

Bulgarian National Awakening in Europe
The Protest Movement in Sofia 2013

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Abstract

The trend in current academic literature on recent protest movements occurring worldwide is to emphasize the global dimension and common grounds movements that occurred after 2011. In this research I first introduce the concept of recognition struggle to the study of protest movements and argue that protesters struggle to freely express their previously misrecognized, marginalized and oppressed identities against national regimes. Second, I argue that the protest movement in Sofia, summer 2013 expresses a distinctively Bulgaria character in comparison to other European protest movements in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Romania and Turkey. The distinctively Bulgarian character expressed during the protest movement in Sofia is manifested in the combination of a pre-modern identity of Bulgarian folklore, myths and traditions with a modern identity with critique of the allegedly oligarchic and corrupt Oresharski cabinet and a European consciousness. With this line of reasoning I discuss in this research three types of struggle for recognition and argue that the protest movement in Portugal, Spain and Greece are primarily engaged in a struggle for social rights against austerity measures and welfare state cuts. Further, I analyze that movements in Bulgaria and Romania are centered on political rights, struggling against as illegitimately regarded national regimes of corruption and despotism whereas protesters in Turkey struggle against what protesters regard as an authoritarian imposition of an Islamist identity by the Turkish regime.

Keywords: European Protest Movements; Bulgaria; Identity Politics; Recognition Struggle; Bulgarian Identity

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List of Abbreviations

- AKP Turkish 'Justice and Development Party'
- BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party
- DANS Bulgarian National Security Agency
- DPS Bulgarian Party 'Movement for Rights and Freedom'
- EU European Union
- GERB Bulgarian Party 'Citizens for European Development in Bulgaria'
- NPBB Facebook Group '*Национален Протест срещу безобразията в България*'
(National Protest against the Outrageous Conditions in Bulgaria)

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In early 2013 for the first time since 1997 Bulgarians gathered together on the streets of many cities in order to demand change of the political economy and the government itself. After the first protests in early 2013 diminished, a new and even stronger movement developed during the summer, including in its peak over 50, 000 protesters only in Sofia, occupying its street for more than 110 days. Protesters demand the resignation of the current government and the Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski. Only in the year 2013 massive protest movements occurred in Brazil, Turkey, Romania, Armenia but also the Arab Spring since 2011, the Indignados in Spain since 2011, Chilean student protests 2011-2012 or the Occupy movement in over 88 countries and mobilized thousands of individuals worldwide. Hereby individuals come together, occupy public space and squares as Tahrir Square in Istanbul, La Puerta del Sol in Madrid, Independence Square in Sofia and express their grievances against the financial system, the political economy and the politics of the national regimes. Scholars as Estanque, Costa and Soeiro (2013) suggest that the protest movement in Bulgaria is another instance of the global phenomenon of post-'11 movements. The goal of this research is to understand in how far the Bulgarian protest movement is another example of the global phenomenon of movements or is rather an expression of a distinctively Bulgarian character possibly manifested in anti-socialist slogans or the concrete demand of Oresharski's resignation.

The implosion of global capitalism, Langman (2013) states, mobilized people globally in protest movements. Different authors have interpreted the worldwide outburst of such movements in different ways. Estanque, Costa and Soeiro (2013) argue a '*new global cycle of protests*' is occurring since 2011 in which they see materialism, centered on labour and material issues as a consequence of the global financial crisis as a common global dimension. Tejerina, Benski, Langman and Perugorría (2013) see social inequality that results from the global economic crisis at the heart of post-'11 movements. Baumgarten (2013) contradicts that trend and admits that different protest movements have common patterns but emphasizes that the nation state is a fundament that accounts for differences between movements which is coherent with the line of reasoning in this research. Standing (2011) argues that the global economic crisis has created a new social class across nations, namely the 'precariat' that gets deplored of its previous source of identity due to high unemployment or precarious labour conditions. Various scholars as Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos (2013), Estanque et al. (2013) and Tejerina et al. (2013) recognize the 'precariat' as the social basis of post-'11 movements but in this research it is argued that the discussed movements are rather based on other collective identities such as national ones. Jasper and Polletta (2001) emphasize that new protest movements are based on collective identity as an anti-hegemonic discourse and a mean to struggle for their recognition, gain power and transform society. This research aims at understanding the collective identity on which the protest movement in Sofia is based in comparison to the identities expressed in the other protest movements.

In this research it is argued that the protest movements in Bulgaria, Portugal, Spain, Greece Turkey and Romania are engaged in a struggle for recognition of collective identities that are misrecognized by national political elites and global economic elites. Hence, the key motive for political mobilization is to have been abused, dominated, stigmatized or been denied the expression of one's identity and with it human rights. Estanque et al. (2013) and Benski et al. (2013), put a strong emphasis on emotions as a catalyst of post-'11 protest movements in which

emotions such as anxiety and outrage resulting out of structural crisis and a misrecognition of one's identity, mobilize and get transformed within movements to emotions of collective empowerment, joy and enthusiasm via the free expression of one's identity. According to Perugorria and Tejerina (2013) values of 'sharing' and 'being together' are part of the freely expressed identity within protest movements that has been widely misrecognized by national elites. In terms of identity politics, non-recognition or misrecognition is what defines injustice; the struggle for recognition is a struggle for justice, a struggle for being given equal cultural worth against second-class citizenship and against imposed or reified identities. In order to pinpoint in what sort of struggle for recognition the protest movement in Sofia is engaged in and whether it gives expression to a distinctively Bulgarian character, the identity politics of protest movements in Portugal, Greece, Spain, Romania and Turkey are compared to it.

1.2 Research Question

The overall goal of this bachelor thesis is to develop an interpretation of the Bulgarian distinctiveness expressed in the protest movements in Sofia. Hence the main research question: *To what extent does the Bulgarian protest movement in summer 2013 manifest a distinctively Bulgarian identity?* In order to answer the main research question, three sub-questions are created.

1. How did the Bulgarian protest movement in summer 2013 emerge?

This first question aims at giving insight into the struggle of the protest movement in Sofia. The narrative, meaning the collective experience and interpretation of the Bulgarian regime created within the movement is reconstructed. This question includes the research of the cultural expressions of the collective identity of the protest movement.

2. What are the similarities and differences between the protest movement in Bulgarian and the other five European countries?

The aim of the second question is to find similarities but more importantly differences in the identity politics of the protest movement in Bulgaria and the other protest movements in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Romania and Turkey. Hereby narratives, ideals, beliefs, symbols and meanings of the movement's identity expressions and quest for recognition are used to interpret the significance of the identity of the Bulgarian summer movement vis-à-vis other movements. Answering this question allows me to pinpoint what is inherent to the selected movements and what is peculiar about the Bulgarian protest. In order to be able to find similarities and differences a classification of protest movements is made in order to pinpoint the character of the struggle for recognition.

Baumgarten (2013) argues that differences between post-'11 movements occur due to the different national frameworks, referring to social welfare spending or segmentation of civil society. The aim of the third sub-question is to interpret the significance of national identity in the encountered differences between the protest movements in Bulgaria and Portugal, Spain, Greece, Romania and Turkey. The insight of this question helps me to interpret in how far the protest movement in Sofia summer 2013 expressed an autonomous Bulgarian national identity and is hence embedded in the Bulgarian nation state or is another instance of the global phenomenon of protest movements.

3. To what extent is the protest movement in Sofia an expression of a distinctive Bulgarian national identity?

1.3 Approach

In this research I seek to pinpoint the distinctively Bulgarian character expressed in the summer protest movement in Sofia vis-à-vis other protest movements in Europe. Therefore I combine identity politics, in particular the concept of struggle for recognition with recent academic literature on worldwide protest movements. Hereby I interpret and reformulate the current body of academic literature on recent protest movements in terms of struggle for recognition. In the first part of the research I reconstruct the identity politics of the protest movement in Sofia during summer 2013 by applying the logic of Burawoy's extended case method. This method is chosen because it seeks in-depth understanding of a particular social situation, taking the specific cultural, societal and historic context into consideration instead of seeking generalizing patterns. In the second part I then classify the protest movements in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey according to the social, political and cultural dimensions of their struggle for recognition with a focus on expressed identities and values. This classification allows me to pinpoint what is intrinsic to recent protest movements in Europe but also what is peculiar about the protest movement in Bulgaria. In the third and final part, an interpretation of the Bulgarian distinctive character is constructed by discussing the Bulgarian national identity expressed during the protest movement in Sofia summer 2013. The thesis is organized as follows; in the second chapter struggle for recognition of misrecognized identities is being connected to recent academic literature on protest movements in the theoretical framework. In the third chapter the methods with the necessary conceptualization for this research are presented. The distinctiveness of the protest movement in Bulgaria in comparison to the protest movements in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Romania and Turkey is pinpointed and explained via the distinctive Bulgarian national identity in the fourth chapter. In the conclusion the research results and the practical implications for Europe are discussed.

2. Theorizing Contemporary Protest Movements

The aim of this chapter is to combine recent academic literature on post-'11 protest movements with the concept of recognition struggle in order to theorize identity politics of recent movements in Europe. The chapter is organized as follows. First, identity politics and the concept of recognition struggle are introduced. Second, the work of various scholars in the field of recent protest movement is discussed. Hereby it is argued that even though all protest movements have several dimensions of struggles a differentiation between social, political and cultural struggle for recognition can be made in terms of expressed collective identities, demands and represented values. Finally the concept of national identity and post-socialist identity that is barely discussed in protest or new social movement studies is introduced in order to be able to interpret the distinctive Bulgarian character expressed in the protest movement in Sofia. In current academic literature on protest movements after the year 2011, starting with the protest movement in Tunisia and the Arab Spring, the Occupy movements in over 88 countries, the Indignados in Spain, the Outraged in Greece, national mobilizations in Israel, Romania etc. follow there are two streams of theoretical debates. In the first stream scholars emphasize the common global dimensions of such movements and see them as a social phenomenon with common grounds and characteristics. Estanque, Costa and Soeiro recognize a '*new global cycle of protests*' (2013) whereas Tejerina, Perugorría, Banski and Langman (2013) apply the term '*new wave of global mobilizations*'. In the second stream scholars see the nation state as a main factor and of post-'11 movements. Baumgarten (2013) pinpoints that post-'11 movements have similarities with different local expressions that take place in the national framework and are mainly shaped by it. In this chapter, unlike the first stream of thought, it is argued that post-'11 movements take place within the national framework and that national identity manifests the distinctiveness of the protest movement in Bulgaria.

2.1 Identity Politics and Struggle for Recognition

In the early 1990s, Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor provided a re-valuation of Georg Hegel's original concept of recognition struggle which will be used in this research as the fundamental concept in order to interpret the identity politics of protest movements in Europe. Hegel had argued that social and national development are governed by the imperative of mutual recognition, in the sense that one can develop a relation to the self only when one has learned to view oneself from the viewpoint of the other. The struggle for the establishment of social relations of mutual recognition, for Hegel, is a precondition for self-realization which depends on the respect and esteem that one receives from others. According to Taylor (1992, p.26), one becomes capable of self-realization, and hence of recognition, through the acquisition of rich languages of expressing one's identity. From this Hegelian point of view the aim is being given equal cultural worth against imposed or reified identities. As Taylor (1992, p.25) explains: '*The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.*' Thus understood, the struggle for recognition is not only a struggle for having one's cultural distinctness recognized by the other, but also that one's identity is recognized as culturally valuable as equal respect.

Honneth (1995) points out that individuals come to struggle for recognition because they experience disrespect, humiliation or denigration. The key motive for political mobilization, then, it is assumed, is having been abused, dominated, stigmatized or being denied human rights, by the other (Presbey, 2003; Kleist, 2008). Langman (2013) as well as Tejerina et al. (2013) apply Jasper's concept of collective identity in order to explain mobilizations. Structural crisis as such does not create a protest movement but instead the crisis must establish misrecognition of identities and attack common norms, values and beliefs of the masses. Jasper argues that this creates a 'moral shock' that is collectively experienced within a common frame and a common narrative. Langman (2013, p.4) states: *'Identities [...], mediate between structural conditions, e.g., legitimation crises at the level of system, such as political economy and culture, and the interpersonal/individual interpretations and reactions that may lead to crises of identity, culture, and legitimating meanings as people withdraw commitment to the social (dis)order[...].'* According to Jasper and Polletta (2001) people engage in moral protest in order to alter identities imposed and imprinted by the regime and to create a space to collectively express the real 'self', to express the true identity via protest movements (p.285 ff). Hence, mobilizations require a created common narrative based on a collective identity with a clear identification of 'the other' that misrecognizes the common identity. Klandermans and Bernd (2001) theorize a step further than Jasper and Polletta in order to explain political collective action and argue for a 'politicized collective identity', meaning a group of protesters that defines itself in opposition to a political authority. Within the concept of 'politicizes collective identity' Klandermans and Bernd (2001) identify three stages derived from ideal types, namely *'awareness of shared grievances; adversarial attributions; and involvement of society at large, or representatives thereof, as a third party in addition to the immediate out-group or opponent'* (p.329).

2.2. Social Struggle for Recognition

The first type of struggle that can be pinpointed is the social struggle for recognition. Since the publication of Honneth's and Taylor's books, the Hegelian concept has been widely debated. Nancy Fraser (1995) criticized Taylor for shifting the emphasis away from social injustice (to be repaired by social policies and progressive tax) to cultural injustice (to be repaired by identity politics) (Fraser, 1995; Honneth, 1995). She argues that misrecognition not only follows from cultural slights but also from social structures that systematically deny equal opportunities. Fraser seeks to reconceptualise Taylor's concept to include issues of redistribution in recognition struggles. That is, for Fraser, struggles for recognition aim at changing institutionalized patterns that subordinate particular groups, such as minorities, women or gays and lesbians (Zurn, 2003). In contrast with Taylor, Honneth does not ignore problematic issues of social structure, yet, he sees conflicts over redistribution of national or global resources as the outcome of struggles for recognition waged by groups over the degree of cultural worth. Fraser, by contrast, argues that people may well suffer distributive injustice that is not rooted in cultural slights but are caused solely by institutionalized social relations of social subordination (Zurn, 2003; McNay, 2008). And such oppressive structures of misrecognition may well manifest themselves within identity political groups that demand for a purified identity and enforce rigid cultural conformism and loyalty upon their members. Not all struggles for recognition are just or should be complied with. In sum, for Fraser, the challenge is to connect specific identity formations to the often invisible power structures, including hegemonic structures, underlying them (McNay, 2008).

Langman and others identify in Southern Europe as well as in the United States 'occupy social movements', a social struggle for recognition of a 'liberal' identity, within the common frame of social and economic inequalities (Tejerina, Perugorría, Banski, Langman, 2013). Hereby liberal identity refers to Western values of social equality, equality of opportunity, social economy and a welfare state that ensures the social and economic well-being of citizens. Individuals are outraged, mobilize and struggle because their liberal identity is misrecognized by capitalist regimes that impose austerity measures and welfare cuts (Banski, Langman, 2013). It is commonly agreed that the financial meltdown after 2008, the political agenda of global capitalism, acting in favor of the markets and with severe cut backs of the welfare state created a structural crisis with sovereign debt crisis, strict austerity measures and high unemployment (Langman, 2013; Tejerina et al., 2013; Banski et al. 2013; Sotirakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 2013). Langman argues (2013) that 'occupy social movements' bloom out of a legitimacy crisis of the political economy as a social struggle of recognition between the masses, the 99% and the as illegitimately regarded elites of the political economy, the 1% (pp.2). Protesters have identified 'the other', their enemy, according to Tejerina and Perugorría (2013) as '*robber bankers*' and '*corrupt politicians*' (p.431) that are '*arrogant, self-dealing, incompetent, and incapable of remedying the damage they have wrought*' (Gitlin, 2013, p.9). This socioeconomic damage includes privatization of services and resources, polarization of income, mass poverty, mass unemployment and what Standing has named the creation of a new dangerous class- the 'precariat'.

Standing (2011) applies the term 'precariat' to a new class whose members suffer from precarious labour conditions, exploited, forced into living conditions without security or predictability, on the limits of social existence. He argues that the social manifestation of the self and existence do not flow out of the real identity of well-educated students trapped in youth unemployment, a middle class with downward mobility as well as marginalized and criminalized migrants. Following Standing's argument individuals are pushed into a '*false, distorted, and reduced mode of being*' (Taylor, 1992, p.25) and hence the 'precariat' is marked by anger, frustrations, outbursts of violence, loss of trust in 'the other', namely political actors and institutions and hence forms a dangerous class. Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos (2013), Tejerina et al. (2013) as well as Estanque et al. (2013) see the 'precariat' as the major actor in global protest movement. Hence the social struggle of recognition also takes a dimension of struggle of redistribution as Fraser argued. Tejerina et al. (2013) pinpoint the 90's generation and Banski, Langman (2013) young adults (20-35 years), technologically skilled, educated and unemployed as the main actor and catalyst of movements. In contrast, Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos (2013) and Kuymulu (2013) argue for an inter-generational and inter-class nature of 'occupy social movements'. However, it is commonly argued that 'occupy social movements' protest against austerity measures, feeling misrecognized in their social rights and needs by welfare state cuts (Tejerina, Perugorría, 2013). In sum, protesters turn against the identity, ideology and actions of the economic and financial elites that are within the protests narrative presented as guilty for the economic crisis and with it their precarious living conditions and struggle for redistribution and recognition of social rights.

2.3 Political Struggle for Recognition

The second type of struggle identified in this research is the political struggle for recognition. Benski, Langman, Perugorría and Tejerina (2013) argue that another common trend to post-'11 movements, e.g. in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Libya and Syria and other countries which formed the Arab Spring organized primarily in a political struggle for recognition of their democratic identity. This is a political struggle of recognition which implies the free expression of identity and practice of democratic values and political rights such as for example freedom of speech. It is argued that this identity is misrecognized by the anti-democratic national regimes that humiliate, imprison or kill citizens that express their democratic identity, make use of their political rights and for example criticize regime politics. Hence as it is assumed, individuals whose political rights are violated and their identities are misrecognized participate in protest movements in order to struggle for political reforms which would bring the recognition of their democratic identity and values. Hereby 'the other' is identified in the undemocratic and authoritarian regimes (Benski et al., 2013). Protests against undemocratic elites does not only take place in regimes in the Middle East or North Africa. Ben Brucato (2012) argues that the liberal democratic state has failed to include pluralism and to achieve true representation of the people, express the identity of the masses. In contrast to the nation state the Occupy Movement, it is argued, does not only follow an exclusively ideological commitment to direct democracy, expressed in the 'Real Democracy Now!' slogan but instead, it is argued, creates a space to express the protester's democratic identity and to put real democracy into practice in their process, organization and mobilization form (Brucato, 2012; Tejerina, Perugorría, 2013). The stakes and the dimensions of the struggle of political rights are very different; in the Arab Spring protesters struggle for a democracy and fundamental human rights whereas protesters in liberal democracies struggle for the quality of the democracy and social and political rights. Hence in the rest of the research the Arab Spring will not be included in the argument and only movements from European liberal democracies will be discussed.

2.4 Cultural Struggle for Recognition

The third type of struggle is based on the recognition of a cultural identity. Mobilization form of post-'11 movements has typically been horizontal, as Marina Sitrin (2006) argues: *'Horizontalism requires the use of direct democracy versus hierarchy and anti-authoritarian creation rather than reaction. It is a break with vertical ways of top-down organizing and relating, but a break that is also an opening'*(p.45 ff). Post-'11 movements engage also in a cultural struggle for recognition and express this via formulated demands. They are leaderless with decentralized networks, rejecting traditional forms of leadership and acting in a direct, participatory democracy of equals. Due to its horizontalism it has managed to mobilize and socialize people from different age groups and social classes (Benski et al., 2013). Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos (2013) arguing about the Outrageous Movement in Athens, agree with Tejerina and Perrugorría (2013) about the Spanish 15M or in Portugal (Baumgarten, 2013) that all participants could participate in general assemblies where tactics were discussed and decided via open microphone and hand signs in occupied public spaces, mostly squares or parks or online. The occupation of public space in itself is already an act of struggle of recognition, rejecting the capitalist urban planning and the privatization of public spaces (Kuymulu, 2013). However, not only a democratic identity was expressed within post-'11 movements but also a cultural expression of the collective identity took place. Kuymulu argues that authoritarian

claims of the national regimes, for example the increasing Islamist course of Erdogan's regime, were commonly rejected by diverse, including religious, protesters as the regime's misrecognition of a contrary, anti-Islamist and anti- Imperialist Kemalist cultural identity (Kaya, 2007). Hereby the cultural struggle took place against the regime imprint into private lives, e.g. regulations on alcohol consumption (Kuymulu, 2013).

'These attempts to refashion identities were especially clear in envisioning an alternative kind of society more concerned with sharing, caring, inclusion, toleration, and self-determination/creativity, all of which were sensitive to the environment – and all of which were ignored by the elites' (Benski et al., 2013, p.551). Hence Tejerina and Perugorría (2013) argue that the encounter of people during the protests, the togetherness has turned 'non-congruent emotions' (Langman, Benski, 2013) of distrust against political institutions, humiliation and anger about persisting injustices into the expression of affirmative emotions such as collective empowerment and joy (Tejerina, Perugorría, 2013, p.434). This has been the main motivation for people to persist in long-term 'occupy social movements'. In media coverage much criticism has been voiced that the goal of post-'11 movements are unrealistic, very difficult to be translated into a large-scale society and hence nearly impossible to actually cause a social transformation. Jasper (2001) opposed this criticism by arguing that hope for social alternatives is the fundament of social transformation. Even though alternative visions and the struggle for recognition might be depicted as utopian, without high aspirations for a better world as a source of motivation, and higher beliefs of what is possible actually social transformation would be impossible (Langman, 2013). The utopian, the desired better world in 'occupy social movements' would mean a world in which people can freely express their identity, are recognized and respected by democratic governments *'based upon social equality, toleration of difference, and the inclusion of all within a caring and sharing community'* with *'greater economic justice or dreams of democratic governance that genuinely represents the interests of the majority of citizens rather than the elites'* (Benski, Langman, 2013, p.535). The three identified types of struggle for recognition are a theoretical basis to differentiate movement but it is assumed that different national contexts shape each movement differently.

2.5 National Identity in Protest Movements

The role of national identities in protest or social movements is barely discussed among scholars. Baumgarten (2013) opposes the current trend to generalize post-'11 movements and argues that the nation state continues to be the main target. Hereby she pinpoints that for example the 'support base for a movement' is shaped by the structural aspects of civil society but also factors such as national discourse or national media influence. Benedict Anderson (1991) argues that nations are 'imagined communities', a representation of space in which members of a nation share a strong bond, based on common beliefs that people hold about their nation and themselves. They are based on common narratives, values, shared interpretations of past and present, the believe in a common destiny which are created by the national discourse and is held together by a common national identity (Smith, 1996). Smith emphasized the importance of shared memory by stating: *'no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation'* (Smith, 1996, p.383). Katherine Verdery (1993) argues that the 'nation' and 'national identity' were crucial in the self-understanding of the Balkans and Eastern Europe during the 19th and 20th century, in the context of the territorial restructuring of the Balkan Wars and the Bulgarian 'National Awakening' discourse during and after the end of the Ottoman Empire. Hereby it is

argued that the Bulgarian 'National Awakening', rooted in the 19th century took place vis-à-vis the imposition of an alien Ottoman identity. Hence, the national narrative embraced and romanticized particularly pre-modern folklore, traditions, myths and poets that were then accounted to be 'truly' Bulgarian. Thus, it is argued that the importance of pre-modern folklore in the Bulgarian identity is stronger than in for example Western European nationalism that were rather born out of religious identities, as for example Dutch Calvinism.

Craig Young and Duncan Light (2001) argue that socialism altered typical sources of identity, changing the notion of nationalism with socialism and putting Christian identity to the margins. A key goal of the socialist regime was to create a 'socialist' nation in which the Communist Party would represent all the people. To achieve this, policies of homogenizing society by reducing inequalities and assimilating social groups were implemented (Young, Light, 2001). Moreover they argue that the current democratic deficit is connected to the socialist experience (Young, Light, 2001). In post-socialism identity the perception of the self and the nation needed to be newly formed, constructed and reproduced, contested to meet the new ends of liberal democracy and market economy. Taraz Kuzio (2012) argues that in the transitional period socialist leaders continued to be in power but disguised as social democrats. This state structure was officially removed by the second part of the fourth wave of democratization, in Bulgaria in 1997. Susan Rose-Ackerman (2001) argues in line with Young and Light and that the profound distrust towards political institutions continues in post-socialist national identities, together with a reliance on inter-personal relationships rather than use of public institutions. Vaclav Havel (1990) pinpointed during his famous speech in front of the Polish Sejm and Senate that the post-socialist identity is characterized in its urge to '*Return to Europe*'. In the '*Return to Europe*' Central and Eastern European countries are presented as originally European whereby Havel refers to European values of freedom, democracy and rule of law as opposed to socialist rule that is despotic, anti-democratic and tyrannical. Hence, it can be concluded that post-socialist identity is the anti-thesis to socialist identity, rejecting its norms and values but also political practices with a European consciousness.

2.6 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter it has been argued that in post-'11 movements expressed collective identities and values can result in a classification of a political, social and cultural struggle for recognition even though they all protest movements engage in all types of struggles boundaries are blurred. It was shown that protesters mobilize in order to get their social rights and 'liberal' identities recognized by political and economic elites, outraged against welfare state cuts and austerity measures, engaged in a social struggle for recognition and redistribution. What stays a contradiction is that typically protesters that are engaged in a social struggle for recognition, as theorized by Tejerina and Perrugoría (2013) in the Indignados Movement in Spain or the Occupy Movement (Gitlin, 2013), share a strongly democratic commitment and put direct democracy in practice via general assemblies or open debates. Thus, these types of movements engage in a political struggle but the social struggle is predominant, as Estanque et al. (2013) state because these movements primarily struggle against the consequences of the economic crisis and with it unemployment and austerity measures. Protesters from post-socialist liberal democracies come together in order to struggle for recognition by national political elites in terms of their democratic identity and values, against undemocratic, unrepresentative and as corruptly displayed regimes. It is argued that struggle of recognition has also a cultural

dimension in which cultural identities are misrecognized by the regime which imposes a distinctive and alien cultural identity. For example an Islamist, authoritarian identity imposed on modern, secular rather Kemalist protesters. Finally it was argued that concepts of 'nation' and 'national identity' are crucial for the Balkans and that socialist practices and identity are opposed to a rather European post-socialist identity.

3. Methodology

This chapter provides the methodological framework and the research design for linking the concepts introduced in chapter two to the selected data in order to answer the sub-questions and the main research question. In the first part of this chapter the data collection is justified thus what data has been used and how it has been selected. In the second part the data analysis is explained, meaning how the extended case method is useful for the theoretical insights in order to find answers to the main research question. In the concluding remarks the methodological insights and further research activities are outlined.

3.1 Research Design

This research is inspired by Michael Burawoy's extended case method which is considered valuable for an interpretative approach in which in-depth understanding of the protest movement in Sofia is sought. It is important to note that the intention of this method is to extend and improve already existing theories, not to invent new ones (Burawoy, 1991). Hereby the protest movement in Sofia is chosen as an 'anomaly' which firstly does not fit to the recent academic theories on protest movements. Via this research current theories can be improved and extended (instead of being rejected or approved) based on the initially 'anomic' protest movement in Sofia (Burawoy, 1988). Hence, this research is based on current theories of post-'11 movements but extends them by introducing the issue of identity politics and struggle for recognition. The aim is not to uncover structural patterns between the protest movements in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey but instead to compare and with it understand distinctiveness within the protest movement in Sofia. This means that there is a strong emphasis on the uniqueness of the protest movement in Sofia, embedded in the Bulgarian cultural complex (Burawoy, 1991). The points of comparison between the movements are the expressed collective identities, expressed values and goals which, as it is assumed manifest the collective identity and values. After re-interpreting the current body of academic literature on post-'11 movements in terms of struggle for recognition, I will pinpoint the struggle for recognition in the movement in Sofia and compare it to the struggles in the other five selected movements. In the end the concept of national identity will be applied in order to find explanations for the differences that have been revealed.

3.2 Case Selection

The Bulgarian protest movements is the focus of this research but in order to make out its distinctively Bulgarian identity other five European protest movements are used as comparative units of analysis- 15M in Spain, the Geração à Rasca in Portugal and the Indignant Citizen Movement in Greece from the year 2011 but also the protest movement in Romania early 2013 as well as the mobilizations in Turkey 2013. Bulgaria was chosen as the main case as it is a striking fact that for the first time since 1998 Bulgarians mobilize and given the post-socialist civil society it is crucial to analyze whether there is a difference to other European countries or not. Bulgaria was selected as an initially 'anomic' case of 'occupy social movements' due to its exclusively national struggle for recognition. Moreover, no democratic practices are followed and global financial elites are not defined as 'the other' but instead only national elements such as the Oresharski cabinet and its identity. In particular the protest movement in Sofia between

July 14 and August 3 was chosen as in Sofia the central and largest protests took place. July 14 was the first day of the protest movement, the same day as Delyan Peevski's nomination was announced. August 3 was chosen as the final day of the analysis as that day the Parliament had its first vacation day, movement participation number dropped significantly so that these 50 days represent the first phase of the Bulgarian protest movement.

The comparison between the cases takes place in the European context and therefore only protest movements from the European Union were chosen (except for Turkey). The protest movements in the capitals are analyzed since they have been the center of the strongest mobilizations. The time period of the analyzed protest movements in Portugal/Lisbon starts after March 15, in Spain/Madrid May 15 and Greece/Athens May 25 2011. Portugal, Spain and Greece are three Southern and South-Eastern European countries that experienced the first massive protest movements with wide media coverage and consequently set a milestone for research of new protest movements. Moreover these three cases are taken as typical 'occupy social movements' as identified in chapter two. Even though protests continue partly, the focus lies on 2011 because there fundamental demands and dynamics were set. Even though Turkey is not in the European Union and has a controversial cultural heritage with Europe it is not deniable that it is an important political partner and a potential member state for the EU. But even more important, Bulgaria and Turkey share a cultural heritage due to their common history during the Ottoman Empire. Simply the fact that the ethnic-based Turkish party is the second-strongest party in the current triple coalition in Bulgaria's government shows that Turkey and Bulgaria continue to be of mutual sociopolitical importance for each other. Hence the protest in Gezi Park, Istanbul during summer 2013 is analyzed as well. Since Romania and Bulgaria share a socialist past and entered together the EU in 2007 it is useful and interesting to include Romania in the comparison. Protest movements occurred in Romania in early 2013 and in summer 2013 but since the Romanian summer movement resembles more an ecologist movement- with low participation numbers and centered on the gold mine plan in Rosia Montana, the anti-governmental protest movement in Bucharest in early 2013 is more suitable for this research. Turkey and Romania are also chosen as anomie cases of the 'occupy social movements'.

3.3 Data Collection

Four types of data are used in this research. Firstly, primary data documents such as newspaper articles, blog entries or Facebook announcements for the Bulgarian, Turkish and Romanian movement in order to reconstruct the narrative, the cultural expression of the identity politics within the mobilization. The second type is secondary data, 7 scientific articles on movements from Turkey, Greece, Portugal and Spain as empirical material. The third type of data for the protest movement in Sofia is primary data from non-participant observation, including impressions, photo material by personal participation in the daily march in Sofia without taking an active and influential role as a researcher. The fourth type of data are open-ended interviews, not personally conducted, but encountered on Youtube or in newspapers for the Bulgarian protest movement which reveal attributed meanings to the Bulgarian regime and the protest movement. Due to its recentness, movements in Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria have not yet been discussed in secondary literature. Hence, in order to understand development and events of protest movements, newspaper articles have been chosen. However, in order to gain data also pictures and Youtube videos from the protesters, signs, emotional and cultural expressions, use of language are used. Another way of getting insight is via the interpretation of interviews which,

it is assumed, reflect individual experiences of the struggle for recognition of protesters. In Annex 1 the data sources and data are listed according to the sub-question for which they served with a detailed list of all articles and videos.

It is not a well-kept secret that Bulgarian mainstream media are monopolized and are threatened in its pluralism, in some cases even experiencing direct censorship and manipulation by their business or governmental owners (Balkanleaks, 2013). In order to avoid a one-sided view and manipulation dictated by one interest group diversity of online media was used. 13 articles from 8 national online tabloid newspapers have been used (see annex 1), published from July 1 until August 3. In order to have a diversity of data sources, some newspapers were chosen based on their in-depth investigation, e.g. Fakti, whereas others were chosen based on their popularity, e.g. BTV News. In the case of participant numbers, national media widely reported on 3500 participants, based on the information given by the national police whereas international media accounted for over 50, 000 protesters (Offnews, 20.06.2013). In order to diversify data sources about movements in Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria 6 international online newspapers have been used. A way to avoid either conservative or liberal bias is to use politically diverse newspapers, thus rather liberal newspapers as The Guardian and New York Times as well as rather conservative newspapers such as the Washington Post. Additionally articles from Bulgarian political blogs such as the anti-governmental information agency Noresharski.com, organized by independent protesters, has functioned as a relevant source of primary data about protesters expressed identities and narratives. In order to understand the struggle for recognition of the Bulgarian protesters and Facebook, group 'Национален Протест срещу безобразията в България- National protest against the outrages in Bulgaria) (NPBB) and the event '#ДАНСwithme ден 7'. For interviews the protester's initiative 'The Voice Of' on Youtube was followed.

3.4 Data Analysis

The protest movement is operationalized into the three main concepts 'Bulgarian summer movement', 'Identity Politics' and 'National Identity' with three dimensions. Each dimension, for example 'Narrative' (Figure 1) or 'Struggle for Social Rights' (Figure 2) have two (in one case four) keywords so that in the end 21 keywords help to collect data and analyze it in order to answer the research questions. The constructed concepts and dimensions are based on theoretical propositions described in chapter two. The resulting keywords, e.g. '(N)Oligarchy' or 'Self-Immolation' (Figure 1) follow logically the dimensions but are formulated based on the collected data. These analytical schemes are the methodological aid for the data analysis in chapter 4 and follow exclusively the logic of the extended case method.

Figure 1, Analytical scheme based on RQ1: How did the Bulgarian protest movement in summer 2013 emerge?

Concept	Dimensions	Keywords
Bulgarian summer movement	Narrative	Resignation Oresharski Cabinet
		Populism
		Corruption
		(N)Oligarchy
	Mobilization	Protesters
		Expression of Emotions
	Expressions	Symbolism
		Self-Immolation

The first analytical scheme aims at reconstructing the identity politics and struggle of recognition within the protest movement in Sofia. Polletta and Jasper (2001) argue that mobilizations are based on a collective identity that has a common narrative of empirical reality which results from the misrecognized collective identity. Hence the first dimension 'Narrative' aims at understanding the narrative created within the protest movement in Sofia. The keywords are what Klandermans et al. (2001) name '*adversarial attributions*' that protesters assign to the Bulgarian regime. The first keyword is 'Resignation Oresharski Cabinet' which identifies 'the other' who is misrecognizing the collective identity of the protest movement and against whom protesters are struggling for recognition. In the common narrative, characteristics are ascribed to 'the enemy' thus the Bulgarian regime such as 'Populism' and 'Corruption'. The fourth keyword shows within the common narrative a rejection of the political essence of the Bulgarian regime, widely expressed in the protest slogan '(N)Oligarchy'. Tejerina et al. (2013) and Sitrin (2006) argue that post-'11 movements are horizontal and leaderless. Hence, the second dimension 'Mobilization' aims at understanding how the collective identity was expressed within the structure of the movement. The keyword 'protesters' refers to the issue of how protesters have mobilized together within a struggle for recognition, aiming at understanding the use of Facebook events and groups that gave expression to a misrecognized identity and with it mobilized individuals within a common social action. Hereby 'expression of emotions' within the movement is further keyword to collect data. Taylor (1992) argued that self-realization and hence recognition manifests itself via the acquisition of rich languages of expressing one's identity. Therefore the third dimension aims at understanding 'expressions' of the common identity within the protest movement. 'Symbolism' refers to the meaning of applied language, slogans, actions and used symbols such as the Bulgarian flag. Even though no 'Self-Immolation' took place within the protest movement in Sofia, protesters have made frequently references to self-immolators, at times identified them as heroes in their rejection of the Bulgarian regime.

Figure 2, Analytical scheme based on RQ2: What are the similarities and differences between the Bulgarian and other protest movements in Europe?

Concept	Dimensions	Keywords
Identity Politics	Struggle for Social Rights	Anti-Austerity
		Anti-Corporatism
	Struggle for Political Rights	Resignation Government
		Real Democracy Now
	Struggle for Expression of an Autonomous Cultural Identity	Anti- Authoritarian Claims
		Anti- Regime Imprint

With the second concept 'Identity Politics' of the protest movements in Sofia but also Lisbon, Madrid, Athens, Bucharest and Istanbul are reconstructed which ultimately results in a classification of these movements. As Benski et al. (2013) argue a social manifestation of the 'struggle for social rights' has been common to 'occupy social movements'. Protesters identify regime's austerity measures as imposed and illegitimate and hence struggle for the recognition of their liberal identity by the 'Anti-Austerity' protests. Within this social manifestation global financial elites or 'robber bankers' (Tejerina, Perugorría, 2013) are being also identified as 'the other', being accused of the financial crisis 2008 so that the struggle of recognition turns 'Anti-Corporatism'. The second common trend identified by Benski, Perugorría, Langman and Tejerina (2013) is a political struggle for recognition, thus a 'struggle for political rights'. In a political struggle for recognition protesters perceive that anti-democratic national regimes misrecognize a democratic identity and violate political rights. Within a political struggle the 'Resignation of the Government' is demanded. Not only the regime is rejected but a democratic identity gets expressed in a commonly used slogan (and movement) 'Real Democracy Now'. Identity politics can engage predominantly in a 'struggle for expression of an autonomous cultural identity'. Hereby autonomous refers to a cultural identity that is free and independent from the national regime. Protesters feel their cultural identity misrecognized and turn against the impositions of national regimes by expressing 'anti-authoritarian claims', for example limiting divorce possibilities in the name of authoritarian-religious claims. This struggle is not a political struggle for recognition because it does not turn against political issues or ideologies but instead against authoritarianism as part of culture. The second keyword displays the protests in 'Anti-Regime Imprint', rejecting the imprint of the regime's identity in the cultural realm of individuals, for example forbidding alcohol consumption or requiring a certain amount of children per couple.

Figure 3, Interpretative scheme based on RQ3: To what extent is the protest movement in Sofia an expression of a Bulgarian national identity?

Concept	Dimensions	Keywords
National and Cultural Identity	Distinctive Civil Society	Distrust
		Solidarity
	Distinctive Political Memory	Tradition of State Alienation
		Tradition of Use of Violence
	Distinctive Values and Symbolisms	National Expressions
		Tradition of Protests

The third concept aims at interpreting the differences found between the protest movement in Bulgaria and the other five European countries. Estanque etc. and Tejerina et al. (2013) argue

that protest movements have different regional expressions and Baumgarten (2013) accounts the nation state for it. Verdery (1993) argues that 'national identity' has been a crucial notion in the development and self-perception of Central and Eastern Europeans which despite socialism has not ceased to be an important course of identity. Hence the relevance national and cultural identity in the protest movement in Sofia vis-à-vis other movements is discussed. Following the structure of the second analytical scheme, the dimensions, which represent dimensions of the national identity, are subdivided into 'Distinctive Civil Society', 'Distinctive Political Memory' and 'Distinctive Values and Symbolisms'. Rose-Ackerman (2001) argues that 'Distrust' towards political institutions and traditional party politics is still decisive in post-socialist countries, but also that 'solidarity' towards fellow citizens and reliance on inter-personal relationships is anchored in post-socialist culture. Smith (1996) argues that the common interpretation of the past, thus a common memory is crucial for the national identity and the nation itself. Hence the second dimension is 'Distinctive Political Memory'. 'Tradition of State Alienation' makes reference to what historic events protesters refer to in the Bulgarian protest movement in summer 2013. The other keyword is tradition of violence is the tradition of use of violence, expressed in the readiness to apply violence during protests. Every national identity has its norms and values and hence the third dimension 'Distinctive Values and Symbolisms'. 'National expressions' refers to symbols and expressions of the Bulgarian identity encountered during the protest movement in Sofia, such as the reference to pre-socialist national heroes, national folklore, national poetry but also the 'Return to Europe' discourse. As Baumgarten (2013) argued, the national tradition with protests gives explanation for the current rise of protest movements and therefore the Bulgarian tradition with protests is used as the final keyword.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

In this research the focus lies on the peculiarity, subjectivity and distinctiveness of the protest movement in Sofia. Following the extended case method, the protest movement in Bulgaria has been chosen as an anomic case of 'occupy social movements' since it has an exclusively national struggle for recognition whereas post-'11 movements share common global dimensions. In order to understand the distinctively Bulgarian identity expressed in the protest movement in Sofia, two analytical and one interpretative scheme were introduced. The two analytical schemes make the description of the protest movement in Sofia possible as well as a classification of identity politics of protest movements from Lisbon, Athens, Madrid, Bucharest and Istanbul. The third interpretative scheme makes the interpretation of national identity with an emphasis on the Ottoman and post-socialist experience, as a factor for differences in protest movements possible.

4. Data Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to understand to what extent the Bulgarian protest movement in summer 2013 manifests a distinctively Bulgarian identity or is a further instance of what Estanque et al (2013) named 'new cycle of protests'. In the first section of this chapter the identity politics and the struggle for recognition of the protest movement in Sofia are reconstructed. Hereby peculiarities of the social movement in Sofia are pinpointed and the focus lays on anomalies, phenomena such as repeated self-immolations which initially contradict the theory of non-violence in order to be able to extend via the research existing theory. In the following section the six European protest movements will be typified along the dimensions of social, political and cultural struggle of recognition. This classification of the movements will enable me to compare the identity politics of the various movements with the one in Sofia. The points of comparison are expressed collective identities, values and goals. It is argued that the movements in Lisbon, Madrid and Athens perform primarily a social struggle for recognition, that the movements in Sofia and Bucharest are primarily engaged in a political struggle for recognition whereas the mobilizations in Istanbul struggle to get their cultural identity recognized. This classification clarifies similarities and differences along the lines of expressed identities, aims and values of the protest movement in Bulgaria and the other five European movements. In the final section it is discussed in how far a distinctively Bulgarian national identity accounts for differences between the protest movements.

4.1 The Quest for 'Saving Mother Bulgaria'- The Bulgarian Summer Movement 2013

4.1.1 'NOligarchy!' - The Narrative of the Protest Movement in Sofia

Jasper and Polletta (2001) argue that protest movements are based on a collective identity, as similarly Honneth (1995) and Taylor (1992) argue for a struggle of recognition of a collective identity. Protesters perceive events as a 'moral shock', events that violate common norms and values. This interpretation of events within protest movements takes place via a common frame and a collectively created narrative. The protest movement in Sofia, between July 14 and August 3 developed its common narrative, with a clear identification of 'the other' in the Oresharski cabinet.

One of the first steps of Plamen Oresharski, the newly elected Bulgarian Prime Minister and his cabinet, was the appointment of the media mogul Delyan Peevski (Economist, 06.07.2013) as head of the National Security Agency (DANS). Days before the appointment the requirements for this position were altered in order to fit Peevski's curriculum (Capital, 14.06. 2013). According to a protestor quoted in an article of The New York Times (28.06.2013) Delyan Peevski represents Bulgaria's major problems, namely *'corruption, nepotism, organized crime and the abuse of state power'*. Moreover, in the same article Philip Gounev, a corruption expert at the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia states that: *'Peevski represents a typical example of state capture by oligarchs'* (NY Times, 28.06.2013). Previously to his appointment Peevski has been involved in trials for corruption and organized crime without being persecuted, achieved high positions in public institutions with close connections to high-ranking persons from politics and economy with a fake university degree in law (Capital, 14.06.2013). Protesters identify Peevski as one of Bulgaria's oligarchs and his appointment urged over 50, 000 Bulgarians to protest since July 14 in Sofia against his appointment the same day it was announced (OffNews,

08.07.2013). Hence the protest movement displayed itself as the '*Noligarchy*' or '*anti-oligarch movement*'. An anonymous protester interviewed in 'The voice of...' (24.07.2013) ascribes oligarchic, corrupt and undemocratic rule to the entire government. After the annulment of Peevski's appointment protests continued, with a word play by which Prime Minister Oresharski's government was baptized '*Oligarski's cabinet*' within the movement (Dnevnik, 14.07.2013).

Even though the protest movement in Sofia started against the appointment of Peevski, after its annulment and a follow-up trial, the movement continued for over 110 days with the concrete demand for the resignation of the government. The protester's demands were not met with Oresharski's argument that his resignation and early elections would be irresponsible, destabilizing even more Bulgaria (BTV News, 16.06.2013). As articulated in an article on Noresharski (29.07.2013), the refusal to resign and have early elections is an undemocratic act, not recognizing the will of the people. Another reason why the government was defined as illegitimate and undemocratic on '#ДАНСwithme ден 7' by protesters, is that after the early elections in May 2013 a triple coalition with the Socialist Party, the Turkish ethnic-based party 'Movement for Rights and Freedom' (DPS) and the extreme right party Attack (Capital BG) was formed. As widely discussed on NPBB protesters feel misrecognized and misrepresented by the ultra-nationalist Attack and the Turkish ethnic-based DPS. Moreover they see in the Socialist Party, elected with 20%, identified in the long-term party chairman Sergei Stanishev, a continuation of a socialist identity, mafia and corruption, widely referred to as '*red trash*' or '*red mafia*' in the movement (Noresharski, 29.07.2013; Dnevnik, 29.07.2013). Hence, the protest movement does not only struggle for the recognition of its post-socialist collective identity but formulates concrete political demands next to the general demand of resignation. In 'The Voice of' (24.07.2013) the protester and professor in philosophy Vladimir Brezov demands the change of the parliamentary election system that would enable new and small parties to enter the parliament (News, 25.06.2012).

Many politicians, for example Sergei Stanishev from the Socialist Party suspect the protesters to be paid and organized by a particular interest groups (24chasa, 29.08.2013), mainly accusing the former leading party and current opposition, Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) (Noresharski, 29.07.2013). Hence protesters started to explicitly state on signs that they are participating voluntarily and are unpaid, reflected in slogans as '*I am not paid, I hate you for free*' (NPBB). Since the party secretary and former Prime Minister Boiko Borisov tried to turn the protests in Sofia in favor of his party, present them as an oppositional protest, within the movement an outrageous anti-GERB mood developed ('*We don't want GERB back, we want a future!*', NPBB). Novaković (2012) states that Boiko Borisov personifies what the movement struggles against, namely oligarchic rule, mafia and corruption. Nevertheless Borisov displays himself and GERB as representatives of the movement, for example demanding in the name of 'the people' the cabinet's resignation and early elections. Hereby Borisov follows a populist course, blocking for example the implementation of a new credit for Bulgaria, discussed in the parliament, in the name of 'the people' (Noresharski, 05.07.2013). Moreover Borisov and GERB rejected to participate in parliamentary sessions in order to boycott the triple coalition in the name of the protesters (Mediapool, 11.07.2013). However, in the narrative of the movement Borisov's actions are displayed as a false and populist game, abusing the image of the protests for his benefit, profiting from a possible governmental resignation in terms of popularity and hence higher election quotes in early elections. Consequently 'the other' that violates the democratic and post-socialist norms and values within the movement's narrative is not only the

triple coalition, Prime Minister Oresharski but also the oppositional party GERB, as expressed in one of the many slogans '*DPS=GERB=ATAKA=BSP*'. Consequently, the protest movement in Sofia is neither engaged in an ideological struggle but instead rejects the identity of the entire Bulgarian political elite and demands fundamental reforms of the political system.

Even though various politicians suggested that the protest movement is organized top-down by GERB, protesters express their own identity through the mobilization structure in a horizontal approach. Sitrin (2006) states that horizontalism is the struggle against authoritarian, top-down, hierarchical structures and establishes the expression of an anti-authoritarian, democratic identity in which individuals are considered and treated as equals. There is no clear leader in the protest movement in Sofia but instead a decentralized network of protesters initiates online debates and coordinates the protest marsh route via Facebook. The Facebook event '*#ДАНСwithme ден 7*' was the tool to coordinate the protests on issues such as time, meeting point and route, officially created by 34 persons with 82 996 Facebook participants (10.10.2013). The Facebook page '*Национален Протест срещу безобразията в България*' (National Protest against the Outrageous Conditions in Bulgaria) with 92 698 'likes' also gives protesters an open space to freely express their identity and exchange information, impressions and to debate, explicitly rejecting vulgar, offensive, ideological and inadequate posts. In its mobilization structure the protest movement in Sofia is according to Sitrin's (2006) concept horizontal but unlike Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos (2013), Tejerina and Perugorria (2013) and Baumgarten's (2013) proposition no direct democracy was put in practice via general assemblies or open microphone sessions. On the one hand protesters in Sofia demand and expect 'real democracy' from their elites which was also formulated in other movements but on the other hand unlike other movements in Spain, Portugal or Greece direct democracy was not put into practice, at least in the first period of the movement.

4.1.2 'Bulgaria is Ours'- Identity Expressions of the Bulgarian Summer Movement

The struggle for recognition in the Bulgarian summer movement primarily manifested itself via a daily march, starting on Independence square and occupying the city center of Sofia (NPBB). The protest movement was explicitly 'civilized' and non-violent (*#ДАНСwithme ден 7*, NPBB) with families and their small children as well as member of diverse social background and age groups which is similar to the social basis as pinpointed by Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos (2013) in Greece and Kuymulu (2013) in Turkey (*#ДАНСwithme ден 7*). Protesters are increasingly angry and outraged since their demand for resignation is not met (NPBB) and therefore protesters want to walk the talk in the spirit of the national hero Vasil Levski. Hence, on the 40th day, July 23 the building of the National Parliament was blocked. Protesters built a human circle around the building, supported by bricks and waste containers (Noresharski, 24.07.2013). From 17 o'clock until 2 o'clock in the morning 108 persons, 30 deputies and three ministers were blocked in, exported in the morning by a police bus (Dir BG, 23.07.2013). This was the first time that in the peaceful protest movement violent clashes occurred between the police and protesters. This is line with Klandermans' and Bernd's (2001) concept of 'politicized collective identity' in which he argues that protesters share strong in-group solidarity but that for 'the other' thus the Bulgarian regime other values apply and hence protesters see it as fully legitimate to block deputies and ministers in a building. Another identity expression was the private 'Morning Coffee' initiative. Protesters gathered every morning before the start of the parliamentary sessions in front of the National Parliament building in order to protest directly

against the deputies coming to work. The 'Morning Coffee' provided free coffee for protesters and collected over 3000 leva (ca. 1500 €) voluntary tips which were later donated to a homeless shelter with the explanation that people have to do what the government does not- care for each other (Protestnamreja, 21.09.2013). Thus, the protest movement gives, as Jasper and Polletta (2001) argue an open space to express the protester's values and identity which and these values of 'caring' are in line with what Benski et. al (2013) argue. According to them the post-'11 movements expresses an identity that is more concerned with sharing and caring and that is fundamentally ignored and violated by political and economic elites.



Picture 1: Daily March, protesters Eagles Bridge and 'Carigradsko Shose', Sofia, 20.07.2013

In summer 2013 Sofia turned to a stage of free identity expressions, creative and diverse forms of protest and every evening after 18:30 to a sea of Bulgarian flags, accompanied by the three syllable slogan '*Ostavka!*' (Resignation!). As diverse protesters state on interviews on 'The Voice Of' it is a national protest, expressing the Bulgarian identity, reflected in the Bulgarian flag as the major symbol. Hence to protest became a matter of '*saving Bulgaria*' (or '*Bulgaria is Ours- You are Fired*', '*If we do not protest the one to pay is Bulgaria*') and with it a matter of Bulgarian pride. The importance of pride to protest was frequently reflected on protest signs. The highly 'Bulgarian' character of the movements reflects Verdery's argument that the 'nation' and 'national identity' are fundamental to the self-perception of East Europeans. July 13, the 31st day of the protests, a group of protesters re-enacted the French Revolution, Delacroix's '*La Liberté guidant le peuple*'. As stated in an article of the newspaper 24 chasa (13.07.2013) the 'actors' decision to street stage this scene manifests the struggle against the new aristocrats seen in the oligarchic and oppressive Bulgarian regime, with the people, from all social classes, guided by liberty. Todorva Ilieva, the bare-chested protagonist frequently waves a European flag and shouts: 'Europe, where are you? Democracy! Revolution!'. Through out the movement an anti-socialist identity was expressed in slogans such as '*You red scum bags, look at your tracks, you are disgrace of the human race*'. July 15, the 33rd day of the protests staged the fall of the Berlin Wall. The wall was built by boxes which were labeled with '*Mafia*', '*Resignation*', '*Zone Free of Communism*', '*Independent Media and Society*' and many more (OffNews, 16.07.2013 ; BTV News, 16.07.2013).



Picture 2: French Revolution, 13.07.2013

The anti-socialist and national character were widely expressed within the movement in Sofia. Next to it there were ambiguous streams on the topic of Europe and the European Union. One stream was to put the European Union equal to the Bulgarian regime and to display it as 'harmful' and 'useless'. Another and stronger stream in Sofia was pro-European in which the Oresharski cabinet and its politics are seen as an obstacle for Bulgaria to return to Europe. Hereby protesters perceive Bulgaria as a part of Europe with European values of freedom and democracy which is in line with Vaclav Havel's (1990) 'Return to Europe' discourse after the fall of socialism. The actors that staged the French Revolution on the streets of Sofia frequently waved a European flag. Next to a European identity protesters proclaim a Bulgarian identity. In 'The Voice of' (24.07.2013) one protester states that the Bulgarian regime acts against the interests of the Bulgarians and is even opposed to the Bulgarians. Within the movement the 'true' Bulgarians are seen in the national heroes such as the freedom fighter Vasil Levski, the poets and writers Hristo Botev and Ivan Vazov that within the national Bulgarian narrative rescued Bulgaria from the enslavement and oppression of the Ottoman Empire. These are opposed to the 'false Bulgarians' like Boiko Borisov, Delyan Peevski or Sergej Stanishev who are 'shameless', 'unscrupolous', 'evil' and 'egocentric'. Within the movement Levski was widely quoted with phrases as *'Without a revolution we are lost forever and ever'*, *'We need deeds, not words'* (NPBB) that support the struggle for a Bulgarian government that expresses the real Bulgarian identity. In one interview of 'The Voice Of' a middle-aged woman calls for radical action, a revolution in order to clean the '*political trash*', meaning the Oresharski Cabinet (The Voice Of, 24.07.2013). Not only figures from the Bulgarian national narrative were used but also Gandhi, Maria Theresa or Bob Marley who stand for humanity, not a particular nation. They do not stand in contradiction to the national heroes as Levski because they all are voices of the oppressed, the humiliated and the marginalized with which protesters in Sofia feel identified.

In the year 2013 for the first time in Bulgarian history a wave of self-immolations occurred, with six fatal victims, six survivors and over four failed attempts or threats (Vesti, 13.08.2013). February 20, the 32-year old photographer Plamen Goranov, his name Plamen translated from Bulgarian meaning 'burning flame', became a self-fulfilling prophecy and he turned himself into the Bulgarian Jan Palach or Mohamed Bouazizi. Armed with a poster demanding the dismissal of the mayor of Varna who is directly connected to TIM, a group of high-ranking organized crime, Plamen Goranov set himself on fire in front of the municipality building of Varna and died three days after, March 3, due to his injuries. Plamen Goranov became the symbol of the fight against

the mafia and the Bulgarian regime (Vice, 2013). During the protest movement in Sofia many tributes were paid to Plamen's self-sacrifice while displaying him as a hero as Levski or Botev. Plamen's act of self-immolation is interpreted within the protest movement in Sofia in line with what I argue a Bulgarian tradition of self-sacrifice for 'Mother Bulgaria' that is rooted in pre-modern Bulgaria and is within the national narrative recognized in the acts of the many freedom fighters that allegedly sacrificed their lives in their struggle against the Ottoman rule.



Picture 3: Protester's memorial Plamen, between National Parliament and University, Sofia, 'Plamen, rest in peace, friend'.



Picture 4: Logo Plamen Goranov, NPBB

Other threats, failed and successful attempts of self-immolation express as it is interpreted in this research the manifestation of the fatal consequences from a structural misrecognition of identity and an unheard struggle for recognition, bringing people to the edge of despair and insanity. March 13, the 52-year old Smith Dimityr Dimitrov set himself on fire in front of the building of the Presidency in Sofia and survived. In the documentary 'Burned Alive in Bulgaria' (Vice, 2013) he announces that the oligarchic and corrupt Bulgarian regime tired him. In a BTV News interview he refers to the catastrophic social situations of many Bulgarians, plagued by mass poverty and unemployment. Dimitrov explains that *'the problem of the Bulgarians is [...] the inability to feel human'* and advises *'not to despair. However, how is it possible not to despair when there is nothing joyful, nothing hopeful. Maybe the new government will give them (the Bulgarians) a chance'* (BTV News, 13.03.2013, annex 3). Self-immolation is an extreme form of protest but Dimitrov reflects in a lost generation and Bulgarians that are put to the margins of social existence and driven to despair, anger and outrage which is widely expressed within the protest movement in Sofia. Hence, unlike Tejerina's and Perugorrias's (2013) and Benski's et al. (2013) argument that a movement in itself transforms emotions of anger and frustration to joy and

empowerment this research reveals that emotions of anger and outrage can even be intensified, especially if protesters continue to be unheard, misrecognized and humiliated by the regime.

4.2 The Identity Politics of Protest Movements in Europe

Estanque et al. (2013) and Tejerina et al. (2013) emphasize the common grounds, motives and structures of post-'11 movements. First, general similarities between the protest movements in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are pinpointed. Second, the movements are classified along their differences. All protesters are engaged in identity politics, giving expression to an identity that is widely misrecognized by the national regimes. Within the five movements in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania the frame of the financial and economic crisis after 2008 and the subsequent political crisis is common whereas in Turkey the financial crisis is not widely referred to within protests. In the six movements, individuals chose to occupy the streets as a mean for social transformation rather than traditional party politics as they feel betrayed and hence have lost their trust in the political elites. Emotions such as outrage, anger and frustrations about the political and economic elites are driving forces behind the mobilizations (Benski et al., 2013). The six movements have in common that even though there were at times transgressions to violence, in their core they are non-violent and peaceful. The protest movement itself gives an open space to freely express the collective identity whereby a high plurality of ideas and creativity is being created, with a high degree of sense of humor (Brucato, 2013; Kuymulu, 2013). Protesters from the six movements were primarily mobilized via social media in a leaderless and decentralized form, what Sitrin (2006) has named horizontalism. Hence, all five movements except for Turkey share protest against what is rooted similar causes such as the global financial crisis and the diverse national political mismanagement of the crisis. Moreover all six movements reject in different degrees their national regimes as a misrecognition of the own identity.

4.2.1 'We are the 99%'

The first type of recognition struggle can be pinpointed in the protest movements in Portugal, Spain and Greece. Honneth (1995) and Taylor (1992) shifted Hegel's concept of struggle for recognition into the sphere of cultural injustice whereas Fraser (1995) opposes and emphasizes the social sphere of a struggle for redistribution. Her argument is that distributive injustice is not rooted in cultural slights but is caused solely by institutionalized social relations of social subordination, to be repaired by social policy. The three movements in Portugal, Spain and Greece are primarily typified as a struggle for social rights because issues of redistribution, unemployment and austerity measures are central in the critique of the movement. This is in line with Estanque's et al. (2013) argument that *'the central concern of the protesters [are] the difficulties in finding employment and social justice'* (p.32). The turning point for the beginning of mobilizations in Greece (Sotirakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 2013) was the midterm-austerity package 2011 whereas Estanque et.al (2013) argue that in Portugal it was the performance of Deolinda's song that addresses precarious labour conditions in Portugal, in particular experienced by the well educated youth. In the Spanish 15M manifesto *'How to Cook a Non-violent Revolution'* one of the central concerns is: *'We don't understand why we need to pay the bills of a crisis whose authors continue to enjoy record benefit'* (Tejerina, Perugorria, 2013, p.431).

In the protest movement in Portugal, Greece and Spain a strong expression of a democratic identity with demands for direct democracy and more transparency in politics occurred whereby participatory democratic structures were put into practice via general assemblies. It is argued that this is an expression of a struggle for political rights and the recognition of a democratic identity.

Estanque et al. (2013) recognize in Portugal, Tejerina and Perugorría (2013) in Spain and Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos (2013) in Greece 'the precariat' as a collective identity. As already argued, protesters in Portugal, Spain and Greece are concerned with social injustice and identify the 'other' as national politicians that are displayed as guilty and corrupt, allegedly making the people, the 99% suffer from cuts in social rights whereas the truly guilty ones according to the movement's narratives, namely big banks get bailed out and get state aid. The 'other', the economic and financial elites, '*thieving and swindling bankers*', the 1%, it is assumed in the movements, only get richer whereas the masses impoverish (Tejerina, Perugorría, 2013, p.432). Hence, these movements are called 'Anti-Austerity' protests whereas in this research it has been formulated as struggles for social rights. Hereby global capitalism (Baumgarten, 2013), capitalist policies as bailing out banks (Tejerina, Perugorría, 2013) and the structural crisis of the capitalist system (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos, 2013) are being fiercely rejected within the protest movements in Portugal, Spain and Greece. The protest movements in Portugal and Spain experienced similar degrees of police violence and protest sabotage by national politicians whereas in Greece protester's human rights were infringed and police brutality even alarmed Amnesty International, similar to the protests in Istanbul (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos, 2013). In sum, the three discussed European protest movements are closer to Fraser's concept of struggle for redistribution than Honneth who sees struggles of social injustice rooted in the cultural worth. Hence, it is argued that even though Portugal, Spain and Greece also engage in other types of struggles, the predominant is the struggle for social rights.

4.2.2 'One Solution, Another Revolution'

The second type of recognition struggle is primarily seen in the protests in Romania and Sofia. The protest movement in Romania after January 2013 was triggered by a TV debate between the President Basescu and junior health minister Dr Raed Arafat (BBC, 18.01.2013). Within the narrative of the Romanian protest movement Basescu represents the identity of the '*tyrannical*' and '*corrupt*' national '*dictatorship*' and political elites that introduced the majority of strict austerity measures. Junior health minister Arafat struggled to establish a mobile emergency system in Romania and has become the hero of the Romanian protest movement, hereby displayed to fight in the interest of the people (NYT, 10.02.2013, Presseurop, 18.01.2013). In the TV debate Basescu attacked Arafat to be '*a leftie who didn't like privatization and competition*' (BBC, 18.01.2013). What started as a protest movement against Basescu's allegedly rude and disrespectful attitude towards Arafat, quickly turned into a Romanian anti-regime protest (The Guardian, 16.01.2013). During the movement protesters expressed their outrage about the political mishandling of the economic crisis, the presence of the IMF, unemployment and austerity measures which is a struggle for social rights (EurAktiv, 20.01.2013). As interpreted in this research, at the heart of the movement lies the deep dissatisfaction with the governing party, political system, post-socialist practices of corruption as typified in the '*champagne socialist*' opposition which is also rejected by protesters (BBC, 18.01.2013). Hence protesters have identified 'the other' that misrecognized the protester's identities in the entire political

elite and President Basescu. Protesters in Bucharest staged the 1989 communist revolution as an expression of their anti-socialist identity whereas others carried signs with '*Liberty!*' (CNN, 16.01.2013). During the movement in Bucharest police brutality was applied so that protests turned violent (EurAktiv, 20.01.2013). Consequently the Romanian Prime Minister Emil Boc and his cabinet resigned February 7 (The Guardian, 07.02.2013).

Benski, Perugorria and Tejerina (2013) have pinpointed a political struggle for recognition mainly within the Arab Spring but as argued in this research, at the heart of the protest movements in Bulgaria and Romania lays a struggle for political rights. The 'other', identified in the governing regime, protesters account to be corrupt, oligarchic, despotic, and tyrannical. This identity stands in direct opposition to the collective identity expressed in the protest movements that fights for political accountability, transparency and true representation. In terms of Klanderman's and Bernd's (2001) argument, it is argued that the collective identity in protests in Romania and Bulgaria are highly politicized because the protesters form a direct opposition to the national cabinets, share the grievances against political mismanagement and corruption and see themselves as representatives of society at large, as 'we, the people' even though participant numbers on no movement did get higher than 50, 000 people. Hence, it is argued that the struggle takes place within the political realm. In both movements in Romania and Bulgaria the socialist past comes up in which protesters see the socialist regime's practices of nomenclature, power concentration on a few figures and the oppression of the masses as a continuation of socialist practices such as organized crime and corruption among the political elites which are then rejected. It is argued that Romanians and Bulgarians struggle for the recognition of a political identity, instead of a social or cultural identity, because they do not merely demand a change of the political figures as expressed in a slogan '*We do not want replacement, we want change*'. This change implies for protesters a fundamental restructuring of the political system, new political elites that would represent as demanded the people and hence the Romanian and Bulgarian slogan '*One solution, another revolution*'.

4.2.3 'I asked God what to do. He replied #diengezi'

The third type of struggle, the protests at Gezi Park could be identified as a political struggle for recognition as it is a reaction to what is perceived as outrageous behavior of policy brutality, dictated by as interpreted by protesters, an authoritarian regime identified in the figure of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party AKP. Instead I argue that protesters struggle for recognition of a misrecognized cultural identity. In line with Jasper and Polletta (2001) in this research it is argued that the protest movement creates a space in which the expression of a Turkish cultural identity is created. This is allegedly opposed to Erdoğan's regime that is accounted to be '*tyrannic*', '*imposing Islamism*' and '*authoritarian*'. Özden Sözüalan (2013) argues that the Gezi Uprising was neither concerned with economic issues nor aimed at concrete political goals as a resignation of the regime but instead took place in a cultural sphere. Kaya (2007) pinpoints that '*the Turkish life-world is colonized by the nationalist Islam*', typified by what protesters portray as Erdoğan's increasingly Islamist and authoritarian policies. Kaya (2007) argues that the anti-thesis to Islamist authoritarianism is the Kemalist nationalist identity, engaged in secular political and social rights of a modern, pro- European state. The latter identity is expressed in protesters that are outraged about the regime's imprint into the life-world by impositions such as '*go and consume alcohol at home; have at least three children per couple; ban their children from attending rock concerts; raise pious and well-behaving*

children; to eat this kind of bread and not that' (p.147) or to ban TV shows on religious and moral grounds.

This fundamentally imposed Islamist cultural identity by the regime mobilized '*ordinary people from all walks of life, beliefs, political opinions, and sexual orientation*' (p. 147). Tejerina et. al (2013) and Benski et al. (2013) proclaimed 'the precariat' as the social basis of post-'11 movements but in Gezi Park a wide variety of people, also economically stable Turks, feel addressed by the movement and mobilize. In the starting phase of the protest mainly 'ecologists' participated and tried to prevent the regime's plans to turn a historically meaningful park into shopping center. The police brutality and the excessive use of teargas outraged a wide range of Turks who then occupied the streets in order to protest against the human rights violations and the alleged abuse of regime authority (Kuymulu, 2013). I would disagree that the struggle can primarily be identified as (mis) recognition of a religious identity against the imposition of an Islamist identity because also among the protesters there are believing Muslims (Kuymulu, 2013; Sözalan, 2013) which rebel against the cultural and not religious imprint by Erdoğan's regime. Hence the widely used slogan '*I asked God what to do. He replied #diengezi* (#Occupygezi, the hashtag for the movement in Twitter and Facebook). On the one hand this hashtag manifests the protester's rejection of Erdoğan's Islamist claims on morality by which for example he denounces the movement in Gezi Park as '*wrong*', '*piteous*' and a '*blasphemy*'. On the other hand #diengezi (#Occupygezi) reveals that protesters identify rather with Western Occupy movements instead of the Arab Spring and hence did not name the movement in Istanbul for example #arabspringturkey. As Baumgarten (2013) pinpoints and as assumed in this research, movements take place within the nation state and global phenomena are translated into diverse local expressions, based on different collective identities.

4.3 Post-Ottomanism and Post-Socialism in the Protest Movement in Sofia 2013

The French ambassador in Sofia, Philippe Autié holds in an interview that the reason for the mass protest movement is the profound lack of trust towards political institutions and its elites (Mediapool, 14.06.2013). Several protesters state in interviews that after the fall of socialism Bulgaria was sold for small money, the same socialists stayed in power but disguised themselves as social democrats and established a corrupt state of 'wild capitalism' (The Voice of, 24.07.2013), referring to a market economy without rules. Protesters express during the movement in their signs the profound lack of trust towards the political elites and public institutions. Janka, a young protester (The Voice of, 24. 07.2013) states that she has been angry and dissatisfied for already a long time about the injustices of the political and economic situation in Bulgaria but that she did not know a way to express her dissatisfaction. The center for the study of democracy (2010) observes that after 1989 an oligarchic system based on corruption and organized crime made it difficult for civil initiatives or NGOs to develop next to the corrupt system. Another protester (The Voice Of, 27.07.2013) states that the Bulgarian regime has managed to destroy what in his opinion are the three main columns that make out a good nation, health care, education and labour market which as it is perceived in the movement, affects most Bulgarians independently from their social class or age group. Hence, when the protest movement started, youngsters, pensioners, families with their children, professors, doctors thus people from diverse backgrounds, mobilized and participated in what was commonly expressed, the creation of a civil society (The Economist, 10.09.2013).

Young and Light (2013) argue that socialism altered traditional sources of identity for Bulgarians and that people's alienation from politics are related to the socialist experience. In this research it is argued that protesters perceive the alienation between the ruling class and the people as rooted much deeper in Bulgarian history. The Ottoman rule is still present in the national consciousness in which Bulgarians interpret the Ottoman Empire, in the national vernacular commonly referred to as *'500 years of Turkish slavery'* as a despotic rule by strangers that tried to extinguish *'Bulgarian nationhood'*. Within the protest movement many analogies have been drawn between the Ottoman rule and the current Bulgarian regime which, as it is perceived by protesters destroy the possibility to live in dignity or as Dimitrov, the self-immolator states: *'the problem of the Bulgarians is [...] the inability to feel human'* (BTV News, 13.03.2013, annex 3). According to protesters the regime destroys the educational, health care, and pension system and labour market conditions. Debates between protesters at times get a xenophobic character (NPBB, 20.06.2013), expressing opinions against the Turkish and Sinti and Roma population in Bulgaria. A striking point is that the analogy to the Ottoman rule shows a repetitive pattern in which protesters feel alienated and betrayed by the current regime as they did during Ottoman rule, threatened in their Bulgarian identity which is ultimately expressed in a widely used quote by Hristo Botev, poet, rebel against the Ottoman rule and one of the founding fathers of Bulgarian nationhood within the national narrative: *'The foundations of every government are theft, lies and violence'* and *'every government is a conspiracy against the freedom of humanity'*. August 2 the 18-year old Miglena Doncheva posted a polemic article named *'Good morning, slaves!'* that quickly initiated heated debates in social media. She accuses the Bulgarians for accepting and not rebelling against the injustices of the Bulgarian regime, precarious labour conditions and ends with *'Go on sleeping nation, you have 500 years of slavery internship experience'*.

The argument of Young and Light (2013) that socialism was a source of people's alienation from politics is being extended in this research so that it is argued that from the protester's points of view the late socialist and post-socialist experience are a continuation of state abuse and alienation between the ruling class and the people. The Socialist Party and politicians as Sergej Stanishev are perceived as a continuation of socialist practices as the nomenclature rule, oppression of the masses and free media, enforced party loyalty and use of private relations for Bulgarians who wanted to achieve something, e.g. a career within a party dominated and rigid system, of mafia and corruption. What is a paradox is that these practices are exercised by the majority of Bulgarians (Rose-Ackerman, 2001) but protesters fiercely rejected them among the political elites. A political blogger pinpoints that *'the system is rotten'* and that Bulgarians are forced into corrupt practices (TV Almamata, 2013). A particular point in the protester's narrative of post-socialism is how allegedly corrupt, socialist oligarchs split and sold the country after 1990 for their own pocket which continues in the narrative up to today (Vice, 2013). This is expressed in slogans like *'Politics is a Business and Democracy is a commodity'*, or *'Vasil Levski and Hristo Botev did not agree to sell'*. In this research it is argued that the continuous state alienation and people's deception with the performance of the ruling class that is displayed among protesters has shaped the protest movement in a twofold way. First, the protest is directed towards the national elites and the national system whereas little critique is formulated against the global economic system or European or global elites unlike for example protests in Athens that scapegoated the Troika and European elites. Second, protesters ascribe to the Bulgarian regime, what Klandermans (2001) defines as *'adversarial attributes'* within the politicized collective identity of *'evil'*, *'abusive'* and *'bad'* since their alienation is, as it is argued, not rooted in recent events but in the 19th century. The same pattern that is allegedly repeated in

the Bulgarian regime is reflected in a slogan: *'The lack of evolution in you leads to a revolution in us'* (NPBB).

In this research it has been argued that the collective identity that mobilizes protesters in Sofia is predominantly the Bulgarian national identity which is in line with Baumgarten's (2013) argument that post-'11 movements primarily take place within the realms of the nation state. National expressions such as the frequent reference to Levski and Botev, the Bulgarian flag as the major symbol but also the blaming of nearly exclusively national elites is assumed to be typical of the movement in Sofia. A high variety of street performances, such as the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall were staged expresses a modern and European consciousness and a rejection of the socialist experience. The expression of a European consciousness within the protest movement in Sofia is supported by Vaclav Havel's *'Return to Europe'* discourse in which he argued that post-socialist countries turn away from the despotic socialist experience in order to return to a Europe of freedom and democracy. Next to the street performances also a high variety of costumes, such as Darth Vader with a mask of Oresharski, a pig costume with Peevski's face and others were encountered in the daily march. One striking costume was of the Bulgarian *'haidut'*, a figure coming from pre-modern Bulgarian folkloric narrative, located from the 15th to 19th century. It refers to men that were vagabonds, outlaws and robbers that typically lived in the Bulgarian mountains and fought against the Ottoman Empire. Brunnbauer and Pichler (2002) argue that in Bulgarian myths and collective memory *'haiduti'* were driven by their *'freedom-loving spirits'* and are *'the champions of national liberation'* (p. 80 ff). Moreover they argue that within the national narrative mountaineers and *'haiduti'* were the true Bulgarians, those who stayed pure and truthful to Bulgarian tradition vis-à-vis false Bulgarians in the lowlands and cities that experienced cultural exchange with Ottomans and were engaged in trade and politics (Brunnbauer, Pichler, 2002). The frequent reference to Bulgarian poets and heroes, myths of freedom-loving true Bulgarians as the *'haidut'*, rooted in pre-modern peasantry and pre-modern history of the Ottoman Empire express a pre-national, folkloric consciousness in the protest movement in Sofia. The combination of a modern national Bulgarian identity with a largely European consciousness with a pre-modern, folkloric and rural identity is what is observed in this research to make out the distinctively Bulgarian character expressed in the protest movement in Sofia, summer 2013.

4.4 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter it is argued that the all discussed European protest movements share a common core which is centered on protester's outrage of the global capitalist crisis, its political mismanagement and the lack of democracy. These core issues manifest in each nation state differently as for example in Bulgaria and Romania political scandals such as Peevski's appointment or Basescu's TV debate with Arafat cause a 'moral shock', in Greece the announcement of a midterm austerity package outraged the Greeks whereas in Turkey Erdoğan's Islamist imposition of alcohol regulation or to ban TV shows on moral grounds caused a 'moral shock'. The six European movements are compared based on their collective identities, demands and values. As it is analyzed in this research, due to the central issue of austerity measures, redistribution, unemployment and 'the precariat' as a collective identity the movements in Portugal, Spain and Greece engage primarily in a social struggle for recognition. Based on the strong demands for direct democracy it is analyzed that these movements also carry out a political struggle for recognition. In contrast to it the research reveals that in Bulgaria

and Romania no direct democracy is put into practice but instead democracy is demanded from the national political elites. The research reveals that the movements in Bulgaria and Romania are mainly engaged in a political struggle for recognition because the collective identities are formed as an opposition to the national cabinets and hence the central demand is resignation. The movement in Turkey struggled against the allegedly Islamist and authoritarian regime imprint and defended their cultural identity of what can be called a rather Kemalist, modern and secular identity.

The appointment of the Mafioso and alleged oligarch Delyan Peevski initiated the Bulgarian summer movement and after the first mobilizations the resignation of the Oresharski cabinet became the core demand of the 'anti-oligarch' movement. As it is analyzed, within the movement an anti-socialist character was expressed as for example manifested with the staging of the fall of the Berlin Wall which is connected to the people's socialist and post-socialist alienation with the political system. It is analyzed that the socialist and post-socialist experience in Bulgaria is connected to the Bulgarian's distrust towards political institutions and hence protesters attribute characteristics as '*evil*', '*abusive*', '*shameless*' not as a reaction to recent political events but due to the tradition of what is perceived as state abuse stemming from to socialist regime. In this research it was also analyzed that the protesters connect their alienation with the political system to the Ottoman rule and see themselves as rebelling oppressed reflected in the costume of the folkloric myth of the '*haidut*'. It is argued that the protest movement in Sofia is a national movement due to its highly national discourse, criticizing mainly the national system but also referring to specifically Bulgarian narrative, such as national heroes as Levski. Hereby the protester display the movement as a struggle to save Bulgaria and Bulgarian nationhood and hence protesting becomes a matter of pride and honour. Together with the national character the research revealed the expression of European consciousness, manifested in the staging of the French Revolution. As argued this is in line to the 'Return to Europe' discourse that the protesting Bulgarians reject (post-) socialist practices of corruption and mafia and want to return to the Europe of freedom and democracy, which in the eyes of the protesters would mean to remove the Oresharski cabinet and change fundamentally the political system, as for example the election code. In sum it is analyzed that the Bulgarian distinctive character is a result of a combination of a pre-modern and folkloric identity with a modern, national and widely European identity, jointly expressed within the protest movement in Sofia.

5. Conclusion and Discussion

The most direct contribution of this research lies in the attempt to pinpoint and understand the distinctively Bulgarian character expressed during the protest movement in Sofia, summer 2013. In this research protest movements in Europe were theorized as struggles for recognition which enabled me to analyze the different identity politics and to make out a classification. As analyzed in the research, despite some valid generalizations encountered in academic literature, such as common grounds for protests in the global financial crisis, the political mismanagement and lack of democracy, the research revealed more important differences within the realms of the nation state and the national identity. The creation of the Bulgarian national identity within the 'National Awakening' discourse in the 19th century took part vis-à-vis the alien and imposed Ottoman rule. In this research it is argued that the protest movement in Sofia summer 2013 is a re-articulation of the national identity vis-à-vis the corrupt and oligarchic Bulgarian regime personified in the Oresharski cabinet. Hereby the research revealed that the protest in Sofia is a national movement, based on a distinctive Bulgarian identity. This distinctiveness of the Bulgarian identity is manifested via the expression of a pre-modern folkloric identity in combination with a modern, Bulgarian and partly European consciousness.

The goal of this research is to pinpoint the distinctively Bulgarian character expressed during the protest movement in summer 2013 vis-à-vis European protest movements in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Romania and Turkey. In order to be able to pinpoint such a distinctiveness the concept of struggle for recognition is discussed in regard to the work of scholars on post-'11 movements. First, following Estanque's et al. (2013) and Fraser's (1995) arguments it is argued that protesters from the European Union in Portugal, Spain and Greece engage primarily in a struggle for recognition of social rights against allegedly imposed welfare state cuts and austerity measures perceived by protesters as illegitimate by their national regimes. The narratives of these movements are centered on the economic crisis 2008 in which the global financial elites and the political mismanagement, thus national elites, are being identified as 'the other' that denies social rights. Second, in this research it is argued that the protest movements in Bulgaria and Romania that are outside the Eurozone are predominantly engaged in a struggle for political rights which is shaped by the common socialist past. Protesters perceived acts of the national prime ministers as a 'moral shock' and decided to protest initially against the actions of the prime ministers. Protesters then turned to a general rejection of the regime that is interpreted to be corrupt and illegitimately ruling. Hereby protesters struggle for the recognition of a democratic identity by demanding radical reforms in the political systems, transparency and accountability. Third, the research reveals that the protest movement in Turkey expresses a struggle for recognition of an autonomous cultural identity. In the eyes of the protesters the struggle takes place against the Islamist regime of Erdoğan who, as protesters experience it, rules based on authoritarianism and does not accept alternative identities vis-à-vis the protesters that represent what can be named a rather Kemalist and modern identity and orient rather on Western Occupy movements instead of protests in the Arab Spring.

In this research it is analyzed that the protest movement in Sofia expresses a distinctively Bulgarian character that is manifested by a symbiosis of a pre-modern folkloric consciousness and a modern Bulgarian identity and a widely European consciousness. This research revealed that in the very fundament protesters across Europe mobilize against the issues of the global capitalist crisis, corrupt regimes. On the one hand as analyzed global issues manifest differently due to different regimes' identities such as the concrete rise of university tuition fees as in Spain

or provocative behavior of political figures as in Romania. On the other hand events that cause a 'moral shock' are interpreted differently by the people based on diverse collective identities and hence protests against similar structures of for example the negative consequences of global capitalism its political mismanagement get very different expressions and manifestations. A common character of protest movements in Europe is for example the occupation of public space and the mobilization via social media but the research also analyzes important differences. The protest movement in Sofia is an expression of a distinctively post-socialist Bulgarian civil society in which protesters show profound lack of distrust against the Bulgarian regime but also solidarity for the struggle of the protest movement from Bulgarians with diverse social backgrounds and age groups. Protesters do not perceive the movement as a struggle for the recognition of a particular social or cultural identity but instead they struggle for the recognition of the allegedly real Bulgarian identity with social justice, democracy, accountability and transparency vis-à-vis the allegedly false, corrupt and oligarchic Bulgarian regime. The Bulgarian regime is experienced as illegitimate, corrupt and populist and therefore protesters reject it in its whole. Protesters express the 'real' Bulgarian identity by references to national heroes as such as Vasil Levski, Hristo Botev, Ivan Vazov, Georgi Rakovski but also the self-immolator Plamen Goranov vis-à-vis the false Bulgarians such as Boiko Borisov, Plamen Oresharski or Sergei Stanishev. Extreme acts such as Plamen Goranov's self-immolation are a further evidence for protesters that the current situation in Bulgaria is unbearable, pushing 'normal' and 'good' Bulgarians to the margins of social existence and with it to acts of insanity and self-sacrifice. As analyzed in this research, participating in the protest movement was then not an optional civil act but a matter of pride in the quest for saving 'Mother Bulgaria' against a regime that is allegedly destroying it and undermining 'true Bulgarian nationhood'.

Scholars such as Estanque et al. (2013), Tejerina et al. (2013) and Langman (2013) have shifted the emphasis to the global dimensions, hereby generalizing post-'11 movements. What Benski et al. (2013) generally named 'occupy social movements' has in this research been refined into the three types of struggle for recognition, namely for social rights, political rights and an autonomous cultural expression. Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos (2013), Benski et al. (2013) and Tejerina et al. (2013) recognize the 'precariat' as the social base of post-'11 movements which is reflected in the analysis of this research for movements that struggle for their social rights. What Benski et al. (2013), Langman (2013) and Estanque et al. (2013) have indirectly but not explicitly argued is that 'occupy social movements' are a reconciliation between material topics, such as austerity measures and unemployment, with post-material values of community-based sharing and caring with consideration of the environment. However, in this research it was analyzed that other movements are based on different collective identities for example in the protest movement in Bulgaria on the Bulgarian national identity or the protest movement at Gezi Park in Istanbul on a modern and anti-authoritarian collective identity. Consequently, as reflected in this research, post-material values exist but are not predominant within movements that are engaged in a political or cultural struggle for recognition but instead rather values and norms that flow out of the collective identity, for example the demand for a secular state structure based on a rather modern, secular, Kemalist collective identity in Gezi Park.

Moreover Benski et al. (2013) locate the political struggles for recognition within the realm of the Arab Spring, thus what protesters identify as authoritarian regimes with excessive abuse of human and political rights as for example in civil war like conditions in Egypt. In this research it is analyzed that a struggle for political rights can also occur within European liberal democracies, such as Romania and Bulgaria with admittedly very different dimensions, stakes

and collective identities than the Arab Spring. This means that Bulgarian and Romanian protesters experience corruption, illegitimate rule and populism as a violation of their political rights. Benski et al. (2013), Langman (2013) and Tejerina and Perugorria (2013) argue that initial emotions of outrage and anger were transformed via the participation in a movement into emotions of joy and empowerment. In movements in which no concrete demands were posed but instead sought a space to freely express their identity as in the Occupy Movement or posed and accomplished their demands as in Romania, this emotional transformation is recognizable. In contrast to it, in movements that are centered on a concrete demand which is not achieved, as the resignation of the Oresharski cabinet or the parliamentary rejection of the midterm austerity package in Athens, the participation is experienced at times with emotions of joy and collective empowerment by protesters but mostly even with more anger, frustration and exhaustion as was analyzed in this research and as Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos (2013) argue.

The EU commissioner for Justice Viviane Reding was the first European political figure to take a firm stand on the protest movement in Sofia and to officially support it. Viviane Reding sees in the Bulgarian protest movement as a battle for European values of freedom, democracy and rule of law. In order to support protesters she initiated a citizen's dialogue event in which Bulgarians could articulate their grievances towards Bulgarian politicians. This initiative is very valuable out of two reasons. First, it shows the presence of the EU in Bulgaria and opposes the low-profile policy of other European key figures not to take a decisive stand in the matter of protests. The results of this research show that Bulgarian protesters are alienated from all Bulgarian parties and decisive action from the EU would answer Todora Ilieva's, the bare-chested protagonist in the staging of the French Revolution, question: 'Europe, where are you?'. Second, this initiative and support for protesters is in line with the results of this research in which it is argued that the protester's struggle for democracy, transparency, accountability with a European consciousness. The European Union could set policies that use the momentum of the protest movement in order to lay the foundation of an active civil society and foster the creation of civil initiatives and NGOs. Third, given the result of this research that the protest movement in Sofia is a form of national re-awakening the EU should consider and address in terms of strategies of integration the symbiosis of the pre-modern, folkloric character together with the modern, Bulgarian identity expressed within the movement in Sofia. Hereby questions of how the discussed symbiotic Bulgarian identity expressed during the protest movement in Sofia can be integrated in Europe should be taken into consideration. In sum, the involvement of key figures from the EU as Viviane Reding can foster protester's trust towards the EU and future initiatives should concentrate on the recognition of the expressed Bulgarian identity. Apart from concentrating on recognition of the Bulgarian identity European solidarity can be enhanced by connecting protesters of protest movements in all Europe.

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Annex 1.

Sub Question	Data Source	Data
1.	<u>1.Primary Sources</u> <u>National Online Newspapers:</u> BTV News (2) Mediapool (1) Vesti (1) Offnews (2) News (1) Dnevnik (2) 24 Chasa (2) Capital BG (1)	<u>BTV News</u> „Орешарски няма да подава оставка - било безотговорно“, 16.06.2013 „Берлинската стена“ съборена в София в 33-я ден на недоволство“, 16.07.2013 <u>Mediapool</u> „Бойко Борисов: При ГЕРБ протестите бяха за цени, сега са за ценности“, 11.07.2013 <u>Vesti</u> „37-годишна жена е с опасност за живота след самозапалване“, 13.08.2013 <u>OffNews</u> „50 000 на протест от Ректората до „Плиска“, 08.07.2013 „Danke schön, Германия е с нас“, 16.07.2013 <u>24chasa</u> „Манолова: Вече няма българин, който не знае, че протестите са платени“, 29.08.2013 „1 месец #ДАНСwithme: Френската революция оживя пред парламента, модел разголи гръд“, 13.07.2013 <u>News</u> „Нов Изборен кодекс, но и промени в законите за партиите и медиите“, 26.06.2013 <u>Dnevnik</u> „Над 10 000 излязоха на протеста срещу Делян Пеевски в София (хронология)“, 14.06.2013 „Имаме ли основание да викаме "червени боклуци", 29.07.2013 <u>Capital BG</u> „По пътя към трудното обединение- Кои са допирните и конфликтните точки в политическите програми на БСП, ДПС и Атака“, 19.05.2013

	<p><u>International Online Newspapers</u> The Economist (1) New York Times (1)</p> <p><u>Blogs:</u> Balkanleaks (1) Protestnamreja (1) Noresharski (4)</p> <p><u>Facebook Page:</u> (1)</p> <p><u>Facebook Events:</u> (2)</p> <p><u>Facebook hashtags:</u></p> <p><u>2.Interviews</u> Dimitry Dimitrov (self-immolator)</p> <p><u>3.Own Impressions</u> Pictures of Daily March</p> <p><u>3.Secondary Source</u> <u>Youtube:</u></p>	<p><u>The Economist</u> ,Noresharski! Noligarchy!' 06.07.2013</p> <p><u>New York Times</u> After Political Appointment in Bulgaria, Rage Boils Over, 28.06.2013</p> <p><u>Balkanleaks</u> <i>Bulgarian Media: Lacking Money and Morals:</i> Embassy Sofia, 18.06.2009</p> <p><u>Protestnamreja</u> 100-те успеха на протеста, 21.09.2013</p> <p><u>Noresharski</u> ,Защо и срещу какво протестирам?', 29.07.2013 ,Бойко Борисов до Самуил Петканов: Да забравим личните вражди и да работим за общата цел – оставка', 05.09.2013 'Блокадата на Парламента – 1.00 ч', 24.07.2013</p> <p>'Национален Протест срещу безобразията в България' (NPBB)</p> <p>'Оставка на "Кабинета Орешарски"' '#ДАНСwithme 7'</p> <p>#ДАНСwithme, #ДАНСwithme world, #Ostavka</p> <p>BTV News:,Самозапалил се мъж зове: Не посягайте към този мъчителен начин на протест', 13.03.2013</p> <p>1.АМТВ, ПОРТРЕТ НА ПРОТЕСТА 2013</p>
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	<p>1. TV AlmaMata (1)</p> <p>2. Vice (1)</p> <p>3.The Economist (1)</p>	<p>2. Burned Alive in Bulgaria</p> <p>3. The battle of Bulgaria: A waiting game</p>
2.	<p><u>1.Secondary Literature</u></p> <p>'Direct democracy now!': The Greek indignados and the present cycle of struggles' by Nikos Sotirakopoulos and George Sotiropoulos</p> <p>'Greece: the persistence of political terrorism' by George Kassimeris</p> <p>'<i>Geração à Rasca</i> and beyond: Mobilizations in Portugal after 12 March 2011' by Britta Baumgarten</p> <p>'The New Global Cycle of Protest and the Portuguese Case' by Elísio Estanque, Hermes Augusto Costa and José Soeiro</p> <p>'Politics of the encounter: Cognition, emotions, and networks in the Spanish 15M' by Ignacia Perugorría and Benjamín Tejerina</p> <p>'Reclaiming the right to the city: Reflections on the urban uprisings in Turkey' by Mehmet Bariş Kuymulu</p> <p>'A Few Remarks on the Lessons of Gezi Uprising' by Özden Sözalan</p> <p><u>2.Primary Sources</u></p> <p><u>International Newspapers:</u></p> <p>The Guardian (1)</p> <p>CNN (1)</p> <p>New York Times (1)</p> <p>Euraktiv (1)</p> <p>PressEurope (1)</p>	<p><u>The Guardian</u></p> <p>Romania's politicians must reconnect with reality, 16.01.2013</p> <p><u>CNN</u></p> <p>Opposition: More Romanian protests being planned, 16.01.2013</p> <p><u>New York Times</u></p> <p>Taking Care of His Adopted Country, One Emergency at a Time, 10.02.2013</p> <p><u>EurAktiv</u></p> <p>Romanian protests take nasty turn, 20.01.2013</p>

		<u>PressEurope</u> Raed Arafat, der Empörte wider Willen, 18.01.2013
3.	<u>Primary Data</u> <u>National Newspaper</u> Mediapool (1) <u>International Newspaper</u> The Economist (1) <u>Speech</u> Vaclav Havel <u>Secondary Literature:</u> Report by The Center for the Study of Democracy	Посланик Филип Отие: Начинът, по който бе издигнат Пеевски, буди учудване, 14.06.2013 Bulgaria: Birth of a Civil Society, 21.09.2013 Vaclav Havel January 25, 1990. Speech presented at Polish Sejm and Senate, Warsaw, Poland. Civil Society in Bulgaria- Trends and Risks, 2013

Annex 2.

Summary Interview Dimitryr Dimitrov, BTV News, 'Самозапалил се мъж зове: Не посягайте към този мъчителен начин на протест' ('The self-immolated man invokes: Do not protest in such a creal manner'), 13.03.2013

'After my self-immolation I was between death and life for a few days. My motivation was neither political nor economic but rather social. For a long time, getting into my 50-ies, I see my peers getting unemployed, without means, losing their homes, with properties mortgaged to pawnshops in order to survive. Many people committed suicide...they have many years left before their retirement and do not know what to do. [I decided to inflame myself] the day that the president had to give his mandate for the new government. I thought that this way I could 'enlighten' people, to show them how to think correctly about the elections. [...] But our system does not listen to the problems of the people. The problems of the Bulgarians are poverty, the inability to pay their bills, the inability to buy the most basic groceries, [having] no recreation at all...the inability to feel human. The Bulgarian lives from one day to the other. [My act] was a cry for help for an age group that is not being taken serious. I simply give the advice to the people – do not despair. However, how is it possible not to despair when there is nothing joyful, nothing hopeful. Maybe the new government will give a chance.'