
The use of a temporary restraining order in the Netherlands

A study of regional differences in the use of the temporary restraining order between 2009-2012

MASTER THESIS

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Abstract

To tackle the problem of domestic violence, new legislation was adopted in 2009 in the Netherlands by means of a temporary restraining order. The implementation of the temporary restraining order takes place on a municipal level, whereby municipalities work together on a police regional level for the implementation of the restraining order. While it has been a few years since the temporary restraining order was set, this research was conducted to investigate the use of the temporary restraining order. Hereby the following research question was answered:

To what extent do differences in the severity and extent of the local domestic violence problems and characteristics of the mayors explain the variance in the use of temporary restraining orders in the different police regions in the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2012?

To answer this question regression analysis was conducted and interviews were conducted in six police regions. Hereby one interview was conducted per police region. The regions that were investigated are: Flevoland, Gelderland Midden, Groningen, Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Twente and Utrecht. More information on the methodology used in this study can be found in chapter three. The outcomes of the research showed the following results:

Throughout the years the number of temporary restraining orders has increased. The research shows that the severity and extent of domestic violence can to some extent explain the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands. The severity and extent of domestic violence is measured by adding the number of police reports and the number of *ex officio* investigation. The characteristics of the mayor that are investigated in this study were: the type of mandate used in the police region and the age, gender and political background of the mayor. The study showed that the use of the temporary restraining order can partially be explained by the type of mandate used in a police region. The age and political background of the mayor do not influence the use of the temporary restraining order. The gender of a mayor has a significant effect on the use of the temporary restraining order in the year 2010, when male mayors issued more temporary restraining orders than female mayors.

During the interviews more insight was gathered on the role of the mayor. If mayors consider the use of the temporary restraining order a priority, this leads to more attention for the subject and therefore more temporary restraining orders will be imposed. When police capacity is lower, this influences the use of the restraining order. However, if the use of the restraining order is considered a priority, the temporary restraining order will still be imposed often. There are also other persons who are important for the use of the restraining order, it is important in a region or municipality that there are people who have a leading role in the use of the restraining order and who keep the attention of the parties concerned involved on the topic.

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1. Introduction

The national government in the Netherlands has become increasingly aware of the importance of tackling the problem of domestic violence. Domestic violence is a major social problem, because it is “one of the largest forms of violence in our society”¹ (Movisie, 2009, p.1). In order to address this problem a national policy was designed, which is described, among other things, in the document ‘Private Violence – Public Issue’ of the Ministry of Justice (2002). To tackle the problem of domestic violence several measures have been taken, which are described in chapter 2, but the course of time showed that there was a need for an additional tool to tackle domestic violence. Therefore new legislation has been adopted in 2008 that aims to counteract domestic violence. The measure is designed as a temporary restraining order, which became effective January 1, 2009 (Beke & Rullens, 2008). The legislation makes it possible to impose a temporary restraining order in a situation where someone cannot be prosecuted through criminal law, but there are indications that the situation will escalate quickly (Beke & Rullens, 2008). This means that the measure was implemented with the goal to prevent domestic violence.

In the Netherlands implementation of the restraining order takes place at a municipal level, and the mayor is responsible for the decision making (Lünnemann, Römkens, & De Roos, 2009). Hereby there are differences in the use of the temporary restraining throughout the years. In Nijmegen for instance, there was an increase in the use of the restraining order after a new mayor was installed (De Stentor, 2012).

1.1 Domestic violence

Domestic violence is defined by the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands as “violence that was committed by someone from the domestic circle of the victim” (Ministerie van Justitie, 2010, p.1). The term domestic sphere refers to the relationship between the victim and the offender, whereby the offender can be an (ex-)partner, family member and also family friend (Ministerie van Justitie, 2010). When defining domestic violence, a distinction is often made between physical violence, sexual violence and psychological violence (Coker et al., 2002; Van der Veen & Bogaerts, 2010; Van Dijk, Flight, Oppenhuis, & Duesmann, 1997).

1.2 Temporary restraining order

As stated before, the temporary restraining order is one of the measures taken by the Dutch government to tackle the problem of domestic violence. A temporary restraining order is administrative law and not criminal law. Since it is administrative law it can be imposed by the mayor when information indicates that one's presence in a house causes a dangerous situation, or there are serious reasons to suspect danger. The restraining order is thus a decision and therefore it is possible for stakeholders to appeal (Ministerie van Justitie, 2008). A temporary restraining order is imposed for a period of 10 days, and can be extended to up to four weeks (*Wet tijdelijk huisverbod*, 2008). In addition, the temporary restraining order can only be imposed to persons who share a household with the victim and who are aged eighteen and older (*Wet tijdelijk huisverbod*, 2008).

¹ Quotes from Dutch documents are translated into English by the author.

Since the introduction of the temporary restraining order, there is an additional possibility available to address domestic violence. It is possible to impose a temporary restraining order when no offense has yet been committed or when a victim does not want to report a crime (Schreijnenberg et al., 2010). In order to impose the temporary restraining order, there first must be a situation where "events or circumstances indicate that the presence of a person in the home produces serious and immediate risk to the safety of one or more persons who live with him in the house" (Schreijnenberg et al., 2010, p.16). A second aspect of the temporary restraining order that needs to be achieved is that an assistance program needs to be started for all the people involved.

To decide if a temporary restraining order needs to be imposed, a risk assessment instrument is drafted in 2008 by Kuppens and Beke (Timmermans, Kroes, & Homburg, 2010). This risk assessment (RIHG) is the basis for deciding whether or not a temporary restraining order needs to be imposed and consists of a questionnaire (Timmermans et al., 2010). The RIHG is prescribed by law and therefore has to be used by the assistant public prosecutor. The goal of the RIHG is to gather information on three themes. These themes relate to the possible offender of domestic violence, what occurred during the violent incident and information about the family background (Timmermans et al., 2010). In appendix A the form for the risk assessment (RIHG) is given.

Although the mayor is officially qualified to impose a temporary restraining order, he or she can also decide to mandate the implementation of the temporary restraining order to an assistant public prosecutor. Hereby there are two types of mandates, namely a mandate where the assistant prosecutor consults the mayor before a decision is made (signing mandate) and a full mandate where the assistant public prosecutor makes a decision and then the mayor is informed (Schreijnenberg, De Vaan, Vanoni, & Homburg, 2010). This means that also when a temporary restraining order is imposed by the auxiliary prosecutor, the mayor has to be informed of the decision (*Wet tijdelijk huisverbod*, 2008). For a mayor it is not possible to mandate the decision of extending or withdrawing a temporary restraining order (Kamerstukken II, 2005/06, 30 657, nr. 3, p. 2).

The process of imposing a temporary restraining order proceeds as follows. In almost all cases the process for a temporary restraining order starts when the basic police function responds to a notification for a possible domestic violence case. First the police decides if there is reason to contact the assistant public prosecutor (Ministerie van Justitie, 2008). If this is the case, the second step is that the assistant public prosecutor is contacted and he or she makes the decision whether or not to start the process of imposing a temporary restraining order. The third step is to fill in the risk assessment form (RIHG) at the location of the domestic violence report. This form is designed to assist the assistant public prosecutor in gathering information and the weighing of the information. Based on the outcomes of the RIHG it is decided whether or not a temporary restraining order is imposed (Ministerie van Justitie, 2008). If the assistant public prosecutor only has a signing mandate the mayor has to be contacted, and he or she decides whether or not a temporary restraining order is imposed based on the information the assistant public prosecutor provides. If the assistant public prosecutor has a full mandate, he or she can decide independently whether or not to impose a temporary restraining order.

After the decision is made and signed, it must to be announced to the persons involved and an assistance program is started for all the people involved (Ministerie van Justitie, 2008). Ten days after the temporary restraining order is imposed, an advice is given to the mayor about the situation and whether or not the temporary restraining order needs to be extended. The advice for the mayor can be drawn up by different parties, such as assistance organisations, or the civil service employee of the mayor (Ministerie van Justitie, 2008).

It has been a few years since the measure has been set and it is due time to examine the use of the temporary restraining order and to explain differences in its use. To be able to explain differences between police regions and throughout time, the research focuses on the period between 2009 and 2012. In the Netherlands several studies on the temporary restraining order have been conducted. In these studies the role of the mayor was not examined, in order to explain differences in the use of the restraining order in the entire country. The aim of the studies was for instance to evaluate the overall process of the temporary restraining or to examine the effects of the temporary restraining order (Schreijnenberg et al., 2010). The mayors in the Netherlands have the possibility to decide whether or not to impose a temporary restraining order. However, a mayor is not obliged to impose a restraining order. Therefore it is possible that a mayor's personal characteristics have influence on whether or not a temporary restraining order is imposed. Because municipalities and police regions can to a large extent decide how to shape the process, it is possible that there are large differences in the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands. These differences may not be desirable because this can result in differences in the treatment of citizens.

At the start of the research the goal was to gather information on the use of the temporary restraining order on a municipal level. The temporary restraining order is namely an administrative measure for which municipalities are responsible. However, from early on in the research, the gathering of information about the number of temporary restraining orders of the different municipalities in the Netherlands turned out to be more difficult than expected. There is little need to cooperate or to share information on the number of restraining orders. Therefore there is also no database available for the number of temporary restraining orders per municipalities, which makes it very difficult to gather information on the restraining order. To be able to investigate the use of the restraining order, the research was conducted on a regional level, namely at the level of Dutch police regions. In figure 1 an overview is given of the 25 Dutch police regions. Since January 2013 the police regions do not exist anymore, because of the national police that was founded (Rijksoverheid, n.d.). However, because the research focuses on the period between 2009-2012 this is not a problem.

Figure 1. Police regions in the Netherlands

1. Groningen
2. Friesland
3. Drenthe
4. Noord-Holland-Noord
5. IJsselland
6. Flevoland
7. Zaanstreek-Waterland
8. Kennemerland
9. Amsterdam-Amstelland
10. Twente
11. Gooi en Vechtstreek
12. Noord- en Oost-Gelderland
13. Utrecht
14. Hollands-Midden
15. Haaglanden
16. Gelderland-Midden
17. Rotterdam-Rijnmond
18. Gelderland-Zuid
19. Zuid-Holland-Zuid
20. Brabant-Noord
21. Midden- en West-Brabant
22. Zeeland
23. Brabant-Zuidoost
24. Limburg-Noord
25. Limburg-Zuid



1.3 Research questions

To explain differences in the use of the temporary restraining order, the following main research question is answered:

To what extent do differences in the severity and extent of the local domestic violence problems and characteristics of the mayors explain the variance in the use of temporary restraining orders in the different police regions in the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2012?

To answer the general research question mentioned above, four specific sub questions are formulated. These questions are:

1. Which differences exist in the use of the temporary restraining order between police regions in the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2012?

To explain differences in the use of the temporary restraining order, one has to know which differences there are in the use of the temporary restraining order.

2. Which differences exist in the severity and extent of domestic violence in the different police regions in the Netherlands?

There are many aspects that influence the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands, one of these aspects is the severity and extent of domestic violence. The severity and extent of domestic violence may influence the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands.

3. Which differences exist in the characteristics of the mayors in the Netherlands?

The characteristics of the mayor are expected to have an influence on the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands. In the theory chapter the characteristics are described that are expected to be important.

4. To what extent can the severity and extent of domestic violence and characteristics of the mayor explain the differences in the use of the temporary restraining order?

The answer to these research questions show to what extent the severity and extent of domestic violence and the different characteristics of a mayor explain the use of the temporary restraining order.

1.4 Reading guide

In chapter two the theoretical framework of the study is given. In this chapter the characteristics of the mayor are stated that are expected to influence the use of the temporary restraining order. Chapter three describes how the study is designed. Starting from chapter four the research questions are answered. First chapter four describes differences in the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands. Chapter five discusses the severity and extent of domestic violence and chapter six answers the research question about the characteristics of the mayors. In addition, chapter seven describes the selection of police regions and the interviews. After which chapter eight discusses the outcomes of the interviews. Finally the conclusion is given.

2. Theory

In this chapter the theoretical framework of the thesis is outlined. The main focus of the study is to investigate the influence of personal characteristics of a mayor and the extent of domestic violence on decision making. Therefore the theoretical framework discusses first some information about the severity and extent of domestic in the Netherlands is given. Secondly, relevant theory about the influence of personal characteristics is given. To answer the research questions also eight hypotheses are formulated in this chapter.

2.1 Severity and extent

Over the years there has been a bigger focus on the approach to domestic violence. To address the problem of domestic violence, the national government has made a national policy in 2002. Since the policy was implemented, there were four important developments in the approach of domestic violence. One of the first changes that was visible, is that in 2003 the 'indication domestic violence' became effective. "This indication describes how police and the judiciary need to approach domestic violence" (TransAct, 2006, p.1). The indication "requires that the police immediately takes someone into to custody if there is a reasonable suspicion of guilt at a situation where some is caught red handed" (VNG, 2004, p.25).

The second change that was made, is related to the registration of domestic violence incidents. For a long time the Dutch police did not use specific codes for the registration of domestic violence incidents. As a result, it was not clear for a long time what the official domestic violence numbers were in the Netherlands. Since 2004 this has changed, because a national registration method was implemented. Through the registration of incidents, a better overview is gathered of the extent of domestic violence, but the registration does not provide for a complete overview of the severity and extent of domestic violence. According to Van Dijk, Flight, Oppenhuis & Duesmann (1997) domestic violence is still often not reported. They state that in only 12 % of the domestic violence cases the police is contacted and that only in 6 % of the cases an official complaint is filed. There has thus been an improvement of the registration of domestic violence because of the new registration, but the registration is still far from complete.

The third development is that since 2005 the opportunity was created for the police to investigate a case or prosecute a suspect, even when a victim does not want to cooperate or press charges (Jongebreur, Lindenberg, & Plaisier, 2011; TransAct, 2006). This is called an *ex officio* investigation or prosecution (Ferweda, 2009; TransAct, 2006).

In 2009, a fourth major development was the introduction of a temporary restraining order for domestic violence. The process of imposing a temporary restraining order usually starts when the police is contacted about a domestic violence disturbance. The basic police goes to the address of the notification and assesses whether or not the assistant public prosecutor needs to be contacted. When there are more incidents of domestic violence, the changes are bigger that the assistant public prosecutor is contacted to investigate whether a temporary restraining order needs to be imposed.

In the Netherlands it is possible that there are differences between the number of domestic violence reports and *ex officio* investigations. It is possible that if there are more domestic violence reports and *ex officio* investigations in a police region, this might partially explain the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands. Therefore the following hypothesis is stated:

H1: The more severe and extensive the problem of domestic violence in the Dutch police regions, the more temporary restraining orders are issued.

2.2 Characteristics

In the past, research has been conducted that investigates the influence of personal characteristics on the decision making of for instance judges. Kulik et al. (2003) for instance state that demographic variables, like age and gender, can influence a person's decision making, because this person can relate to a victims perspective because of their personal experiences. In this paragraph the theory is discussed that describes the influence of personal characteristics on decision making. Hereby it should be noted that the researches focus mainly on the decision making of judges, jurors or law enforcement personnel in the United States. It is possible that in the Netherlands the effects of personal characteristics on decision making differs from that in the United States.

2.2.1 Mandate

To explain differences in the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands, characteristics of mayors are investigated. Research examined to what extent characteristics of decision makers influences their decisions. For instance, Kulik, Perry and Pepper (2003) investigated personal characteristics of judges on sexual harassment situations, where they focused on trained law personal. The mayors who deal with possible domestic violence cases are to some extent trained, but not to the same extent as a public prosecutor. Gutek (1995) states that research indicates that when people are not trained personal characteristics influence perceptions. Therefore it may be possible that there is a difference between police regions where the temporary restraining order is fully mandated to an assistant public prosecutor and police regions where this is not the case.

According to Quinn (1996) trained law personnel is more experienced and therefore their personal characteristics will have less influence on their decisions. This means that personal characteristics can play a greater role with mayors than with assistant public prosecutors. Vidmar (2011) states that sometimes judges who are trained are more willing to impose a sentence than not trained jurors. Therefore, it is expected that a trained assistant public prosecutor will issue more temporary restraining orders than a mayor who is not specifically trained. To test whether there is an influence of the mandate on the use of the temporary restraining order the following hypothesis is formulated:

H2: In police regions where the use of the temporary restraining order is fully mandated more temporary restraining orders are imposed than in regions where the mayor takes the final decision.

2.2.2 Age

In addition to mandating the restraining order, there are more characteristics that are expected to influence the use of the restraining order. One of these characteristics is the age of a judge. As stated before, Gutek (1995) describes that personal characteristics such as age can influence someone's perception, when they are not trained. While a mayor is not specifically trained for imposing a restraining order, it is possible that a mayor's age influences the decision making. Kulik et al. (2003, p.83) found that the age of a judge is "associated with case outcome". Hereby younger judges are 'more likely to decide cases in favour of the plaintiff than older judges' (Kulik et al., 2003, p. 83). This means that it is expected that younger mayors will issue more temporary restraining order than older mayors. There is only an expected effect for regions where the mayor decides and there is no expected effect in the regions where the decision making is fully mandated. To be able to test the effect the following hypotheses are formulated:

H3: In police regions where the mayors imposes the temporary restraining order, younger mayors issue more temporary restraining orders than older mayors.

H4: In police regions where the assistant public prosecutor imposes the temporary restraining order, there is no influence of age of the mayor on the use of the temporary restraining order.

2.2.2 Gender

According to Kulik et al. (2003) researchers state that demographic variables, like age and gender, can influence a person's decision making. A person can relate to a victim's perspective because of their personal experiences. The article states that women are more often a victim of sexual harassment and therefore female judges will relate more easily to a victim of sexual harassment. Even though sexual harassment cases and domestic violence cases are not the same, it is still possible that personal experiences of women makes them issue more restraining orders than male mayors.

Steffensmeier and Hebert (1999, p.1164) argue that women are expected to "make substantial different decisions than men" because they "are assumed to have been socialized differently and thus have a different "personality"". To test whether there is an influence of demographic characteristics such as age and gender on decision making, many researches have been conducted in the United States. Collins and Moyer (2008) for instance investigated the influence of a judge's gender and race on decision making. They state that gender and race of judge's are expected to influence decision making, although studies investigating the influence of gender are not unambiguous. There are studies (Collins & Moyer, 2008; Steffensmeier & Hebert, 1999) who find that there is influence of a judge's gender on decision making, while other studies do not (Kulik et al., 2003). Steffensmeier & Hebert (1999) investigated whether the gender of a judge effects sentencing of criminal defendants. The research showed that "women judges are somewhat harsher" (p. 1163). This means that female judges sentence criminals more often and for longer periods of time. Domestic violence is a specific type of crime, and judges differ from mayors in many aspects. Nevertheless it is expected that female mayors judge more harshly and will therefore issue more temporary restraining orders than male mayors. To test whether gender influences decision making the following hypotheses are stated:

H5: In police regions where the mayors imposes the temporary restraining order, female mayors issue more temporary restraining orders than male mayors.

H6: In police regions where the assistant public prosecutor imposes the temporary restraining order, there is no influence of a mayors gender on the use of the temporary restraining order.

2.2.4 Political background

In the Netherlands mayors are almost always related to a specific political party. It is expected that this political background may influence the decision making of mayors. Finding studies that investigate the influence of a mayors political background on decision making is not easily done. However, in the United States research is conducted on the political background of judges. In the United States judges are related to either the Democratic or Republican party. Kulik et al. (2003, p. 83) investigated among others the influence of the political affiliation of judges on the outcome of cases. Hereby they found that Democratic judges will make more decisions in favor of the prosecutor than Republican judges in the United states. The authors indicate that this is expected because “Democrats vote more liberally on civil rights issues (including sexual discrimination issues) than Republicans” (Kulik et al., 2003, p.81). This suggests an effect of political background on decision making. However, civil rights issues cannot be compared to domestic violence problems. In addition, the difficulty of the Dutch political system is that unlike the American system, there are many different political parties. Therefore we cannot easily compare the Dutch system with the American system. To find out what the expected effect is for political background on the decision making of mayors, other researches are examined that focus on the situation in the Netherlands.

To investigate whether political background influences the decision making of mayors, there needs to be examined which political parties are expected to influence the number of temporary restraining orders. As stated before, there are many different political parties In the Netherlands, there is a lot of fragmentation. Therefore it is possible that the Dutch mayors can be related to many different political parties. In the Netherlands Decentraal Bestuur (2011) investigated information about mayors, such as the political party mayors are related to. Hereby most of the mayors have a background that comes from three political parties, namely the CDA, VVD and PvdA (Castenmiller, 2008; Decentraal Bestuur, 2010). This makes it more easy to indicate which political parties are expected to have an influence on decision making.

In the Netherlands there have traditionally been very distinct political movements. However, the last 50 years there have been some changes to this movements, while many new political parties have been founded and some parties are merged. Nevertheless, there are still different political movements visible in the Netherlands. Lucardie (2007, p.1) describes that political movements are “a set of beliefs and desires that people have about the way they want to shape their future together”. In the Netherlands Lucardie describes different political movements. These movements are a liberal movement, a Christian democrat movement and a social democratic movement. Within these movements several political parties can be places. In the Netherlands there are two political parties who describe themselves as

liberal. Namely the VVD and D'66. Further there are left wing political parties with a socialist background, namely the PvdA, SP and the Green Left party. In addition, there are three Christian parties, such as the CDA, Christian Union and the SGP. There are clear differences between the Christian parties, for instance the CDA is the only party who refer to themselves as Christian Democrats.

The different political movements have different focal points. For instance liberal parties as the VVD and D66 have a strong focus on individual freedom, and they do not want the government to be involved to much in the life of citizens. It is thereby important to state that liberals view the safety of their citizens as a task of the government (VVD, 2008; D66, n.d.).

The use of the temporary restraining order is an intrusive measure, because it denies someone of one of their primary rights, namely to live in their own house. It could be that mayors of liberal parties are more reluctant to impose a temporary restraining order, because of a possible invasion of human right. This does not mean, that it is expected that liberal mayors do not impose the temporary restraining order. However, it is expected that mayors of liberal parties in regions where there is a signing mandate, impose the temporary restraining orders less, than mayors of other political parties. To test whether this is the case, the following hypotheses are stated:

H7: In police regions where the mayors imposes the temporary restraining order, liberal mayors issue less temporary restraining orders than mayors from other political backgrounds.

H8: In police regions where the assistant public prosecutor imposes the temporary restraining order, there is no influence of political party of the mayor on the use of the temporary restraining order.

2.3 Hypotheses summarized

The following hypothesis are stated to be tested for the study

Characteristic	Hypotheses
<i>Severity and extent of domestic violence</i>	<i>H1:</i> The more severe and extensive the problem of domestic violence in the Dutch police regions, the more temporary restraining orders are issued.
<i>Mandate</i>	<i>H2:</i> In police regions where the use of the temporary restraining order is mandated more temporary restraining orders are imposed than in regions where the mayor takes the final decision.
<i>Age</i>	<p><i>H3:</i> In police regions where the mayors impose the temporary restraining order, younger mayors issue more temporary restraining orders than older mayors.</p> <p><i>H4:</i> In police regions where the assistant public prosecutor imposes the temporary restraining order, there is no influence of age of the mayor on the use of the temporary restraining order.</p>

<i>Gender</i>	H5: In police regions where the mayors impose the temporary restraining order, female mayors issue more temporary restraining orders than male mayors.
	H6: In police regions where the assistant public prosecutor imposes the temporary restraining order, there is no influence of a mayors gender on the use of the temporary restraining order.
<i>Political background</i>	H7: In police regions where the mayors imposes the temporary restraining order, liberal mayors issue less temporary restraining orders than mayors from other political backgrounds.
	H8: In police regions where the assistant public prosecutor imposes the temporary restraining order, there is no influence of political party of the mayor on the use of the temporary restraining order.

2.4 Specified research questions

Based on the theory it is possible to further specify the third and fourth sub research question. This makes the research questions used for this study are:

To what extent explain differences in the severity and extent of the local domestic violence problems and characteristics of the mayors the variance in the use of temporary restraining orders in the different police regions in the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2012?

The four sub questions are:

1. Which differences exist in the use of the temporary restraining order between police regions in the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2012?
2. Which differences exist in the severity and extent of domestic violence in the different police regions in the Netherlands?
3. Which differences exist in mandating the temporary restraining order, the political background, age and gender of mayors in the Netherlands?
4. To what extent can the severity and extent of domestic violence, mandating the temporary restraining order, the political background, age or gender of the mayor explain the differences in the use of the temporary restraining order?

3. Methodology

To answer the research question and test the hypotheses, data is gathered on the temporary restraining order in the different police regions in the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2012.

3.1 Quantitative research

Before it is possible to explain differences in the use of the temporary restraining order, it is necessary that the number of temporary restraining orders in the Netherlands is known. While the research focuses on four individual years, a longitudinal study is conducted. The research is conducted in two stages. First information is gathered about the number of temporary restraining orders in all police regions in the Netherlands. To be able to compare the number of temporary restraining orders in the different police regions, it is important that relative numbers are given. Therefore the number of temporary restraining orders are given per 10.000 citizens. Because the entire population is investigated, the external validity of the study is high.

Information is also gathered about the severity and extent of domestic violence in the Netherlands and about four characteristics of mayors that are expected to have an influence on their decision making, as described in chapter 2. These characteristics are: whether or not the use of the restraining order is mandated, the gender, age and political background of the mayors. In the first stage of the research, quantitative methods and data are used. To analyse the data linear regression analysis is used. This way a good overview is gathered of the use of the restraining order in the 25 police regions. In the theory it was hypothesized that personal characteristics of mayors may only have influence on the decision making in regions where there is a signing mandate and not in the other regions. To test whether this is the case the data is split up on the basis of the type of mandate that is used in the police region. The 14 regions where there is only signing mandate are one group and the 11 regions where there is a full mandate or combination of mandate is the other group. The variables that are tested with the split data are: the age, gender and political party of the mayor.

3.2 Qualitative research

For the second part of the analysis six police regions were selected. Within these regions extra background information is gathered on the use of the temporary restraining order. The selecting of the regions did not occur by random sampling, but was based on the numbers of relative temporary restraining orders per police region. Hereby regions were selected that deviate from the average and regions that show a more average development. Regions are thus selected because they have a high, average or low relative amount of temporary restraining orders or because there is a large increase or decrease in the number of temporary restraining orders throughout the years. In addition also a region is selected that has an average development throughout the years. In chapter 7 a more elaborate underpinning of the choices for the six regions are given.

Within each of these six regions one person was selected for an interview to gather extra background information on the use of the temporary restraining order and the role of the mayor. By conducting interviews, more extensive information can be gathered on how the temporary restraining order is used in the six regions. The type of interview conducted is an in-dept, semi structured interview. Hereby a list of questions is used, but there is also the possibility to ask, for instance, follow up questions (Baarda, Goede, de & Van der Meer, 2007). The list of questions used for the interviews can be found in appendix B. The transcripts of the interviews transcripts are coded. Hereby the method of open coding is used (Burnard, 1991).

The selection of the respondents for the interviews took place based on different criteria. Within each region there are different organisations and persons who work on the restraining order. Hereby there is often one organisation, such as a municipality or the Support Centre for Domestic Violence, which plays a coordinating role (Beke & Rullens, 2008). To select respondents for the interviews, documents about the temporary restraining order in the different regions have been checked. The documents were used to investigate which organisation(s) or person(s) play a leading or coordinating role in the use of the restraining order. This way it was possible to select respondents who have a broad overview of the use of the temporary restraining order in the police region. It turned out that some people were not easily accessible or present because of holidays. In these cases a different person was selected, who also was, to a large extent, aware of the situation in the police regions. In chapter 7, a broader underpinning is given for how the respondents are selected.

3.3 Data collection

For the first part of the research data is gathered on the number of temporary restraining orders in different police regions in the Netherlands, that existed until 2013 (Rijksoverheid, n.d.). The number of temporary restraining orders in the different regions are given per 10.000 citizens to be able to compare the regions.

The information on the number of temporary restraining order was expected to be available through databases or (municipal)documents, but this was not the case. It turned out that the National Program Domestic Violence and the Policetask had an overview of the number of temporary restraining orders in the Netherlands per police region. The characteristics of the mayor was gathered for each of the four years. Hereby the information was gathered through the internet. The information on the type of mandate used in the regions was found through many different documents and website. The sources used as a basis for the data on the type of mandate in the different police regions can be requested from the author. The data on the other characteristics of the mayor were gathered through the list of Dutch mayors in Wikipedia (Wikipedia, 2013, a.; Wikipedia, 2013, b.). This method of data collection is assumed to be reliable for this research, while the political party, gender and age of a mayor are not expected to cause disagreement.

3.4 Operationalisation

In the Netherlands the extent of domestic violence has been investigated by, among others, research companies Beke and Movisie. Domestic violence is often measured by looking at the levels of reporting's of domestic violence. This measurement gives an indication of the problem, but has a problem of the so called 'dark number' (Van Zwieten, Biersma & Bieleman 2010). Using only data of the police and assistance organizations results in an underestimation of the extent of domestic violence. In order to get a broader view of the magnitude of the problem some researches use a so called 'capture-recapture' method. Hereby the part of the population that is not registered is estimated with the use of characteristics of individuals for which information is recorded (Van der Veen & Bodearts, 2010). In this study, underestimation of domestic violence does not have to be a problem, because the underestimation is present in all police regions. There is no indication that there is a correlation between the underreporting and the variables involved.

In the previous section information is given on the severity and extent of domestic violence. Hereby it is stated that it is important to measure both the number of official reports of domestic violence, but also the number of *ex officio* investigations. An *ex officio* investigation means that the police can investigate a case or prosecute a suspect, even when a victim does not want to cooperate or press charges (TransAct, 2006). In this research the number of official complaints and *ex officio* investigations were added up, to get a broader overview of the nature and extent of domestic violence in the different police regions in the Netherlands.

The characteristics of the mayor also need to be operationalized. Hereby the political background of mayors is measured by looking at the percentage of mayors from liberal political parties per region, and gender is measured by the percentage female mayors in a region. Further the average age of a mayor is measured by subtracting the mayors year of birth from the year in which the temporary restraining orders are imposed (for instance 2010). This described approach makes that the research question can be answered.

In the next chapter the first research question is answered. Hereby differences in the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands are described.

4. The use of the temporary restraining order

In this chapter the first sub research question is answered. This question is: Which differences exist in the use of the temporary restraining order between police regions in the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2012? To answer this question differences in the number of restraining orders between the regions are given and also differences across time.

4.1 Differences between regions

In the Netherlands there are clear differences in the number of temporary restraining orders. This can be seen in table 1. The relative amount of temporary restraining orders are mainly important. It is expected in advance that throughout the years the amount of restraining orders increases, specifically in the first years. This because the actors first have to get used to the new instrument and how it can be applied. Looking at the average number of restraining orders, this development is also visible. Over the years the number of restraining orders has increased from an average of 1,3 to an average of 2 temporary restraining orders per 10.000 citizens.

When looking at the number of temporary restraining orders it is also clear that in certain regions the restraining order is used more than in other regions. In 2009 the number of restraining orders in the regions Gelderland-Zuid and Zeeland were very low, compared to the other regions, namely 19 and 3 temporary restraining orders. Per 10.000 citizens this is 0,5 temporary restraining orders in Gelderland Zuid and 0,06 temporary restraining orders in Zeeland. It is not clear why this is the case. A possible explanation for a low number of restraining orders, is the fact that not all municipalities were able to start immediately with the implementation of the temporary restraining order (Huisverbod.nl, 2009). However, this applies to municipalities in many different police regions.

In the regions Amsterdam-Amstelland, the region Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Haaglanden and in Twente the average number of temporary restraining orders is much higher than in other regions. These regions all have more than 3 temporary restraining orders per 10.000 citizens. This is also visible in table 1, where the relative numbers of temporary restraining orders for the different years are given. Rotterdam is an extreme case, because for all years Rotterdam imposes more temporary restraining orders than the other regions. For all years the region has more than two times the number of restraining orders than average, namely between 3,34 and 4,69 temporary restraining orders per year.

4.2 Differences across time

Besides differences in the use of the restraining order between the different regions, there are also clear differences in the development over time. In some regions the number of restraining order only starts increasing in 2011 or 2012 (Brabant Noord and Brabant-Zuidoost), while in most regions the number of restraining orders increases stronger after 2009. Also the development in Flevoland is very interesting, since the number of temporary restraining orders is higher in 2009 than it is in 2010 and 2011 while in 2012 the number of restraining orders is more than doubled compared to the year before. Besides Flevoland there are more regions where there are increases and decreases in the use of the restraining order. This can also be seen in table 1.

Table 1. The number of temporary restraining orders for the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (absolute numbers and per 10.000 citizens)

Police region	Temporary restraining orders (Tro's) 2009	Tro's per 10.000 inhabitants 2009	Temporary restraining orders 2010	Tro's per 10.000 inhabitants 2010	Temporary restraining orders 2011	Tro's per 10.000 inhabitants 2011	Temporary restraining orders 2012	Tro's per 10.000 inhabitants 2012
Amsterdam-Amstelland	114	1,23	291	3,09	343	3,58	315	3,25
Midden- and West-Brabant	89	0,83	98	0,91	113	1,05	120	1,11
Brabant-Noord	42	0,66	40	0,63	73	1,14	88	1,37
Brabant-Zuidoost	67	0,91	59	0,82	58	0,78	120	1,62
Drenthe	36	0,73	49	1,00	60	1,22	76	1,55
Flevoland	58	1,51	22	0,57	40	1,02	89	2,25
Friesland	59	0,91	106	1,64	105	1,62	111	1,72
Gelderland-Midden	105	1,61	92	1,40	133	2,02	100	1,51
Gelderland-zuid	3	0,06	22	0,41	61	1,14	62	1,16
Gooi en Vechtstreek	56	2,3	46	1,89	41	1,68	52	2,12
Groningen	66	1,15	139	2,41	90	1,55	112	1,93
Haaglanden	148	1,47	309	3,04	304	2,96	388	3,74
Hollands midden	51	0,67	88	1,16	106	1,39	90	1,17
IJsselland	55	1,09	74	1,46	117	2,3	107	2,09
Kennemerland	46	0,89	35	0,67	55	1,05	80	1,52
Limburg-Noord	105	2,04	95	1,84	128	2,48	106	2,05
Limburg-Zuid	100	1,64	131	2,16	116	1,91	145	2,39
Noord- & Oost-Gelderland	89	1,1	72	0,89	89	1,1	109	1,34
Noord-Holland-Noord	107	1,67	93	1,45	104	1,62	98	1,52
Rotterdam-Rijnmond	413	3,34	498	3,99	522	4,15	593	4,69
Twente	142	2,29	224	3,59	201	3,21	189	3,02
Utrecht	76	0,63	113	0,93	93	0,76	172	1,39
Zaanstreek-Waterland	47	1,48	68	2,12	74	2,3	92	2,84
Zeeland	19	0,5	52	1,36	53	1,39	46	1,21
Zuid-Holland-Zuid	57	1,19	58	1,21	60	1,25	69	1,43
Total	2150		2874		3139		3529	
Average		1,28		1,62		1,79		2,00

4.3 Analysis

There is an expected positive relationship between the number of citizens in a police region and the number of temporary restraining orders. Hereby the number of citizens is given per 10.000 citizens. The data shows that there is indeed a significant correlation between the number of inhabitants and the number of temporary restraining orders for the different years (between 0,61 and 0,72). The regression analysis shows that the number of citizens explains the number of temporary restraining orders to some extent, namely 37 % in 2009, 44 % in 2010, 44 % in 2011 and 52 % in 2012. Table 2 shows that if there are more citizens in a police region, there are also more temporary restraining orders for all years. Per 10.000 citizens the number of the temporary restraining order increases between 1,8 and approximately 3,2. Throughout the years there is a larger effect visible of the number of citizens on the use of the restraining order.

Table 2. Regression analysis for the influence of the number of citizens on the number of temporary restraining orders in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

	2009		2010	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constante	-32,389	34,316	-67,479*	45,729
Citizens	1,795***	,485	2,752***	,643
R Square	,373		,444	

	2011		2012	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constante	-41,757	43,159	-77,181*	47,036
Citizens	.2,666***	,632	3,263***	,654
R Square	,436		,520	

*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; N = 25

It is important to state that the case Rotterdam is an outlier, specifically in 2009. This region has more citizens and imposes more restraining orders, which makes the correlation stronger than it would be without Rotterdam.

4.4 Conclusion

The question was, which differences exist in the use of the temporary restraining order in the Netherlands. On average the use of the restraining order has increased in the police regions. However, in about ten regions, there were clear decreases and increases throughout the years. Also between the different police regions clear differences are visible. In some regions the temporary restraining order is imposed three times more often per 10.000 citizens than in other regions. The next chapters seek to explain these differences. Hereby the severity and extent of domestic violence and several characteristics of the mayors are investigated.

5. Severity and extent of domestic violence

In this chapter the second research question and part of the fourth research question is answered. These questions are: Which differences exist in the severity and extent of domestic violence in the different police regions in the Netherlands and to what extent can the severity and extent of domestic violence explain differences in the use of the temporary restraining order? First the data on police reports and *ex officio* investigations is investigated to see which differences exist in the severity and extent of domestic violence in the Netherlands. Afterwards, a regression analysis is conducted to see to what extent the number of temporary restraining orders can be explained by the severity and extent of domestic violence.

5.1 Severity and extent of domestic violence in the Netherlands

To be able to compare the police regions with each other, the severity and extent is measured per 10.000 citizens. This is also the same as to how the number of temporary restraining orders are measured. As stated before, the severity and extent of domestic violence is measured by adding the number of police reports and *ex officio* investigations. Hereby the data is only available for the year 2010. This means that it is possible that for the other years the number of police reports and investigations increases or decreases. In table 3 the police numbers are given including the numbers per 10.000 citizens. For the different police regions there are differences in the number of domestic violence reports and *ex officio* investigations per region. In the Twente region for instance the number of *ex officio* investigations is relatively high, it is not clear what can exactly explain these differences.

When looking at the relative number of domestic violence reports and *ex officio* investigations there are clear differences visible between the different regions. The Noord en Oost Gelderland region for instance has 13 reports and *ex officio* investigations per 10.000 citizens, while the Rotterdam Rijnmond and Haaglanden region have more than 32 reports and investigations per 10.000 citizens. Also the Amsterdam Region has a high amount of reports and investigations per 10.000 citizens. The fact that there are clear differences between the police regions indicates that if is an effect for the severity and extent of domestic violence, this will be visible in the outcomes of the regression analysis.

5.2 Analysis


When conducting a regression analysis the dependent and independent variables are important. Hereby independent variables are expected to affect the dependent variable. The dependent variable is described as “the phenomenon that you want to explain” (Huizingh, 2007, p.298). For this study the dependent variable is therefore the use of the temporary restraining order, and the independent variables, are the severity and extent of domestic violence, the mandate of the temporary restraining order and the age, gender and political background of the mayor.

Table 3. Police reports and *Ex officio* investigations in the Netherlands in 2010

Police regions	Police reports	<i>Ex officio</i> investigations	Number of police reports and <i>ex officio</i> investigations	Police reports and <i>ex officio</i> investigations per 10.000 citizens
Amsterdam-Amstelland	2161	612	2773	29,40
Midden- en West-Brabant	1440	584	2024	18,88
Brabant-Noord	752	241	993	15,59
Brabant-Zuidoost	993	290	1283	17,45
Drenthe	645	260	905	18,43
Flevoland	625	160	785	20,24
Friesland	869	188	1057	16,35
Gelderland-Midden	792	244	1036	15,77
Gelderland-zuid	653	310	963	18,09
Gooi en Vechtstreek	309	139	448	18,39
Groningen	995	398	1393	24,16
Haaglanden	1926	1334	3260	32,05
Hollands midden	852	348	1200	15,77
IJsselland	531	200	731	14,42
Kennemerland	675	177	852	16,38
Limburg-Noord	652	290	942	18,29
Limburg-Zuid	1183	100	1283	21,11
Noord- en Oost-Gelderland	785	267	1052	12,99
Noord-Holland-Noord	1051	249	1300	20,25
Rotterdam-Rijnmond	2780	1270	4050	32,45
Twente	689	512	1201	19,26
Utrecht	1399	719	2118	17,35
Zaanstreek-Waterland	502	208	710	22,18
Zeeland	579	201	780	20,45
Zuid-Holland-Zuid	563	269	832	17,35

According to Huizingh (2007) it is useful to make a scatterplot and conduct a correlation analysis, before conducting a regression analysis. This because it gives you an indication of whether two variables have a linear relation and how strong they correlate. The scatterplot for the temporary restraining orders and police reports and *ex officio* investigations is given in figure 2. Hereby there is a linear relationship visible between the variables. It is thus useful to conduct a regression analysis. In the scatterplot it is visible that the Twente region is an outlier. This region has a lot more temporary restraining orders compared to the number of police reports and *ex officio* investigations than the other police regions.

Figure 2. Scatterplot of relationship between temporary restraining orders and the number of police reports and *ex officio* investigations for the year 2010



In table 4 the outcomes of the hypothesis for the dependent variable ‘temporary restraining orders’ and the independent variable ‘severity and extent of domestic violence’ are given. The correlation of the model is .757, which means that there is quite a strong relationship between the variables. Further the outcomes of the research show that the severity and extent of domestic violence accounts for 57.3% of the temporary restraining orders. The outcomes indicate that there is a positive influence of the severity of domestic violence on the use of the temporary restraining order ($b = .146$). This can be said with a certainty of 95% certainty. While there is a significant relationship between the two variables, the first hypotheses is accepted. The more severe and extensive the problem of domestic violence, the more temporary restraining orders are issued.

Table 4. Regression analysis for the influence of the severity and extent of domestic violence in the Netherlands on the number of temporary restraining orders

	B	S.E.
Constante	-1.254**	(.534)
Severity and extent of domestic violence	.146***	(.026)
R Square	.573	

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$; $N = 25$

One sided test

6. Characteristics mayor

In this chapter an answer is given to the third research question: Which differences exist in mandating the temporary restraining order, the political background, age and gender of mayors in the Netherlands? In addition also an answer is given to part of the fourth research question, namely to what extent explain characteristics of the mayor the differences in the use of the temporary restraining order? To answer the questions, first the mandate is described, then the gender and age of the mayor followed by the political background of mayors and the conclusion.

6.1 Mandate

As stated before in the Netherlands mayors have the possibility to decide whether or not to impose a temporary restraining order. In addition mayors can also decide to what extent they will mandate this decision. When a mayor has a strong opinion on whether or not to use a temporary restraining order, they will be more likely to have a partial mandate (the mandate to sign decisions after consulting the mayor). Therefore the mandate is seen as a characteristic of a mayor. Hereby it is possible that mayors of big cities are more likely to have given a full mandate, because of the high number of temporary restraining orders per year.

To find the data on the mandate in the Netherlands turned out to be more difficult than expected. To gather the data, documents of the different regions and municipalities are gathered. As far as know there is only one municipality where there was no mandate issued and the mayor conducted the entire process of imposing a restraining order. Further it turned out that most municipalities in the regions work together on some level for the implementation of the restraining order. In most regions the municipalities also decided to use the same type of mandate. In Groningen for instance there is a full mandate, while in Flevoland and Utrecht a signing mandate is used. For 23 of the 25 regions complete data is found on the mandate. Hereby it should be noted that some changes have been made in the type of mandate. In the Gooi en Vechtstreek region for instance the mandate was changed from a full mandate to a signing mandate in august 2012 (GGD Gooi en Vechtrstreek, 2012; Politie Gooi en Vechtrstreek, 2012). It is possible that other changes have occurred throughout time, but that these changes were not uncovered or stated in documents. While throughout time there were barely any changes to the mandate, it is decided to first conduct the regression analysis for the years 2010 and 2011 where the small changes are not taken into account. Because there are no changes in the type of mandate throughout time, but there are differences in the amount of temporary restraining orders, there are differences in the correlation between the variables.

In most regions the municipalities all have the same type of mandate, hereby it is decided to state the percentage full mandate in the different regions. There are 14 regions where the mayors makes the decision (signing mandate) and there are five regions where there is full mandate and there are six regions where there is a combination of mandate. When looking at the scatterplot of the temporary restraining orders and the mandate for 2010, it is clear that there is not a linear relationship between the two variables. This can also be seen in figure 3.




Figure 3. Scatterplot of relationship between temporary restraining orders and police reports and *ex officio* investigations

De Vaux, Vellemand and Bock (2008, p. 196) state that “If the scatterplot is not straight enough, stop here” and the variables “must have a *linear* association or the model won’t mean a thing”. In order to answer the question, the regression analysis is conducted using a dummy variable. Hereby the type of mandate used in police region is divided into two categories. The first category (0) consist of the 11 regions where there is a signing mandate and the second category (1) consist of the 14 regions with a full mandate or combination of mandates. The outcome of the regression analysis can be seen in table 5. The meaning of B is different when a dummy variable is used, compared to a regular regression analysis, because with a dummy variable there are only two categories. The B compares the two categories of the dummies (Huizingh, 2007). For the sample, the police regions with a full mandate or combination of mandates scored 0,9 higher than regions with a signing mandate. This indicates that in regions where the use of the temporary restraining order is mandated, the temporary restraining order is imposed more often than in regions where the mayor makes the final decision.

Table 5. Regression analysis of the influence of type of mandate used in a police region on the number of temporary restraining orders in 2010 and 2011

	2010		2011	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constante	1,226***	,233	1,521***	,231
Mandate	,905***	,351	,603**	,348

*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; N = 25

One sided test

The regression analysis indicates that there is significant relationship between the type of mandate and the used of the temporary restraining order. Therefore the second hypothesis is accepted. In police regions where the use of the temporary restraining order is mandated more temporary restraining orders are imposed than in regions where the mayor takes the final decision.

6.2 Age

To investigate the possible influence of a mayors age on the use of the temporary restraining order first the average age of mayors in the different regions in the Netherlands is calculated, after which a regression analysis is conducted.

Age mayors

First all the ages of mayors were collected for the years 2009 until 2012. Hereby it stands out that in our sample, the mayors' ages ranged from 29 to 69 in 2009 and from 31 to 72 in 2012, as can be seen in table 6 and table 7. The average age of mayors in the Netherlands is for all years approximately 56 years old. Hereby there are very small difference visible between the average age throughout the years. The first years the average age slightly increases, while in 2012 the average age is slightly lower compared to the year before. The average age of mayors for all regions lies between 50 and 60 years old.

Table 6. The minimum, average and maximum age of mayors in the Dutch police regions for the years 2009 and 2010

Police region	Minimum age of mayors in 2009	Average age of mayors in 2009	Maximum age of mayors in 2009	Minimum age of mayors in 2010	Average age of mayors in 2010	Maximum age of mayors in 2010
Amsterdam	41	54,50	62	36	50,67	63
Brabant-MW	37	57,16	68	32	57,67	69
Brabant-Noord	38	56,32	67	39	56,17	65
Brabant-ZO	38	55,14	64	39	57,23	68
Drenthe	39	53,00	60	40	54,46	71
Flevoland	49	58,00	63	50	58,71	64
Friesland	29	55,78	63	30	56,00	65
Gelderland-Midden	36	54,50	66	37	55,50	67
Gelderland-Zuid	42	57,89	62	43	58,95	66
Gooi- en Vechtstreek	42	51,67	63	43	55,10	64
Groningen	35	55,50	69	36	53,52	66
Haaglanden	40	54,78	62	41	55,78	63
Hollands-Midden	44	58,76	69	39	58,48	70
IJsselland	47	56,59	63	48	58,17	71
Kennemerland	41	53,66	62	42	53,30	63
Limburg-Noord	43	58,91	68	44	56,88	69
Limburg-Zuid	42	55,89	64	43	56,24	70
NO-Gelderland	44	56,86	66	45	58,13	67
Noord-Holland-Noord	45	57,21	65	48	57,67	64
Rotterdam-Rijnmond	43	55,50	69	44	55,86	70
Twente	49	58,65	67	45	57,35	68
Utrecht	39	54,50	69	40	55,42	70
Zaanstreek-Waterland	46	57,90	63	47	57,60	64
Zeeland	47	57,85	64	48	59,00	65
Zuid-Holland Zuid	38	54,95	67	39	55,10	68

Table 7. The minimum, average and maximum age of mayors in the Dutch police regions for the years 2011 and 2012


Police region	Minimum age of mayors in 2011	Average age of mayors in 2011	Maximum age of mayors in 2011	Minimum age of mayors in 2012	Average age of mayors in 2012	Maximum age of mayors in 2012
Amsterdam	39	51,33	61	40	53,29	62
Brabant-MW	33	56,69	71	34	56,60	68
Brabant-Noord	40	56,09	63	41	58,00	67
Brabant-ZO	40	56,24	64	41	55,91	67
Drenthe	41	55,64	72	42	55,38	64
Flevoland	51	58,83	65	49	52,29	66
Friesland	37	57,50	67	38	57,70	67
Gelderland-Midden	38	56,50	68	39	57,28	69
Gelderland-Zuid	44	59,52	67	42	56,71	66
Gooi- en Vechtstreek	44	55,90	65	45	55,89	65
Groningen	45	55,30	67	46	55,04	68
Haaglanden	42	56,78	64	43	58,64	65
Hollands-Midden	40	59,25	71	41	60,04	72
IJsselland	45	55,08	65	40	54,25	63
Kennemerland	43	54,30	64	44	55,36	65
Limburg-Noord	39	56,60	70	40	57,05	71
Limburg-Zuid	37	54,60	66	32	52,67	66
NO-Gelderland	46	58,64	68	47	58,08	66
Noord-Holland-Noord	46	57,69	68	47	58,70	69
Rotterdam-Rijnmond	45	56,90	71	46	58,22	72
Twente	42	56,95	69	43	55,88	66
Utrecht	41	54,67	69	31	53,53	67
Zaanstreek-Waterland	46	58,60	65	45	57,73	65
Zeeland	49	57,79	65	47	57,20	66
Zuid-Holland Zuid	43	56,82	69	44	56,77	70

When the individual municipalities in the Netherlands are examined, there are clear differences visible in the age of the different mayors. However, at the level of the police regions, most of these differences are no longer visible. There are not many differences between the average age of the mayors. This means, that at the regional level, the influence of age on the use of the temporary restraining order will probably not be visible. If there is no difference in the age of mayors in different regions, age cannot be an explanation for the use of the temporary restraining order.

Analysis

To test the influence of a mayor's age on the number of temporary restraining orders, first a scatterplot is made and the correlation between the two variables is examined. The outcomes show that for both the group with a full mandate or a combination of mandate and the group with a signing mandate there is no (linear) relationship between the variables for the years 2009 until 2012. This can be seen in figure 4.

Figure 4. Scatterplots for the relationship between the temporary restraining orders and the age of mayors.



The scatterplots show that it is not useful to conduct a regression analysis, because there is no linear relationship. The scatterplot for the year 2010 is closest to a linear relationship. The outcomes of the regression analysis confirms that there is no significant relationship between the age of a mayor and the use of the temporary restraining order. This is the case in regions where there is a singing mandate and in regions where there is a full mandate or combination of mandates.

6.3 Gender

To test whether the gender of a mayor influences decision making, the percentage of female mayors is investigated. First general information is given on the percentage of female mayors in the Netherlands, after which the outcomes of the regression analysis is given.

Female mayors

The data shows that there are clear differences visible between the different regions, while the percentage of female mayors ranges from 0% to 50 %. As can be seen in table 7, there is one region that particularly stands out, because of the high percentage of female mayors. The percentage female mayors in the Amsterdam region is namely more than 10% higher than the other regions. A second thing that stands out, is that in 2009 there are three regions in the Netherlands in which there are no female mayors, while in 2012 there is only one region with no female mayors.

Table 8. The percentage of female mayors in the police regions in the Netherlands for the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012


Police region	% female mayors 2009	% female mayors 2010	% female mayors 2011	% female mayors 2012
Amsterdam	50,0	50,0	50,0	50,0
Brabant-MW	18,3	21,5	24,3	25,6
Brabant-Noord	15,0	19,0	25,0	25,0
Brabant-ZO	9,5	14,3	9,5	19,0
Drenthe	8,3	3,5	2,8	2,8
Flevoland	33,3	33,3	33,3	33,3
Friesland	22,6	16,1	18,5	15,1
Gelderland-Midden	25,0	25,0	25,0	24,5
Gelderland-Zuid	19,4	18,1	15,3	16,7
Gooi- en Vechtstreek	38,9	36,1	33,3	33,3
Groningen	25,3	21,7	21,7	26,1
Haaglanden	11,1	11,1	11,1	4,7
Hollands-Midden	21,4	24,0	28,0	33,0
IJsselland	0,0	0,0	13,6	12,1
Kennemerland	25,8	20,0	20,0	12,5
Limburg-Noord	9,5	15,0	26,7	28,3
Limburg-Zuid	11,8	10,5	5,6	5,6
NO-Gelderland	13,6	15,1	11,4	12,1
Noord-Holland-Noord	32,0	34,6	35,1	28,6
Rotterdam-Rijnmond	35,0	27,5	36,8	36,8
Twente	0,0	7,1	10,7	14,3
Utrecht	22,7	22,4	20,5	16,7
Zaanstreek-Waterland	11,1	20,3	26,9	34,2
Zeeland	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Zuid-Holland Zuid	16,8	15,8	19,7	17,1

The average percentage of female mayors in the Netherlands has slightly changed throughout the years. In 2009 approximately 19 % of the mayors was female, while in 2012 this has increased to well over 20% of the mayors. This means that there was a very small increase in the number of female mayors in the Netherlands.

Analysis

To test whether the percentage of female mayors influences the number of temporary restraining orders, a regression analysis is conducted. However, first a scatterplot is made and the correlation between the two variables is tested. The outcomes show that in regions where there is a full mandate or a combination of mandates, there is no (linear) relationship between the variables for all four years. The year 2012 is closest to a linear relationship, as can be seen in figure 5.

Figure 5. Scatterplot for the relationship between the gender of a mayor and the use of the temporary restraining order.



The regression analysis in table 9 shows that for the year 2012 the model is significant (with a certainty of 95%) for the regions where there is a combination of mandates. This is unexpected, because in five of the eleven regions none of the mayors decides whether or not to impose a temporary restraining order. For the other years there is no relationship between gender and the use of the temporary restraining order in the regions with a full mandate and a combination of mandates.

Table 9. Regression analysis of the influence of a mayors gender on the use of the temporary restraining order in police regions where there is a full mandate or a combination of mandates for the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012

		2009		2010	
		B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Full mandate and Combination of mandate	Constante	1,095**	,441	1,703**	,571
	Gender	,018	,016	,020	,022

		2011		2012	
		B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Full mandate and Combination of mandate	Constante	1,293**	,550	1,268**	,554
	Gender	,035*	,020	,041**	,020

*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; N = 11

In the regions where there is a signing mandate, the year 2010 is the closest to a linear relationship between the variables. This is also visible in the regression analysis, there is a significant relationship between the gender of a mayor and the use of the restraining order in the year 2010, as can be seen in table 10. In the years 2009, 2011 and 2012 there is no significant relationship between gender and the use of the restraining order in regions with a signing mandate. However, what stands out most in the regions with a signing mandate, is that the direction of the relationship between the percentage female mayors and the use of the restraining order is opposite to what was expected. In 2010 female mayors issue significantly less temporary restraining orders, than male mayors. This means that the fifth hypotheses is rejected. Female mayors in regions with a signing mandate do not issue more temporary restraining orders than male mayors.

Table 10. Regression analysis of the influence of a mayors gender on the number of temporary restraining orders in police regions where there is a signing mandate for the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012

		2009		2010	
		B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Signing mandate	Constante	1,242***	,326	1,992***	,442
	Gender	-0.08	,017	-,044**	,023

		2011		2012	
		B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Sigining mandate	Constante	1,769***	,496	2,367***	,408
	Gender	-.013	,024	-.031*	,020

*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; N = 14

One sided test

6.4 Political background

To investigate the possible influence of a mayors political background on the use of the temporary restraining order first an overview is made of the political background of the mayors in the Netherlands, after which a regression analysis is conducted. As stated in the theoretical framework, the political parties are divided among three political movements. For this research the number of liberal parties is important, because this is expected to have an influence on the number of restraining orders. In the different police regions the percentage of mayors is given who have a liberal background, as can be seen in table 11.

Table 11. The percentage of mayors with a liberal political background in the Dutch police regions for the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012

Police region	Percentage mayors with a liberal political background 2009	Percentage mayors with a liberal political background 2010	Percentage of mayors with a liberal political background 2011	Percentage mayors with a liberal political background 2012
Amsterdam	33,33	33,33	33,33	27,67
Brabant-MW	25,00	30,77	34,62	34,62
Brabant-Noord	28,57	32,52	33,75	30,00
Brabant-ZO	28,57	28,57	33,33	28,57
Drenthe	41,67	41,67	39,58	25,00
Flevoland	33,33	22,17	16,67	16,67
Friesland	34,39	29,03	29,63	33,33
Gelderland-Midden	43,75	43,75	43,75	43,75
Gelderland-Zuid	47,22	53,72	51,39	38,89
Gooi- en Vechtstreek	61,11	55,56	49,11	44,44
Groningen	21,68	26,09	21,74	25,00
Haaglanden	44,44	44,44	44,44	48,11
Hollands-Midden	37,21	38,46	42,00	38,68
IJsselland	43,18	27,27	25,00	34,09
Kennemerland	53,30	60,00	60,00	60,00
Limburg-Noord	19,05	13,33	8,33	17,73
Limburg-Zuid	15,79	15,79	16,67	22,22
NO-Gelderland	36,36	36,36	34,82	31,82
Noord-Holland-Noord	33,31	34,62	37,50	44,43
Rotterdam-Rijnmond	40,00	37,50	31,58	33,32
Twente	20,86	31,57	27,93	16,07
Utrecht	37,93	33,03	36,23	32,04
Zaanstreek-Waterland	11,11	11,11	26,89	37,89
Zeeland	15,38	15,38	11,54	15,38
Zuid-Holland Zuid	15,79	21,05	21,05	20,16

There are clear differences visible in the percentage mayors with a liberal political background. In the different police regions the percentage ranged from approximately 10% up to 60%. Also throughout the years the percentage of mayors with a liberal political background changes. Some regions show an increase or decrease in the number of liberal parties. In addition, the average percentage of liberal parties is about 32 % for all four years.

Analysis

The clear differences in the percentage of mayors with a liberal background, make that if there is an effect of political background on the use of the temporary restraining order, this should become apparent in the outcomes of the regression analysis. Hereby it is expected that if there are more liberal parties in a region, less restraining orders are imposed.

Before conducting the regression analysis, once again a scatterplot and correlation analysis are conducted. The outcomes show that there is no (linear) relationship between the variables for the years 2009 until 2012. This can be seen in figure 5. The outcomes of the regression analysis also confirm this conclusion. There is no relation between political party of a mayor and the use of the temporary restraining order.

Figure 5. Scatterplots for the relationship between the temporary restraining orders and the political background of mayors in regions with a signing mandate





Figure 6. Scatterplots for the relationship between the temporary restraining order and the political background of mayors in police regions with a full mandate or a combination of mandate.



6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter an answer is given to the question which differences exist in the characteristics of the mayors in the different police regions and to what extent do these characteristics influence the use of the temporary restraining order. In the police regions there was a lot of collaboration between the municipalities. This makes that in 14 police regions all municipalities had a signing mandate and in 11 regions there was either a full mandate or a combination of the mandates. The regression analysis showed that the type of mandate used in a police region does influence the use of the temporary restraining order.

When looking at the average age of mayors in the police regions, barely any differences are visible. The regression analysis showed that the age of a mayor does not influence decision making. When looking at the percentage of female mayors in the Netherlands, clear differences are visible, the percentages range from 0% up to 50%. In 2010 there is a significant relationship between gender and the use of the temporary restraining order in police regions where there is a signing mandate, but this is in an opposite direction than expected. In 2010 male mayors issued more temporary restraining orders than female mayors in police regions where there is a signing mandate. In the Netherlands there are clear differences in the percentage of mayors with a liberal background. The percentages range from approximately 10 % to 60 %. The regression analysis shows that political background of a mayor does not explain the use of the temporary restraining order. This indicates that besides the type of mandate, the mayors personal characteristics barely influence the use of the temporary restraining order.

7. Selection regions and interviews

Selection of regions

As stated before, part of the research is to select six regions to gather more background information. The selecting of the regions did not occur by random sampling, but was based on the relative numbers of temporary restraining orders per region. Hereby regions are selected because they had a relatively high or low amount of temporary restraining order or because of there was a large increase or decrease in the number of restraining orders throughout the years. A decrease of the number of temporary restraining orders is not expected while the development of the average number of restraining orders is an increase each year.

There are more aspects that influence the use of the temporary restraining order, such as the number of notifications of domestic violence (where there is not an official report) or the amount of police reports. While the data on the severity and extent of the domestic violence problem was not available at the time when the police regions where selected, this could not be taken into account in the decision making.

The region with the largest (relative) number of temporary restraining orders is the Rotterdam region. This region has a steady increase of the number of temporary restraining orders throughout the years. Also the Twente region has a relative high number of temporary restraining orders. Within this region there are several documents about the use of the restraining order, which makes it possible to have a more useful analysis. This makes that both the Rotterdam and Twente region are selected for analysis.

There are also different regions where there is an interesting development in the amount of temporary restraining orders. In the Flevoland region for instance there is a decrease in the number of temporary restraining orders after the first year, followed by a large increase. Because of this unexpected development the Flevoland region is selected. There are other regions in which the development of the restraining orders is unexpected, because there are different decreases and increases. These regions are Utrecht, Gelderland Midden, Groningen and Limburg Noord. Of these regions, Utrecht is a region which first has a very low amount of temporary restraining orders until in 2012 the number of temporary restraining orders almost doubles compared to the year before. Therefore this region is also selected. Groningen and Gelderland-Midden together give an good picture of the average number of temporary restraining orders and they also have an interesting development throughout the years. Limburg Noord would also be an interesting region to study. However, the development is very similar to Gelderland Midden and the number of temporary restraining orders in the Gelderland region is closer to the average. Therefore the Gelderland Midden region is chosen and not Limburg Noord.

This means that the selected regions are:

- Flevoland
- Gelderland Midden
- Groningen
- Rotterdam
- Twente
- Utrecht

Interviews

In implementing the temporary restraining order the police plays a very important role. In most cases the basis police function responds to a domestic violence report, the police decides whether or not the assistant public prosecutor is contacted. While the police and also assistance organisations work on a regional level it is not feasible that all municipalities have an individual approach. The municipalities have to work together in order to make the approach successful there is often one organisation that has a leading role in the implementation of the temporary restraining order. Often it is even the case that there are only a few persons who play a very important role in the overall process of imposing temporary restraining orders. This makes it possible to interview a single person in the police region and still get a good overview of the situation in this police region.

For the research six persons were selected for an interview. Per police region the goal was to select one person for an interview. But in two regions there was a duo interview, because these two people together could give a more complete overview of the situation in the police regions. In order to select respondents for an interview, documents about the restraining order for the six regions were investigated. In appendix B the persons interviewed are given.

In the Netherlands there are differences visible in the approach of the police regions. Nevertheless, most regions have made the Support Centre for Domestic Violence an important organisation. In documents from the Flevoland region it was stated that the municipality of Almere plays an important role and specifically the policy official (Gemeente Almere, 2009). Therefore this person was selected for an interview.

Within the Gelderland Midden region an employee of the municipality of Arnhem was contacted who was mentioned in documents about the temporary restraining order. This person indicated that there were several people who could be interviewed. Several people were contacted of which some were on holiday. Moviera was also contacted and within this organisation someone was interviewed.

Eijkern, Baan and Veenstra (2010) state that the Advice and Support Center for Domestic Violence is coordinating the collaboration between the different partners in the Groningen region. This makes that within the support center there is likely an overview of the situation in the police region. Therefore the support center is contacted for an interview.

Within the Rotterdam region there is a project manager responsible for the temporary restraining order. In several documents it was mentioned that this person had an overview of the situation in Rotterdam and therefore this person was selected for an interview. In the Twente region two process managers were selected for an interview because they have an overview of the situation in the Twente region. The process managers have a more independent role, making sure they have information on the policy and how the temporary restraining order is implemented. In Utrecht the person responsible for the temporary restraining order was on vacation, that is why his replacement and an assistant public prosecutor were interviewed instead. Together they had an overview of the situation in the Utrecht police region.

8. Regions

In the previous chapter the influence of the severity and extent of domestic violence and the characteristics of the mayors on the use of the temporary restraining was examined. The analysis showed that most characteristics of the mayor do not influence the use of the temporary restraining order. In this chapter the outcomes of the interviews and municipal documents are used to describe to which extent the mayors influence, directly or indirectly, the use of temporary restraining order in the six police regions. Also some background information is given on the use of the restraining order in the police regions. The selected regions are Flevoland, Gelderland Midden, Groningen, Rotterdam, Twente and Utrecht.

Flevoland

The Flevoland region consists of six municipalities. These municipalities are: Almere, Dronten, Lelystad, Noordoostpolder, Urk and Zeewolde. Within the Flevoland police region the temporary restraining order is imposed since March 8, 2009 (Regio Flevoland, 2009). The number of temporary restraining orders in the Flevoland region is given in table 12. In the Flevoland region, arrangements have been made between different organizations regarding the implementation of the temporary restraining order. In an implementation document it is stated that a single implementation regime is necessary to ensure good cooperation between the different partners of the temporary restraining order, such as the police and assistance organizations (Koffijberg & Kriek, 2009). Hereby the Support Centre for Domestic Violence, in Flevoland called the Blijf Groep, plays a leading role in the implementation of the temporary restraining order (respondent Flevoland region, personal communications, July 18, 2013).

Table 12. The number of temporary restraining orders in Flevoland for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (absolute numbers and per 10.000 citizens)

	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of temporary restraining orders	58	22	40	89
Temporary restraining orders per 10.000 citizens	1.51	0.57	1.02	2.25

In the region there was a decrease in the number of temporary restraining order because “we had at the time no chief constable of the police” (respondent Flevoland region, personal communications, July 18, 2013). The interim police manager did not view the temporary restraining order as a priority. In addition, the police struggled with “the implementation of the temporary restraining order, because it is a relatively lengthy process” (respondent Flevoland region, personal communications, July 18, 2013). After a while the police got more attention for the temporary restraining order and as a result the number of temporary restraining orders has increased. In addition the mayor of Almere (who was also responsible for the management of the regional police) has given attention to the use of the temporary restraining order within the police department, which also contributed to the increase (respondent Flevoland region, personal communications, July 18, 2013).

Gelderland Midden

The Gelderland Midden region consists of 16 municipalities. Within the region the number of temporary restraining orders has increased and decreased over the years, as can be seen in table 13. Gelderland Midden police region there are two so called 'centre municipalities' for domestic violence, namely Arnhem and Ede (Mulder, 2013). Within the centre municipalities there are Support Centres for Domestic Violence, these are important in the approach of domestic violence. This has an influence on how the temporary restraining order is used in a region. A centre municipality is obliged to take initiative in the approach of domestic violence (Regioatlas, n.d.). Within the region there are two municipalities who have a leading role in the approach of the temporary restraining order within the Gelderland Midden region. In the Gelderland region the support centres are part of the organisation Moviera (Gemeente Arnhem, n.d.).

Table 13. The number of temporary restraining orders in Gelderland Midden for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (absolute numbers and per 10.000 citizens)

	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of temporary restraining orders	105	92	133	100
Temporary restraining orders per 10.000 citizens	1.61	1.4	2.02	1.51

In the Gelderland Midden region the decision for imposing a the temporary restraining order is taken by the mayor. Hereby the respondent expects that in a bigger city like Arnhem the decision is often taken by a deputy mayor or alderman. It is therefore possible that besides the mayor also the deputy mayor and alderman influence the use of the restraining order. In a small municipality this is not the case, because the mayor has a different position there (respondent Gelderland Midden region, personal communications, July 23, 2013).

The respondent states that there are differences between the mayors. Hereby liberal mayors have more objections towards the restraining order than mayors with a more left-wing background. When imposing the restraining order, the general pattern is that mayors make the same decisions as the police and the case manager have advised. There are differences visible in the process of imposing a restraining order for a mayor. Very rarely there are mayors who want to assess the whole situation, but most of the mayors ask the assistant public prosecutor for advice and follow this advice. It has occurred a few times in all the years that a mayor decides not to impose a temporary restraining order while the advice was to impose (respondent Gelderland Midden region, personal communications, July 23, 2013).

Between the municipalities within the regions, differences are visible because "the more experience municipalities have with the temporary restraining order, the better they get at implementing the law" (respondent Gelderland Midden region, personal communications, July 23, 2013). In municipalities with more experience, it is easier to consult with stakeholders and that in these municipalities the persons involved dare to take more risks (respondent Gelderland Midden region, personal communications, July 23, 2013).

The respondent indicates that there are two problems in the region that influence the use of the temporary restraining order. The first is that there are a lot of cutbacks for the different organisations. The second problem is that the covenants between the organisations involved with the temporary restraining order are out-dated, therefore there is no outside pressure to achieve the goals (respondent Gelderland Midden region, personal communications, July 23, 2013).

Groningen

The Groningen police region consists of 23 municipalities. In 2009 there were 25 municipalities, but the number of municipalities decreased through municipal mergers. In the Groningen municipality the temporary restraining order was imposed since march 2009, the other municipalities started imposing the temporary restraining order later in 2009 (Eijkern et al., 2010). In table 14 the number of temporary restraining orders in the region is given.

Table 14. The number of temporary restraining orders in Groningen for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (absolute numbers and per 10.000 citizens)

	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of temporary restraining orders	66	139	90	112
Temporary restraining orders per 10.000 citizens	1.15	2.41	1.55	1.93

“The power to impose a temporary restraining order, is mandated by all mayors in the Groningen region to specially trained assistant public prosecutors” (Eijkern, Baan, & Veenstra, 2010, p.7). This means that there is no direct influence of the mayor on the use of the temporary restraining order. In the Groningen municipality the assistant public prosecutor is responsible for the entire process of implementing a temporary restraining order. After a temporary restraining order is imposed, assistance is arranged for all the people involved. The process for imposing a restraining order is slightly different in the Groningen region than the standard process. In Groningen the basic police decides whether or not the basic criteria for a temporary restraining order are met. Then the chief of service is informed, who decides whether or not an assistant prosecutor is contacted. This means that there is an intermediate step in the process of imposing a temporary restraining order (Eijkern et al., 2010).

Groningen was one of the three places where a pilot was held about the temporary restraining order. During the pilot arrangements have been made about how the temporary restraining order was going to be implemented. After the measure was introduced, the process and the arrangements remained the same. There was a change in the number of assistant public prosecutors that are available for imposing a restraining order. First all assistant public prosecutors were qualified to impose temporary restraining order, but since two years a smaller group of assistant public prosecutors is working solely on imposing temporary restraining orders (respondent Groningen region, personal communications, July 25, 2013).

This information indicates that there is no influence of the mayor on the use of the restraining order, but this is not the case. In the Groningen region the influence of the mayor was visible in one of the municipalities. In this municipality there was a very low amount of temporary restraining orders, after the mayor paid attention to this, there was an increase visible in the number of temporary restraining orders (respondent Groningen region, personal communications, July 25, 2013). This indicates that attention from a mayor can lead to an increase in the number of temporary restraining orders.

Rotterdam

The Rotterdam- Rijnmond region consists of 19 municipalities. The biggest city in the region is Rotterdam. In the Rotterdam region the implementation of the temporary restraining order started January 1, 2009 because the mayor of Rotterdam at that time made it a priority to start immediately. From the start, agreements were made between the partners on how to implement the restraining order. Hereby the Rotterdam region has made the choice to financially invest in the possibility for many temporary restraining orders, among others by having a crisis service that is available 24/7. This ensures that no matter how many restraining orders are imposed, the financial investment is already made which results in more temporary restraining orders, as can be seen in table 15 (respondent Rotterdam region, personal communications, July 10, 2013).

Table 15. The number of temporary restraining orders in Rotterdam Rijnmond for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (absolute numbers and per 10.000 citizens)

	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of temporary restraining orders	413	498	522	593
Temporary restraining orders per 10.000 citizens	3.34	3.99	4.15	4.69

According to the respondent “police capacity is the most important deciding factor for how often the instrument is used” (respondent Rotterdam region, personal communications, July 10, 2013). In addition, the mayor also plays a role in the use of the restraining order, because if a mayor does not impose a temporary restraining order several times, while the police does not understand the reasons, this results in less initiative of the police for new temporary restraining orders (respondent Rotterdam region, personal communications, July 10, 2013).

Whether or not the use of the temporary restraining order is fully mandated, also has to do with the size of a municipality. This is because for big municipalities, especially when the use of the temporary restraining order is a big priority in a region, it is not doable for a mayor to take the decisions. The respondent further states that “in addition personal ideas of a mayor do play a role” (respondent Rotterdam region, personal communications, July 10, 2013). In smaller municipalities people know each other and therefore the process of imposing a temporary restraining order is more direct.

In the Rotterdam region some mayors have changed the mandate from a signing mandate to a full mandate. This is because firstly the mayors immediately get a message when a temporary restraining order is used, they are always informed. And second, after a while the mayors are used to the measure and feel less the need to be completely in charge (respondent Rotterdam region, personal communications, July 10, 2013). This means that the direct role of the mayors has decreased in the police region.

Twente

The Twente region consists of fourteen municipalities. Within the region several organisations work together for the implementation of the temporary restraining order. The organisations involved are the municipalities, the police, Youth Care and several assistance organisations. Hereby the respondents state that in all municipalities the same approach is used, to ensure that it does not matter in which municipality the restraining order is imposed (respondent Twente region, personal communications, July 1, 2013). In the Twente region all assistant public prosecutors were trained for the implementation of the temporary restraining order. Since October 2009, 21 assistant public prosecutors were selected for the implementation of the temporary restraining order, because this was considered more efficient (Van Zwieten & Bieleman, 2009).

Van Zwieten and Bieleman (2009) state that the mayors in the Twente region did not agree on which type of mandate to use in the region. Therefore both the full mandate and the signing mandate are used in the Twente region. Hereby seven of the fourteen municipalities have a full mandate and the seven other regions have a signing mandate (Veltman, 2010; Zwieten & Bieleman, 2009). The respondent states that “often you see the tendency, that the smaller the municipality, the more signing mandate and the bigger the city, the more full mandate” respondent Twente region, personal communications, July 1, 2013). In the Twente region it is possible for a mayor to withdraw a temporary restraining order, even in a situation where there is a full mandate (line 524). This means that a mayor can always influence the decision making.

The Twente region has a relatively high number of temporary restraining orders, compared to other regions, as can be seen in table 16. One of the reasons why the number of temporary restraining orders in the Twente region was quite high from the beginning is because the mayors have made the implementation of the temporary restraining order a priority. The mayors who consider the temporary restraining order very important, ensure that the other mayors recognize the importance of the restraining order respondent Twente region, personal communications, July 1, 2013).

Table 16. The number of temporary restraining orders in Twente for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (absolute numbers and per 10.000 citizens)

	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of temporary restraining orders	142	224	201	189
Temporary restraining orders per 10.000 citizens	2.29	3.59	3.21	3.02

In the Twente region the implementation of the temporary restraining order is conducted under the supervision of the municipality Enschede. Process managers are hired who are not related to a specific implementing agency, they have an independent role. Their role is placed between implementation and policy, resulting in short lines between the different organisations and government actors (respondent Twente region, personal communications, July 1, 2013).

Within the region there are differences in the number of temporary restraining orders per municipality. In Almelo for instance there are more restraining orders, because Almelo is a “working class city, with a lot of social problems, and it is a poor city, there is also poverty there and poverty is always, an increased risk” respondent Twente region, personal communications, July 1, 2013). Also Enschede has a higher number of restraining orders and also several social problems, but not as much as Almelo.

According to the respondents there are three municipalities who play a leading role in the use of the restraining order, these are the three biggest municipalities, Almelo, Hengelo and Enschede. In the beginning of the process someone of the Public Prosecution played a leading role in the implementation of the temporary restraining order. Also the policy advisor of the Enschede municipality is considered important in the Twente region. The mayors of Enschede and Almelo have a lot of knowledge about the problem of domestic violence and they also pay attention to the problem (respondent Twente region, personal communications, July 1, 2013). In the Twente region dealing with domestic violence and the temporary restraining order is a priority on the governance level.

Utrecht

The Utrecht region consist of 26 municipalities. First the region consisted of 29 municipalities, but the number of municipalities decreased through municipal mergers. Scheelbeek and Smeets (2010) state that within the regions the organizations cooperate, hereby the municipalities Utrecht and Amersfoort are important as center municipalities for domestic violence.

In the Utrecht region, it turned out that using a hundred assistant public prosecutors for the implementation of the temporary restraining order did not work. Therefore the number was decreased to thirty assistant public prosecutors in December 2011. The new approach assures that at any moment there are two assistant public prosecutors working (Gemeente Utrecht, 2011). In the following year the number of temporary restraining order almost doubled to the year before, as can be seen in table 17.

Table 17. The number of temporary restraining orders in Utrecht for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (absolute numbers and per 10.000 citizens)

	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of temporary restraining orders	76	113	93	172
Temporary restraining orders per 10.000 citizens	0.63	0.93	0.76	1.39

In the Utrecht region, the assistant public prosecutor conducts the test, but the mayor makes the decision and signs the decision (respondent Utrecht, personal communications, July 22, 2013). This approach takes up more time than it would if the assistant public prosecutor would conduct the entire process, which is considered one of the reasons why the region has lower amounts of temporary restraining orders than some other regions.

The respondent indicates that there is a difference in the way mayors cope with possible temporary restraining order cases, who are ambiguous. In smaller municipalities it occurs more often that the (deputy) mayor is more reluctant, among others, because they are less experienced in imposing temporary restraining orders. In bigger municipalities this occurs less often. In addition, if a mayor is involved in the subject of domestic violence, they can clearly contribute to and discuss more complicated cases (respondent Utrecht, personal communications, July 22, 2013).

In the Utrecht region there was an increase in the amounts of temporary restraining orders visible throughout the years. This is because it takes a while before the new measure is a part of the behaviour of all the persons involved (respondent Utrecht, personal communications, July 22, 2013). A big difference in the approach of the Utrecht region compared to for instance the Rotterdam region, is that the police only has to call the assistant public prosecutor. They do not have an additional role in the process of imposing a temporary restraining order.

Conclusion

This chapter describes to what extent differences in the severity and extent of domestic violence and characteristics of the mayors can explain variance in the use of temporary restraining order in the 25 police regions in the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2012.

In the Netherlands the use of the temporary restraining order can be partially explained by the severity and extent of domestic violence in the police region. The more severe and extensive the problem of domestic violence in a region, the more temporary restraining orders are imposed. When looking at the characteristics of the mayor it is clear that the type of mandate used in a police region does influence the use of the decision making. In police regions with a full mandate or combination of mandate, more temporary restraining orders are issued than in regions with a signing mandate. This outcome is consistent with the expectation that was described in the theory.

The other characteristics of the mayors barely have an influence. The age and political party of a mayor do not influence the use of the temporary restraining order. When looking at the gender of the mayor it shows that in the year 2010 there is a significant relationship between the gender of a mayor and the use of the temporary restraining order in police regions with a signing mandate. Hereby male mayors issued more restraining orders than female mayors, this is opposite as described in the theory. For the other years there is no relationship between the gender of a mayor and the use of the temporary restraining order. In the theory the expectation was described that all the characteristics of the mayor would influence the use of the temporary restraining order, but in this study, there is not sufficient proof that this is actually the case.

The interviews that were conducted show that despite the outcomes of the regression analysis, mayors do influence the use of the restraining order to some extent. In the different regions the role of the mayor is visible. If mayors state that domestic violence is a priority, this has a positive effect on the use of the temporary restraining order. Besides the mayor, it is also important to have other persons, for instance within the police or municipality, involved with the temporary restraining order who take a leading role and who continue to draw attention to the importance of the temporary restraining order.

The outcomes of the study indicate that the type of mandate used in a police region and the gender of a mayor does influence the use of the temporary restraining order. This is an important conclusion. It may not be desirable that there is an influence of mandate or gender on the use of the temporary restraining order, because of possible unequal treatment of citizens. In the future it would be interesting to conduct the study on a municipal level to get a clearer picture of the differences between municipalities. In addition, it might be useful to examine whether it is desirable that for instance the type of mandate used in a police region influences the use of the restraining order and how these differences can be reduced.

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Inleiding

Risicotaxatie-instrument Huiselijk Geweld

Waar kijkt u naar?

Met het Risicotaxatie-instrument Huiselijk Geweld (RiHG) beoordeelt u als Hulpofficier van Justitie (HovJ) of er bij deze situatie van (mogelijk) huiselijk geweld een huisverbod wordt opgelegd. Met behulp van het RiHG verzamelt u informatie over drie zaken: (1) de mogelijke pleger van huiselijk geweld, (2) het verloop van het geweldsincident en (3) de gezinsachtergronden. In het totaal beoordeelt u 20 signalen.

Hoe werkt het instrument?

Bij ieder signaal wordt een aantal punten (feiten en omstandigheden) genoemd die allemaal moeten worden nagelopen. De punten die van toepassing zijn, moet u aankruisen.

Er gelden twee vuistregels

- Bij sommige signalen zijn de daaronder genoemde punten ongeveer van gelijke orde. Hoe meer punten u in het incident terugziet, hoe duidelijker het signaal (= sterker).
- Bij sommige signalen nemen de daaronder genoemde punten in ernst toe. (Dit is aangeduid met het volgende symbool: ) Hoe meer van de laatste punten u in het incident terugziet, hoe duidelijker het signaal (= sterker).

Geef voor ieder signaal op grond van het beeld dat u zich heeft gevormd een oordeel. U doet dit door één van de symbolen ( = 'sterk signaal',  = 'matig signaal' of  = 'zwak of geen signaal') te omcirkelen.

Drie beoordelingsmomenten

Er zijn drie momenten waarop u de tussenstand opmaakt. Dat wordt precies aangegeven in het RiHG. U moet dan de symbolen met dezelfde kleur optellen. Op basis hiervan volgt een (tussen)oordeel. Aan het eind van het RiHG volgt het beslismoment over het eventueel opleggen van een huisverbod.

LET OP: voor een juiste risicotaxatie dienen alle pagina's ingevuld te worden!

Het RiHG vormt de formele basis op grond waarvan een huisverbod al dan niet wordt opgelegd.

Het is daarom absoluut noodzakelijk dat u het RiHG volledig invult.

Degene die het huisverbod krijgt opgelegd, dient meerderjarig te zijn en op het adres waar het incident zich voordoet te wonen, dan wel meer dan incidenteel daar te verblijven.

Gegevens

Naam HovJ:

Politieregio, bureau / afdeling / team:

Datum incident:

Adres waar incident geconstateerd:

Naam en geboortedatum slachtoffer:

Naam en geboortedatum (mogelijke) pleger:

Eerste screening:

De (mogelijke) pleger van huiselijk geweld

▲ = sterk signaal
 ■ = matig signaal
 ○ = geen/zwak signaal

1. Antecedenten & incidenten (op basis van politieregistratie)

- Registraties (HKS) en mutaties geweld ☐
- Registraties (HKS) en mutaties zeden ☐
- Registraties (HKS) en mutaties wapengerelateerd ☐
- Registraties (HKS) en mutaties overig ☐

Beoordeling:

▲ ■ ○

LET OP!: Registratie (HKS) / mutaties geweld én zeden = 2x rood

▲▲

2. Mate van aanspreekbaarheid

- Volledig in de war ☐
- Apatisch, zich extreem afsluiten ☐
- Gewelddadig, onhandelbaar, niet te corrigeren (tegen slachtoffer of derden zoals de politie) ☐
- Extreem jaloers tegenover slachtoffer ☐
- Dreigementen om zichzelf wat aan te doen of zichzelf daadwerkelijk verwonden ☐

Beoordeling:

▲ ■ ○

3. Riskante gewoonten: alcohol en/of drugs

- Signalen wijzend op verslaving of excessief gebruik alcohol ☐
- Signalen wijzend op verslaving of excessief gebruik soft drugs ☐
- Signalen wijzend op verslaving of excessief gebruik hard drugs ☐
- Onder behandeling (geweest) voor verslaving ☐
- Op het moment fors gedronken (of sterk vermoeden) ☐
- Op het moment drugs gebruikt (of sterk vermoeden) ☐

Beoordeling:

▲ ■ ○

Totaal aantal

☐ ☐ ☐

Eerste beoordelingsmoment *Kruis het vakje achter uw beoordeling aan*

twee of meer ▲ signalen = hoog risico ☐

Eén ▲ signaal en twee ■ signalen = risico ☐

Overwegend ○ signalen = geen/laag risico ☐

► Beoordeling overnemen bij eindbeslissing

Tweede screening:

Het verloop van een (gewelds)incident

4. Bedreiging (Let op: neemt in ernst toe)

- Verbaal (schelden, schreeuwen) ☐
- Dreigen met fysiek geweld ☐
- Dreigen met wapen ☐
- Dreigen met doden ☐

Beoordeling:



5. Psychisch geweld

Slachtoffer onder druk zetten door/bedreigen met:

- Geweld tegen kinderen en/of huisgenoten ☐
- Geweld tegen huisdieren ☐
- Vernielen (dierbare) eigendommen van het slachtoffer ☐
- Vernederen of dwingen iets tegen de wil te doen ☐

Beoordeling:



6. Lichamelijk geweld

- Duwen, schoppen, stompen, haren trekken ☐
- Zware kneuzingen, brandwonden, gebroken ledematen ☐
- Verwonden met wapen ☐
- Verwuring ☐

Beoordeling:



7. Seksueel geweld

- Verkrachting of aanranding ☐
- Gedwongen sex of prostitutie ☐
- (Vermoeden van) kindermisbruik ☐

Beoordeling:



8. Zwaarte van de intimidatie

- Geweld is willekeurig en volstrekt zonder aanleiding ☐
- Dreiging van) plotselinge, extreme uitbarsting van geweld ☐
- Zwaar fysiek geweld (al dan niet met ernstig letsel) ☐
- Slachtoffer is totaal niet weerbaar ☐

Beoordeling:



9. Geweldsontwikkeling

- De zwaarte van het geweld is de laatste jaren toegenomen ☐
- De frequentie van geweld is de laatste jaren toegenomen ☐

Beoordeling:



10. Wapens			
In bezit van vuurwapen	<input type="checkbox"/>		
In bezit van wapenvergunning	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Gebruik van slagwapen, steekwapen of (nep-)vuurwapen	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Gebruik van 'toevallige' wapens (servies, asbak, keukenmes)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Beoordeling:			
11. Gevaarsniveau wapengebruik (Let op: neemt in ernst toe)			
Ermee dreigen	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Ermee gooien van een afstand	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Slachtoffer er direct mee verwonden (direct fysiek contact)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Bewuste (bedoelde) verwonding slachtoffer (min of meer met voorbedachte rade)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Beoordeling:			
12. Aanwezigheid van kinderen			
Kinderen getuige van geweld	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Kinderen apathisch, huilerig of schrikachtig	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Geweld gepleegd tegen kinderen (alle vormen)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Kinderen gewond	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Ondertoezichtstelling en/of andere kinderschermingsmaatregel	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Beoordeling:			
13. Geweldsverwachting			
Slachtoffer vreest toekomstig geweld	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Beoordeling:			
14. Rechtvaardiging achteraf (Let op: neemt in ernst toe)			
Berouw tonen, maar verschuilen achter externe oorzaken	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Ontkennen/minimaliseren van het geweld	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Rechtvaardigen (normaal vinden) van geweld	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Beoordeling:			
Totaal aantal		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Tweede beoordelingsmoment *Kruis het vakje achter uw beoordeling aan*

Twee of meer signalen	= hoog risico	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Eén signaal en zes of meer signalen	= risico	<input type="checkbox"/>	► Beoordeling overnemen bij eindbeslissing
Overwegend signalen	= geen/laag risico	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Derde screening:

De (gezins)achtergronden

15. Spanning door werkgerelateerde problemen

- (Langdurige) werkloosheid ☐
- Recent ontslag/dreiging ontslag ☐
- Problemen rondom WAO of WW uitkering ☐
- Spanningen op het werk ☐

Beoordeling:

▲ □ ○

16. Spanning door financiële problemen

- Veel schulden ☐
- Financieel niet kunnen rondkomen ☐
- Vermoeden van een gokprobleem ☐

Beoordeling:

▲ □ ○

17. Spanning door familie- en relatieproblemen

- Problemen met kinderen uit een eerdere relatie ☐
- Niet accepteren van een zwangerschap ☐
- Onenigheid over opvoeding kinderen ☐
- Gedragsproblemen bij kinderen (bijvoorbeeld huilbaby's) ☐
- Lopende echtscheidingsprocedure ☐
- Overige relatieproblemen ☐
- Problemen rondom verblijfsvergunning ☐

Beoordeling:

▲ □ ○

18. Sociaal isolement door beperkte vriendenkring / kennissenkring

- Contacten strikt beperken (binnen eigen cultuur of geloof) ☐
- Contacten met buitenwereld alleen via pleger huiselijk geweld ☐
- Verbieden van contact met vrienden of bekenden ☐

Beoordeling:

▲ □ ○

19. Sociaal isolement door rollenpatroon

- Pleger controleert financiën (of bijvoorbeeld paspoort) ☐
- Slachtoffer heeft geen zeggenschap binnenshuis ☐
- Slachtoffer mag niet/amper buitenshuis komen ☐

Beoordeling:

▲ □ ○

20. Sociaal isolement door onaangepast gezin:

- Er is geen contact te maken met het gezin ☐
- Geschillen met anderen worden door ruzie/geweld opgelost ☐
- Binnen het gezin is er veel ruzie ☐
- Antecedenten slachtoffer ☐
- Antecedenten andere gezinsleden ☐
- Sociaal isolement door excessief middelengebruik/verslaving ☐

Beoordeling:



Totaal aantal

☐ ☐ ☐

Derde beoordelingsmoment *Kruis het vakje achter uw beoordeling aan*

Twee of meer signalen = hoog risico ☐

Eén signaal en drie of meer signalen = risico ☐

Overwegend signalen = geen/laag risico ☐

► Beoordeling overnemen
bij eindbeslissing

Eindbeslissing *Neem hier het resultaat over van de drie beoordelingsmomenten*

Eerste beoordelingsmoment: hoog risico ☐ risico ☐ laag/geen risico ☐

Tweede beoordelingsmoment: hoog risico ☐ risico ☐ laag/geen risico ☐

Derde beoordelingsmoment: hoog risico ☐ risico ☐ laag/geen risico ☐

- Een of meerdere beoordelingsmomenten met **hoog risico** is huisverbod
- Alle drie de beoordelingsmomenten met **risico** is huisverbod

Uiteindelijk oordeel huisverbod: ja ☐ nee ☐

Zie de volgende pagina voor toelichting en ondertekening >

Toelichting

Belangrijkste signalen (feiten en omstandigheden) die hebben geleid tot een huisverbod:
(ook vermelden in het proces verbaal)

Reactie van de uithuisgeplaatste en slachtoffer op het voornemen tot het opleggen van een huisverbod (ook vermelden in het proces verbaal):

Overige punten van belang:

Ondergetekende heeft alle signalen nagelopen en de feiten en omstandigheden die van toepassing waren aangekruist. Aldus naar waarheid ingevuld.

Naam en dienstnummer:

Datum:

Handtekening:

In opdracht van

Landelijk Programma Huiselijk Geweld en de Politietaak

RiHG

Risicotaxatie-instrument Huiselijk Geweld

Versie 2.2

Ontwikkeling

Advies- en Onderzoeksgroep Beke

Bestellen RiHG

Politiefunctionarissen kunnen het RiHG bestellen bij:

VTS Politie Nederland

Postbus 608

7300 AP Apeldoorn

Bestelfax: 055 527 61 21

Artikelnummer: 5200280000

Verzend- en behandelkosten per set van 50 stuks: € 9,75

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Appendix B. Persons interviewed

The following persons were interviewed in the six police regions:

Flevoland police region

July 18, 2013

Annelies de Maar

Police advisor municipality Almere for among others the temporary restraining order

Gelderland-Midden police region

July 23, 2013

Bob Weysters

Casemanager temporary restraining order (since 2012 process director huiselijk geweld)

Groningen police region

July 25, 2013

Febo Sedens

Coordination temporary restraining order

Rotterdam - Rijnmond police region

July 10, 2013

Sara Etty

Project leader temporary restraining order

Twente police region

July 1, 2013

Jenny Hogenelst

Process manager

Matthie Kroezen

Process manager

Utrecht police region

July 22, 2013

Petra Klein

Implementation temporary restraining order for the municipality Utrecht

Kees Combuur

Assistant public prosecutor

Appendix C. List of questions interviews

Allereerst wil ik u bedanken voor het meewerken aan dit interview.

Om er zeker van te zijn dat we uw antwoorden goed overnemen zou ik het gesprek graag opnemen. De gegevens worden anoniem verwerkt en de opnames worden na een maand vernietigt. Gaat u hiermee akkoord?

- 1. Wat is uw leeftijd?**
- 2. Voor welke organisatie werkt u?**
- 3. Hoe lang werkt u al voor deze organisatie?**
- 4. Bent u betrokken bij de uitvoering van het huisverbod?**
 - a. Zo ja hoe lang al?
 - b. Welke rol vervult u bij de uitvoering van het huisverbod?
- 5. Kunt u in het kort iets vertellen over uw functie en werkzaamheden?**

Ik wil graag wat meer weten over de manier waarop in de regio het tijdelijk huisverbod wordt uitgevoerd. Wanneer gesproken wordt over de regio, heeft dit betrekking op de voormalige politieregio's.

- 6. Kunt u iets vertellen over de uitvoering van het huisverbod in uw regio?**
- 7. In hoeverre zijn er verschillen in de uitvoering van het huisverbod van gemeenten binnen de regio?**
- 8. Zijn er binnen de regio gemeenten die een leidende rol spelen in de aanpak van het huisverbod?**

Zo ja, welke gemeenten? En wat doen deze gemeenten dan?
- 9. Zijn er binnen de regio personen die een leidende rol spelen in de aanpak van het huisverbod? Zo ja, welke? En wat doen deze personen dan?**
- 10. In hoeverre sturen gemeenten binnen de regio de uitvoering van het huisverbod via beleid?**
- 11. In hoeverre sturen gemeenten binnen de regio de uitvoering van het huisverbod via financiële middelen?**
- 12. In hoeverre is er binnen de regio onderling overleg tussen gemeenten en andere partijen over de uitvoering van het huisverbod?**

(omdat hulpverleningsinstanties en politie (vaak) op regionaal niveau werken, iedere gemeente andere aanpak?)
- 13. Zijn er momenten geweest waarop (eerste) ervaringen tot een andere aanpak hebben geleid? (Juist meer doen of zelfs minder).**
 - a. Wat is er toen veranderd?
 - b. Op wiens initiatief vonden deze veranderingen plaats?

14. Was er tussen 2009 en 2012 voldoende capaciteit in uw gemeente voor de uitvoering van het huisverbod?

15. Wat was globaal het aantal huisverboden in de regio in 2009. Wat was globaal het aantal huisverboden in 2012. Heeft u een verklaring voor de verandering tussen 2009 en 2012?

- a. Heeft de verandering in het aantal huisverboden geleid tot een andere aanpak?

16. In hoeverre zijn er verschillen in het aantal huisverboden van de gemeenten binnen de regio?

- a. Waarom denkt u dat in sommige gemeenten het huisverbod vaker wordt ingezet dan in andere gemeenten?

17. In hoeverre bent u op de hoogte van verschillen in het aantal huisverboden per regio in Nederland? Worden er in uw regio meer of minder huisverboden opgelegd dan in de rest van Nederland? Heeft u een verklaring voor dit verschil?

Ik wil graag meer weten over de rol van de burgemeester bij het tijdelijk huisverbod.

18. Wat is de rol van de burgemeester in de regio/gemeente bij de uitvoering van het huisverbod? (wordt er veel gemandateerd/zijn er evt. instructies voor de HovJ)?

- a. Kunt u iets vertellen over de reden van mandaat in regio/gemeente? (wordt er aangeraden om voor een mandaat te kiezen, of is dit alleen de keuze van de burgemeester)

19. Ziet u verschillen in de betrokkenheid van burgemeesters bij de uitvoering van het huisverbod?

- a. Zo ja, welke verschillen.
- b. Waarom denkt u dat sommige burgemeesters vaak en andere weinig betrokken zijn bij de uitvoering van het huisverbod?

Wilt u nog opmerkingen maken met betrekking tot het interview?

IK WIL U GRAAG HARTELIJK BEDANKEN VOOR DIT INTERVIEW! IK STUUR U NA AFLOOP VAN HET ONDERZOEK MIJN RAPPORT OP.