

Approach and Avoidance Motivations in Vicarious and Individual Shame.

Master Thesis
of
Lea K. Hildebrandt
s0157163

As part of the masters' program
Psychology,
Consumer & Behavior Track,
University of Twente,
Enschede, Netherlands.

Supervisor:
Dr.ir. Peter de Vries,
Department of Psychology of Conflict, Risk, & Safety,
University of Twente,
Enschede, Netherlands.

Co-Assessor:
Dr. Mirjam Galetzka,
Department of Communication Science – Corporate and Marketing Communication
University of Twente,
Enschede, Netherlands

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Abstract

Shame can be a very painful, but usually also a privately experienced emotion. Recently, a rather social, vicarious version has gained popularity in both research and everyday language, which is elicited by witnessing someone else transgressing a norm. Individual shame is related to a withdrawal motivation, but the motivational consequences of vicarious shame are not so clear. Interestingly, no research so far has accounted for the different social contexts in which vicarious shame occurs. The aim of this master thesis was to investigate differences in approach and avoidance motivations related to vicarious and individual shame, accounting for the fact that either oneself or another person is responsible for the transgression. For this aim, scenarios that induced either one of these two emotions or one of two control emotions (vicarious and individual pride) were used, which were followed by questionnaire measures aimed at measuring different aspects of approach and avoidance. The results of this study confirm that individually ashamed participants would want to avoid any subsequent encounter with witnesses of their transgression, while vicariously ashamed participants showed a high approach motivation. This difference was found to be mediated by intensity of shame experienced. When this encounter could not be avoided, individually ashamed participants would stay close to their in-group, possibly hoping for comfort, whereas vicariously ashamed participants avoided the transgressor and approached the judging audience, likely to shift the attention to other, more positive aspects of their selves.

Introduction

Having tripped in front of a large audience, discovering that a joke made was rather inappropriate in a given situation, or failing an important exam – everyone is most likely familiar with the feeling of wishing the ground would swallow one up. This emotion is known as shame. Shame can be a very painful negative emotion that is associated with the desire to disappear or hide (e.g. Tangney & Dearing, 2002). It usually results from a failure to act in line with our own or others expectations. This means that we experience shame when *we* do something wrong; a (perceived) personal responsibility is thus an important precondition for shame to occur. Recently, however, the term for a different form of shame has emerged in colloquial language as well as scientific research: vicarious shame, describing the feeling of being ashamed on behalf of another person's wrongdoing. Lacking the personal responsibility for the wrong behavior, vicarious shame occurs in a different context than individual shame. The question then arises whether vicarious shame is similarly associated with a desire to disappear, i.e. an avoidance motivation. Because research on vicarious shame is still scarce, the aim of this thesis is to investigate whether differences exist in the motivational consequences of vicarious and (individual) shame.

Shame

Shame – like guilt, embarrassment, and pride – belongs to the *self-conscious emotions* (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2004, 2007). This group of emotions depends on an objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), which means that we evaluate our self-representation as from an external point of view, such as from that of an audience. We constantly compare our behavior with standards that are based on our desires, expectations, and norms (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004). If we detect a discrepancy between our displayed behavior and the way we would like to behave, we experience a self-conscious emotion. For example, whenever we notice that we fall short of our expectations, we experience a negative emotion (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Carver, 2006),

such as shame or guilt. This is in line with Cooley's (1902) Looking-Glass Self: We constantly imagine how we appear to and are judged by other people, which results in either pride or shame. Importantly, as Leary (2007) noted, self-conscious emotions mainly depend on one's own inferences about other people's evaluations of oneself and not on one's own self-evaluation.

Leary (2007) furthermore emphasized the relationship between self-motives, especially self-enhancement, and self-conscious emotions. The judgment of others – or social acceptance – is, according to Leary's Sociometer Theory (e.g. Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), indexed by self-esteem. He defines the “desire to maintain, protect, and enhance one's self-esteem” (pp. 319-320), as a self-motive: self-enhancement. Therefore, due to our need for social connections (i.e. social acceptance), we constantly self-evaluate in order to protect our self-esteem. A negative self-evaluation can threaten the integrity of our identity, which could result in a self-conscious emotion like shame (Leary, 2007).

Function of self-conscious emotions. The ability to imagine ourselves in past and future enables us to anticipate the intense and painful experience of shame. This pain can be seen as a punishment that we want to avoid experiencing and therefore we would avoid a subsequent loss of face (Baumeister et al., 2007; Leary, 2007). In contrast, positive, pride-eliciting behavior is reinforced. Self-conscious emotions thus trigger *self-regulation* of interpersonal behavior, leading one to “subordinate one's own interests in favor of those of the group or other people” (Leary, 2007, p. 330). Accordingly, self-conscious emotions function by alerting people and “guiding behavior, motivating people to adhere to norms and morals, affectively punishing misbehaviors, and promoting corrective actions following misdeeds” (Leary, 2007, p. 335).

Shame vs. embarrassment and guilt. Shame and embarrassment are often used interchangeably. Sabini and Silver (1997) suggest that embarrassment and shame are equally painful *during* misbehavior, but embarrassment is afterwards judged as less painful. Tangney

and colleagues (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) indicate that embarrassment is associated with feeling foolish about a surprising but rather humorous event. This event is often of a non-moral, rule-breaking nature (Keltner, 1995; Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). However, Sabini and Silver disagree with Tangney and colleagues concerning the assumption that embarrassment and shame are different emotions. This question remains open, but it can be concluded that embarrassment is (retrospectively) less painful than shame.

Guilt seems to be more easily distinguishable from shame, but research has shown that we have a hard time doing so (Smith et al., 2002). Even in research itself, shame is often discussed by comparing it to guilt. The distinction between the two emotions has long thought to be grounded in the type of transgression (i.e. social vs. moral; e.g., Olthof, Schouten, Kuiper, Stegge, & Jennekens-Schinkel, 2000) or how public this transgression is (e.g., Johnson et al., 1987). However, neither of these assumptions has been proven correct, as any possible transgression can lead to either of the two emotions (or most commonly a combination of both) and both emotions can occur in the absence of an audience¹ (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 1996, 2007).

Now widely accepted is Lewis (1971) suggestion that the difference between shame and guilt lies in the appraisals made. When being ashamed, we would evaluate our whole self negatively, whereas when feeling guilty only the respective wrong behavior is negatively evaluated. When ashamed, one might for example think: “I feel bad because I am such a bad person”. In contrast, while feeling guilty, one might think: “I feel bad because I did this stupid thing”. Findings from Tangney and colleagues (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney et al., 1996) and other researchers (Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1990; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995) support this approach. For example, Niedenthal et al. (1994) found that inducing counterfactual thinking focused either on the self (“if only I

¹Smith et al. (2002) proposed that two different types of shame might exist: one that is more public and related to the fear of losing one’s reputation, whereas the other can be felt in private and is associated with self-contempt.

weren't...") or on one's behavior ("if only I hadn't...") lead to experiences of shame and guilt, respectively.

This appraisal-based definition implies that the core self, our identity, is not as much affected when feeling guilty than when ashamed. We might feel regret or remorse but still have a sense of control (Lewis, 1971). Similarly, Sabini and Silver (1997) emphasize that a feeling of responsibility, i.e. not having tried hard enough, is associated with guilt. Shame, on the other hand, is the more painful emotion and is accompanied by feeling small, worthless and powerless (Lewis, 1971; Tangney et al., 1996; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983).

Correspondingly, Tracy and Robins' (2004) appraisal-based model of self-conscious emotions indicates that shame is related to internal, stable, global attributions, whereas guilt is caused by internal, unstable and specific attributions. In addition, Smith et al. (2002) concluded that shame is associated with an external focus: the judgment by (imaginary) others. Guilt, in contrast, is internally focused on the act of transgressing a norm.

Motivational consequences of shame vs. guilt. These different appraisals implicate different *action tendencies* or *behavioral motivations* (de Hooze, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Lewis, 1971). Because guilt arises from focusing only on certain wrong behaviors, guilty individuals might be able to repair the damage done to their self by dissociating themselves from their behavior. A possible way to do so is by apologizing or performing other reparative actions. When ashamed, in contrast, the core self is negatively evaluated, "which increases the difficulty of reacting appropriately" (Wicker et al., 1983, p.36). In order to protect the self from even more damage, the motivation associated with shame is a desire to hide, escape or disappear.

Hence, shame is associated with distancing or avoidance motivations, whereas guilt leads to approach of a witnessing audience (Schmader & Lickel, 2006). Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman (2010) found that shame is related to proscriptive regulation ("should not", avoidance of anti-goal) and guilt to prescriptive regulation ("should", approach of goal). Even though the

latter relationship was not clearly found in all studies (Schmader & Lickel, 2006), it is also reflected in the findings that guilt is more ‘other-oriented’ and pro-social than shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Teroni & Deonna, 2008; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Accordingly, guilty individuals show increased perspective taking, empathy and altruism (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tracy & Robins, 2004). In contrast, shame is described as the more egocentric and less adaptive emotion of the two. It is associated with a “greater alienation from others [... and] a greater desire to punish others, compete with them.” (Wicker et al., 1983, p. 36).

Although the link between shame and avoidance motivations is broadly accepted, evidence exists showing that shame could elicit pro-social (approach) motivations, such as making amends or showing pro-social behavior (de Hooze, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; de Hooze et al., 2010; Frijda, 1986; Tangney et al., 1996). De Hooze et al. (2010) have speculated that shame generally causes the desire to undo the situation and repair the damage done. Only if such a behavior is too risky, shame would lead to avoidance or distancing.

Similarly, Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, and Brown (2012) argue that the prevailing view of shame defines it as inherently self-defensive, including a feeling of inferiority that is linked to avoidance. Specific, non-global shame, which does not include feeling inferior, would therefore lead to pro-social motivations.

These suggestions imply that the distinction between shame and guilt based on approach and avoidance might be ambiguous, especially against the background of Tangney and Dearing’s (2002) proposition that guilt-free shame and shame-free guilt are rare. An important question that arises from this on-going debate is whether the methods often used in shame research are biased towards extreme shame. For example, rather severe events might be more salient in memory and therefore more easily recalled in the often used narrative recall paradigm. Similarly, de Hooze et al (2010) argue that measures of dispositional shame-proneness or chronic shame are often utilized instead of inducing shame in the participants. In shame prone individuals as well as under chronic shame, shame is more intensive and

moreover persistent. Therefore, again, only extreme cases might be studied with these approaches. Inducing shame in the participants, in contrast, allows for higher control and a comparable sample, which could shed a clearer light on the motivations that are caused by shame.

In summary, even though the question whether and how shame differs from embarrassment and guilt is still open to debate, it can be said that shame is a very painful, negative emotion that is elicited by a *personal* transgression of a moral or social norm. A threat to the integrity of one's identity accompanies this emotion, which likely leads to an avoidance tendency of witnesses of the transgression.

This conception of shame, however, raises the question of how this emotion – that highly depends on personal responsibility – can be felt vicariously, thus in response to the transgression of another person.

Vicarious shame

Experiencing an emotion in response to the behavior of someone else is relatively common. For example, one feels angry or disappointed when hurt by another person's behavior. Similarly, one might experience Schadenfreude or envy if a disliked person performs worse or better than oneself (Steinbeis & Singer, 2013). However, these emotions are often elicited either by behavior directed at oneself or by comparing oneself to the other. The behavior eliciting vicarious emotions, on the other hand, often is not directly relevant for oneself. It occurs by simply observing another person in a situation that could likewise lead to a certain individual emotion, such as shame.

Different terms, which are sometimes used interchangeably, exist to describe this sort of emotions. Often, *collective* emotions refer to instances where a broad category, such as nationality, is at the core of the emotion. For example, it has been found that Dutch participants feel collectively guilty when reminded of historical wrongdoings of representatives of their nation (i.e. the colonization of Indonesia; Doosje, Branscombe,

Spears, & Manstead, 1998). *Group-based* emotions reflect emotions that one possibly shares with a whole group and that are elicited in response to wrongdoings of the whole group or single members of it. One could, for example feel guilty because one's peer group treated a different group in an unfair way. *Vicarious* emotions do not necessarily depend on a group but can also be elicited in a dyad (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012). The term stands for emotions that do not need to be shared with other members of a group and that are usually elicited by the wrongdoing of just one other person. Even though no clear boundaries between these three processes exist, I will focus on the latter.

In addition, Welten, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans (2012) recently proposed that two different processes could explain the occurrence of vicarious shame: one that is related to empathy and one that is based on a shared social identity. In their studies, Welten and colleagues (2012) used autobiographical recall and videos to induce shame, and pairs of questions to measure shared identity (i.e. "The behaviour of the other reflected badly upon me") and empathy (i.e. "I imagined myself in the other person's situation"). They found that vicarious shame based on empathy is related to (non-)familiarity and associated with approach motivations, whereas the shared-identity based shame is related to avoidance. Support for the dependence on empathic processes in vicarious emotions comes from Krach et al. (2011), who showed that vicarious embarrassment is mediated by trait empathy. Importantly, Krach and colleagues did not distinguish between the factors of familiarity and shared identity and appeared to have mainly used vignettes about unfamiliar others, with whom no salient shared in-group exists. This could explain why they found empathy to be important but not a shared social identity.

Empathy has been defined as a *shared* affective state that occurs in response to either observing or imagining another's affective state (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). However, looking at Welten and colleagues' (2012) methods and explanation, it shows that they are using empathy interchangeably with the term empathic concern. Empathic concern, however,

is a process similar to sympathy and compassion that does not depend on a shared affective state (Singer & Lamm, 2009; Singer, 2012).

In line with these definitions, Paulus, Müller-Pinzler, Westermann, and Krach (2013) distinguish between empathic and vicarious emotions, suggesting that empathic emotions depend on the perceiver and the target sharing the emotion. Vicarious emotions, they propose, are a broader category that include empathic emotions, but do not depend on shared feelings. They further suggest that both types are related to simulation processes, which lead to mapping the other's bodily states or to projecting oneself into the other's position. A similar distinction is made by Stocks, Lishner, Waits, and Downum (2011), who distinguish between 'imagine-self' and 'imagine-other'. According to them, imagining being in a transgressor's situation would lead to embarrassment and avoidance. In contrast, imagining how the other would feel, one would experience empathic concern and a motivation to approach that other person. Therefore, Paulus et al.'s (2013) vicarious emotions could also be called empathetically concerned or sympathetic emotions.

However, as Welten et al. (2012) have pointed out, a different vicarious shame exists that is based on a shared identity. This is in line with Lickel et al.'s (2005) pioneering research on vicarious emotions. Based on the research tradition on self-conscious emotions, Lickel et al. (2005) define vicarious shame by differentiating it from vicarious guilt. They propose that which of the two emotions is experienced depends on the association felt with other people, as defined by two dimensions: *interpersonal interdependence* and *shared social identity*. The former is characterized by a high degree of interaction, joint goals and shared norms. Relationships with a high degree of interdependence, such as a close friendship, are assumed to be related to vicarious guilt². Transgressions in groups defined by a high degree of the latter dimension, shared identity, are thought to lead to a feeling of shame. In contrast to

² Notice the overlap with Welten et al.'s (2012) concept of (non-)familiarity, which in that case is proposed to predict empathic shame.

interdependence, shared identity does not depend on any interaction or shared goals. It is rather related to a perception of belonging to the same social group.

Therefore, it seems that different routes can lead to (possibly different accounts of what is called) vicarious shame. Welten et al. (2012) argue that both routes described by them lead to the same emotion, due to the fact that both include a self-threat. However, looking closely at the differences between empathy and empathic concern, it is not clear how empathic concern, i.e. feeling bad for someone else, is related to a self-threat. Also, empathic shame, based on imagining oneself in the situation of the other, does, in my opinion, only lead to an imagined threat to the self. However, the (rather egocentric) feeling that the behavior of another person reflects badly upon oneself can indeed threaten the self, as can be explained by the Social Identity Theory. Therefore, this sort of vicarious shame will be the focus of this thesis.

The social identity. Being one of the most influential theories in social psychology, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) states that our identity consists not only of our personal self, but also of a social component. More precisely, this social identity is derived from the memberships in certain social groups, the in-groups. This in-group membership stems from sharing certain characteristics, such as hobbies, nationality, or occupation. Because we can identify with several very different characteristics, we have a great number of social identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Interestingly, this implies that the social self is not static: The perception of the self in respect to others is based on the saliency of certain characteristics in the current context (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002).

Paradoxically, this implies that another person can be a member of one's in-group at a given time but be part of the out-group (which consists of all people that are not in the in-group) at the next moment. For example, a Dutch woman might identify with a German woman when protesting for gender equality but not when attending a soccer game of these two nations.

This saliency depends on the relevance for a “meaningful organization of social stimuli [...] as guidelines for the perceptions and behavior of those who operate within that context” (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002, p. 176). As proposed in self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), categorizing ourselves and others in social groups simplifies and helps interpreting the social environment³.

Social identity threat. Moreover, depending on the status of the in-group, the membership in such a group can enhance or decrease one’s self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, self-enhancement (Leary, 2007) also plays a role in social settings: we like to be part of groups with good reputations that reflect well on us. Social identity is therefore relative to and results from a constant comparison with an out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Although we are biased towards the in-group, which means that we usually see our in-group in a more positive light than the out-group, the comparison can also lead to a negative evaluation of the in-group. This would threaten our (social) identity though feeling inferior to the out-group. Moreover, the social identity can also be impaired as a consequence of a threat from inside the in-group. A fellow member of the group could for example mistreat (a member of) an out-group or behave in other inappropriate ways. Because this would reflect badly on oneself, vicarious shame could occur. Therefore, suggesting that the self extends to social groups, the Social Identity Theory provides an explanation for a threatened self without personal responsibility for a moral or social transgression. This could be the basis for vicarious shame.

Motivational consequences of shame. Individual shame and vicarious shame are both painful emotions that are elicited by a self-threat. Therefore, it could be expected that

³Rabbie and Horwitz (1988) made a distinction between social groups and social categories: “A social group can be considered as a ‘dynamic whole’ or social system, characterized by the perceived interdependence among its members, whereas a social category can be defined as a collection of individuals who share at least one attribute in common” (p. 1). According to this definition, the term ‘in-group’ used here would be based on social categories, which is in line with the self-categorization theory. Notably, this distinction is consistent with Lickel et al.’s (2005) differentiation of interdependence and shared identity.

vicarious shame leads to the same avoidance motivations as individual shame. Indeed, this was found by both Welten et al (2012) and Schmader and Lickel (2006). Schmader and Lickel conducted a study whereby the relationship between individual shame and guilt was compared to the one between vicarious shame and guilt. Participants were asked to recall an event of one of the four emotions and their reparative and distancing motivations were measured. They found that vicarious shame was clearly associated with distancing from the situation, whereas vicarious guilt was linked to reparative actions; this difference was stronger than for the individual emotions. Welten et al. (2012, Study 3) also asked participants to recall a shameful event and rate how much they want to distance from and punish the transgressor. They found that shared-identity based shame was characterized by the desire to distance and punish.

However, besides often utilizing the narrative recall paradigm, the research so far did not consider an important aspect of vicarious shame that is grounded in the nature of the social identity. In contrast to individual shame, vicarious shame usually occurs in a different social context: Whereas in an individual shame situation one is both the transgressor and the person experiencing shame, these two roles are taken by separate people in vicarious shame situations. Therefore, one does not have the personal responsibility for the transgression. As the focus shifts from the individual self to the social self, the social environment is clearly subdivided into two different groups: the fellow in-group members, including or limited to the transgressor, and the out-group. The out-group can be conceptualized as an observing audience, similar to the audience in individual shame. Because the two groups have different roles in the shame-eliciting situation, it can be assumed that vicariously ashamed people would also feel different with respect to in-group (i.e. transgressor and possibly others) and out-group members (i.e. a judging audience). Looking at the literature based on the Social Identity Theory can be helpful to shed light on the behavior towards in- and out-group members.

In-group derogation. As mentioned above, the social identity can be threatened through comparison with an out-group or through an internal threat from the in-group. As a result, one would either attempt to make the in-group appear in a more positive light (social creativity) or leave that in-group (individual mobility; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to Ellemers et al.'s (2002) taxonomy, low commitment to the group (which is often the case in identity-based in-groups, where one does not choose the group mates) when facing group-directed threat leads to individual mobility: "Here the dominant motive is to avoid the negative group identity that has been imposed and possibly align with preferable ones, such as those instrumental to the individual self" (p. 174). This is in line with self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), which suggests that if one's self-integrity is threatened, it can be restored by emphasizing other positive aspects of oneself.

Additionally, Welten (2011) suggested that vicarious shame that is based on a shared social identity is only related to negative social self-evaluations, i.e. worries about the impression others might have of one. In contrast, individual shame would in addition include private self-evaluations, which include worries about what a bad person one is. These private self-evaluations are similar to the global appraisals mentioned above in the definition of shame. Therefore, vicarious shame would not be as much of a threat to one's core self as individual shame and shifting the focus to one's individual identity and approaching the out-group/audience as an individual could be a successful coping strategy to restore one's self when faced with vicarious shame (see de Hooze, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2011)

Subjective group dynamics, as proposed by Marques, Abrams, and Serôdio (2001), expand the view of the Social Identity Theory by implying that different groups are distinguishable by descriptive characteristics, but that within a group prescriptive characteristics play a role. Accordingly, an in-group deviant, who does not act in line with the group's prototypical characteristics and consequently decreases normative fit of the group, would be derogated. Interestingly, shame (but not guilt) has been found to mediate this

relationship between an in-group member's wrong behavior and the punishment of that member as a form of social control (Chekroun & Nugier, 2011). Research on the *black sheep effect* supports this notion (e.g., Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). However, Marques et al. (2001,) point out that this in-group derogation would only occur if individual mobility is not an option.

Therefore, it seems like individual mobility would likely be the response to a vicarious shame eliciting situation. As the focus shifts away from the group membership, it can be assumed that the *association* with this in-group decreases (see Hypothesis 1). When individually ashamed, none of the in-group members is responsible for the transgression; therefore, the in-group association should not be affected by the shame.

Furthermore, individual shame is related to negative evaluations of the core self, hence not much can be done to improve one's reputation. It is expected that individual shame would lead to motivations related to protecting the self from further damage (Hypothesis 2a). In contrast, vicarious shame provides the opportunity to distance oneself from the transgressor through individual mobility. This allows emphasizing other aspects of the self and therefore restoring the impression others have of oneself (Hypothesis 2b).

Because vicarious shame affords the possibility to make up for the transgression, it can be expected that vicarious shame is less associated with a general avoidance tendency of a witnessing audience than individual shame (Hypothesis 3a). However, because of the decreased in-group association – and possibly to punish the transgressor – a lower motivation to approach the transgressor is expected when vicariously ashamed (Hypothesis 3b).

If these hypotheses turn out to be supported by the data and approach motivations in the case of vicarious shame will be found, then these results will contradict earlier findings by Schmader et al. (2006) and Welten et al. (2012). However, this contradiction could be similar to the inconsistent findings regarding individual shame. It could be the case that whether approach or avoidance motivations occur is simply due to differences in the intensity of the

emotion, shame, elicited. Thus, because individual shame is more severe than vicarious shame, higher avoidance motivations are the consequence. This would mean that the relationship between the (vicarious/individual) shame-eliciting situation and approach or avoidance motivations is mediated by the level of shame experienced (Hypothesis 4a).

Introduction current study and summary of hypotheses. The aim of the current research is to investigate the motivational differences between individual and vicarious shame. Scenarios similar to those of de Hooze et al. (2010) will be used in order to avoid the disadvantage of the narrative recall paradigm and to induce comparable and controlled levels of shame between participants. The scenarios are adapted to fit the purpose of this study, thus they manipulate two aspects: whether a transgression took place or not and whether the participants should imagine that they were the transgressor or someone else. This results in a 2 (*performance*: bad vs. good) x 2 (*presenter*: self vs. other) between-subjects design, whereby the bad–other condition should elicit vicarious shame and the bad–self condition represents individual shame. The good performance conditions serve as control conditions. Suggestions from Lickel et al. (2005) are taken into account to design scenarios that should elicit (vicarious) shame but as little guilt as possible. In order to achieve this, a group based on a shared social identity with no earlier interactions is described in the scenarios. The measures used were mostly adopted from earlier described studies (e.g. de Hooze et al., 2010; Lickel et al., 2005; Tangney et al., 1996). These measures are focused on different aspects of approach and avoidance of an in- and out-group, such as the *willingness to approach*, *in-group association*, *restore* and *protect motivations*, and an explicit *distance* measure.

To summarize, the following effects are expected:

- H1) Only the bad performance – other presenter condition leads to a decreased in-group association (i.e. an interaction between performance and presenter on in-group association).




Figure 1. Conceptual model of the hypotheses; the effect of performance and presenter condition on the different dependent variables. Above: bad performance – other presenter condition (vicarious shame); middle: bad performance – self presenter condition (individual shame); below: mediation by shame.

- H2a) Only the bad–self condition is related to higher protect motivations (i.e. An interaction between performance and presenter on protect motivation).
- H2b) Only the bad–other condition is related to increased restore motivations (i.e. an interaction between performance and presenter on restore motivations).
- H3a) The bad–other condition leads to an increased approach motivation of a judging audience, whereas the bad–self condition leads to a decreased approach of the audience (i.e. an interaction between performance and presenter on approach motivation towards the judging audience.)

- H3b) The bad–other condition leads to a decreased approach motivation of the transgressing in-group member, whereas the bad–self condition leads to an increased approach of an in-group member (i.e. an interaction between performance and presenter on approach motivation towards the in-group member).
- H4) The bad–self condition leads to higher shame than the bad–other condition, which in turn results in a greater avoidance motivation (i.e. the relationship between the interaction of performance and presenter and the dependent variables representing willingness to approach motivations is mediated by the intensity of shame experienced).

Methods

Pretest

The aim of the pretest was to test whether the proposed scenarios would be effective in causing feelings of shame. For this purpose, four different scenarios were written, which were inspired by de Hooze et al. (2010). The pretest was conducted online with 95 respondents. Fifty-seven of these were female, 37 were male and 1 person did not disclose his or her gender. The mean age was 26.9 years ($SD = 8.10$) with a range from 19 to 63. Respondents were contacted via email. The aim of the pretest was to test whether the proposed scenarios would be effective in causing feelings of shame. The common text of all four scenarios was:

Imagine that you are a member of the debate club TWISTPUNT of the University of Twente. You and a fellow student, Jan, participate in a national student debate competition. Although you are both very nervous, both of you are motivated to give your best in order to beat the competing universities. Because you think that both of you are equally good, you draw lots to determine who will present.

The remaining part of the scenarios differed in two aspects: *performance* and *presenter*. Two of the four scenarios described a bad performance, whereby the participants

either read that another person, Jan, was giving the presentation or they were giving a presentation themselves (in brackets).

Jan is [You are] drawn; he has [you have] to give the presentation in front of an audience of 70 competing students and a jury of 10. When TWISTPUNT is called, Jan goes [you go] to the front and begins [begin]. During his [your] presentation, everything goes wrong. He stumbles [You stumble] over his [your] own words, his [your] story is muddled, and at the end it is clear that nobody understood what he was [you were] talking about.

Similarly, the other two scenarios describe a situation where the performance was good:

Jan is [You are] drawn; he has [you have] to give the presentation in front of an audience of 70 competing students and a jury of 10. When TWISTPUNT is called, Jan goes [you go] to the front and begins [begin]. During his [your] presentation, everything goes well. He speaks [You speak] clearly, his [your] story has a clear structure, and at the end it is clear that everybody understood what he was [you were] talking about

Hence, the two bad performance scenarios should elicit vicarious and individual shame, respectively, and the good performance scenarios serve as control conditions. Each participant read one of these scenarios and subsequently filled in the State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS) by Tangney and Dearing (2002). This scale was translated to Dutch and German and adapted to fit the purpose of the study. This included splitting one of the questions into two, owing to the fact that literal translations of the English terms (worthless and powerless) have rather different meanings in Dutch and German. This resulted in 6 items measuring shame, 5 items measuring guilt, and 6 items measuring pride (see Appendix 2).

Results. The items were combined and averaged to produce three dependent variables: shame, pride, and guilt. The means and standard deviations of these three variables are




Figure 2. Mean scores on the three subscales (shame, guilt, and pride) of the SSGS for the different conditions (presenter: other vs. self; performance: good vs. bad) of the pretest.

displayed per condition in Table 1 in Appendix 2. The reliabilities of these three scales were very good ($\alpha_{\text{shame}} = 0.92$; $\alpha_{\text{guilt}} = 0.84$; $\alpha_{\text{pride}} = 0.95$). With these dependent variables, a 2 (*performance*: good, bad) \times 2 (*presenter*: self, Jan) MANOVA was carried out using PASW 18. There was no significant main effect of the *presenter* factor, which would indicate the difference between individual and vicarious performance, on any of the independent variables ($F(3,89) = 1.381$; $p = 0.254$). However, the main effect of *performance* did reach significance ($F(3,89) = 261.592$; $p < 0.001$), as well as the interaction effect between both factors ($F(3,89) = 3.327$; $p = 0.023$). Further analyses, consisting of separate ANOVAs, showed that the difference between the good (control) and bad (shame) performance was significant for all three dependent variables ($F_{\text{shame}}(1,91) = 250.77$; $F_{\text{guilt}}(1,91) = 379.39$; $F_{\text{pride}}(1,91) = 614.63$; all p 's < 0.001), with higher scores on the shame ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 0.77$ vs. $M = 1.32$, $SD = 0.39$) and guilt ($M = 4.09$, $SD = 0.49$ vs. $M = 2.06$, $SD = 0.54$) items and lower scores on the pride items ($M = 1.67$, $SD = 0.55$ vs. $M = 4.04$, $SD = 0.41$) when induced with scenarios where the presentation went bad compared to the good-performance scenarios (see Figure 2). The *interaction* between performance and presenter only reached significance for the pride score ($F_{\text{pride}}(1,91) = 9.34$; $p = 0.003$; other F 's < 1) which showed that the respondents had more intense feelings of pride (more if it went well and less if it went wrong) when presenting themselves compared to when Jan was presenting.

In conclusion, it can be said that the scenarios are an adequate means for triggering shame. Both bad performance scenarios equally produce more feelings of shame compared to the two control scenarios.

Experiment

Participants. Eighty-seven undergraduate students of the University of Twente took part in the study, whereof 66 were female. Ranging from 18 to 33, the average age was 22.6 years ($SD = 2.21$).

Procedure. The participants were approached on the campus of the university and asked if they had 5 minutes to complete a questionnaire. Participants who agreed to take part and signed informed consent were handed a paper booklet. They were randomly assigned to one of the 4 conditions. The cover of the booklet contained information about the pretended purpose – measuring the emotional response to stressful situations – and the instructions for the study. The actual booklet comprised 3 parts: the manipulation, a manipulation check, and the dependent measures (see Appendix 1).

Manipulation. The manipulation was achieved by the four pretested scenarios, which manipulated the aspects performance (bad vs. good) and presenter (self vs. other). Subsequently, as a manipulation check, the adjusted SSGS (Tangney, 2002) also used in the pretest was filled in by the participants in order to measure the intensity of shame experienced. In the experimental study, the three subscales of the SSGS – shame, guilt, and pride – showed satisfying internal consistencies ($\alpha_{\text{shame}} = 0.88$, $\alpha_{\text{guilt}} = 0.84$, $\alpha_{\text{pride}} = 0.94$).

Measures. The dependent measures were preceded by the presentation of a second scenario, which was supposed to frame the context for the questionnaires. This scenario, again loosely inspired by de Hooze et al. (2010), was the same for all four conditions, describing the possibility to join the audience of the event (incl. the jury and the other competitors) for a reception afterwards:

At the end of the presentations, a member of the jury announces that drinks will subsequently be served before the judgments will be announced. You overhear some students stating that the jury likes to make use of this possibility to speak to the students personally before making their decisions. You still feel tension about the presentation and think about whether you should attend the reception.

The subsequent questions were aimed at measuring approach and avoidance and related aspects with respect to in-group (Jan) as well as audience (jury) members.

First, three questions were asked measuring the *willingness to approach*. The first question aimed at a general willingness to attend the reception (“I would like to go to the reception”), while the last two questions were used to measure the possible contact with a jury member (audience/out-group; “I would like to talk to a jury member over the topic of the presentation”) and Jan (in-group/transgressor; “I would like to talk to Jan”). The three questions were inspired by de Hooze et al.’s (2010) *willingness to perform* concept.

Second, the questions used by de Hooze et al (2010) to measure *restore and protect motivations* were adapted to match all four conditions, resulting in eight questions. As Schmader and Lickel (2006) pointed out, it is common to use these concepts as indicators for approach and avoidance. Four of the eight questions were concerned with the self-evaluation of the participants (i.e. restore: “I would like to improve the jury's impression of me”; protect: “I would like to avoid damage to the jury’s impression of me”) while the other four questions were aimed at the perceived evaluation of the group (i.e. restore: “I would like to improve the jury's impression of our group”; protect: “I would like to avoid damage to the jury’s impression of our group”).

Third, four questions about the feelings with respect to the in-group member, Jan, and three questions concerning the in-group, the debate club, were asked. The first two questions tapped into the desired association (“During the reception, I would like to be seen with Jan” and “I do not want to be associated with Jan”) and the third measured the perceived similarity

with Jan (“Compared to the other students present, I have a lot in common with Jan”). The fourth question was an *overlap of self, ingroup and outgroup* measure (OSIO, Schubert & Otten, 2002) that is also a measure for similarity and identification with Jan, and which consisted of seven possible distances between two circles representing the participant and Jan. The three questions measuring the association with the debate club (i.e. “It gives me a good feeling to be part of TWISTPUNT”) were adopted from Leach et al. (2008). These measures will subsequently be called *association with Jan*, the *OSIO*, and *association with group*, embraced by the term *in-group association*. All the questions mentioned above were answered on a 7-point Likert scale.

Finally, a direct measure of *distancing* to both in- and out-group was conducted. This measure consisted of a floor plan of a reception room where the informal celebrations described in the second scenario should take place. On this floor plan, furniture as well as the positions of some students was indicated. Furthermore, the positions of one jury member and Jan were included. The design of this fictitious room was symmetrical and the positions of the jury member and Jan were comparable regarding distance to walls, door and chairs. The size of the floor plan was 9 x 8.5 cm.

The task of the student was to mark their own desired position on this floor plan. For the analysis, the distances between the indicated position and the positions of in- and out-group members were subsequently measured. All dependent measures can be found in Dutch in Appendix 1.




Figure 3. Distancing measure: floor plan of the reception room, participants had to draw a cross where they would like to be standing.




Figure 4. Mean scores on the three subscales (shame, guilt, and pride) of the SSGS for the different conditions (presenter: other vs. self; performance: good vs. bad) of the Experiment.

Results

Manipulation check

A MANOVA with these three subscales revealed no main effect of presenter ($F(3,79) = 0.46$; $p = 0.709$), but a significant main effect of performance ($F(3,79) = 90.17$; $p < 0.001$) as well as a significant interaction ($F(3,79) = 5.30$; $p = 0.002$). The main effect of presenter remained significant in the univariate analyses for all three subscales (shame: $F(1, 81) = 107.47$, $p = 0.001$; guilt: $F(1, 81) = 103.43$, $p < 0.001$; pride: $F(1, 81) = 263.52$, $p < 0.001$). For both the shame and guilt subscales, this means that higher scores were found in the bad-performance conditions (shame: $M = 4.47$, $SD = 0.91$; guilt: $M = 5.35$, $SD = 0.84$) compared to the good-performance scenarios (shame: $M = 2.39$, $SD = 0.98$; guilt: $M = 3.19$, $SD = 1.11$). The opposing pattern was found for the pride subscale ($M_{\text{bad}} = 2.42$, $SD_{\text{bad}} = 0.87$ vs. $M_{\text{good}} = 5.23$, $SD_{\text{good}} = 0.82$; see Figure 4). Therefore, it can be concluded that shame was successfully induced with the bad performance scenarios but not with the good performance scenarios. The interaction between performance and presenter was significant for shame ($F(1,81) = 6.381$, $p = 0.013$) and pride ($F(1,81) = 12.907$, $p = 0.001$) but not for guilt ($F(1, 81) = 0.67$; $p = 0.419$). For shame, planned comparisons of the bad-performance condition showed that participants felt more ashamed when they themselves presented compared to

when someone else presented ($M_{\text{self}} = 4.82$, $SD_{\text{self}} = 0.88$ vs. $M_{\text{other}} = 4.14$, $SD_{\text{other}} = 0.82$; $F(1, 81) = 5.92$, $p = 0.017$) but the difference between the two presenters was not significant in the case of a good performance ($M_{\text{self}} = 2.25$, $SD_{\text{self}} = 0.91$ vs. $M_{\text{other}} = 2.53$, $SD_{\text{other}} = 1.05$; $F(1, 81) = 1.32$, $p = 0.255$). In the case of pride, planned comparisons showed that the participants felt less proud when they have given a bad presentation than when someone else gave a bad presentation ($M_{\text{self}} = 2.04$, $SD_{\text{self}} = 0.67$ vs. $M_{\text{other}} = 2.77$, $SD_{\text{other}} = 0.90$; $F(1, 81) = 9.17$, $p = 0.003$); In contrast, they felt more proud after reading the scenario in which they gave a good presentation themselves compared to another person. ($M_{\text{self}} = 5.45$, $SD_{\text{self}} = 0.68$ vs. $M_{\text{other}} = 4.99$, $SD_{\text{other}} = 0.90$; $F(1, 81) = 4.24$, $p = 0.043$). Therefore, shame and pride were more extremely elicited in the self-presenter conditions than in the other-presenter conditions.

In-Group Association

The multivariate analysis of in-group association was significant for performance ($F(3,79) = 13.04$, $p < 0.001$) but not for presenter ($F(3,79) = 1.16$, $p = 0.317$). The interaction was marginally significant with $F(3,79) = 2.29$ and $p = 0.085$.

The univariate association with the group was significantly higher when the presentation went well ($M = 4.88$, $SD = 0.94$) than when it went wrong ($M = 4.31$, $SD = 1.04$; $F(1, 81) = 6.88$, $p = 0.010$).

The association with Jan was also higher in the good-performance conditions ($M = 4.66$, $SD = 0.95$) compared to the bad-performance conditions ($M = 3.51$, $SD = 0.87$; $F(1, 81) = 40.00$, $p < 0.001$). A trend towards a significant interaction was also found ($F(1,81) = 3.41$, $p = 0.069$, see Figure 5). Visual inspection of Figure 5 showed that the association with Jan was higher after a good presentation of Jan and lower after a bad presentation of him compared to when the participants had to imagine presenting themselves.




Figure 5. Mean scores of in-group association, association with Jan (the other member of the in-group), and the OSIO for all four conditions.

Similarly, the OSIO measure also revealed a significant univariate main effect of performance ($F(1, 81) = 40.64, p < 0.001$), showing that a smaller distance between the circles representing Jan and the participant was chosen when the presentation went well ($M = 4.07, SD = 1.32$) than when it went wrong ($M = 2.72, SD = 0.96$).

No other univariate effects for the in-group association measures reached significance (all F 's < 1).

Thus, after a good presentation, associations with Jan and the in-group were higher than after a bad presentation, regardless of who had been the presenter. Therefore, in-group association did not differ between vicarious and individual shame.

Restore and Protect Motivations

The multivariate analysis of the restore and protect motivations (using six different dependent variables: mean restore and mean protect, restore and protect individual, and restore and protect group) revealed no significant differences between conditions

($F_{\text{presenter}}(4,80) = 1.05, p = 0.387$; $F_{\text{performance}}(4,80) = 0.96, p = 0.435$; $F_{\text{interaction}}(4,80) = 2.24, p = 0.072$, see Figure 7 and Table 4, Appendix 2). Therefore, findings from de Hooge et al. (2010) could not be replicated with these measures.




Figure 6. Mean scores on the restore and protect motivations for the four conditions.

Willingness to Approach

The multivariate analysis of the willingness to approach measures revealed a significant main effect for performance ($F(3,81) = 5.65, p = 0.001$) and a significant interaction ($F(3,81) = 2.95, p = 0.038$), but no effect of presenter ($F(3,81) = 1.42, p = 0.244$).

An univariate analysis with the general willingness to approach measure as dependent variable – asking whether the participant would like to attend the reception – yielded a marginally significant main effect of performance ($F(1,83) = 3.60, p = 0.061$) and a significant interaction ($F(1,83) = 4.16, p = 0.045$). Presenter did not reach significance ($F(3,81) = 2.15, p = 0.146$). Planned comparisons revealed that the willingness to attend the reception was equally high if Jan presented – regardless of whether the presentation went well or wrong ($M_{\text{good}} = 5.55, SD_{\text{good}} = 1.44; M_{\text{bad}} = 5.59, SD_{\text{bad}} = 1.74; F(1, 83) = 0.10, p = 0.919$).

If the participants imagined to have presented themselves, the willingness to approach was significantly lower in the bad-performance condition than following a good presentation ($M_{\text{good}} = 5.73, SD_{\text{good}} = 0.99; M_{\text{bad}} = 4.48, SD_{\text{bad}} = 1.66; F(1, 83) = 7.65, p = 0.007$). These results show that participants would avoid the reception especially when individually ashamed but not when vicariously ashamed.




Figure 7. Mean scores on the general Willingness to Approach, the Willingness to Approach the judging audience, and the Willingness to Approach the other in-group member (Jan) for the four conditions.

The analysis of the willingness to approach the audience resulted in no significant effects ($F_{\text{performance}}(1,83) = 0.84, p = 0.361$; $F_{\text{presenter}}(1,83) = 0.00, p = 0.995$; $F_{\text{interaction}}(1,83) = 2.97, p = 0.089$). Visual inspection of the graph (Figure 7) showed a trend towards a crossover interaction: the willingness to approach is smallest when the other person gave a good presentation and highest when the other person gave a bad presentation. The difference is smaller and reversed in the self-presenter conditions.

The willingness to approach Jan during the reception reached significance on the factor performance ($F(1,83) = 7.22, p = 0.009$), but not on the factor presenter ($F(1,83) = 0.39, p = 0.536$) or the interaction ($F(1,83) = 1.84, p = 0.179$). Hence, irrespective of who presented, the possibility to talk to Jan was greater when the presentation had gone well ($M = 6.18, SD = 0.92$) than when it had gone wrong ($M = 5.51, SD = 1.35$).

To summarize, the general tendency to attend the reception was only decreased in the case of individual shame: when the participants imagined to have given a bad presentation themselves. In contrast, the willingness to approach Jan did not depend on whether he or the participant presented, but only on the quality of the performance. Approach of the audience was not significantly different in any of the conditions, but a trend was visible towards highest approach when vicariously ashamed.




Figure 8. Mean scores of the distance to the other in-group member (Jan) and the judging audience for the four conditions.

Distance

Finally, the multivariate analyses of the distances from Jan and the jury member in the floor plan revealed significant main effects of presenter ($F(2, 82) = 3.67, p = 0.030$), performance ($F(2, 82) = 3.61, p = 0.032$), and a significant interaction ($F(2, 82) = 3.86, p = 0.025$).

The univariate analysis of the distance to Jan yielded significant main effects of presenter ($F(1, 83) = 6.95, p = 0.010$) and performance ($F(1, 83) = 7.19, p = 0.009$), which were qualified by a significant interaction ($F(1, 83) = 6.95, p = 0.010$). Planned comparisons showed that the difference between the two performance conditions was significant only in the case of another person having presented, with a significantly greater distance towards Jan if he had given a bad presentation (self: $M_{\text{bad}} = 2.06, SD_{\text{bad}} = 1.57$ vs. $M_{\text{good}} = 2.04, SD_{\text{good}} = 1.41, F(1, 83) = 0.00, p = 0.974$; other: $M_{\text{bad}} = 3.91, SD_{\text{bad}} = 1.66$ vs. $M_{\text{good}} = 2.04, SD_{\text{good}} = 1.87, F(1, 83) = 14.30, p < 0.001$; see Figure 8).

Regarding the distance to the jury, a similar pattern was found: Both the main effects of presenter ($F(1, 81) = 5.64, p = 0.02$) and performance ($F(1, 81) = 4.65, p = 0.034$) were significant, as well as the interaction ($F(1, 81) = 6.47, p = 0.013$). Planned comparisons of the different presenter levels indicate that only in the other-presenter condition a smaller distance

was chosen to the jury if the other person had given a bad presentation (self: $M_{\text{bad}} = 4.27$, $SD_{\text{bad}} = 1.82$ vs. $M_{\text{good}} = 4.13$, $SD_{\text{good}} = 1.57$, $F(1, 83) = 0.07$, $p = 0.787$; other: $M_{\text{bad}} = 2.55$, $SD_{\text{bad}} = 1.71$ vs. $M_{\text{good}} = 4.19$, $SD_{\text{good}} = 1.39$, $F(1, 83) = 11.18$, $p = 0.001$; see Figure 8).

Therefore, the condition in which a bad presentation was given by another person (bad–other) was the only condition in which responses differed from the other three conditions. Particularly, the distance towards the audience was decreased, which was accompanied with an increased distance to Jan, as compared to the good performances and the bad – self presentation.

Mediation

It was hypothesized that the relationship between the interaction of performance and presenter and the willingness to approach variables would be mediated by the amount of shame experienced (moderated mediation). This means that more shame would be experienced in the case of a bad–self presentation compared to the bad–other condition, which would then explain the decreased approach motivations. Separate mediation analyses are carried out for the different dependent variables.

To show that moderated mediation occurs, four conditions should be met (according to Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005), based on Baron and Kenny's (1986) approach): First, the interaction between performance and presenter on the dependent variable should be significant in the reduced model (i.e. without the mediator inserted in the regression, path c in Figure 9). This is called the total effect. Second, the effect of the independent variable, performance, on the mediator shame should be moderated by presenter (path a). Third, in the full model (when the mediator is included in the regression), a significant effect of the mediator on the dependent variable should be found (path b). Fourth, the interaction effect on the outcome variable should be decreased when the mediator is included in the regression




Figure 9. Model of the mediation analyses carried out between the interaction of performance and presenter and the different approach and avoidance motivation measures, mediated by intensity of shame.

(direct effect, path c') compared to the first regression, due to the fact that part of the variance formerly explained by the interaction between the independent variable and the moderator is now accounted for by the indirect path via the mediator. In addition, a Sobel test is usually carried out to show that the indirect path (path $a * \text{path } b$) is significant.

However, Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) argued that the first condition – a significant total effect of the predictor (path c) – does not necessarily need to be found. If another mediator exists that ‘competes’ with the proposed mediator in sign, a non-significant total effect could be found. They propose that finding only a significant indirect effect (via the mediator, $a*b$) would be enough to prove mediation. Moreover, both Preacher and Hayes (2008) and Zhao et al. (2010) criticize the Sobel test for being too conservative and suggest using bootstrapping methods instead. Therefore, the SPSS macro for mediation analysis including bootstrapped confidence intervals provided by A.F. Hayes (INDIRECT, <http://afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html>) was used here. Furthermore,

for these analyses the mediator shame was centered on its mean to decrease multicollinearity and increase interpretability of the results (Judd & Kenny, 1981). The moderator variable, presenter, and the independent variable, performance, were dummy-coded. The interaction term was the product of these two variables. To test for *moderated* mediation, the interaction term was used as the predictor and both the independent variable and the moderator term were included as covariates (Hayes, 2013).

Willingness to Approach. As can be seen in Table 1 (row 1), the conditions for moderated mediation are met. Although the total effect only marginally reaches significance, both parts of the indirect effect (IV to Med * Med to DV) are significant. Furthermore, the bootstrapped 95% CI does not include zero, which indicates that the indirect effect indeed is significant. Hence, these results imply that the relationship between the interaction (of performance and presenter) and willingness to approach is indeed mediated by the amount of shame experienced.

Willingness to Approach Jury. Even though the path from the interaction to the mediator shame is significant and the path between shame and willingness to approach the

Table 1
Regression results for the moderated mediation.

Dependent variable	IV to MED (a)		MED to DV (b)		IV to DV, total (c)		IV to DV, direct (c')		Confidence interval	
	β	<i>t</i>	β	<i>t</i>	β	<i>t</i>	β	<i>t</i>	Low	High
Willingness to approach	.96	2.43*	-.48	-2.95**	-1.08	-1.79 ⁺	-.62	-1.04	-1.35	-.10
Willingness to approach jury	.96	2.43*	-.38	-1.97 ⁺	-1.21	-1.73 ⁺	-.84	-1.19	-1.16	-.03
Willingness to approach Jan	.96	2.43*	-.22	-1.56	.64	1.27	.84	1.65	-.66	.04
Distance jury	.96	2.43*	-.04	.84	1.73	2.45*	1.77	2.40*	-.48	.29
Distance Jan	.96	2.43*	.29	1.45	-1.80	-2.54*	-2.08	-2.85**	-.04	.98

Note. ⁺ $p < 0.01$. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$.

IV=Performance*Presenter; MED=Dependent variable, 95% Confidence interval with 1000 bootstraps.

Total effect: without MED/reduced model. Direct effect: with MED/full model.

jury approaches significance, the confidence interval does include zero (Table 1, row 2).

Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the willingness to approach the jury is mediated by the intensity of shame experienced.

Willingness to Approach Jan. Similarly, amount of shame cannot convincingly be shown to mediate the relationship between performance*presenter and willingness to approach Jan. Only the path between the interaction and shame reaches significance, and the confidence interval also does not include zero (Table 1, row 3).

Distance Jury/Jan. Even though the path between the independent variable (the interaction) and the dependent variable (distance jury) is in both cases significant in the full and in the reduced model, the indirect effect via the mediator does not reach significance, as is reflected in the confidence interval (Table 1, rows 4 and 5).

To sum up, only the general willingness to approach (i.e. attend the reception) is mediated by the amount of shame experienced.

Discussion

The goal of this study was to compare the behavioral motivations resulting from vicarious shame with those of individual shame. For this aim, participants read one of four different scenarios that differed on two factors: performance (bad vs. good) and presenter (other vs. self). A subsequent questionnaire showed that bad-performance scenarios successfully induced more shame than the good-performance scenarios. Participants were then asked to fill in a number of questionnaires that measured different concepts related to approach and avoidance, such as in-group association, restore and protect motivations, and willingness to approach.

With the first hypothesis, it was expected that a decreased in-group association would be found only in the case of a bad presentation of another person. Although in-group association decreased after a bad presentation, it did not differ between the other-presenter and self-presenter conditions. Thus, in-group association was not found to be lower in the

vicarious shame than in the individual shame condition. This result is rather surprising since the vicarious shame discussed here was assumed to be based on a shared in-group. What is more, the consequential approach/avoidance motivations were argued to result from individual mobility, which was linked to a decreased in-group association.

Based on the idea that the core self is evaluated negatively in individual shame and only the perceived impression others have of oneself is impaired in vicarious shame, the second pair of hypotheses stated that vicarious shame (elicited in the bad–other condition) would lead to higher restore motivations, whereas individual shame (bad–self) would be associated with higher protect motivations. However, restore and protect motivations did not differ between the bad–self and bad–other conditions in this study. Moreover, they also did not differ from the good-presentation control conditions and were generally quite high. These results contrast the findings of de Hooze et al. (2010), who found that restore and protect motivations are both higher in the shame than in the control condition.

Furthermore, it was expected that vicarious shame and individual shame would differ in the approach and avoidance motivations elicited. Particularly, it was expected that participants in the bad–self condition would want to avoid any witnesses of the shame-eliciting situation, whereas participants in the bad–other condition would want to avoid the transgressor but might want to approach a judging audience. The results show that the approach tendency was as high in the condition where another person had supposedly given a bad presentation (vicarious shame) as in the positive control conditions. Indeed a smaller general willingness to attend a social situation after the shame-eliciting event can be found if the participants had imagined to have given a bad presentation themselves (individual shame). No difference was found in the willingness to talk to the other in-group member/transgressor, which is equally small in both shame conditions. However, different reasons could underlie these similar avoidance patterns: In vicarious shame, it could be a desire to not be associated with him, whereas in individual shame disappointment for letting the group down could be the

reason. The willingness to talk to the judging audience was not significantly different for any of the conditions; however, a trend can be observed towards a high willingness when vicariously ashamed and a small willingness when individually ashamed compared to the control conditions. In the explicit distance measure, only the bad–other condition lead to a greater distance toward the other person and to a smaller distance toward a member of the judging audience compared to the other three conditions. Therefore, it can be concluded that when individually ashamed, one would like to avoid any subsequent encounters with witnesses of the transgression. However, when there is no choice, then one would want to stay close to the supporting in-group. In contrast, no avoidance of a social gathering would result from vicarious shame. Moreover, at the event, one would approach the audience and avoid the transgressor.

Finally, it was expected that the approach and avoidance motivations elicited would depend on the intensity of shame experienced. This was shown to be the case for the general willingness to attend a subsequent reception, but not for the other measures. This result supports the idea that a distinction can be made between a general avoidance (related to individual shame and mediated by intensity of shame) and specific approach and avoidance patterns while at the subsequent social event (found in vicarious shame and not mediated by shame).

To summarize, it seems that individual shame leads to a general avoidance tendency, if possible, that depends on the intensity of shame experienced. However, if withdrawal is no option, one would want to stay close to the supporting in-group. When vicariously ashamed, a distinction between the transgressor and the witnesses is made and only the transgressor is avoided. Out-group witnesses of the transgression are even more approached in vicarious shame than in the positive control conditions, which suggests that one would want to improve the impression that others have. This distinction between a general avoidance and more specific effects is also reflected in the fact that only the general avoidance depends on the

intensity of shame experienced. However, it could not be shown that the differential motivations found in vicarious shame are linked to an increased restore motivation or a decreased in-group association.

The results reported here support the hypothesis that vicariously ashamed individuals still consider the option to approach a witnessing audience. This is in line with Welten's (2011) suggestion that private shame is related to both private ("I felt like a loser") and social ("I thought that others thought of me as a loser") self-evaluations, whereas vicarious shame is only related to social self-evaluations, which might still allow for corrections. Furthermore, the findings can be integrated with theories on social identity and group dynamics. For example, punishing transgressing in-group members by rejecting them (i.e. the black sheep effect) or mobility towards out-groups (e.g., by emphasizing another in-groups' characteristics) are in line with the distancing to the in-group and the approach of the out-group found in the current study. Similarly, self-serving attributions, i.e. the tendency to retrospectively assign positive outcomes to the self but negative outcomes to external circumstances, could be a mechanism by which the approach of the judging audience in vicarious shame could be explained: Lacking the personal responsibility, it is comparably easy to blame external factors, i.e. the transgressing person, for the shame-evoking event (Leary, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2007).

However, it should be emphasized that no differences in intensity of shame between the two shame-eliciting conditions were found in the pre-test. Therefore, behavioral motivations that would have been found in the pre-test sample might have differed from the results reported here. A study replicating the current findings would help to validate the presented interpretations.

Moreover, it is not clear from the manipulation whether the consequences of shame were investigated or rather the motivational consequences of guilt (or a mixture of both). According to the manipulation checks, guilt was also induced in the bad-performance

conditions (see Figure 4). This is in line with Tangney and colleagues (Niedenthal et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996, Tangney & Dearing 2002) suggestion that guilt-free shame is rare. Furthermore, Smith et al. (2002) suggested that the difficulty lay people have with differentiating the terms shame and guilt (Niedenthal et al., 1994) may be due to the fact that these emotions most often co-occur and it might therefore be difficult to distinguish between the experiences related to each of the two emotions. Therefore, the findings reported here are likely due to a combination of shame and guilt, which is closely linked to everyday experiences of emotions in response to transgressions. Interestingly, including guilt in addition to shame in the regressions showed that guilt is not a significant predictor of any of the dependent measures (not reported here), which supports the assumption that the effects found are due to the shame elicited.

Unfortunately, no relation to decreased in-group association was found, as was expected in the first hypothesis. Although this does not mean that a shared identity does not play a role in the elicitation of vicarious shame, it was expected that changes in association would be an underlying factor predicting approach/avoidance motivations. Similarly, no difference in restore and protect motivations was found between the four conditions. Although it could be the case that the questions used here were not sensitive enough to detect subtle differences between two similar shame-eliciting conditions, a more likely explanation would be that the questions are too explicit and therefore susceptible to demand characteristics. The in-group in this study is based on an artificial category without any prior interaction or knowledge about the personality of the other person but with a strong emphasis on the shared membership in the debate club/university. It could be the case that this manipulation leads to an unchanged explicit in-group association or that individually ashamed participants felt also less in-group association because they felt bad and wanted to withdraw from the group.

Regarding restore and protect motivations, it could similarly be the case that the questions were too obvious. Alternatively, since de Hooij et al. (2010) found both high

restore and protect motivations, these questions might not be sensitive enough to differentiate. It could be the case that both the desire to improve one's image and to protect it from further damage exist, but are not acted upon equally in individual and vicarious shame. Moreover, pride, which was elicited in the control conditions, might also lead to agreeing with the items in the restore and protect questionnaire. Following a good presentation, one might, for example, have the desire to not be evaluated badly and to affirm one's competence.

Alternatively, the scenarios used here might not have induced strong shame in the first place. This is in line with the proposition that the behavioral motivations related to shame might depend on the intensity of shame experienced and that certain methods (i.e. shame proneness measures or narrative recall) might be associated with rather strong shame. The (lack of differential) results found here could consequently be due to the fact that the scenarios used were originally designed by de Hooge et al. (2010) to elicit shame that is not very extreme. In addition, more implicit measures of in-group association and restore motivations could shed more light on the relationship between these measures, shame, and approach and avoidance. Specifically, in-group association – or saliency of different (social) identity characteristics – could be implicitly measured with paradigms related to the self-concept. For example, a task similar to the self-complexity task (Linville, 1985) could be used, where participants would have to place words of concepts related to the self (i.e. including in-group membership) at self-chosen distances from the word "I". Concerning restore and protect motivations, a measure that is focused not only on the desire to restore or protect, but includes the behavioral consequences of doing so (i.e. approach and avoidance) or forces a choice between protect and restore motivations might be helpful.

Thus, further research efforts should be directed at investigating mediating factors of the different approach and avoidance motivations in vicarious shame. Even though no promising results were found here regarding in-group association and restore motivations, implicit measures and different manipulations could result in clearer results. Moreover, it

would be necessary to further distinguish shared-identity based vicarious shame from empathic shame. This contrast would be interesting for in-group association, because it would be expected that it would increase in empathic shame and therefore it could be shown that there is a relative decrease in shared-identity shame. Furthermore, the definition of empathic shame by Welten et al. (2012) is not clear yet: They are possibly talking about two different mechanisms and/or emotions. In addition, they suggested that familiarity predicts empathic shame, whereas Lickel et al. (2005) use a similar concept (interdependence) as predictors for vicarious guilt. Therefore, a clearer definition of these vicarious emotions is needed. It might be fruitful to include the feeling of control over the situation in a study, which might allow for a differentiation between vicarious shame and guilt.

Finally, the interpretations regarding the approach and avoidance of the in-group are not comparable due to the fact that the in-group in the vicarious shame condition stands for the transgressor, whereas the in-group in the individual shame condition is a possibly sympathetic passive observer. Future research should thus include a separate in-group in addition to the transgressor. It could be expected that avoidance of the other members of the in-group is smaller than avoidance of the transgressor in the vicarious shame condition; however, it would be interesting to see whether approach of the judging audience is similar and whether this depends on commitment to, or association with, the in-group.

Although criticism on projective measures, which would include the scenarios used here, exists (e.g. Hayduk, 1983), narrative recall paradigms might not be a better solution as long as it is not controlled for the intensity of a number of different emotions that could be elicited. The recall of autobiographical memories might be biased in extremity of emotions and details remembered. Furthermore, it might strongly differ between participants. With the scenarios used here, the eliciting situations are the same for all participants, and the effect of this situation can be studied with less variance. Because it is almost impossible to research shame situations in real life, projective measures combined with narrative recall might be a

good approach to the study of shame. Inducing first-hand self-conscious emotions would be the desirable solution but might only be possible by staging situations similar to the ones used here or using immersive virtual environment technology, which would in addition allow for a high experimental control and less ethical concerns (McCall & Blascovich, 2009).

Conclusion

The aim of this master's thesis was to investigate the motivational consequences of vicarious shame compared to individual shame when accounting for the different social context in which these emotions occur. Scenarios and questionnaire measures were implemented in order to induce vicarious and individual shame as well as two pride control conditions and to measure different aspects of approach and avoidance. It was hypothesized that vicarious shame is more strongly related to approach of the judging audience than individual shame, and that this differential relationship is mediated by the intensity of shame experienced. It was found that vicarious and individual shame indeed differ in their general behavioral motivation and specific motivations towards in- and out-group. Individual shame does lead to general avoidance and distancing, which is in line with earlier findings. However, a distinction should also be made between the two different groups. It seems that individual shame leads to a general motivation to avoid, but if this is not possible a closer distance to the in-group than to the out-group would be chosen. The reason could be that the in-group offers some sort of safety compared to the out-group. The current findings show, that, in contrast to individual shame, vicarious shame clearly can lead to approach – namely both a general approach and that of the out-group, or judging audience. Only the general avoidance with individual shame versus the general approach in vicarious shame was mediated by the intensity of the shame experienced. The specific motivations to in- and out-group seem to be more dependent on the nature of the transgression and not the emotion elicited. This conclusion supports the assumption that vicarious shame, in contrast to individual shame, might be reduced by switching to a focus on the individual self, thereby offering a possibility to restore one's

identity. Further research on defining vicarious shame and differentiating it from empathic shame is needed.

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Appendix 1

Beste student,

Welkom bij de studie “stressreacties onder studenten“. Het doel van deze studie is een beeld van de emotionele responses van studenten in stressvolle situaties te verkrijgen. Het gaat hierbij om situaties die je tijdens jouw studie zou kunnen tegenkomen. Uiteindelijk zal worden gekeken welke emoties een rol bij deze voor studenten typische stresssituaties kunnen spelen.

Onderaan deze pagina zie je twee algemene vragen. Als je deze hebt beantwoord kun je verder gaan.

Op de volgende pagina zul je eerst een scenario zien. Lees dit scenario goed door en probeer je zo goed mogelijk in te leven. Vervolgens word je gevraagd een aantal vragen te beantwoorden. Met deze vragen wordt nagegaan hoe je je in de situatie zou kunnen voelen. Beantwoord deze vragen alsjeblieft volledig en zo precies mogelijk.

Het is de bedoeling dat je de vragen spontaan beantwoordt zonder er lang over na te denken. Verder is het belangrijk dat je niet vooruit leest maar de vragen in de juiste volgorde beantwoordt.

Het invullen van deze vragenlijst zal ongeveer 10 minuten duren. De antwoorden zullen natuurlijk anoniem worden verwerkt.

Alvast hartelijk dank!

Lea Hildebrandt

l.k.hildebrandt@student.utwente.nl

1. Hoe oud ben je?

2. Wat is jouw geslacht?

O m

O v

Scenarios

Vicarious shame (VS): *Stel je voor dat je lid bent van de debatteervereniging TWISTPUNT van de Universiteit Twente. Jij en een andere student uit de groep, Jan, nemen deel aan een nationaal debatteerkampioenschap voor studenten. Hoewel jullie allebei erg zenuwachtig zijn, zijn jullie gemotiveerd alles te geven om de andere universiteiten te verslaan. Omdat jullie denken allebei even goed te zijn, trekken jullie kort voor de presentatie lootjes om te bepalen wie de spreker zal zijn. Jan wordt gekozen; hij moet de presentatie geven voor een gezelschap van 70 concurrerende studenten en 10 juryleden.*

Wanneer TWISTPUNT wordt opgeroepen gaat Jan naar voren en begint. Tijdens Jans presentatie gaat alles fout. Hij komt niet uit zijn woorden, het verhaal is warrig en aan het eind wordt duidelijk dat niemand begreep waarover Jan heeft gesproken.

Vicarious control (VC): *Stel je voor dat je lid bent van de debatteervereniging TWISTPUNT van de Universiteit Twente. Jij en een andere student uit de groep, Jan, nemen deel aan een nationaal debatteerkampioenschap voor studenten. Hoewel jullie allebei erg zenuwachtig zijn, zijn jullie gemotiveerd alles te geven om de andere universiteiten te verslaan. Omdat jullie denken allebei even goed te zijn, trekken jullie kort voor de presentatie lootjes om te bepalen wie de spreker zal zijn. Jan wordt gekozen; hij moet de presentatie geven voor een gezelschap van 70 concurrerende studenten en 10 juryleden. Wanneer TWISTPUNT wordt opgeroepen gaat Jan naar voren en begint. Tijdens Jans presentatie verloopt alles goed. Hij praat duidelijk, het verhaal heeft een duidelijke rode draad en aan het eind is duidelijk dat iedereen begreep waarover Jan heeft gesproken.*

Individual shame (IS): *Stel je voor dat je lid bent van de debatteervereniging TWISTPUNT van de Universiteit Twente. Jij en een andere student uit de groep, Jan, nemen deel aan een nationaal debatteerkampioenschap voor studenten. Hoewel jullie allebei erg zenuwachtig zijn, zijn jullie gemotiveerd alles te geven om de andere universiteiten te verslaan. Omdat jullie denken allebei even goed te zijn, trekken jullie kort voor de presentatie lootjes om te bepalen wie de spreker zal zijn. Jij wordt gekozen; je moet de presentatie geven voor een gezelschap van 70 concurrerende studenten en 10 juryleden. Wanneer TWISTPUNT wordt opgeroepen ga jij naar voren en begint. Tijdens jouw presentatie gaat er alles mis. Je komt niet uit je woorden, het verhaal is warrig en aan het eind is duidelijk dat niemand begreep waarover je hebt gesproken.*

Individual control (IC): *Stel je voor dat je lid bent van de debatteervereniging TWISTPUNT van de Universiteit Twente. Jij en een andere student uit de groep, Jan, nemen deel aan een nationaal debatteerkampioenschap voor studenten. Hoewel jullie allebei erg zenuwachtig zijn, zijn jullie gemotiveerd alles te geven om de andere universiteiten te verslaan. Omdat jullie denken allebei even goed te zijn, trekken jullie kort voor de presentatie lootjes om te bepalen wie de spreker zal zijn. Jij wordt gekozen; je moet de presentatie geven voor een gezelschap van 70 concurrerende studenten en 10 juryleden. Wanneer TWISTPUNT wordt opgeroepen ga jij naar voren en begint. Tijdens jouw presentatie verloopt alles goed. Je praat duidelijk, het verhaal heeft een duidelijke rode draad en aan het eind is duidelijk dat iedereen begreep waarover je hebt gesproken.*

Stel je voor dat je in de net beschreven situatie bevindt. Hoe zou je je voelen?

Hieronder zie je enkele uitspraken over hoe je je op dit moment wel of niet zou kunnen voelen.

Beoordeel alsjeblieft deze uitspraken door een getal van de zevenpuntschaal te omcirkelen.

Beantwoord de vragen spontaan zonder veel na te denken. Onthoud dat je elke uitspraak beoordeelt op basis van hoe je je in de beschreven situatie zou voelen.

Als ik bij de beschreven situatie
aanwezig zou zijn, zou ik...

	helemaal niet						heel sterk
3. ...me goed voelen over mezelf.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. ... door de grond willen zakken.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. ... spijt voelen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. ... me waardevol voelen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. ...me klein voelen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. ...me gespannen voelen over deze presentatie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. ...me capabel voelen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. ... me nuttig voelen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. ... het gevoel hebben dat ik een slecht persoon ben.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. ... niet op kunnen houden te denken aan deze presentatie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. ... me trots voelen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. ... me vernederd voelen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. ... me willen verontschuldigen voor deze presentatie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. ... me tevreden voelen over deze presentatie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. ... me waardeloos voelen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. ... me machteloos voelen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. ...me slecht voelen over deze presentatie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. ... me verantwoordelijk voelen voor de uitkomst van deze presentatie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. ... het gevoel hebben dat ik de presentatie kon beïnvloeden.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Nu krijg je een 2^e scenario te lezen. Lees deze alsjeblieft zorgvuldig door en probeer je wederom zo goed mogelijk in te leven.

Aan het eind van de presentaties maakt een jurylid bekend dat er nog een borrel plaatsvindt voordat 's avonds de beoordelingen bekend gemaakt worden. Je hoort van andere studenten dat de juryleden deze informele gelegenheid gebruiken om voor de beoordeling nog een keer persoonlijk met de studenten te praten. Je voelt je nog gespannen over de presentatie en denkt erover na of je er naartoe zult gaan.

Op de volgende twee pagina's volgen nog enkele vragen over hoe je je in deze tweede situatie zou kunnen voelen. Beantwoord deze alsjeblieft weer spontaan en denk niet lang over de antwoorden na.

Ombladeren →

Geef alsjeblieft aan hoe groot de waarschijnlijkheid is dat je het onderstaande zou uitvoeren.

22. Ik zou naar de borrel willen gaan.

zeer	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	zeer
onwaarschijnlijk								waarschijnlijk

23. Ik zou tijdens de borrel met een jurylid over het onderwerp van de presentatie willen praten.

zeer	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	zeer
onwaarschijnlijk								waarschijnlijk

24. Ik zou tijdens de borrel met Jan willen praten.

zeer	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	zeer
onwaarschijnlijk								waarschijnlijk








Stel dat je beslist om naar de borrel te gaan. Wat zou jouw motivatie kunnen zijn om wel of niet met het jurylid te praten?

	helemaal niet	1	2	3	4	5	6	heel sterk
25. Ik zou het beeld wat de jury van mij heeft willen verbeteren.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
26. Ik zou de indruk van de groep willen verbeteren.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
27. Ik zou willen vermijden dat ik slecht geëvalueerd wordt.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
28. Ik zou willen vermijden dat de groep slecht geëvalueerd wordt.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
29. Ik zou schade aan het beeld dat men van mij heeft willen voorkomen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
30. Ik zou schade aan het beeld dat men van onze groep heeft willen voorkomen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
31. Ik zou mezelf ervan willen verzekeren dat ik competent ben.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
32. Ik zou mezelf ervan willen verzekeren dat onze groep competent is.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

Hoe zou je je tijdens de borrel tegenover Jan en TWISTPUNT voelen?


	helemaal niet						heel sterk
33. Ik zou graag met Jan tijdens de borrel willen worden gezien.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34. Ik zou niet met Jan willen worden geassocieerd.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35. In vergelijking met de andere aanwezige studenten heb ik veel met Jan gemeen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
36. Ik ben aan TWISTPUNT toegewijd.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37. Het geeft me een goed gevoel om deel te zijn van TWISTPUNT.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38. Dat ik lid ben van TWISTPUNT is belangrijk voor hoe ik mezelf zie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

39. Stel je zich voor dat een van de onderstaande cirkels jou voorstelt en de andere Jan is. Kruis hieronder s.v.p. aan welk van de onderstaande afbeeldingen het beste weergeeft hoe jij je ten opzichte van Jan voelt.

O		O	
	Jij Jan		Jij Jan
O		O	
	Jij Jan		Jij Jan
O		O	
	Jij Jan		Jij Jan
O			
	Jij Jan		

40. Stel je voor dat de borrelruimte er als volgt uitziet (zie onderstaande plattegrond).

Wanneer je naar de borrel gaat, blijkt dat Jan, een jurylid en enige studenten hier ook al aanwezig zijn. Probeer je de situatie goed voor te stellen en vraag je af waar je je het liefst in deze borrelruimte zou bevinden gedurende de borrel. Geef door middel van een kruis aan waar jij graag zou willen staan in de borrelruimte.



Dit is het einde van dit onderzoek.
Heel er bedankt voor het meedoen!

Appendix 2

Table 2

Numbers, means and standard deviations of the three subscales of the SSGS per condition in the pretest

Condition	N	Shame		Guilt		Pride	
		M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Individual shame	25	3,45	0,75	4,18	0,46	1,50	0,49
Vicarious shame	23	3,12	0,76	4,00	0,51	1,85	0,57
Individual pride (control)	23	1,37	0,42	2,16	0,49	4,16	0,47
Vicarious pride (control)	24	3,12	0,76	1,96	0,57	3,92	0,31

Table 3

Numbers, means and standard deviations of the three subscales of the SSGS per condition in the experiment

Condition	N	Shame		Guilt		Pride	
		M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Individual shame	21	4,82	0,88	5,57	0,87	2,04	0,67
Vicarious shame	22	4,14	0,82	5,15	0,77	2,77	0,90
Individual pride (control)	22	2,25	0,91	3,22	1,06	5,46	0,68
Vicarious pride (control)	21	2,53	1,05	3,15	1,18	4,99	0,90

Table 4

Means and standard deviations of the three willingness to approach measures per condition

Condition	N	willingness to approach		willingness to approach jury		willingness to approach Jan	
		M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Individual shame	21	4,48	1,66	4,90	1,41	5,76	1,09
Vicarious shame	22	5,59	1,74	5,50	1,85	5,27	1,55
Individual pride (control)	22	5,73	0,99	5,18	1,40	6,09	0,87
Vicarious pride (control)	22	5,55	1,44	4,59	1,71	6,27	0,99

Table 5

Numbers, means and standard deviations of the Restore and Protect motivations per condition

		Restore					
Condition	<i>N</i>	Individual		Group		General	
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Individual shame	21	5.214	0.830	5.143	1.195	5.179	0.856
Vicarious shame	22	4.864	1.329	5.523	0.957	5.193	1.077
Individual pride (control)	22	4.909	0.781	5.046	0.722	4.977	0.703
Vicarious pride (control)	22	4.796	1.130	4.955	1.112	4.875	0.969
		Protect					
Condition	<i>N</i>	Individual		Group		General	
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Individual shame	21	4.738	1.020	5.262	1.068	5.000	0.922
Vicarious shame	22	4.614	1.234	5.182	0.983	4.898	0.999
Individual pride (control)	22	4.773	1.403	4.773	1.232	4.773	1.256
Vicarious pride (control)	22	4.318	1.468	4.909	1.341	4.614	1.306

Table 6

Numbers, means and standard deviations of the In-group association for the Group and for Jan per condition

Condition	N	In-group association					
		Group		Jan		OSIO	
		M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Individual shame	21	4.159	1.129	3.691	0.727	2.857	0.910
Vicarious shame	21	4.460	0.946	3.341	0.966	2.591	1.008
Individual pride (control)	22	4.849	0.597	4.530	0.729	3.909	1.019
Vicarious pride (control)	21	4.905	1.216	4.780	1.127	4.227	1.572

Table 7

Numbers, means and standard deviations of the Distance towards the audience and Jan per condition

Condition	N	Distance (in cm)			
		Jan		Jury	
		M	SD	M	SD
Individual shame	21	2.057	1.567	4.267	1.825
Vicarious shame	22	3.909	1.663	2.550	1.709
Individual pride (control)	22	2.041	1.420	4.132	1.567
Vicarious pride (control)	22	2.041	1.868	4.191	1.388