or we actually might want to, if we can learn from it or if the sustainability and reliability are significantly improved.'* (Respondent 4 ministry of Internal Affairs)

The local approach can be seen back (the respondent states that DGOBR prefers local energy chains) yet this 'local focus' does not seem to be to promote or develop Veenhuizen, but because of the idea that 'local' assures 'sustainable and reliable'.

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<sup>15</sup> Also the respondent, like many others, states that the consequences of not reaching the 2020 goals are unknown.

#### 5.3.4 conclusion

The starting point of thought for these respondents is different as for the respondents from the regional organizations. These three respondents did not take initiative but have been involved later (about when the seminar on 22th may was held). This illustrates that the original aim (from the local Veenhuizen developments) is logically not shared.

When comparing the outline with the framework of Fenger and Klok (2001), all three show a somewhat 'indifferent' attitude, not very keen in taking action or to invest in a preliminary stage. Because of this, it is doubtful whether to call this group a 'coalition', because of belief indifference and independency (not dependent on whether this project succeeds or not). Also these three have not shown real coordinated activity. However, at the seminar commitment is declared. Also in the Green Deal, certain commitments of the national government have been granted. This 'indifference' is not a barrier per se, the ones that are in favor of the project could be able to convince these. This has already happened to some extent (policy oriented learning).

### 5.5 Policy Brokers

In this section DLG and OBV are central. DLG and OBV have used their resources to facilitate the formation of a network of different organizations. They have made contacts with the national governmental institutions and have facilitated several meetings. DLG and OBV do not have formal authority in this biomass project, it cannot make formal decisions. Despite this, they have used their means to invest in this yet uncertain project. As Ingold & Varone (2011) assume, this role cannot be without self-interest in the project. The interviews illustrate this. Hence this section deals with the question, to what extent can these be considered as policy *brokers* or as policy *entrepreneurs*?

#### 5.5.1 DLG

The respondent from DLG scores most extreme on all dimensions in the questionnaire with high scores on sustainability and regional development, and a low score on profitability. This respondent clearly focuses on the broad picture of this project, the biomass project as part of broader developments concerning sustainability and the development of Veenhuizen. He argues that the broad story of Veenhuizen as sustainable prison-village could contribute to the project. The respondent argues that the opportunities in this unique project in itself is reason enough to proceed with the project. He further argues that realizing this project is the only way to really gain experiences in this innovative field.

This respondent has been involved from the very first steps of the project up until the signing of the Green Deal. This Green Deal (and the process of request) is the document that assures the Ministry of Economical Affairs to grant manpower from DLG to this project.

DLG has played a large role in the project so far, with conducting the first feasibility studies and with helping the OBV with organizing the first meetings with other actors. The respondent recognizes this role and admits DLG has functioned well as 'starter', claiming that now it would be time of others to take over the initiative. DLG laid contacts and helped bringing together between various layers of government. Besides the clear personal affection with this project, the respondent sees the importance of this project for DLG as a whole. The biomass a new playing field for DLG, when this project turns out to be a success it would mean positive exposure for DLG. The role DLG has played in this project is exactly the role that DLG is aiming to play in this the new terrain of biomass. DLG wants to become an authority as facilitator of biomass projects. Such biomass-projects often require combined forces of private and public sector. DLG sees this niche as bridge between the public and the private sector as opportunity to develop its organization. For this, the respondent acknowledges that a success in this project is also in the self-interest for DLG.

DLG is not the only organizations to have the capabilities to facilitate the network (despite some resources mentioned in the previous chapter ). Other respondents have noticed that DLG is searching for a new role for their organization, and more specific that DLG is trying to position themselves in the biomass debate. As has appeared before, other organizations have stated to be willing or to be able to play a similar role as 'bridge between actors'.

The value of this project for DLG is evident. The exposure from the remarkable features of this project would be welcome for DLG in its attempts to position itself on the biomass terrain. As Sabatier describes, a policy broker is an intermediary organization between opposing coalitions trying to reach stability. This respondent sees this project as being a 'success' when a biomass installation is realized. Thus, DLG is not aimed at 'avoiding conflict' and 'reaching compromises' but aimed at moving organizations in order to establish a certain 'policy change'. DLG needs a success exploit the image of a network facilitator in biomass networks. The beliefs as appeared from both the questionnaire and the interview show that this respondent is to high extend in favor of the biomass project. This attitude corresponds with the attitude of the described members of coalition A.

### 5.5.2 OBV

The main motives for the OBV seem to be clear, since it is a bureau aimed at enhancing economical and cultural developments Veenhuizen and improve the exposure of Veenhuizen. In their 'vision on Veenhuizen' (Ontwikkelbureau Veenhuizen, 2011, p. 57) the OBV has posed several ambitions. Some are relevant in this project, namely;

- To maintain current employment and create new employment
- To attract suitable industries
- To keep and maintain the structure and character of Veenhuizen

In the questionnaire however, the OBV is scoring relatively low on the dimension of regional development. This can be explained by the scores on the statements that compare regional development with profitability, the respondent clearly sees profitability as precondition for the project (scoring low on regional development when compared to profitability). This is somewhat in contradiction with other statements, for example *'only financial motives have to play a role'*, and *'social benefits can compensate a negative financial result'* (respondent agrees on both). On the statement *'socio-economic effects on the region Veenhuizen have to be leading in decision making'*, the respondent agrees (score 4). So the scores are average and for the local dimension low, the interview gives other insight in the respondent's beliefs.

These, at first sight, discrepancies can be explained by the respondent's solid attitude that profitability is the precondition, while other advantages can help persuading organizations. *'Something that is not profitable should not be started. That is the experience from other projects here. We once had persuaded an organization too fast, when it then can't continue in the end it hurts a lot.'* (Respondent 8 OBV)

The first attempts of the OBV in this project is to combine the (apparently abundant) biomass in the surroundings with a local consumer were a few years ago. After a while, the OBV (with means of the province of Drente) hired DLG to calculate a business case for biomass for two of the prisons. This was initiated because of the obvious supply of biomass, and with the idea of Veenhuizen as a self-supplying colony as it used to be.

The main interests of the OBV, as appears in the interview, are in the promotion and development of Veenhuizen. These developments include the tourist sector (museum, monuments), cultural developments and supporting (small-) entrepreneurs and to develop the brand 'Veenhuizen'. The presence of the prisons is considered to be important (vital) for many reasons.

This has several reasons according to the respondent, employment, image and for tourists to actually see history combined with modern prisons.

*'It is about securing the presence of Justice here. The three prisons are very important (...).It helps when you can bring certain developments about.'*

*'The national government has invested, apart from the prisons, about 60 million here (=Veenhuizen) in the last decade. I think the fact that there were still 3 prisons here has helped enormously. There have been large investments, and that makes it for the government harder to say that they are leaving here. (...) It is an interaction, which has to be maintained. My argument therefore is that we need to remain taking steps. It has to remain dynamical, this will bind Justice and the government to undertake activities here. (respondent 8 OBV) '*

The local approach is also seen back in the respondents strive to find local biomass supply, thereby mentioning Staatsbosbeheer, Natuurmonumenten and the municipality as possible suppliers. His ambition is to let 'the market' arrange everything that is 'outside the prison fences' (the logistic organization etc.). Sustainability in itself is not an important motive for this respondent.

### 5.5.3 Conclusion

Both DLG and the OBV have played a role as 'intermediaries' in the field of the biomass project. DLG and OBV as intermediaries have proven their importance. Both have actively acted in bringing together different organizations. All respondents have had contact with both actors. Especially the 'national actors' (DJI, RGD etc) have stated that their involvement started on invitation of DLG. Sabatier described policy brokers as intermediaries in a policy subsystem.

A *policy broker* is described as intermediary between different coalitions aimed at decreasing conflict and reaching compromises. Ingold and Varone (2011) add that policy brokers are independent from any coalition, but necessarily must see some self-interest at stake.

A *policy entrepreneur* is also aimed at bringing together different organizations. However policy entrepreneur is a advocate of policy change and therefore policy entrepreneur is not necessarily independent from a coalition. Its aim is not at decreasing conflict per se, its aim is in moving others towards the direction of policy change.

DLG is in a transition, finding a new role. Biomass is a new and upcoming market in which DLG sees a niche for itself to act as a bridge between national and regional governments, or between public and private actors. The Veenhuizen biomass project could help DLG with developing this new task. When this project is realized DLG can use this as successful example of their new role. The interest of the OBV is in developing Veenhuizen. This project could well fit the goal of developing the region, by enhancing economical developments and binding the prisons in their environment. Also the project could contribute to the image of Veenhuizen.

Both have clear self-interests in the biomass project. Both are real advocates of policy change, and are actively trying to move others towards this goal. These respondents cannot be considered as independent from a coalition. Therefore DLG and the OBV could be considered more as *policy entrepreneur* than as *policy broker*.

Other respondents however have stated their desire to fulfill similar roles (for example the Province of Drenthe and Ministry of Internal Affairs). This can be seen as consequence of the described changing role of government towards network governance (which requires a more mediating role of governments). This does stress the need for DLG to claim a position in the biomass market.

## 5.6 Conclusion

This analysis shows that the beliefs as presented in this chapter differ on various topics between the respondents. The first thing to notice concerns the focus of all respondents. The initial idea was to map beliefs concerning *biomass* and sustainability. It turned out that this biomass project is for many a vehicle for other underlying broader motives. When trying to find belief systems in this biomass project, it was necessary to have a broader scope.

The three dimensions that have been formulated for the quantitative analysis were formulated before conducting the interviews. These dimensions appear to correspond on general with the main motives found in the interviews. Also the respondent's scores on the questionnaire are to large extend similar to what is said in the interviews. The only exception is the respondent of Staatsbosbeheer.

Two remarks concerning the three dimensions are interesting. Sustainability appears to be mainly an 'extrinsic' motive, caused by obligatory sustainability targets. Further, every respondent claims that a project has to be 'profitable' for the government to invest in. The definitions (if any clear definition has been given) of what 'profitable' actually means differ.

Two clusters of respondents are identified, based upon the questionnaire and the interviews. One (coalition A) consists of the municipality, the province, DEO and the PI itself. The project fits in the larger plans of regional development that have been unfolded in the past decade. Profitability is seen as a necessary condition for success, but it is not the core-reason to participate. congruent and symbiotic. These organizations however lack the authority and the resources to complete the project. They need DJI and RGD for realizing the project. Their ideas differ from the ideas that are dominant in this group. This coalition has coordinated their actions to influence the national (and decisive) governmental institutions. In terms of Fenger & Klok (2001) this cluster can be regarded as a group with *strong coordination*. Beliefs are congruent and interdependencies are symbiotic. Also these have shown coordinated activities.

The 'national' respondents did not take initiative but have been involved later (about when the seminar on 22th may was held). When comparing to the framework of Fenger and Klok (2001), all three show a somewhat 'indifferent' attitude, not very keen in taking action or to invest in an uncertain project. For this, it is doubtful whether to call this group a 'coalition', because of belief indifference and independency (these organizations are in their goals not dependent on whether this project succeeds or not). Also these have shown little or no coordinated activities. They could participate in future steps of the project, but only when facing certain conditions (and with a positive business case).

DLG and OBV have acted as facilitators of meetings and helped bringing together different actors. They have invested resources without having direct authority in the project. Both have their motives to do so. DLG is trying to take a position in the emerging biomass debate, and the OBV's concern lies with developing the Veenhuizen area and maintaining the prison. Both can be regarded as policy *entrepreneurs*.

Conflict could potentially arise between suppliers, when they would be competing to maximize their role as suppliers. Their conditions and ideas differ greatly. Natuurmonumenten appears to have congruent beliefs as those in coalition A, Staatsbosbeheer is more indifferent.

## 6. Conclusion en discussion

This project is an example of the 'network shift of governance', where governments are aiming to find collaborations with various organizations. The Veenhuizen biomass project is, when conducting this research, in a preliminary stage. The decisions whether to realize the ambition or not was not taken yet. The barriers in realizing the project is not a technological issues, rather it is an issue of connecting the dots. The step is to form a network, finding collaboration through a positive sum game.

This research is aimed at mapping the field of actors and mapping the network behavior in the Veenhuizen biomass project. With this, an exploration of expected coalition behavior is sketched. The main question in this research is;

What are the prospects of coalition behavior in the case 'Green energy for the prisons in Veenhuizen', when considering belief systems and interdependencies as determinants of coalition behavior?

The Advocacy Coalition Framework is a framework that describes policy change as result of interactions between coalitions in a policy subsystem. Policy beliefs are considered the glue between coalitions, coordination between actors increases when beliefs are congruent. In this case the a subsystem consists of local, regional and national actors. Different actors with different beliefs have met each other. These interactions have led to policy learning in practice. Because of the interactions, actors were forced to take standpoints on entire new topics. The ACF has proven to be a useful framework for research in this case. Several elements like a policy subsystem with advocacy coalitions, and interactions that lead to policy oriented learning (and a gradual shift of beliefs) can be seen in the Veenhuizen project. Also the framework of Fenger & Klok (2001), introducing interdependencies as second determinant of coalition behavior, has proven to be very useful.

The quantitative and the qualitative data-collection methods have strengthen each other. The combination of the research methods has contributed to a complete and extensive image. This triangulation was especially aimed for analysis of belief systems. The three dimensions that were formulated in the questionnaire appear also in the interviews as the main motives. Also the scores are to large extend similar, with the exception of one respondent.

The actors that have been involved so far in this biomass project could all contribute to a successful realization of the project. In terms of the framework of Fenger & Klok, the interdependencies can be considered to be highly *symbiotic*. All are dependent on each other's actions, the input of all actors can add to each other, and do not interfere with others. The central decisive actor is DJI, the agency of the ministry of Safety and Justice that controls Dutch custodial system, followed by the RGD. DJI has to decide upon the future of the prisons, and has to make a decision on realizing (thus investing) the biomass project. The roles that the other actors could play is dependent on the course of the project, the contents of the business case and steps that follow. The Municipality and province are needed for regulations, but have no (or little) physical resources to influence decision making. The Drentse Energy Organization could play a role in financing the project when a private company is willing to realize and exploit the installation. Though, the regional and local actors have contributed in the preliminary stages of the project. This bottom-up approach caused the project to be discussed in all layers of government.



The first thing to notice when speaking about 'beliefs' is that the interests and beliefs in this project are divided on a much broader range than 'biomass' or 'sustainability'. Sustainability is the cause of the project (and the Green Deal), the underlying motives are broader than that. The development of the region, the uncertain future of the prisons and the positioning of the organizations in the emerging market of biomass all have their influence on the respondents. In this project, a gradual shift in beliefs can be seen due to exogenous variables. For example changes in policies (sustainability targets have started in current shape last years), political decisions and economical conditions have influenced the development (and origins) of the biomass project. The Green Deal certainly helped bringing actors together (and it has forced some to be involved). These variables have mainly influences on secondary aspects of belief systems. It influences specific policy choices and the availability of policy instrument. The effects on policy core beliefs are more rigid, but can be.

With the quantitative analysis, two broad clusters of actors have been distinguished. The national governmental actors are more or less indifferent towards the project. They all are not against it, when facing certain conditions, but did not take initiative (and are on short term not likely to take initiative). Due to the belief indifferent and a large extend of resource independency 'no coordination' is to be expected. The reason that they are involved is because of the bottom-up approach of the initiators. The beliefs of the organizations in this cluster are not divergent but rather indifferent. When facing certain conditions, these organizations could well play an important role in the project. This would be dependent upon political decisions on the future of the prisons and a positive business case.

The second cluster consists of both respondents of the Municipality Noordenveld, the Province of Drenthe, The DEO and the Penitentiary Institution Veenhuizen itself. These are in favor of the project and have participated in the early stages of forming a network. The underlying motives differ, but all acknowledge the broader picture of the prisons within social-economic development of the Veenhuizen area. Considering the framework of Fenger and Klok (2001), strong coordination is to be expected. All are potential collaborators (Kim&Roh 2008), whether they would or could take collective action is dependent on the course of the project (and thus, on the choices of other actors).

A special role is for *policy brokers*, mediators between opposite coalitions. These have used their resources to try to bring various actors together, and being a bridge between regional and national actors. The assumption of Ingold and Varone (2011) that policy brokers must act out of self-interest on topics that are close to their deep core beliefs, is met in this case. The position of DLG and the OBV, and the way they have operated, has more similarities with the concept of *policy entrepreneurs*. Both are real advocates of policy change. The project has been set in motion, the role for these policy entrepreneurs seems to be finite. They have proven their value in the preliminary stages of bringing together organizations.

Without the assumption that the prisons will be open for long term, no further coalition is to be expected. Assuming that the prisons will remain in Veenhuizen in one way or another (a likely scenario), further coordination is to be expected. The first step that need to be undertaken is conducting a business case. When the outcomes and conditions seem favorable, all organizations could well be in favor of further realizing the project. The discussion will then shift to more detailed and practical questions. Conflict could potentially arise between suppliers, when they would be competing to maximize their role as suppliers.

## Discussion

This research has been an explorative research, trying to find prospects for future events by mapping current and past actions and positions of relevant actors, as part of broader interest of DLG.

For this interview interviews with representatives of organizations have been conducted. Here is always the threat of mixing personal with organizational standpoints (especially when aiming to map 'beliefs'). Using a mixed-methods design could limit this threat. Because of this triangulation (qualitative, quantitative, literature/documents) the explanatory power of this research is increased. The current state of affairs is thoroughly mapped, yet caution is always needed when trying to formulate expectations for the future.

The beliefs and interests vary more than expected, exceeding more than sheer topics on 'sustainability' or 'biomass'. This project is set in a political environment, with underlying discussion on the future of Veenhuizen. The saving goals of the Ministry of Justice actually became clear during this project. The exact way these savings will take place is yet uncertain, which makes the future of the existence of the prisons in Veenhuizen also unsure. This discussion makes some elements of the project sensitive. Especially those who are closely concerned with the future of the prisons of Veenhuizen could have been refrained from giving insight in sensitive information. Also, though the project is going and the Green Deal is signed, the exact way the biomass project has to take shape is yet uncertain.

Basic questions like the type of biomass technique and the role of private companies in realizing and exploiting the project are yet to be determined in a business case. This creates the uncertainty and possible reserved attitudes towards speaking about positions in the project. Also the internship at DLG could have been to some extent a barrier during the interviews. It helped making contact with the respondents, hence DLG is also an actor in the project. DLG did play (and will play) a certain role, and thus has some relation to the project and the other actors.

The emerging field of biomass production in Dutch landscape is an interesting source for further research. Other projects with innovative ways of looking at 'waste' and 'landscape' have been started. It would be very interesting to look at this project in a later time, or to look at projects that have been finished to compare the process with the way this project has developed. Also the instrument of the Green Deal could provide very interesting topics for further research. The first series of Green Deals is not yet completed. It would be interesting to look at results of these projects when realized and to search for the effects the Green Deal has had.

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## Appendix A.

### Questionnaire

1.	Energie uit biomassa zoals bedoeld in dit project is niet vanzelfsprekend aan te merken als zijnde 'duurzaam'.				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
2.	Als de markt dit initiatief niet oppikt en overneemt kan het project niet slagen.				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
3.	Eventuele maatschappelijke baten kunnen een negatief financieel resultaat niet compenseren.				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
4.	Dit project draagt bij aan een duurzamere bedrijfsvoering van de overheid				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
5.	De terugverdientijd van de nodige investeringen moet het belangrijkste criterium in de besluitvorming zijn.				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
6.	De markt moet de regie in dit project op zich nemen, overheid moet hoogstens een ondersteunende rol spelen.				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
7.	Het is niet de verantwoordelijkheid van mijn organisatie om dit project te realiseren				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
8.	De overheid moet het initiatief voor dit project op zich nemen, omdat dit project het gebruik van duurzame energie stimuleert.				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
9.	Het motief duurzaamheid is het belangrijkste motief om dit project te steunen				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
10.	Enkel financiële motieven moeten een rol spelen in de besluitvorming rondom dit project.				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens
11.	Als het project zonder subsidie niet kan slagen moeten we er niet aan beginnen.				
	1. Zeer mee oneens.	2. Mee oneens.	3. Neutraal.	4. Mee eens.	5. Zeer mee eens

12.	Dit project kan bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling en promotie van het dorp Veenhuizen.
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens
13.	Dit project is belangrijk voor mijn organisatie want het draagt bij aan de duurzaamheidsdoelstellingen van mijn organisatie
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens
14.	Het is niet de taak van mijn organisatie om andere partijen over te halen te participeren
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens
15.	Publieke partijen die beschikken over aanbod van biomassa moeten hun biomassa aan de hoogste bieder verkopen.
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens
16.	Ook wanneer het project niet rendabel is moet het doorgang vinden wanneer het bijdraagt aan de ontwikkeling en promotie van de regio Veenhuizen.
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens
17.	De sociaal-economische effecten in de regio Veenhuizen moeten leidend zijn in de besluitvorming.
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens
18.	Dit project kan bijdragen aan een efficiëntere bedrijfsvoering van de overheid.
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens
19.	Het stimuleren van de regionale economie is een motief voor mijn organisatie om deel te nemen aan dit project.
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens
20.	Als dit project niet voltooid wordt heeft het schadelijke gevolgen voor de regio Veenhuizen.
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens
21.	Ook wanneer dit project niet financieel rendabel is moet het doorgang vinden wanneer dit project bijdraagt aan duurzame bedrijfsvoering van de overheid.
	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zeer mee oneens. Mee oneens. Neutraal. Mee eens. Zeer mee eens

## Appendix B.

### Statements per dimension.

#### Sustainability:

Sustainability	
It is self-evident that energy, as meant in this project, can be considered as 'sustainable'.	
This project contributes to a more sustainable management of the government.	
The government has to take initiative for this project, because this project stimulates the use of sustainable energy.	
This project is important for my organization because it contributes to the sustainability goals of my organization.	
Even when this project will not be profitable it has to be realized since it contributes to a more sustainable management of the government.	
Cronbach's Alpha	,744

The Cronbachs alpha of these statements combined is .744 which can be considered as reasonably good, especially when considering the low N (N=12).

One statement is rejected because it harms the Cronbachs Alfa (.68 instead of .744);  
*'The motive sustainability is the most important motive to support this project'.*



## Profitability

Profitability	
Possible social benefits can't compensate a financial negative result.	
The pay-back time of the needed investments should be the most important criterion in the decision making.	
Only Financial motives should play a role in the decision making in this project.	
Public organizations that possesses biomass should sell this biomass to the highest bidder.	
This project can contribute to a more efficient management of the government.	
Also when this project is not profitable it has to continue for it contributes to regional developments and promotion of Veenhuizen <sup>16</sup>	
Also when this project is not profitable it has to continue for it contributes to a sustainable management government. <sup>17</sup>	
Cronbach's Alpha	,733

## Regional development

Regional Development	
This project can contribute to the development and promotion of the village Veenhuizen.	
The social-economical effects for the region Veenhuizen have to be leading in the decision making.	
Stimulating regional economy is a motive for my organization to participate in this project.	
When this project will not be developed it can be harmful for the region Veenhuizen	
Also when this project is not profitable it has to continue for it contributes to the development and promotion of the region Veenhuizen.	
Cronbach's Alpha	,762

<sup>16</sup>The scores on this statement are reversed in the analysis

<sup>17</sup> The scores on this statement are reversed in the analysis

## Appendix C.

### Interviewprotocol.

How and when has your organization first been involved in this project?

Which role has your organization played so far? (check with personal observations)

What is your impression of the project?

What are the core tasks and main goals of your organization as a whole?

How does that relate to this project?

What are your goals/targets in this project? Why are you involved?

When would you regard this project as a 'success'?

Which conditions are necessary for this project to succeed?

What does the term 'profitability' mean to you?

What do you expect on the further course of the project?

How can your organization contribute in realizing this project?

And later, when this project has been realized?

Which resources can your organization contribute?

What would be the desired role of 'the market' (private organizations) in this project?

To what extent is the 'local' approach important?

How do you see the role of your organization in developing Veenhuizen?

Can this project contribute to development of Veenhuizen?

Which organizations are necessary in the realization of the project (and why)?

Which organizations necessary in the realization of your specific goals in this project (and why)?

Have you had contact with DLG or the OBV?

What do you desire from DLG and/or the OBV in this project?

*Suppliers:*

First: general information on standpoints biomass trade.

Does your organization deliver biomass from Veenhuizen and surroundings to third parties?

How do you experience competition in the biomass market (local, national)?

What are the conditions under which you are willing to deliver biomass (national, project-specific)?

Would you deliver in this specific project when another (random) demander offers a higher price?