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**BACHELOR THESIS**

by

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**Euroscepticism shaping Migration Discourses?  
An Analysis of political Debates on Immigration  
from Bulgaria and Romania**

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## **Abstract**

Recognising a heated discussion about Romanian and Bulgarian free movement in British Newspapers, my interest about its development arose. Simultaneously, increasing attention is paid to Eurosceptical politicians, bringing up the question if the attitude towards the EU is an influencer on the Eastern European migration debates. The question is treated by a qualitative critical frame analysis of primary literature, namely political debates of two particular cases: Great Britain as starting point of my reflections and Germany, differing from UK in its EU-attitude. Analysis shows that Euroscepticism is a noticeable influencer on the discourse about free movement, shaping British discussions in a less receptive way for free movers than German debates.

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## **1. Introduction**

The following Bachelor thesis deals with the interconnection of the attitude towards the European Union (EU) and free movement policy towards Bulgarians and Romanians at the example of two different European Union Member States. Yet, the issues of EU-critical attitude and migration policy towards Eastern European Member States are treated separately or combined with divergent policy fields. But recently, both are discussed increasingly in the Member States due to a certain event: The repeal of restricted access to the European labour market for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens. The countries joined the EU in 2007, but are only allowed to exercise free movement since 1 January 2014. It raises question of the attitude towards the EU playing a role in the migration debate's alignment. The thesis establishes a hypothesis that parties' attitudes towards the EU are applicable to their position towards free movement of Romanians and Bulgarians. To verify the hypothesis a comparative case study of Germany and Great Britain shall be conducted. The chosen method is a frame analysis of political debates, as I assume political actors' to consciously frame their positions on migrants' arrival. The politicians' performance is presumed to be not only empty rhetoric, but to affect political actions. The influences can be revealed by observing politicians' statements' framing processes. Within the scope of a frame analysis I apply Sensitizing Questions to German Plenarprotokolle and British Hansards' documents. The questions intend to divine the actors' problem definitions and solutions and may expose actors' underlying contemplations, fostering a certain position on Bulgarian and Romanian migration policy.

The following thesis is segmented into the theoretical framework giving an overview of free movement, already conducted research on EU-critical perspectives and migration policy, as well as on previous migration discourses, resulting in the thesis research question. Thereupon it elaborates methodology and choices for cases and material. The thesis' analysis looks at Great Britain and Germany separately before comparing the particular results. It is followed by the results' discussion and answering of the research question.

## 2. State of the Art and Thesis' Objective

In the following sections the concepts of criticism of the EU, free movement and immigration are presented, depicting the theoretical basis for my research question and design.

The situations given facts are Romanians and Bulgarians ability to exercise free movement since 1 January 2014. For the understanding of this mobility I will present the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU in connection to the countries' Accession Treaty. As free movement's permissions are clearly outlined, the intense discussion on Bulgarian and Romanians' arrival in several Member States is unexpected. To approach the issue, immigration policies and previous migration discourses display a good indicator to assess countries' treatment of foreigners. In the research questions' development discourses obtain double attention. Despite the indicator function, discourses are canvas for politicians to project their attitudes on.

Politicians' actions and statements are assumed to be chosen consciously to pursue a certain goal. The process of using well-considered assertions to shape a debate into a particular direction is called framing. The discussions are supposed to be influenced by one particular factor: the parties' strength of anti-European streams.

### 2.1 Euroscepticism

To describe a sceptical position towards the EU, several terms are of common use. *Europhobia* is sparsely defined in literature. The term is applied by Henderson to Central and Eastern European Countries, whereby "phobia" describes the countries "fear of the unknown" (Henderson 2001: 13). Compared to that, the terms *EU-Scepticism* or *EU-Criticism* are rather used in everyday language than in specialised literature. By contrast *Euroscepticism* is extensively defined and developed since the late 1990s. The importance of distinguishing between the terms is reasoned with the readers' increasing comprehension, the better the term I refer to is defined. While *Europhobia* and *EU-Criticism* allow great leeway for interpretation, *Euroscepticism* is a fixed indicator, able to determine countries' respectively persons' attitude towards the EU. This is crucial to identify comparable cases.

The basis for the term Euroscepticism is set by Taggart's first definition. Taggart makes clear that the national level of Euroscepticism among the public is not necessarily equal with the political parties' level (Taggart 1998: 366ff.). This finding

justifies my focus on party-based Euroscepticism among the Member States. It fits best to show a connection between the strength of Euroscepticism and the national policy towards migration<sup>1</sup>. The term's conceptualisation is continued by Szczerbiak and Taggart, distinguishing between "'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism" (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001: 9). Hard Euroscepticism can be found among sceptics e.g. opposing the EU integration wholly, being not satisfied with the overall execution of the "European integration" (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001: 10). Compared to that soft Eurosceptics express dissatisfaction with particular policy fields in a constructive way. Through criticism the distinction is further developed (Kopecky & Mudde 2002). Thereupon, Szczerbiak and Taggart refine their definition as follows: Hard Euroscepticism appears in cases of "principled opposition" to European integration encompassing "transfer of powers to supranational institution such as the EU", while Soft Euroscepticism is not characterised by fundamental resistance to EU integration, respectively "transferring powers to a supranational body", but by "opposition to the EU's current or future planned trajectory" (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2003: 12). The role of transferring powers to the EU is not further explained and it remains open why it plays a greater role in the new definition than in the previous one.

The latest literature on Euroscepticism is provided by Szczerbiak and Taggart in 2008. Their definitional dichotomy is maintained, but the respective definition is extended under influence of several criticisms. Hard Euroscepticism of political parties is shaped by "principled opposition" (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008a: 7) to the EU. It can be shown in political actions opposing the recent state of the EU integration. Soft Eurosceptical parties do not reject the EU, but express opposition to particular policy fields or reveal domestic concerns being contrary to the EU course. The definitions cannot be applied exactly to every European party and are open for further remarks (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008a: 7f.). The concluding chapter is almost the same as their 2003 Working Paper: The revision of definitions incorporates the transfer of powers and an outlook on the necessity to further develop "a more comprehensive typology" (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008b: 248) for party-based Euroscepticism.

Several approaches to determine a country's degree of Euroscepticism exhibit reference to Szczerbiak and Taggart's distinction into hard and soft Euroscepticism, showing its ability to serve as variable in the thesis' research question.

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<sup>1</sup> For further definition of migration see chapter 2.2.

According to the latest definition the United Kingdom is classified into the category hard Euroscepticism. This assumption is underlined by various empirical evidences: Evans exhibits voters' strong Euroscepticism and their assessment of party-based Euroscepticism on the basis of British Election Panel Studies (Evans 1998: 576f.). Gifford gives an overview of literature on the British situation, concluding that Euroscepticism is present in the British party system in "hard forms" (Gifford 2006: 867). The recent Conservative party's effort to promote a national referendum on withdrawal from the EU is one additional indicator of hard Eurosceptics in the British party system.

Indeed, Eurobarometer surveys show falling support for European integration among German public, while parties still oppose public Eurosceptical claims. Lees indicates to categorise Germany as soft Eurosceptical country (Lees 2002: 245ff.). Germany's position towards EU integration shifted noticeable, but is still depicting no evidence to suppose hard Eurosceptical streams, neither among the public, nor in the party system (Busch & Knelangen 2004: 84ff.). The enhanced pursuit of domestic concerns underlines my suggestion of categorisation.

My assessment of party-based Euroscepticism is underpinned by Taggart's first classification into a four-part scheme. Both, Great Britain and Germany have "Single-issue parties", which only exist to oppose the EU (Taggart 1998: 368ff.). The German party does not exist anymore, while the British Eurosceptical party *UK Independence Party* (UKIP) records a massive increase in votes in the 2014 European election. UKIP is winner of the election (26.77 %) in Great Britain, obtaining 24 of 48 seats for Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (European Parliament: Elections 2014). Both countries still display Eurosceptical factions in the party system, but Germany exhibits less strong characteristics than Great Britain.

Despite a nationwide classification into hard and soft Euroscepticism, the concept allows to categorise particular politicians' statements as central units of analysis. Their statements' degree of Euroscepticism may prove a correlation with positions on Bulgarian and Romanian free movement.

## **2.2 Legal Basis of Free Movement and Immigration**

The free movement provisions for European Union Member States are documented in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). They encompass

free movement of goods (Art. 28 TFEU) and free movement of persons, services and capital (Title IV TFEU). The latter includes free movement of workers according. Its meaning is defined in Art. 45, 2 TFEU: employers are not allowed to discriminate any European Union citizen based on his or her nationality. Consequently it provides EU citizens access to every Member States' labour market. European Union citizenship is defined in Art. 20 TFEU. Every person "holding the nationality of a Member State" (Art. 20 TFEU) is an EU citizen. Romania's and Bulgaria's inhabitants are EU citizens since 1 January 2007. In 2005 the Member states give green light for Bulgaria and Romania's accession with 497 of 661 votes for Romania and 522 of 661 votes for Bulgaria (Van Orden & Moscovici 2005). Their citizens' access to other Member States' labour markets is restricted until 1 January 2014. This seven year period of restrictions is attributable to the Accession Treaty<sup>2</sup>, including transitional provisions. According to Art. 20, Accession Treaty the Member States are allowed to apply "national measures" (Accession Treaty, Annex VI 1.2) to adjust the inflow of immigrant workers from Bulgaria to the national labour markets for a period of five years, until 1 January 2012. After two years of application the transitional measures are analysed by the European Commission, while the Member States get the possibility to extend the period of restricting measures for two more years (Accession Treaty, Annex VI 1.3). The extension is only possible in case of immigrant workers from Bulgaria posing a serious threat to the national labour market. Requirement for the continuation is to advertise the European Commission on the issue (Accession Treaty, Annex VI 1. 5). It is possible for Member States to bring forward the motion to suspend the entire or parts of the "Articles 1 to 6 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68" (Accession Treaty, Annex VI 1.7), regarding the "Eligibility of Employment" ((EEC) No 1612/68), if the Commission assess the labour market's equilibrium endangered by free movement of workers from Bulgaria (Accession Treaty, Annex VI 1.7). The Treaty also provides opportunity to broaden the freedom of movement for citizens from Bulgaria by applying Articles 1 to 6 of the above named regulation two years after accession (Accession Treaty, Annex VI 1.12), in other words: allowing early access to the Member States labour markets.

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<sup>2</sup> Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania.



In Annex VII the measures 1.1 to 1.14 are equally applied to Romania (Accession Treaty, Annex VII 1.1 – 1.14).

Compared to free movement migration is divided into internal versus international. The latter encompasses “cross-border movement” (Castles & Miller 2009: 21) of individuals or families, while internal migration describes the moving process within countries’ frontiers (Castles & Miller 2009: 21f.). To underline the difference in the following, migration is understood as movement from one location to another, while immigration describes the definite step of crossing borders.

At first glance actions of free movement and immigration seem to be very similar, namely crossing national boundaries to live (temporarily or in the long term) in another state than the one before. The distinctive differentiation between the two concepts is the group of people able to apply them. While free movement is only usable for EU citizens within the EU territory, immigration is performed by all Third Country Nationals (TCN) coming to the EU. Free movement was once built enabling EU citizens to freely move around the Member States without any restrictions, while immigration is often tied to strict rules and integration policies, like civic integration tests.

### **2.3 Immigration Policies and Migration Discourses**

To assess the impact of politicians Euroscepticism on national discussions on free movement from Bulgaria and Romania, I will recap basic actions in immigration policies and the case countries’ previous migration discourses.

Although immigration policies do not apply to intra-EU immigrants, they are an indicator for a country’s approach to deal with foreigners.

Germany characterised itself not as “immigration land” (Kivisto 2002: 162) for a long time. This self-assessment implies a long way to German citizenship. Labour immigrants are needed during the 50s and 60s. They are explicit temporary residents, expected to return to their countries of origin. Before the German reunification, permanent residents obtain a residence permit - which is not equal to German nationality - after legally staying five or eight years. The governments ‘no immigration country’ attitude is maintained, although the number of immigrants reached two million in the 1970s. Immigration policy changes considerably in 2000. By the new nationality law the time of residence for foreign-born required before

obtaining permanent residence is reduced from 15 to eight years, while citizenship is directly given to children born within German frontiers (Kivisto 2002: 161f.). In 2005 the Immigration Act becomes law, introducing a clear understanding of limited residence permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis) versus unlimited settlement permit (Niederlassungserlaubnis), as requirement for granting German citizenship. The latter may be obtained after five years of unlimited legal residence, when fulfilling some further requirements.<sup>3</sup> The Act focusses a 'Best & Brightest' approach, promoting easier access to settlement permits for highly qualified. The reform goes along with different integration approaches like (partly obligatory) integration courses (Schneider 2007a). The Immigration Act is reformed in 2007, introducing the EC long-term residence permit (Daueraufenthalt-EG) for TCNs after five years of legal stay, but also more restrictions regarding the difficulty level of nationalisation, or requirements for Non-EU citizens to join spouses in Germany (Schneider 2007b).

After the Second World War the British Nationality Act (1948) grants citizenship to all citizens of the British Colonies, allowing movement to the United Kingdom (UK). The "open migration regime" (Geddes 2003: 32) is changed in the 60s by the Commonwealth Immigrations Acts, to keep out coloured immigrants from sovereign Commonwealth states, fearing their racial difference. British immigration policy exhibits strict controls for immigration, whereby it is shaped by ideas of racial differences of people (Geddes 2003: 31ff.). These ideas are prevented to become reasons for discrimination in the Race Relations Acts 1965, '68 and '76. The provisions prohibit discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, nationality and colour. They are based on the overall idea of a multicultural society, where different cultural orientations live together with "equal opportunit[ies]" (Geddes 2003: 44). The late 60s are also shaped by Conservative Powell's *Rivers of Blood* speech, fanning fear about the arrival of a great number of immigrants. The 1981 British Nationality Act formulates a new, more restrictive definition of citizenship, establishing three categories. The law initiates a phase of ever more restrictions, making Great Britain not easy to enter (Hansen 2000: 213ff.). Since 1994 immigration is organised by a five-level system, categorising immigrants into different classes according to their qualifications. Depending on tier and fulfilment of further requirements, immigrants are allowed to apply for a residence permit respectively an indefinite leave to stay. Only with such permission application of British citizenship is

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<sup>3</sup> For further requirements see: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.  
<http://www.bamf.de/EN/Migration/migration-node.html>. [09.09.2014]

possible after five years.<sup>4</sup>

To sum up, the British immigration policy includes many restrictive rules leading to effective approaches to control unwanted immigration, e.g. through the system, complemented by a obligatory citizenship test.

The comparison shows that the countries chose differing approaches to deal with immigration. While Germany took very long to introduce achievable requirements before issuing citizenship, going along with integration measures, the United Kingdom developed from an “open door policy” (Geddes 2003: 33) to a restricted comprehension of citizenship accompanied by strict controls for immigrants.

To depict the discourses on migration, I will firstly introduce the term *discourse*. It appears in the literature since the 13<sup>th</sup> century and passed through a number of semantic shifts. The analysis of a discourse can be either on a purely linguistic level or on a discourse theoretical level (Keller 2008: 109). Attributable to the latter are three predominant orientations: A “normative-critical” perception according to Habermas, the “empirical-analytic” notion and a “genealogical-critical” (Kerchner 2006: 33) definition, characterised by post-structuralistic influences. The choice of definition depends on the given “research interests” (Keller 2008: 109). A clear classification of the national discourses into one of the streams is hardly possible, because of various concepts underlying the particular works, which are not always revealed. The term *discourse* I refer to in the following sections is most likely to be assigned to the “analytical-pragmatic” (Kerchner 2006: 38) approach. It is suitable to enable an analysis of political actors’ interactions, by which they try to lobby for their particular persuasion (Kerchner 2006: 38 ff.).

For Great Britain and Germany applies that most migration discourses’ analyses among researchers either deal with particular ethnic minorities in specific circumstances or with religion, especially the Islam (Halm 2008). Wengeler analyses patterns of argumentation in migration discourses in German quality papers. He recognises a shift from tolerance of immigrants’ different cultures towards expectations of adaption (Wengeler 2006: 14ff.).

It shows that most research on migration discourses in Germany refers to the media (Butterwegge & Hentges 2006, Geißler & Pöttker 2009). Morgenstern deals with racism and immigration in the political debates of the German Bundestag from the

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<sup>4</sup> For further information see: GOV.UK.  
<https://www.gov.uk/browse/visas-immigration>. [09.09.2014]  
<https://www.gov.uk/browse/citizenship>. [09.09.2014]

1950s to late 1980s (Morgenstern 2002). But, neither for Germany, nor for the United Kingdom exist comprehensive discourse analyses only regarding migration.

Some results provides Thränhardt, shedding light on both sides of a discourse, on the political and the medial respectively the public side. After the World War II German parties support the immigration of foreign workers for the economic boom. The need for qualified workers from abroad is a common argument in the 1950s, which shifts into argumentation against immigration as “economic burden” (Thränhardt 2002: 351) in the 70s, including the ongoing discussion about immigrants’ rights to access social welfare benefits. The first appreciation of taking up asylum seekers shifts to campaigns against them in the 1980s elections and early 90s, evoking “xenophobia” (Thränhardt 2002: 355) among some parts of the public. It is answered with rejection by large numbers of Germans. Now, further European integration is supported by the majority of German parties, claiming the need for more effective integration of immigrants (Thränhardt 2002: 350ff.).

The British political discourse on immigration is characterised by several shifts over time. After World War II Great Britain allows “non-white Commonwealth migration” (Hansen 2000: 6) within an open migration regime. In the 1950s the political migration discourse turns towards greater restrictions for migrants from the “New Commonwealth” (Hansen 2000: 18), nevertheless open borders are maintained. The evolved “multicultural society” (Hansen 2000: 19) experiences restraints for further extension in the 1960s (Hansen 2000: 17ff.). The 1965s Race Relations Act brings new substance into the British migration discourse by promoting integration while opposing discrimination. The latest debates in UK turn on the question to either continue immigration, following the multiculturalism approach or to limit migration, especially regarding the national youth’s access to the labour market (Pettitt & Davis 2014).

## **2.4 The Research Question**

The research questions’ development starts with the actual issue of free movement for Bulgarians and Romanians. They joined the EU in 2007, whereby the accession is combined with a temporary provision regarding transitional measures in the 2005 Accession Treaty. These restrictions ended with 1 January 2014.

I followed an intensive discussion about the issue in Great Britain, which gives rise to various questions. Why are public and politicians concerned about Romanian and Bulgarian free movers? Free Movement is an essential part of the EU's overall concept – so why does a country, once agreeing on the provisions, criticise this mobility now? Which influencing factors operate on the discussions' alignment?

For the latter several factors may be decisive: The media, the electoral or the politicians themselves.

I recognised increased attention paid by politicians to anti-EU streams in the last years. The development reached its former peak in the 2014 European Elections, with persuasive right-wing, anti-European electoral victories, among others in Great Britain. Anti-European orientations seem to obtain a general recovery among European parties. The concept describing various versions of rejecting the EU is called Euroscepticism.

A country, obviously criticising immigration from Bulgaria and Romania – which is not even immigration but free movement – allows the suggestion of criticising the EU as a whole by implication. Aligning the Member States' positions on free movement for Bulgarians and Romanians and their general attitude towards the EU, expressed in the degree of Euroscepticism, I formulate the following universal hypothesis.

*(A) A country's pro EU position in general issues can be transferred to the country's attitude towards migrants from Bulgaria and Romania, applying the right of free movement of workers.*

As my underlying research premise assumes people to act rational<sup>5</sup>, politicians act rational by representing their doubts towards the EU, expressed e.g. during election campaigns, equally in policy areas related to the EU concept. Free movement within the EU territory - now executable by Romanians and Bulgarians - is such an issue; an essential EU achievement, legally declared in the TFEU. I assume politicians to transfer their subjective Eurosceptical attitude on the particular policy field of free movement policy by consciously framing their statements in the migration discourse, aiming at a certain goal. This goal may be to take up the recent Euroscepticism's boom. The politicians framed assertions enter the general discourse and shape it into a previously selected direction.

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<sup>5</sup> I refer to 'rational' as description for pursuing own targets respectively presenting a subjective attitude by performing considered actions, instead of relying on impulsive behaviour

The facts lead to establishing cohesion between politicians' anti-European position and the intensity of debates on free movers from Bulgaria and Romania.

The thesis' epistemological interest is to find out if parties' attitudes towards EU integration are linked to their position regarding the migration from Bulgaria and Romania since 1 January 2014. The approach suggests a comparative case study, allowing insights into cases of varying premises. The second country is the unit of validation for Great Britain. The countries have to differ substantially in one variable: the level of Euroscepticism. A comparison of two countries, showing differences in their attitude towards the EU may lead to the observation of different reactions towards free movement of Bulgaria and Romania. One case should follow an EU friendly approach, while the other country should be opposing the EU. Based on these given requirements, and due to restrictions regarding the language, Germany and the United Kingdom are most appropriate to compare.

Exploring the German and the British case makes it necessary to further elaborate the approaches' expected outcome, which will be reviewed in the thesis.

*German politicians generally support the European Union and therefore appreciate Bulgaria's and Romania's free movement of workers within the EU.*

*The United Kingdom's political actors' behaviour is directed against several aspects of the European Union. It is expected that British politicians position Britain against the Bulgarian and Romanian possibility of free movement of workers within the EU.*

The expectations represent the interest in finding linkages between two different policy areas, which are not proven to be in correspondence yet.

The politicians' above named proceeding of introducing strategic frames into the debates and the expected coherence between the attitudes towards the EU and migration from Bulgaria and Romania involves the formulation of a precise hypothesis.

*(B) If a Member States national parties' Euroscepticism is transferrable by political actors to the orientation of the migration discourse regarding Bulgaria and Romania, the framing process of political debates in a Eurosceptical country is less receptive for free movement from Romania and Bulgaria than in a less Eurosceptical Member State.*

Taking all assumptions and hypotheses into account, supplemented by a temporal limitation of a few months before and after the decisive event of lifting restrictions, the thesis' research question reads as follows:

*How is immigration from Bulgaria and Romania framed in the parliaments' political debates in Germany and the United Kingdom between September 2013 and April 2014?*

The evolving sub-questions are:

*Which differences and similarities can be found in the framing of the political debate in Germany and Great Britain?*

*Are the differences and similarities in line with the countries' political actors' attitude towards the EU?*

### **3. Methodology**

#### **3.1 Case Selection**

The choice of countries is determined by the need for a strong Eurosceptical country and a less Eurosceptical country to work out the differences in Euroscepticism's impact.

The classification of Germany and Great Britain into the soft - hard Euroscepticism dichotomy in section 2.2 clarifies the countries suitability to be compared by means of their political debates.

According to several Eurobarometer surveys Great Britain exhibits strong characteristics of Euroscepticism among citizens. Recent results show that in Great Britain more people than EU average have a negative image of the European Union. The 2013 Eurobarometer highlights less Britons than Germans identify as EU citizen (Eurobarometer 2013: 4ff.).

Germany features governmental efforts and commitment for the stabilisation of the Eurozone after the financial crisis. Compared to that the United Kingdom decided to not accept the common currency and UK Prime Minister David Cameron already plans a referendum about EU continuance in 2017 (Mason 2014). Great Britain and Germany also properly fit as research cases due to better language comprehension compared to other Member States fulfilling the above named requirements.

### **3.2 Data Collection/Material Selection**

To elaborate the impact of politicians' Euroscepticism on discussing free movement of Bulgaria and Romania in Germany and Britain, I choose a data basis consisting of transcripts of political debates in both countries' parliaments. The documents are reports of the plenary sessions in the German Bundestag and the British House of Commons, the lower chamber of the UK parliament.

The number of documents is limited by applying the following search terms to the parliaments' internal databases: 'Bulgaria', 'Romania' and 'Immigration'.

These three search terms are chosen on basic knowledge about the issue and serve as door opener for further adaptations. Some terms appear several times in the documents of first search. As a result of their expected, respectively known (free movement) importance, they are included into the data collection process by combining them with the nation states' names. The search terms read: 'Mobility', 'Poverty Migration' and 'Free Movement'.

The quests at the online archives are conducted with four possible search term combinations of the nation states' names with one of the above named catchphrases. The research results in a number of documents, too large to analyse. For Germany 17 documents are suggested, which include at least one of the terms. After a detailed review I exclude ten documents, where catchphrases appeared in an entirely different context than free movement from Bulgaria and Romania in coherence with lifting transitional controls. To reduce the debates to five per country I choose those featuring the greatest frequency of the words 'Bulgaria' and 'Romania' in the context of migration, as only these can bring the other search terms in the required reference frame. If 'Bulgaria' or 'Romania' appeared in a different context than migration, the mention is subtracted from the counted frequency. The same procedure is applied to the results of the look up of British plenary session. Out of 16 hits, ten are adopted to a short list, excluding the documents containing the search terms in a different context. The reports are classified by the same strategy: Those five documents with the largest frequency of 'Bulgaria' and 'Romania', mentioned in a textual connection of expiring restrictions and migration, are chosen. The approach exhibits one weakness: in some cases the search terms 'Bulgaria' and 'Romania' appeared in inquiry-response-sessions. To not bias the material selection by replacing these documents, I include them into the analysis, marking them to consider their exceptional position.

The final data set consists of five German plenary minutes between 15 January,



2014 and 3 April 2014 and five parliamentary debates between 22 October 2013 and 19 December 2013.

### **3.3 Critical Frame Analysis**

The data's analysis is based on the Critical Frame Analysis according to Verloo (2005). The choice is attributable to the general assumption of finding *frames* in political debates.

The concept of *framing* is introduced by Goffman in the 1970s. He states that different individuals use different "frameworks" (Goffman 1974: 21) for different kind of circumstances. These "schemata" (Goffman 1974: 21) help to interpret the individuals' perception of reality and attribute a meaning to occasions. Goffman makes a distinction between "Natural frameworks", giving a sense to events not being influenced by any person, and "Social frameworks" (Goffman 1974: 22) able to provide information for the interpretation of occasions including an "intended effect of man" (Goffman 1974: 23.). Snow and Benford carry on research and introduce "collective action frames" (Snow and Benford 1992: 136) as outcome of the framing process in social movement theory. All collective action frames show the same characteristics. Firstly, they have a "punctuating function" to newly define situations in terms of the particular actor's perception. Secondly, they make "diagnostic and prognostic attributions" (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). Collective action frames execute the identification of persons responsible for a situation and delegate the problem solutions (Snow and Benford 1992: 136ff.).

Verloo based her frame analysis approach on these features of frames. Snow and Benford's setup is renamed and supplemented. The project's team makes some adaptations to the particular research field of Gender Mainstreaming and develops a comprehensive "framework" (Verloo 2005: 9) of *Sensitizing Questions*, to apply to political debates about Gender Mainstreaming at different levels. The second step of Verloo's approach is the construction of "Super-text[s]" (Verloo 2005: 11) based on codes distributed to the analysed documents during the first phase of examination with Sensitizing Questions (Verloo 2005: 9ff.).

The approach's underlying assumptions are the reason for my choice to apply frame analysis to the plenary sessions. The method supposes that actors intentionally create a certain mood by consciously framing their statements. This process

includes (re-)definition of the event, attribution of a problem diagnosis and adscription of the problem solutions' responsibility. The intentional creation of a situation's perception among the recipients can be looked upon as a tool by which political actors are able to rationally transfer their Eurosceptical attitude on their opinion on migration from Bulgaria and Romania. The concept of framing assumes actors to consciously frame statements in a particular way to cause specific outcomes, varying from gaining voters' voices to concrete policy actions. This is in line with the above named presumption that politicians' Euroscepticism has an active influence on the political debate about migration from Bulgaria and Romania.

As Verloo's approach is directed towards Gender Mainstreaming in EU political debates, I apply some modifications for the issue of migration. The element *Voice* is removed from the list of Sensitizing Questions, as all speakers are Members of Parliament. The structure is predominantly obtained from Verloo and segmented into (1) Diagnosis, (2) Attribution of Causality, (3) Prognosis and (4) Call for Action. Part 1 and 3 are similarly divided into several sub-items. Most questions are suitable to adopt, as Verloo tried to achieve universal applicability. But parts of the lists are worded in a more open way, to not predetermine an expected outcome (see Annex I).

The developed framework is applied to German and British plenary sessions. The analysis follows the questions' sequence strictly to allow an easier comparison of the results.

## **4. Analysis**

In the following section I will present the frame analysis' results separately for Great Britain and Germany. The passage's structure relates to the Sensitizing Questions' order, whereby in particular cases solutions are directly attached to the problem identifications for a better comprehension of the context. The remaining content is resumed in problem identification including description and problem accountability and problem solution with presentation and addressed actors.

## **4.1 Great Britain**

The five parliamentary debates in the British House of Commons encompass a large amount of pages. On 56 pages 30 speakers of three parties - Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats - propound their concerns on the issue of immigration from Bulgaria and Romania. Many spokespersons do not only issue one statement per meeting, but state their opinion several times in one session. The Members of Parliament often argue for more than one particular concern, so I dissect their statements into the enumerated problems, which are subsequently analysed in detail.

### **4.1.1 Problem Identification**

The British political debate is characterised by presenting various problems related to the lifting of transitional controls for Bulgaria and Romania. The overall voice names immigration itself as serious problem, being reason for diverse impacts. The Conservatives, recent governing party, perceive Romanian and Bulgarian immigration undermining their aim to reduce net migration (House of Commons 2014: Reckless (Con) 569/60, 231, hereafter HC), as well as having a negative influence on the labour market (HC: Bone (Con) 572/97, 309WH). This argument is shared by Labour party's Shadow Home Secretary Cooper (HC: 571/83, 269). The argument's focus is either exploitation of immigrants by not paying the minimum wage, referring to Cooper, or increased competition for national unemployed (HC: Ruffley (Con) 572/97, 327WH). Both parties fear the abuse of social benefits through immigrants (HC: Cooper 571/83, 271) or in particular an "impact on [...] health service" (HC: Mills (Con.) 572/97, 294 WH). The apprehension immigrants could abuse the benefits system is reasoned by fairness that should be shown to UK citizens and legal residents. The latter contribute to the system for a long time, while new migrants may get access to it straightaway (HC: Reckless 569/60, 231). The aspect is developed further by Turner (Con), criticising free movement for giving all persons "the same rights" (HC: 572/92, 74WH), irrespective their origin or offering to the social system.

The parties' members represent their constituencies' opinions against immigration, which they use as argument for claiming changes in the recent British immigration policy (HC: Mills 569/60, 212). Despite the above named dominant problem of immigration in various versions, some more problems are articulated; predominantly single persons' concerns, which do not always receive approval by colleagues. Keith

Vaz' (Lab) makes "push and pull factors" (HC: 571/83, 271) the actual problem of immigration, but Home Secretary May (Con) ignores his objection completely (HC: 571/83, 271). Concerns expressed by the governing parties, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, vary from uncertainty of authorities about altered operating rules for immigration (HC Hughes (LD) 571/83, 276), to feeling misunderstood by the EU (HC: de Bois (Con) 571/83, 280). Some concerns are expressed in questions, making a grab at colleagues' approvals.

An issue, expressed by the competing Conservatives and Labour Party, deals with exaggerated statements in the public on the estimated number of Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants. While Elphicke (Con) formulates a question to enquire the Home Secretary's position (HC: 571/83, 279), Barron (Lab) marks speculations of numbers of new immigrants as "scaremongering" (HC: 571/86, 610). He intends to make the government publish estimates on the number of expected immigrants from 1 January 2014 onwards. While Conservatives perceive immigration itself as striking problem, fostered by the repeal of transitional controls for Bulgaria and Romania, Labour is not solely concerned with making immigration responsible, but with cares for the sending countries, as well as the expected newcomers. Sheerman (Lab/Co-op) presents his voters' misgiving about the amount of "school places and social housing" (HC: 571/92, 612) for new immigrants. Vaz seeks the problem of expected immigration in insufficient EU support for Bulgaria and Romania, e.g. missing help to access EU-funded financial means. According to him the discussion could have been shaped differently, if the countries got appropriate guidance (HC: 572/97, 301WHf.). The Conservatives express concerns about impacts on Bulgaria and Romania evoked through immigration. Howarth (Con) reasons his claim for the extension of restricted access for Romanians and Bulgarians by referring to negative effects for the countries, if they lose their most qualified workers to other EU Member States (HC: 571/86, 271). Bridgen (Con) stresses to consider this implication, too (HC: 572/97, 297WH). An aspect both parties perceive as problematic, leading to immigration from Bulgaria and Romania, are unequal living conditions and level of wages (HC: Bone 572/97, 307WHf.; HC: Vaz 572/97, 301WH). The Members of Parliament show comprehension for people seeking a "better life" (HC: Ruffley 572/97, 324WH), as UK features many economic incentives for immigrants. These incentives make Conservatives raise the problem of free movement regulations not being appropriate anymore. Thus, they need to be reformed (HC: Turner 572/97, 76 WH; HC: Bone 572/97, 307WH; HC: Ellwood (Con) 572/97, 307WH). One interesting problem, identified by Ellwood, states the

debate as “binary” (HC: 572/97, 316WH). Ellwood wants to express that the question on immigration cannot be easily answered with yes or no, but rather has to be considered in an encompassing way. He continues by pointing out that the debate tends to stereotype the affected actors (HC: 572/97, 316WHf.). His opinion is later captured by Hanson (Lab) accusing speakers of classifying all Romanians and Bulgarians in “one particular category” (HC: 572/97, 335WH), what he refuses as not being suitable. A similar allegation is made by Bloomfield (Lab) a few days before, denouncing the government to use the issue of immigration to only win votes. He accuses the government to hype the debate (HC: 572/97, 77WH).

The above named problems are underlined by Conservatives finding various ways to depreciate previous Labour government’s decisions, especially regarding the early lifting of transitional controls for the 2004 accession countries (HC: May 571/83, 267). Degrading the Labour government’s performance by basic stylistic devices like rhetoric questions or alliterations emphasises the long-standing conflict between the big opposing Labour and Conservative party. Every opportunity to underline the opposition’s “incompetence” (HC: Bone 572/97, 306WH) is taken. The metaphor “wave of immigrants” (HC: Patel (Con) 569/60, 7WH; HC: Hollobone 571/86, 624; HC: Bridgen 572/97, 297WH) is named about five times, depicting immigration as uncontrollable force by comparing it to an act of nature. This paraphrase receives additional expressiveness as Great Britain is an island, affected by the destructives of the sea. The metaphor assigns immigrants the same destructiveness. Another commonly used technique is to perform attacks on opposition’s speakers, thereby getting personal, even impertinent (HC: May 571/83, 270). The spokespersons use basic stylistic devices like alliterations or enumerations to underline their pride of the United Kingdom, reinforcing reasons to fear immigrations’ impacts (HC: Turner 572/92, 74WH). One outstanding neologism is Elphicke’s “welfare tourism” (HC: 571/83, 279). It expresses his expectation of immigrants rather coming to UK to enjoy a good time, comparable to holidays, than to work. About 30% of all participants use stylistic devices. The high frequency of stylistic devices shows that the Members of Parliaments consider the issue of migration from Bulgaria and Romania emotionally, so they want to express opinions in an elaborated linguistic way.

About eight statements express that delegates’ constituencies explicitly refuse further migration from Bulgaria and Romania (HC: Hollobone (Con) 571/83, 275), whereby many more indirectly argue with negative effects for UK citizens.

Immigrants would be a burden for the British society, especially regarding greater competition on the housing and labour market (HC: Cooper 571/83, 269; HC: Bridgen 572/97, 297WH). Mills argues that immigration is a problem, as Great Britain still has to cope with recessions' impacts, so that they cannot accommodate any more people (HC: 572/97, 298WH). Although many Members state that lifting of transitional controls for immigrants counteracts the government's aim to reduce net migration (HC: Bone 572/97, 306WH), some speakers do argue for immigration, but only of well educated workers (HC: Patel 569/60, 7WH; HC: Turner, 572/92, 76WH).

Not many speakers' statements name mechanisms, being favourable for a respective problem. If the question is answered, the immigration and benefits systems are pictured to be mechanisms, not effectively working (HC: Reckless 569/60, 231; Patel, 7WH; HC: Mills 572/97, 294WHf.). Other mechanisms referred to are structures, especially the EU Accession Treaty's structures with determined regulations, e.g. the maximum seven-year period of transitional controls (HC: May 571/83, 267f.). Mills makes a particular point by criticising the EU structures of decisions, implemented years later, like it is the case with signature of Accession Treaty and countries' actual joining. Due to him this approach takes the countries' possibility of deciding in the context of current proceedings (HC: 572/97, 298WH). More mechanisms attributable to the EU are old structures of EEC times, although the situation of a growing number of also less wealthy Member States requires new guidelines (HC: Bone 572/97, 307WH). An interesting aspect is the implicitly named mechanism problematising sending countries' societies: well educated Romanians and Bulgarians prefer to emigrate to earn more money abroad, than to stay and support their home countries (HC: Howarth 571/83, 271). It shows British politicians recognising deficiencies in Romania and Bulgaria and acknowledging them as contributing push factors for immigrants. Two more mechanisms are Ellwood's objection of a "bracket[s]"-thinking-system (HC: 572/97, 317WH), people still use to categorise immigrants in the debate and Hanson's criticism of stereotype-thinking, which places all Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants in "one particular category" (HC: 572/97, 335WH). By referring to these comparable mechanisms, both express dissatisfaction about how the debate is shaped. It is peculiarly that mechanisms are hardly captured by other speakers in the further course of the discussion, but rather named a single time, with rare approval of the following spokespersons.

For having created the above named problems, supported by some mechanisms, different persons and institutions are made responsible. Overall there is little

attribution of responsibility for problems. The previous Labour and the current Conservatives governments are made responsible for having missed the chance to establish a “dialogue” (HC: Vaz 572/97, 301 WH) with Romania and Bulgaria or to help the countries in accessing the EU provided financial means (HC: Vaz 572/97, 301WHf.). It is conspicuous that the previous Labour government is not made responsible to have signed the Bulgarian and Romanian Accession Treaty in 2005 – Mills even states that “we signed that treaty” (HC: 572/97, 298WH). But the government is blamed to have not applied any restrictions to migration of the 2004 accession countries, leading to a large influx of EU-migrants (HC: May 571/83, 267; HC: Ruffley 572/97, 325WH). Hughes makes an unidentified group of people responsible to misunderstand the newly introduced measures by the government to control migration, leading to “fear of immigrants” (HC: 571/83, 276). The same approach is used by Barron to stress that some people, who are not further named, perform “scaremongering” (HC: 571/86, 610) about the upcoming immigration from Bulgaria and Romania.

#### **4.1.2 Problem Solutions**

The problem solution approaches are various. One idea is to stop incentives for immigrants by changing the benefits system or restricting access to it. It is noticeable that these measures are already initiated (HC: May 571/83, 267). Several Members of Parliament claim to change the immigration system in terms of the ‘Best & Brightest’ scheme, known from Migration theory, which is repeatedly interposed into the debate (HC: Patel 569/60, 1WH; HC: Bone 572/97, 208 WH; HC: Ruffley 572/97, 325WH). Appreciation that the government already took action into this direction is expressed by Harper (HC: 571/86, 610).

Vaz’ solution for the expected migration is to find motives for emigration from Bulgaria and Romania. The approach shall be accompanied by support for national development, e.g. “infrastructure” (HC: 571/83, 271), leading to greater incentives for educated workers to stay in their countries of origin (HC: 571/83, 271). Carswell (Con) suggests to withdraw from the European Union (HC: 572/97, 299WH), which could be the result of Vaz’ favoured “referendum” (HC: 572/97, 305WH). Nevertheless, for him free movement regulations need to be discussed with the EU, as he does not preclude voting for a continued membership in the EU (HC: Vaz 572/97, 305WH). Ellwood and Hanson want to meet exaggerated statements about estimates of immigrants coming to UK with a “more cognitive debate” (HC: Ellwood 572/97, 317WH); respectively with constructive and efficient work, e.g.

arrangements that can be established until 1 January 2014 (HC: Hanson 572/97, 335WH). Another solution approach is referred to by several Members of Parliament: care about labour market issues to minimise impacts of immigration from Bulgaria and Romania. One concrete proposal is to introduce the minimum wage, preventing exploitation of immigrants on the one hand and migrants undercutting local workers on the other, accompanied by increasing sentence for not paying it (HC: Hanson 572/92, 91 WH). About 22% of 50 British solutions statements claim to solve the problem of immigration by extension of transitional controls. The central problem solution is named by several politicians, like Howarth (HC: 571/83, 271), Hollobone (HC: 571/86, 624) and Mills (HC: 572/97, 298WH). It is assumed that several delegates do not express their approval in their statements, but agree with the above named proponents; derived from other depictions. 12 % of speakers demand for reforms of the immigration system, while 6% prefer to restrict immigrants' access to social benefits. It is noticeable that not very speaker proposes a problem solution. Very few Members of parliament see the solution in searching and correcting problems in the sending countries, while many claim for or allude to extending the restrictions. If Members do not demand to suspend the lifting of restrictions, they at least want to aggravate access to the social benefits system. About 27% of 70 statements respectively problem articulations are without any concrete, convertible problem solution. Only seven statements name a particular course of action. It may be attributable to the absence of an overall consistency of suggesting problem solutions. I recognise little mechanisms termed to be contributing to problem solutions. Patel names reforms to be an important mechanism to change the immigration system (HC: 569/60, 1WH), while Vaz perceives a referendum as a useful national mechanism (HC: 572/97, 305WH).

The solutions are presented by using few stylistic devices to stress what the speakers perceive as important. Conservatives' delegate Mills uses the euphemism "gentle [...] measure" (HC: 572/97, 298WH) to underline the significance of extending transitional controls as only adequate way to cope with the problem of immigration. All in all there is less support for problem solutions by linguistic devices, than for the problem identifications. It goes in line with the above named remark that not every statement including a problem articulation presents a solution to it.

About 14% of all statements address the current government to solve the problems of upcoming immigration (HC: Mills 596/60, 212; HC: Patel 569/60, 1WH; HC: Mills 572/97, 298WH) and the problems on the labour market, expected to occur after 1



January 2014, if nothing will be changed (HC: Cooper 569/60, 269; HC: Hanson 572/97, 335WH). Particular Ministers are addressed, like Home Secretary May (HC: Howarth 571/83, 271) to rethink the lifting of “transitional controls” (HC: Hollobone 571/86, 624). The British Prime Minister David Cameron is addressed by Vaz to start discussing free movement with his EU counterparts (HC: 572/97, 305WH). It is noticeable that there are no calls upon the EU commission or Bulgaria and Romania itself to take action, as free movement is seen as essential catalyst for migration, while Romania and Bulgaria could react on emigration.

The appearance of problem diagnosis and solution approaches is not balanced in the British debate. It is rather shaped by distinct definitions of problems versus a superficial solution to them (e.g. HC: Reckless 569/60, 231). Delegates only name a problem, while not explaining it any further (HC: Patel 569/60, 1WH). That confirms the first impression of problem identifications dominating the statements, while solutions are presented relatively rarely, leading to an imbalance of diagnosis and prognosis. I have to remark that some included statements are questions in rounds of questions, where one cannot expect to find any problem solutions. Nonetheless the debate exhibits balanced declaration; then again some are characterised by elaborating neither diagnosis, nor prognosis.

#### **4.1.3 Particularities**

In addition to the above named results I like to present some peculiarities, catching my attention during the debates’ analysis. Immigration depicts a problem for most delegates, but in only a small number of cases consequences and impacts are cited, like Patel does (HC: 569/60, 2WHf.). The discussion about immigration is so encompassing that Romania and Bulgaria are not always the central point of a statement, but rather used as vivid example, due to its actuality (HC: Howarth 572/92, 88WH). It is recognisable that some delegates’ argumentations are very hard to follow. Patel argues to extend transitional arrangements by connecting immigration to European national criminals, but reasons for it cannot be extracted from her statement (HC: 569/60, 7WH). It is comparable with Field’s argumentation connecting Roma settling in encampments in London to Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants (HC: 569/60, 8WHf.). It gets not clear if he assumes all future migrants from the two countries to behave similarly, which would be discriminating against them. Many parliamentary debates go round in circles with recurring problem definitions, argumentations and solutions.

The sometimes little constructive proceeding is characterised by imputations and insults (HC: May 571/83, 270; HC: Stuart (Lab) 571/83, 272). Members of Parliament react with evasive answers to concrete formulated questions (HC Vaz and May 571/83, 271). Delegates introduce new aspects or formulations, but do not give elaborated information on their stance (HC: Brazier (Con) 571/86, 611). At last I bothered about some delegates' apparently altruistic motives to claim for restrictions on immigration. Howarth depicts the emigration of well-educated people from Bulgaria and Romania as damage to the countries and therefore demands to extend the transitional controls (HC: 571/83, 271). On the first sight this argumentation seems unselfish. But looking at Howarth's other statements – e.g. stating immigration as “a growing threat” (HC: 572/97, 89WH) to the UK - trying to prevent exodus from Bulgaria and Romania rather appears to be a hidden argument for restricting access based on other reasons. The same question of the real motive applies to Bridgen, who is concerned about the national economic effects of educated Bulgarians and Romanians leaving their countries. As he introduces his statement by referring to British unemployed, whom are not easy to place on the labour market, one can assume his worries about Romania and Bulgaria to be not purely motivated altruistic (HC: Bridgen 572/97, 297WH).

#### **4.1.4 Résumé**

To sum up: It seems that British Members of Parliament are willing to depict all problems they experience and assign responsibility for their emergence, while not everyone presents profound solutions to the problems. The most common solution approach, especially of the Conservative Party, is to extend transitional controls. Some Labour delegates refuse this stark measure, but see the necessity to deal with the “challenges” (HC: Hanson 572/92, 91WH) evoked by immigration from Bulgaria and Romania. The discourse is characterised by some contradictions and sparsely detailed explanations, attributable to the Members' emotions respectively their strong will to unconditionally enforce the own standpoint.

The debate in Great Britain tends to resolve around Bulgarians and Romanians coming to the UK as immigrants, not as free movers. Great Britain seems to desire applying the same measures to Bulgarians and Romanians, they use for third country immigrants, wherefore they are – bound to the Accession Treaty - not allowed to. The comparison of EU citizens with TCNs is underlined by naming agenda items 'Immigration (Bulgaria and Romania)' (572/97), instead of 'Free Movers from Bulgaria and Romania'. Although one can repeatedly find references to

free movement, treating Bulgarians and Romanians in the discourse equally as TCNs indicates Great Britain's refusal of their integration. Comparing EU free movers with TCNs may be attributable to the recent observations of rich countries' efforts to restrict immigration of low skilled workers (Prichett 2006: 1). Thus, a discursive equalisation of Bulgarian and Romanian free movers and immigrants from non-EU countries can be explained, if British politicians assume Romanians and Bulgarians to be predominantly unskilled. This is indicated by Fields referring to Roma as "aggressive beggars" (569/60, 7WH). The equalisation is desired to be extended by particular restrictions for EU-citizens' access to Great Britain.

The British discourse on free movement for Bulgarians and Romanians features a 'refusal frame': politicians frame migration from the two countries as severe problem, depicting further vexations for UK citizens, making rejection of migration the logical consequence. Free movement is framed as immigration, with its negative characteristics, evoking claims for altering the free movement system or withdrawal from the EU. Despite these two options, British politicians see a solution in introducing the 'Best & Brightest frame', permitting access for well-educated migrants, refusing to grant it to low qualified workers.

The frequency of 'refusal' and 'criticism of free movement frame' (see table in Annex III) allows the suggestion of a coherence between the Eurosceptical 'withdrawal from EU frame' and the particular framing of the free movement discourse, explained above, which will be reviewed by analysis of Germany.

## **4.2 Germany**

In the five German parliamentary debates dealing with migration from Bulgaria and Romania, 12 different delegates rise to speak about the issue. They belong to four different political parties: SPD, CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and Die Linke.

### **4.2.1 Problem Identification**

The speakers present a row of differentiated problems and concerns. An issue seeming to be important for all representatives is migration from Romania and Bulgaria, in the course of lifting the transitional agreements, depicted in a negative image (Deutscher Bundestag 2014, hereafter BT: Jelpke (Linke) 18/9, 526; Korte (Linke) 18/11, 780f.). The participants refer to a CSU campaign, which they depreciate because of its anti-immigrant content. Especially the opposition as well

as the SPD accuse the CSU of depicting migration as a problem. The CDU/CSU reacts with refusal of populist attacks against immigrants (BT: Gauweiler (CSU) 18/9, 522). This attitude is underlined through stylistic devices like hyperboles or irony by opposing speakers, as well as usage of expressive descriptions of the campaign (BT: Jelpke 18/9 526; BT: Korte 18/11, 780f.). The refusal of anti-immigrant approaches in Schmidt's (SPD) statement shows that assuming immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania would immigrate into the German social benefits' system is not based on reliable evidence (BT: 18/9, 518). Another important topic appearing several times are immigrants suffering from bad working and living conditions in Germany. The aspect is explained by scenarios in the meat industry (BT: Kramme (SPD) 18/26, 2083f.). Employers exploit migrant workers by paying them small wages and hosting them in poor accommodations. A new law shall prohibit these conditions by initiating a labour agreement, applying also to migrant workers (BT: Schiewerling (CDU) 18/26, 2090f.). Schmidt adds another facet: She blames the EU's weak economic success to be the reason for increasing migration from Bulgaria and Romania. Low wages in the countries of origin force Romanians and Bulgarians to exercise free movement to escape poverty. To solve the problem she suggests improvement in Bulgaria and Romania to make migration not the only way to get out of unemployment. Free movement shall be retained, as one of the EU's central developments. Although she states that changes are needed, it is noticeable that she does not address anyone to take action about it (BT: 18/9, 517f.). CSU-associate Gauweiler supports his SPD colleague Oppermann's attempt to newly arrange the conditions for free movement to prevent migrants only benefiting from the German social system. The CDU/CSU does not fully support free movement under the given circumstances of a broad German social benefits system. Gauweiler refers to Oppermann, stating that free movement enables poor immigrants to come to Germany, whom the social system cannot take care of (BT: 18/9, 522f.).

The debates about migration from Bulgaria and Romania not only turn on the issue itself, but develop in adjacent discussions. One connected issue is the German skill shortage, whose resulting gaps on the labour market can be filled by immigrants. The Minister for Labour and Social Affairs Nahles (SPD) declares herself in favour of immigration to cope with demographic change. She stresses that predominantly qualified workers migrate from Bulgaria and Romania. She emphasises as well that mechanisms must not be abused, going along with the position of the Christian

Democrats (BT: 18/19, 1454). The debate is headed into another direction by Die Linke delegate Jelpke. She sheds light on insufficient national asylum systems in the EU, enabling a “Fortress Europe” (BT: 18/9, 526), not accessible for refugees. Thus, she is concerned about Germany to push forward an EU consistent asylum policy (BT: 18/9, 526 f.).

The problem identification in the German political debate on migration from Romania and Bulgaria displays plainly that not migration itself from the two countries is the problem for or a threat to German policy or society. Problematic are rather some influencing factors, determining the reality’s discussion. These factors are the given situation of the EU, still limited by economic recession’s impacts and the national situation of depicting immigration from Bulgaria and Romania in a negative way (BT: Ulrich (Linke) 18/9, 505f; BT: Gauweiler 18/9 522). These structural factors are accompanied by the fact that the Romanian and Bulgarian governments only used less than half of the EU funded budget for measures on the national labour market and benefits system (BT: Gauweiler 18/9, 522).

The attribution of responsibility for having created a problem appears to be modest. The CSU is explicitly named to be responsible for their campaign, spreading “anti-European” (BT: Korte 18/11, 780) content, while Beck (Grüne) accuses the government to draw their statements on “abuse of social benefits” (BT: Beck 18/7, 333) upon not existent data.

#### **4.2.2 Problem Solutions**

The debate is characterised by several approaches to solve the outlined problems. The delegates criticising the right-wing attacks on immigrants appeal to show resistance to such paroles and to meet the issue on justified facts (BT: Schmidt 18/9, 518). The dishonourable working and living conditions for immigrants give occasion to claim for measures to help and support migrant workers (BT: Schiewerling 18/26, 2090). Especially workers in the meat industry shall be protected by the already initiated “Arbeitnehmer-Entsendungsgesetz” (BT: Kramme 18/26, 2083) of SPD and CDU/CSU. This approach goes in line with opposition delegates Ulrich and Müller-Gemmeke (Grüne). They demand an overall minimum wage to prevent exploitation of migrant workers in low-pay sectors, respectively to boost the economy (BT: Ulrich 18/9, 506; BT: Müller-Gemmeke 18/26, 2092). Despite solutions suggested for national involvement, the CDU addresses the

European Commission to take care of Romania and Bulgaria spending the remaining EU financial means (BT: Gauweiler 18/9, 522).

The propositions of problem solutions are emphasised by different stylistic devices to underline the necessity to take competent action, to create identification with the issue or to tease the opposition, especially conducted by Die Linke, in the direction of CDU/CSU (BT: Jelpke 18/9, 527). Four speakers of SPD, CDU/CSU and Die Linke, apparently like to use elaborated language, as their statements are characterised by stylistic devices in the problem definition, as well as in suggesting problem solutions. Four of eight statements address the German government or particular Ministers to take action, either in a national context, for example the introduction of a minimum wage, or in the European context to put greater pressure on other Member States (BT: Ulrich 18/9, 506; Jelpke 18/9, 526).

Especially remarkable is that neither Romania, nor Bulgaria or the EU commission are addressed to change the given situation in the sending countries, which are partly blamed to be a cause for immigration. No particular people, institutions or organizations are named to have voice in suggesting particular courses of action to solve the problems. By addressing the Government or Ministers the spokespersons seem to feel they have assigned the tasks sufficiently. Other interpretations are that the delegates implicitly assume the addressees to have enough power or they do not see any person or institution having sufficient authority to be particularly named. The unspoken assumption of someone's responsibility for a problem could be the reason for the speakers to not always mention who is liable for a problem. Thus, the ascription of accountability is extracted from implicit meanings of voiced comments.

Other concerns, not always solicited are mechanisms in the problem definitions, nor mechanisms contributing to solve the problem. While some statements implicitly indicate EU structures working as problem-creating mechanisms, only little mechanisms are named to support the problem solutions. Pressure on non-conforming actors in the meat industry is mentioned to support the changing of working conditions (BT: Schiewerling 18/26, 2090). The small rate of mechanisms could be a result of the rather specific and dynamic problem solution approaches, which cannot be fitted into a static construct like mechanisms.

#### **4.2.3 Résumé**

To conclude one has to underline distinctly that migration from Romania and

Bulgaria is not seen as the overarching problem in Germany. The delegates are rather anxious about the CSU anti-immigrant campaign creating a negative image of immigrants. The delegates' concerns are predominantly presented in a way integrating basic stylistic devices or an overall consistent argument to convince the audience of the own point of view. There are no large disagreements among the parties, whereby every speaker introduces a personal focus into the debate.

The balance between problem diagnosis and prognosis is mainly given, except a few cases, where the problem identification is of larger size than the definition of a possible problem solution. It is recognisable that the debates also reach related areas, like asylum policy or unreasonable working conditions in German abattoirs, whereof especially migrant workers are affected. As many of these immigrants come from Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, it has a certain importance for the general debate on migration from Eastern Europe.

The European Union or European Commission is only two times addressed to take action against German anxieties. As all Member States are concerned of lifting the restrictions for Romania and Bulgaria, it is remarkable that the German parliament rather tries to solve the problem on its own, than sharing the tasks with the EU or to blame others to be responsible. Nevertheless, the European Commission is assigned to take the important function of caring for Romania and Bulgaria accessing the specially arranged fund. The reasons for immigration, respectively the arguments in the debate are broadly conceived and not focused on a particular actuator, person in charge or a single possible solution. The problem identification is presented comprehensively, while solution approaches incorporate various starting points.

The German discourse is framed to bring immigrants' bad working conditions on the labour market into the focus to develop solutions to the problem. Among individual politicians one can find a 'pro – migrant frame', accompanied by efforts to frame the discourse in a rather positive way, opposing the CSU' negative campaign approach. The discourse is framed in a soft Eurosceptical way insofar as the EU is criticised to have missed to care of Romania and Bulgaria accessing the provided financial means.

## 5. Discussion

In the following section I will discuss the analysis' results for Great Britain and Germany by comparison and further interpretation targeting to answer the research questions named at the thesis' beginning.

The first conspicuousness is the debates' length. The extent of the British debate is much broader than the discussion in Germany. The British governing parties obtain significant more speaking time during the debates than the opposition, whereby the Conservatives have a considerable greater part than the Liberal Democrats. In Germany one can find a relatively balanced conversation's proportion between governing parties and opposition. All chosen British documents are from 2013, while all German documents featuring the utmost frequency of 'Romania' and 'Bulgaria' are from 2014. It indicates that British politicians address the problem before it ever occurred, while the German parliament is concerned about tackling difficulties appearing after Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU.

Despite these formal differences, one has to regard the textual ones. In both countries the discourse is framed by 'criticism of the negative image'. Many German delegates criticise the depiction of a negative image of immigration, like the CSU anti-immigrant campaign. In the United Kingdom only a small number of representatives refer to a negative picture as problem. It represents a greater share of the overall frequency of frames in Germany than in Great Britain (see Annex III). The majority in Britain is rather engaged in painting such an image itself by illustrating immigration's impacts. The German debate partly even creates a positive image of migration, seen in the 'pro – migrant frame'. The same debate is characterised by a 'bad working conditions frame', giving a warning about insufficient care for migrant and national workers in some low-paid sectors, which lead to workers' exploitation. The British parliament pays attention to employers not paying the minimum wage to immigrants, but rather because of increasing competition on the labour market as consequence, depicting a drawback for British citizens ('labour market frame'). One aspect that is shared among Conservatives in UK and Germany is the need to renegotiate and reform the current regulations of the EU free movement system. About 16% of articulated frames are 'criticism of free movement frames', presenting the system as actuator for the named problem of migrating Romanians and Bulgarians. Another shared issue is the 'criticism of the EU frame', whereby it can be oriented towards two different branches: criticism of the EU because of little support for Bulgaria and Romania or criticism in terms of



missing comprehension for the national situation. The first stream appears in both discourses, while the UK is not satisfied with the EU's understanding for its position. While the most frequently presented problem in Great Britain is immigration itself, the German debate focusses on the given circumstances, like the EU financial crisis, the national situations in the sending countries or the dissemination of the immigration's negative image as central problems. The most common appearing solution in Britain is the extension of transitional arrangements to continue control over the borders. Compared to that, the German debate suggests a more extensive approach to solve the presented problems, varying from discussions with the EU to enforcement of the minimum wage. These proceedings are also suggested by some British delegates, but the overwhelming consensus claims to not open the borders to all kinds of immigrants. Regarding the linguistic design the German debate is marked by neutral formulations of problems or solutions, while the British discussion is very emotional. It is characterised by personal, sometimes offensive attacks towards the opponents. Compared to that, one cannot find many emotional outbursts in the German debate. Besides that, German delegates generally do not blame colleagues for their actions, except the CSU, vigorously criticised for its anti-immigrants campaign. In both debates I found a comparable amount of speakers using stylistic devices. The UK debate features 30% of statements with linguistic and rhetoric means, while about 41% of German speakers apply them to their speeches. This slightly higher quantity is attributable to overall fewer speakers, whereby less question rounds are included into the documents, where one does not expect linguistic sophistication.

Several concepts presented in the thesis' beginning are taken up by politicians in both countries, enabling to show the coherence of politicians' anti-EU attitude and a less open oriented discussion on free movement for Bulgaria and Romania. Free movement itself is seen in Germany as crucial element of the EU, worth its retention. This statement is a clear signal towards a general endorsement of the EU and its associated mechanisms. In contrast British politicians delineate themselves from EU's general proceedings, claiming withdrawal and criticising EU's particular approaches to deal with UK's concerns about migration from Bulgaria and Romania. Although German politicians also address the EU to care for Romania and Bulgaria's financial assistance, the British behaviour goes in line with the stronger anti-EU position. The whole British discourse turns around how to reduce immigration, necessary because of various reasons. Thereby the politicians constitute migration from Bulgaria and Romania, which is legally speaking free

movement, rather as immigration of Third Country Nationals. Such a neglect of facts underlines the discourses' emotional charge, as well as UK's Eurosceptical position. Refusing acknowledgement for Bulgaria's and Romania's permission of free movement is a match for refusal of an essential achievement of EU integration. This reaction can be categorised as hard Euroscepticism. Compared to that, the German discourse features little severe criticism of the EU, but suggestions for particular policy fields, underpinning German politicians' soft Eurosceptical position. The general discourse on Bulgaria and Romania practicing free movement is rather characterised by efforts to solve migration's preceding problems than to prevent movement. Occurrence of both facts militates for the assumed influence of Euroscepticism on the shape of the migration discourse.

Strong versus moderate refusal of EU policies in UK and Germany reflect the previously introduced classification into the hard – soft Euroscepticism distinction. The disparity, particularly in combination with the differing overall character of the debates named above, shows the expected coherence of politicians' Euroscepticism with their attitude toward free movers from Bulgaria and Romania.

The overall result of the analysis' comparison is that the discourses on immigration from Bulgaria and Romania in Germany and the United Kingdom are framed differently. The British politicians use framing to depict immigration as a grave problem for the British society, which can be only solved by the particular action of extending transitional controls.

Overall, the potential or recent advent of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens is problematised in the United Kingdom in a more intensive manner than in Germany.

This finding, converging with the countries expressed position on Euroscepticism, indicates that the hypotheses named at the beginning can be confirmed. A Member States' position towards the EU is transferrable by political actors onto their attitude towards migration; respectively the framing process in a less Eurosceptical country is receptive for migration, while the framing in a more Eurosceptical country leads to a rather sealed attitude towards free movement. But I found in Great Britain, as well as in Germany counteracting voices, which are either supporting or refusing further immigration and try to frame the debate in a way, they perceive as correct. These people only display a minority, while the above named result is the consideration of the entirety. However, one has to recognise that this entirety is only a small part of the EU's totality.

## **6. Conclusion**

Qualitative work with particular material of recent actuality and genuine character, like the chosen plenary debates, enables a first insight into the topic and allowed me to answer the research question, formulated at the outset. The debates' analysis shows that the discourses on immigration are framed differently in Great Britain and Germany, depicting cases of differing degree of the central variable: Euroscepticism. While Germany shows openness for Bulgarian and Romanian migrants, the British political discourse is characterised by greater reticence towards Romanian and Bulgarian execution of free movement. The thesis' findings confirm the hypothesis that a politicians' positions towards the EU are transmittable to their attitude towards free movement of Bulgaria and Romania. The transfer, executed by political actors framing their statements, may lead to either a receptive appreciation of Eastern European migration or to a more secretive attitude towards the issue, depending on the countries' primary stance toward the EU. The presence of Euroscepticism's influence through political actors on the alignment of a national migration discourse indicates the assumption of further possible transfers on other EU-related areas. It shows that framing is a powerful tool for individuals to influence a discussion into a particular direction. We have to acknowledge that the interference is not distinctly limited to discourses, but may reach the realm of decision making. Thus, we should keep in mind that political actors frame discourses in their way, when making our own political assessments. As consequence of Euroscepticism being a strong influencer on issues concerning the EU, it may become an obstacle for further EU integration respectively enlargement. And it will most likely lead to disagreement among the Member States about reforms regarding free movement. In how far EU consensus will be affected, depends on the Eurosceptics' power to broaden their transnational influence through strategic framing, and likewise on the reaction of politics and public.

It is important to annotate that the result cannot be transferred to commonality, respectively all other Member States. The findings do not claim any unlimited applicability to the EU. To obtain an encompassing outcome, an empirical and quantitative observation is necessary, as well as further evaluation of already conducted research, which would have exceeded the capacity of this thesis. This paper is conducted to give a first insight into the topic, which is of recent, as well as future actuality, especially regarding the potential accession of Turkey.

To receive renewed confirmation of the above named outcomes, I suggest

continuing research firstly on the political debates, as it is well over half a year since Romania and Bulgaria acceded the EU. Prior, the frame analysis' method of Sensitizing Questions needs further advancement, as Verloo's intended universality does not apply yet. Some issues were not addressed in the political statements, while other questions were hardly to answer without having determined possible answer options beforehand. An adaption could not be performed yet, due to the thesis' limited scope. The second approach is the alignment of findings for political discourses with an analysis of the public's assessment to receive an overall image of a country's mind-set. Do the delegates adequately represent their constituents' opinion? At last I suggest compiling a broadly conceived study of several EU Member States, comparing positions towards the EU and their influence on immigration policy decisions concerning future accession countries. The study's results may determine generalisability for the transferability of Euroscepticism on particular EU-related policy areas.

The research arena of political discourse-shaping, influenced by various potential factors, holds ready many opportunities for further endorsement.

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## **8. Annex**

Annex I: Sensitizing Questions

Annex II: List of Abbreviations

Annex III: Frequency of Frames

## Annex I

### Sensitizing Questions

#### DIAGNOSIS

- Representation
  - What is represented as the problem?
  - What is not represented as the problem?
- Actuators
  - How is the problem depicted to reproduce itself?
- Which mechanisms are mentioned?
- Form
  - What is the argumentation?
  - What conviction strategies can be found?
  - What stylistic devices are used in the text?
    - Dichotomy
    - Metaphor
    - Hyperbole

#### ATTRIBUTION OF CAUSALITY/RESPONSIBILITY

- Who is depicted to have made the issue a problem?
- Who is responsible for it? Who is affected by the problem?
- What is seen as cause of what?

#### PROGNOSIS

- Representation
  - What should be done to solve the problem?
  - What are the proposed means to reach a certain goal?
  - What are the suitable courses of action suggested?
- Denouements
  - Which mechanisms are mentioned to contribute to solve the problem?
- Form
  - What is the argumentation?
  - What conviction strategies can be found?
  - What stylistic devices are used in the text?

#### CALL FOR ACTION

- Who is addressed to do something? Who is not called upon?
- Who has voice in suggesting a course of action for a problem solution?
- What are the limits of action? Why are some actions not possible?

BALANCE

- How is the balance between diagnosis and prognosis?
- Are there contradictions? Between the different dimensions?

## **Annex II**

### List of Abbreviations

CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union
Con	Conservative Party
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union
EU	European Union
Grüne	Bündis 90/Die Grünen
Lab	Labour Party
LD	Liberal Democrats
Linke	Die Linke
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TCN	Third Country National
UK	United Kingdom

### Annex III

#### Frequency of Frames

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Great Britain</b>	<b>Germany</b>
Labour Market	6	-
Criticism of negative Image	3	3
Refusal	12	-
Withdrawal from EU	2	-
Bad Working Conditions	1	4
Pro-Migrant	-	1
Criticism of Free Movement	6	1
Criticism of EU	1	
- Support for Bulgaria & Romania	1	1
- missing Comprehension	1	



## **Statement of Authorship**

I hereby certify that this Bachelor Thesis has been composed by myself, and describes my own work, unless otherwise acknowledged in the text. All references and verbatim extracts have been quoted, and all sources of information have been specifically acknowledged. It has not been accepted in any previous application for a degree.

Münster, 15 September 2014



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