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THEORIZING EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:

A CASE STUDY ON THE COMMISION'S PROPOSAL FOR THE EU ENERGY AND CLIMATE GOALS 2030

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Declaration of Academic Integrity

I hereby confirm that the present bachelor thesis is solely my own work and that if any text passages or diagrams from books, papers, the Web or other sources have been copied or in any other way used, all references - including those found in electronic media - have been acknowledged and fully cited.

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List of Abbrevations

EU European Union

LI Liberal Intergovernmentalism

MS/s Member State/s

NGO/s Non-governmental organization/s

SC Social Constructivism

Single European Act **SEA**

QCA Qualitative Content Analysis

QMV Qualified Majority Voting

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1. Introduction

1.1. **Background**

"But there is hope on the horizon. I believe we are now standing on the brink of a Third Industrial Revolution: the Low Carbon Age. We are not there yet. But once again, it is Europeans who are leading the way." (Barroso, 2007)

These were the words of the European Commission's president José Manuel Barroso, holding a speech at the Loyola de Palacio energy conference in October 2007. Besides other statements expressed by EU politicians, scientists or in publications of EU institutions¹, these sentences mirror EU's ambitious and progressive attitude towards climate and energy targets over the past few decades. While EU's actions in the area of environmental policy evolved relatively late, in the early 1970s, it soon became an established common policy (Knill & Lifefferink, 2007, p. 1). The EU adopted an increasing number of legislations in this field and took over a global leadership role, promoting the reduction of emissions (Zito, 2000, p. 1). As early as 1991, during the negotiations on the Climate Change Convention, the EU started leading the way. Fostering binding targets for emissions, the EU began "pushing for stringent international commitments" (Oberthür & Kelly, 2008, p. 36). Especially in the time past 2000, the EU became more successful with pursuing its targets. For example in 2001, the EU played a vital role in the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol against the United States' opposition (Oberthür & Kelly, 2008, p. 36). While practicing a 'soft' leadership, a leadership by example, the EU proposed in the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 "the deepest emission cuts and accepted the highest reduction target among the major industrialized countries" (Oberthür & Kelly, 2008, p. 36). Another major step was done by way of the EU's 2020 climate and energy package, set in 2007 by EU leaders. It contained the '20-20-20 targets' aiming at a "20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels; raising the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20%; [and] a 20% improvement in the EU's energy efficiency" (European Commission, 2014a). All in all, the positive trend of increasing EU environmental policy developed and lasted over the past decades. This context made it even more surprising when the European Commission, the often called "Motor der Integration" (Weidenfeld, 2010, p. 130), seemingly backed away from its past ambitious attitude in its proposal on the energy and climate goals for 2030, published in January 2014 (see European Commission, 2014a). The proposal, especially the nonbinding sustainable energy target and the reduction target for emissions, have been widely criticized,

¹ E.g. Dimas (2007), European Commission (2014d) and Zito (2005)

² Translation by the author: "Engine of European integration".

in particular by NGO's, politicians and some industry associations (Harvey and Traynor, 2014). Even the European Parliament criticized in its adopted resolution on the 2030 framework for climate and energy policy, that targets should be binding and implemented through individual national targets and that the share of renewable energy on the European energy market should be increased from the suggested 27% up to 30% (European Parliament, 2014). Whereas a policy change or reduced ambition regarding the emission target can only be assumed due to reactions, the renewable energy goal constitutes a clearly observable policy change. The 2020 goals contained binding national targets for the renewable energy share that directly and measurable obliged every member state (MS). Conversely, the proposed target for 2030 is only binding on an EU level. This seemingly shift of the Commission's course of action in the field of environmental policy, raises the question, how this policy decision can be explained.

1.2. **Approach and Research Question**

In the area of European studies, EU integration theories concentrated for many decades by now, on explaining successes and failures of European integration. These approaches are equally used in specific policy areas of the EU to explain policy decisions and reveal mechanisms leading to policy change. Hence, they are also increasingly applied to the field of EU environmental policy³ (Wurzel, 2002). One or even more of these theories could eventually be employed to explain the policy decision expressed in the Commission's publication of the energy and climate goals 2030, and help answering the following research question.

Main research question: How can the policy decision, expressed in the EU Commission's proposal for the Energy and Climate Goals 2030, be explained?

The study's main goal is to examine general patterns that hint at the applicability of one or more EU integration theories to the policy change in EU environmental policy. Therefore, a case study focusing on the EU Commission's proposal for the energy and climate goals 2030 is carried out. Two approaches, selected from European integration theories serve as theoretical framework, providing different explanations for EU policy decisions. They are analyzed to identify factors that might explain the EU Commission's proposal. These factors can be found embedded in hypotheses, assumptions, propositions and mechanisms described by the theories.

To determine if the discovered theoretical suggestions apply to the case of the Commission's proposal, content of publications that might offer insight into the context of the decision making process, is analyzed. For this reason, the study focuses on actors that are either involved in the framework's

³ For example see Dupont & Primova (2011); Golub (1997); Jordan, Brouwer & Noble (1999); Wurzel (2002); Zito (2000)

development or can be expected to offer observations on or discussion of the event. Thus, publications of the EU Commission, two influential German newspapers and dominant German stakeholders (environmental organizations and trade associations) are selected. These materials are then used for a qualitative content analysis (QCA) according to Mayring (2010)⁴. Following a deductive approach, a category system, which is based on the two chosen integration theories, is developed and applied to the selected qualitative material. After filtering relevant passages from the material, they are evaluated and interpreted against the underlying theories. Equally the quantity of values on different variables is considered and analyzed.

1.3. Scientific Relevance

A study focusing on the Commission's proposal for the energy and climate goals 2030 will examine EU theories in a new context. Whereas former applications of EU integration theories on EU environmental policy took place in the context of a gradual development of this policy field, the study at hand applies theories to a policy decision representing a turning point. Therefore, the study of the Commission's proposal for the energy and climate goals 2030 might produce results and explanations deviating from former studies and can for this reason add a new perspective to the theorizing of this particular policy field. The proposal constitutes a change in the Commission's environmental policy making and needs to be considered and embedded in the still highly vibrant and divided theory debate. A broad approach including two theoretical viewpoints, might help identifying broad patterns to continue with an aligned and more detailed research addressing one specific approach. To illustrate the social and scientific relevance of the topic at hand, one can also refer to Diez and Wiener (2003). They point out several reasons why theorizing aspects of EU integration is still highly valuable, despite the availability of empirical facts on EU institutions. Not only does studying integration theories help explaining outcomes and processes and therewith enhances the understanding of institutions. It also enables the formulation of predictions about future developments. In addition, Diez and Wiener underline integration theories' importance for highlighting assumptions and propositions that otherwise often unconsidered underlie empirical work⁵. Therefore, theories can also help making empirical findings more meaningful. These statements by Diez and Wiener emphasize the importance of further adding new perspectives and findings to the EU integration theory debate. In addition, decision making in the field of EU environmental policies is politically highly important and will further on constitute an eminently relevant object of research. Effectively targeting environmental challenges is and will remain a global task and requires the coordination between and cooperation of countries. Accordingly, the EU can be expected to further on play a special and substantial role in the field of environmental policy.

⁴ More detailed explanation on the case selection and data collection in 4.2. and 4.3. of the Methodological Framework.

⁵ Also see Rosamond (2000, p. 14) on theoretical awareness.

2. Background: EU Environmental Policy and EU Energy and Climate Goals

EU environmental policy's rapid development over the past decades wasn't intended or anticipated from the EU's early beginnings. The foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957 through the Treaty of Rome was primarily driven by economic motivations, in particular economic integration. Thus, the Treaty of Rome did not include any competence in the area of environmental policy (Knill, 2008, p.17). Only many years later, in 1974, the Paris European Summit marked the "beginning of an independent EU environmental policy" (Knill & Liefferink, 2007, p.2). After the "Commission seized the initiative" (Jordan, 1999, p. 3) in 1971, presenting a proposal on a formal environmental action program, Heads of European governments adopted a declaration on environmental and consumer policy in Paris (Knill & Liefferink, 2007, p. 3). According to Knill (2008, p.19f), several reasons account for the introduction of EU environmental policy in the early 1970s. First, individual national environmental standards constituted non-tariff trade barriers and thus lead to distortion in competition, which hindered the realization of an EU common market. Furthermore at that time, environmental issues were more and more politicized due to environmental catastrophes in the 1960s and the increasing perception of cross-border environmental burdens. The growing importance and awareness of these issues was also reflected in the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Another important determinant of the evolvement of an EU environmental policy is established in the EU's goals of approximation of living conditions and the general raising of the standard of living in the EU. These objectives are set out in the preamble and Art. 2 of the Treaty of Rome. They are argued to imply that the improvement of the environmental state constitutes one of the EU's goals. The same argumentation was applied, when justification for the legal basis of EU operations in the field of environmental policy was required. For there was no explicit legal basis providing the EU with competences in this area, Art. 2 and in particular Art. 100 and Art. 235 TEEC⁶ were used as enabling provisions for environmental measures (Jordan, 1999, p. 7). Due to the institutional context of the 1970s, namely that environmental policies first had to be supported unanimously by the Council of Ministers and additionally needed implementation by each single state, scaled down the expectations towards EU environmental policies (Jordan, 2005, p. 4). However, on the contrary, environmental policy developed continuously and took root as an established EU policy area (Jordan, 2005, p.4). Another milestone in the history of EU environmental policy was set in 1987 through the extension of the EEC Treaty by the Single European Act (SEA). Even though the SEA was economically motivated, it added a new chapter on environmental policy to

⁶ Art. 100 TEC [Art. 173 TFEU] grants the EU the right to harmonize laws, regulations and administrative provisions, if necessary to guarantee the functioning of the Common Market. Art. 235 TEC [Art. 18 TEU] states that the EU may provide 'appropriate measures' for the realization of EU objectives, even when the Treaty does not contain explicit provisions.

the Treaty⁷. This chapter included environmental goals and offered a legal basis for legitimized action in this field (Knill, 2008, p. 26f). Besides the changes in the content of the Treaty, some institutional change took place. From this time on, environmental measures that were related to the realization of the single market should be decided by means of qualified majority voting (QMV)⁸, and not any longer by unanimous agreement (Weale, Pridham, Cini, Konstadakopulos, Porter, & Flynn, 2003, p. 5). Moreover, the European Parliament was empowered through the introduction of cooperation procedure⁹ (Weale et al., 2003, p. 5). In the 1990s, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty brought once more some changes. New and extended competences regarding environmental protection were introduced and further institutional changes established. For instance, QMV now also covered measures based on Art 175 TEC [Art. 192 TFEU] and the EU parliament's participation was further strengthened (Knill, 2008, p. 35). Additionally, in Amsterdam Treaty, the Community incorporated the concept of sustainable development as a major task into the Treaty and put special emphasis on the integration of environmental issues in other policy areas (Knill, 2008, p. 35). In the meantime, the European Environmental Agency, based in Copenhagen, was founded and started operating in 1994. Its main task was the building up and maintenance of an information and monitoring network on environmental issues (Knill, 2008, p. 36). The Nice Treaty following soon after the millennium did not produce any significant changes to the Treaty's chapter on environment (Jordan & Fairbrass, 2005, p. 43). Similarly, in the Lisbon Treaty, the chapter largely remained the same with regard to its environmental provisions. It was again institutional change that was impacting environmental policy making (Lee, 2008, p. 132). Yet, the Treaty "reinforces established political commitment to the importance of climate change" (Lee, 2008, p. 132).

After being proposed by the Commission in 2009, the Europe 2020 strategy was launched in 2010 to replace the often criticized Lisbon strategy (Borrás & Radaelli, 2011, p. 465). Europe 2020 aims at turning the EU into a "smart, sustainable and inclusive economy" (European Commission, 2010) by pursuing five headline targets, one of these being the "20/20/20 climate and energy target" (European Commission, 2010). In this context, '20/20/20' represents the objectives of a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% compared to 1990 levels, an increase in share of renewable energy sources in the final consumption to 20% and an increase of 20% in energy efficiency (European Commission, 2010, p. 11). EU's binding legislation to achieve these objectives is summarized in the

⁸ Oualified Majority Voting (OMV) is one possible voting rule, used by the Council of Ministers to decide on issues and proposals. Decisions are reached with 50% of the member states' votes. The votes are weighted according to the state's population seize. While in the Treaty of Rome the Community set the target to adopt QMV to most decisions after 1965, the EU's integration crisis during the 1960s prevented the achievement of this objective and QMV was finally more extensively applied in consequence of the Single European Act (Phinnemore & McGowan, 2010, p. 375).

⁷ Art. 174-176 TEC [Art. 191-193 TFEU]

⁹ The Cooperation procedure was a legislative procedure, introduced by the Single European Act. It required the Council of Ministers to allow the EU Parliament a second reading before making a final decision on new legislature. It was abolished by the Treaty of Amsterdam and replaced by the Codecision procedure that grants the EU parliament even more influence (McCormick, 2008, p. 390).

2020 climate and energy package. It includes the reformation of the EU emissions trading system, national binding targets for greenhouse gas emission not covered by the trading system, binding national targets for the share of renewable energy in MSs' energy consumption and a legal framework for the use of carbon capture and storage technologies (European Commission, 2014b). In spring 2013, the European Commission already initiated the first steps towards a new climate and energy framework for the decade following Europe 2020. Adopting a Green paper, the Commission started a public consultation, addressing MSs, EU institutions and stakeholders on the development of a 2030 framework on climate and energy policies (European Commission, 2013). Ten month later, in January 2014, the Commission published its proposal on the energy and climate goals 2030. Regarding specified objectives, the policy framework mainly contains a 40% reduction goal of greenhouse gas emission compared to the 1990 level and a renewable energy share target of 27% of total EU energy consumption by 2030 (European Commission, 2014a). Compared to the '20/20/20 target', it is noticeable that the policy framework for 2030 only makes provisions for a binding renewable energy target on the EU level, while no national targets are intended. Especially the latter has been widely criticized, in particular by several NGO's, politicians and industry associations (Harvey and Traynor, 2014).

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. **EU Integration Theories**

In the 1950s and 1960s, the EU theory debate evolved and developed simultaneously with different phases of European integration (Weidenfeld, 2010, p.40). In this process, international relation theories provided impetus for competing approaches on integration (Weidenfeld, 2010, p. 41). At an early stage three main theories, namely federalism, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism dominated the field. Later, turns in integration and unexpected events, lead to revision of existing and the creation of new approaches (Diez & Wiener, 2003, p.6ff). Two of the more recently developed theories¹⁰ are liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and social constructivism (SC). They are chosen for this study, since they represent two contrasting and largely conflicting approaches. LI holds a rationalist and state-centric view on the international system and accentuates intergovernmental practices. In contrast, Constructivism highlights the importance of social processes, non-material aspects and supranationalism. Furthermore, both theories also partly overlap with different variations of another essential European integration theory: new institutionalism¹¹. Covering these widely

¹⁰ Even though the term 'theory' does not formally apply to social constructivism, to simplify matters, it will be used throughout this study to describe social constructivism as well as liberal intergovernmentalism. Likewise, the expression 'approach' is used interchangeable for 'theory'.

¹¹ Rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism share some basic assumptions with LI and SC. For further reading see Aspinwall & Schneider (2001), Hall and Taylor (1996) and Pollack (2004).

diverging approaches, the study aims at detecting pointers towards one 'theoretical direction', offering plausible explanations for the proposal's content. Moreover, choosing highly differing approaches increases the probability that the analysis generates clearer and more significant results for one approach, avoiding too mixed and blurred explanations for the policy decision. To not exceed the scope of this study, theoretical considerations of the theories will be limited to the interpretations of one author each. LI will be described according to its originator Andrew M. Moravcsik and SC according to Jeffrey T. Checkel.

Following, the two theories will be outlined and examined in more detail to identify specific hypotheses, assumptions, propositions or mechanisms on EU policy making.

3.1.1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal intergovernmentalism, as formulated by Andrew Moravcsik, evolved in the second half of the 1980s. It represents a revised version of intergovernmentalism, combining elements of 'mid-range' theories on economic interests, bargaining and institutional choice¹² (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 19). Originally, liberal intergovernmentalism was developed as a 'grand theory', aiming at "explaining major turning points" (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 1) in EU integration history. Moravcsik specifically analyzes why European governments continuously agreed on coordinating policies. For this purpose he focuses in his study "The choice of Europe" (Moravcsik, 1998) on the creation of five treatyamendments that significantly enhanced EU integration. Moravcsik has often been criticized¹³ for exclusively placing grand bargaining in the centre of LI (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.81). However, he declares that "this does not foreclose the possibility that LI, properly specified, will be helpful in explaining many everyday decisions as well" (Moravcsik, 1995, p. 613). This view is equally supported by Rosamond (2000, p. 147) and has already been performed in practice¹⁴.

LI has its primary origin in intergovernmentalism. In the mid 1960s, Stanley Hoffmann (1966) established intergovernementalism as criticism of the neofunctionalist approach employed by Ernst Haas. Regarding regional or EU integration, intergovernemntalism predicates states still being the central units that determine community policies, as well as the scale and scope of integration (Weidenfeld, 2010, p. 54). Highlighting social, cultural and political differences of states, Hoffmann presents the nation state's constituting factors: national consciousness, national situation and

¹² Referring to this aspect, Moravcsik differentiates LI from classical theories that mainly refer to one determining factor. He substantiates the incorporation of several approaches with the need for multicausal explanations to include the demand as well as the supply side of integration, to achieve a higher generalizability of the theory, and to increase the theory's empirical robustness (Moravcsik, 1993, p.480f; 1998, p. 19).

¹³ For example by Wincott (1995).

¹⁴ E.g. Golub (1997) and Jordan et al. (1999).

nationalism (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 867ff). Based on these variations, he employs the 'logic of diversity' (Hofmann, 1966, p. 881) that in contrast to neofunctionalists' 'logic of integration' sets limits to unintended functional integration. Whereas he consents to the possibility of supranational integration in 'low politics' (e.g. economic policy) whenever national states can realize profits, the communitarization of 'high politics', policies that are "key importance to the national interest" (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 882), remains unattainable.

Moravsik's rationalist framework

Moravcsik followed the intergovernmentalist approach in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Picking up on neofunctionalist limitations, he introduces a revised intergovernmentalist theory (Moravcsik, 1993). His whole argument is embedded in a rationalist framework that contributes two basic assumptions: (1) states are unitary actors, and (2) unitary states are rational (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 22f). As Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) point out, the first assumption comprises that states are still the crucial actors in the anarchic international system and pursue their objectives through intergovernmental bargaining and not by using force or the establishment of central authorities. However, even though LI shares state centrism with the realist view, national security does not constitute the dominant motivation for cooperation. In the same way, power is also not depended on 'coercive capabilities'. Furthermore, according to LI, state preferences and identities are also not seen as uniform. According to Moravcsik, the assumption of fixed preferences¹⁶ is insufficient for explaining varying state behaviour. States' objectives underlie their strategic interaction and need to be considered for analysis of states' influence and power (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 20f). Accordingly, Moravcsik incorporates a liberal theory of national preference formation in the framework of his theory (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 482; 1998, p. 21). Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig describe state rationality as states calculating the potential utility of alternative options from which they will choose the alternative allowing them to maximize their utility. Thus, collective outcomes are the product of aggregated individual actions based on the pursuit of preferences (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 69).

¹⁵ The neofunctionalist 'logic of integration' predicts integration by means of spillover effects, including the spreading from 'low politics' into sectors of 'high politics'. Propelling factors here are increasing interdependence and supranational agents (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 881).

¹⁶ Moravcsik also uses the term 'black box' to describe the realist/neorealist view of states, including steady preferences for security, power or wealth (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481).

The three stage framework

In the early 1990s Moravcsik still subdivided the process of international cooperation and conflict into two stages, namely national preference formation and interstate bargaining (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 482). Later on, he integrated the third substantial part of his theory, institutional choice, into this framework (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 24; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 69). As already mentioned, the distinctive feature of Moravcsik's LI is the multicausal approach it follows. He integrates a liberal theory of national preference formation, an intergovernmental bargaining theory of international negotiations, and a functional theory of institutional choice in one framework (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 69). In his study on five cases from EU history, Moravcsik puts his hypotheses on the process stages as follows:

"[...] European integration can best be explained as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices respond to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constitutes, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of international institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments." (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 18)

Analyzing the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome, the Common Agricultural Policy, the introduction of the European Monetary System, as well as the negotiations of the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, Moravcsik tests competing theories that provide explanations for the three stages of the process¹⁷ (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 18ff). In the following, it shall be closer looked at each of the stages and the theoretical explanations or mechanisms applied by Moravcsik.

National Preference¹⁸ Formation

Moravcsik (1993) employs a liberal theory on preference formation to explain national preferences in EU negotiations. According to this approach, state policies are decided by politicians that are subject to constraints from societal pressure. According to the liberal theory Moravcsik applies, the relationship between society and government mirrors a principal-agent-relationship. Consequently, groups, e.g. producers, tax payers, consumers etc., express their preferences that are then aggregated by the government. In this process identities, interests and influence of societal actors vary across time and place, but also take diverse shapes in the context of different issue areas. However, this doesn't imply that governments or state leaders cannot have own policy objectives, but they require supporting coalitions of influential groups, holding these specific interests. After all, governments strive to stay in office.

¹⁷ See Appendix 1 for Moravcsik's table on the rationalist framework, including the competing theories.

¹⁸ Moravcsik defines national preference as an "ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes, often termed, 'states of the world'[...]" (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 24).

According to Moravcsik, societal pressure differs in connection with some determining factors. One determinant is the magnitude of gains and losses, or the expected costs and benefits for the groups exercising the imminent pressure on the government. Moravcsik states here that groups that can gain or lose significantly by reason of the policy, typically tend to be most influential. Furthermore, uncertainty and costs involved play a decisive role. If "net costs and benefits of alternative policies are certain, significant and risky" (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 487), groups will have high motivation to mobilize politically and hence, pressure and constraint for governments increases. In addition, Moravcsik points out that the stronger the interest in a specific issue area is, the more likely is its political mobilization. Regarding particular societal groups, he determines the competition of producer groups versus tax payers and individual consumers. Here, the latter groups show more diffuse interests to the advantage of domestic producer groups. In this context, Moravcsik additionally emphasizes that the constraint wielded by domestic producer groups is especially tight when costs and benefits for individual sectors, which are important segments for domestic producers, are significant and predictable (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 490).

Moravcsik also addresses 'international policy externalities' to explain governments' ambition for policy coordination.¹⁹ He applies liberal theories of economic interdependence that predict the evolution of policy externalities as a result of economic interdependence. For example transborder flows of goods and services or pollutants through air and water. These externalities then generate incentive for cooperation. However, the extent of motivation to cooperate heavily depends on the question if states are affected by negative or positive externalities and how much they are exposed to those. If domestic policies are sufficient to cope with externalities, cooperation won't be implemented. Further, Moravcsik illustrates two purposes of policy coordination that both aim at the removal of international policy externalities: on one hand market liberalization to accommodate economic interdependences, and on the other hand harmonization to guarantee public goods provision. Moreover, he highlights the conflict of distribution of benefits that is inherent in all cooperation.

To develop an issue-specific view on preference formation, Moravcsik (1993) distinguishes the areas of commercial liberalization, socio-economic public goods provision and political, institutional or redistributional policies. Especially the second area of public goods provision is important in the context of this study. It covers the provision of public goods to redress market failures and therefore includes besides monetary, social, and regulatory policies, also environmental policies. Here, as illustrated before, uncoordinated policies that cause negative policy externalities are the propelling force, generating incentive for cooperation. These externalities can for example be caused by transborder flows of water or air etc. Moravcsik particularly underlines that usually smaller

¹⁹ As already mentioned, governments nevertheless need to construct a coalition of influential groups to realize policies or coordination.

governments will aspire to coordinate, for they often have little control over their domestic market and are exposed to high economic interdependence. Additionally, Moravcsik characterizes the international coordination of such policies as a "two dimensional issue" (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 492). He argues that governments have to balance on one hand the flows of economic transaction, and on the other hand the level of public goods provision. Furthermore, he states that the two-dimensionality leads to a broader range of mobilized interests for public goods issues than for commercial policies. Regarding the constraint on governments, Moravcsik identifies varying patterns depending on the intensity and predictability of private interests. Whereas coordination of policies to provide public goods, such as the regulation of pollution, display diffuse patterns of interests, "policies involving the direct regulation of goods and production processes tend to engender stronger mobilization of producer groups" (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 493).

In his later empirical study on treatment negotiations/amendments, Moravcsik (1998) strongly focuses on testing if economic interests or geopolitical²⁰ interest are decisive for EU cooperation. In this process he comes to the conclusion that economic interests, in other words cooperation to seek mutually beneficial policies to address policy externalities, were prevailing in all five case studies. Geopolitical motivations only applied to exceptional cases.

Interstate bargaining

Using intergovernmentalist theory of international cooperation, Moravcsik develops a bargaining game that depends on the relative bargaining power of involved actors (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 71). Goal of the bargaining is an agreement about the terms of cooperation and the associated distributional consequences (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 496). In his paper on the liberal intergovernemntalist approach, Moravcsik (1993) illustrates in detail the 'rules' of this game. First of all, Moravcsik limits the bargaining space to the national preferences of participating states. Following, he establishes three underlying assumptions of the bargaining game: (1) states cooperate voluntarily, no military power or economic threat is employed; (2) the EC 'bargaining-environment' is relatively information rich what means that actors have information about preferences of other participants, opportunities and technical implications of policies; and (3) transaction costs are low, so that little costs arise - negotiations take place in an extensive time period, and side-payments and issue linkages are possible. From these assumptions, he concludes that negotiation outcomes on one hand are always efficient and therefore generally pareto-optimal, and on the other hand that the bargaining leverages of states depend on the intensity of their national preferences. The more a state desires an agreement, the weaker is its relative bargaining power and it is more likely to make concessions and put effort into the achievement of the

²⁰ Geopolitical interests include issues such as security, defense, territory and sovereignty. For this reason, states representing these interests usually also cooperate economically with their geopolitical partners (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 27).

agreement. It will have to compromise with the "least forthcoming" (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 500) government and usually a lowest common denominator agreement will result. The latter is due to the fact that the range of possible agreements is constrained by the preferences at hand. However, according to Moravcsik, agreements do not necessarily need to be built on the lowest common standard, for regulatory policies are often two-dimensional. This enables to apply side-payments or linkages to achieve agreements above the lowest common denominator.

Furthermore, Moravcscik (1993) identifies three determinants of interstate bargaining: unilateral policy agreements/non-agreements, alternative coalitions including the threat of exclusion, and compromises, side-payments and linkages. In general, cooperation must offer benefits compared to the best alternative available. Often, there is an asymmetrical interdependence between states with regard to policy issues. Normally one state is less dependent, for it can gain less from the respective agreement. Consequently, this state has a greater bargaining leverage and can make use of nonagreement as an implicit sanction. In this context, Moravcsik establishes the rule of thumb that "large, prosperous, relatively self-sufficient countries" (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 500) tend to have most influence, because they can gain significantly less from an agreement than more dependent smaller states. Moreover, states have the possibility to compare the future benefits of an agreement with those of an alternative coalition. States that can potentially be part of an alternative coalition gain bargaining power. An alternative coalition can take the form of cooperation with a non-EU country or the use of multi-speed of policies within the EU and therefore incorporates the exclusion of states. Especially exclusion can create negative external policy effects for ruled out states. Thus, the threat of alternative coalitions generates incentives to compromise. However, if positive policy externalities result from an alternative coalition, the contrary effect applies and excluded states may free-ride. Side-payments and linkages constitute the third determinant of interstate bargaining. Moravcsik points out that due to varying preference intensities of states across issues, they can "exchange concessions in issue-areas about which their preferences are relatively weak[,] for concessions in other areas about which they care more" (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 505). Consequently, they can agree on package-deals that potentially increase the welfare of both sides. Greatly asymmetrical interests will result in the highest advantage. Nonetheless, there remains one obstacle to linkages: domestic opposition. Domestic groups opposing the policy in question can solely be 'ignored' if compensations are paid or if only moderate costs of adjustment affect important domestic groups. Otherwise, the linkage will turn out to be unstable or will be circumvented by and by.

All in all, Moravcsik concludes on linkages that (1) they are most likely where interests of domestic groups are not strong, (2) that they most probably occur in the final stage of bargaining, and (3) that they are most probably used for closely related issues. Additionally, if linkages imply severe losses for domestic groups, the reimbursement though domestic side-payments turns out to be most effective.

In his empirical study on LI, Moravcsik (1998) tests supranational bargaining theory²¹ and intergovernmental bargaining theory, using the aforementioned cases from EU integration history. In all his case studies he considered the intergovernmental approach proved. He identifies that plenty information was available to governments in bargaining processes, so that they were often even better informed than supranational actors involved. He finds overarching governmental entrepreneurship and states that "proposals that appear to have been proposed by international actors, were actually managed behind the scenes by major governments through classical diplomatic means" (Moravcsik, 1998, p.480). All in all, he evaluates the negotiations of the case studies as efficient and preferences of participants as transparent.

Institutional choice

Picking up on regime theory, Moravcsik (1993) employs the liberal intergovernmentalist framework in institutional choice. He declares that MSs do accept supranational institutions, as long as they strengthen their control over domestic issues and help them in achieving otherwise unattainable objectives. According to Moravcsik, the EU strengthens states' power in two ways: (1) by increasing the efficiency of interstate bargaining and (2) by extending the autonomy of national political leaders. The first mechanism builds upon functional regime theory and states that institutions enhance cooperation by providing information, reducing uncertainty, increasing efficiency and facilitating agreements. Consequently, institutions are especially useful and most likely, when transaction costs are high and monitoring and enforcement of compliance are critically important. In this case, governments can make credible commitment to a policy by means of a neutral procedure of enforcement, provided by supranational institutions.

Whereas Moravcsik (1993) considers the concept of incomplete contracting to fail in entirely explaining inconsistencies of delegation or pooling of sovereignty by MSs, he employs a cost-benefit analysis, following public choice analysis. According to this approach, the costs and benefits of future decisions are analyzed compared to alternative institutional designs. This analysis ascribes delegation and pooling the achievement of more decisions at lower costs compared to individual package deals. Thus, it can be considered as more efficient. Moreover, Moravcsik presents three encouraging conditions for the delegation or pooling of sovereignty. First, potential gains play a decisive role. The greater potential gains of a decision are, the more time pressure is present, and the less attractive the status quo is, the more likely are governments to pool or delegate sovereignty. Uncertainty inherent a decision is another relevant factor for delegation and pooling. According to Moravcsik, the lack of knowledge about future decision's details and outcomes increases the likeliness of sovereignty

²¹ Supranational bargaining theory highlights supranational entrepreneurship being caused by the lack of available information. It sees integration as the unintentional choice of governments and unforeseen consequence of package deals (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 54).

transfer. Third, the extent of risk for national governments or domestic groups with strong interests influences the probability of delegation/pooling. Governments will only have an incentive to delegate sovereignty, if there is a small probability that decisions will be unforeseeable distorted against their interests.

Furhtermore, Moravcsik (1993) regards the autonomy of national political leaders as strengthened through a 'two-level game'. According to this approach national governments use EC institutions to overcome national oppositions and increase therewith their own policy autonomy. This happens mainly by means of supranational institutions.

In his case studies on LI, Moravcsik (1998) tests federalist theory, technocratic management and credible commitments to explain institutional choices in the EU. In this respect he determines credible commitments being decisive for pooling and delegation decisions. Thus, the latter are mainly used to ensure implementation and enforcement of agreements. However, for the time period of the 1980s and 1990s, he also detected patterns hinting at federalist theory.

3.1.2. Social Constructivism

Constructivism developed in international relations in the 1980s (Adler, 2002) and only started being concerned with the study of the EU in the late 1990s (Risse, 2009). Assuming that social action leads to the construction of identity and therewith constitutes actors behaviour and interests in the context of global politics, constructivism contradicts neo-realist and neo-liberal theory (Christiansen, Jorgensen &Wiener, 1999, p. 535). The approach comprises several strands that can be subsumed under modernist constructivism, represented by scholars such as Emanuel Adler, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Alexander Wendt and Jeffrey Checkel, modernist linguistic constructivism, radical constructivism, critical constructivism and pragmatic constructivism (Adler, 2002, 97f). While the various forms of constructivism differ with regard to hermeneutic and constitutive factors for social reality etc., a common ground, which is widely accepted among constructivists, can be ascertained. Adler (2002) summarizes four shared assumptions derived from constructivists' ontology: (1) intersubjective understanding, subjective knowledge and material objects form the social world, (2) human's conscious of facts and their language create social facts/reality, (3) all individual thinking and feeling happens against the background of collective/intersubjective understandings that can be expressed in language or rules, and (4) agents and structures mutually constitute each other²².

²²The fourth assumption of mutual constitution of agents and structures is not shared by radical constructivists (Adler, 2002, p. 100).

From a social constructivist perspective, human agents do not act unaffected by social structures surrounding them, but are subject to the mutual constitutiveness of agency and structure²³ (Risse, 2009, p. 160). On one hand they "construct and reproduce it [social reality] through their daily practices" (Risse, 2009, p. 160), while on the other hand their identities and interests are constructed by social structures vice versa. It is in particular this major claim of social constructivists, which is contrary to the rationalist ontology of exogenously produced identities that are shaped by domestic politics or human nature per se (Wendt, 1994, p. 485). In this respect, social constructivists particularly attribute constitutive effects to institutions and social norms that on one hand regulate behaviour/constrain choices of agents and on the other hand constitute their identities (Risse, 2009, p. 163). In addition social contructivists employ a 'logic of appropriateness' that contradicts rationalist institutionalism's 'logic of consequentialism' (Checkel, 1998, 2005; Risse, 2009). Whereas rationalists believe that institutions constrain actors at maximising their given preferences, SC and sociological institutionalism insist on the prevalence of rule-guided behaviour. According to this assumption, actors strive to "do the right thing" (Risse, 2009, p. 163) by complying with the seemingly appropriate rule in a given social context. While SC as such does not make any assertion on European integration, constructivist scholars started from the late 1990s on entering the field of European studies. Here, they examine the role of intersubjectivity in regime analysis, the impact of social interaction of states, constitutive effects of European norms, communication and discourse in the EU and the development and consequences of European identity²⁴ (Christiansen, Jorgensen & Wiener, 1999; Risse, 2009).

As Risse (2009), Moravcik (2001) and Checkel (2001a, 2001b, 2005) state, constructivists analyzing European integration, still act in a meta-theoretical sphere. While having agreed on a set of core assumptions, SC is still undertheorized and lacks mid-range theories, from which hypotheses for further empirical tests can be derived. However, Checkel's studies of European socialization processes²⁵ "come[.] closest to such an attempt" (Risse, 2009, p. 174). Therefore, in the following, 'Checkel's constructivism' will be considered in more detail. An approach including substantive theory, clear hypotheses and propositions, will later help to nurture a comprehensive category system for the OCA.

Checkel's constructivism

In his studies from the late 1990s on, Checkel (1999, 2001a, 2001b) analyzes the role of social learning, effected by social interaction in international institutions and organizations. In this process he

²³ For a short review on the agency and structure debate in constructivism see Adler (2002, p. 104).

²⁴ For example Checkel and Katzenstein (2009), Risse (2001), Sedelmeier (2003), Schmidt and Radaelli (2004).

²⁵ See e.g. Checkel (2001a, 2001b, 2005)

focuses on social learning and persuasion, in particular highlighting MS compliance and diffusion pathways of (European) norms.

Checkel (2001b) distinguishes three approaches that explain compliance in the context of social interaction. Besides a rationalist approach that focuses on instrumental calculations and mostly material incentives and a constructivist approach that similarly argues with instrumental calculations and coercion/social sanctioning mechanisms, Checkel sees highest added value by means of a 'social learning and deliberation approach'. He defines social learning as "a process whereby actors, through interaction with [...] [norms or discursive structures], acquire new interests and preferences – in the absence of obvious material incentives" (Checkel, 1999, p. 548). Consequently, the third explanation places a non-instrumental choice mechanism in an environment of social interaction among agents. Instead of unilateral calculations, mutual social learning and deliberation take centre stage and promote preference change of agents (Checkel, 2001b, p. 560). Regarding social learning, Checkel especially highlights its differentiation from rational choice's 'simple learning'. While through the latter, agents only acquire information during social interaction to reshape their strategies for further pursuit of fixed preferences, 'complex social learning' involves the shaping of interests and identities through social interaction (Checkel, 1999, p. 548, 2001b, p. 561). Conceding that strategic interaction by self-interested actors cannot be excluded, Checkel draws upon constructivist research on social learning. Trying to determine whether and when social learning takes place, he identifies in constructivist literature four hypotheses when social learning is most likely to occur²⁶.

Furthermore, social learning approaches imply an influential role for communication. To underpin his learning/communication argument, Checkel further draws upon theories of persuasion and argumentation. He defines persuasion as a "cognitive process" or "a mechanism through which social learning may occur, thus leading to interest redefinition and identity change" (Checkel, 1999, p. 549), and extracts three hypotheses on persuasion from literature of the afore mentioned theories²⁷²⁸. In his later works, Checkel goes more into detail on persuasion and particularly stresses the difference between manipulative and argumentative persuasion (Checkel, 2001a, p. 221, 2001b, p. 562,). Whilst he characterizes manipulative persuasion as asocial and strategic agency which is often associated with politicians influencing mass publics, argumentative persuasion represents a social process shaped by interaction. In addition, argumentative persuasion can cause the change of attitudes and preferences.

²⁷ For Checkel's hypotheses on ideal settings for persuasion of agents see Appendix 3.

²⁶ For Checkel's hypotheses on social learning see Appendix 2.

²⁸ In his study on the Committee of Experts on Nationality, Checkel found empirical support for processes of persuasion and learning that lead to rethinking of preferences. However, not all committee members showed new learned interests (Checkel, 1999, p. 551).

Not only did Checkel in his later studies dig deeper into the topic of persuasion. He also integrated the hypotheses on social learning and persuasion into a set of five hypotheses/conditions that describes under which conditions agents are accessible to argumentative persuasion:

HYPOTHESIS 1: ARGUMENTATIVE PERSUASION IS MORE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE WHEN THE PERSUADEE IS IN A NOVEL AND UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT - GENERATED BY THE NEWNESS OF THE ISSUE; A CRISIS; OR SERIOUS POLICY FAILURE - AND THUS COGNITIVELY MOTIVATES TO ANALYZE NEW INFORMATION.

HYPOTHESIS 2: ARGUMENTATIVE PERSUASION IS MORE LIKELY TO BE EFEECTIVE WHEN THE PERSUADEE HAS FEW PRIOR, INGRAINED BELIEFS THAT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PERSUADER'S MESSAGE. PUT DIFFERENTLY; NOVICE AGENTS WITH FEW COGNITIVE PRIORS WILL BE RELATIVELY OPEN TO PERSUASION.

HYPOTHESIS 3: ARGUMENTATIVE PERSUASION IS MORE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE WHEN THE PERSUADER IS AN AUTHORITATIVE MEMBER OF THE IN-GROUP TO WHICH THE PERSUADEE BELONGS OR WANTS TO BELONG:

HYPOTHESIS 4: ARGUMENTATIVE PERSUASION IS MORE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE WHEN THE PERSUADER DOES NOT LECTURE OR DEMAND BUT INSTEAD "ACTS OUT PRINCIPLES OF SERIOUS DELIBERATIVE ARGUMENT:"

HYPOTHESIS 5: ARGUMENTATIVE PERSUASION IS MORE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE WHEN THE PERSUADER-PERSUADEE INTERACTION OCCURS IN LESS POLITICIZED AND MORE INSULATED, PRIVATE SETTINGS.

(Checkel, 2001b, p. 562f)

Further, Checkel (1999, 2001b, 2001c) focuses on socialization/diffusion pathways. Here he follows up on the questions through what processes norms are constructed at EU level and how these socialize and interact with agents. Concerning norm development, Checkel refers to constructivist theoretical and empirical work. Thereof he takes the three crucial factors: individual agency, open policy windows and processes of social learning and socialization (Checkel, 1999, p. 552). Using the term 'individual agency', Checkel describes the presence of individuals that possess entrepreneurial skills and "often turn their individual beliefs into broader, shared understandings" (Checkel, 1999, p. 552). Policy windows constitute a context in which a group of agents is confronted with a new, unknown or unclear problem. This specific situation allows the involved entrepreneur to be most successful, for these conditions promote an easier breaking down of steady preferences. Last, the already described processes of social learning and socialization represent the third dynamic for norm development. However, according to Checkel, it is important that social learning proceeds among a bigger group of actors, since individual agency proved to be deficient for the creation of lasting social norms. Additionally, Checkel (1999, p. 552f, 2001c, p. 182) explores diffusion pathways of social norms to national settings. Here, he refers on one hand to societal mobilization by non-state actors, networks etc. that put decision makers under political pressure and coerce them to change state policies. On the other hand, there is constructivist social learning that comprises the adoption of "prescriptions embodied in norms" (Checkel, 1999, p.553) and later internalization of those. A shared intersubjective understanding emerges that then affects agents' behaviour. To determine under what circumstances which of these mechanisms applies, Checkel constructs the hypothesis that the domestic structure of a state is determining for the diffusion pathway. Here he classifies four groups of structures: liberal, corporatist, statist and state above society. Each of these promotes either societal pressure on elites, elite learning or a combination of both²⁹ (Checkel, 2001c, p. 182). Checkel also tested his hypothesis in case studies on Germany and Ukraine. He comes to the conclusion that the German corporatist structure enhanced social mobilization mechanisms, while Ukraine's centralist system facilitated elite learning (Checkel, 2001b, p. 567ff). Drawing upon his case studies, Checkel also identifies three ways in which institutions impact the compliance process: (1) institutional legacies, (2) structure of domestic institutions, and (3) pre-existing norms (Checkel, 2001b, p. 580).

In his introduction for a special issue of the journal 'International Organization' on conditions under which institutions matter, Checkel (2005) theorizes dynamics that promote socialization outcomes in the context of international institutions. Defining socialization as "a process of inducting actors into norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel, 2005, p. 804), he follows the central question if international institutions can socialize agents in today's Europe. According to Checkel, socialization involves the shift from a logic of consequences, based on the calculation of cost and benefits, to the logic of appropriateness, which is independent from material incentives or sanctions. Including the possible role instrumental rationality might play, he distinguishes three mechanisms: strategic calculation, role playing and normative suasion. Strategic calculation has its roots in rationalist social theory. According to this mechanism, agents base their actions on calculations to maximise their interests. Therefore, this dynamic does not lead to a logic of appropriateness. Behavioural adoption through this mechanism can be achieved by means of political conditionality. Material incentives are used to affect behavioural change of states (intergovernmental reinforcement) or non-governmental actors in a particular state (transnational reinforcement by reward)³⁰. Role playing has its origins in organizational theory and cognitive/social psychology. This concept states that agents act appropriate to expectations, regardless if they accept the role or not. This mechanism constitutes a shift away from the logic of consequences, even though a reflective internalization by way of communicative processes does not take place. Checkel names the role playing dynamic 'Type I internalization/socialization'³¹. On the other hand, normative suasion displays a communicative understanding of rationality. It constitutes a complete shift from the logic of consequence to the logic of appropriateness. Here, agents internalize new understandings in a reflective way and are generally open to redefine their preferences.

²⁹ For Checkel's table on domestic structure and norm diffusion see Appendix 4.

³⁰ Conditions increasing the likelihood of behavioral adoption according to community norms: Appendix 5.

³¹ Conditions under which internalization of new roles according to community norms is more likely: Appendix 6.

They put forward arguments, trying to persuade each other. From this perspective, language is upvalued from a simple tool to a constitutive factor for agents and their interests. Checkel calls this mechanism 'Type II internalization/socialization'³².

However, Checkel concedes that the seemingly hierarchical structure of the mechanisms not necessarily needs to be reflected by reality. For example, internalization might also be possible without efforts of persuasion. Therefore, the three categories should rather be regarded as nominal than ordinal (Checkel, 2005, p. 814).

4. Methodological Framework

4.1. Qualitative Content Analysis according to Mayring

In the study at hand, a case study that focuses on the Commission's proposal is carried out to answer the research question, how can the policy decision, expressed in the EU Commission's proposal for the energy and climate goals 2030 be explained? In the context of the case study, a QCA according to Mayring (2010) is conducted.

Mayring's (2010) QCA aims at analyzing fixed communication in a systematic way, driven by rules and theory, with the goal to draw conclusions with regard to specific aspects of communication. However, this definition is not only limited to the contents of communication, but can also include social-cultural context, the communicator's intentions or emotional condition, as well as effects on the audience. Furthermore, QCA tries to enable integration of quantitative and qualitative techniques to proceed on one hand in a systematic fashion and on the other hand remain flexible to deal with high complexities. The QCA conducted in this study focuses on the contents of communication to derive potential information on the creation and contents of the Commission's proposal on the energy and climate goals 2030. Mayring also highlights QCA's applicability and usefulness in various contexts, such as theory formulation, pilot studies, case studies and theory testing etc. Yet, the study at hand takes the form of a case study, following a strong deductive approach by applying the above outlined integration theories to selected material. The central tool of the content analysis represents a category system. It helps putting the analysis targets in concrete terms and enhances the comparability of results by determining variables, possible values, definitions of variables and corresponding code rules³³. To ensure that the category system adequately identifies relevant information embedded in the material, a

³² Conditions for persuasion socialization mechanism: Appendix 7.

³³ In light of the breath of LI and SC and the strong differences between them, it can be expected that hardly all or even many of the categories will apply to the material. This expectancy was also confirmed in the prior text exercise. Thus, typical examples would only be of limited use in the analysis. For this reason, the study here forgoes the use of typical examples in the category system.

text exercise prior to the actual analysis enabled a revision of the category system³⁴. In this study the category system consists of indicators for the two theories that are translated into variables³⁵. Liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist assumptions, prepositions and hypotheses, which are formulated by Moravcsik and Checkel or can be derived from their theoretical considerations, provide the foundation for these variables. It is the analysis' objective to identify text parts or statements in selected material that can offer information for answering the main research question. Furthermore, patterns might be detected that attach importance to the explanatory value of one or both theories.

Not only does Mayring highlight QCA's utility for case studies (Mayring, 2010, p.23). Likewise, Kohlbacher (2006) discusses, how QCA can offer valuable contributions, particularly for case studies. He emphasizes its openness and ability to deal with complexity, as well as the possibility to integrate different materials. Especially the latter characteristic enables to include diverse material in this study to cover a broad and eventually varying range of perspectives that can equally provide extensive insights on the case. In addition, QCA's use for theory-guided analysis is, besides its inductive benefits, supported (Kohlbacher, 2006; Gläser & Laudel, 1999). This feature equally goes well with the deductive approach employed in this study.

4.2. Case Selection

The European Commission's proposal for the energy and climate goals 2030, published on January 22, 2014 (European Commission, 2014a), serves as the subject of the case study. It is chosen on the basis of preliminary considerations: The Commission's white paper is selected on one hand for its actuality that makes it a recent and politically relevant issue to deal with. On the other hand, the Commission's proposal constitutes a special case in the field of EU environmental policy. After the EU performed for a long time a global leadership role in climate policies (Zito, 2000, p. 1), the proposal, especially the non-binding sustainable energy target and the reduction target for emissions, have been widely criticized. Particularly NGO's, politicians and industry associations denounced the proposal as 'backing away' from ambitious climate goals (Harvey and Traynor, 2014). Whereas a policy change or reduced ambition regarding the emission target can only be assumed due to reactions, the renewable energy goal constitutes a clearly observable change. While the 2020 goals contained binding national targets for the renewable energy share, the proposed target for 2030 is only binding on an EU level. Due to this surprising turn, the case of the Commission's proposal offers new material and a new perspective in the theory debate on EU integration, in particular in the field of EU environmental policies. This non-consistent development in EU environmental policy, challenges EU integration

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³⁴ A prior text exercise is part of the QCA's analysis process described by Mayring (2010). The QCA carried out in the course of this study also followed this procedure. The process sketch of the QCA (deductive application) according to Mayring can be found in Appendix 8.

³⁵ The expressions 'category' and 'variable' are used interchangeably in this study.

theories anew and might lead to results, deviating from studies in this area that were carried out prior to this change. Furthermore, the Commission's proposal caused many and wide-ranging reactions of various actors and organizations in the form of articles, statements and press releases. These offer a variety of material that can be used for data collection and analysis by means of QCA.

4.3. Data Collection

Specification of material

In this study, qualitative data is collected and analyzed to identify possible explanations for the policy decision represented by the proposal. German newspaper articles and publications from the EU Commission and German stakeholders serve as material for the QCA. One way to assess motivations/causes for decisions in a complex policy process is to include several perspectives of actors involved, and observations included in media coverage. Newspaper articles (including editorials) from two dominant German newspapers, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung³⁶ are chosen, for they report about events of public interest and therefore also cover the Commission's proposal. They provide information on the background and context of events, as well as to some degree objective observations. Particular stakeholders, such as environmental groups and trade associations, are involved in the creation of the proposal³⁷ and/or affected by its outcomes. For this reason these groups publish press releases or articles on the event that might include their observations, opinions and background information on the proposal and its creation. In this study, publications from Greenpeace Germany, WWF (World Wildlife Fund) Germany, BUND (German Association for Environment and Nature Protection), BDI (Federation of German Industries), BDEW (German Association of energy and water industries), BEE (German Renewable Energy Federation), VIK (German Power Generation Association) are selected. All these stakeholders have a thematic connection with the proposal and rate among the biggest and most influential interest groups in Germany (n.a., 2014). Last, the Commission's publications that are connected to the proposal (press release and 'Questions & Answers' publication) and the proposal itself will be analyzed. The Commission's proposal lies within the centre of analysis and associated publications might already include information on its creation and underlying motivations and objectives.

Origin of material

To collect publications for data analysis, the time period of January 1^{st} to 31^{st} is considered. While the proposals publication was on January 22^{nd} , some information on the proposal's content came to light

³⁶ Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung represent two "opinion-leading quality newspapers within the German press landscape" (Schuck & de Vreese, 2006, p. 12) and are for this reason usually addressed in scientific studies; for example see Berkel (2006), Brettschneider (1997), Schuck and de Vreese (2006).

³⁷ By means of the consultation phase that was initiated by the Commission in 2013.

beforehand and was already covered by media and stakeholders. Press releases and articles of stakeholders are retrieved from the corresponding websites³⁸. Newspaper articles are taken from the particular newspaper archives, accessed via the library of University Münster and the land of North Rhine-Westphalia³⁹.

Limitations

However, it is important to keep in mind that all material used does not reflect the unfiltered or unaltered reality of events. Not only is it possible that the producer of material received and/or interpreted information wrongly, but also, referring to the standard communication model (Mayring, 2010, p. 56), it cannot be ruled out that senders of information (e.g. individuals or organizations) practice strategic communication according to their interests and pursued objectives. Moreover, the reason for selection of newspaper and stakeholder publications that are particularly from Germany needs to be clarified. Due to Germany's energy transition (*Energiewende*⁴⁰), emissions and the generation and use of renewable energy play a decisive role in Germany's public discourse. Therefore, one could expect a stronger response regarding the quantity and level of detail of publications. Nevertheless, this implies that any results might be fragmental and are limited to the German context. Further research that is extended to more countries will be required.

Regarding the difficulties associated with this type of research design, one has to consider that for example compared to other designs, the absence of a control group, use of non-randomized treatment and a non-random sampling method (concerning a case study one can hardly speak of sampling but rather of case selection), cause substantial threats to the external and internal validity of the study. Alternative explanations cannot be ruled out and the analysis of a single unit is inadequate to estimate causal effects or probabilities. However, the aim of the study is not to identify causal relationship but to search for broad patterns. When these turn out to be significant, they need to be subjected to more pinpointed research in follow-up studies.

4.4. Category Definition

The variables of the category system are derived from the specific theoretical approaches outlined above. Relevant statements, assumptions, mechanisms and hypotheses on states' cooperation represent the foundation for the categories. First, each variable can apply or not apply to a coding unit⁴¹ of the

³⁸ www.greenpeace.de; www.wwf.de; www.bund.net; www.bdew.de; www.vik.de; www.bee-ev.de; www.bdi.eu

³⁹ Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek (ULB); Website: http://www.ulb.uni-muenster.de

⁴⁰ The German Energy Transition aims at the massive expansion of renewable energy generation/harvesting to constitute an alternative to nuclear energy and fossil fuels. Main targets are the increase of renewable energy share to 40-45% by 2025 and 55-60% by 2035 (Bundesregierung, 2014).

⁴¹ A coding unit is the smallest text portion that can fall into a category (Mayring, 2010, p. 59).

selected material. Second, if the theoretical basis of a variable provides for diversification, values are added to single variables. However, only few variables are suitable for the division into clear values. Predominantly, the categories aim to cover the phenomena described in the theories in a systematic but open way. Therefore, coding units should be analyzed and evaluated most unrestrictedly, what could be impeded by the formulation of too narrow value definitions. As the excerpt of the category table (see Table 1)⁴² shows, the variable definition explains the mechanism or hypotheses underlying the variable. The code rules give instructions which criteria must be fulfilled by a coding unit to fall within the category. The code rules are mainly descriptive or take the form of 'AND and OR statements', defining necessary conditions.

Table 1: Excerpt category system

| Variable | Value | Variable definition | Code rule |
|---------------|-------|--|---|
| Argumentative | | Process of interaction "in which | Agent (state, organization, etc.) aims at |
| persuasion | | communicator attempts to induce a | convincing other agent (e.g. state) of |
| | | change in the belief, attitude or | particular belief, attitude or behavior by |
| | | behavior of person through | using communication |
| | | transmission of a message in a context | and and |
| | | in which the persuadee has some | attitude/belief/behavior of receiving agent |
| | | degree of choice" (Checkel, 2001b, p. | changes |
| | | 562). Process of convincing. Involves | and and |
| | | changing of attitudes about cause and | coercion is absent (the latter condition |
| | | effect. Absence of coercion. | does not necessarily be mentioned in the |
| | | | statement) |

A preliminary analysis of the material was exercised to detect categories or code rules that lack clarity or are in some other way misleading. These categories were then revised. The final working through of the material followed.

Regarding the categories and underlying theories, one could question in how far these are applicable to the daily decision making of the EU Commission that in this case concluded in the discussed proposal. Not only does LI specifically represent a grand theory dealing with 'big treaty amendments', also both approaches exclusively address to a great extent interstate action. However, it needs to be pointed out that it is again a theory underlying the assumption that the EU Commission pursues own, supranational preferences and does not follow the rules of interstate bargaining or diplomacy – this theory is namely neo-functionalism (Wonka, 2008, p. 117). While many researchers pick up on the belief of an independent Commission, there are also numerous studies showing that the Commission can't be regarded as a supranational unitary actor (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998; Ross, 1995; Wonka, 2007).

 $^{^{42}}$ The complete table of the category system can be found in Appendix B.

In addition there are also studies claiming that the influence the Commission exerts and the role it plays vary over time (Christiansen & Jorgensen, 1998; Dinan, 1997). Furthermore, does Moravcsik not exclude the explanatory value of LI for EU's daily decision-making (Moravcsik, 1995, p. 613) and other researchers also already applied this 'grand theory' to regular policy making, even in the field of EU environmental policy (e.g. Dupont & Primova, 2011; Golub, 1997; Jordan, Brouwer & Noble, 1999). If the Commission makes use of its right of initiative to pursue own supranational goals, or if Commissioners 'only' follow their own states' interests, is not definitively clarified yet. For these reasons the variables, even though they often refer to interstate action, will be used for analyzing the material on the Commission's proposal.

4.5. Analytic, Coding and Contextual Unit

One important step in QCA is the definition of analytic units, coding units and contextual units. The analytic unit or unit of analysis defines which parts of a text are analyzed (Mayring, 2010, p. 59). In this research, statements on the creation of the proposal and its determining factors and underlying motivations represent the analytic unit. However, in some cases the analytic unit reaches broader and additionally covers other information relevant for the application of the theories, such as indirect indications. To exclude biased results due to findings that do not directly relate to the proposal's development, they will be considered in the analysis and interpretation. The smallest text part that can fall within a category is the coding unit (Mayring, 2010, p. 59). Here, the smallest text portions that are taken into consideration are coherent parts of sentences. This enables on one hand to address differentiated and smaller statements, and prevents on the other hand too high abstraction. If for example single words would serve as coding unit, they might be analyzed separated from their context, what finally induces inaccurate and misleading results. The contextual unit specifies the maximum part of a text that can fall into a category (Mayring, 2010, p. 59). The analysis run in this study includes as contextual units, if necessary, complete texts that are produced by one actor (for example a whole press release published by an environmental organization). This is done to consider the possibility that smaller text fractions might not explicitly express a statement falling into one of the categories, while the text as a whole communicates a clear message that can be assigned to one of the categories.

5. Analysis

5.1. Quantitative Analysis

In quantitative terms, the QCA produced greatly deviating results for the categories derived from LI and SC. The category system consists of 28 variables representing hypotheses and mechanisms of LI, and 23 variables abstracted from SC. The QCA of Commission, newspaper and stakeholder publications identified 128 text passages in the material that fall within one of the LI-categories⁴³, while only six passages were consistent with SC's variables. Whereas the 128 'LI-findings' are distributed among 19 of the 28 LI-categories, the six 'SC-findings' only cover two out of 23 categories of SC. Consequently, 67.9% of LI-categories were consistent with at least one finding in the material, while only 8.7% of SC-categories were covered at all. These results already indicate a prevalence of LI explanations for the reasons and development of the Commission's proposal. In the LI part of the category system, four variables showed highly significant results in numerical terms. These contain the most outstanding variable of the whole analysis: economic interests. 51 text passages in the selected material fell into this category and determined economic interests/motivations as driving for the formulation of the energy and climate goals. With a wide gap in between, three other variables of the LI categories follow up the economic interests, counting between eight and ten findings each. These are namely the emergence of lowest common denominator agreements, the difference in intensity of interests of domestic groups and the sufficiency of domestic policies to cope with externalities. Conversely, the SC categories produced in total only six findings. Four of these can be attributed to the variable 'individual agency', which consequently represents the SC variable with most findings.

With regard to the origin of findings, it can be observed that newspapers are the most prevalent source, counting 54% of total findings. They are followed by Commission publications providing 35% of findings. The least often source are stakeholder publications which account for 11% of the findings. Having a closer look at the material, this can be explained by two factors: the number and volume of publications taken into account, and the typical structure and content of stakeholder publications. Not only are there less stakeholder publications compared to newspaper articles. They are also considerably less extensive than newspaper articles and the three Commission publications, because they usually have the form of press releases or short articles. Furthermore, most of these consist of a reproduction of the climate and energy goals, expression of approval or disapproval with the goals, as well as critique and demands. Stakeholder publications were seldom concerned with the creation

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⁴³ The 128 findings include 12 double counted findings that fall or partly fall into two, and one finding that falls into three categories. This is for the categories here are not mutually exclusive and findings sometimes capture bigger text passages that apply to more than one category.

process or motivations behind the proposal, and therefore are not captured by many categories. Their value lies to a large extent in indirect information.

Following, the variables will be analyzed individually and in more detail. In this context, the findings' content and source of origin shall be examined to assess possible implications or limitations of the quantitative results. Furthermore, it will help to better reconstruct the circumstances of the proposal's creation. Quotes from newspapers and stakeholder publications are translated by the author, Commission publications have originally been in English.

5.2. LI Analysis Results

Moravcsik's (1993, 1998) rationalist framework particularly highlights state centrism, state rationality, international bargaining and non-uniform state-interests. These assumptions are represented in the LI categories one to four. Six findings in the material indicate that states or governments were the crucial and decisive actors that determined the climate and energy goals, e.g. "[...] and that there aren't too many reductions planned from the start, that's what the governments will take care of." (Weiss, 2014). Other findings highlight a reemphasis of the national component of policy making, illustrating the national states' power in the decision-making process: "Meanwhile, the reemphasis of national decision-making, a trend that can be generally observed in Europe, reached the field of EU environmental policy." and "Sceptics have been right. [...] that national governments don't like being told what energy sources to use or how to consume energy." (Gammelin, 2014e). Furthermore, the assumption of non-uniform state preferences, represented in the variable 'Diversity of state interests and identities', produced seven findings in the material. These mainly state that MSs do have differing or controversial interests or they even list these interests in more detail, e.g. "However, the positions are widely differing." (Süddeutsche.net, 2014) or "If the EU wants to give the main points here, it timely has to set binding goals - however, this is regarding the different ideas, for example in Eastern Europe, not an easy task." (Bauchmüller, 2014b). Four text passages fell into the category that measured if states rationally calculate to maximise their utility. Here again, the collected data either includes that states rationally calculate ("[...] in Europe all the more, every government does what is nationally opportune [...]" (Gammelin, 2014c)) or illustrates in detail how individual states display such a behaviour ("In the past months many states expressed their opposition against a renewable energy target. Great Britain aims at increasing its nuclear energy share. East European states, especially Poland, fear that a further expansion of the renewable energy share might harm their industry." (Kafsack, 2014a)). The last variable examining compliance of material with Moravcsik's rationalist framework, addresses the question if states use international bargaining to pursue their objectives. Three findings fall within this category. Here especially expressions such as 'wrangling' or

'deeply divided'⁴⁴ in a relevant context, indicate bargaining processes ("Yet, concerning the extent of emission reduction, there is a wrangling between member states and the Commission. Many interests are involved." (Gammelin, 2014c) or "Van Rompuy warned the 28 governments that are deeply divided about the future EU climate goals, [...]." (Gammelin, 2014b)).

Even though Moravcsik examines governmental entrepreneurship in the context of institutional choice, the variable also highlights the national states' relevance and thus shall be considered in connection with the rationalist framework. This category produced five findings, again solely in newspaper material. Findings reflect how MS governments take the initiative and influence the proposal or make suggestions, e.g. "Prime Minister David Cameron proposed to the Commission president a huge turnaround. [...] Barrosso actually used the British advice and turned it into a European proposal." (Gammelin, 2014c) or "This makes the letter that was sent to the EU Commissioners for climate and energy, quite remarkable. It contains the signatures of the British energy and climate minister Ed Davey, his French colleague Philippe Martin, the Italian minister for environment Andrea Orlando - and two signatures from Germany: Barabra Hendricks and Sigmar Gabriel, ministers for environment and energy, have signed." (Bauchsmüller, 2014b).

Regarding the categories for the rationalist framework, it is noticeable that the analysis created findings for all these variables. Even though numbers of complying text passages might not seem numerous, considering all analysis results and comparing with other categories (excluding one exceptional variable), they are still remarkable. Especially the assumption of states as unitary actors with non-uniform interests generated relatively high resonance. However, one other characteristic is striking about these categories. All text passages falling within them have their origin in newspaper material. This needs to be considered when evaluating the findings significance. Why for example is no support for the rationalist framework found in EU Commission publications? This can probably be explained by the Commission's role and status in the EU. Claiming to "represent[.] the interests of the EU as a whole" (European Commission, 2014c) and at the same time stating in the proposal or other publications that MSs' interests have been decisive for its content, would undermine the Commission's authority and credibility. Therefore, it can be seen as relatively unlikely and the missing of findings in material from the Commission can be regarded as natural and irrelevant for interpretation of significance. Nevertheless, there were also no findings in stakeholder material. Even though findings are most valid when supported by different material sources, it has to be considered that stakeholder material generally did not produce many findings. As already mentioned, concerning the content, it was widely limited to reproduction of the climate and energy goals, approval or disapproval of those and putting requirements/demands. Therefore, no information on the rationalist

⁴⁴ The expression 'deeply divided' is translated from the German word 'zerstritten' and must therefore be interpreted in the sense of 'in a dispute' or 'quarrelled'.

framework was covered by the category system's coding rules. However, some information on the role of states in the EU can be derived from stakeholder findings in other categories by means of interpretation. For example in the text passages of the category 'Mobilization, competition and expression of domestic interests', stakeholders demand more efforts from national governments or politicians for ambitious climate goals, e.g. "[...] "In cooperation with other European Head of governments, the German government should act on the EU Commission to agree on binding and ambitious targets for greenhouse gas reduction, the expansion of renewable energies and further expansion of energy efficiency", demands Falk [CEO of the federal association of renewable energy]." Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e.V. (2014). These demands indicate that stakeholders assign decisive power to national governments what in turn supports the assumption of states as crucial actors. For these reasons, not too much emphasis should be put on the absent findings. The text passages at hand, and considering the circumstances of Commission and stakeholder publications, the rationalist framework can be seen as significantly supported by the findings of the QCA.

Preference formation

In the process of preference formation, Moravcsik attaches great importance to domestic groups. Seven findings in the analysis underline the mobilization, competition and expression of domestic interests. They particularly show that domestic groups claim certain actions from the government or ally, e.g. "Until 2030 greenhouse gas emission shall be reduced by 40% compared to 1990 levels. [...] NGOs, such as Greenpeace, demanded a reduction target of at least 55%. Industrial associations pronounced themselves for a maximum reduction of 35%." (Kafsack, 2014d) or "[...] there was a broad consensus among stakeholders that the ETS should remain the central instrument to bring about the transition to a low carbon economy." (European Commission, 2014a). These findings originate from all types of material and are in relation to other categories numerous. While these results relatively strongly support the existence and involvement of domestic groups, the direct mechanism of domestic groups successfully putting pressure on and coercing governments is only indicated by two text passages. They originate from a newspaper and a stakeholder publication and describe a clear connection between policy outcome and interest groups: "[...] and by this means reconcile climate policy with industry interests." (Kafsack, 2014e) and "If the EU Commission does not want to be deemed as a vehicle for the British nuclear and German-Polish coal industry, it has to present three serious climate goals for 2030." (Zender, 2014). Nevertheless, taking into account that only two findings back the coercion mechanism, it cannot even roughly be rated as confirmed. But these results may constitute a starting point for more detailed analysis on this issue. Especially, for the two findings explicitly describe the mechanism. Besides the coercion mechanism, Moravcsik's approach also allows for state leaders having their own objectives, provided that these are endorsed by supportive coalitions. Three findings, one each from newspaper, stakeholder and Commission publications, fall within this category, e.g. "The German government now insists on an independent goal for renewable energies. [...] Environmentalists support the German position" (Bauchmüller, 2014a) or "The creation of such a reserve [the market stability reserve] [...] is supported by a broad spectrum of stakeholders." (European Commission, 2014c). This again does not represent a significant result but a relevant hint and might offer impulse for further research.

Furthermore, Moravcsik (1933) names factors that influence the mobilization of interests. While there is only one finding supporting the role of significant costs and benefits for domestic groups, nine findings in the category 'diffuse and intense interests of domestic groups' give weight to this factor. Text passages are derived from newspaper articles and stakeholder publications. One finding even directly reproduces the hypothesis ("It is hard to understand why [...] the rise in energy efficiency should be politically the least sexy. There are too few lobbyists for that in Brussels. Sure, this is different, if I run 50 nuclear piles, just like France, and I want to continue running them, because otherwise my economic system collapses." (Kafsack, 2014f)), while others highlight the approval of the proposal by industry interests and/or the disapproval of environmental interests, e.g. "Greenpeace commented disappointed on the Commission's plans. [...] The federal association of German industry (BDI) was pleased." (Süddeutsche.net, 2014) or "Greenpeace criticized that the EU climate policy has a mess on its hands, because the proposals are not sufficiently ambitious. However, the German energy industry praised that now reliable framework conditions for companies are attainable." (FAZ.net, 2014). However, two points have to be considered regarding this category. The first point that needs consideration is again the absence of findings from Commission publications. Yet the same explanation applies here as for the rationalist framework. The supranational and independent character inherent the Commission, does not allow to highlight a stronger assertiveness of one interest group or its essential influence on the policy outcome. Second, the category's coding rule is based on the assumption that consent of industry interests with the proposal and environmental interest's disapproval of the proposal indicate that industry interests are more intense/mobilized and thus more effectively coerce governments, what finally leads to the result they desire or approve. This would actually require significant results in the category on the coercion mechanism. Even though this does not apply here, the noticeable consistency by which producer groups agree with the outcome and environmental groups disagree, should be taken into account. They raise the question what exactly lead to this phenomenon and again directs attention to the coercion mechanism that needs to be examined more closely. The variable that measures the connection between the area of coordination (production processes vs. public goods) and the mobilization of interests, is pointing in the same direction as the diffuse and intense interests issue. Nonetheless, this category only produced one finding and does not facilitate throwing light on the matter.

Moravcsik also deals with factors that can be seen as motivation or stimuli for cooperation. Here he names negative policy externalities as one important determinant. In the context of the Commission's proposal, the analysis identified six text passages falling into this category. They mainly encompass statements on distortion of competition and the market, on divergent policies and once on a classic externality such as pollution e.g. "[...] further integration of the internal energy market and undistorted competition at its core." (European Commission, 2014a), "But energy policy is unnecessarily getting complicated when every nation wants to pursue their own energy policy agenda." (Weiss, 2014) or "Not only GHG emissions but also air pollution will be cut, benefiting human health." (European Commission, 2014d). However, these findings originate from one newspaper article and five Commission publications. It is questionable in how far the findings reflect true motivations or can be accounted to strategic communication by the Commission, for other sources rarely support this variable. Analyzing this question would go beyond the scope of this study. For now it shall be recorded that the number of findings in this category is relatively high what ascribes it some undetermined relevance.

In addition to negative policy externalities, Moravcsik identifies economic interests as a decisive factor for the cooperation of states. In the QCA at hand, the category measuring for economic motivation represents an exceptional variable. Not only does it provide 51 findings, which accounts for 38% of all analysis findings, additionally these findings stem from diverse material. The category applied to 15 text passages from newspapers, 36 from Commission publications and two from stakeholder publications. Besides the frequency of occurrence, the diversity of sources emphasizes, the significance of these findings. Economic interests seem to have played an important role in the creation of the proposal and the decision on targets and goals. Analyzing the content of the findings, some key words are repeatedly used and topics continually picked up on. One major role in the category's findings plays competition, e.g. "It is a compromise emphasising competitiveness. It is certainly the result of the European economic crisis and an attempt to address the emerged trauma [...]" (Kafsack, 2014f) or "[...] transition towards a competitive, secure and sustainable energy system [...]." (European Commission, 2014c). Other common themes are energy prices and costs of decarbonisation/climate protection (e.g. "The high prices for energy and natural gas are according to energy commissioner Günther Oettinger a clear competitive advantage for the industry. [...] the expansion of renewable energy share is too expensive." (Kafsack, 2014d) or "[...] meet common energy and climate challenges more cost-effectively [...]" (European Commission, 2014a)), growth and the creation of jobs (e.g. "[...] there is a need to continue to drive progress towards a low-carbon economy which ensures competitive and affordable energy for all consumers, creates new opportunities for growth and jobs and provides greater security of energy supplies and reduced import dependence for the Union as a whole." (European Commission, 2014a)), and signals for investments (e.g. "[...] create more investor certainty and greater transparency [...]." (European Commission, 2014a)). Another issue that is quite often referred to, is the import dependency or security of supply, e.g. "[...] ensuring continuous and adequate supplies of energy from all sources to all users, [...] increasing EU reliance on imported oil [...] gas import dependency is expected to rise [...]. This increases EU's vulnerability to supply and energy price shocks. [...] improve the Unions security of supply [...]." (European Commission, 2014a) or "The security of EU energy supplies [...] remains an issue due to the Union's high and increasing dependence on imports from sometimes politically unstable regions." (European Commission, 2014d). While security of supply is of great importance to the working of economies, it can be asked if it moreover includes a geopolitical aspect. Import dependency of energy might also be a factor affecting the security or sovereignty of states. For this reason these findings might not be included in the category of economic interests to support LI. However, two arguments suggest that the geopolitical component of these findings can be ignored and the findings can be retained in support for LI. First, statements on energy supply always contain to some degree an economic aspect and second, even though Moravcsik (1998) finds in his study a prevalence of economic interests over geopolitical interests, he does not totally exclude pertinence of geopolitical interests. As Moravcsik and Schimmlefennig (2004) renewed concede, although Moravcsik found in his study "The choice of Europe" (Moravcsik, 1998) that in all 15 cases economic reasons were decisive, in half of the cases also geopolitical reasons were influential and had an "important secondary impact" (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 70).

Other topics that are repeatedly touched upon but with significantly less frequency than the ones mentioned before, are specific economic interests of individual MSs, the economic and financial crisis and carbon leakage. All in all, one can conclude that the category on economic interests can be regarded as confirmed by the analysis. It was supported by newspaper articles, Commission and stakeholder publication and represents, by a clear margin, the category with most findings.

While according to LI, negative policy externalities and economic interests constitute decisive factors for cooperation among states, Moravcsik constrains cooperation to the requirement that national policies are not sufficient to deal with externalities. For this reason, the category 'sufficiency of domestic policies to cope with negative externalities' checked for pointers in the material that give information about the weighting of European and national policy solutions and which of these two are more efficient in reaching a set goal. This category applied to eleven text passages in the material. In most statements, more flexibility for states, which would lead to higher efficiency of policy solutions, is given as a reason for non-binding renewable energy targets on a national level, thus noncooperation, e.g. "[...] greater flexibility for Member States and gives them the possibility to take advantage of the most cost-effective means of achieving a more sustainable, secure and competitive energy system." (European Commission, 2014d). Alternatively the statements reflect the assessment of efficiency of a European against a national solution, e.g. "[...] so that we are clear what can be

influenced through national and Union policy and what cannot." (European Commission, 2014a). Furthermore, the specific preferences and circumstances of MSs play a role, e.g. "[...] providing flexibility for Member States to define a low-carbon transition appropriate to their specific circumstances, preferred energy mix and needs in terms of energy security and allowing them to keep costs to a minimum." (European Commission, 2014a). This category offers some direct insight into what explicit reason could have caused the policy change. It indicates that the policy change from a binding national renewable target to a target solely on the European level was caused by an evaluation of efficiency. It displays the higher efficiency of national solutions in the area of renewable energy policies as the reason for the decision. Even though this category seems to offer a comprehensible explanation for the policy change, one should take a look at the origin of the findings. Nine of the findings stem directly from Commission publications, while the last is taken from a newspaper article that is reproducing a Commission statement. Here again, as it was already the case for the category on negative policy externalities, the text passages' origin suggests that the Commission might strategically transmit the message of a more efficient national policy, while the validity for this reason can't be backed by other sources. Comparing the explanation of the policy outcome by means of economic interests and the sufficiency of national policies, the analysis produced a far more valid result on economic interests as an explanatory variable.

Interstate bargaining

In the area of interstate bargaining, only one category generated a significant number of findings – lowest common denominator agreements. According to Moravcsik (1993, 1998), due to the fact that bargaining space of states is restricted by the preferences they hold, usually lowest common denominator agreements emerge. The corresponding category applied to eight text passages in the material. They either support that weak compromises lead to the policy outcome, e.g. "In the end, such a weak compromise might result "that some major goals of the German energy transition cannot be achieved" [says Franziska Achterberg, Greenpeace expert for energy]" (Gammelin, 2014c), or that bargaining orientates along preferences representing the lowest standard, e.g. "There are also political reasons that Barroso supports the focus on CO2 emissions. Great Britain, Poland and other member states declared themselves against a renewable energy target on a national level. Consequently, de facto such a target can't be pushed through on a European level." (Kafsack, 2014c). However, all eight findings are abstracted from newspaper articles. Here again, the Commission's role of an independent institution that is supposed to represent EU's preferences and not MSs' ones, can account for missing statements from Commission publications on lowest common denominator agreements. While taking into account the total number of stakeholder publications and their predominant content, encourages to not necessarily expect support for the lowest common denominator hypothesis. However, their absence cannot be completely disregarded. Conclusively, the variable can be assessed as highly relevant, even though not entirely confirmed.

Moravcsik (1993, 1998) also theorizes factors that influence the bargaining power of participating states. Here, the categories measuring the connection of high intensity of preference and weak bargaining power and of independence/self-sufficiency and strong bargaining power, produced one finding each. When regarding the content of the findings one can conclude that they can't be valid, for they contradict. While Germany according to the first category should have weak bargaining power, the second category ascribes Germany strong bargaining power. For this reason and the insignificant number of findings, these variables did not generate usable results.

Furthermore, only few findings fall within the categories on linkages. Moravcsik (1993, 1998) theorizes the use of linkages in bargaining and determines factors promoting linkages. The category on varying preference intensities of states across issues, which encourage linkages, applied to two text passages in newspaper articles: "To come to an accommodation with the German government, Barroso wants to make the renewable target at least on the European level as binding. [...] To convince environmentalists and the German government, Barroso wants to push the demanded reform of the emission trading system." (Kafsack, 2014c) and "Barroso accommodates Great Britain and Poland in a different policy field." (Kafsack, 2014c). The text passage on the linkage of energy and climate goals with the reform of the emission trading system also fell into the category of closely related issues. While the content of the findings clearly matches the theory with regards to differing preferences and related issues, it is noticeable that only two individual findings support linkages. Especially for they are both taken from the same article and both refer to the same event. Therefore, it cannot be said if this case of linkages represents an individual case or was only perceived as linkage by this one author. On the other hand it is also plausible and possible that only this one case of linkages occurred during the bargaining for the energy and climate goals. Consequently, it cannot be seen as significant but should be considered as a potential, even if unconfirmed, case of linkages in the context of LI and requires further examination.

Institutional choice

With regards to content, most theoretical consideration on institutional choice do not apply to the context in which the analysis material was created. Only the category of governmental entrepreneurship produced results that have already been considered in connection with the rationalist framework.

5.3. SC Analysis Results

SC according to Checkel is mainly based on the logic of appropriateness and communicative processes that lead to preference change/social learning (e.g. Checkel, 1998, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). The material from newspaper articles, Commission and stakeholder publications on the proposal for energy and climate goals, did hardly contain anything offering information on discourses or communicative processes in connection with the proposal. When communicative practices were mentioned in the material, they normally included a bargaining component and fell within one of the LI categories. Thus, they represented negotiating in which preferences are expressed but not changed on the basis of exchange of arguments. Further, they even negate the possibility of changes in state preferences. The following example from the LI category on lowest common denominator agreements can further illustrate the latter phenomenon: "There are also political reasons that Barroso supports the focus on CO2 emissions. Great Britain, Poland and other member states declared themselves against a renewable energy target on a national level. Consequently, de facto such a target can't be pushed through on a European level." (Kafsack, 2014c). This quote from a newspaper article shows that the author excludes the possibility that MSs might change their preference on the topic. When countries such as Great Britain and Poland are against a renewable energy target, there is no chance of them changing their interests and no possibility for a further reaching agreement.

However, the SC categories also applied to few text passages in the material that hint at mechanisms described by Checkel's SC. First, the category on argumentative persuasion produced two findings in newspaper articles: (1) "After long and intensive discussions within the EU-commissioner's circle, [Barroso] "didn't receive any opposition" among his colleagues; this was stated in the president's environment." (Gammelin, 2014a); and (2) "Climate commissioner Connie Hedegaard fights for her climate goal and might also be fairly happy with the outcome. However, she can hardly withstand, when she constantly gets to hear from other commissioners, such as Mister Oettinger, how cheap energy is in the United States." (Kafsack, 2014f). In both text passages communicative processes ("[...] constantly gets to hear from [...]" (Kafsack, 2014f) and "[...] intensive discussions [...]" (Gammelin, 2014a)) are followed by a hint at change or adoption of attitude ("[...] can hardly withstand [...]" (Kafsack, 2014f) and "[...] didn't receive any opposition [...]" (Gammelin, 2014a)). In how far these indications can be assessed as real cases of argumentative persuasion is not as clear. Commissioners might have held the same opinion from the beginning and the absence of opposition is no result of discussion. In the same way, the fact that Hedegaard can 'hardly withstand' could also be a consequence of distribution of bargaining power or some way of coercion or pressure. Despite having coding rules that most adequately try to identify applicable text passages, the findings' content needs to be evaluated individually to come to meaningful interpretations and conclusions. In this case, the findings for argumentative persuasion should be regarded with suspicion and not necessarily as proximate confirmation of this mechanism. Furthermore, they are not numerous and only retrieved from newspaper articles. However, they also point at discursive processes that took place in the course of the proposal's development and consequently offer a new connecting factor for further research on these processes.

Besides argumentative persuasion, the SC category on individual agency produced four findings in newspaper material. The findings mainly emphasize the important role that individuals in the development process of the proposal played and what kind of policy they promoted that has been transferred into proposal content, e.g. "On the hallways of the European Commission people start making bets. Which German is going to have his will about the EU climate target?" (Gammelin, 2014c) or "Prime Minister David Cameron proposed to the Commission president a huge turnaround. [...] Barroso actually used the British advice and turned it into a European proposal." (Gammelin, 2014c). The findings of this category clearly support a theoretical fragment of SC and represent a contrast to the LI explanation. Especially one finding in the individual agency category contradicts LI's rationalist framework: "The German government wrote an email to the German negotiator in Brussels, making clear how important binding renewable energy targets are for Germany. [...] However, from what is heard, Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger didn't support the German claims in the negotiations." (Gammelin, 2014a). This text passage is inconsistent with the LI assumption that states are the decisive actors that express their interests in interstate bargaining. LI would normally expect, even though it concerns an EU Commission proposal, that state interests are crucial and therefore, that for example Commissioner's sent by states would also represent their states' interests.

However, regarding the overall findings in the LI categories and the only sporadic and few findings in the SC categories, there seems to be much stronger support for LI. This is further confirmed, for the few SC findings are entirely retrieved from the same material source. For this reason, from the data collected in this study, it can be concluded that compliance of LI with the processes leading to the Commission's proposal is much more likely than explanation by means of SC. Yet, it needs to be considered that other factors might also have amplified the gap between the numbers of LI and SC findings. Even though it cannot be tested in the scope of this study, methodological decisions might also account for the extreme difference in outcomes. Even though it seems equally likely that journalists and stakeholders are to the same degree informed about preferences and bargaining processes of states, as they are about communication containing argumentative characteristics, it cannot be excluded that there is a difference and that they are less acquainted with the latter. Therefore, follow-up studies should consider this possibility and check more specifically for argumentative communication in connection with the proposal on energy and climate goals 2030. Here, a similar approach as already carried out by Hooghe (1999) could be applied. Interviews with Commissioner's and other bureaucrats involved in the proposal's creation, could offer more detailed insight into communicative processes and how these are shaped. In addition they could open up the black box of crucial actor's interaction in closed-up or less politicized settings.

6. Conclusion

6.1. Summary of Core Findings

The research question of this study is how the policy decision expressed in the EU Commission's proposal for the Energy and Climate Goals 2030 can be explained. Keeping in mind that the drawn conclusions from this study are limited by the 'German perspective' and biased messages inherent the selected material, the findings at hand indicate that this question can be answered by means of LI.

In quantitative terms the QCA shows that LI clearly outnumbers SC. While 128 text passages applied to LI categories, SC only complied with six text passages. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of LI categories, compared to SC, covered one or more text passages in the material. Conclusively, LI applied much more far reaching and in a more comprehensive way to the material associated with the proposal. SC explanations are not at all confirmed by the QCA. The few findings identified through SC categories, solely hinted at communicative processes and potential influence of individual agents in the course of the proposal's development. However, they cannot be assessed as significant and do not deliver any reliable information on consequences or initiated processes, such as persuasion or social change.

In contrast to the SC categories, LI produced not only more numerous, but also richer findings that allow for more interpretation and drawing of conclusions. Moravcsik's rationalist assumptions are the basis and framework for the entire theory of LI. The analysis at hand explicitly supports these assumptions, highlighting the role of states as crucial actors in the development of the proposal for energy and climate goals. In addition, there are relatively numerous and strong findings illustrating the diversity of state interests on EU energy and climate goals and the governmental entrepreneurship states performed in the proposal's creation. Even though the support is weaker for these assumptions, the findings also hint at states having rationally calculated their interests and having represented those in bargaining processes.

The analysis of preference formation showed that there exist strong and mobilized interest groups concerned with the EU energy and climate goals. These interest groups that hold different views on the topic also voice their claims against national governments or EU institutions. Yet, the coercion mechanism, through which domestic groups exert pressure on national governments, is only indicated by two findings and therefore not clearly confirmed. In the same way, only few findings applied to the hypothesis that national governments pursuit own objectives while they are supported by coalitions of influential interest groups. But there is stronger support in numbers for a division of strong producer interests and diffuse environmental interests. These could account for the conceptual orientation of the proposal and its specific targets. However, these findings are partly based on the coercion mechanism and therefore loose in significance. As a consequence, it can be concluded that there has been a

significant presence of interest groups in the process of the proposal's development. Still, coercion of governments through domestic groups and the distinction between strong producer groups and weak environmental groups cannot be ultimately confirmed. Yet, there are indications for both propositions. Further research is required to reliably assess their relevance.

Turning to motivations or decisive factors for cooperation or non-cooperation, the analysis produced findings on three different factors: negative policy externalities, the sufficiency of domestic policies to deal with transboundary issues and finally economic interests. Whereas the former two explanatory factors were supported by findings that only originated from Commission publications, the latter is supported by an extensive number of findings from all material sources. It represents the most significant result of the study and indicates that the major motivations behind this particular proposal have been of an economic nature. On the contrary, findings on negative policy externality and sufficiency of domestic policies suggest that the Commission uses these explanations, in particular that national policies represent a more efficient solution, to explain the policy change reflected in the renewable energy target. At the same time, the strong support for the economic interest category and the according findings' content clearly indicates that competitiveness, energy prices, costs of decarbonisation for states, growth and jobs as well as security of supply have been the propelling force shaping the proposals nature. Here, more research is required to determine if and which particular economic developments between 2010, when the 2020 goals were decided, and 2013/2014 took place that might account for a stronger focus on economic interest 'at the expense of' the renewable energy target. For this, the economic crisis and the crisis of the euro zone and therewith connected indicators such as economic growth, employment rates etc. should be considered.

Another LI proposition that is supported by analysis findings is the emergence of lowest common denominator agreements. While this category was supported by eight findings, it cannot be regarded as confirmed, for all text passages came from newspaper articles. Apart from this limitation the findings seem highly plausible and should be further examined. Furthermore, the analysis includes hints at linkages that might have played a role in the process of the proposal development. However, the findings are not significant and further research on those is required.

All in all, one can conclude that this study on one hand positively confirms the application of LI on the EU Commissions proposal for energy and climate goals 2030 and allows excluding the applicability of SC with a high but non assessable degree of probability. On the other hand, as part of the LI explanation, the study identifies economic interests being the driving force for the proposal's design and confirms LI's rationalist framework as fundamental setting for the policy development and decision. However, not all major propositions of LI generated significant or any findings, or could be doubtlessly confirmed. This applies especially to the coercive function of domestic groups in the process of preference formation, the differing influence of domestic groups and the process of interstate bargaining, including lowest common denominator agreements and linkages. However, due to existing hints towards these propositions, further research seems to offer promising results.

6.2. **Implications and Outlook**

While the theory debate on European integration is still not settled or decided yet, the study at hand further emphasizes the application of LI. Even though the study clearly highlights the crucial role of economic motivations in the decision making process for the EU energy and climate goals and supports the rationalist system in which states operate, it also raises many questions that have a need for further examination. On one hand, some variables of this study that positively pointed at LI mechanisms but were only attributed small significance by means of this study, require further research. Here, especially the role of interest groups in the development process of the proposal and the hypothesis of lowest common denominator agreements seem to offer promising starting points. In particular the impact of interests groups is of high relevance regarding the legitimacy of policy outcomes. Moreover, the high support for Moravcsik's rationalist framework questions the EU Commission's independence and role in EU policy making. Can it really be reduced to an outsourced administrative machinery representing states' interests? In contrast to these impulses delivered by LI results, one should not totally disregard SC. Despite the fact that SC did not generate any significant results in this study, it cannot be regarded as refuted. Not only should a follow up study on the Commission's proposal consult alternative methods to rule out the possibility that the method choice and material selection of this study lead to poor results for SC. In addition, the maybe not completely matured 'theory' of SC might need revision to provide hypotheses that are not only straightforward, but can also be easier measured.

Regarding future developments the study implies a high relevance of economic motivations for policy decisions in EU environmental policy. A direct link between the economic situation and the weight of economic motivations in the decision making process of the proposal is not addressed in this study. However, the outstanding results on economic interests suggest a decisive role of economic motives in EU policy making. This might not only concern EU environmental policy, but a much wider array of policy fields, for example social policies. It remains to be seen, if there is a causal connection between the economic situation and the influence it has on EU policy making. Provided such a linkage exists, further cuts in terms of ambition in environmental policies and other policy areas might be expected, depending on respective economic conditions.

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
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Appendix A: General

Appendix 1: Moravcsik's rationalist framework for international cooperation



Source: Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The choice for Europe. Social purpose & state power from Messina to Maastricht.* London: Cornell University, p. 24

Appendix 2: Checkel's hypotheses on social learning

- Social learning is more likely in groups where individuals share common professional backgrounds for example, where all/most groups members are lawyers or, say, European central bankers.
- 2 Social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure.
- 3 Social learning is more likely where group meets repeatedly and there is high density of interaction among participants.
- 4 Social learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure and exposure.

Source: Checkel, J. T. (1999). Social construction and integration. Journal of

European Public Policy, 6(4), p. 549

Appendix 3: Checkel's hypotheses on ideal settings for persuasion of agents

- when they are in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information;
- when the persuader is an authoritive member of the in-group to which the persuade belongs or wants to belong; and
- when the agent has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader's message.

Source: Checkel, J. T. (1999). Social construction and integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(4), p. 550

Appendix 4: Domestic structure and norm diffusion

| | Liberal | Corporatist | Statist | State-above- society |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|--|----------------------|
| Domestic mechanisms empowering international norms | Societal pressure on elites | Societal pressure on elites (primary) and Elite learning (secondary) | Elite learning (primary) and Societal pressure on elites (secondary) | Elite learning |

Source: Checkel, J. T. (2001c). The europeanization of citizenship? In M. G. Cowles, J. Caporaso & T. Risse (Ed.), *Transforming Europe* (pp. 180-197). New York: Cornell University Press, p. 182

Appendix 5: Conditions – behavioral adoption

- Target governments expect the promised rewards to be greater than the costs of compliance (Intergovernmental Reinforcement)
- Targeted societal actors expect the costs of putting pressure on the government to be lower
 than the benefits of conditional external rewards, and these actors are strong enough to force
 the government to comply with the international norms (Transnational Reinforcement).

Source: Checkel, J. T. (2005). International institutions and socialization in Europe: introduction and framework. *International Organization*, 59(4), p. 809

Appendix 6: Conditions – internalization of new roles (Type I internalization)

- Agents are in settings where contact is long and sustained, and it has some significant duration.
- Agents are in settings where the contact is intense.

[...]

- Those agents with extensive previous professional experience in regional or international policymaking settings are more likely to internalize supranational role conceptions.
- In contrast, agents with extensive domestic policy networks who are briefly "parachuted" into regional/international settings will be less likely to internalize new role conceptions.


Source: Checkel, J. T. (2005). International institutions and socialization in Europe: introduction and framework. International Organization, 59(4), p. 811

Appendix 7: Conditions – persuasion-socialization dynamics (Type II internalization)

- The target of the socialization attempt is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze information.
- The target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency's message.
- The socializing agency/individual is an authoritative member of the ingroup to which the target belongs or wants to belong
- The socializing agency/individual does not lecture or demand but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.
- The agency/target interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings.

Source: Checkel, J. T. (2005). International institutions and socialization in Europe: introduction and framework. International Organization, 59(4), p. 813

Appendix 8: Process sketch of the QCA (deductive application) according to Mayring



Source: Mayring, P. (2000). Qualitative content analysis. *Forum Qualitative Social Research*, 1(2). Retrieved May, 15, 2014 from http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1089/2386

Appendix B: Category System

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

The following variables, values, variable descriptions and code rules are derived from Liberal Intergovernmentalism as outlined in '3.1.1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism' of this study. They are based on Moravsik's and Schimmelfennig's works on Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2001; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2004, 2009).

| | Variable | Value | Variable description | Code rule |
|----|--|-------|--|--|
| 1. | States are crucial actors | | States are crucial actors in the international system, e.g. opposed to supranational institutions, interest groups acting on an international level etc. | State's/states' preferences are decisive with regards to policy outcome/policy proposal/(degree of) cooperation |
| 2. | Diversity of state interests and identities | | State preferences are not fixed or uniform and not exclusively focused on security and power. | Interests/preferences/positions of states differ |
| 3. | States use international bargaining to pursue their objectives | | States use international bargaining to pursue their objectives, and no force/coercion/etc. | States negotiate/bargain to achieve cooperation/create policies and states do not use force/coercion to achieve cooperation/policies (this conditions does not necessarily need to be mentioned) |
| 4. | States rationally calculate to maximize their utility | | States rationally calculate potential benefits and costs of cooperation to maximize their utility | State seeks cooperation/policy outcome from which it benefits or state calculates benefits and costs and decides according to this calculation |
| 5. | Economic interests are driving force | | Economic interests are prevailing compared to other interests, e.g. geopolitical/security interests | Economic interests are driving force for cooperation/policy decisions |

| | Preference formation | | |
|----|----------------------------------|---|--|
| 6. | Mobilization, competition and | Societal interests are mobilized and expressed, aiming | Domestic group/s express/es interests and/or make/s claims. |
| | expression of domestic interests | to constrain state leaders. In this process, identities, | |
| | | interests and influence of societal actors vary across | |
| | | time and place, but also take diverse shapes in the | |
| | | context of different issue areas. | |
| 7. | Societal pressure/constraint | Politicians that decide state policy (/influence EU | State decision-makers are constrained in their decisions by pressure |
| | | policy) are subject to constraints from societal pressure | exercised by societal groups (e.g. interest groups such as trade |
| | | or aggregate preferences expressed by domestic groups | associations environmental groups, consumer groups, tax payers) |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | statement indicates the causal connection between the view taken by |
| | | | the government and the interest of domestic group/s |
| 8. | State leader's own objectives + | State leaders follow own policy objectives, supported | States' policy objectives are initiated by state leaders |
| | supportive coalitions | by coalitions of influential domestic groups | and |
| | | | are supported by coalitions of influential domestic groups |
| 9. | Costs and benefits for domestic | Domestic groups that gain or lose significantly by way | One or more domestic group/s is/are |
| | group | of the policy result are most influential | (1) most influential compared to other domestic groups |
| | | | and |
| | | | (2) gain/s or loose/s significantly through the particular policy |
| | | | |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | |
| | | | Domestic group expresses approval with policy outcome with |
| | | | reference to its resulting (significant) gains or (significant) losses |
| | | | induced by alternative policies |

| 10. | Motivation to mobilize interests | If costs and benefits of alternative policies are certain, | Costs and benefits of alternative policies are certain, significant and |
|-----|----------------------------------|--|---|
| | | significant and risky, groups are more likely to | risky |
| | | mobilize and constraint for governments increases | and_ |
| | | | domestic group (affected by policies) mobilizes |
| | | | and/or |
| | | | constraint for government increases |
| 11. | Diffuse and intense interests of | Tax payer and individual consumer interests are | Tax payers and consumers have relatively diffuse interests |
| | domestic groups | relatively diffuse compared to domestic producer group | and |
| | | interests. Thus, producer groups have an advantage | |
| | | over other interests in exerting pressure on/constraining | domestic producer groups have intense interests |
| | | governments | |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | |
| | | | domestic producer groups have an advantage over other interests in |
| | | | exerting pressure on governments (e.g. as measured by outcomes) |
| | | | |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | |
| | | | domestic producer groups agree with policy outcome |
| | | | and/or |
| | | | tax payer/consumer groups/environmental groups disagree with |
| | | | policy outcome |

| 12. | Costs and benefits for individual | | When costs and benefits for individual sectors, that are | Costs or benefits for individual sector, which is important for |
|-----|---------------------------------------|------------------|---|---|
| | sectors/important segments | | important segments for domestic producers, are | domestic producers, is high |
| | | | significant and predictable, the constraint by domestic | and |
| | | | producer groups is especially high | there is high constraint by domestic producer groups |
| | | | | |
| | | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | | |
| | | | | Domestic producer groups highlight importance of regulated sector |
| | | | | and benefits/costs of policy/policy alternative and approve the policy |
| | | | | supported by government |
| 13. | Negative (policy) externalities | | States use cooperation to address negative (policy) | Cooperation/policy decision aims to address negative (policy) |
| | | | externalities. E.g. transborder flows of water or air, or | externality (e.g. transborder issues or national regulations) or |
| | | | externalities caused by national regulations of one or | consequences of those. |
| | | | some member state/s. | |
| 14. | Extent of negative policy externality | a) state heavily | States heavily(/little) affected by negative policy | a) State is heavily affected by negative policy externality |
| | | affected by | externalities have high(/low) motivation to cooperate | and has high motivation to cooperate with other states/makes efforts |
| | | negative policy | | to cooperate and bargain |
| | | externality | | |
| | | b) state little | | b) state is little affected by negative policy externality |
| | | affected by | | and |
| | | negative policy | | has low motivation to cooperate/is not noticeable engaged in |
| | | externality | | negotiations |
| 15. | Positive policy externality | | States affected by positive policy externalities have no | State is affected by positive policy externality/benefits from policies |
| | | | motivation to cooperate | of other states |
| | | | | and |
| | | | | has no motivation to cooperate/is not noticeable engaged in |
| | | | | negotiations |

| 16. | Sufficiency of domestic policies to | | If domestic policies are sufficient to cope with | Cooperation is used as 'ultima ratio'; emphasis on subsidiarity; if |
|-----|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---|---|
| | cope with neg. policy externalities | | externalities, cooperation won't be implemented | national regulation is sufficient or more effective to cope with issue at |
| | | | | hand, there is nor regulation on an EU level. |
| | | | | |
| | | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | | |
| | | | | States' domestic policy is sufficient to cope with externalities |
| | | | | and |
| | | | | they do not seek/implement cooperation |
| 17. | Area of coordination and | a) regulation of | Whereas the regulation of goods and production | a) Regulation of goods and production processes |
| | mobilization of interests | goods and | processes engenders strong mobilization of producer | and |
| | | production | groups, coordination of policies to provide public | strong mobilization of producer groups |
| | | processes | goods displays diffuse patterns of interest | |
| | | b) coordination of | | |
| | | policies to provide | | b) mobilization for public goods provision (e.g. environmental |
| | | public goods (e.g. | | policies) |
| | | environmental | | and |
| | | policies) | | diffuse patterns of interest/low mobilization |
| | | | | |
| | Interstate bargaining | | | |
| 18. | High intensity of national preference | | States with a high intensity of national preference, have | State has a intense national preference |
| | | | a weaker bargaining power and a more likely to make | and |
| | | | concessions and put effort in achievement of agreement | has weaker bargaining power (reflected in outcomes) |
| | | | | |
| | | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | | is more likely compared to other states to make concession |
| | | | | <u>or</u> |

| | | | "puts effort in" achievement of agreement. |
|-----|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 19. | Lowest Common denominator | Bargaining space is determined by national preferences | Agreement is based on the lowest common denominator/standard of |
| | agreement | of participating states. Thus, lowest common | participating states' preferences |
| | | denominator agreements result. | <u>or</u> |
| | | | policy outcome represents a compromise of all states involved |
| 20. | Results above lowest common | Agreements above lowest common standard are | Agreement above lowest common standard (defined by national |
| | standard | possible by means of side-payment and/or linkages | preferences) is achieved |
| | | | <u>and</u> |
| | | | side-payments and linkages are made. |
| | | | |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | |
| | | | State(s) agree on policy apart from their preference in exchange for |
| | | | side-payments or linkages with other policies/areas |
| | | | |

| 21. | Independence/self-sufficiency of | a) Large, | Large, prosperous and relatively self-sufficient | a) |
|-----|------------------------------------|------------------|---|---|
| | states and influence in bargaining | prosperous and | countries gain significantly less from agreement than | State is large, prosperous and relatively self-sufficient |
| | | relatively self- | more dependent smaller states and therefore tend to | and |
| | | sufficient state | have more influence | gains significantly less from agreement compared to smaller states |
| | | b) Dependent and | | and |
| | | small state | | has much influence on policy/cooperation outcome |
| | | | | |
| | | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | | |
| | | | | Policy outcome represents preferences of large, prosperous and self- |
| | | | | sufficient state(s)/large, prosperous and self-sufficent state(s) approve |
| | | | | policy outcome |
| | | | | |
| | | | | b) |
| | | | | State is small and dependent |
| | | | | and |
| | | | | has little influence on cooperation outcome |
| | | | | |
| | | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | | |
| | | | | Policy outcome does not represent preferences of small and |
| | | | | dependent state(s)/small and dependent state(s) disapprove policy |
| | | | | outcome |

| 22. | Non-agreement and alternative | a) state can be part | States that can be part of an alternative coalition (threat | a) State can be part of an alternative coalition |
|-----|--------------------------------------|----------------------|---|---|
| | coalition possibilities | of an alternative | of exclusion) or can credibly threat with non-agreement | and |
| | | coalition | gain bargaining power | has relatively more bargaining power compared to other states not |
| | | | | having these options/approves policy outcome |
| | | b) state can | | |
| | | credibly threat | | <u>or</u> |
| | | with non- | | |
| | | agreement | | b)credibly threatens with non-agreement |
| | | (unilateral | | and |
| | | agreement) | | has relatively more bargaining power compared to other states not |
| | | | | having these options/approves policy outcome |
| 23. | Varying preference intensities of | | Varying preference intensities of states across issues | States have varying intensities of preference across several issues |
| | states across issues - linkages | | can lead to linkages/package-deals | and |
| | | | | states implement linkages/package-deals |
| 24. | Weak interests of domestic groups - | | Linkages are most likely where interests of domestic | Interests of domestic groups are weak |
| | linkages | | groups are not strong | and |
| | | | | linkages of several issues are made by state leaders to cooperate. |
| 25. | Final stage of bargaining - linkages | | Linkages are most likely to occur in the final stage of | Cooperation is in the final stage of bargaining |
| | | | bargaining | and |
| | | | | linkages are made |
| 26. | Closely related issues - linkages | | Linkages are most probable used for closely related | Issues are closely related |
| | | | issues | and |
| | | | | linkages are made among these. |
| | Institutional choice | | | |
| 27. | Governmental entrepreneurship | | Governmental entrepreneurship is overarching. Even | States governments are the dominant entrepreneurs in the policy |
| | | | proposals are "managed behind the scenes by major | process/regarding proposals |

| | | governments" (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 480) | |
|-----|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| 28. | EU institutions to overcome national | National governments use EC institutions to overcome | National governments instrumentalize EC institutions |
| | oppositions | national oppositions and increase therewith their own | |
| | | policy autonomy | <u>and</u> |
| | | | |
| | | | overcome national oppositions |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | increase their own policy autonomy |

Social Contructivism

The following variables, values, variable descriptions and code rules are derived from Social Constructivism as outlined in '3.1.2. Social Constructivism' of this study. They are based on Chekel's and Risse's works on Social Constructivism (Checkel, 1998, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2005; Risse, 2009).

| | Variable | Value | Variable description | Code rule |
|----|--------------------------------|-------|--|--|
| 1. | Logic of appropriateness | | State strives "to do the right thing" (Risse, 2009, p. 163) and complies to seemingly appropriate rule | State acts accordingly to rules (appropriate in given context), which does not necessarily represent the state's preference based on |
| | | | 103) and complies to seemingry appropriate rule | expected benefits |
| 2. | Social learning - preferences, | | Actors acquire new interests and preferences through | Actors/states interact with norms or discursive structures (EU) |
| | interests | | interaction with norms or discursive structures (no | and |
| | | | material incentives); identities might be shaped | acquire new interests and preferences |
| | | | | and |
| | | | | there are no material incentives present. |
| | | | | Optional: identities might be shaped |

| | Argumentative persuasion | | |
|------|---|--|---|
| 3. | Argumentative persuasion | Process of interaction "in which communicator | Agent (state, organization, etc.) aims at convincing other agent (e.g. |
| 3. | Argumentative persuasion | | |
| | | attempts to induce a change in the belief, attitude or | state) of particular belief, attitude or behavior by using |
| | | behavior of person through transmission of a | communication |
| | | message in a context in which the persuadee has some | and and |
| | | degree of choice" (Checkel, 2001b, p. 562). Process of | attitude/belief/behavior of receiving agent changes |
| | | convincing. Involves changing of attitudes about cause | and |
| | | and effect. Absence of coercion. | coercion is absent (the latter condition does not necessarily be |
| | | | mentioned in the statement) |
| 3.1. | Sub-variable Argumentative | Argumentative Peruasion is more likely when | The targeted agent is in a novel or uncertain environment |
| | Persuasion: Persuadee is in a novel or | persuadee is in a novel/uncertain environment -> | and and |
| | uncertain environment (new issue, | cognitively motivated to analyze new information | is argumentatively persuaded (in contrast to or to a higher degree |
| | crisis, policy failure) | | compared to targeted agents not being subjected to these conditions) |
| 3.2. | Sub-variable Argumentative | Novice agents with few cognitive priors will be | The targeted agent has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are |
| | Persuasion: Persuadee has few prior, | relatively open to persuasion. Argumentative | inconsistent with the persuading agent's message |
| | ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent | persuasion is more likely. | and and |
| | with the persuader's message | | is argumentatively persuaded (in contrast to or to a higher degree |
| | | | compared to targeted agents not being subjected these conditions) |
| 3.3. | Sub-variable Argumentative | Persuader is authoritative member of in-group to which | The persuading agent is an authoritative member of the in-group to |
| | Persuasion: Persuader is an | persuadee wants to belong enhances effectiveness of | which the targeted agent wants to be belong |
| | authoritative member of the in-group | argumentative persuasion. | and |
| | to which the persuader belongs or | | the targeted agent is argumentatively persuaded (in contrast to or to a |
| | wants to belong | | higher degree compared to targeted agents not being subjected these |
| | | | conditions) |

| 3.4. | Sub-variable Argumentative | Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective | The persuading agent does not lecture/demand targeted agent, but |
|------|-------------------------------------|--|---|
| | Persuasion: Persuader does not | if persuader does not lecture/demand, but acts out | acts out of principle |
| | lecture/demand, but acts out | principles of deliberative argument | and |
| | principles of deliberative argument | | the targeted agent is argumentatively persuaded (in contrast to or to a |
| | | | higher degree compared to targeted agents not being subjected these |
| | | | conditions) |
| 3.5. | Sub-variable Argumentative | Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective | The persuasion process takes place in a less politicized and more |
| | Persuasion: Persuader-Persuadee | if persuader-persuadee interaction takes place in less | insulated, private setting |
| | interaction in less politicized and | politicized and more insulated, private settings. | and |
| | more insulated, private settings. | | the targeted agent is argumentatively persuaded (in contrast to or to a |
| | | | higher degree compared to targeted agents not being subjected these |
| | | | conditions) |
| | Norm development | | |
| 4. | Individual agency | Presence of individuals that possess entrepreneurial | An individual that possesses entrepreneurial skills is present in |
| | | skills and "often turn their individual beliefs into | interactions on an EU level |
| | | broader, shared understandings" (Checkel, 1999, p. | and |
| | | 552). Individual agency constitutes a crucial factor for | turns its individual beliefs into a shared understanding |
| | | norm development on an EU level. Dynamic for norm | and |
| | | development. | (consequently) norms are developed on an EU level. |
| | | | |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | |
| | | | An individual gives the impetus/plays a crucial role for/in the norm |
| | | | development (or creation of policy) on the European level |

| 5. | Open policy window | Context in which group of agents is confronted with a | A group of agents is confronted with a new or unknown or unclear |
|----|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| | | new, unknown or unclear problem. This promotes | problem (and) individual entrepreneurs work more successfully |
| | | easier breaking down of steady preferences. | and |
| | | Entrepreneurs can work more successful. Dynamic for | (consequently) norms are developed on an EU level. |
| | | norm development. | |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | States are confronted with new, unknown or unclear problem which |
| | | | facilitated the agreement on new policies |
| 6. | Social learning/Socialization - norms | See above. Process of norm development. Only | Actors/states (a bigger group) interact with norms or discursive |
| | | effective if proceeds among bigger group of actors. | structures (e.g. in EU institutions) |
| | | Individual agency not sufficient for creation of lasting | and |
| | | social norms | acquire new interests and preferences and |
| | | | there are no material incentives present |
| | | | and |
| | | | norms are developed on an EU level Optional: identities might be |
| | | | shaped |
| | | | |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | Learning process through the interaction with/within EU facilitated |
| | | | the agreement on new policies. |
| | | | and |
| | | | no material incentives were present (the latter condition does not |
| | | | necessarily need to be mentioned in the statement) |
| | | | |

| | Diffusion pathways of norms | | |
|----|-------------------------------------|--|---|
| 7. | Societal mobilization | Diffusion pathway of norms. Societal mobilization of | Non-state actors, networks etc. aim at the diffusion of norms |
| | | non-state actors, networks etc. that put decision-makers | and |
| | | under political pressure, coercing them to change state | mobilize |
| | | policy | and |
| | | | put decision-makers under political pressure/coercing them to change |
| | | | state policy |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | State behaves in certain way due to pressure from non-state actors |
| | | | who aim at adoption to EU/international norms |
| 8. | Social learning - adoption of norms | Adoption of "prescriptions embodied in norms" | Decision makers/elites adopt prescription embodied in international |
| | | (Checkel, 1999, p. 553) and later internalization of | norms |
| | | those. A shared intersubjective understanding emerges | and |
| | | that then effects agents' behavior. | internalize those |
| | | | and |
| | | | change their behavior accordingly |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | Governments internalize EU/international norms and bahve according |
| | | | to those. |
| 9. | Liberal state structure - norm | In liberal state structures, the role of elites is in policy | The state has a liberal structure (individuals and societal groups play |
| | diffusion | making highly constrained through societal pressure on | a central role in policy making) |
| | | elites. | and |
| | | | the role of elites is highly constrained |

| 10. | Corporatist state structure - norm | In corporatist state structures societal pressure in elites | The state's structure is corporatist (policy networks connect state and |
|-----|---|---|--|
| | diffusion | is the primary and elite learning the secondary | society) |
| | | mechanism for norm diffusion. | and and |
| | | | society plays an important role in decision-making |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| 11. | Statist state structure - norm diffusion | In statist state structures, elite learning is the primary | The state has a statist structure (societal penetration of the state and |
| | | and societal pressure on elites the secondary | the mobilization of social interests is relatively weak) |
| | | mechanism for norm diffusion. | <u>and</u> |
| | | | elite decision-makers play a dominant role in policy making |
| 12. | State-above society structure - norm | In states with state-above society structures, elite | The state has a state-above society structure (state exercises control |
| | diffusion | learning is the dominant norm diffusion mechanism | over society) |
| | | | and |
| | | | elite learning is necessary to give international norms meaning on a |
| | | | national level |
| | Dynamics promoting socialization outcomes | | |
| 13. | Type I internalization/socialization - | Role playing. Agents act appropriate to expectations, | Agents act appropriate to expectations of international institutions/EU |
| | Role playing | regardless if they accept the role. A shift away from | <u>and</u> |
| | | logic of consequences. No reflective internalization | do not internalize new understandings in a reflective way |
| | | through ways of communicative processes. | |
| | | | <u>or</u> |
| | | | State acts according to rules and expectations of EU norms without |
| | | | agreeing with or truly supporting them |

| 13.1. | Long sustained contact – | Agents are more likely to internalize roles according to | State is for a long time EU member |
|-------|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| | internalization of roles | norms of groups, when they have long and sustained | |
| | | contact with these groups/norms. | and and |
| | | | |
| | | | internalizes new roles (for coding rule see 13.) |
| 13.2. | Intense contact – internalization of | Agents are more likely to internalize roles according to | State is particularly or to a high degree engaged in the |
| | roles | group norms, when the contact with these | EU/negotiations |
| | | groups/norms is rather intense. | |
| | | | and |
| | | | |
| | | | Internalizes new roles (for coding rule see 13.) |
| 13.3. | Experience in regional/international | Agents that are experienced with regional/international | Agent is experienced with policymaking on an international or |
| | policy making | policymaking more probably internalize supranational | regional level (e.g. has already been member of some other |
| | | roles. | international cooperation such as OECD, NATO, UN, EU etc.) |
| | | | 1 |
| | | | and |
| | | | internalizes new roles (for coding rule see 13.) |
| 13.4. | Extensive domestic policy networks | If agents have extensive domestic policy networks and | State has strong domestic policy networks (clusters of actors owning |
| | | only recently started participating in | different interests and influencing the successful implementation of |
| | | regional/international settings are less probable to | policies (e.g. domestic stakeholders) |
| | | internalize new roles. | |
| | | | and |
| | | | |
| | | | internalizes new roles (for coding rule see 13.) |

| 14. | Type II internalization/socialization - | Normative suasion. Complete shift from the logic of | Agents put forward arguments to persuade each other |
|-----|---|--|--|
| | Normative suasion | consequences to the logic of appropriateness. Agents | <u>and</u> |
| | | internalize new understandings in a reflective way. | are open to redefine their preferences |
| | | Agents are generally open to redefine their preferences. | <u>and</u> |
| | | They put forward arguments, trying to persuade each | internalize new understandings in a reflective way. |
| | | other. Language as constitutive factor for agents and | |
| | | interests. | <u>Or</u> |
| | | | |
| | | | States adopt new understandings they truly adopt due to discussion |
| | | | with other states. |

Appendix C: QCA Findings

| Liberal Intergovernmentalism | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|--|-------|--|
| | Variable | | | |
| 1. | States are crucial actors | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation⁴⁵</u> | Value | Source |
| | "Die Skeptiker lagen richtig. [], dass sich nationale Regierungen nicht gerne vorschreiben lassen, welche Energiequellen sie nutzen, wie sie Energie verbrauchen." | "Sceptics have been right. [] that national governments don't like being told what energy sources to use or how to consume energy." | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: Gammelin (2014e, January 23) |
| | "Inzwischen hat der allgemein in Europa zu beobachtende Trend der Rückkehr ins Nationale auch die Europäische Umweltpolitik erreicht." | "Meanwhile, the reemphasis of national decision-making, a trend that can be generally observed in Europe, reached the field of EU environmental policy." | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: Gammelin (2014e, January 23) |
| | "Die Ankündigung ist ein Signal des Rückzugs ins Nationale." | "The announcement is a signal for a reemphasis of national decision-making." | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: Gammelin (2014e, January 23) |
| | "Van Rompuy hat die über die künftigen europäischen Klimaziele heillos zerstrittenen 28 Regierungen gewarnt, []" | "Van Rompuy warned the 28 governments that are deeply divided about the future EU climate goals, []." | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: Gammelin (2014b, January 21) |
| | "[] und dass man von vornherein nicht allzu viel Einsparungen plant, darum kümmern sich die Staaten schon." | "[] and that there aren't too many reductions planned from the start, that's what the governments will take care of." | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: Weiss (2014, January 16) |

⁴⁵ Newspaper article quotes or quotes from stakeholder publications are all translated by the author. European Commission's documents were originally published in English.

| | "Die meisten anderen EU-Staaten und die Europäische Kommission wollen | "On the contrary, most other EU members and the | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
|----|---|---|-------|------------------------------------|
| | hingegen kein eigenständiges Ökostromziel festlegen []" | European Commission don't want to set an | | Kafsack (2014, January, 10) |
| | | independent renewable energy goal []." | | |
| 2. | Diversity of state interests and identities | | | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | "Die Positionen gehen allerdings weit auseinander." | "However, the positions are widely differing." | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | | | | Süddeutsche.net (2014, January 14) |
| | "Jeder für sich und gegen alle." | "Every state for himself and against all others." | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | | | | Weiss (2014, January 16) |
| | "Hinter dem Streit steht auch die unterschiedliche Energiepolitik verschiedener | "The dispute is also motivated by the differing | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | europäischer Staaten. So setzt Großbritannien vor allem auf neue Atomkraft - | energy policies of the EU member states. For | | Bauchmüller (2014a, January 16) |
| | und würde schon deshalb gerne auf eigene Ökoenergie-Ziele verzichten. | instance, Great Britain backs new nuclear power and | | |
| | Dagegen muss die Bundesregierung derzeit ihr Ökostrom-Gesetz gegen | would therefore prefer not having a renewable | | |
| | Eingriffe aus Brüssel verteidigen." | energy goal. On the other hand, Germany currently | | |
| | | has to defend its renewable energy law in Brussels." | | |
| | "Will die EU hier Akzente setzen, muss sie rechtzeitig ihre Ziele verbindlich | "If the EU wants to give the main points here, it | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | festlegen - was angesichts der recht unterschiedlichen Vorstellungen etwa in | timely has to set binding goals - however, this is | | Bauchmüller (2014b, January 9) |
| | Osteuropa nicht ganz einfach ist. | regarding the different ideas, for example in Eastern | | |
| | | Europe, not an easy task." | | |
| | "Zwar wäre es Ländern wie Polen wohl recht, wenn man sie mit dem Ärgernis | "Indeed, countries such as Poland would be okay, if | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | Erneuerbare Energien einfach in Frieden ließe." | they are left alone with annoyances like renewable | | Weiss (2014, January 16) |
| | | energy." | | |
| | "Doch um die Höhe gibt es zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten und der Kommission | "Yet, concerning the extent of emission reduction, | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | ein großes Gerangel, denn sehr viele Interessen sind im Spiel." | there is a wrangling between member states and the | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | | Commission. Many interests are involved." | | |

| | "Großbritannien kann jetzt ohne Bedenken Atommeiler statt Ökokraftwerke | "Great Britain can now safely plan nuclear piles | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
|----|--|--|--------------|------------------------------|
| | planen. Spanien kann unter Verweis auf die klammen Kassen alle ökologischen | instead of producing renewable energy. Spain can | | Gammelin (2014e, January 23) |
| | Bemühungen einstellen. Deutschland ist frei, seine Energiewende beliebig | refer to its deficit and stop any ecological efforts. | | |
| | umzuplanen. Die Mitgliedstaaten in Osteuropa werden auf das Treiben ihrer | Germany can re-plan its energy transition as it likes. | | |
| | Partner im Westen verweisen und ihrerseits in Kohle investieren." | And EU member states in Eastern Europe will refer | | |
| | | to the actions of their western neighbours and | | |
| | | further invest in coal." | | |
| 3. | States use international bargaining to pursue their objectives | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| | "Doch um die Höhe gibt es zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten und der Kommission | "Yet, concerning the extent of emission reduction, | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | ein großes Gerangel, denn sehr viele Interessen sind im Spiel" | there is a wrangling between member states and the | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | | Commission. Many interests are involved." | | |
| | "[]"London und Berlin haben einen Deal geschlossen, sich gegenseitig nicht | "[] "London and Berlin made a deal to not block | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | zu blockieren" sagt der Luxemburger Grüne Claude Turmes" | each other" said the Luxembourger Claude Tumes, | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | | Member of the Greens." | | |
| | "Van Rompuy hat die über die künftigen europäischen Klimaziele heillos | "Van Rompuy warned the 28 governments that are | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | zerstrittenen 28 Regierungen gewarnt, []" | deeply divided about the future EU climate goals, | | Gammelin (2014b, January 21) |
| | | []." | | |
| 4. | States rationally calculate to maximise their utility | | | |
| | Content | | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | "[] in Europa macht erst recht jede Regierung, was national opportun ist []" | "[] in Europe all the more, every government does | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | | what is nationally opportune []" | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |

| | "Premierminister David Cameron legte [] nahe [] [, es sei] "unerlässlich, | "Prime minister David Cameron stated that it is | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
|----|---|--|--------------|---------------------------------|
| | alles zu vermeiden, was die Regierung von ihrem preiswerten Weg der | "crucial to avoid everything that could prevent the | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | Dekarbonisierung abbringt oder den Wettbewerb verzerrt". [] Studien zufolge | government to follow a low-cost way for | | |
| | würde ein neues Ziel für erneuerbare Energien London jährlich zusätzlich neun | decarbonisation or that distorts competition." [] | | |
| | Milliarden Pfund kosten." | According to research, a new target for renewable | | |
| | | energies would cost London nine billion Pounds | | |
| | | yearly." | | |
| | "Von den großen EU-Ländern kämpft vor allem Großbritannien gegen | "Of the large EU member, especially Great Britain | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | verbindliche Ziele für Öko-Energie. London will die Atomkraft ausbauen und | fights binding renewable energy targets. London | | Gammelin (2014, January, 15) |
| | sich deshalb lediglich dazu verpflichten Treibhausgase zu reduzieren." | aims at expanding its nuclear power and therefore | | |
| | | only wants to commit to greenhouse gas reduction." | | |
| | "In den vergangenen Monaten haben sich zudem viele Staaten gegen ein | "In the past months many states expressed their | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | Ökostromziel ausgesprochen. Großbritannien will stärker auf Atomkraft setzen. | opposition against a renewable energy target. Great | | Kafsack (2014a, January 8) |
| | Die Osteuropäer, allen voran Polen, fürchten, dass ein weiterer Ausbau des | Britain aims at increasing its nuclear energy share. | | |
| | Ökostromanteils ihre Industrie überfordert." | East European states, especially Poland, fear that a | | |
| | | further expansion of the renewable energy share | | |
| | | might harm their industry." | | |
| 5. | Economic interests are driving force | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| | "Viele Mitgliedstaaten fühlen sich durch europäische Entscheidungen | "Many member stated feel restricted by European | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | eingeengt, sie haben genug zu tun, um Unternehmen wettbewerbsfähiger zu | decisions, they are already occupied with making | | Gammelin (2014e, January 23) |
| | machen, Jobs zu schaffen, Energie bezahlbar zu halten." | their companies competitive, creating jobs and | | |
| | | keeping energy affordable." | | |

| "Energiekommissar Oettinger begründete die Abkehr mit den hohen | "Energy commissioner Oettinger justified the | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
|---|--|---------------------------------|
| Energiepreisen. [] "Da müssen wir handeln, das ist für die industrielle | turning away from binding renewable energy targets | Gammelin (2014d, January 23) |
| Wertschöpfung nicht hinnehmbar und auch ein soziales Problem",[]" | with high energy prices. [] "We have to take | |
| | action, the high prices are not acceptable for | |
| | industrial value creation and they moreover | |
| | constitute a social issue", [] | |
| "[] in Europa macht erst recht jede Regierung, was national opportun ist und | "[] in Europe all the more, every government does | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| niedrige Energiepreise garantiert." | what is nationally opportune and what can guarantee | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | low energy prices []" | |
| "Nur dadurch könnten "notwendige Investitionssignale" gegeben werden." | "Only by this means, the right investment signals | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | can be generated." | Gammelin (2014, January, 15) |
| "Premierminister David Cameron legte [] nahe [] [, es sei] "unerlässlich, | "Prime minister David Cameron stated that it is | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| alles zu vermeiden, was die Regierung von ihrem preiswerten Weg der | "crucial to avoid everything that could prevent the | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| Dekarbonisierung abbringt oder den Wettbewerb verzerrt". [] Studien zufolge | government to follow a low-cost way for | |
| würde ein neues Ziel für erneuerbare Energien London jährlich zusätzlich neun | decarbonisation or that distorts competition." [] | |
| Milliarden Pfund kosten." | According to research, a new target for renewable | |
| | energies would cost London nine billion Pounds | |
| | yearly." | |
| "Dutzende Milliarden an Investitionen in Klimaschutz würden so ausgelöst, | "Investions of dozen billions would be initiated, | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| werben die Minister, samt Jobs und Wachstum. Und obendrein helfe dies, | including jobs and growth, this is how the ministers | Bauchmüller (2014b, January 9) |
| Europas Importabhängigkeit bei Energien zu senken." | campaign for the targets. And in addition they | |
| | would help reducing Europe's import dependency | |
| | for energies." | |
| "Es ist ein Kompromiss der die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in den Vordergrund | "It is a compromise emphasising competitiveness. It | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| stellt. Es ist sicher das Ergebnis der europäischen Wirtschaftskrise, und ein | is certainly the result of the European economic | Kafsack (2014f, January 24) |
| Versuch, das Trauma einigermaßen zu adressieren []" | crisis and an attempt to address the emerged trauma | |
| | []" | |

| "Von allen Seiten hört er [Barroso] etwas von Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und | "From all sides Barroso hears about competitiveness | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
|---|---|---------------------------------|
| Wachstum" | and growth" | Kafsack (2014f, January 24) |
| "[] wenn ich 50 Atommeiler betreibe wie Frankreich und die weiter betreiben | "[] if I want to run 50 nuclear piles, just like | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| will, weil sonst mein ganzes Wirtschaftssystem kollabiert." | France, and I want to continue running them, | Kafsack (2014f, January 24) |
| | because otherwise my economic system collapses." | |
| "[] dass die Briten von bis zu siebzig Atomkraftwerken sprechen, die sie in | "[] that the British are talking about up to 70 | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| die Landschaft stellen wollen. Daran sieht man, wie viel Geld im Spiel ist." | nuclear piles they want to set up. That is how one | Kafsack (2014f, January 24) |
| | can see how much money is involved." | |
| "Die hohen Preise für Strom und Erdgas in Europa sind nach Ansicht von | "The high prices for energy and natural gas are | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| Energiekommissar Günther Oettinger ein klarer Wettbewerbsnachteil für die | according to energy commissioner Günther | Kafsack (2014d, January 23) |
| Industrie. [] der Ökostromausbau ist zu teuer." | Oettinger a clear competitive advantage for the | |
| | industry. [] the expansion of renewable energy | |
| | share is too expensive." | |
| "Nach Ansicht Barrosos zeigen die Vorschläge, dass die EU Führungsrolle in | "In Barroso's view, the proposal shows that the EU | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| der globalen Klimapolitik beibehalten und zugleich die Wirtschaft unterstützen | can keep its leadership role in global climate policy | FAZ.net (2014, January 22) |
| sowie Jobs schaffen könne." | and at the same time can support the economy and | |
| | create jobs." | |
| "Barroso begründet seine Linie damit, dass das Nebeneinander verschiedener | "Barroso explains his plans by the fact that having | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| Ziele bisher die Kosten des Klimaschutzes unnötig in die Höhe getrieben habe" | several goals at the same time unnecessarily | Kafsack (2014c, January 21) |
| | increased the costs for climate protection in the | |
| | past." | |
| "Ein alleiniges CO2-Ziel, das indirekt Subventionen für die Kernenergie | "A sole CO2-target, which indirectly means | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| bedeute, []." | subsidies for nuclear energy, []." | Kafsack (2014, January, 10) |
| "Großbritannien will stärker auf Atomkraft setzen. Die Osteuropäer, allen voran | "Great Britain aims at increasing its nuclear energy | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| Polen, fürchten, dass ein weiterer Ausbau des Ökostromanteils ihre Industrie | share. East European states, especially Poland, fear | Kafsack (2014a, January 8) |
| überfordert." | that a further expansion of the renewable energy | |
| | share might harm their industry." | |

| "Much has also changes since 2008. Most obvious is the impact of the | European Commission (2014a, |
|---|-----------------------------|
| economic and financial crisis which has affected Member States' capacity to | January 22, p. 2) |
| invest. Fossil fuel prices remain high which negatively affects the Union's trade | |
| balance and energy cost. [] At the same time, households and industrial users | |
| are increasingly concerned by rising energy prices and price differentials with | |
| many of the Union's trading partners most notably the USA." | |
| "[] there is a need to continue to drive progress towards a low-carbon | European Commission (2014a, |
| economy which ensures competitive and affordable energy for all consumers, | January 22, p. 3) |
| creates new opportunities for growth and jobs and provides greater security of | |
| energy supplies and reduced import dependence for the Union as a whole." | |
| "[] this commitment should follow a cost-efficient approach which responds | European Commission (2014a, |
| to the challenges of affordability, competiveness, security of supply and | January 22, p. 3) |
| sustainability, and which takes account of current economic and political | |
| circumstances." | |
| "[] meet common energy and climate challenges more cost-effectively []" | European Commission (2014a, |
| | January 22, p. 3) |
| "Ensuring that the competitiveness of business and affordability of energy | European Commission (2014a, |
| consumers are central in determining the objectives of the framework and the | January 22, p 4) |
| instruments to implement it." | |
| "Enhancing investor certainty []" | European Commission (2014a, |
| | January 22, p. 4) |
| "European and national targets [] have not always ensured market | European Commission (2014a, |
| integration, cost-efficiency and undistorted competition. [] a main target for | January 22, p. 4) |
| greenhouse gas emissions reduction represents the least cost pathway to a low | |
| carbon economy []." | |
| "[] ensure that the Union continues to follow the least cost pathway to a low- | European Commission (2014a, |
| carbon economy" | January 22, p. 5) |

| "[] leaving greater flexibility for Member States to meet their greenhouse gas | European Commission (2014a, |
|--|-----------------------------|
| reduction targets in the most cost-effective manner []" | January 22, p. 6) |
| "[] major objectives of EU climate and energy policies: improved | European Commission (2014a, |
| competitiveness; security of supply; sustainability; and the transition to a low | January 22, p. 7) |
| carbon economy." | |
| "Energy is important for the competitiveness of Member States economies as it | European Commission (2014a, |
| affects production costs of industries and services and the purchasing power of | January 22, p. 8) |
| households. [] comparative disadvantage still exists. [] risk is particularly | |
| high for industries that have a high share of energy costs and which are exposed | |
| to international competition." | |
| "[] ensure the competitiveness of Europe's energy-intensive industries." | European Commission (2014a, |
| | January 22, p. 11) |
| "[] ensuring continuous and adequate supplies of energy from all sources to | European Commission (2014a, |
| all users. [] increasing EU reliance on imported oil [] gas import | January 22, p. 11) |
| dependency is expected to rise []. This increases EU's vulnerability to supply | |
| and energy price shocks. [] improve the Unions security of supply []." | |
| "[] create more investor certainty and greater transparency []." | European Commission (2014a, |
| | January 22, p. 12) |
| "[] ensure a competitive and secure energy system. [] ensure regulatory | European Commission (2014c, |
| certainty for investors [] leading to the development of new technologies." | January 22) |
| "The framework aims to drive continued progress towards a low-carbon | European Commission (2014c, |
| economy and a competitive and secure energy system that ensures affordable | January 22) |
| emergy for all consumers, increases the security of the EU's energy supplies, | |
| reduces our dependence on energy imports and creates new opportunities for | |
| growth and jobs []." | |

| "Barroso said: "[] European energy policy is key for our competitiveness. | European Commission (2014c, |
|---|-----------------------------|
| [] EU's interest to build a job-rich economy that is less dependent in imported | January 22) |
| energy through increased efficiency and [] the renewable target of at least | |
| 27% is an important signal: to give stability investors, boost green jobs and | |
| support our security of supply"." | |
| "Oettinger said: "The 2030 framework is the EU'S drive for progress towards a | European Commission (2014c, |
| competitive low-carbon economy, investment stability and security of energy | January 22) |
| supply. My aim is to make sure that energy remains affordable for households | |
| and companies. [] this needs to be achieved at least cost."[]" | |
| "[] transition towards a competitive, secure and sustainable energy system. | European Commission (2014c, |
| Driven by a more market-oriented approach [] with significant benefits in | January 22) |
| terms of energy trade balances, reliance on indigenous energy sources, jobs and | |
| growth. An EU-level target for renewable energy is necessary to drive | |
| continued investment in the sector." | |
| "[] transition towards a competitive, secure and sustainable energy system | European Commission (2014c, |
| []." | January 22) |
| "[] ensure a competitive and secure energy system in a 2030 perspective that | European Commission (2014c, |
| will continue to build on a market integration, supply diversification, enhanced | January 22) |
| competition, development of indigenous energy sources, as well as support to | |
| research, development and innovation." | |
| "The comparison with international partners highlights rising price differentials | European Commission (2014c, |
| [] which could undermine Europe's competitiveness, particularly for energy | January 22) |
| intensive industries." | |
| "The impact of the economic and financial crisis needs to be taken into account | European Commission (2014d, |
| []." | January 22) |

| "The security of EU energy supplies [] remains an issue due to the Union's | European Commission (2014d, |
|--|-----------------------------|
| high and increasing dependence on imports from sometimes politically unstable | January 22) |
| regions." | |
| "Investors urgently need a clear policy framework that provides predictability | European Commission (2014d, |
| and reduced regulatory risk beyond 2020." | January 22) |
| "[] ensure that the EU is on the cost-effective track [] The target will result | European Commission (2014d, |
| in stronger benefits in terms of energy independency, the EU's external fuel bill, | January 22) |
| health impacts, employment and competitiveness." | |
| "[] significant benefits in terms of greater reliance on indigenous energy | European Commission (2014d, |
| sources and in terms of energy trade. Such target will also continue to drive | January 22) |
| growth in the renewable sector []." | |
| "The framework will have multiple economic and environmental benefits []." | European Commission (2014d, |
| | January 22) |
| "[] helping to reduce costs, create jobs, enhance competitiveness and bring | European Commission (2014d, |
| also energy security benefits linked in particular to lower fossil fuel use and | January 22) |
| imports. [] new growth sectors are expected to create opportunities in fields | |
| such as engineering, basic manufacturing, transport equipment, construction | |
| and business services. Overall job growth is expected []" | |
| "The proposed GHG reduction target would improve the functioning of the | European Commission (2014d, |
| European carbon market and increase certainty for investors []" | January 22) |
| "[] prevent carbon leakage []" | European Commission (2014d, |
| | January 22) |
| "[] reduce the EU's trade deficit in energy commodities, EU exposure to | European Commission (2014d, |
| supply disruption and to volatile fossil fuel prices []" | January 22) |

| | "The explicit aims of these plans will be to create more investor certainty []" | | | European Commission (2014d, |
|----|--|---|-------|-----------------------------------|
| | | | | January 22) |
| | "[] increase predictability for investors" | | | European Commission (2014d, |
| | | | | January 22) |
| | "Die EU will in ihrer zukünftigen Energie- und Klimapolitik diese Politikfelder | "In its future energy and climate policy, the EU aims | | Verband der Industriellen Energie |
| | besser miteinander verzahnen und auf eine Industriepolitik abstimmen." | at better integrating these policy fields and to better | | (2014, January 22) |
| | | attune those to industry policies." | | |
| | "[] "[] Eine Verbindung der Klimapolitik mit den energiepolitischen Zielen | "[] "[] An integration of climate policies with | | Verband der Industriellen Energie |
| | einer wettbewerbsfähigen und sicheren Energiebereitstellung in der EU []", | energy policy goals of a competitive and secure | | (2014, January 22) |
| | []." | energy supply in the EU []", []." | | |
| | Preference formation | | | |
| 6. | Mobilization, competition and expression of domestic interests | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | Value | Source |
| | "Bis zum Jahr 2030 soll der [Treibhausgasausstoß] um 40 Prozent verglichen | "Until 2030 greenhouse gas emission shall be | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | mit 1990 sinken. [] Nichtregierungsorganisationen wie Greenpeace hatten ein | reduced by 40% compared to 1990 levels. [] | | Kafsack (2014d, January 23) |
| | Abbauziel von 55 Prozent gefordert. Industrieverbände hatten sich für maximal | NGOs, such as Greenpeace, demanded a reduction | | |
| | 35 Prozent ausgesprochen." | target of at least 55%. Industrial associations | | |
| | | pronounced themselves for a maximum reduction of | | |
| | | 35%." | | |
| | "There is broad political consensus about its [energy efficiency's] importance." | | | European Commission (2014a, |
| | | | | January 22, p. 7) |

| | "[] there was a broad consensus among stakeholders that the ETS should | | | European Commission (2014a, |
|----|--|---|-------|-----------------------------------|
| | remain the central instrument to bring about the transition to a low carbon | | | January 22, p.8) |
| | economy." | | | |
| | "Die Umwelt- und Entwicklungsverbände fordern die Bundesregierung auf, | "Environmental and development organizations | | WWF Deutschland (2014a, January |
| | sich für drei ambitionierte und verbindliche 2030-Ziele einzusetzen: []" | request the German government to advocate three | | 20) |
| | | ambitioned and binding targets for 2030." | | |
| | "[]Deutschland muss sich in der EU dringend für mehr Ambition und | "[] Germany urgently has to advocate more | | WWF Deutschland (2014b, January |
| | Verbindlichkeit der drei Ziele einsetzen" sagt Regine Günther weiter." | ambition and bindingness for the targets" states | | 22) |
| | | Regine Günther." | | |
| | "Greenpeace fordert Energieminister Sigmar Gabriel auf, sich für drei | "Greenpeace demands energy minister Sigmar | | Greenpeace Deutschland: |
| | ambitionierte und verbindliche 2030 Ziele einzusetzen: []" | Gabriel to advocate three ambitioned and binding | | Borgerding, B. (2014, January 22) |
| | | targets for 2030: []" | | |
| | "[] "Zusammen mit den europäischen Staats- und Regierungschefs sollte die | "[] "In cooperation with other European Head of | | Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie |
| | Bundesregierung auf die EU-Kommission einwirken, verbindliche und | governments, the German government should act on | | e.V. (2014, January 22) |
| | ehrgeizige Ziele für die Verminderung von Treibhausgasen, den Ausbau der | the EU Commission to agree on binding and | | |
| | Erneuerbaren Energien und die Steigerung der Energieeffizienz zu | ambitious targets for greenhouse gas reduction, the | | |
| | beschließen", fordert Falk ['Geschäftsführer des Bundesverbandes Erneuerbare | expansion of renewable energies and further | | |
| | Energie]." | expansion of energy efficiency", demands Falk | | |
| | | [CEO of the federal association of renewable | | |
| | | energy]." | | |
| 7. | Societal pressure/constraint | | | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | "[] und die Klimapolitik so mit den Interessen der Wirtschaft versöhnen." | "[] and by this means reconcile climate policy | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | | with industry interests." | | Kafsack (2014e, January 23) |

| | "Wenn die EU-Kommission nicht als Steigbügelhalter der britischen Atom- | "If the EU Commission does not want to be deemed | | Greenpeace Deutschland: |
|----|--|---|--------------|-------------------------------------|
| | und der deutsch-polnischen Kohleindustrie gelten will, muss sie kommende | as a vehicle for the British nuclear and German- | | Zender, M. (2014, January 15) |
| | Woche drei ernsthafte Klimaziele für 2030 vorlegen." | Polish coal industry, it has to present three serious | | |
| | | climate goals for 2030." | | |
| 8. | State leader's own objectives/supportive coalitions | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | Value | Source |
| | "Die Bundesregierung pocht nun vor allem auf ein eigenes Ziel für | "The German government now insists on a | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | Ökoenergien. [] Auch Umweltschützer stützen die deutsche Position" | independent goal for renewable energies. [] | | Bauchmüller (2014a, January 16) |
| | | Environmentalists support the German position" | | |
| | "The creation of such a reserve [the market stability reserve] [] is supported | | | European Commission (2014c, |
| | by a broad spectrum of stakeholders." | | | January 22) |
| | "[] "Die Energiewirtschaft wird in diesem Zusammenhang auch die neue | "[] "Energy industry will in this context also | | Bundesverband der Energie und |
| | Bundesregierung und Brüssel bei ihrem richtigen und wichtigen Werben für | empathically support the new government's | | Wasserwirtschaft (2014, January 22) |
| | eine ambitionierten europäischen Klimaschutz mit Nachdruck unterstützen", | important promoting of an ambitioned European | | |
| | sagte Müller [Vorsitzende der Hauptgeschäftsführung des Bundesverbandes der | climate protection", said Müller [Head of the | | |
| | Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft []." | management of the federal association of energy and | | |
| | | water industry []." | | |
| 9. | Costs and benefits for domestic group | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | "Das ist heute eine gute Botschaft aus dem heute veröffentlichten EU-Energie | "This is good news from the today published EU | | Verband der Industriellen Energie |
| | und Klimapaket bis 2030, so der VIK [Verband der Industriellen Energie- und | energy and climate package 2030, stated the VIK | | (2014, January 22) |
| | Kraftwirtschaft] []. "[] Eine Verbindung der Klimapolitik mit den | [Industrial energy association] []. "Integrating | | (2017, January 22) |
| | energiepolitischen Zielen einer wettbewerbsfähigen und sicheren | climate policy with energy policy goals like a | | |
| | Energiebereitstellung in der EU ist unbedingte Notwendigkeit", so Dr. Annette | competitive and secure energy supply in the EU, is | | |
| | Energicoretisterionig in der Eo ist unbednigte Notwendigkeit, 50 Di. Annette | competere and secure energy suppry in the EO, is | | |

| | Loske, Hauptgeschäftsführerin des VIK." | absolutely essential", stated Dr. Annette Loske, | | |
|-----|--|--|--------------|------------------------------------|
| | , 10 | CEO of VIK." | | |
| | | | | |
| 10. | Motivation to mobilize interests | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| 11. | Diffuse and intense interests of domestic groups | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | Value | Source |
| | "Grüne enttäuscht, Industrie zufrieden." | "Greens disappointed industry pleased." | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | | | | Süddeutsche.net (2014, January 14) |
| | "Greenpeace äußert sich enttäuscht zu den Plänen der Kommission. [] | "Greenpeace commented disappointed on the | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | Zufrieden zeigt sich der Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI)." | Commission's plans. [] The federal association of | | Süddeutsche.net (2014, January 14) |
| | | German industry (BDI) was pleased." | | |
| | "Es ist schwer zu verstehen, warum [] die Steigerung der Energieeffizienz, | "It is hard to understand why [] the rise in energy | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | politisch am wenigsten sexy sein soll. Es gibt einfach zu wenige Lobbyisten | efficiency should be politically the least sexy. There | | Kafsack (2014f, January 24) |
| | dafür in Brüssel. Klar, ist das anders, wenn ich 50 Atommeiler betreibe wie | are too few lobbyists for that in Brussels. Sure, this | | |
| | Frankreich und die weiter betreiben will, weil sonst mein ganzes | is different, if I run 50 nuclear piles, just like France, | | |
| | Wirtschaftssystem kollabiert." | and I want to continue running them, because | | |
| | | otherwise my economic system collapses." | | |
| | "Greenpeace kritisierte, dass die EU-Klimapolitik vor einem Scherbenhaufen | "Greenpeace criticized that the EU climate policy | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | stehe, weil die Vorschläge nicht ehrgeizig genug seien. Die deutsche | has a mess on its hands, because the proposals are | | FAZ.net (2014, January 22) |
| | Energiewirtschaft lobte dagegen, dass nun verlässliche Rahmenbedingungen für | not sufficiently ambitious. However, the German | | |
| | Unternehmen möglich seien." | energy industry praised that now reliable framework | | |
| | | conditions for companies are attainable." | | |

| | "Die europäische Klimapolitik droht nach Ansicht von Umwelt- und | "According to environmental and development | | WWF Deutschland (2014a, January |
|-----|---|---|-------|-------------------------------------|
| | Entwicklungsverbänden bis zur Bedeutungslosigkeit abgeschwächt zu werden." | organizations, the European climate policy runs the | | 20) |
| | | risk to be reduced to unimportance." | | |
| | "Der WWF Deutschland kritisiert das vorgelegte Konzept: []" | "WWF Germany criticized the presented concept: | | WWF Deutschland (2014b, January |
| | | []" | | 22) |
| | "Für den Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) gehen die Vorschläge | "The federal association of German industry (BDI) | | Bundesverband der Deutschen |
| | der EU-Kommission zur Klima- und Energiepolitik grundsätzlich in die richtige | judged the Commission's proposals on climate and | | Industrie e.V. (2014, January 22) |
| | Richtung." | energy policy as a step in the right direction." | | |
| | "[] "Die deutsche Energiewirtschaft unterstützt ausdrücklich das heute von | "[] "The German energy industry explicitly | | Bundesverband der Energie und |
| | der Europäischen Kommission vorgeschlagene europaweit verbindliche CO2- | supports the European binding reduction target for | | Wasserwirtschaft (2014, January 22) |
| | Minderungsziel []", sagte Hildegard Müller, Vorsitzende der | CO2 emissions that has been proposed by the EU | | |
| | Hauptgeschäftsführung des Bundesverbandes der Energie- und | Commission today []", said Hildegard Müller, | | |
| | Wasserwirtschaft []." | Head of the management of the federal association | | |
| | | of energy and water industry []." | | |
| | "Das wird den Erneuerbaren-Ausbau erlahmen lassen und garantiert riskanten | "This will erode the increase of renewable energies | | BUND (2014, January 22) |
| | und umweltschädlichen Atom- und Kohlekraftwerken ihr Fortbestehen." | and guarantees persistence for risky and | | |
| | | environmentally harmful nuclear and coal energy." | | |
| 12. | Costs and benefits for individual sectors/important segments | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | Value | Source |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| 13. | Neagtive (policy) externalities | | | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | | | | |

| | "[] furthering market integration and preventing market distortion." | | | European Commission (2014a, |
|-----|--|---|------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | | | January 22, p.3) |
| | "[] further integration of the internal energy market and undistorted | | | European Commission (2014a, |
| | competition at its core." | | | January 22, p. 3) |
| | "European and national targets [] have not always ensured market | | | European Commission (2014a, |
| | integration, cost-efficiency and undistorted competition." | | | January 22, p. 4) |
| | "Moreover, most renewables development in the EU is driven by national | | | European Commission (2014a, |
| | support schemes, which [] can hinder market integration and reduce cost- | | | January 22, p. 6) |
| | efficiency. [] [and] also affects the competitiveness of energy sources []" | | | |
| | "Not only GHG emissions but also air pollution will be cut, benefiting human | | | European Commission (2014d, |
| | health." | | | January 22) |
| | "Aber die Energiepolitik wird unnötig kompliziert, wenn weiter jede Nation | "But energy policy is unnecessarily getting | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | Europas ihr energiepolitisches Süppchen kochen will." | complicated when every nation wants to pursue their | | Weiss (2014, January 16) |
| | | own energy policy agenda." | | |
| | | | a) state heavily | |
| | | | affected by | |
| | | | negative policy | |
| | | | externality | |
| 14. | Extent of negative policy externality | | | |
| | | | b) state little | |
| | | | affected by | |
| | | | negative policy | |
| | | | externality | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |

| 15. | Positive policy externality | | | |
|-----|--|---|--------------|---|
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| 16. | Sufficiency of domestic policies to cope with neg. policy externalities | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | Value | Source |
| | "[] so that we are clear what can be influenced through national and Union policy and what cannot." "Die Kommission sei zu der Überzeugung gelangt, dass die Mitgliedstaaten | "The Commission was led to the belief that member | | European Commission (2014a, January 22, p. 4) Süddeutsche Zeitung : |
| | mehr Flexibilität in ihrer nationalen Energiepolitik benötigen." | states need more flexibility for their national energy policy." | | Gammelin (2014d, January 23) |
| | "Contributions may come from renewable energy sources, domestic reserves of conventional or unconventional fossil fuels [] and nuclear according to Member State preferences over their energy mix []." | | | European Commission (2014a, January 22, p. 11) |
| | "While Member States need flexibility to choose policies that are best-matched to their national energy mix and preferences []." | | | European Commission (2014a, January 22, p. 12) |
| | "However, it [the EU-level target for renewable energy] would not be translated into national targets through EU legislation, thus leaving flexibility for Member States to transform the energy system in a way that is adapted to national preferences and circumstances." | | | European Commission (2014c, January 22) |
| | "Renewable energy target [] with flexibility for Member States to set national objectives." | | | European Commission (2014d, January 22) |

| | "[] greater flexibility for Member States and gives them the possibility to | | | European Commission (2014d, |
|-----|--|--|------------------|---------------------------------|
| | take advantage of the most cost-effective means of achieving a more | | | January 22) |
| | sustainable, secure and competitive energy system." | | | |
| | "[] providing flexibility for Member States to define a low-carbon transition | | | European Commission (2014a, |
| | appropriate to their specific circumstances, preferred energy mix and needs in | | | January 22, p. 3) |
| | terms of energy security and allowing them to keep costs to a minimum." | | | |
| | "[] the EU target would not be translated into national targets via EU | | | European Commission (2014a, |
| | legislation, thus leaving greater flexibility for Member States to meet their | | | January 22, p. 6) |
| | greenhouse gas reduction targets in the most cost-effective manner in | | | |
| | accordance with their specific circumstances, energy mixes and capacities to | | | |
| | produce renewable energy." | | | |
| | "[] providing flexibility for Member States to define a low-carbon transition | | | European Commission (2014a, |
| | appropriate to their specific circumstances, preferred energy mix and needs in | | | January 22, p. 3) |
| | terms of energy security and allowing them to keep costs to a minimum." | | | |
| | | | a) regulation of | |
| | | | goods and | |
| | | | production | |
| | | | processes | |
| 17. | Area of coordination and mobilization of interests | | b) coordination | |
| 17. | Tited of cool dilitation and mosmization of interests | | of policies to | |
| | | | provide public | |
| | | | goods (e.g. | |
| | | | environmental | |
| | | | policies) | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | "Es ist schwer zu verstehen, warum [] die Steigerung der Energieeffizienz, | "It is hard to understand why [] the rise in energy | a) and b) | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | politisch am wenigsten sexy sein soll. Es gibt einfach zu wenige Lobbyisten | efficiency should be politically the least sexy. There | | Kafsack (2014f, January 24) |

| | dafür in Brüssel. Klar, ist das anders, wenn ich 50 Atommeiler betreibe wie | are too few lobbyists for that in Brussels. Sure, this | | |
|-----|---|--|--------------|------------------------------------|
| | Frankreich und die weiter betreiben will, weil sonst mein ganzes | is different, if I run 50 nuclear piles, just like France, | | |
| | Wirtschaftssystem kollabiert." | and I want to continue running them, because | | |
| | | otherwise my economic system collapses." | | |
| | Interstate bargaining | | | |
| 18. | High intensity of national preference | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | "Denn auf was sich die Kommission da geeinigt hat, dürfte bei vielen für | "The Commission's agreement might lead to | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | Enttäuschung sorgen, gerade in der Bundesregierung, die sich Auftrieb für die | dissatisfaction of many, especially the German | | Süddeutsche.net (2014, January 14) |
| | Energiewende erhofft hatte. [] Vor allem die Bundesregierung hatte auf | government that hoped for a boost of its energy | | |
| | national bindende Zielvorgaben gehofft, um die anderen Länder zu mehr | transition. [] In particular the German government | | |
| | Investitionen in Wind- und Solarstrom zu bewegen." | hoped for national binding targets to stimulate the | | |
| | | other member states to invest more in wind and | | |
| | | solar energy." | | |
| 19. | Lowest Common denominator agreement | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | "Am Ende könnte so ein schwacher Kompromiss herauskommen, "mit dem | "In the end, such a weak compromise might result | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | einige zentrale Ziele der deutschen Energiewende nicht erreicht werden | "that some major goals of the German energy | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | dürften" [sagt Greenpeace Energie-Expertin Franziska Achterberg]" | transition cannot be achieved" [says Franziska | | |
| | | Achterberg, Greenpeace expert for energy]" | | |
| | "Es ist ein Kompromiss der die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in den Vordergrund | "It is a compromise emphasising competitiveness." | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | stellt." | | | Kafsack (2014f, January 24) |

| | "Es war naiv zu glauben, dass Europa dem deutschen Kurs folgen würde. Die | "It has been naive to believe that Europe would | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
|-----|---|--|-------|---------------------------------|
| | meisten EU-Staaten sind mit der Besinnung auf ein CO2-Ziel, aus welchen | follow the German agenda. Most EU countries are, | | Kafsack (2014e, January 23) |
| | Gründen auch immer, vollauf zufrieden." | for some reason, satisfied with the focus on one | | |
| | | CO2 target." | | |
| | "Dass sich Barroso für die Konzentration auf den CO2-Ausstoß ausspricht, hat | "There are also political reasons that Barroso | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | auch politische Gründe. So haben sich Großbritannien, Polen und andere | supports the focus on CO2 emissions. Great Britain, | | Kafsack (2014c, January 21) |
| | Staaten gegen ein eigenes Ziel für die erneuerbaren Energieträger | Poland and other member states declared themselves | | |
| | ausgesprochen. Ein solches Ziel ist damit faktisch auf europäischer Ebene nicht | against a renewable energy target on a national | | |
| | durchzusetzen." | level. Consequently, de facto such a target can't be | | |
| | | pushed through on a European level." | | |
| | "Die meisten anderen EU-Staaten und die Europäische Kommission wollen | "On the contrary, most other EU members and the | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | hingegen kein eigenständiges Ökostromziel festlegen []" | European Commission don't want to set an | | Kafsack (2014, January, 10) |
| | | independent renewable energy goal []. | | |
| | "In den vergangenen Monaten haben sich zudem viele Staaten gegen ein | "In the past months many states expressed their | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | Ökostromziel ausgesprochen." | opposition against a renewable energy target." | | Kafsack (2014a, January 8) |
| | "[] und zusammen mit den Kollegen aus der Slowakai, Polen, Italien und | "[] and together with colleagues from Slovakia, | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | Rumänien die 40-Prozent-Marke blockiert?" | Poland, Italy and Rumania blocking the 40-percent- | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | | level?" | | |
| | "Der Bundesregierung kommt Barroso insofern entgegen, als er das Ziel für die | "To come to an accommodation with the German | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | Erneuerbaren zumindest auf EU-Ebene verbindlich machen will." | government, Barroso wants to make the renewable | | Kafsack (2014c, January 21) |
| | | target at least on the European level as binding." | | |
| 20. | Results above lowest common standard | | | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | | | | |

| 21. | Independence/self-sufficiency of states and influence in bargaining | | a) Large, prosperous and relatively self- sufficient state b) Dependent and small state | |
|-----|---|---|---|--------------------------------|
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | "[] und genau darauf zielt auch die mächtige Phalanx der vier | "[] And this exactly what the powerful phalanx of | a) | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | wirtschaftsstärksten EU-Länder. [] Ein konkretes Ziel schwebe den | the four strongest economic EU countries aim at. | | Bauchmüller (2014b, January 9) |
| | Regierungen auch schon vor: "mindestens" minus 40 Prozent." | [] They already have a specific target in mind: "at | | |
| | | least" a reduction of 40 percent." | | |
| | | | a) state can be | |
| | | | part of an | |
| | | | alternative | |
| | | | coalition | |
| | | | | |
| 22. | Non-ageement and alternative coalition possibilities | | b) state can | |
| | | | credibly threat | |
| | | | with non- | |
| | | | agreement | |
| | | | (unilateral | |
| | | | agreement) | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

| 23. | Varying preference intensities of states across issues - linkages | | | |
|-----|---|--|--------------|---------------------------------|
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | "Der Bundesregierung kommt Barroso insofern entgegen, als er das Ziel für die | "To come to an accommodation with the German | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | Erneuerbaren zumindest auf EU-Ebene verbindlich machen will. [] Um | government, Barroso wants to make the renewable | | Kafsack (2014c, January 21) |
| | Umweltschützer und Bundesregierung für sich einzunehmen, will Barroso die | target at least on the European level as binding. [] | | |
| | [] geforderte Reform des EU-Emissionshandels vorantreiben." | To convince environmentalists and the German | | |
| | | government, Barroso wants to push the demanded | | |
| | | reform of the emission trading system." | | |
| | "Großbritannien und Polen kommt Barroso auf einem anderen Feld entgegen." | "Barroso accommodates Great Britain and Poland in | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | | a different policy field." | | Kafsack (2014c, January 21) |
| 24. | Weak interests of domestic groups - linkages | | | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | | | | |
| 25. | Final stage of bargaining - linkages | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| 26. | Closely related issues . Linkages | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | "Um Umweltschützer und Bundesregierung für sich einzunehmen, will Barroso | "To convince environmentalists and the German | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | die [] geforderte Reform des EU-Emissionshandels vorantreiben." | government, Barroso wants to push the demanded | | Kafsack (2014c, January 21) |
| | | reform of the emission trading system." | | |

| | Institutional choice | | | |
|-----|---|---|-------|--|
| 27. | Governmental entrepreneurship | | | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | "Bedauerlich ist, dass die Behörde [die Kommission] den Trend [Rückzug ins Nationale] befördert" | "Unfortunately, this institution [the Commission] promotes the trend [reemphasis of national decision-making]" | | Süddeutsche Zeitung : Gammelin (2014e, January 23) |
| | "Das allein macht den Brief so bemerkenswert, der diese Woche an die EU- Kommissare Für Klima und Energie [] rausgegangen ist. Er trägt die Unterschrift des britischen Energie-und Klimaministers Ed Davey, seines französischen Amtskollegen Philippe Martin, des italienischen Umweltministers Andrea Orlando - und gleich zwei Unterschriften aus Deutschland: Barbara Hendricks und Sigmar Gabriel, die Minister für Umwelt und Energie, haben unterzeichnet." | "This makes the letter that was sent to the EU Commissioners for climate and energy, quite remarkable. It contains the signatures of the British energy and climate minister Ed Davey, his French colleague Philippe Martin, the Italian minister for environment Andrea Orlando – and two signatures from Germany: Barabra Hendricks and Sigmar Gabriel, ministers for environment and energy, have signed." | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Bauchmüller (2014b, January 9) |
| | "Dass sich Barroso für die Konzentration auf den CO2-Ausstoß ausspricht, hat auch politische Gründe. So haben sich Großbritannien, Polen und andere Staaten gegen ein eigenes Ziel für die erneuerbaren Energieträger ausgesprochen. Ein solches Ziel ist damit faktisch auf europäischer Ebene nicht durchzusetzen." | "There are also political reasons that Barroso supports the focus on CO2 emissions. Great Britain, Poland and other member states declared themselves against a renewable energy target on a national level. Consequently, such a target de facto can't be enforced on a European level." | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Kafsack (2014c, January 21) |
| | "[] und dass man von vornherein nicht allzu viel Einsparungen plant, darum kümmern sich die Staaten schon." | "[] and that there aren't too many reductions planned from the start, that's what the governments will take care of." | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: Weiss (2014, January 16) |

| | | | 1 | |
|-----|---|--|--------------|------------------------------|
| | | | | |
| | "Premierminister David Cameron legt dem Kommissionspräsidenten | "Prime Minister David Cameron proposed to the | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | kurzerhand einen gewaltigen Schwenk nahe. [] Barroso hat aus dem | Commission president a huge turnaround. [] | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | britischen Ratschlag tatsächlich einen europäischen Vorschlag gemacht." | Barrosso actually used the British advice and turned | | (20110, 0411441) 22) |
| | ornisenen Ruisening austernen einen europaisenen Vorsening gemaene. | it into a European proposal." | | |
| | | it into a European proposai. | | |
| | | | | |
| 28. | EU institutions to overcome national oppositions | | | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | | | | |
| Soc | ial Contructivism | | | |
| | Variable | | | |
| 1. | Logic of appropriateness | | | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
| | | | | |
| 2. | Social learning - preferences, interests | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |

| 3. | Argumentative persuasion | | | |
|------|---|--|--------------|---------------------------------|
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | "Nach langen und teilweise heftigen Diskussionen im Kreis der EU- | "After long and intensive discussions within the EU- | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | Kommissare [] [, habe Barroso] im Kreise der Kollegen "keinen | commissioner's circle, [Barroso] "didn't receive any | | Gammelin (2014a, January, 15) |
| | Widerstand gegen ein einzelnes Ziel erfahren", hieß es im Umfeld des | opposition" among his colleagues; this was stated in | | |
| | Präsidenten." | the president's environment." | | |
| | "Klimakommissarin Connie Hedegaard kämpft für ihr Klimaziel und ist | "Climate commissioner Connie Hedegaard fights for | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | vielleicht auch einigermaßen zufrieden, aber sie kann nicht dagegen | her climate goal and might also be fairly happy with | | Kafsack (2014f, January 24) |
| | argumentieren, wenn man ständig von anderen Kommissaren wie Herrn | the outcome. However, she can hardly withstand, | | |
| | Oettinger hört, wie billig die Energie in den Vereinigten Staaten ist." | when she constantly gets to hear from other | | |
| | | commissioners, such as Mister Oettinger, how cheap | | |
| | | energy is in the United States." | | |
| 2.1 | Sub-variable Argumentative Persuasion: Persuadee is in a novel or | | | |
| 3.1. | uncertain environment (new issue, crisis, policy failure) | | | |
| | <u>Content</u> | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| 2.2 | Sub-variable Argumentative Persuasion: Persuadee has few prior, | | | |
| 3.2. | ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader's message | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |

| 3.3. | Sub-variable Argumentative Persuasion: Persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuader belongs or wants to belong | | | |
|------|---|--------------------|--------------|--------|
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| 3.4. | Sub-variable Argumentative Persuasion: Persuader does not lecture/demand, but acts out principles of deliberative argument | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| 3.5. | Sub-variable Argumentative Persuasion: Persuader-Persuadee interaction in less politicized and more insulated, private settings. | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| | Norm development | | | |

| 4. | Individual agency | | | |
|----|---|--|--------------|---------------------------------|
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | "Auf den Fluren der Europäischen Kommission werden erste Wetten | "On the hallways of the European Commission | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | abgeschlossen. Welcher Deutsche wird sich beim EU-Klimaziel | people start making bets. Which German is going to | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | durchsetzen?" | have his will about the EU climate target?" | | |
| | "Premierminister David Cameron legt dem Kommissionspräsidenten | "Prime Minister David Cameron proposed to the | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | kurzerhand einen gewaltigen Schwenk nahe. [] Barroso hat aus dem | Commission president a huge turnaround. [] | | Gammelin (2014c, January 22) |
| | britischen Ratschlag tatsächlich einen europäischen Vorschlag gemacht." | Barrosso actually used the British advice and turned | | |
| | | it into a European proposal." | | |
| | "Klimakommissarin Connie Hedegaard kämpft für ihr Klimaziel und ist | "Climate commissioner Connie Hedegaard fights for | | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: |
| | vielleicht auch einigermaßen zufrieden, aber sie kann nicht dagegen | her climate goal and might also be fairly happy with | | Kafsack (2014f, January 24) |
| | argumentieren, wenn man ständig von anderen Kommissaren wie Herrn | the outcome. However, she can hardly withstand, | | 11415401 (2011), valually 21) |
| | Oettinger hört, wie billig die Energie in den Vereinigten Staaten ist." | when she constantly gets to hear from other | | |
| | | commissioners, such as Mister Oettinger, how cheap | | |
| | | energy is in the United States." | | |
| | "Die Bundesregierung hatte am 9. Januar per E-Mail an die deutschen | "The German government wrote an email to the | | Süddeutsche Zeitung: |
| | Unterhändler in Brüssel klargestellt, wie wichtig Deutschland ein | German negotiator in Brussels, making clear how | | Gammelin (2014a, January, 15) |
| | verbindliches Erneuerbaren-Ziel ist. [] Energiekommissar Günther | important binding renewable energy targets are for | | |
| | Oettinger unterstützte die deutsche Forderung in den Verhandlungen dem | Germany. [] However, from what is heard, Energy | | |
| | Vernehmen nach allerdings nicht." | Commissioner Günther Oettinger didn't support the | | |
| | | German claims in the negotiations." | | |
| 5. | Open policy window | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
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| 6. | Social learning/Socialization - norms | | | |
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| | Diffusion pathways of norms | | | |
| 7. | Societal mobilization | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| 8. | Social learning - adoption of norms | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| 9. | Liberal state structure - norm diffusion | | | |
| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
| | | | | |
| 10. | Corporatist state structure - norm diffusion | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | <u>Value</u> | Source |
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| 11. | Statist state structure - norm diffusion | | | |

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| 12. | State-above society structure - norm diffusion | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | Value | Source |
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| | Dynamics promoting socialization outcomes | | | |
| | 2 junios promoting socialization outcomes | | | |
| 13. | Type Linterpolization/socialization Dale playing | | | |
| 13. | Type I internalization/socialization - Role playing | | | |
| | Content | <u>Translation</u> | <u>Value</u> | <u>Source</u> |
| | <u>comm</u> | - Timbawon | · ceruse | <u> </u> |
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| 13.1. | Long sustained contact – internalization of roles | | | |
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| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
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| 13.2. | Intense contact – internalization of roles | | | |
| 10.2. | | | | |
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
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| 13.3. | | | | |
| | Experience in regional/international policy making | | | |
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| | Content | Translation | <u>Value</u> | Source |
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| 13.4. | Extensive domestic policy networks | | | |
|-------|---|--------------------|-------|--------|
| | Content | Translation | Value | Source |
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| 14. | Type II internalization/socialization - Normative suasion | | | |
| | <u>Content</u> | <u>Translation</u> | Value | Source |
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