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BACHELOR THESIS

DETERMINING POLICY POSITIONS AND SUCCESSFULLY LOBBYING INTEREST GROUPS IN EU GENDER POLICY-MAKING

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1. Introduction

> *"With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers"* (European Union, 2012, p. 117).

The equal treatment between men and women is a European legal right and a very present topic in political debates. Nevertheless, the representation of women in company boards remains relatively low as an EU Commission's (2012a) progress report uncovers. Some EU member states including France and Belgium have adopted legally binding measures to increase the number of women in corporate boardrooms, others banked on voluntary measures (European Commission, 2012a, p. 13). In May 2012, the Commission launched a public consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU' to gather opinions on its consideration of a legal strategy to equal the gender imbalance in corporate boards of companies listed on stock exchanges (European Commission, 2012d, p. 1).

The underrepresentativeness of the female gender in company boards is, however, no novelty. Since 2003, the proportion of women in corporate boards in the EU only increased from 8.5% to 13.7% in 2012 (European Commission, 2012a, p. 10). A question directly related to this fact is why did the EU wait almost a decade to initiate a legal initiative to counterbalance the existing disequilibrium?

A seemingly natural explanation could be that interest groups' lobbying efforts affected or in this case restrained EU law-making. The European Union's decision-making process differs from national governance in terms of the incorporated interest representation component. Interest groups play a significant role in terms of delivering expertise and fulfilling the connecting link between the EU and member state level (Greenwood, 2011, pp. 1, 7). EU institutions not uncommonly require interest groups' resources to form policy outcomes. Hence their interaction with the European legislative is capable of affecting EU public policy results.

This research zooms in on these questions and tries to make the latent trait 'influence' visible and measurable using the example of the public consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU' in 2012. The research questions of this analysis are (*1) What is the policy position of the European Commission pre and post the consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU'?, (2) What types of interest groups participated in the consultation and where are their policy positions located?,* and *(3) Which interest groups profited from the position (non-)shift and influenced the Commission successfully?*

Researchers have struggled so far to identify a thoroughly accepted measuring strategy and a consistent theoretical base to capture the multi-layered concept of influence. To answer the

research questions of this case study, the measurement of influence relies on two assumptions. Prior the launch of the public consultation, the EU Commission must firstly have formed an opinion on the topic. This is believed to hold as the Commission is seriously considering a legally binding female quota. Secondly, several interest groups with differing preferences must have submitted their comments during consultation phase which was also the case. To identify successfully lobbying interest groups, the policy positions of the Commission (pre- and post-consultation) and of the participating interest groups are determined by applying computerized text analysis. Based on the findings of Klüver (2011, p. 493) and Dür & De Bièvre (2007, p. 3), successful interest groups are defined in terms of a distance decrease of their own policy positions to the Commission's policy position meaning that if an interest group managed to pull the policy position of the Commission closer to its ideal preferences after the consultation it is considered successful.
Using the submitted contributions of the interest groups and EU press releases and the legislative proposal as the relevant dataset, the policy positions of the Commission (initial and final) and of the interest groups are located on a one-dimensional issue scale through the text scaling model Wordfish. Having located the different positions, two opposing lobbying coalitions left and right of the Commission's initial policy position can be identified (Klüver, 2011, p. 486). According to Klüver (2012b, p. 1128) it can be expected that the interest groups belonging to the larger lobbying coalition are more likely to succeed with their lobby efforts. I expect the Commission to shift its policy position towards interest groups lobbying against the quota. As companies are directly addressed by the legal quota, I assume most business interest groups to be in disfavor of the quota as it constitutes a significant intervention in corporate affairs. On the other hand, I expect women's and civil society associations and the like to be more in favor of the quota.

To generate the research results, this thesis starts with an introduction to its theoretical assumptions including a review of three relevant studies, the research questions and their operationalization. Proceeding, I specify the thesis' underlying methodology by amplifying on the research method, Wordfish, and the document selection. Lastly, the analysis and conclusion parts summarize the findings and the thesis closes with a brief outlook of possible future research.

2. Theoretical Framework

In the following chapter, the underlying theoretical assumptions and concepts of the thesis concerning the research on interest group influence are outlined. To study interest groups' influence, the "state – interest group" relation must be understood first. Therefore, this chapter begins with an introduction to pluralism and corporatism theory after having defined

the most necessary terms. In the next section, I proceed with briefly describing the status of interest groups within EU policy procedures and reviewing more recent studies on interest group political influence and its success determinants. Following behind, I discuss the role of interest groups in the sphere of EU gender policy which, lastly, leads to the presentation of three research questions and their operationalization aiming at revealing which interest groups influenced the EU Commission successfully in the public consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU' in 2012.

2.1 Definition of Necessary Terms

A vital step for the study of interest group influence in political systems is to delimit the term 'interest group'. I draw on a relatively broad definition of an interest group by Beyers, Eising & Maloney (2008). Accordingly, interest groups must firstly have an organization, secondly pursue a political interest, but finally mustn't seek political office (Beyers et al., 2008, pp. 1106f.).

Interest groups express their interests through lobbying. I apply the definition of lobbyism by Milbrath (1963) who stated that: *"Lobbying is the stimulation and transmission of a communication, by someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, directed to a governmental decision-maker with the hope of influencing his decision"* (Milbrath, 1963, p. 8). I expand this definition by the notions of Klüver (2012a, p. 64) and Dür & De Bièvre (2007, p. 6) who see lobbying as a multilayered collective action rather than an individual action taking.

Lastly, the terms 'power', 'influence', and 'luck' need to be delimited. I draw on the definition of Woll (2007) who stated that influence is to be seen as the exertion of power and its impact on policy results (Woll 2007, p. 61). Dür & De Bièvre (2007) pick up the causality of influence and policy results by declaring actors as powerful when the actual policy outcome moved closer to their preferences after lobbying (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007, p. 3). But how can one distinguish if an actor was decisive in a situation or just lucky? The concepts of luck and influence are both abstract and their existence is not directly visible which is why a distinction is sometimes hard to make. Assuming, for example, that there are three parties, P1, P2, and P3 which constitute a government (Steunenberg, 2011, p. 390). P1 and P3 have three votes each and P2 has one vote. To pass a law, a total amount of five votes is needed. Assuming further that the preferences of P1 and P3 are situated on either extreme end of an issue dimension. However, only the two are able to create a lawful decision as a coalition of for example P1 and P2 would not suffice. If then P1 and P3 negotiate a decision in the middle of their preferences which happens to be closest to P2's preferences, is P2 then considered powerful or just lucky (ibid.)? This example of Steunenberg (2011) shows that in politics, actors can be sometimes powerful (and more narrowly influential) or just happen to be lucky (Steunenberg, 2011, p. 391). However, Steunenberg (2011) argues that the concepts of

power and luck are in fact fairly different although sometimes resulting in the same outcome. He distinguishes power from luck as the former entails a systematic component whereas the latter occurs more or less at random (Steunenberg, 2011, p. 391). Power is hence the ability to frequently force an outcome. An actor can be attributed as powerful if a policy result is beneficial to him/ her (Warntjen, 2007, pp. 179f.). Moreover, a result can also be beneficial if nothing happens at all, i.e. if the status quo remains.

However, a certain policy result can be due to various other factors which affect a decision-making process next to the lobbying effort of an actor (ibid.). The difficulty of measuring influence as an invisible ability of interest groups to dictate policy outcomes is to distinguish it from luck and other reasons (ibid.).

2.2 Pluralism and Corporatism Theory

When studying the influence of interest groups, it remains vital to assess how an interest group acts in the political sphere. In the political science literature of the mid-20th century, two main schools, namely pluralism and corporatism including Mancur Olson's group formation theory, opposed each other while trying to explain pressure group logic in a political system (Michalowitz, 2007, p. 30). The two approaches furthermore led to different explanations of interest group representation in political science research. The following section aims at introducing the two theoretical approaches and their underlying assumptions.

With the emergence of pluralism theory in the 1940s, the scope of political science studies shifted moving from the scrutiny of formally established legal entities and procedures (institutionalism) towards groups and their interests (Ainsworth, 2002, p. 5). In general pluralism theory, pressure groups outside the traditional political arena and their interactions have been regarded as essential if one tries to understand governmental decision-making processes (Ainsworth, 2002, pp. 5f.). Further, pluralists saw this approach as socially integrative. In their view, pluralism led to the natural formation of interest groups to pressure the state cooperatively rather than solely (Zipfel, 2007, p. 64). The equal distribution of political power to all organized groups is then balancing out the centralistic government. Any group could organize their interests in principal and would compete with the same chances for political influence (ibid.). Group bargaining and negotiations became inherent to public policy formation. Inclusion of different groups expressing their interests on issues they are concerned with was regarded as advantageous and commonplace for policy-making (Ainsworth, 2002, pp. 5f.).

However, pluralism critiques quickly detected flaws in the pluralistic group approach. Its core assumption, that power was inclusive and equally distributed among all groups pressuring a political system, was their main target of criticism (Ainsworth, 2002, p. 6). Elmer Schattschneider especially evaluated pluralism as an elitist and exclusive rather than

inclusive theory (Ainsworth, 2002, p. 7). Also, the mobilization and maintenance of groups was assumed to be automatically the case in pluralism theory (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. 65). In 1965, Mancur Olson and his collective action approach revolutionized group studies as he singled out the dilemma of collective action in group formation and elaborated internal group criteria (e.g. small size, specialized interests) which allegedly make some groups more likely to pressure a political system than others (Olson, 1971, p. 48; Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. 67). This consequently meant that a hierarchical and functional order of interest groups renders a fair competition for political influence impossible (Zipfel, 2007, p. 64). This stood in sharp contrast to pluralism theory which assumed an equal opportunity for every group to express its opinions and contribute to the policy formation process.

The two schools interpret interest group representation as either integrative and unfettered or elitist and distorted. This thesis tries to examine interest groups' influence in the EU political system. With regard to the EU gender consultation, I expect corporatism theory to hold in this research. Small business groups (especially companies) possess specialized interests and can be assumed due to their resource abundance and social importance to be placed at the top of the hierarchy closest to political decision-makers and can hence be assumed to be most influential.
To understand how interest groups access the EU and affect its decisions, the next section provides an overview of EU policy procedures and the status of interest groups within them.

2.3 EU Policy-Making Processes and the Role of Interest Groups

The EU polity opens up different lobbying channels compared to national governmental structures. To understand lobbying success, this sections aims at explaining the status of interest groups within the EU and its legal procedures.

Interest group representation is inherent to the polity nature of the European Union and is hence a historically grown systematic component (Greenwood, 2011, pp. 1-2). The special polity and the incorporated institutions are more receptive to lobbyism than national governments might be. With the White Paper on European Governance in 2001, the EU tried to encourage actors outside the formal political sphere (such as interest groups) to participate in the EU policy-making process and acknowledged its necessity for optimally aligning European interests (European Union, 2001, pp. 2-3). Also to tackle the Union's democratic deficit and to create a greater public accessibility, the incorporation of informal actors and their interests of European, national or local importance was established (Greenwood, 2011, p. 1; Michalowitz, 2007, pp. 188f.). Interest groups are likewise important to fill in the connection gap both ways between the EU level and the member state and even

the civil society level (Greenwood, 2011, p. 5). Also in terms of expert knowledge, public and private interest groups play an important role while delivering relevant information for EU policy decisions (Klüver, 2012a, p. 61; Bouwen, 2004, p. 346). Overall, there are three procedures of EU action taking, namely the Community method, the intergovernmental method and the cooperation method where interest groups may exercise their lobby efforts. In areas where member states transferred their competences to the European level, mostly the Community method applies. Here, the Commission holds the primary right of legislative initiative (Klüver, 2012a, p. 61). Contrary to the intergovernmental and cooperation method, where the Commission is obliged to work in closer cooperation with the Council and Parliament, the institution is head of power when a process is based on the Community method (Europe, n.d.). However, the Parliament and Council must give their approval and are also able to enforce amendments (Michalowitz, 2007, pp. 68-70). Additionally, the Commission commonly strives to reach a consensus between all policy relevant actors to achieve the most possible support for its decision (Michalowitz, 2007, p. 66).

To sum up: Depending on which decision-making procedure (which voting majority and so forth) applies different EU institutions might be more or less receptive to interest groups' lobbying efforts. Though in fact genuine influence on policy outcomes is never fully guaranteed, lobbyism is still a required common practice. Researchers of the last decade(s) dedicated themselves to the exact topic and worked on making the influence on interest groups visible and measurable.

2.4 New Theoretical Approaches of Studying Interest Group Influence in the EU

More recent studies examining interest groups have turned away from the group formation issue of the mid 1940s and more frequently have tried to explain what successful interest group influence constitutes. This section provides a review of relevant EU interest group literature and the underlying influence determinants.

2.4.1 Review of Selected Influence Literature

The previous sections established the European Union's openness to interest group participation in policy-making processes. An exact and current number of actors or interest groups engaging in EU interest representation is, however, not available (Greenwood, 2011, pp. 8, 12). What can be recorded is that the amount of interest groups engaging on EU level significantly increased over the past decades (Greenwood, 2011, p. 12). But with their increased quantity, did their influence on policy decisions also increase? This basic question of influence is now addressed by recent studies focusing on interest groups. In the following section, the researches of Bouwen (2004), Dür (2008), and Klüver (2011) are being reviewed on their assumptions of influence determinants.

Pieter Bouwen (2004) defines interest group influence as the ability to access EU institutions (Bouwen, 2004, p. 340). The influence is based on an exchange between interest group and political institution. The exchange entails the interest groups' resources, 'access goods', being traded for actual 'access' to an EU institution (ibid.).

Three access goods can be distinguished: expert knowledge, information about the European encompassing interest, and information about the domestic encompassing interest (ibid.). Expert knowledge is thereby an interest group's expertise or special knowledge concerning an issue. The information about the European encompassing interest is the aggregated interests of a sector in the EU internal market and the information about the domestic encompassing interest relates to the aggregated interests of a sector in the domestic market (ibid.). Furthermore, Bouwen (2004) sees the economic law of demand and supply as deterministic (Bouwen, 2004, p. 341). Political access is hence determined by the supply of an access resource and its demand. The supply of an access resource is further dependent on the organizational form of an interest group which is additionally dependent on the interest group's size, economic strategies, and domestic structures (Bouwen, 2004, p. 342).

Interest group influence is therefore affected by the kind of information and its supply and demand. The assumption, however, that access equals influence is questionable. One interest group may get access to an institution, but can still fail to be heard. The operationalization of influence in this case may be implemented incongruously.

In his research, Andreas Dür (2008) singled out four determinants affecting interest group's ability to influence the political system which are interest group resources, political institutions, issue characteristics, and interest group strategies (Dür, 2008, p. 1213).

With group resources, Dür is referring to *"money, legitimacy, political support, knowledge, expertise, and information"* (Dür, 2008, p. 1214). Interest groups exchange their support or expertise for influence on policy outcomes. However, an interest group's internal organization, type of membership, and size determines its resource abundance and also its political influence may vary accordingly (ibid.). Similar to Bouwen (2004), Dür (2008) sees an interest group's possibility to exchange its resources for political influence as dependent on the demand for it and the supply of it. For example, if political actors have no alternatives to receive certain information, it is very likely that the interest group possessing this particular information can trade it for a great deal (Dür, 2008, pp. 1214f.).

Political institutions are affecting interest group influence as they admit different possibilities for lobbyism (Dür, 2008, p. 1215). On EU level, the Commission and the Parliament are believed to be accessible to lobbying interest groups (ibid.). Also the type of staffing in a particular institution is affecting its receptiveness to interest groups' preference voicing. As

the EU Commissioners are not being elected they may be less accessible for interest groups than Parliamentarians (Dür, 2008, p. 1216).

Issue characteristics are to be understood as the type of policy, its public salience, and its complexity (Dür, 2008, p. 1217). Depending on if a policy outcome is regulatory, distributive or redistributive, interest groups of different types and with different interests may profit respectively (ibid.). Also, it is assumed that concerning technical policy issues, political actors may be more receptive to interest groups with specialized than diffuse interests. The public salience likewise affects interest group influence. A publicly unknown issue may be easier to influence than a moralized or controversial issue (Dür, 2008, pp. 1217f.).

Finally, interest groups apply different strategies to effectively exchange their resources for political influence (Dür, 2008, p. 1218).

Dür's (2008) approach to explain influence is more holistic focusing on external as well as internal questions. What he disregards is, however, that lobbying is a group activity often leading to coalition formation of interest groups sharing similar policy preferences (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. 139).

In the research of Heike Klüver (2011) it is claimed that interest group influence significantly depends on the issue context and more specifically the relative size of lobbying coalitions, the issue's salience, complexity, and its degree of conflict (Klüver, 2011, p. 484). A lobbying coalition is a group encompassing all interest groups that lobby for the same policy goal (ibid.). Generally, one can expect two lobbying coalitions, one favoring and one opposing a certain policy proposal (Baumgartner et al., 2009, pp. 6f.). Furthermore, Klüver showed that the effect of salience is reversed according to the coalition's size an interest group belongs to. Belonging to the larger lobbying coalition, salience allegedly has a positive effect on an interest group's influence and vice versa (ibid.). Differently from Bouwen (2004) and Dür (2008) who more intensively studied the internal traits of interest groups, Klüver primarily focuses on the issue context towards which interest groups direct their lobbying efforts (Klüver, 2011, p. 486). In this competitive environment, interest groups, according to Klüver, are likely to form coalitions which consequently vary between policy issues (ibid.). Interest group influence is examined by Klüver (2011) in an early policy formation phase. Lobbying coalitions are located left and right of the Commission's policy position on the same issue dimension (Klüver, 2011, pp. 486f.). Figure 1 displays the formation of lobbying coalitions. Interest groups 1-4 and interest groups 5-6 would create coalition A and B respectively on the same policy issue as they have similar lobbying objectives. It is argued that successful influence is depending on the relative coalition size an interest group belongs to (Klüver, 2011, p. 487).

What is innovative in the research of Klüver is that she assessed lobbying attempts of interest groups in a collective way which is also supported by Baumgartner & Leech (1998)

Figure 1: Concept of Lobbying Coalitions (Klüver, 2011, p. 486)[1]



who stressed the importance to study allied lobbying groups instead of every single interest group separately (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. 139).

Summing up, there is no unitary way of measuring interest group influence in policy-making processes. Hence, existing studies on examining interest group influence have so far often produced contradictory results (Dür, 2008, p. 1213). But to reconstruct EU policy outcomes, it remains vital to assess the effect of interest group lobbyism in legislative processes (Lowe & Benoit, 2013, p. 299; Kantola, 2010, p. 77). However, researchers so far lack a unitary conceptualization, operationalization, and simultaneous consideration of different channels of influence (Dür, 2008, p. 1220).

2.5 Influencing the EU Commission in Gender Policy-Making

Interest groups also engage in EU gender policy-making. This section provides a brief introduction to former and current EU gender strategies.

Ever since the Treaty of Rom and the incorporated equal payment clause of men and women, the EU pursues gender equality (Kantola, 2010, pp. 125f.). When examining policy-making processes, it is widely recognized that the EU Commission adopts a dominant position in terms of defining policy proposals (Bouwen, 2004, p. 346).

In 2012, the Commission launched a public consultation on a legally binding 40% female quota for executive boards of companies listed on stock exchanges. During this consultation, all concerned actors have been asked to comment on the matter. This proposal is a relatively innovative approach as gender policies so far have been mostly interconnected with labor market policies and the use of non-binding soft law (Kantola, 2010, pp. 125f.; Woodward, 2003, p. 67). Since the 1980s, a fairly new approach called ‘gender mainstreaming’ evolved in the literature which expands the scope and tools of customary EU gender policies fostering such lawful approaches as the public consultation in 2012 (Kantola, 2010, p. 125). With the mainstreaming approach, initiatives to promote equality of the sexes can be incorporated in other policy fields (surpassing the prior focus of employment policies) which

[1] IG refers to the policy position of an interest group; COMM refers to the policy position of the Commission.

is to encourage an overall gender sensitivity in policy and law-making processes in general (Kantola, 2010, p. 127; Woodward, 2003, p. 66). It is also believed that the mainstreaming approach will become eventually institutionalized if it is incrementally applied (Bretherton, 2001, p. 62).

Over the past years, the ambitious mainstreaming approach, however, failed to achieve a genuine and comprehensive EU institutionalization of the matter (Bretherton, 2001, p. 62). Bretherton (2001) argued that *"the processes of institutionalization are selective, and receptiveness to new ideas and principles is to a large degree a reflection of interests"* (Bretherton, 2001, p. 72). Also Agustín (2008) claimed that organizations which share a similar policy opinion with EU institutions receive preferential treatment (Agustín, 2008, p. 507). But what are those interests that apparently successfully limit EU gender equality policy-making to employment market issues? Why is the mainstreaming approach only barely visible in EU policy-making? Zooming in on these questions, the investigation of interest groups and their influence embodies a vital exercise to understand EU gender policy outcomes. Based on the previous notions, the following research questions concerned with the measurement of interest group influence during the Commission's consultation on gender imbalance in 2012 have been developed.

2.6 Research Questions

Referring to the study of Klüver (2011) who found that lobbying success is mostly depending on policy positions and the size of a coalition of interest groups, this thesis' research questions are directed towards the same matter (Klüver, 2011, p. 502). To measure interest group influence, I apply computerized text analysis using the Wordfish scaling model by Slapin & Proksch (2008) to locate the policy positions of the Commission pre- and post-consultation phase and the positions of the participating interest groups on a one-dimensional policy scale. To be able to assess whether the Commission has shifted its policy position towards a certain lobbying coalition or camp, it is crucial to firstly locate the Commission's initial and final policy positions on the topic:

> *1. What is the policy position of the European Commission pre and post the consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU'?*

To evaluate which interest groups successfully pulled the Commission's position towards their own preferences, the interest groups which participated in the consultation and their policy positions of the matter have to be determined and located:

> *2. What types of interest groups participated in the consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU' and where are their policy positions located?*

After having determined the Commission's and the interest groups' policy positions, it is now possible to detect opposing camps of lobbying interest groups, the Commission's policy position shift (if it occurred) and possible winners and losers of the lobby process. The final research question is hence:

> *3. Which interest groups profited from the position (non-)shift and influenced the Commission successfully?*

In the upcoming analysis, it is expected that a position shift of the Commission is taking place towards interest groups that oppose the 40% female quota. Interest groups favoring the quota are anticipated to have lobbied unsuccessfully. As the weak outcome of the EU gender mainstreaming approach has shown, one must assume that the EU will again retreat from comprehensive gender equality measures and will significantly mitigate its prior proposition. Also, a bias towards business in the policy-making process can be expected which additionally would be supported by the elitist corporatism approach (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. 106). As the proposed quota constitutes a strong intrusion into operational decisions, it is therefore likely that business interest groups will mostly belong to the quota-opposing camp making it more difficult for political actors to maintain it.

2.7 Operationalization

To recall, lobbying success according to Klüver (2011) is affected by an interest group's membership to a certain lobbying coalition. A lobbying coalition, a coalition of interest groups or a lobbying camp is the accumulated number of interest groups left and right of the Commission's policy position on a one-dimensional policy issue (Klüver, 2011, p. 494). Klüver (2012b) states further that belonging to the larger lobbying coalition it is more likely for an interest group to be lobbying successfully (Klüver, 2012b, p. 1128). As a consequence, this thesis focuses on a specific definition of success by Klüver (2011) where *"lobbying success is measured by assessing whether the distance between the policy position of interest groups and that of the Commission is smaller at t_2 than at t_1"* (Klüver, 2011, p. 493), whereby t_1 is the Commission's position pre-consultation phase and t_2 post-consultation.[2] Following this structure, successfully lobbying interest groups can be detected by their membership of lobbying coalition and the change in their policy positions' distance to the position of the Commission as shown in Figure 2.

This operationalization of lobbying success is also coinciding with the believes of Dür & De Bièvre (2007, p. 3) who define successful lobbying as the closer distance of a political actor's policy position to an interest group's ideal point post-lobbying compared to pre-lobbying. Note that when no significant shift becomes visible it may still reveal that certain interest

[2] In Figure 2, "t_1" equals "Commission 1" and "t_2" equals "Commission 2".

Figure 2: Operationalization of Influence, based on Klüver (2012b, p. 1122)



groups just managed to keep the position of the Commission quite exactly where it was. Also if both lobbying coalitions are of the same size, one can argue that both camps successfully counter-lobbied each other which might explain why no policy shift has taken place.

However, one cannot be thoroughly sure that a policy (non-)shift of the Commission is due to no other reason but the interest groups' lobbying effort (Warntjen, 2007, p. 180). But, given that the Commission's policy position pre-consultation phase has been elaborated in cooperation between the Parliament and the Council (see European Commission, 2012a), it can quite confidently be assumed that any deviation from this initial position is due to lobbying efforts. The analysis, however, does not depict each interest group's degree of influence. Only its membership to the successful lobbying coalition reveals that it has been successful, but not how successful compared to other interest groups.

Other important determinants of success, such as salience, the degree of complexity, and group resources not included in the operationalization are not labeled as uninsightful. The group coalition theory is, however, the most promising approach which is why the thesis is solely focusing on it. Also, the limited framework doesn't permit to conceptualize an overall comprehensive measurement of influence.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This analysis examines the influence of interest groups in EU gender law-making, specifically during the public consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU' which was conducted from March 5th to May 18th 2012. Documents from the EU Commission and submitted contributions of the participating interest groups are analyzed to determine their policy positions on the topic. This study investigates one particular case due to three

reasons. Firstly, the considered consultation and more importantly the submitted contributions are publicly available. Secondly, the case offers a great variety in terms of actor nationality as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Interest Group Nationality of the English Data Subset[3]



And thirdly, the issue is relatively simple and straightforward meaning that the Commission released its opinion on a lawful female quota and put six clear questions concerning its scope and fashion which have been distinctly commented on by most interest groups. Contrarily, the consultation on the 'Structural Reform of the Banking Sector' conducted in spring 2013 included eleven highly complex questions and proposed several courses of action (European Commission, 2013). Here, interest groups on the one hand served to clear the Commission's indecisiveness and on the other hand as well expressed their own opinions on the topic, but more imprecisely, i.e. the majority would agree with the Commission in one point, disagree in a second point, and have no opinion or understanding of some other point. The complexity of the issue and its multifacetedness would have made the analysis on a one-dimensional scale rather difficult which is why it was decided against this and other more complex consultation topics.

Speaking in terms of variables, the influence of interest groups on the Commission's policy position concerning gender imbalance on corporate boards is the independent variable and the shift in position of the Commission constitutes the dependent variable. The unit of

[3] MK = Macedonia, LU= Luxembourg, NO = Norway, CH= Switzerland, CZ =Czech Republic, CY = Cyprus, SE = Sweden, DE = Germany, PT = Portugal, FR = France, NL = Netherlands, IE = Ireland, ES = Spain, FI =Finland, IT = Italy, DK = Denmark, Global = Global origin, European = European origin, GB = Great Britain; for further details see appendix p. 33ff.

analysis remains the individual interest group or its submitted document. Though when aggregating them, it cannot be distinguished if they are equally powerful.
However, the thesis faces difficulties with establishing a causal relation. It is not certain if an interest group, although belonging to the larger lobbying camp and decreasing its distance to the Commission's final policy position, was de facto influential. More importantly, this thesis focusses on the accurate and realistic determination of policy positions of the specific actors involved in the consultation. Nevertheless, the estimation of policy positions in a convincing fashion could serve as an indicator for interest groups' successful lobbying efforts. Additionally, a non-shift of the Commission's policy position may still display that, firstly, the two lobbying camps are equally influential and counter-lobbied each other, secondly, that the Commission was thoroughly resistant to all lobbying efforts or that, thirdly, the interest groups initially closest to the Commission's policy position managed to preserve the status quo.
As the study observes the Commission's policy position over time, the case study is also longitudinal.

3.2 Research Method

To determine the policy positions of the interest groups and the Commission and to detect a shift in the latter, a quantitative approach is pursued. The use of computerized text analysis for the determination of policy positions is booming since recent years (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013, p. 268). Computerized content analysis methods are defined by Grimmer & Stewart (2013) as the *"systematic analysis of large-scale text collections"* (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013, p. 268). They bring significant advantageous additions to political science studies which are the possibility to utilize large amounts of textual data in a reliable way (Ruedin, 2013, p. 539). However, the progress in statistical assistance cannot replace the qualitative interpretation and evaluation of the research's findings (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013, p. 268). As manual coding is labour intensive and the amount of text is overwhelming, the documents in use cannot be manually coded in a conscientious fashion within the time limits permitted for this thesis.

Mainly three research methods have been on the short-list for this analysis, namely a dictionary approach, Wordscores, and Wordfish. The dictionary approach bases the assignment of a document to a certain category on the presence of preselected key words (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013, p. 274). Concerning the consultation, no already established dictionary on the particular gender topic exists. And using dictionaries created for an unrelated topic will most likely lead to erroneous results (ibid.). The option to self-define a dictionary was discarded due to time reasons and reliability issues usually associated with elaborating dictionaries by hand (Klüver, 2009, p. 537). Wordscores by Laver, Benoit & Garry (2003) works in a matter similar to dictionaries. The program uses a set of reference texts (of

which the policy positions on the dimension in question are known) to compare the word frequencies from those reference texts to the word frequencies from virgin texts (of which the policy positions are unknown) (Laver et al., 2003, p. 313). This quickly enables the location of virgin texts' policy positions on the basis of the word pool extracted from the reference texts. However, we lack independent measures of interest group positions which would suffice to define the policy position of reference texts and to validate the computer coding results. Therefore, Wordscores is ruled out as well.

3.2.1 Wordfish

The program Wordfish eventually proved to be most appropriate for this analysis. It is based on the expectation maximization algorithm written for *R* which uses frequencies of words to estimate latent variables, such as political positions (Slapin & Proksch, 2009b, p. 2; Slapin & Proksch, 2008, p. 705). It relies on the assumption that word frequencies are generated by a Poisson process (Slapin & Proksch, 2009b, pp. 1ff.). The Poisson distribution is relatively simple combining the mean and the variance into one parameter, λ, meaning that the frequency with which a word *j* is uttered by actor *i* is obtained on the basis of the distribution (Slapin & Proksch, 2009b, p. 2).

Functional Form of the Wordfish Model (Slapin & Proksch, 2008, p. 709):

$$y_{ij} \sim \text{Poisson}(\lambda_{ij}) \quad (1)$$

$$\lambda_{ij} = exp(\alpha_i + \varphi_j + \beta_j * \omega_i) \quad (2)$$

Y_{ij} is the count of word *j* in a document of actor *i* (Slapin & Proksch, 2009b, p. 2). α_i is an actor fixed effect and controls for the differences in length of the documents in use and φ_j is a word fixed effect which discriminates for words which are more frequently used in all documents, such as "and" or "the" (Schmitt, 2008, p. 114). ω is the party's position in document *i* and β represents the weight of the word *j*. The latter two unknown parameters are being estimated through the iterative expectation maximization algorithm producing estimates of the variables in question with a maximized likelihood (Slapin & Proksch, 2009b, p. 3). The Wordfish algorithm hence relies on three assumptions, which are one-dimensionality, conditional independence and the Poisson distribution of words (Lowe & Benoit, 2013, pp. 301ff.).

The one-dimensionality assumption supposes that the analyzed texts and the containing words express information on the explicit policy dimension one is interested in and that the relative frequencies of words convey this information (Slapin & Proksch, 2009a, p. 324; 2008, pp. 711f.). Lowe & Benoit (2013 p. 301) sees a threat in the multiple use of a single dimension's vocabulary. To avoid running into multi-dimensionality or including irrelevant information, a neat selection and processing of the used texts is essential to guarantee a

maximum certainty of outputs (Slapin & Proksch, 2009a, pp. 330f.). In this case study, one-dimensionality is not an issue since the submissions of the interest groups and the documents of the Commission are concerned with the proposed female quota only and are not compared across different cases or policy issues (Klüver, 2012a, p. 66). Also Baumgartner et al. (2009, pp. 6f.) back the one-dimensionality assumption since they found that concerning policy issues, typically two groups oppose each other, either being in favor or in disfavor of the issue in question. Also, Dür & De Bièvre (2007) found that in regulatory policies, it is most common that groups oppose each other on the topic (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007, 6) which in this case applies. Hence, the Wordfish assumption is believe to be met.

The conditional independence of words in a text is, according to Lowe & Benoit (2013, p. 301), a hardly compliable assumption. The Poisson distribution assumes that word occurrences are independent. However in the natural language, words correlate with each other what may lead to a parameter uncertainty underestimation in the analysis (Lowe & Benoit, 2013, p. 301). Being aware of the improbability that this assumption holds in the natural language, Slapin & Proksch (2008) conducted several tests using different distributions which more resembled the natural word use. All results highly correlated with each other which is why the simplified Poisson distribution is proven to be perfectly applicable (Slapin & Proksch, 2008, p. 716).

Another often criticized threat to the model is its ignorance of word meaning. Slapin & Proksch (2009a) give example sentences where the meaning is converse, but the word counts are exactly the same: *"'We are against lowering taxes, and for tax increases' and 'We are for lowering taxes, and against tax increases'"* (Slapin & Proksch, 2009a, p. 324). To easily solve this issue, a large dataset with long documents should be selected to guarantee accurate estimate results (Slapin & Proksch, 2009a, pp. 324, 326). The overall efficiency of Wordfish is also confirmed by studies of Klüver (2009) and Slapin & Proksch (2008) which show high validity of Wordfish results compared to expert or hand-coded results. However, Grimmer & Stewart (2013, p. 294) stress the necessity of a linguistic ideological dominance in the texts in use. If the ideological assumption does not hold, Wordfish may produce erroneous results. Hence to keep the preconditions of Wordfish, careful considerations prior the analysis are essential (ibid.).

To run Wordfish in *R,* a word frequency matrix of word counts from the documents is needed (Slapin & Proksch, 2009a, p. 330). In this analysis, the program JFreq by Will Lowe is used to create word counts of each word in each document. To identify the model, the mean of all policy positions is set to zero and the standard deviation to one (Klüver, 2012b, p. 1121). While then locating policy positions of the Commission and interest groups, Wordfish does not predefine what the right or left end of the scale actually displays and *"it is up to the*

researcher to make an assessment […] based upon her knowledge of politics" (Slapin & Proksch, 2009a, p. 324).

3.3 Document Selection

To measure the influence of interest groups on the Commission's proposal of a female quota for corporate boards in 2012, documents of the Commission and the submissions of the interest groups are used as the dataset in this analysis. They can simple be downloaded from the Commission's website. The Commission's policy position pre-consultation is extracted on the basis of the Commission's (2012b, 2011) press releases *'European Commission weighs options to break the 'glass ceiling' for women on company boards'* and *'EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding meets European business leaders to push for more women in boardrooms',* which have been joint into one document. The Commission's position post-consultation is based on its *'Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures'* (2012c). The research's focus on the Commission as the primary lobby exertion spot is justified by Klüver (2011, p. 485). The Commission as the conductor of the consultation process embodied the main target for lobbyists to promote their own interests at the time. Also, the consultation phase is the instance of a law-making process where the underlying proposal is still most easily amendable which is why it can be expected that all relevant lobbying efforts are captured while assessing the consultation phase only (ibid.).

The policy preferences of the interest groups are determined by using their submitted contributions during the consultation. A total number of 312 contributions have been submitted, of which 163 were written in English, 89 in German, and 60 in other languages. As Wordfish works only for one language at a time, the English documents representing the largest dataset have been selected for the analysis assuming that they constitute a representative sample of all submissions. Of the 163 submissions, 21 had to be excluded as they were submitted by public bodies or individuals not meeting the applied interest group definition. Eleven have been duplications and two had to be excluded as they contained less than 200 words, which I considered to be too short, reducing the amount of useful submissions to 129. Together with the two documents serving to locate the Commission's position pre- and post-consultation, 131 documents are used in the analysis. All in all, 181 submitted documents have not been used. This, however, does not constitute a problem as Slapin & Proksch (2008, pp. 717f.) found that missing data is not significantly threatening confidential outcomes of a Wordfish analysis.

For Wordfish, it is vital that the type of data is textual and uses a similar language pool as the policy positions are extracted based on the frequency of words (Klüver, 2012b, p. 1121). Therefore, press releases and not for example EU Green Papers are considered as the latter

are written in a more formal and law-specific fashion which cannot similarly be expected of the language used in the interest groups' contributions. The directive proposal, although a legislative document, meets this requirement well.

The data has been processed, meaning numbers, currencies, and spelling mistakes have been removed manually. Also, British spelling has been changed to American spelling. Slapin & Proksch (2009a, p. 332) suggest stemming the words so that their morphological and inflexional endings are eliminated. Stemming aggregates textually resembling word which reduces the amount of unique words in the analysis making it more precise. However, compound words may also get cut short which could lead to an information loss (ibid.) Therefore, stemming was not performed.

Removing stop words or commonly used words from the matrix is another suggestion that Slapin & Proksch give to process the data. But as the Wordfish algorithm already discriminates against more frequently used words, this step has been omitted (Slapin & Proksch, 2009a, p. 325).

To test the external validity of the English position estimates, the German submissions are also analyzed. From the total number of 89 contributions in the German language, 19 had to be excluded due to non-compliance with the applied definition of an interest group reducing the amount of documents to 70. To locate the Commission's positions, the same texts (but in German) are used which are similarly used to determine the Commission's positions in the English dataset increasing the total amount of German documents to 72.

Furthermore, a validity check of the Wordfish estimates is included in the analysis. By drawing a random sample of 32 English documents, the policy positions of the selected interest groups are analyzed through hand-coding. Measurement validity is then tested by calculating the concordance correlation coefficient between the different estimates. To draw the sample, the documents of the German subset have been randomly ordered in Excel and the first 32 of the list have been selected for the analysis. To determine a policy position, I scrutinized the documents on the basis of 6 questions which are directly taken from the EU Commission's consultation questionnaire (European Commission 2012d):

(1) How effective is self-regulation by businesses to address the issue of gender imbalance in corporate boards in the EU?
(2) What additional action (self-regulatory / regulatory) should be taken to address the issue of gender imbalance in corporate boards in the EU?
(3) Which objectives (e.g. 20%, 30%, 40%, 60%) should be defined for the share of the underrepresented sex on company boards and for which timeframe? Should these objectives be binding or a recommendation? Why?
(4) Which companies (e.g. publicly listed / from a certain size) should be covered by such an initiative?
(5) Which boards/board members (executive / non-executive) should be covered by such an initiative?

(6) Should there be any sanctions applied to companies which do not meet the objectives? Should there be any exception for not reaching the objectives?

The questions (3) and (6) have been simplified focussing on the type of regulation (3) and the sanctions (6) only. The developed scoring scheme is as follows:

(1) effective = 0, not effective = 1
(2) no action = 0, self-regulatory = 0.5, either or = 0.75, regulatory = 1
(3) no quota = 0, flexi-non-binding quota = 0.25, non-binding quota = 0.5, flexi-binding quota = 0.75, binding quota = 1
(4) none = 0, some specific companies = 0.5, all companies = 1
(5) none = 0, executive boards = 0.5, non-executive boards = 0.5, both = 1
(6) sanctions: no = 0, yes = 1

Interest groups could score a maximum amount of six out of six points. The more their suggestions in the submissions are favoring a lawfully binding quota the higher they scored on each question. The average is then calculated by dividing the total scoring amount by six. Average scores <0.5 would be in disfavor of the female quota and average scores >0.5 would be in favor of the quota; 0.5 represents exactly the middle.

Manual coding entails, however, several threats which are the difficulty of validation, replication (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013, pp. 275, 292) in line with reliability (Klüver, 2009, p. 537). Problematic is that other humans may code the documents differently from me. However, hand-coding also brings advantages in terms of text interpretation. As textual data conveys meaningful information to which a computer is ignorant, reading might bring insightful conclusions which computers might disregard (Lowe & Benoit, 2013, p. 300). For the comparison of the results, a concordance correlation coefficient is calculated.

4. Analysis

4.1 The English Dataset

The centerpiece of this research is to detect successful interest group lobbying coalitions through locating their policy positions. Therefore, the seemingly most representative English dataset has been selected for the main analysis. The Commission's position prior the consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU' is expected to possibly shift after the consultation towards interest groups opposing the proposed female quota which are most likely business interests (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. 106; Yackee, 2006, p. 133).

The first research question asks for the policy position of the Commission pre- and post-consultation phase. Applying the English dataset to Wordfish, the program estimates all 131 document positions on a one-dimensional policy scale from -2 to +2 as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Wordfish Policy Position Scores of the English Subset[4]



The Commission's position pre-consultation (Commission 1) is estimated at -0.91904 and post-consultation (Commission 2) at -1.19662 indicated through the red marks. Wordfish does not predefine what the positive or the negative end of the scale constitutes (Slapin & Proksch, 2009a, p. 324). Therefore, I read through the most extreme documents on each end and found that a high negative Wordfish score is equivalent to a strong support of a female quota, whereas a high positive Wordfish score depicts a quota refusal of the respective interest group. Based on this information, the Commissions position pre-consultation (Commission 1) started off at a policy position already favoring the quota (-0.91904) which after the consultation (Commission 2) turned out to be even stronger (-1.19662). The standard error of the position measurement is with 0.043189 of Commission 1 and 0.018498 of Commission 2 considered to be very low which reveals high measurement accuracy. The policy position shift of the Commission is also considered significant as the confident interval of the policy position pre-consultation, which ranges from -1.0036903 to -0.83439, does not overlap with the confidence interval of the position post-consultation, which ranges from -1.2328782 to -1.16037.

The second research question is concerned with the types of participating interest groups and their policy positions. Figure 5 displays an overview of the kinds of organizations which submitted a comment during the consultation. The majority of interest groups are either associations or companies. The classification was based on the interest groups' names if it directly indicated its organization, e.g. the *Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry* was categorized as an association. If not directly apparent, I applied specific definitions to assign each group to a category (see appendix, pp. 33ff.).

Almost all interest groups could be directly associated with business interests and just 20 of

[4] For the Wordfish document positioning results of the English dataset see appendix pp. 38ff.

Figure 5: Types of Interest Groups within the English Subset



the total 129 interest groups can be considered as not primarily and exclusively being concerned with business, but rather with research, human rights issues etc. In respect thereof, one cannot as expected say that business interest groups automatically oppose the quota. As nearly all interest groups are pursuing some kind of business interest, there is almost an equal amount of interest groups either supporting or opposing the quota. 72 of the 129 participating interest groups are in favor (all negative Wordfish scores) and 75 in disfavor of a female legal quota (all positive Wordfish scores).

To answer research question three, which was to detect successfully lobbying interest groups, the Commission's first policy position, Commission 1, is used as the cut-off point and parts the variation into two lobbying camps as displayed in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Lobbying Coalitions of the English Subset and the Commission's Position Shift



Coalition B mostly representing the contra-quota camp is more than 3.5 times larger than Coalition A. According to Küver (2012b, p. 1128), who found that the larger the lobbying camp the likelier the event of lobbying success of that particular camp, Coalition B was expected to be successful. To recall, success is defined as the smaller distance of an interest group's position to the Commission's policy position post-consultation compared to pre-

consultation (Klüver, 2011, p. 493). However as Figure 4 and 6 reveal, the Commission moved its position even further to the left end of the scale (-1.19662) which means towards the smaller Coalition A. Contrary to Klüver's (2011) findings, the smaller lobbying Coalition A supporting a female quota probably managed to outlobby the significantly larger Coalition B. Therefore, it might be the case that the larger lobbying group was not necessarily the more powerful coalition. However, additional factors might be a (co-)reason for this specific outcome. Table 1 displays the ten most pro-quota lobbying interest groups of Coalition A which are to be considered successful according to the Commission's position shift.

Table 1: Ten Most Pro-Quota Lobbying Interest Groups of the English Subset

Documents (Estimated Position)	Interest Group	Characteristics[5]
DO102 (-1.55599)	International Federation of Business and Professional Women	EU business organization, operating in over 100 countries, more than 250,000 members
DO121 (-1.52542)	Portuguese Platform for Women's Rights	Portuguese non-governmental civil society organization, more than 2,500 member organisations in 30 countries
DO84 (-1.50972)	Foundation for Research in Law and Business	Spanish civil society network
DO2 (-1.47362)	Syntec Numérique	French professionals' association, 1,200 members and 4.4 m Euro budget in 2013
DO88 (-1.45897)	Gender Sociology Department of Czech Republic	Czech academy of science, governmental organization; one of the oldest sociological centers in Europe and educates more than 4,300 students
DO54 (-1.41525)	Deloitte	British professional service firm; US$ 32.41 bn budget and 203,000 employees in 2013
DO34 (-1.35820)	Centre for Regional Policy Research and Cooperation 'Studiorum'	Macedonian non-governmental think tank; five employees
DO49 (-1.31893)	Danish Employers' Association of the Financial Sector	Danish employers' association; members are 189 Danish firms
DO73 (-1.31271)	European Trade Union Confederation	European Confederation of trade unions; 60 m members from 36 countries
DO70 (-1.31006)	European Professional Women's Network Lisbon	Portuguese women's network of professionals; 340 voluntary members

The table reveals that these successful interest groups are different in their type of organization, nationality, and subject matter. Also in terms of budget and numbers of employees (if it was accessible on their websites), the interest groups cannot be patterned. This indicates that internal characteristics such as resources and the organization as well as interest type may not be so decisive for successful lobbying as it was assumed by Dür (2008), Bouwen (2004), and the assumptions of coporatism theory.

[5] Information is extracted from the interest groups' homepages.

4.2 The German Dataset

To check if this outcome is representative for the overall dataset, the next section analogously analyzes the German dataset including 72 documents. Figure 7 displayes the Wordfish results which in contrast to the English set show a reversed position shift of the Commission.

Figure 7: Wordfish Policy Position Scores of the German Subset[6]



The Commission's position pre-consultation, Commission 1, was estimated at -1.045061 and post-consultation, Commission 2, at 0.4226 with a low standard error of 0.03159 and 0.02669 respectively. The shift has additionally proven to be significant. Equivalent to the English subset, the negative Wordfish scores represent the pro-quota lobbying camp, whereas the positive scores represent the contra-quota lobbying camp. In this case, the Commission's initial position was firstly in favor of a quota which turned into the contrary post-consultation as becomes also visible in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Lobbying Coalitions of the German Subset and the Commission's Position Shift



The Commission's pre-consultation policy position (Commission 1) divides the distribution into Coalition C and D in a ratio 1:6. The Commission shifted its position towards the right,

[6] For the Wordfish document positioning results of the German dataset see appendix pp. 46ff.

positive end of the issue dimension representing the interest groups lobbying in disfavor of a quota. Consequently, the larger Coalition D was successful compared to the smaller Coalition C as indicated through the theoretical assumptions. What these reversed results uncover is that neither the English nor the German subset can be considered as representative for the whole dataset of the contributions submitted during the consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in Corporate Boards in the EU'.

To assess whether the Wordfish scores are valid findings, I drew a random sample of 32 English interest group submissions and coded their policy positions manually through in-depth reading of the documents (coding scheme see section 3.3). An interest group was able to receive a maximum amount of six points which would equal an overall approval of a legally binding female quota for all EU companies and their executive as well as non-executive boards. Based on a scoring scheme by Thomson (2011, p. 89), documents with an average score >0.5 are labelled with a pro-quota disposition (short: 'Pro'). Answers that supported no quota or action on EU level at all were graded with zero. Therefore, documents with an average score <0.5 are labelled as the contra-quota lobbying camp (short: 'Contra'). Documents with an average score of 0.5 represent the exact middle. Assuming every question has the same weight, the average policy score is then calculated by dividing the sum of each interest group's single scores on each question by the total amount of questions, that is six. Table 2 shows the coding results:

Table 2: Manual Coding of 32 Randomly Selected English Documents

Interest Group[7]	Q: (1)	Q: (2)	Q: (3)	Q: (4)	Q: (5)	Q: (6)	Total/ Average	WF Estimate	Manual Coding	Word-fish
1.	0	0.5	0.25	0.5	1	0	2.25/ 0.375	1.15830	Contra	Contra
2.	1	0	1	0.5	1	1	4.5/ 0.75	-0.48682	Pro	Pro
3.	0	0	0	0.5	1	0	1.5/ 0.25	-0.57425	Contra	Pro
4.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-0.11581	Pro	Pro
5.	1	1	1	0.5	1	0	4.5/ 0.75	-1.11983	Pro	Pro
6.	1	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	5/ 0.83	1.64600	Pro	Contra
7.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-1.28654	Pro	Pro
8.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-1.18930	Pro	Pro
9.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-1.45897	Pro	Pro
10.	0	0.5	0	0	0.5	0	1/ 0.17	-0.61692	Contra	Pro
11.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-0.92681	Pro	Pro
12.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/ 0	0.09935	Contra	Contra
13.	0	0.5	0	0.5	1	0	2/ 0.33	-0.37440	Contra	Pro
14.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-0.97829	Pro	Pro

[7] For the assignment code of the interest groups see appendix p. 49ff.

15.	1	1	1	1	1	1	6/ 1	-0.78468	Pro	Pro
16.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-0.96431	Pro	Pro
17.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	1.07873	Pro	Contra
18.	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5/ 0.083	-0.50801	Contra	Pro
19.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-0.91880	Pro	Pro
20.	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	0	2.5/ 0.42	1.29726	Contra	Contra
21.	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	3/ 0.5	1.38270	Middle	Contra
22.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-1.47362	Pro	Pro
23.	1	0.75	0.75	1	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	0.15607	Pro	Contra
24.	0	0.5	1	1	1	0	3.5/ 0.58	-0.08995	Pro	Pro
25.	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	2/ 0.33	1.43838	Contra	Contra
26.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/ 0	0.48626	Contra	Contra
27.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/ 0	-0.24504	Contra	Pro
28.	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	4/ 0.67	-0.09687	Pro	Pro
29.	0	0	0.25	0.5	0.5	0	1.25/ 0.21	-0.80857	Contra	Pro
30.	0	0	0.25	0.5	0.5	0	1.25/ 0.21	-0.67024	Contra	Pro
31.	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	5.5/ 0.92	-0.82540	Pro	Pro
32.	1	0.5	0.75	0.5	1	0	3.75/ 0.63	-0.68834	Pro	Pro

The last four columns of Table 2 contrast the findings of the Wordfish and hand-coded results. Of the overall 32 documents, the Wordfish and the manual coding results match 21 times in terms of the interest group's assignment in either pro- or contra-quota category. The results did not match in 11 cases which are represented by the lines highlighted in grey. Additionally, the concordance correlation coefficient p_c between the hand-coded and Wordfish results was calculated which takes into account the measurement precision (Pearson correlation coefficient, p) and accuracy (C_b) (MedCalc, 2014). C_b was calculated at 0.98 which indicates no systematical over- or underestimation of the positions through Wordfish. The measurement precision p with 0.3 and the concordance correlation coefficient p_c with 0.29 is, however, a discouraging result. The correlation and hence the validity of the Wordfish estimates are to be seen as very low.

5. Conclusions

The separate analysis of the German and English dataset reveals that nationality might have an effect on Wordfish outcomes. Locating the policy positions on the quota issue dimension via Wordfish revealed that within the English dataset the distribution of interest groups is outbalanced in numbers by the contra-quota lobbying coalition. This effect was even more distinct within the German subset. However, the lobbying success determination according to the theory proved to be contradictory in the two datasets. Whereas the smaller, pro-quota

Coalition A lobbied successfully in the English subset, the larger, contra-quota Coalition D lobbied successfully in the German subset.

Concerning the interest groups' nationality, the English subset is comprised of a great variety. Although the majority of comments came from British interest groups, the variation remains quite balanced (see Figure 3). Contrarily, the German subset, though containing one comment of a Swiss[8] interest group and five comments of Austrian[9] interest groups, predominantly consists of submissions by interest groups coming from Germany. Therefore, it might be the case that German interest groups due to their special national character might have evaluated the same policy proposal on a legally binding female quota differently than interest groups from other countries captured in the English dataset. This outcome is to be regarded as an insightful result with respect to other studies researching interest group influence and utilizing an English subset only to draw inferences from the overall dataset.

With regard to the first research question, *What is the policy position of the European Commission pre and post the consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU'?,* it is clear that the Commission started off at a position in favor of the quota indicated by similar Wordfish scores of the English (-0.91904) and German subset (-1.045061). What remains unclear is the Commission's policy position post-consultation. Analyzing the English documents, the Commission moved its position further to the pro-quota end (-1.19662), whereas its position moved to the contra-quota end with regard to the German documents (0.4226). A reason for this inconsistency next to the nationality aspect could be the difference in proportion of the pro- and contra-quota interest group coalitions. The ratios in both subsets credited the contra-quota camp, which was 1:3.5 in the English and almost twice as high, 1:6, in the German dataset. The higher number of interest groups negating the quota within the German dataset might have prompted the Wordfish algorithm to evaluate words more in disfavor of the legislative proposal than compared to the English subset. However, as the German sample is smaller in terms of the total amount of documents in use (72 compared to the English set of 131), it is less likely that the findings of the German data analysis hold for the overall dataset. It might be assumed with more, but no certain confidence that the results of the English data analysis could rather be treated as a trend for the overall dataset.

In respect of research question two, *What types of interest groups participated in the consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU' and where are their policy positions located?,* and with regard to the contributions in English, the consultation participants showed a relatively great variety in terms of nationality as well as organization type (Figure 3, 5). The expectation that the quota-opposing lobbying camp is supposedly

[8] Swiss interest group: Vereinigung Schweizer Unternehmen in Deutschland

[9] Austrian interest groups: Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, Paneuropabewegung Österreich, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, KAV-Fraueninitiative, Industriellenvereinigung.

composed of business interest groups did not hold. Nearly all participating interest groups could be associated with pursuing some kind of business interest and were almost equally distributed between the quota-opposing (75 positive Wordfish scores) or supporting camp (72 negative Wordfish scores). Also, the assumptions of corporatism theory (particular types of groups with special interests are more decisive than others) were not distinctly met.

The assessment of the last research question, *Which interest groups profited from the position (non-) shift and influenced the Commission successfully?,* remains the most interesting and yet difficult. The theoretical assumptions of Klüver (2012b, p. 1128), who found that the larger lobbying coalition would be the successful one, did not hold in both analyzed datasets. Furthermore, it seems doubtful to consider a whole lobbying coalition successful as suggested by Klüver (2012b, p. 1122), because in both datasets there are some interest groups which, though belonging to the successful lobbying coalition, recorded an increase in the distance of their policy position to the Commission's final policy position.
Within the English subset, the successful Coalition A consisted of 28 interest groups, but after close scrutiny only 19 of them actually decreased the distance of their positions to the Commission's position post-consultation compared to pre-consultation. Similar observations hold within the German subset. Here, Coalition D is considered successful which contains of 60 interest groups. But when calculating the distance decrease, only 50 interest groups of the respective coalition actually managed to get closer to the Commission's policy position. Another way to determine successfully lobbying interest groups could be to look at the confidence intervals of the Wordfish estimates. The interest groups of whom the confidence intervals with the Commission's position do not overlap pre-consultation, but post-consultation are those which could be considered successful. However, this requires valid estimates in the first place and leaves room for further research.

What can be generally extracted from these findings? Although a generalization of the findings from the English dataset is not applicable, it might be treated as an indication of the actual policy position shift of the Commission due to its larger sample size. In respect thereof, the findings might uncover that the small lobbying coalition favoring a legally binding quota might have been able to outlobby the larger contra-quota lobbying coalition. With respect to the Commission's final position estimated by Wordfish, this outcome seems realistic as the Commission actually proposed a female 40% quota for non-executive boards in publicly listed companies excluding small and medium enterprises in November 2012 (European Commission, 2012e). This proposal was then also supported by the EU Parliament one year later (European Commission, 2012b).
Nevertheless, the findings are to be treated with caution. The robustness check conducted through the calculation of the concordance correlation coefficient between the Wordfish and hand-coded policy position scores yielded a 0.29 correlation only.

6. Limitations

6.1 Internal Validity

A threat to the internal validity of the study is its lack of a counterfactual analysis (Gerring & McDermott, 2007, p. 694). One may not be sure if influence of interest groups is really measured as there is no possibility to obtain the Commission's decision on the female quota without having listened to the public opinion. The possibility remains that the Commission changed its mind because of some other reason unrelated to the lobbying effort of interest groups. Due to the special situation of the consultation, however, one can be relatively confident that the Commission assessed the facts on a binding female quota and formed an opinion in coherence with concerned EU entities, such as the Parliament and Council, before launching the consultation. Therefore, changes in the opinion might be to a high degree a reason of lobbyism.

6.2 External Validity

An additional limitation might be the restricted generalizability of the research's findings. The outcomes of the English subset are hardly generalizable to German or other language documents. Furthermore, the case cannot be easily compared across other cases. The conducted study at hand, however, did not primarily aim at generating generalizable results as it dealt with a rather specific topic which led to specific case related results. Nevertheless, the converse results of the two subsets constitute a burden to the analysis.

6.3 Measurement Validity

The major issue in this analysis is the measurement of influence. The exclusion of other reasons than direct lobbying which could have led to a position shift of the Commission is limiting causal inferences (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007, pp. 7-8). A further source of criticism is the major simplification of the concept capturing lobbyism. Indirect lobbyism or the exaggeration of preferences (as commonly used in political bargaining situations according to Dür & De Bièvre, 2007) remains disregarded. Furthermore, it could be problematic that the model excludes organizations which didn't submit a comment.

When focusing on this particular EU consultation on gender equality proposing hard law, it can be assumed, however, that long-term strategies of interest groups most likely match their preference expressions and that all relevant actors actually participated during consultation phase.

Additionally, the research's sole focus on the Commission as the only spot of lobby exertion might be rated as insufficient. This is alleviated, though, by Thomson (2011) who claims that depending on the decision-making procedure *"the Commission can […] ensure that decision*

outcomes are as close as possible to its policy preferences" (Thomson, 2011, p. 79). And as the consultation issue is based on the Community method, the Commission embodies the most empowered legal actor in the process and it can be assumed that the majority of lobbying efforts are primarily directed towards the institution.

Nevertheless, the weak correlation between manually and computerized positioning results constitutes a great limiting factor to the study. It either indicates that the manual or the Wordfish coding was not highly accurate. This, however, cannot be pinned down further in the given framework of the thesis.

7. Outlook

This research aimed at uncovering successful lobbying coalitions of interest groups during the public consultation on 'Gender Imbalance in corporate Boards in the EU' conducted by the European Commission in 2012. Applying computerized text analysis through Wordfish, the submitted contributions of the participating interest groups and press releases as well as a legislative proposal of the Commission are used to locate their policy positions on the one-dimensional issue scale either favoring or disfavoring a female quota for corporate boards in the EU. The determination of the Commission's and interest groups' policy positions is essential to examine successful lobbyism defined by a decrease in the distance of the institution's and interest groups' policy positions after consultation compared to prior consultation.

What this study indicates is that the interest group's nationality might play a role in evaluating EU gender questions and not so much internal characteristics or type of actors as often indicated through the literature (Mahoney, 2007, p. 41; Dür & De Bièvre, 2007, p. 6). The difference in outcome of the German and English subset analysis suggests that drawing on the English contributions during an EU consultation only might produce results which do not hold for the overall dataset. This assumption could lead the way to further research in this particular realm. Also important to note is the low concordance correlation of 0.29 between the hand-coded and Wordfish results which might indicate that Wordfish is not the most appropriate measure to locate latent policy positions after all. This should be tested more extensively in subsequent studies.

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Appendix

A. Interest Group Categorization Scheme and Listing of the English Subset (Figure 3 and 5)

Category Definitions:

If indicated in the interest groups' names, they are categorized accordingly; otherwise definitions below apply:

An association is an organization of people or groups of people to pursue a certain purpose (e.g. confederations).

A company is any kind of company (e.g. banks, firms, non- or for-profit companies).
Networks are chambers of commerce, groups of organizations/ associations/ companies.

A governmental organization is any organization founded and/or set up by the government (e.g. universities, expert groups).

An international organization is an organization of global importance which is acting globally and is including international members (not just European).

A trade union is either a common trade union or a group of trade unions.

Interest Group	Explanation of Organization	Country of Origin	Operational Level	Category
30 Percent Club	Group of Organizations and Chairmen	UK	International	Network
Aberdeen Asset Management	Global Investment Management Company	UK	International	Company
Akava	Confederation of Unions for Professional and Managerial Staff in Finland	FI	National	Trade Union
Amanda Bolt Associations	Company	UK	International	Company
American Chamber of Commerce	Chamber of Commerce	FR	International	Network
An inspirational Journey	Company	UK	National	Company
ArcelorMittal	Steel and Mining Company	LU	International	Company
Association of British Insurers	Association of British Insurers	UK	National	Association
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants	Association of Chartered Certified Accountants	UK	International	Association
Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry	Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry	EU	International	Association
Association of Mutual Insurers and Insurance Cooperatives in Europe	Companies' Association	EU	International	Association
Aviva	Company	UK	International	Company
BASF	Company	DE	International	Company
BDO Accountancy	Company	UK	International	Company
BlackRock	Investment Management Company	UK	International	Company

BP Global	Company	Global	International	Company
British Bankers' Association	Bankers' Association	UK	International	Association
British Psychological Society	Registered Charity	UK	International	Charity
Business Europe	Business Association	EU	International	Association
Capita Registrars	Company	IE	International	Company
Catalyst	Non-profit Women's Association	Global	International	Association
CEC	European Managers' Organization	EU	International	Association
CEEMET	Council of European Employers of Metal, Engineering and Technology-based Industries	EU	International	Employers' Organization
Centre for Regional Policy Research and Cooperation 'Studiorum'	Non-governmental Think Tank	MK	National	Network
Centro Studi	Non-profit Association	IT	International	Association
Cocéa	Insurance Company Group	FR	International	Company
Concreta-Mente	Civil Society Organization	IT	National	Civil Society Organization
Confederation of Finnish Industries	Business Organization	FI	National	Association
Confederation of Swedish Enterprises	Business Organization	SE	National	Association
Co-operative Asset Management (TCAM)	Investment Management Enterprise	UK	National	Company
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI)	Union of Cypriot Businessmen	CY	International	Network
Cyprus Women's lobby	Cypriot Network of Women's and non-governmental Organizations	CY	International	Network
Czech Savings Bank	Retail Bank	CZ	National	Company
DAC Beachcroft	Law Firm	UK	International	Company
Danish Committee on Corporate Governance	Danish Committee on Corporate Governance	DK	International	Network
Danish Employers' Association of the Financial Sector	Employers' Association	DK	National	Employers' Organization
Danish Institute for Human Rights	Institute for Human Rights	DK	National	Governmental Organization
Danish Shareholders' Association	Organization Representing Private Investors in Denmark	DK	International	Association
Danish Society of Engineers (IDA)	Business Association	DK	International	Trade Union
Danish Shipowners' Association	Danish Industry Association	DK	International	Association
Danish Society of Engineers (IDA)	Danish Trade Union	DK	International	Trade Union
Deloitte	Professional Service Firm	UK	International	Company
DI Confederation of Danish Industry	Business Organization	DK	International	Association
Institute of Directors in Ireland (IoD)	Irish Representative of Business Professionals	IE	National	Association
Directors' Institute of Finland	Finnish Association for	FI	National	Association

	Board Professional			
EIRIS Foundation	Charity	UK	National	Foundation
Employment Lawyers' Association	Lawyers' Association	UK	International	Association
EPP Women	European Civil Society Organization	EU	International	Association
Ernst & Young	Firm	UK	International	Company
Eumedion	Foundation	NL	International	Foundation
EuroCommerce	Retail, Wholesale and International Trade Sectors	EU	International	Association
European Banking Federation	European Banking Associations	EU	International	Association
European Centre for Women and Technology (ECWT)	European Multi-Stakeholder Partnership	EU	International	Network
European Confederation of Directors' Associations (ecoDa)	European Not-for-Profit Business Association	EU	International	Network
European Network for Women in Leadership (WIL)	Civil Society Organization	EU	International	Civil Society Organization
European Professional Women's Network Lisbon	Portuguese Women's Network of Professionals	PT	International	Network
European Professional Women's network London	British Women's Network of Professionals	UK	International	Network
European Professional Women's Network-Amsterdam	Dutch Non-Profit Organization	NL	International	Network
European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT)	European Association	EU	International	Association
European Sustainable Investment Forum	Pan-European Network	EU	International	Network
Trade Union Confederation	European Confederation of Trade Union Organizations and Federations	EU	International	Trade Union
European Women Lawyers Association (EWLA)	Non-Profit Making International Non-Governmental Organization	EU	International	Association
European Women's Lobby (EWL)	Organization of European Women's Associations	EU	International	Network
Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)	Partnership of Independent Local Market Experts	UK	International	Network
F& C Investments	Asset Management Firm	UK	International	Company
Federation of Businesswomen Association from the Mediterranean	Spanish Business Association	ES	International	Network
Fempower	German private Consulting and Lobbying Organization	DE	International	Company
Finland Chamber of Commerce	Finnish Business Association	FI	International	Network
Finnish Federation of University Women	Organization of Finnish Female University Graduates	FI	International	Network

Fondazione A. J. Zaninoni	Italian Recognized Foundation	IT	National	Foundation
Foro del Buen Gobierno y Accionariado	Research and Academic Institution	ES	National	Company
Foundation for Research in Law and Business (FIDE)	Spanish Civil Society Network	ES	National	Foundation
Fredrika-Bremer-Förderbundet	Women's Rights Organization	SE	National	Association
GC100 Group	Unincorporated Members' Association Administered by the Practical Law Company Limited	UK	International	Association
Gender & Sociology Department of the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic	Czech Academy of Science	CZ	National	Governmental Organization
Gender Equality Project	Swiss Foundation	CH	International	Foundation
Genderatwork	Global Research and Consultancy Non-Profit Firm	Global	International	Company
GSK	Global Healthcare Company	Global	International	Company
Henkel	Firm	DE	International	Company
Hermes Equity Ownership Services	Asset Firm	UK	International	Company
Highland Opportunity Ltd	Company	UK	National	Company
Art and Science of Board Effectiveness, Development and Transition (IDDAS)	International Organization	Global	International	Network
Ingersoll Rand International Ltd	Company	IE	International	Company
INSEAD	International Graduate Business Schools	Global	International	Business School
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW)	Professional Accountancy Organization	UK	International	Association
Institute for Chartered Secretaries and Administrators UK	Institute for Chartered Secretaries and Administrators	UK	National	Association
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS)	Professional Organization	UK	International	Association
Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators Ireland	Business Organization	IE	International	Association
Cranfield International Center for Women Leaders	British Research Center within the School of Management at Cranfield University	UK	International	Governmental Organization
Federation of Business and Professional Women Europe (BPW Europe)	Business Organization	EU	International	Network
Irish Business Employers' Confederation	Business and Employers' Organization	IE	International	Employers' Organization
KPMG	Company	UK	National	Company
Law Society of England and Wales	Professional Association	UK	International	Association
Leaderful Women Project	Research Organization	UK	International	Association
Legal & General Group	Financial Services	UK	National	Company

	Company			
Local Authority Pension Fund Forum	Collaborative Shareholder Engagement Group	UK	National	Network
London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG)	International Exchange Group in Financial Sector	UK	International	Network
Lord Davies & Steering Groups	Groups of Experts set up by the British Government to Monitor Progress	UK	National	Governmental Organization
ADE Vallès	Civil Society Organization	ES	National	Civil Society Organization
The Mentoring Foundation	British Organization	UK	International	Foundation
NASDAQ OMX Group	Asset Trade Company	Global	International	Company
National Employment Saving Trust (Nest)	Defined Contribution Workplace Pension Scheme	UK	National	Governmental Organization
National Women's Council of Ireland (NWCI)	Organization	IE	National	Association
Noi Rete Donne	Women's Network	IT	National	Network
Novo Nordisk	Healthcare Company	Global	International	Company
Opportunity Now	Employer's Organization	UK	National	Employer's Organization
Euroshareholders	Organization of European Shareholders Associations	EU	International	Network
Passage	Advocacy Service Association	NL	National	Association
Portuguese Platform for Women's Rights	Portuguese Non-Governmental Organization	PT	International	Civil Society Organization
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP	Professional Service Company	UK	National	Company
The Professional Boards' Forum	Staff Recruiting	NO	International	Company
Professional Women Association of Milan	Women's Association	IT	International	Association
Quoted Companies Alliance	International Organization	Global	International	International Organization
Rolls-Royce	Company	UK	International	Company
Scotland Europe	European Organization	EU	International	Association
Securities Market Association	Finnish Cooperation Association	FI	National	Association
Shire plc	Biopharmaceutical Company	UK	International	Company
SIS-Social Innovation Society	Italian Civil Society Organization	IT	National	Civil Society Organization
Sodexo	Company	FR	International	Company
SONAE SGPS	Company	PT	International	Company
Syntec Numérique	Professionals' Association	FR	International	Association
Trades Union Congress (TUC)	Trade Union Centre	UK	National	Trade Union
European Association of Craft, small and medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME)	European Employers' Organization	EU	International	Employers' Organization
United Nations Team in	International	Global	International	International

Brussels	Organization			Organization
Valore D (Donne al Vertice per l'Azienda di Domani)	Italian Companys' Association	IT	National	Association
Women Capital	Company	NL	International	Company
Women in Aerospace Europe (WIA-E)	European Organization	EU	International	Network
Women's Council in Denmark	Women's Civil Society Organization	DK	National	Civil Society Organization
WomenCEO	Women's Civil Society Organization	ES	International	Civil Society Organization
Unión Sindical Obrera	Worker's Tade Union	ES	National	Trade Union

B. Wordfish Results

a) Wordfish Results of the English Subset

Documents	Estimate	Standard Error	Lower	Upper
DO1	-0.72021	0.081519	-0.8799818	-0.56043
DO2	-1.47362	0.023699	-1.5200685	-1.42717
DO3	-1.28654	0.032197	-1.3496496	-1.22344
DO4	-0.80857	0.062443	-0.9309538	-0.68618
DO5	-0.92681	0.065396	-1.0549854	-0.79864
DO6	-0.59528	0.052886	-0.6989317	-0.49162
DO7	-0.48682	0.094621	-0.6722745	-0.30137
DO8	-0.55932	0.049982	-0.6572832	-0.46136
DO9	-0.82540	0.074420	-0.9712566	-0.67954
DO10	-0.07808	0.054922	-0.1857284	0.02956
DO11	-0.58759	0.117385	-0.8176564	-0.35752
DO12	1.43838	0.018708	1.4017156	1.47505
DO13	1.34852	0.046772	1.2568479	1.44019
DO14	0.97875	0.065764	0.8498528	1.10764
DO15	-0.74030	0.121746	-0.9789184	-0.50168
DO16	1.00278	0.072280	0.8611136	1.14444
DO17	-0.08995	0.099021	-0.2840259	0.10413
DO18	1.14988	0.032781	1.0856350	1.21413
DO19	0.57523	0.070168	0.4377062	0.71276
DO20	-0.96668	0.049549	-1.0637912	-0.86956
DO21	-0.90934	0.082064	-1.0701865	-0.74850
DO22	1.29726	0.036255	1.2262002	1.36832
DO23	-0.22565	0.116504	-0.4539968	0.00269
DO24	1.40412	0.030062	1.3451954	1.46304
DO25	1.37931	0.026534	1.3273018	1.43131
DO26	1.51342	0.037678	1.4395686	1.58727
DO27	1.62184	0.008087	1.6059906	1.63769
DO28	1.51665	0.010457	1.4961599	1.53715
DO29	-0.61692	0.076720	-0.7672930	-0.46656
DO30	1.39554	0.031183	1.3344173	1.45665
DO31	0.78968	0.116878	0.5606023	1.01876
DO32	-0.89171	0.057415	-1.0042390	-0.77918
DO33	-0.50801	0.090844	-0.6860648	-0.32996
DO34	-1.35820	0.018318	-1.3941017	-1.32230
DO35	-1.17598	0.062451	-1.2983790	-1.05357

DO36	-1.18313	0.055622	-1.2921439	-1.07411
DO37	-1.19662	0.018498	-1.2328782	-1.16037
DO38	-0.91904	0.043189	-1.0036903	-0.83439
DO39	1.64600	0.004994	1.6362140	1.65579
DO40	-0.88969	0.077618	-1.0418189	-0.73756
DO41	-0.53954	0.080311	-0.6969435	-0.38213
DO42	-1.10111	0.084763	-1.2672423	-0.93498
DO43	1.42965	0.019877	1.3906944	1.46861
DO44	-0.22745	0.132046	-0.4862575	0.03135
DO45	-0.96431	0.066322	-1.0942963	-0.83432
DO46	-0.62786	0.064895	-0.7550469	-0.50066
DO47	0.63834	0.087306	0.4672198	0.80945
DO48	-0.57425	0.085014	-0.7408734	-0.40763
DO49	-1.31893	0.071279	-1.4586332	-1.17922
DO50	-1.27317	0.046090	-1.3635083	-1.18284
DO51	-0.81784	0.083288	-0.9810861	-0.65460
DO52	-0.67024	0.115684	-0.8969808	-0.44351
DO53	-0.92471	0.091937	-1.1049029	-0.74452
DO54	-1.41525	0.017042	-1.4486530	-1.38185
DO55	-0.43067	0.069390	-0.5666709	-0.29467
DO56	1.08988	0.046996	0.9977646	1.18199
DO57	-0.27472	0.067836	-0.4076776	-0.14176
DO58	1.01449	0.048730	0.9189774	1.11000
DO59	1.09737	0.021561	1.0551150	1.13963
DO60	-1.11983	0.059075	-1.2356158	-1.00404
DO61	1.06005	0.057256	0.9478300	1.17227
DO62	1.20981	0.059845	1.0925172	1.32710
DO63	-0.72466	0.062006	-0.8461916	-0.60313
DO64	-0.31142	0.080065	-0.4683424	-0.15449
DO65	-0.78468	0.081522	-0.9444588	-0.62490
DO66	-0.74864	0.056378	-0.8591365	-0.63814
DO67	-0.68834	0.060389	-0.8067001	-0.56998
DO68	0.15607	0.079578	0.0000995	0.31204
DO69	-0.75291	0.081830	-0.9132934	-0.59253
DO70	-1.31006	0.033037	-1.3748124	-1.24531
DO71	-0.60519	0.097427	-0.7961387	-0.41423
DO72	-0.80493	0.065332	-0.9329824	-0.67689
DO73	-1.31271	0.030497	-1.3724847	-1.25294
DO74	-1.05506	0.060040	-1.1727337	-0.93738
DO75	-1.18930	0.027980	-1.2441348	-1.13446
DO76	0.04197	0.096818	-0.1477940	0.23172
DO77	1.58446	0.008598	1.5676059	1.60131
DO78	-0.82784	0.088375	-1.0010525	-0.65463
DO79	-1.19054	0.063239	-1.3144903	-1.06660
DO80	-0.68781	0.058631	-0.8027281	-0.57290
DO81	-0.65072	0.118288	-0.8825575	-0.41888
DO82	-0.98577	0.079019	-1.1406431	-0.83090
DO83	-1.10113	0.067348	-1.2331329	-0.96913
DO84	-1.50972	0.011796	-1.5328431	-1.48660
DO85	-0.09687	0.183394	-0.4563142	0.26258
DO86	1.03278	0.054417	0.9261262	1.13944
DO87	0.23966	0.091982	0.0593746	0.41994

DO88	-1.45897	0.027777	-1.5134152	-1.40453
DO89	-0.44468	0.105066	-0.6506050	-0.23875
DO90	1.07811	0.067905	0.9450146	1.21120
DO91	0.09935	0.131164	-0.1577215	0.35643
DO92	0.94757	0.070174	0.8100360	1.08511
DO93	0.08865	0.124772	-0.1558948	0.33320
DO94	0.51158	0.103321	0.3090695	0.71408
DO95	0.26405	0.115130	0.0384023	0.48970
DO96	0.86470	0.042327	0.7817420	0.94766
DO97	0.85580	0.084299	0.6905741	1.02102
DO98	1.12165	0.049098	1.0254207	1.21788
DO99	1.05208	0.052806	0.9485805	1.15558
DO100	1.07569	0.058630	0.9607757	1.19060
DO101	1.39191	0.029190	1.3346970	1.44912
DO102	-1.55599	0.010209	-1.5759957	-1.53598
DO103	0.48626	0.072313	0.3445257	0.62799
DO104	1.37229	0.044422	1.2852254	1.45936
DO105	0.69553	0.045595	0.6061680	0.78490
DO106	1.59628	0.020366	1.5563670	1.63620
DO107	1.12112	0.063776	0.9961205	1.24612
DO108	1.47859	0.034737	1.4105040	1.54667
DO109	0.97483	0.043777	0.8890253	1.06063
DO110	1.37368	0.034332	1.3063914	1.44097
DO111	-0.97622	0.081101	-1.1351771	-0.81727
DO112	1.39818	0.029006	1.3413269	1.45503
DO113	-0.24504	0.083442	-0.4085858	-0.08150
DO114	1.38270	0.020306	1.3429042	1.42250
DO115	1.07873	0.049592	0.9815285	1.17592
DO116	-0.91880	0.080443	-1.0764614	-0.76113
DO117	-0.37440	0.069055	-0.5097486	-0.23906
DO118	1.15830	0.058743	1.0431684	1.27344
DO119	-0.45866	0.080245	-0.6159371	-0.30138
DO120	-0.97829	0.063577	-1.1028955	-0.85368
DO121	-1.52542	0.020950	-1.5664831	-1.48436
DO122	1.32898	0.038037	1.2544238	1.40353
DO123	1.20026	0.057921	1.0867413	1.31379
DO124	-0.11581	0.081640	-0.2758264	0.04420
DO125	1.10756	0.045388	1.0186058	1.19652
DO126	1.11404	0.062469	0.9915997	1.23647
DO127	0.43777	0.057365	0.3253342	0.55020
DO128	-0.50971	0.061989	-0.6312033	-0.38821
DO129	1.21081	0.072760	1.0682004	1.35341
DO130	-0.30537	0.064564	-0.4319089	-0.17882
DO131	-0.61767	0.075706	-0.7660478	-0.46928

b) Ordered Wordfish Estimates of Document Positions of the English Subset

Documents	**Estimated Positions**
DO102	-1.55599
DO121	-1.52542
DO84	-1.50972

DO2	-1.47362
DO88	-1.45897
DO54	-1.41525
DO34	-1.35820
DO49	-1.31893
DO73	-1.31271
DO70	-1.31006
DO3	-1.28654
DO50	-1.27317
DO37	-1.19662
DO79	-1.19054
DO75	-1.18930
DO36	-1.18313
DO35	-1.17598
DO60	-1.11983
DO83	-1.10113
DO42	-1.10111
DO74	-1.05506
DO82	-0.98577
DO120	-0.97829
DO111	-0.97622
DO20	-0.96668
DO45	-0.96431
DO5	-0.92681
DO53	-0.92471
DO38	-0.91904
DO116	-0.91880
DO21	-0.90934
DO32	-0.89171
DO40	-0.88969
DO78	-0.82784
DO9	-0.82540
DO51	-0.81784
DO4	-0.80857
DO72	-0.80493
DO65	-0.78468
DO69	-0.75291
DO66	-0.74864
DO15	-0.74030
DO63	-0.72466
DO1	-0.72021
DO67	-0.68834
DO80	-0.68781
DO52	-0.67024
DO81	-0.65072
DO46	-0.62786
DO131	-0.61767
DO29	-0.61692
DO71	-0.60519
DO6	-0.59528
DO11	-0.58759
DO48	-0.57425

DO8	-0.55932
DO41	-0.53954
DO128	-0.50971
DO33	-0.50801
DO7	-0.48682
DO119	-0.45866
DO89	-0.44468
DO55	-0.43067
DO117	-0.37440
DO64	-0.31142
DO130	-0.30537
DO57	-0.27472
DO113	-0.24504
DO44	-0.22745
DO23	-0.22565
DO124	-0.11581
DO85	-0.09687
DO17	-0.08995
DO10	-0.07808
DO76	0.04197
DO93	0.08865
DO91	0.09935
DO68	0.15607
DO87	0.23966
DO95	0.26405
DO127	0.43777
DO103	0.48626
DO94	0.51158
DO19	0.57523
DO47	0.63834
DO105	0.69553
DO31	0.78968
DO97	0.85580
DO96	0.86470
DO92	0.94757
DO109	0.97483
DO14	0.97875
DO16	1.00278
DO58	1.01449
DO86	1.03278
DO99	1.05208
DO61	1.06005
DO100	1.07569
DO90	1.07811
DO115	1.07873
DO56	1.08988
DO59	1.09737
DO125	1.10756
DO126	1.11404
DO107	1.12112
DO98	1.12165
DO18	1.14988

DO118	1.15830
DO123	1.20026
DO62	1.20981
DO129	1.21081
DO22	1.29726
DO122	1.32898
DO13	1.34852
DO104	1.37229
DO110	1.37368
DO25	1.37931
DO114	1.38270
DO101	1.39191
DO30	1.39554
DO112	1.39818
DO24	1.40412
DO43	1.42965
DO12	1.43838
DO108	1.47859
DO26	1.51342
DO28	1.51665
DO77	1.58446
DO106	1.59628
DO27	1.62184
DO39	1.64600

c) Document Coding of the English Subset

DO1	SONAE
DO2	Syntec Numérique
DO3	Trades Union Congress
DO4	UEAPME
DO5	United Nations Team in Brussels
DO6	Valore D
DO7	Women Capital
DO8	Women in Aerospace Europe
DO9	Women s Council in Denmark
DO10	WomenCEO
DO11	Worker's Trade Union Spain
DO12	30 Club Investor Group
DO13	aberdeen asset management
DO14	Amanda Bolt Associates - Investor Relations
DO15	American Chamber of Commerce in France
DO16	An Inspirational Journey company
DO17	ArcelorMittal
DO18	Association of British insurers
DO19	Association of Chartered Certified Accountants
DO20	Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry
DO21	Association of Mutual Insurers and Insurance Cooperations in Europe

DO22	Aviva
DO23	BASF
DO24	BDO Accountancy
DO25	BlackRock
DO26	BP
DO27	British Bankers' Association
DO28	British Psychological Society
DO29	Business Europe
DO30	Capita Registrars
DO31	Catalyst
DO32	CEC
DO33	CEEMET
DO34	Centre for Regional Policy Research and Cooperation 'Studiorum'
DO35	Centro Studi
DO36	Cocéa
DO37	Commission Post-Consultation
DO38	Commission Pre-Consultation
DO39	Concreta-Mente
DO40	Confederation of Finnish Industries
DO41	Confederation of Swedish Enterprises
DO42	Confederation of Unions for Professional and Managerial Staff in Finland
DO43	Co-operative Asset Management
DO44	Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry
DO45	Cyprus Women's Lobby
DO46	Czech Saving Bank
DO47	DAC
DO48	Danish Committee on Corporate Governance
DO49	Danish Employers' Association of the Financial Sect
DO50	Danish Institute for Human Rights
DO51	Danish Shareholders Association
DO52	Danish Shipowners' Association
DO53	Danish Society of Engineers
DO54	Deloitte
DO55	DI Confederation of Danish Industry
DO56	Directors' Institute in Ireland
DO57	Directors' Institute of Finland
DO58	EIRIS Foundation
DO59	Employment Lawyers' Association
DO60	EPP WOMEN
DO61	Ernst Young
DO62	Eumedion
DO63	EuroCommerce
DO64	European Banking Federation
DO65	European Center for Women and Technology
DO66	European Confederation of Directors Associations (ecoDa)

DO67	European Network for Women in Leadership
DO68	European Professional Women's network London
DO69	European Professional Women's network Amsterdam
DO70	European Professional Women's network Lisbon
DO71	European Round Table of Industrialists
DO72	European Sustainable Investment Forum
DO73	European Trade Union Confederation
DO74	European Women Lawyers Association
DO75	European Women's Lobby
DO76	Expert Corporate Governance Service
DO77	FC Investments
DO78	Federation of Businesswomen Association from the Milan
DO79	Fempower
DO80	Finland Chamber of Commerce
DO81	Finnish Federation of University Women
DO82	Fondazione A. J. Zaninoni
DO83	Foro del Buen Gobierno y Accionariado
DO84	Foundation for Research in Law and Business
DO85	Fredrika-Bremer-Förderbundet
DO86	GC100
DO87	Gender Equality Project
DO88	Gender Sociology Department of Czech Republic
DO89	Genderatwork
DO90	GSK
DO91	Henkel
DO92	Hermes
DO93	Highland Opportunity
DO94	IDDAS
DO95	Ingersoll Rand International
DO96	INSEAD Corporate Governance Initiative
DO97	Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators Ireland
DO98	Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
DO99	Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland
DO100	Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators UK
DO101	International Center for Women Leaders
DO102	International Federation of Business and Professional Women
DO103	Irish Business Employers' Confederation
DO104	KPMG
DO105	Law Society of England and Wales
DO106	Leaderful Women Project
DO107	Legal General Group
DO108	Local Authority Pension Fund Forum
DO109	London Stock Exchange Group
DO110	Lord Davies Steering Group
DO111	ADE Vallès
DO112	Mentoring Foundation

DO113	NASDAQ OMX
DO114	National Employment Saving Trust
DO115	National Women's Council of Ireland
DO116	Noi Rete Donne
DO117	Novo Nordisk
DO118	Opportunity Now
DO119	Organisation of European shareholders associations
DO120	Passage
DO121	Portuguese Platform for Women's Rights
DO122	Pricewaterhouse Coopers
DO123	Professional Boards' Forum
DO124	Professional Women's Association of Milan
DO125	Quoted Companies Alliance
DO126	Rolls-Royce
DO127	Scotland Europe
DO128	Securities Market Association
DO129	Shire
DO130	Social Innovation Society
DO131	Sodexo

d) Wordfish Results of the German Subset

Documents	**Estimate**	**Standard Error**	**Lower**	**Upper**
DO1	-0.990958	0.03470	-1.05896	-0.92295
DO2	-0.532397	0.05918	-0.64838	-0.41641
DO3	2.163622	0.05390	2.05799	2.26926
DO4	-0.951059	0.06231	-1.07318	-0.82893
DO5	0.002778	0.06979	-0.13400	0.13956
DO6	-0.471246	0.06445	-0.59756	-0.34493
DO7	-0.280331	0.05369	-0.38556	-0.17510
DO8	2.181651	0.05408	2.07566	2.28764
DO9	-0.147671	0.06389	-0.27289	-0.02245
DO10	1.807263	0.05249	1.70439	1.91014
DO11	-0.779736	0.05444	-0.88644	-0.67304
DO12	-0.228516	0.07794	-0.38127	-0.07576
DO13	-1.045061	0.03159	-1.10698	-0.98314
DO14	0.422600	0.02669	0.37029	0.47491
DO15	-0.147070	0.08467	-0.31302	0.01888
DO16	0.113931	0.06797	-0.01928	0.24714
DO17	-0.053541	0.05415	-0.15967	0.05259
DO18	-0.448113	0.05637	-0.55860	-0.33763
DO19	-0.173317	0.10633	-0.38171	0.03508
DO20	-0.299990	0.04522	-0.38861	-0.21137
DO21	2.231566	0.05219	2.12927	2.33386
DO22	2.162328	0.05281	2.05883	2.26583
DO23	2.143831	0.05398	2.03803	2.24963
DO24	2.241649	0.05083	2.14202	2.34128
DO25	-1.213149	0.05398	-1.31894	-1.10735
DO26	0.740555	0.07561	0.59236	0.88875

DO27	0.010236	0.09924	-0.18427	0.20474
DO28	-1.120634	0.03055	-1.18051	-1.06075
DO29	1.560433	0.04915	1.46410	1.65676
DO30	1.990383	0.06023	1.87234	2.10843
DO31	-0.728278	0.03475	-0.79639	-0.66016
DO32	-1.236513	0.04258	-1.31996	-1.15306
DO33	1.743476	0.04704	1.65128	1.83568
DO34	-0.948453	0.03945	-1.02577	-0.87114
DO35	1.729257	0.04717	1.63682	1.82170
DO36	-0.137075	0.08381	-0.30134	0.02719
DO37	2.160461	0.05319	2.05621	2.26471
DO38	-1.234293	0.03864	-1.31003	-1.15856
DO39	0.052595	0.05930	-0.06363	0.16882
DO40	-0.704916	0.05694	-0.81652	-0.59332
DO41	-0.981615	0.04555	-1.07089	-0.89234
DO42	-0.057289	0.08802	-0.22981	0.11523
DO43	-0.496795	0.08834	-0.66994	-0.32365
DO44	-0.273774	0.05219	-0.37607	-0.17148
DO45	-0.800588	0.03573	-0.87062	-0.73056
DO46	-0.702739	0.08108	-0.86165	-0.54383
DO47	-0.521066	0.02947	-0.57883	-0.46330
DO48	0.831237	0.09308	0.64880	1.01367
DO49	-0.039665	0.08803	-0.21219	0.13286
DO50	-0.392377	0.07119	-0.53191	-0.25284
DO51	-0.283787	0.11152	-0.50237	-0.06521
DO52	-0.318972	0.04873	-0.41449	-0.22346
DO53	-1.152274	0.04026	-1.23119	-1.07336
DO54	-0.776004	0.05695	-0.88762	-0.66439
DO55	-0.073776	0.04490	-0.16178	0.01422
DO56	-0.169120	0.04771	-0.26262	-0.07562
DO57	-0.064305	0.09167	-0.24398	0.11537
DO58	0.329446	0.06234	0.20726	0.45163
DO59	-0.444588	0.06754	-0.57697	-0.31220
DO60	-1.144079	0.05781	-1.25738	-1.03078
DO61	2.093990	0.05685	1.98256	2.20542
DO62	-0.868574	0.05636	-0.97904	-0.75811
DO63	-0.757153	0.03524	-0.82621	-0.68809
DO64	-0.803798	0.05952	-0.92045	-0.68715
DO65	-1.749546	0.05166	-1.85080	-1.64829
DO66	-1.175312	0.03225	-1.23853	-1.11210
DO67	1.079756	0.07262	0.93742	1.22209
DO68	2.188740	0.05213	2.08656	2.29092
DO69	1.022536	0.05811	0.90864	1.13644
DO70	-1.466649	0.02085	-1.50752	-1.42578
DO71	-1.202762	0.06217	-1.32461	-1.08091
DO72	-0.369579	0.04276	-0.45339	-0.28577

e) Document Coding of the German Subset

DO1	Siemens AG
DO2	Soroptimist International Deutschland

DO3	Starkstrom Gerätebau
DO4	Terre Des Femmes
DO5	ThyssenKrupp
DO6	Verband Deutscher Unternehmerinnen
DO7	Verdi vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft Baden-Württemberg
DO8	Vereinigung Bayrischer Wirtschaft
DO9	Vereinigung Schweizer Unternehmen in Deutschland
DO10	Wacker Chemie
DO11	Wirtschaftskammer Österreich
DO12	Women&Work
DO13	Commission Pre-Consultation
DO14	Commission Post-Consultation
DO15	Accente Communications
DO16	Adidas
DO17	AGV
DO18	Allianz
DO19	Arbeitgeberverband Chemie Reinland-Pfalz
DO20	Bauer
DO21	Bayerischer Bankenverband
DO22	Bayrische Bauindustrie
DO23	Bayrische Metall-Elektro-Arbeitgeber VBM
DO24	Berufliche Fortbildungszentren der Bayrischen Wirtschaft
DO25	Better Than Possible
DO26	BMW
DO27	Braun Höller Kommunikation Strategie
DO28	Bücherfrauen
DO29	Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie
DO30	Bundesarbeitgeberverband Glas und Solar
DO31	Bundesarbeitskammer Österreich
DO32	Bundesforum Männer
DO33	Bundesverband Handel
DO34	Bundesverband Medien und Informationswirtschaft
DO35	Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände
DO36	Business Professional Women Bremen
DO37	Carl Heuchel Nördling
DO38	Comité permanent l'égalité
DO39	Deutsche Industrie und Handelskammer
DO40	Deutsche Telekom
DO41	Deutscher Frauenrat
DO42	Deutscher Akademikerinnen Verband
DO43	Deutscher Frauenring
DO44	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
DO45	Deutscher Juristinnenbund
DO46	Deutscher Landfrauenverband
DO47	Deutsches Aktieninstitut

DO48	Erdgas Schwaben
DO49	Erfolgsfaktor Frau
DO50	Europäische Akademie für Frauen in Politik und Wirtschaft
DO51	European Confederation of Independent Trade Unions
DO52	Frauen in die Aufsichtsräte
DO53	Frauennetz Lichtenstein
DO54	Friedrich Boysen
DO55	Gesamtmetall
DO56	Gesamtverband Deutscher Versicherer
DO57	Gross Seger
DO58	Handelsverband Deutschland
DO59	Hans Böckler Stiftung
DO60	Hewlett-Packard
DO61	Hunger Hydraulik
DO62	Industriellenvereinigung
DO63	Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Klön
DO64	Katholischer Deutscher Frauenbund
DO65	KAV-Fraueninitiative
DO66	Kienbaum Management Consulting
DO67	Landesvereinigung der Unternehmensverbände NRW
DO68	Markgraf
DO69	Nordmetall Verband der Metall und Elektroindustrie
DO70	Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund
DO71	Paneuropabewegung Österreich
DO72	SAP

C. Manual Coding Scores (Table 2)

1.	Opportunity Now	effective	self-regulatory	non-binding	publicly listed companies	both	no
2.	Women Capital	not effective	no action	binding	publicly listed companies; companies working for the government or the governmental or state agencies/ organisations; companies/organisations that are owned by the individual states in the EU	both	yes
3.	Danish Committee on Corporate Governance	effective	no action	no action	publicly listed companies	both	no
4.	Professional Women's Association	not effective	regulatory	binding	listed and financial institutions, large companies, public	both	yes

	Milan				institutions		
5.	EPP Women	not effective	regulatory	binding	all companies listed on stock exchange	both	no
6.	Concreta-Mente	not effective	regulatory	binding	listed and state-controlled companies	executive or non-executive	yes
7.	Trades Union Congress	not effective	regulatory	binding	publicly-listed and non-listed companies	both	yes
8.	European Women's Lobby	not effective	regulatory	binding	companies with more than 50 employees and all owned-state companies	both	yes
9.	Gender & Sociology Department of Czech Republic	non-effective	regulatory and self-regulatory	binding	state-owned companies/institutions and companies with more than 50 employees	executive and non-executive	yes
10.	Business Europe	effective	self-regulatory	no action	none	either executive or non-executive	no
11.	United Nations Team in Brussels	not effective	both	binding	publicly quoted companies; companies that are part of the public sector and those who have their shares on the stock market over the 50 million Euros	both	yes
12.	Henkel	effective	no action	no action	none	none	no
13.	Novo Nordisk	effective	self-regulatory	no action	publicly listed and state-owned companies	both	no
14.	Passage	not effective	regulatory	binding	state-owned and companies with more than 50 employees	both	yes
15.	European Center for Women and Technology	not effective	regulatory	binding	all companies	both	yes
16.	Cyprus Women's Lobby	not effective	regulatory	binding	state owned and companies with more than 50 employees	both	yes
17.	National Women's Council of Ireland	not effective	regulatory	binding	publicly listed and state-owned companies	both	yes
18.	CEEMET	effective	self-regulatory	no action	none	none	no
19.	Noi Rete Donne	not effective	regulatory	binding	publicly listed, state-owned companies	both	yes
20.	Aviva	self-regulatory	self-regulatory	non-binding	publicly listed and not listed companies,	both	no

					SMEs		
21.	National Employment Saving Trust	not effective	self-regulatory	non-binding	all premium listed FTSE companies	non-executive	no
22.	Syntec Numérique	not effective	regulatory	binding	companies with more than 500 employees	both	yes
23.	European Professional Women's Network London	not effective	either or	binding flexi quota	all companies	both	yes
24.	ArcelorMittal	effective	self-regulatory	binding	all organizations	both	no
25.	30% Investor Club	effective	self-regulatory	self-regulated	FTSE-100 and FTSE-250 companies	executive	no
26.	Irish Business Employers' Confedera-tion	effective	no action	no action	none	none	no
27.	NASDAQ OMX	effective	no action	no action	none	none	no
28.	Fredrika-Bremer-Förderbundet	effective	self-regulatory	non-binding	all companies	both	yes
29.	UEAPME	effective	none	non-binding flexi	flexi	executive	no
30.	Danish Shipowners' Association	effective	self-regulatory	flexi non-binding	listed companies	executive	no
31.	Women's Council in Denmark	not effective	regulatory	binding	listed and state owned companies	both	yes
32.	European Network for Women in Leadership	not effective	self-regulation	flexi binding quota	large profit companies	both	no

Declaration of Academic Integrity

I hereby confirm that the present thesis *"Determining Policy Positions and Successfully Lobbying Interest Groups in EU Gender Policy-Making"* is solely my own work and that if any text passages or diagrams from books, papers, the Web or other sources have been copied or in any other way used, all references – including those found in electronic media – have been acknowledged and fully cited.

Münster, 30th June 2014