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# GOAL ALIGNMENT IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT

A Case Study Research of the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition

A Master's Thesis for Business Administration – International Management

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## PREFACE

About six months ago, I have commenced on what might very well be the largest research project of my life. As the date for defense of the end result is approaching, time has come to look back, not only on the process of collecting data and writing my thesis, but on the total of years that have made up my student time.

I feel that in the end, what you gain from studying is not an extensive knowledge on all the aspects related to the subject you are studying, but rather a frame of reference that helps you to take decisions, both professional and personal, and to interpret what is going on in the world around you. Although I have always had a large interest in the workings of the economy and the role business plays in society, and in particular in international society, not long after commencing my studies the feeling that something was missing grew stronger. To me, business goes beyond pure commercialism, which has led to a particularly strong interest in Corporate Social Responsibility, development issues, and the role business could play in making the world a better place.

My idealism has put me on a search for meaning of the subjects I had learned in university. It has taken me to Northern Ghana, where I have done a research on microfinance and have worked closely with the poor communities there, and with an NGO in sustainable agriculture. My search has also taken me to Brazil, where I have researched the influence of cultural values on new venture creation, and have set up a project helping the children growing up in the slums of Goiânia. I have had the pleasure of meeting so many inspiring people, all of them with a unique view on life and the world. All these views I have taken in, and together they have contributed to my personal frame of reference.

Finally, this search for meaning has taken me to The Hague. At the department of Sustainable Economic Development of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs I have spent six months researching synergy potentials in Dutch policy on research for sustainable agriculture. It was through colleagues at the Ministry that I heard about the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition for the first time. Already having a strong interest in the ways corporations may contribute toward building a better society, I became very interested in the initiative and eventually managed to convince the coordinating NGO to allow me to research the process of goal alignment within AIM. Herbert Smorenburg and Luca Genovese, thank you for the opportunity.

Together with Schuttelaar & Partners, a consultancy firm specialized in health, development, and food security issues, I have collected my data through interviewing several key individuals involved. The S&P consultants involved proved to be excellent sparring partners, providing me with some very valuable insights. I would like to take this opportunity to thank them, both for the insights and the pleasant collaboration. Thank you, Rutger Schilpzand, Karin Ruigrok and Doutzen Wagenaar.

I would moreover like to thank all my ex colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I have had too many colleagues to mention them all separately, but those that I have worked with the closest or that have been involved with my research are worth listing here. Marcel Beukeboom, thank you for giving me the opportunity and trust to let me experience the workings of the Ministry. Corinne Abbas, thank you for being my mentor and allowing me the space to work on my thesis during 'Ministry' hours. Frits van der Wal, Paulus Verschuren, Anno Galema, thank you for involving me in AIM. Wijnand van Ijssel, Mario Leeflang, Jeroen Rijniers, Kevin Huyzen, thank you for your ideas and the good times we spent together.

Of course I should also thank my supervisors, without whom this whole project would not have been possible. Huub Ruel and Martin Stienstra, many thanks for your thoughts, your feedback, and your patience. Finally, last but not least, my family, friends, and boyfriend. Thank you for supporting me, even during stressed times, for showing interest in a subject that at times must have sound completely out of your reach, and for generally being there.

## ABSTRACT

In recent times, collaboration between different-sector parties in so-called Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for development have gained popularity as a means toward promoting development. Despite their rising popularity and hailed promise of solving complex development issues however, to date little research has been done on the internal dynamics of these often complex forms of intersectoral collaboration.

Organization types involved in these PPPs for development range from purely public to private, commercially oriented organizations. These organizations are often answering to drastically different constituencies, leading to a divergence in interests and strategic and operational realities. The different groups of constituencies of involved parties call for diverging courses of action of their focal organizations, leading to a variety of goals being pursued by the different partners through their involvement in PPPs for development. Little is known about the nature of the goals that are being pursued, and how these goals are aligned for the purpose of the initiative. The research at hand attempts to fill this knowledge gap by investigating the practice and process of goal alignment in PPPs for development.

Specifically, a case study has been conducted on the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition (AIM), a large Dutch PPP for development involving government, academia, and various non-governmental organizations and private sector parties. An iterative coding procedure of data in the form of various documents and semi-structured interviews with key individuals involved has led to the emergence of a conceptual framework untangling the multiplicity of goals for collaborative initiatives. This framework categorizes these goals into a hierarchy of three levels, being organizational goals, collaboration goals, and operational goals. The research moreover provides insight into the various goals pursued by different organization types through their involvement in these PPPs for development. Comparing the organizational goals of different organization types involved showed a divergence between the goals and outcome types pursued by different classes of organizations. Multiple goals and outcome types are moreover pursued at the same time by single organizations.

The research shows the process of getting these different goals aligned for the initiative to be an ongoing and dynamic process. The iterative coding procedure has moreover identified several factors facilitating this process, the most important of which appear to be a brokering organization, flexibility, and a cleverly formulated meta-goal and collaborative strategic plan, whereas among others frequent staff rotations and power struggles were found to be complicating the process.

The research findings contribute to literature on interorganizational collaboration and facilitates the practice of goal analysis and alignment in collaborative ventures. As AIM is a comparatively large collaborative venture with partners collaborating both on a platform level and project levels, findings of the research at hand may be representative for both PPPs for development and the larger, more complex phenomenon of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms.

*Key words: Public-Private Partnerships, PPPs, development, goal alignment, interorganizational collaboration, intersectoral collaboration, nutrition security, malnutrition*

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|      |  |
|------|--|
| AIM  | the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition  |
| BoP  | Base of the Pyramid  |
| CDI  | Center for Development Innovation (WUR)  |
| CEO  | Chief Executive Officer  |
| CSR  | Corporate Social Responsibility  |
| CSSP | Cross-Sector Social Partnership  |
| F2F  | Face-to-face   |
| FDOV | Facility for Sustainable Entrepreneurship and Food Security<br>(Faciliteit voor Duurzaam Ondernemen en Voedselzekerheid) |
| GAIN | Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition   |
| ICCO | Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation   |
| IP   | Intellectual Property  |
| M&E  | Monitoring & Evaluation  |
| MFA  | Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands)  |
| MNC  | Multi-National Corporation   |
| MSP  | Multi-Stakeholder Platform   |
| NGO  | Non-Governmental Organization  |
| NWGN | the Netherlands Working group on Global Nutrition  |
| PPP  | Public-Private Partnership   |
| PPS  | Public-Private Collaboration (Publiek-Private Samenwerking)  |
| S&P  | Schuttelaar & Partners   |
| SUN  | Scaling Up Nutrition   |
| UN   | United Nations   |
| WFP  | World Food Programme   |
| WUR  | Wageningen University & Research   |

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## INTRODUCTION

For six decades, Western donors have been trying to use money to promote the development of countries that are lagging behind economically. This development aid has been accompanied by continual public debate about which strategies are most effective, with many believing that traditional development aid has produced insufficient results and some even suggesting scrapping aid completely (van Lieshout et al., 2010). What is more, due to the continuing financial crisis, most governments are facing far-reaching budget cuts.

To cope with changing perspectives on development aid and public demands for increased efficiency and effectiveness, the involvement of the private sector constitutes a growing priority in many development aid programs (IOB, 2013). Meanwhile, in a response to increasing demands for Corporate Social Responsibility and a growing realization of the potential of the so-called Base of the Pyramid (BoP) (Prahalad, 2005), corporations are increasingly targeting development issues. These developments are contributing to the emergence of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), a type of intersectoral collaborative venture involving government, business and potentially other parties. These PPPs for development are becoming increasingly popular in both development and corporate policy and practice as a means of addressing global development issues (e.g. Buse & Walt, 2000a; MFA, 2013a; World Bank, 2002).

Both the appeal of and the challenge inherent in PPPs for development arise from the notion of building new relationships between actors that have drastically different constituencies and interests, accompanied by divergent strategic and operational realities. Whereas most public parties may be expected to leverage partnerships to contribute toward the achievement of their development objectives, businesses are generally perceived to partake in PPPs only when cooperation directly or indirectly contributes to corporate profitability (Bakan, 2004; Kolk et al., 2008). Strategic objectives of involved parties in PPPs for development could thus be very different. However, since shared partner commitment to formal goals and social value generation is said to potentially significantly increase the viability of the partnership (Arya & Salk, 2006), these diverging goals should be aligned to a certain extent for the partnership to function.

The increase in popularity of PPPs for development has spurred research on these collaborative ventures, ranging from organizational perspectives evaluating internal dynamics, to policy perspectives concerned with external effects and impact of these partnerships, to governance perspectives analyzing the influence of the partnerships on public decision-making (Glasbergen, 2011). Several models depicting the process of such partnerships have been proposed, numerous impact and effectiveness studies have been performed, and several terms and definitions are proposed to label the phenomenon. Within this growing base of research, it is striking that the process of alignment of the goals pursued by different-sector organizations involved has been largely ignored. The research in the thesis at hand therefore sets out to provide more insight into this process.

## RESEARCH GOAL

Each party involved in public-private partnerships does so for its own motivations, which may vary along the project life cycle. As each party involved has different constituencies and interests, the strategic objectives of different partners involved may vary significantly. Hence, the goal of the research in the thesis at hand revolves around the following:

**To describe the process of goal-alignment in Public-Private Partnerships for development.**



## CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION

In working towards achievement of the above-stated research goal, the research in the thesis at hand revolves around answering the following central research question:

**How are the goals of parties involved in Public-Private Partnerships for development aligned for the joint initiative?**

This research question has a managerial form, revolving around the evaluation of a process in the internal workings of PPPs for development. The research at hand can therefore be categorized under the organizational perspective as identified by Glasbergen (2011).

This central research question has been further divided into three sub-questions that are stated below.

### SUB-QUESTION 1

With different groups of constituencies posing diverging demands on their focal organizations, it may be expected that different-sector parties pursue different goals through their involvement in PPPs for development. Businesses for example are generally perceived to partake in PPPs only when cooperation contributes to corporate profitability, either directly or through reputational benefits (Bakan, 2004; Kolk et al., 2008). Governments, NGOs and knowledge institutions do not exist to make profits, and instead have different motivations for partaking in partnerships. In order to analyze the goal alignment process in PPPs for development, further clarity is needed about the motivations of both public and private sector parties for participating in such collaborative initiatives, leading to the first sub-question:

***What are key goals of different sector parties for participating in PPPs?***

- a. What are key goals of companies for participating in PPPs for development?***
- b. What are key goals of Non-Governmental Organizations for participating in PPPs for development?***
- c. What are key goals of knowledge and research institutions for participating in PPPs for development?***
- d. What are key goals of the government for participating in PPPs for development?***

### SUB-QUESTION 2

When different parties have different motivations for uniting in PPPs for development, it follows logically that in partaking in these partnerships the parties pursue different (implicit and explicit) goals. For a PPP to be effective however, shared partner commitment to formal goals and social value generation is argued to be crucial (Arya & Salk, 2006), indicating the need for alignment of the different goals that partners bring to the table. As the next step toward answering the central research question, it is therefore important to indicate main differences between partnership goals of the different parties involved, and to analyze how these goals were aligned to overcome these differences and facilitate implementation. The second sub-question has thus been formulated as follows:

***How is goal alignment in PPPs for development achieved?***

- a. What are the main differences in goals for PPPs for development of the different parties involved?***
- b. How are different goals of the different parties involved being aligned for the PPP for development?***

### SUB-QUESTION 3

Partnering is not a neatly sequenced process. In fact, it is described by many scholars as a continuous process with many feedback loops. These loops may be induced by changes in the strategic environment of one of the partners, which might lead to changing strategies, problem definitions, or roles along the partnership timeline (Clarke & Fuller, 2011; Roloff, 2007), implying that goals that were aligned at a certain moment may not be aligned any longer in the future. The level of goal alignment among parties participating in PPPs for development may then vary along the PPP life cycle, affecting the priority the partnership has for each organization involved.

To ensure that partnerships keep their priority level within the respective partners involved, project managers should make sure that the goals of the partnership stay aligned with those of the other partners (Platje et al., 1994). When investigating goal alignment in PPPs for development, it is therefore important to take into account the potentially dynamic nature of goal alignment by identifying measures taken to keep partnership goals aligned, through answering the following sub-question:

#### ***How do goals stay aligned during the course of the PPP for development?***

In the next chapter of the thesis at hand, a theoretical framework is described providing the background of the research conducted and an initial direction in which answers to the central research question and sub-questions may be sought. The methodology used to collect and analyze data is described in the Methodology chapter following the Theoretical Framework, in which also a description of the case under study is provided. The following Results chapter contains a rich description of findings resulting from the data analysis, on which the Conclusion of the research in the chapter thereafter is based. Finally, a discussion and listing of limitations of the research in the Discussion & Limitations chapter precedes the final Implications chapter containing a description of implications for theory and practice.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

By definition, PPPs lie at the interorganizational level and are a type of collaborative ventures. These collaborative ventures come in all forms and shapes, such as alliances, partnerships, consortia, business networks, etc., and their number has been growing steadily over the last decades (e.g. Doz & Hamel, 1998; Hagedoorn & Rajneesh, 1996). In interorganizational collaboration, two or more organizations contribute resources such as money, staff time, expertise, etc., to undertake a project that could and/or would not be done by one organization alone (e.g. Gray, 1985). Hence, according to the traditional economic view, these ventures are initiated based on the need to acquire necessary complementary resources in the pursuit of shared objectives.

Multi-organizational collaborative relationships have been the focus of extensive research (e.g., Gulati & Singh, 1998; Kogut, 1988; Williamson, 1991). These collaborative ventures may consist exclusively of private organizations, or may encompass collaboration among private, governmental, and/ or civil society organizations. The latter form of collaboration, spanning the borders of the business, government, and civil society sectors, is frequently referred to in the literature as Cross-Sector Partnerships. This term covers a variety of interorganizational relationships and terminology under its umbrella, such as multi- or cross-sector collaboration (Hardy, Lawrence & Philips, 2006); business or government nonprofit partnerships (Austin, 2000c; Gazley & Brudney, 2007); business-community partnerships (Loza, 2004); collaborative or multiparty alliances (Berger, Cunningham & Drumwright, 2004; Zeng & Chen, 2003) and finally, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).

Public-Private Partnerships, in their traditional sense leveraged as a new approach for managing cities, are broadly defined as “an arrangement in which a government and a private entity, for-profit or non-profit, jointly perform or undertake a traditionally public activity” (Savas, 2000, p. 15). These PPPs are usually leveraged by governments when they need to build capital-intensive infrastructure with a long lifespan such as a highway, airport, public building, or water system. A complex combination of public and private capital is used to fund the building of the desired facility. The private sector partner subsequently operates the facility under a long term franchise, contract, or lease. Characteristic for such PPPs are private capital and private management of the design, construction, and long-term operation of the infrastructure (Savas, 2000). A general characteristic of PPPs then is the pursuit of common goals, while leveraging joint resources and capitalizing on the respective competences and strengths of the partners (Jamali, 2004).

The range of public-private projects described as public-private partnerships in academic literature is enormous (Ingerson, 1999) and to date scholars have not managed to reach an overall consensus on what actually constitutes a Public-Private or Cross-Sector Partnership. Whereas some scholars classify contract-driven, transaction-based collaboration between business and other sectors as PPPs, others only consider fully-fledged partnerships where parties involved share risks, cost and benefits. Moreover, PPPs range from the traditional, interest-based PPPs as described above, “where direct commercial gains are offered in exchange for some agreed performance measure”, to alliances which are more than interest-based, “where business partners enter the relationship with an explicit interest in achieving social and environmental aims that goes beyond short-term fee-for-service or goods-for-sale strategies” (Zadek, 2008, p. 16-17). The former are referred to by the Dutch government as Public-Private Collaboration (PPS – Public-Private Samenwerking) whereas the latter is referred to as Public-Private Partnership, leveraged to facilitate sustainable development in developing countries (MFA, 2010). PPPs as considered in the thesis at hand relate to the latter form of PPPs, in which actors from different sectors collaborate to jointly address a development issue.

## PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Multi-organizational collaborative initiatives targeting development issues, or PPPs for development, have different dimensions and dynamics than PPPs in their traditional sense. PPPs for development are situated in an uncertain, complex, and often distant setting, generally lacking good governance. Moreover, partners are often heterogeneous and successful collaboration thus requires a great degree of trust or at the very least an understanding of the different backgrounds of each partner (Kolk et al., 2008).

As is typical in a new and evolving field, terminology in the academic literature for these Public-Private Partnerships leveraged for development purposes, or shorter, PPPs for development, varies. References by scholars to such partnerships include cause-based partnerships (Parker & Selsky, 2004); Cross-Sector Social Partnerships (CSSPs) (e.g., Selsky & Parker, 2005); issues management alliances (Austrom & Lad, 1989); business-community partnerships (Loza, 2004); social or multiparty alliances (Berger et al., 2004; Zeng & Chen, 2003); Social Partnerships (Waddock, 1991; Warner & Sullivan, 2004); social service partnerships (Takahashi & Smutny, 2002) and finally, Public-Private Partnerships for development.

Again, these terms encompass a very broad range of projects and there is a wide variety of forms and shapes these PPPs for development can take (Reed & Reed, 2009). They may vary in terms of their size, scope, and purpose. Moreover, they may vary in level of engagement (local to global) and diversity of partners, and range from dyads to multiparty arrangements. They may deal with a variety of issues, and potentially have a role in both agenda setting and implementation activities. Participation may be totally voluntary to fully mandated (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Finally, their timelines range from single, one-off events to collaborations going on over several years (Hemmati, 2002). These differences indicate the need to further narrow down the definition of the specific type of interorganizational collaboration analyzed in the thesis at hand to facilitate reliability and generalization purposes.

There are various definitions of PPPs for development present in academic literature. An early definition by Waddock (1991), who refers to PPPs for development as CSSPs, states that CSSPs are “the voluntary collaborative efforts of actors from organizations in two or more economic sectors in a forum in which they cooperatively attempt to solve a problem or issue of mutual concern that is in some way identified with a public policy agenda item” (p. 481-482). Selsky & Parker (2005) add that these issues are “social issues and causes that actively engage the partners on an ongoing basis” (p. 22). Partnerships of this type are defined in UN documents as “voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both State and non-State, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits” (United Nations, 2003, p. 4).

The Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation (2004) adds that parties share risks, responsibilities, means, competences, and profits. By doing so, these PPPs for development are beyond a transactional nature in which they do one specific value transaction together, and can be considered ‘integrative’ (Austin, 2000c) or ‘strategic’ (Ashman, 2001), aiming to share their resources, knowledge, and capabilities in such a way that joint value creation ensues (Kolk et al., 2008). The underlying logic then, is that by combining resources and expertise, additional resources and knowledge are generated. These facilitate the achievement of results that benefit all parties involved and which could not have been achieved by any partner individually (Reinicke et al., 2000). Thus, there is the potential for synergy of some form; by combining resources the ‘sum is greater than its parts’.

The multiplicity of terms and definitions, sometimes even used concurrently in the same document (e.g. United Nations, 2004), lead to confusion and to scholars calling for greater clarity and rigor in the use of the term ‘partnership’. This calls for a clear definition of the concept of PPPs for development underlying the research at hand. Common notions of prior definitions and descriptions of PPPs for development are therefore combined to form the following definition:

*A voluntary, integrative collaborative effort of actors from the private profit and/ or non-profit and public spheres of society, in which they strategically aggregate their resources and competencies and share responsibilities, risks, and benefits, aiming for joint value creation in pursuing a common, overarching development goal that no member can achieve on its own.*

PPPs for development may be formed between business and NGOs, which are frequently referred to as *private-nonprofit partnerships*, and which commonly address the underinvestment in the ‘social capital’ of a country (Putnam, 2000). They may moreover consist of business and government actors, generally addressing the inadequate (private and public) provision of public goods (Kolk et al., 2008), also known as the ‘policy rationale’ for partnerships (OECD, 2006, p.19), or as the ‘underinvestment’ problem encompassing insufficient investment of both the state and the private sector (Kolk et al., 2008). In *tripartite partnerships* government, as well as private and civil society actors are involved. These partnerships target in particular the problems resulting from the ‘institutional void’ caused by diminished governmental influence and weak governance structures (Van Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2006).

#### CATEGORIZING PARTNERSHIPS

Several scholars have provided categorizations of partnerships, focusing on different characteristics of these collaborations. Below, some of the more prominent and relevant categorizations are explained.

Kolk et al. (2008) provide a categorization of partnerships at three different levels: the micro, meso, and macro level. Micro-partnerships revolve around a single project, focusing on a particular country or specific activity; meso-partnerships go beyond this project basis and aim to improve the sustainability of a certain sector or supply chain; and macro-partnerships “have broad objectives, define issues widely, address multiple interests and therefore also cover several countries or global activities” (p. 268-269), which are not necessarily related to a company’s core activities.

Zadek (2008) relates his three primary categories of PPPs to their purpose and distinguishes commercial, resourcing, and rule-setting PPPs. Commercial PPPs encompass public services and infrastructure and fall under the PPPs in the traditional sense, or PPS, as described above. In these collaborations businesses are involved for profit motives. Resourcing partnerships are collaborative initiatives aimed at achieving public goals such as combating AIDS or road safety through the mobilization of public and private resources. Rule-Setting partnerships focus on “the joint development, advocacy and stewardship of rules or standards (e.g. business and human rights, anti-corruption codes) governing the (cross-border) behavior of targeted adopters” (p. 7).

The United Nations Foundation and the World Economic Forum (2003) also categorize partnerships based on their purpose, and distinguish operational, policy or strategy, advocacy, and multifaceted partnerships. Most PPPs are operational in nature, forming a collaborative to address well-defined problems. Some however, may be better classified as policy or strategy partnerships, addressing new or particularly complex challenges through defining policy or strategy. Examples of such a partnership are the several task forces analyzing the role of information technology in development. Partnerships intended to promote action or create awareness and political will related to key issues, e.g. the global HIV/AIDS awareness campaign, are termed advocacy partnerships. Finally, some partnerships are multifaceted, integrating operational, policy and advocacy elements or starting with targeting high-level policy issues but evolving to include operational components.

## ANALYZING PPPs FOR DEVELOPMENT

### THE PROCESS OF PPPs

Scholars have developed several frameworks in which the development, management, and analysis of PPPs for development is structured. They almost universally agree that these partnerships can be examined according to chronological stages, and both strategic management and collaboration literature provide several stage models (e.g. Austin, 2000b; Googins & Rochlin, 2000; Gray, 1989; McCann, 1983; Seitanidi & Crane, 2009; Waddell & Brown, 1997; Waddock, 1989). However, the number of stages, the labels attached to these stages, and the variables examined within these stages vary (Selsky & Parker, 2005).

Most stage models are said to involve rather broad and not very informative categories. Selsky & Parker (2005), for instance, argue that partnerships move from selection through design to institutionalization. More detailed models are said to further a better understanding of issues related to the management of the collaboration, such as how to select partners, how to design partnerships, and how long-term sustainability and success of these partnerships can be ensured (Glasbergen, 2011). Below, some of the more prominent and applicable process models found in the literature are explained.

McCann's (1983) and Gray's (1989) models describing the process of collaboration, which are among the most widely referenced, involve the three phases of problem-setting, direction-setting, and structuring. Waddock (1989) subsequently adjusted these models to be applicable to PPPs for development and adjusted the labels to issue crystallization, coalition building, and purpose formation. The model later offered by Waddell & Brown (1997) is a more comprehensive model of the collaborative process, consisting of five phases: identifying preconditions for partnership; convening partners and defining problems; setting shared directions; implementing action strategies; and institutionalizing and/or expanding successful inter-sectoral collaboration.

More recently, Seitanidi & Crane (2009) provided a more detailed, empirically derived model describing the three process stages of partnership selection, partnership design, and partnership institutionalization, in which they further included sub-processes. As with McCann's (1983), Gray's (1985), Waddock's (1989) and Waddell & Brown's (1997) model, the authors did not incorporate external effects of the partnership into the model (Clarke & Fuller, 2011).


Clarke and Fuller (2011) provide a different process model of collaborative strategic management providing a more complete illustration of the dynamic, co-evolutionary process of PPPs for development, which is further explained below.

### CLARKE & FULLER'S PROCESS MODEL OF COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Clarke & Fuller (2011) build on and expand on McCann's (1983), Gray's (1985), Waddock's (1989), Waddell & Brown's (1997) and Seitanidi & Crane's (2009) models as described above, and propose a more comprehensive process model for collaborative strategic management which subsequently has been empirically validated. Their model incorporates implementation of the partnership at both the individual organizational level and the level of collaboration. They moreover leave room for expanded outcomes of interest, and included feedback loops. Their model does not just incorporate enduring collaboration as an outcome such as in Waddell & Brown's (1997), but also focuses on the collaborative strategic plan, the collaborative goals achieved, the actions taken both by individual organizations and the collaboration as a whole, and the organizational learning outcomes. Clarke & Fuller's (2011) model thus appears to be the most applicable when analyzing the process of goal alignment in PPPs for development.

Because of its feedback loops, Clarke & Fuller's (2011) model incorporates the dynamism in the collaborative process at both the collaborative level of the partnership and the individual level of implementation. Its labels moreover more closely match the strategy literature. This model thereby provides a better documentation and explanation of the collaborative strategic plan formulation and implementation process, and is thus potentially

more suitable to guide a structured analysis of collaborative strategies of PPPs for development. Their model is displayed in figure 1 below.



**Figure 1:** Process model of collaborative strategic management. Source: Clarke & Fuller (2011), p. 90.

During the first stage, marked with *a* in the figure above, the context is being assessed and the partnership is formed. There is usually a lead organization who targets the social problem(s) and considers different situational factors related to the issue, such as potential partners, resources needed, etc. (Gray, 1989). Next, this lead organization invites initial partners to join in a PPP. This partnership formation process does not occur at just this one, discrete moment in time however; partners may be added or removed in any stage, as visualized by the bottom box marked with *f* indicating that changes in the domain may lead to changes in different stages. Such changes may be based on corrective action, overlapping activities, cyclical decision making and external factors.

During the second stage of the collaborative strategic management process the collaborative strategic plan is formulated. In this stage, marked with *b*, the partners that have formed the partnership in phase one work together to formulate a common vision, mission and/or values statement(s) and translate these statements into overarching, long-term collaborative goals, or *meta-strategy* (Glasbergen, 2011; Huxham & MacDonald, 1992). A collaborative strategic plan should subsequently be formulated, stipulating courses of action for both individual partners and the collaboration as a whole. Through this plan the partnership may moreover allocate the resources necessary to carry out the stipulated courses of action (Clarke & Fuller, 2011).

Thus, during this stage the goals of the partners are being preliminarily aligned. This process of goal alignment may proceed quickly or may take years to negotiate, depending on the nature and extent of the issues involved. Actors often agree to disagree to not be lost in endless discussions (Roloff, 2007), and extremely contentious and divisive topics are generally not included in the consensus documents (Huxham & MacDonald, 1992). The stability that is achieved by formalizing the partnership may become dynamic again when for instance new partners join the partnership or when the initial circumstances on which the partnership is based change in the following implementation phase (Glasbergen, 2011).

The third and fourth stages of the process, marked with *c* and *d*, occur simultaneously. These stages involve the deliberate and emergent implementation of the collaborative strategic plan. Aspects of this implementation that are related to the overarching strategic objectives of the partnership and that focus on aspects of the ecological, economic, legal, political, regulatory, social and/or technological environments (Fahey & Narayanan, 1986), are being enacted by the partnership as a whole. Involved partners hereby interact with both participating and non-participating stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). Other aspects of implementation are enacted by individual partners within their respective organizations, as displayed in stage four (*d*). This

implementation is more narrowly focused and within the managing capabilities of the individual partners. Pooling or transferring of resources may however assist them by doing so (Hardy et al., 2003).

It is not unusual for some actors to leave the PPP when the partnership is being implemented, e.g. for reasons of divergence between expectations and reality, contextual changes or a perceived lacking of effectiveness of the partnership. Many PPPs fail during these stages, because all actors need to honor their commitments and the PPP is put to the test by implementation problems. When the activities chosen turn out not to resolve or impact the issue, actors return to stage *b* to revise their problem definition and analysis of the issue and to formulate a new or adjusted collaborative strategic plan (Rolloff, 2007). A revised problem definition and collaborative strategic plan will likely lead to changes in the group of actors involved, since outcomes of the problem analysis may require new actors to be included (Rolloff, 2007).

According to Huxham (1993), reliance on individual implementation as in *d* is most appropriate when there is less detail in the strategic plan. When the implementation process of stages 3 and 4 is sufficiently structured, there will be ongoing monitoring and evaluation, and corrections are being made whenever necessary. The fifth and final stage, marked with *e*, relates to the outcomes of the collaborative strategy implementation. These outcomes are the results of both the collective and individual actions taken. Clarke & Fuller (2011) identify six types of possible outcomes:

- *Plan-centric outcomes* are outcomes related to the underlying problem the partnership aims to solve or in other words, the impact the partnership creates on the problem (e.g. Gray, 1989; Logsdon, 1991).
- *Process-centric outcomes* are outcomes that lead to changes of the partnership and the process of implementation, and changes to actions related to this implementation process (e.g. Pinto & Prescott, 1990).
- *Partner-centric outcomes* are outcomes benefiting the individual organization (e.g. Hardy et al., 2003; Huxham & Hibbert, 2004).
- *Outside stakeholder-centric outcomes* involve changes in the relationships between the partnership (including its individual partners) and non-participating stakeholders (e.g. Freeman, 1984).
- *Person-centric outcomes* are outcomes limited to an individual basis (e.g. Hood et al., 1993).
- *Environmental-centric outcomes* are unexpected outcomes related to the environmental context (e.g., ecological, governmental, technological, regulatory, social environments, etc) (Fahey & Narayanan, 1986). These outcomes are beyond the focal issue(s) of the partnership.

Most PPPs tend to alternate between the deliberation and implementation stages in their life cycle. When new actors join, they may repeat the deliberation stage *b*. Definitions of the issue, the meta-goals, and the approach may also be reconsidered after evaluation of the outcome of stage *e*. Some PPPs live on after its outcomes are known, other PPPs will either dissolve when the partnership fails to meet the expectations of the partners, or become something else, e.g. lead to the incorporation of results into laws and regulations or to the establishment of a formal organization. Rolloff (2007) therefore included an extra stage into his Life Cycle Model, called the *institutionalization or extinction phase*.



## GOALS FOR PPPs FOR DEVELOPMENT

In line with theories on collaboration management and governance in which goals are alternately referred to as the reasons for initiation of the collaboration, the aspirations of involved parties, and the nature of the collaborative advantage these parties search after (Vangen & Huxham, 2012), in the thesis at hand goals are being broadly defined to include missions, purpose, stated motivations, aspirations and values.

### LEVELS OF GOALS

Huxham and Vangen (1996) characterize goals on three levels. At the top level are the *meta-goals*, the goals for the common cause of the collaboration, i.e., “a statement of what it is aiming to achieve” (Huxham & Vangen, 1996, p. 9). A clear definition of purpose and roles is required to ensure that all actors understand the PPP’s interest, priorities, and expectations. Defining a meta-goal may thus be considered a source of PPP identity building. In practice, however, giving an explicit definition of meta-goals may prove to be difficult. A meta-goal should be tight enough to provide for sufficient direction for the PPP and for the partners, but broad enough so that each partner can identify itself with it (Huxham & Vangen, 1996). The more centrally aligned the meta-goal of the partnership is to each partners’ strategy and mission, the more important and vigorous the partnership appears to be (Austin, 2000b). Because of the fundamental importance of the meta-goal for the network’s discussion and actions, this meta-goal may be challenged whenever new actors join the PPP.

Beyond the meta-goal, clarity in problem definition and solution identification can significantly increase the viability of the partnership. PPPs for development are still a relatively new phenomenon and partners thus have limited experience. Based on prior research findings on PPPs for development, it may therefore be expected that formal goals are of vital importance to keep these alliances on track (Arya & Salk, 2006).

At the second level are the goals that each of the participating organizations pursues for itself through collaborating, but which are not (directly) related to the meta-goal of the PPP. Such goals could be termed *organizational goals* and may be the motivations of the different sector partners as explained below, under the paragraph ‘Motivations for partaking in PPPs for development’. Third-level goals are those goals which individual members involved from the participating organizations may be pursuing through the collaboration, and which were found to be usually related to career aspirations or job security. These goals may be termed *individual goals* (Huxham & Vangen, 1996). The individual might for example see the PPP as an opportunity for gaining work experience in a new field, or as a personal networking opportunity.

Most research focuses on the middle category of organizational level goals (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Actions of those involved in the PPP may however be expected to be motivated both by organizational and individual goals. It is therefore necessary to consider not only the meta-goal(s) of the collaboration but also the goals at the organizational and individual level. Moreover, goals of the second and third level often form part of hidden agendas and are not explicitly stated. However, these organizational and individual goals often provide the incentive for different actors to participate in the PPP. It is therefore necessary to consider not only the explicitly stated goals of the partners, but also those that have not (yet) been openly discussed, those that actors claim to have but in reality not adhere to, and those that actors do not admit they have. What is more, although to ensure that all involved parties actively participate and remain committed it is important to take organizational goals into account in setting the PPP agenda, to make effective progress in the process of goal alignment and defining (a) realistic meta-goal(s), each party must also be willing to compromise on its own priorities (Huxham & Vangen, 1996).

## THE ADDED VALUE OF PARTNERSHIP

There appears to be a general agreement among business, governments, and other parties that for partnerships to work, there must be benefits, or added value, for all parties involved (Graham & Woods, 2006). Clearly defining these multiple potential and actual sources of value is seen as critical; the more specifically partners can identify expected benefits to them and to society, the greater their commitment to the collaboration will be (Austin, 2000b). Such multiple possible benefits and their worth are, according to Austin (2000b), being identified during the *value definition process*.

Because different partners have different needs and different constituencies with different expectations of their focal organizations, there may be substantial differences in how they weigh the benefits of collaboration (Austin, 2000b). The added value of partnership can take the form of both direct and indirect, intangible benefits. A direct benefit is that a partnership can give direction to the relevant meta-problem (Turcotte & Pasquero, 2001). Partners may moreover learn new ways of framing the problem and potential solutions (Huxham & Vangen, 2000b), which may be considered plan-centric and process centric outcomes according to Clarke & Fuller's (2011) classification. These benefits or outcomes may only be evident in the long run (Waddock, 1991). Partners involved may thus initially only receive or perceive indirect benefits (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Partnering benefits are moreover not always readily defined and quantified. Whatever the identified benefits may be however, the relevant stakeholders of each organization involved must deem them useful and convincing to provide for sufficient internal support to ensure enduring involvement of the partners, and thus sustainability of the partnership (Austin, 2000b).

For each partner then, perceived value of the collaboration should outweigh the risks, which entails the concept of *collaborative advantage* (Glasbergen, 2011; Huxham, 1993; Huxham & MacDonald, 1992; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Kanter, 1994; Vangen & Huxham, 2006). This collaborative advantage pertains to the synergy argument for undertaking partnership activities; collaboration will lead to real advantages when through this collaboration something can be achieved that neither party can achieve on its own, and which is in the interest of all parties. Collaborative advantage then postulates the possibility that each party can connect its own interest with the common objective of the PPP for development; thus, that goals of the different partners are aligned with the meta-goal of the partnership.

Collaborative advantage in itself however will not be enough. Fairness needs to be ensured in that involved parties need to feel that there is a balance in the distribution of benefits and costs among the partners. Because partners are driven to collaborate by different motivations and they face different benefits and risks, this balance is a matter of perception. A sense of unfairness however, demotivates the partners and will erode trust (Austin, 2000c). As with trust, collaborative advantage needs to be maintained throughout the lifecycle of the PPP (Glasbergen, 2011).

To determine the desirability of a partnership, costs and risks of the collaboration relative to the benefits should be weighed by each partner. Costs may be determined by identifying the opportunity costs of collaborating, e.g. the resources that must be deployed for the collaboration rather than being put to alternative use. Management and staff time is often the scarcest resource being put in the collaboration. Not all benefits or costs however, are directly or easily translatable into monetary terms (Austin, 2000b). Because trisector partnerships are often targeting institutional voids (Kolk et al., 2008), the lack of competition moreover impedes the determination of value by market forces. Determination of strategic value is based on judgment and is surrounded by uncertainty; determining a cost-benefit ratio is thus not an easy calculation, even more so for nonprofits (Austin, 2000b).

## MOTIVATIONS FOR PARTAKING IN PPPs FOR DEVELOPMENT

Based on the above, parties may be expected to enter into a partnership only when they expect that through the partnership they may secure some type of value over and above that which they could achieve working alone or within a conventional contract, i.e., they expect to secure some sort of collaborative advantage. Actors in PPPs for development need to be able to motivate the investment of their effort and resources into these PPPs to their constituencies.

Executives of private, for-profit firms are in general only accountable to their owners or stockholders, although increasingly they are (voluntarily or compulsory) responsive to a wider set of stakeholders. They have legal scope to engage in a wide range of activities with a broad geographic scope, primarily limited by employment, patent, and antitrust laws, market dynamics, the organization's capacity for change, and revenue generation (Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2002). Governments, in contrast, attain their legitimacy from the support of their citizens (Linder, 2000) and are subject to intense scrutiny by the press, interest groups, and private citizens. To maintain their constituencies' confidence, public organizations need to be responsive to their needs and interests and usually discuss important decisions in an open forum. Their scope is geographically limited as in many cases they are bound to their national borders (Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2002).

These important philosophical and legal differences between private and public sector organizations impose different constraints on these organizations, complicating cooperation. Mutually beneficial partnership opportunities however, exist exactly because of these differences (Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2002). Indeed, if organizations were to pursue the same goals they would be unlikely to collaborate except with pooling of financial resources as a driving force. Because of their complementary powers, the different sectors can help each other to accomplish things that may not be attainable otherwise. However, this means that different organizations will partake in the PPP for different reasons and often want to achieve different ends through it, and some actors will have less reason to be committed to the partnership than others (Huxham & Vangen, 1996).

Based on a review of existing literature, the possible motivations of the different actors for partaking in these PPPs for development will be explained.

## POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS OF CORPORATIONS

There is very little reason to believe that corporations have significant ethical levels of motivation to partake in PPPs for development. The market mechanism forces businesses to act in their own economic interest and businesses cannot account for altruism to their shareholders (Bakan, 2004; Glasbergen, 2011). Partnering of businesses in PPPs for development can thus only be motivated to their shareholders if this somehow, directly or indirectly, contributes towards corporate profitability.

As a direct contribution towards profitability, corporations may want to leverage PPPs for development as a means to reach the Base of the Pyramid (BoP) (Prahalad, 2005) market in developing countries. It may be a risky for businesses to penetrate a new market in a developing country, and prior research has found that some companies are motivated to partner to limit their exposure to risk (e.g. Linder, 2000). According to Muldoon (2005), MNCs must develop cooperative strategies with home and host governments, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations to make the best judgments on markets they are not yet familiar with. Through collaboration corporations may be able to tap into critical competencies such as expertise, or needed resources residing within their partners, that companies cannot develop on their own or on time (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). Moreover, according to North (1991), companies rely heavily on personal networks in host countries with weak institutional infrastructure. Embassies of the home government in the respective country and local NGOs can provide the necessary network and specialized know-how to overcome infrastructural difficulties (Rondinelli & London, 2003). Thus, companies may be motivated by the possibility of gaining sensitive political and market information that can provide advantages over the competition (Richter, 2004).

Businesses may also see social challenges as opportunities for creating new business models that address a previously undiscovered need or an existing need in a new way (Cristensen et al., 2006; Porter & Kramer, 2011) and partnering in PPPs for development may be leveraged as an opportunity to develop and test technology (Kanter, 1999). Involvement in partnerships may moreover save operational costs. To be directly contributing to corporate profitability, partnerships should be related to a company's core activities. Such partnerships then have an intensifying function because they come on top of individual activities the corporation is already undertaking. Through funding and/or expertise from other partners which may be tapped into through partnerships, corporations may address issues at a larger scale and/or take more risks (Kolk et al., 2008). Because of all the intervening variables however, it is complicated to identify a direct link between collaboration and profits (Austin, 2000b). When comparing tripartite partnerships to the two other types of PPPs (public-private, private-nonprofit as explained before), Kolk et al. (2008) found that in many cases, tripartite partnerships are less directly related to a companies' core activities, something that according to the authors can be explained by the supposed role of these partnerships in 'filling' institutional voids.

This leads to the expectation that corporations may be motivated to partake in PPPs for development not by direct contribution towards profitability, but by more indirect benefits. One of these more indirect benefits of partaking in partnerships is organizational learning (e.g., Kanter, 1999; London et al., 2005) by cross-fertilization of thinking (Elkington & Fennell, 1998), e.g. obtaining interpersonal and administrative skills, technical skills in relevant for addressing the issue, reflective skills modifying mind-sets and habits, and insight into social circumstances that can lead to needed innovations (Waddell, 1999). However, organizational learning as a primary strategic intent has been questioned by many scholars (e.g., Inkpen, 2002; Salk & Simonin, 2003).

Although corporations are primarily accountable to their shareholders (Bakan, 2004), in recent decades competitive pressure associated with globalization has pushed some corporations to be more responsive to a wider group of stakeholders (Utting, 2000b). In today's era of globalization, the relationships that a company maintains with these stakeholders, such as its employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, governments, activist groups, research institutes, etc., are becoming increasingly complex and cover a wider range of organizations, issues and geographies than ever before. This has led to the emergence of new and creative forms of cooperation as a strategic approach for building and managing stakeholder relations (Nelson, 1997, p. 47-48).

As an indirect contribution to profit, participation in PPPs for development may thus be interesting for corporations as part of their reputation management strategy (Glasbergen, 2011; Kanter, 1999), thereby increasing awareness of and attractiveness to new and existing customers, investors, and employees (Elkington & Fennell, 1998; Kanter, 1999; Rondinelli & London, 2003; Yaziji, 2000). Indeed, corporations have been found to be encouraged to partner by demands for corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Going beyond corporate social responsibility, corporations may be motivated to partake in PPPs for development for business diplomacy considerations.

One of the most important assets for MNCs in today's age is legitimacy (Ordeix-Rigo & Duarte, 2009); "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574), which is attained by matching the expectations and demands of a broad range of stakeholders (Ordeix-Rigo & Duarte, 2009). Business diplomacy, a method of cooperating with people in an effective way to get things done, using tact and understanding to build and sustain positive relationships and trust (London, 1999) with government representatives and other stakeholders, may be seen as a proactive method toward obtaining such legitimacy. By doing so, an MNCs reputational capital is built and safeguarded, potential conflicts with stakeholders may be prevented, and political risk is minimized (Saner, Yiu & Søndergaard, 2000). Engagement in PPPs for development may be considered as one of the tactics of translating the application of business diplomacy into practice. Indeed, Ordeix-Rigo & Duarte (2009) state that PPPs for development are the "corporate diplomacy end curtain" (p. 559).

Based on the motivations above, private sector partners may be said to pursue *partner-centric* and *outside stakeholder-centric outcomes* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011).

#### POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS OF NGOS

Nonprofit organizations are accountable to the civil society they represent, and are bound by its values (Glasbergen, 2011). Thus, their goals in PPPs for development tend to be altruistic, i.e. by partaking in such PPPs they can generate direct support for their cause or influence social change (Fabig & Boele, 1999). When the partnership is related to the core activities of the private partner, through their involvement NGOs may want to ensure that development dimensions are sufficiently addressed by these activities, and may share knowledge to this end (Kolk et al., 2008).

Like corporations, NGOs may also be motivated to be involved in partnerships to facilitate organizational learning (Elkington & Fennell, 1998). They may want to gain access to technical, management and/ or marketing expertise (Austin, 2000b; Kanter, 1999; Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2002) and foster cross-fertilization of thinking and participatory learning (Hulme, 1994).

Partaking in PPPs may provide NGOs with increased leverage and visibility (Elkington & Fennel, 1998) and can widen their networks. By collaborating with private parties, NGOs may gain access to their supply chain. Moreover, engagement in PPPs for development may provide an opportunity for NGOs to exert influence over government policy or corporate social priorities. They may also be motivated by the possibility of career development for current and future staff members and volunteers (Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2002).

Moreover like corporations, NGOs may also have an economic interest in their involvement in PPPs for development. They may for instance be motivated by demands for improved efficiency and accountability (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Through partnerships they may want to secure additional financial resources, services, or goods (Austin, 2000b) to scale up their work and scope (Glasbergen, 2011), and/or to become more important institutional actors (Doh & Teege, 2002) with greater name recognition (Austin, 2000b; Kanter, 1999).

These motivations may be related to *plan-centric*, *partner-centric*, and *outside stakeholder-centric outcomes* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011).

#### POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS OF GOVERNMENTS

Governments may leverage PPPs for development both as a political symbol and as a policy tool (Linder, 2000). As a policy tool, governments may want to partner with corporations and civil society to increase chances of their objectives being realized (Glasbergen, 2011). Governments are responsible for the public good, but the nature and scale of public service needs and the limited ability of governments to address them (Gray, 1989) may lead to implementation gaps in their policies that may only be solved through partnerships (Glasbergen, 2011). Moreover, limited effectiveness of traditional development aid has led governments to realize that some challenges are difficult to tackle in isolation (van Lieshout et al., 2010). The latest financial crisis has led to fiscal stringency of, and a limited public support for, official development assistance (ODA) (MFA, 2013). Limited public support for ODA because of its limited effectiveness may be overcome by construing PPPs for development as a political symbol, thereby reforming government functioning, restructuring public service provision, and leading to “moral regeneration” in bringing government closer to the “virtue” (i.e., efficiency) of the market (Linder, 1999).

From a policy perspective, savings of public funds, shifting government risk, or mobilization of additional private capital may be some of the motivations for governments to partake in PPPs for development (Kolk et al., 2008). Also, governments may utilize complimentary expertise that can be bundled through partnerships and may want to leverage these PPPs for development as an opportunity to involve actors that would not have been able to participate otherwise, for example because of their small size, lack of expertise, high risk or high

cost (Weyzig & vander Stichele, 2004). PPPs may moreover be leveraged to facilitate faster delivery of commitments to development objectives contained in multi-annual strategic plans. Indeed, albeit the notion of PPPs for development was still rather new and difficult to come to terms with for Dutch policy advisors, they indicated to Kolk et al. (2008) that these partnerships should be a means to a development end.

Based on the above, governments may thus be said to mainly be pursuing *plan-centric* and *outside stakeholder-centric outcomes* through their involvement in PPPs for development.

#### POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS OF ACADEMIA

Academic literature from which the motivations of knowledge institutions for their involvement in PPPs for development can be derived is very limited. Based on logical reasoning one may expect that knowledge institutions and research institutes are expecting to derive greater name recognition through their involvement in high-profile PPPs for development. Moreover, involvement may lead to more research opportunities and thus more publications, and the knowledge they generate will be applied into practice, leading to an increased relevance of their research. Beyond reputational considerations, through collaboration with government and private sector parties academia may secure additional research funding. By collaborating with NGOs, they may expand their networks and gain more insight into the demands of the end-users of their innovations, facilitating a broader societal acceptance and commercialization of findings. Also, they may access the tacit knowledge in the field and/ or of the private sector (Smits & Kuhlmann, 2004).

The motivations above may be related to *partner-centric* and *person-centric outcomes*, and possibly *outside stakeholder-centric outcomes*.

## GOAL ALIGNMENT

As becomes apparent from the elaboration on possible goals of different sector parties above, when actors from different sectors focus on the same issue they are likely to think about it differently, to be motivated by different goals and expected rewards, and to use different approaches (Selsky & Parker, 2005, Waddell & Brown, 1997; Westley & Vredenburg, 1991). Although each party involved in the PPP has somehow been incentivized to participate, they also take risks when entering into commitments and the elasticity of each party is thus restricted. In any case, as explained before, the perceived value of collaboration should outweigh its risks. When there is a strong positive collaboration between goals pursued by different partners, one may expect that they are having a stronger incentive to coordinate their actions to mutual benefit (Gray, 1985).

Differences in motivations are believed to derail collaborative intent (e.g., Gricar, 1981) and scholars argue that partnership effectiveness is likely to be the highest if the PPP fits all involved parties' strategic objectives (Kolk et al., 2008), or in other words, creates sufficient value for all actors involved. The different motivations and goals that parties bring to the table thus need to be aligned to create a successful partnership. Indeed, based on a meta-review of eleven global partnerships, Bezanson & Isenman (2012) found dealing with asymmetries of power, different perspectives, and often conflicting interests to be influencing the effectiveness of partnerships. When divergent interests of different-sector partners are not being confronted directly and aligned somehow, these asymmetries may lead to sub-optimal results. A balance of value exchange which is perceived to be unequal may eventually even lead to the collapse of the partnership (Austin, 2000b).

However, while prior research has pinpointed the necessity of a "sufficient overlap" between goals of the partners involved, this does not entail that partners need to agree on everything; when they would, the essential complementarity between partners would to a large extent be lost (Eden & Huxham, 2001; Vangen & Huxham, 2012). Disagreements on goals should however be discussed. To ensure that all partners "play by the same rules", it is key to have clearly articulated goals, transparency, and a clear understanding of each other's interests, priorities and expectations (Malena, 2004).

Although conclusive evidence to date is limited, there are good reasons to assume that goal alignment of partners involved in PPPs for development does not happen at one moment in time, say, merely at the partnership formation stage, but rather is a dynamic process. The interests and context of partners can change over time, and new partners may join the partnership while others may leave. Partners communicate knowledge and frame and reframe issues, and the relationships among partners evolve while the situational context changes (Glasbergen, 2011). Goal alignment may thus be expected to be a dynamic, co-evolutionary process. Below, common factors found in prior literature to be influencing this goal alignment process in PPPs for development, or in the broader category of interorganizational collaboration, are explained.

## TRUST

The organizations' names and reputations may be put at major risk when partnering and the deeper the alliance, the more exposed each partner is to what happens to their counterparts. This depth however, also contributes toward a more effective management of risk by the individual partners (Austin, 2000b). A foundation of mutual trust is necessary for partners to relinquish some control and autonomy to gain the benefits of partnership. Trust may be defined as a "reduction of feelings of vulnerability or risk in the partnering process" (Glasbergen, 2011, p. 4). A minimum level of trust is argued to be essential to agree on goals and to conduct teamwork (Das & Teng, 1998).

Some authors suggest that to lay such a foundation for mutual trust and open communication, clearly articulated goals, transparency and a clear understanding of partners' motives and expectations are key. Disagreements should be made explicit at the outset with discussion of acceptable parameters of divergence (Malena, 2004). Findings in business-to-business alliances show that formal goals and business plans are associated with higher learning. As explained before, the relative newness of PPPs for development

necessitates the need for setting formal goals to keep the partnership on track (Arya & Salk, 2006). Trust may thus be considered to both be influencing the process of goal alignment in affecting how much each partner is willing to compromise on its own goals, and be influenced by the extent of goal alignment.

Trust is not created once and for all, however. The process of building trust needs to be managed, maintained and supported by positive experiences throughout the entire partnership lifecycle (Glasbergen, 2011). Personnel changes for instance may erode the trust that has been built up in the partnership. Lessons learned, trust that has been built up, and personal networks of individuals may disappear when individuals leave the partnership (Lister, 2000).

## POWER

Other authors stress the significance of the influence of power in the process of goal alignment (e.g., Doh & Teegen, 2002; Parker & Selsky, 2004; Reed & Reed, 2008; Waddell, 2000), or the degree to which the actors in the PPP are able to exert influence in the partnership and steer it toward their goals. Utting (2000b) for example stresses that a big part of the goal-alignment process depends on the balance of forces within the partnership and the type of power struggle which takes place as the different actors try to advance their specific agendas. Some scholars claim that there are huge power differentials between business and non-business partners, which makes it difficult for NGOs to exert much influence. Private partners have many options and a significant amount of resources, meaning that they can determine in great part the conditions under which they participate in PPPs for development, and can effectively skew the benefits of such PPPs toward their own interests rather than toward the issue targeted by the partnership (Reed & Reed, 2008). Private parties may for example engage in what has been termed 'institutional capture' by exerting undue influence over the decision-making processes of government and NGOs.

The complex and often unrealistic and unachievable meta-goals of trisector partnerships (Huxham & Vangen, 1996) may lead to an even stronger shift of the balance of power towards private interests (Zammit, 2004). Large power imbalances may thus lead partners into political or opportunistic behavior at the expense of impact on the issue targeted (Doh & Teegen, 2004; Parker & Selsky, 2004). Partnerships may for instance be initiated targeting the areas close to where private sector partners have operations, or may be designed to benefit key company stakeholders rather than the most stakeholders that have the most pressing needs. Other authors however, argue that in trisector partnerships the capacity for mobilizing a constituency around the issue targeted (Waddell, 2000), for implementing decisions (Pasquero, 1991), or for achieving goals (Selsky & Parker, 2005) may be more important and thus generates more power. Bezanson & Isenman (2012) found the influence that donors may exert over the partnership through the power of the purse-string to be a major potential issue in partnerships.

Whoever has the most power, scholars argue that for a partnership to be effective, equitable, horizontal relations need to be formed to deal with these power imbalances. To understand the balance of power in a tripartite PPP for development, it is important to realize who is participating on whose terrain and in whose process. Lankatilleke (1999) explains that the inception of a partnership reveals much about the power balance that will emerge in a partnership. Who initiated the partnership and selected the other partners is significant. The way in which one partner may fill a need of another provides insight as well (Miraftab, 2004). From a more nuanced perspective, some authors argue that power distribution between partners does not necessarily need to be equal, but that each partner needs to recognize the positive and negative influence the other actors exert on them (e.g., Waddell, 2000).



## BROKERING

When there are fewer and more homogeneous stakeholders, values are more likely to converge than in complex tripartite partnerships. For the latter situations, some authors stress the role of intermediaries or 'linking-pin organizations' (e.g., Westley & Vredenburg, 1991) in balancing the power in the PPP and facilitating the recognition of common problems, shared interests, and mutual understanding (Arya & Salk, 2006). A neutral party moderating the discussion, especially during the stage in which the collaborative strategic plan is formulated, as explained in the section on the process model of collaborative strategic management (Clarke & Fuller, 2011), helps to avoid a relapse to strategic behavior and fosters an "open, fair, and problem orientated discussion atmosphere" (Roloff, 2007, p. 240). These specialized broker organizations have an understanding of both sectors and are thus in a good position to translate and shape emerging ideas (Arya & Salk, 2006). The government, for instance, may function as a moderator with its legal and financial mechanisms evening out imbalances caused by legal, institutional, and financial differences between actors and may keep the playing field level (Miraftab, 2004).

## GOVERNANCE

Bezanson & Isenman (2012) stress the necessity of a strong governance framework in PPPs for development, among others to ensure that there are appropriate strategies in place with realistic and attainable goals. Such strategies then could make sure that goals of the different partners stay aligned toward a common end. To ensure that represented needs of partners involved in a PPP are balanced and this balance is maintained, a high level steering group or a project board, providing challenge and support for the project team, was found to be a common feature of PPPs (Nisar, 2013). To ensure effectiveness however, sufficient capacity to timely and effectively make decisions is essential. Since the choice of solutions is usually informed by the type of stakeholders involved, it should moreover be ensured that all stakeholders are represented in the board (Bezanson & Isenham, 2013; Nisar, 2013).

## THE EXTENT OF GOAL ALIGNMENT

Some authors argue that formulating explicit goals in partnerships is not always possible or even desirable. Partners may not be able to reach consensus on goals for the partnership that effectively serve their interests. Information asymmetry and potential hidden agendas further strengthen the need for partners to tolerate a certain degree of ambiguity. Whereas explicit goals contribute to better control, these imply sacrificing flexibility. In some cases, partners may even consider partnering exactly due to goal ambiguity and uncertainty about the future (Das & Teng, 1998).

## METHODOLOGY

### UNIT OF ANALYSIS

The intention of the research at hand is to explore, describe, and understand the subject in question – the process of goal alignment in public-private partnerships for development. Because the research at hand aims to provide an answer to the ‘how’ question of a present-day phenomenon on which the researcher does not intend to exert any undue influence, conducting a case study constitutes a logical methodology (Yin, 2009). Case studies have been a prominent methodology in past research on collaboration and have proven to be particularly useful for generating theoretical and practical insights (Gray & Wood, 1991). Considering the scope of the research at hand, a single case study has been conducted. The single case study approach constitutes an interpretative study of data about the unique process of goal alignment employed by a complex PPP for development. The advantage of single-case studies is that they allow for an extensive analysis of the case under investigation (Yin, 2009).

Specifically, the PPP for development that is the subject of the case study of the research at hand is the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition (AIM), a public-private partnership claiming to be a delivery mechanism bringing together different stakeholders to improve food and nutrition security. AIM has been selected as the subject of the case study because it is one of the few PPPs for development in which the Dutch government is in fully fledged partnership with the other partners, instead of merely functioning as a funder and then leaving the PPP to get on with its work, for which “donorship” may be a more accurate term (Ahmad, 2006). Because of the substantial involvement of the Dutch government, AIM is more representative of PPPs for development as described in prior research than other PPPs for development in which the Dutch government is involved, allowing for a better generalizability of the results. Moreover, the substantial involvement of the Dutch government provides for dynamics in the process of goal alignment that go beyond the public sector partner’s goals boiling down to the requirements set for the PPP to be eligible for funding. The Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition will be described more thoroughly below.

### CASE DESCRIPTION: THE AMSTERDAM INITIATIVE AGAINST MALNUTRITION

On the initiative of a UN-affiliated NGO, in 2009 during a meeting between CEOs of three Dutch corporations with representatives of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and said NGO, the ambition was raised to combine forces to impact malnutrition. A declaration of intent was drafted and the partners informally agreed to work together toward the ambition of reaching 100 million malnourished people in 6 countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, South-Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia). Based on the idea of the Dutch Diamond Approach, in which complementary partners work together, a Dutch knowledge institution and a prominent Dutch NGO were invited to join. The initiative was officially launched in May 2009.

In the following years, several other partners joined and at present, AIM consists of 29 partners from both the North and the South. Partners include governments, private sector partners, NGOs, a research institute and a knowledge institution. Partners have committed to invest more than 10 million Euros for the next 5 years into AIM, which then started to be described as a “joint initiative aimed at developing innovative social business ideas and sustainable solutions to tackle malnutrition using a market-based approach” (AIM, 2013). AIM’s approach and an overview of partners are visualized in figure 2 below. Founding partners are indicated by the dotted line.



Figure 2: Overview of AIM's approach and partners. Source: AIM, 2013.

AIM currently manages a portfolio of 7 pilot projects, or work streams, of which 6 were granted government funding through the Facility for Sustainable Entrepreneurship and Food Security (FDOV) in 2013. Projects are executed throughout the entire value chain and intervene on different aspects: providing healthy water and good hygienic practices; improving the nutritional value of dried vegetables through innovative processing techniques; assisting the local production and retail distribution of micronutrient powders; developing retail outlets for nutritious products; producing and distributing fortified food additives; supporting quality assurance labs; providing access to finance; and monitoring and evaluating the progress and implementation of the different projects. Common to all projects is that they aim to become sustainable in the long term, and that they provide for the possibility to be scaled up and replicated when they prove to work (AIM, 2013). At the time of this research, 2 out of the 7 projects are in their implementation phase, the other projects are still in their inception phase; finishing contracts, fine tuning the interventions, determining roles and responsibilities and executing base line studies (Schuttelaar & Partners, 2014).

The organization of AIM is visualized in figure 3 below.




Figure 3: Visualization of AIM organization.

AIM, with its broad focal issue and objectives, addressing multiple interests and having multiple focal countries, may thus be categorized as a 'macro-partnership' based on the categorization of Kolk et al. (2008). Moreover, AIM may be said to be a 'resourcing partnership' based on the categorization of Zadek (2008). Based on the categorization of the United Nations Foundation and the World Economic Forum (2003), AIM is a 'multifaceted partnership', collaborating to address the problem of malnutrition, but also aiming to influence government policy and create awareness and political will.

## METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The objective of the methodology is to gather qualitative and verified data useful for analyzing the key features involved in the process of goal alignment within AIM. Two types of data collection were used to gather data. Documents were made available through both the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AIM secretariat, including annual reports, narrative progress reports, meeting presentations and minutes, FDOV grant applications, financial reports, publication materials, and data from another AIM case study conducted by the Partnering Initiative. Primary data was supplemented through a web search, analyzing publications of several partners on their websites related to their involvement in AIM.

However, the degree of influence of such official discourses or documents may vary in different circumstances, and what is omitted from such documents may often be fundamental to the operation of the partnership. The real level of influence of different actors thus depends on many factors beyond those that may be identified through a document analysis (McQuaid, 2000). In addition, McQuaid and Christy (1999) stipulate that different actors within a partnership may have different views on its purpose, operation and power structures. Therefore, key informants of all parties involved were asked for additional information by means of semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews allow gaining insight into the interviewee's perception by giving them the opportunity to answer freely without guidance (Leech, 2002) and are intended to lead to a (semi-structured) conversation about the topic, leaving room for other, unforeseen but possibly relevant issues to arise. Such interviews are considered to be particularly helpful when trying to understand the perceptions and meanings key actors and their organizations attach to activities and developments (Kolk et al., 2008).

Interviews were conducted in cooperation with Schuttelaar & Partners, a consultancy firm specialized in health and sustainability. Schuttelaar & Partners had been requested by the AIM secretariat to conduct a strategic analysis of AIM, which provided an excellent opportunity for the researcher of the research at hand to gain access to key actors of all partners involved by integrating the interview protocols and jointly conducting the interviews. Interviews served both to verify selected pieces of information about goal alignment generated through the document analysis, and generate new information omitted from the documents. By doing so, these interviews increase reliability of the collected data.

The interview protocol consists of 11 main questions relating to 8 aspects: the objectives of the partner; the meta-goal of AIM; the interviewee's perception on the goal alignment process; factors contributing toward fruitful collaboration; the interviewee's perception on the future of AIM; the role of the AIM secretariat; stakeholder representation; and the distinctive character of AIM as compared to other PPPs for development. Probes were included under the main questions to provide guidance to the interviewer as to which aspects may be interesting to elaborate upon. The extensive literature study that has been conducted and the theoretical framework that has been derived from this and which has been presented in the previous chapter provided the basis for the semi-structured interview protocol. The complete interview protocol is provided in Annex 1.

In-depth interviews of all but two partners were carried out in the period between March and May 2014, during which senior management, operational staff members or both, depending on availability, were interviewed. Two partners (a Southern NGO and a Southern business partner) could not be reached. The initial

intention was to conduct all interviews face-to-face, however, due to many respondents being situated abroad, some interviews had to be conducted by telephone or Skype. Depending on availability, duration of the interviews ranged between 30 minutes and an hour and a half, with an average length of approximately 75 minutes. For reliability reasons (i.e., ensuring that the respondent can speak freely and is not limited by language barriers), interviews were, whenever possible, conducted in the native language of the respondent, being Dutch or English.

To give respondents the opportunity to sufficiently prepare and eventually refresh their memories and/or gather information with others in their organizations, main interview questions were sent a few days prior to the interviews, together with a short briefing. The briefing and pre-sent interview questions can be found in Annex 2. To ensure that the respondents could speak freely, they were ensured full anonymity. All interviews were recorded and reports of these interviews were subsequently written and sent back to the respondents for authorization. By requesting feedback and authorization of the interview report by the interviewee, results could be validated.

One of the former partners, a prominent Dutch NGO, announced to step out of the AIM platform in the same period the interviews were being conducted. Because it was expected that the motivation of this organization to exit the AIM platform could provide valuable insights into the goal alignment process, it was decided to still interview this partner using an adjusted interview protocol. This adjusted protocol can be found in Annex 3. This respondent received a briefing prior to the interview that was similar to the briefing the other respondents received, but which contained the adjusted main interview questions.

## METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

The taken approach to analyze the data is of an interpretative nature (Bortz & Doering, 2006). Glaser and Strauss (1980) suggest that through such an inductive qualitative approach the researcher can draw rich descriptions and possible explanations. The document analysis and semi-structured interviews generated a wealth of information, which has been coded and analyzed using NVIVO, a computer software package allowing for deep levels of analysis of large volumes of qualitative data.

First, the answers to the different questions of the semi-structured interviews were grouped together in separate Word documents, after which all Word documents with the interview questions and relevant documents gathered from AIM and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as described before were uploaded to NVIVO. NVIVO's word count procedure was subsequently used to identify potentially relevant terms on which could be coded. General words frequently used, such as 'and' and 'the', and specific words frequently used but deemed irrelevant, such as 'partnership' and 'impact', were disregarded. Potentially relevant terms most frequently returning in the transcripts and documents were 'FDOV', 'trust', 'platform', 'meetings'. 'flexible', and 'secretariat'.

These terms however were considered to be too narrow for the first step of the coding procedure and were thus only written down for the time being, after which the first step of the coding procedure commenced. When going through the transcripts, gradually some main categories emerged, being 'Timeline AIM', 'goals pursued', 'factors potentially related to goal alignment', and 'undefined but potentially relevant'. Relevant answers and remarks in the interview transcript were coded at the respective categories and at the same time received a code referring to the organization(s) they related to, and the origin of the organization, being North or South.

The data in the broad category codes was subsequently revisited and was recoded into smaller categories, leading to a refinement of the codes. Specifically, in the goal category through an iterative coding procedure three different categories of goals emerged. 'Factors potentially related to goal alignment' was split up in 'Initial goal alignment' and 'process of goal alignment' into which the data was recoded. After being recoded,

the same iterative coding procedure has led to the emergence of smaller categories of these two codes, in which the terms most frequently mentioned in the transcripts and during the interviews as identified by the word count were included. A separate code was created to gather codes that appeared to be related to goal alignment, but could not be readily assigned to one of the codes that emerged just yet. At the same time, the codes referring to the different organizations involved in AIM were grouped together under codes referring to organization types, being government, private sector, NGOs and academia. All coded sentences and excerpts received multiple codes at the same time.

Next, uploaded documents were analyzed one by one and relevant sentences, excerpts and figures were coded at codes that had emerged during the coding of the interview transcripts. Items that were appeared relevant but could not be grouped under one of the existing codes were placed under the 'undefined' category as mentioned before. Halfway through the coding procedure of the documents, it was realized that some excerpts and statements related to the platform level of AIM, whereas others related to the project level. All codes and the interview transcripts or documents the coded data was derived from were subsequently revisited to receive an extra code, being either 'Project level' or 'Platform level'. For some of the codes it was unclear to which of the respective categories they related to, these were therefore coded as 'Unknown'.

After all the documents were coded, the 'undefined' category was revisited and data was regrouped into similar categories, through which four new categories emerged. Next, all codes were revisited one by one and some of the data was regrouped under a code that appeared more relevant. At the same time, labels of the codes were critically analyzed with some codes receiving more relevant labels. Because of the wealth of data, codes that contained very little data were deemed irrelevant. Data was whenever possible recoded under more relevant codes and codes deemed irrelevant were regrouped under a 'deleted' code.

Next, through the analyze function NVIVO was commanded to generate several overviews of combinations of codes. Specifically, overviews were generated with all different factors identified as influencing the practice and process of goal alignment per organization and organization type, on both a platform and a project level. By doing so, it potentially deviating organizations, differences between organization types, and disagreements between organizations could be identified. An overview of goals pursued by different organizations and different organization types for each of the three categories of identified goals was moreover generated.

As a final interpretation of the analyses, main results found were integrated into a giant mindmap and a first attempt of sorting the data (e.g., different goals per organization type) into tables was made. Final categorization, (e.g. into specific goals, outcome types pursued, and whether factors identified were facilitating or distorting the goal alignment process) occurred while writing up the results. An overview of the final codebook is provided in annex 4. Main categories and the results of the analyses are described in the results section below.

## RESULTS

To answer the first sub-question partners were, amongst others, asked about their reasons for involvement in AIM, their opinion about the overall ambition of AIM, and what AIM should look like in 2020. An extensive document analysis generated further goal statements and indications of organizational goals. Through the iterative coding process gradually three subcategories of goals emerged, defined as organizational goals, encompassing the motivations of each of the individual organizations for participating in AIM; collaboration goals, encompassing the goals that partners aspire to achieve together, or the purpose the PPP for development should serve; and operational goals, referring to *how* the collaboration will be undertaken, relating to any aspect of the collaborative process. The methodology used unfortunately did not generate sufficient data to make substantive claims about individual goals brought into AIM and these are therefore left out of the analysis. Wherever assumptions about individual goals are being made, this is explicitly mentioned.

The goal-related statements for all three subcategories of goals were grouped together under related aims. For each category respectively, all different objectives are mentioned in the results section described below, starting with the goals that were stated the most. For the goals that were most mentioned, one or more statements of the respondents are given which are exemplifying for the responses related to those goals and which provide an illustration and nuance to the claims made in this results section. Throughout the section on results for Sub-questions 2 and 3, statements are given when they are considered to be illustrative to the claims being made. All responses are anonymized and the organizations to which the statements are related can thus not be traced.

### SUB-QUESTION 1

#### **WHAT ARE KEY GOALS OF DIFFERENT PARTIES FOR PARTICIPATING IN PPPs FOR DEVELOPMENT?**

As explained before, within AIM there are various different parties involved, adhering to diverging mandates, mission statements and backgrounds. For the report at hand these organizations have been grouped together into companies, where wherever relevant a further distinction is made between Northern and Southern companies; NGOs; academia (one knowledge institution and one research institute); and the government. Below, their motivations and goals for AIM are being addressed by different sub-questions.

#### COMPANIES

##### **Sub-question 1a: what are key goals of companies for participating in PPPs for development?**

#### ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS

When asked why corporations decided to join the initiative, all respondents stated multiple arguments and therefore may be said to seek after multiple benefits through participation in AIM.

For most corporations involved, the theme of AIM or one of its projects is related to the organization's core activities. Most corporations then, indicated to be involved in AIM because eventually they expect to generate business by addressing the need for nutritious products or services enhancing nutrition, previously undiscovered or at least unaddressed by most, through creating new business models. They aim to leverage AIM to first of all develop the market for their products and services:

*"Different companies can use their expertise to decrease malnutrition, including [the companies active in the same sector as me]. In that way you can develop the entire sector, and develop knowledge. In preparing the market, competing organizations can work together".*

Once this market has been developed, companies aim to further penetrate the market leveraging their first mover advantage and obtained legitimacy through collaboration in AIM. Many respondents argued explicitly or implicitly that through AIM they manage to achieve results that they are not able to achieve on their own, i.e.,

by tapping into knowledge on the local situation or by leveraging their partners' networks. Some companies explicitly mentioned that they aim to strengthen or overcome weak institutional infrastructure, and to limit their exposure to risk while penetrating this newly developed market.

*"I expect business and profits as a consequence to be a partner in this project. It is mainly a new market, not on type of product but focused on a region, which is Africa. I think this is the main motivation of our commitment. That it is maybe easier for us to enter this market, on the one side. But on the other side we like to support the project. It is also good for our recognition in this region and also for our reputation. So there are different arguments."*

Although most companies expect to derive some form of reputational enhancement through their involvement in AIM, only two companies explicitly stated to be partly involved for CSR purposes. Most of them explicitly or implicitly refer to an increase in their legitimacy through their involvement in AIM, and may thus be involved for reasons beyond CSR purposes, i.e., for business diplomacy considerations. A few of them mentioned to pursue goals related to organizational learning, countering the reservations of some scholars about the goal of organizational learning in PPPs (e.g., Inkpen, 2002; Salk & Simonin, 2003) as explained in the theoretical framework. Some moreover see AIM as a vehicle facilitating cooperation with (indirect) competitors. Finally, Southern companies in particular see AIM as an opportunity directly contributing toward the development of their company.

#### COLLABORATION GOALS

Companies were moreover asked to state the purpose they see for AIM. The majority of the companies stated that AIM having a business focus, focusing on generating business models that are eventually self-sustainable and which lend themselves to be up-scaled, is of primary importance to them:

*"For me it only makes sense to be involved in these type of projects: business and social impact at the same time. All the other ones have a philanthropic perspective and that is fine, but in order to get a real and lasting impact we need a business focus. AIM is special because of the business focus without negative social impact."*

All Southern companies and one of the Northern companies stressed the role of AIM in generating social change by acting as a reference or benchmark for other platforms and/or other Southern companies.

#### OPERATIONAL GOALS

The vast majority of companies indicated that AIM should focus on implementation and demonstrating results. About half of the companies moreover stressed the importance of learning and/ or monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the projects. One of the companies mentioned that AIM should expand its platform basis. Finally, one company indicated that AIM should strengthen its local focus.

#### NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

**Sub-question 1b: what are key goals of Non-Governmental Organizations for participating in PPPs for development?**

#### ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS

As with companies, most NGOs stated multiple reasons for their involvement in AIM. All NGOs indicated to be primarily involved in AIM because the main issue targeted by AIM, being malnutrition, is of strategic importance to them. Through cooperation in a PPP for development, they hope to give extra visibility to the theme and to increase the leverage of their interventions. Practically all NGOs stressed that collaboration enables them to jointly create a stronger impact. Ending malnutrition is thus related to the values of civil society they represent and through their involvement in AIM, NGOs seek to generate direct support for their cause. Some NGOs mentioned that through AIM they seek to influence government policy or corporate social



priorities. Some NGOs moreover claimed to have become involved explicitly to bring the theme further and act as a watchdog to make sure all important aspects and stakes are being addressed through the PPP:

*“AIM started as a top-down plan where companies tackled malnutrition, mainly by fortification. But fortification is not the only road to increasing food security, the story is more complex. We wanted to raise awareness about the broader story, and if you look at AIM now you see we managed to do so. We make sure the broad perspective of what constitutes food and nutrition security is brought in.”*

The next motivation most frequently stated, by a majority of the NGOs in AIM, is that they seek to facilitate organizational learning through their involvement, both by tapping into technical expertise of their partners, and in a process sense by gaining experience in working in partnerships and with a new, market-based approach to development cooperation. About half of them mentioned that through AIM they seek to expand their network and find new partnering or funding opportunities. Finally, a few of them implicitly indicated to be interested in becoming more important institutional actors through their involvement in AIM, and to cooperate in AIM in response to increasing demands for improved efficiency and accountability of NGOs, motivations which are both related to reputational enhancement.

#### COLLABORATION GOALS

In stating their collaboration goals it is interesting that, same as when asking the corporate partners, the majority of the NGOs stressed the importance of AIM having a business focus:

*“I think in the end the businesses need to do it because they are financially sound, they know how to be self-reliant and they integrate the project in the local economic system.”*

Although some of the NGOs tried to nuance this a bit:

*“It might be that new partners want to join the platform because they see it as a business opportunity, however it needs to be more than that; it needs to be a motivation to do something against malnutrition, from a business perspective.”*

Indeed, an equal number of NGOs see a clear role for AIM in advocating social change and lobbying other companies and governments, and want to turn AIM into a movement towards social change. A little less than half of all the NGOs stressed the importance of strengthening the experimentation base and have AIM function as an incubator for nutrition solutions.

#### OPERATIONAL GOALS

When asked how AIM should function or what AIM should undertake to remain successful, three of the NGOs stressed the importance of a focus on implementation of the current projects:

*“AIM needs to show the actual contribution in the countries in the South towards the provision of affordable, nutritious products and the actual improvement of producers in producing or improving these nutritious products. This has to go beyond being a think tank and needs to be something visible on the ground. There is a lot of money going into AIM, so it needs to deliver something concrete.”*

About half of the NGOs stressed the importance of having a learning agenda and M&E to draw lessons on what works and to cross-fertilize projects. Three of the NGOs moreover indicated that they feel AIM should further integrate its current partners and projects. Two NGOs indicated that they want AIM to strengthen its local focus and further integrate its ultimate beneficiaries, one of them feels that it is important that AIM has a broad focus. Finally, one of the NGOs stressed the need for formalizing the cooperation.

## KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTIONS AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

### **Sub-question 1c: what are key goals of knowledge and research institutions for participating in PPPs for development?**

#### ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS

Knowledge and research institutions were mainly motivated to join AIM to derive insights from the platform, gaining knowledge on market-based nutrition interventions, circumstances on the ground, and collaborative initiatives to contribute to the base of knowledge. Through their involvement in AIM, they moreover expect to receive funding for their research and may be said to seek for greater visibility and recognition by publications generated through the research they conduct:

*“AIM is interesting learning material. We will start making joint publications with AIM. We will publish stories about our learnings in practice. Because we know many similar projects, we can connect partners and initiatives and in such a way start new projects. Financing and matchmaking is very interesting for us.”*

AIM furthermore provides opportunities for them to expand their networks, possibly leading to new research opportunities and consultancy assignments, and to enter into collaborations with parties that are otherwise more difficult to reach. Finally, the parties acknowledge that through combining the strengths of the partners in AIM a larger impact can potentially be made in improving nutrition, and both stated to be partly altruistically motivated:

*“As a nutritionist I am committed to the 100 million people and I want to discover the best intervention strategy. I am less interested in giving knowledge to the companies. Our research group cooperated because of the urge to do something.”*

#### COLLABORATION GOALS

As for the corporate and non-profit partners in AIM, both academia stated to recognize the importance of AIM having a primary business focus. As could be expected, they moreover both stressed the importance of AIM for generating knowledge and facilitating learning:

*“There will come a day that funders like to see if and how it works. If we don’t have evidence, funding might stop. That is a strongly underestimated risk, that holds not only for science or NGOs but for all of us. The same holds for learning. We have to learn within a work stream: are we doing the right things? Is our theory of change correct? But also in between the work streams, because there are generic aspects.”*

One of them moreover stressed that AIM should be focusing on being a platform bringing together different stakeholders and integrating the different work streams. The other sees a role for AIM in advocacy and lobbying the government to relax the current legal and financial framework.

#### OPERATIONAL GOALS

Both institutions repeatedly stressed the importance of focusing on current projects and generating results with these:

*“It is about time to fulfill our promises and deliver! There is and should be an extremely high sense of urgency.”*

No other operational goals were put forward in the interviews or could be generated through the document analysis which could be specifically linked to the knowledge and research institutions.

## GOVERNMENT

### Sub-question 1d: what are key goals of the government for participating in PPPs for development?

#### ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS

First of all, government involvement in PPPs for development in general and AIM specifically provides a political symbol, changing government functioning and bringing it closer to the virtue of the market:

*“MFA joined AIM because nutrition as a topic was new, interesting and relevant, and because AIM constituted an actual Multi-Stakeholder Platform, representing an important modality. Under Koenders [i.e., then Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation] there was a spirit of opening up and collaborating, without having a specific thematic perspective.”*

Moreover, as also becomes partly clear from the statement above, through its involvement in AIM the government seeks to strengthen the realization of one of its development objectives, increasing food security, by leveraging complementary expertise. In doing so, it recognizes the importance of different parties working together. The government may furthermore seek to mobilize additional private capital; 50% of the funding for the work streams for which a FDOV subsidy was granted needs to be funded through own contributions of the partners, although these contributions may be in kind. Initially, the government moreover intended to shift risk inherent to innovative projects towards its corporate partners:

*“At one point, the government said that if a work stream fails then the corporate partner would be liable – but this would have been a show stopper and had to be withdrawn.”*

#### COLLABORATION GOALS

When asked about their goals for AIM, government respondents indicated to want to see AIM to become a genuine platform of partners and stakeholders working on nutrition, which will preferably decentralize itself towards the South:

*“I hope that in 2020 a group of enthusiasts still meets and converses twice a year, within a movement that keeps on proposing innovative plans to potential funders.”*

The government moreover stressed that, as do about half of the NGOs, they see a role for AIM as an incubator, generating bankable proposals as a basis for experimentation into nutrition solutions. Government indicated that for them it is mainly important for AIM to make its partnership and incubation model work:

*“This model eventually needs to be fruitful, this would be the most important for me. How many people we may reach with that in the coming years, is secondary to me. If the model proves to be sustainable, we will definitely reach those numbers, and more than 100 million. There should be a larger focus on quality as to quantity.”*

#### OPERATIONAL GOALS

The main operational goal stated by the government is that AIM should continue fulfilling its incubator role, thereby continuing to generate new bankable proposals for interventions. The government moreover feels that AIM's focus on the South should be strengthened. Finally, the government stressed that AIM should have a learning agenda and M&E.

## SUB-QUESTION 2

### HOW IS GOAL ALIGNMENT IN PPPs FOR DEVELOPMENT ACHIEVED?

**Sub-question 2a: what are the main differences in goals for PPPs for development of the different parties involved?**

From the above analysis of key goals of the different parties involved in AIM it became clear that all parties stated multiple aims they seek after with their involvement. In table 1 below, these (sub)goals are summarized and wherever relevant integrated into the main goal they refer to. Goals that were stated by only one of the companies or NGOs are considered not to be representative for the category as a whole and are therefore not included in the table.

| <i>Organization type →<br/>Goal type ↓</i> | <b>Private sector</b>   | <b>NGOs</b>   | <b>Academia</b>  | <b>Government</b>   |
|--|---|---|--|---|
| <b>Organizational goals</b>                | Develop market<br><br>Penetrate market<br><br>Develop company (South)<br>Reputational enhancement | Create impact on theme<br><br>Expand network<br><br>Organizational learning<br>Reputational enhancement | Increase knowledge base<br><br>Receive funding for research<br><br>Reputational enhancement<br>Expand networks<br><br>Create impact on theme | Change government functioning<br><br>Create impact on theme |
| <b>Collaboration goals</b>                 | Business focus<br>Generate social change (South)  | Business focus<br>Advocate social change<br><br>Lobby<br>Experiment/<br>incubate                        | Business focus<br>Generate knowledge   | (Decentralized) MSP<br>Experiment/<br>incubate              |
| <b>Operational goals</b>                   | Implementation/<br>demonstrate results<br><br>M&E   | Implementation/<br>demonstrate results<br><br>M&E<br><br>Integration<br>Strengthen local focus          | Implementation/<br>demonstrate results   | Experimentation<br><br>Strengthen local focus<br><br>M&E    |

**Table 1:** Summary of AIM goals.

Organizational goals appear to translate down to some extent into collaboration and operational goals, e.g., businesses state to be involved to develop and penetrate the BoP market with new business models, they thus argue for a business focus for AIM, and feel that AIM should both focus on implementation of existing projects (i.e., business models currently developed) and M&E to track results and to improve these models where necessary; the government, primarily motivated by political symbolism, i.e., demonstrating and developing a novel way of tackling development problems, want to keep feeding the incubator function of AIM and put a main focus on experimentation. The same can be argued for goals of NGOs and academia.

Main motivations for businesses to be involved in AIM revolve around building a market for their products or services and gaining a foothold on the BoP market. Developing knowledge on the needs of this market, building a network among local stakeholders, and strengthening weak infrastructure all seem to be means toward this end. Motivations for businesses, i.e., the organizational goals that they pursue, thus mainly seem to revolve around *partner-centric outcomes* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011) as explained in the theoretical framework. Corporations moreover want to strengthen their reputation through their involvement in AIM, which may be categorized as an *outside stakeholder-centric outcome*.

It is moreover interesting that, with the exception of one Northern company, only the Southern companies explicitly mentioned that they want to leverage AIM to generate social change, a *plan-centric outcome* according to the classification of outcomes of Clarke & Fuller (2011). The most credible explanation to this is that business men from Southern companies are experiencing this local context and the difficulties related to this context on a daily basis. Their organizations may be more strongly constrained by the negative effects of malnutrition, although it is also very credible that respondents from Southern companies are more driven to tackle the problem of malnutrition also from a personal motivation.

NGOs are, as explained before, mainly involved to generate social change and combat the problem of malnutrition. Facilitating organizational learning, expanding their network and influencing government policy and corporate social priorities seem to be means toward achieving the end of creating a stronger impact on malnutrition. NGOs may thus be said to mainly focus on *plan-centric outcomes* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011). Some respondents however moreover indicated to be motivated by possibilities to find new partnering and funding opportunities, expand their networks, and facilitate organizational learning, which may all be categorized as *partner-centric outcomes*. Goals contributing toward reputational enhancement (i.e., responding to demands for more efficiency and accountability; become more important institutional actors) may be categorized as *outside stakeholder-centric outcomes*. Some NGOs moreover indicated to be involved because they want to develop knowledge on and experience with functioning in a partnership with partners from other sectors, whereas some moreover stressed the importance of AIM being an incubator, a platform experimenting with innovative solutions, while inspiring others to do the same, which may be classified as *process-centric outcomes* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011). NGOs thus pursue a mix of outcomes, with plan-centric outcomes carrying the greatest weight.

Academia seem to be lying somewhere in between private sector organizations and NGOs considering their goals for AIM and the type of outcomes they seem to be pursuing. Their reason for involvement is, as explained before, mainly knowledge-driven. Organizational goals revolving around deriving insights, building the knowledge base, increasing the relevance of their research, expanding their networks, and securing funding for research all are *partner-centric outcomes* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011), although building a knowledge base around ways to tackle malnutrition may also be classified as a *plan-centric outcome*. These institutions moreover indicated to be involved because of the urge to do something against malnutrition, again a *plan-centric outcome*. This last reason to focus on plan-centric outcomes may however be based more on individual goals whereas the partner-centric outcomes are based on the goals of their organization. Finally, the development of the knowledge base on and experience with PPPs for development or collaborative initiatives in general could moreover be characterized as a *process-centric outcome*.

Based on the analysis above, the main motivation for government involvement can be described as political symbolism; a change in the way government attempts to tackle development problems. Government respondents moreover continuously stressed the importance of AIM being a platform bringing different stakeholders together, and an incubator generating new innovative solutions to tackle malnutrition. Government then, may be said to mainly be pursuing *process-centric outcomes* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011). Although they claim that achieving the stated mission of reaching the 100 million is subordinate to the functioning of the model, still eventually this model needs to contribute toward their development objectives.

The government is thus moreover pursuing *plan-centric outcomes*, although the process-centric outcomes are given more priority.

From the above analysis it becomes clear that the type of outcome that is being pursued is not uniformly distributed among the different organization types or even within the same class of organizations; one NGO may put a larger focus on process-centric outcomes, whereas another NGO weighs plan-centric outcomes as more important. Organizations may moreover pursue different outcome types, and thus different goals, at the same time. What is interesting however, is that there appears to be a common understanding, at least among businesses, NGOs, and academia, that AIM should generate business-led initiatives as sustainable solutions against malnutrition. These different goals and outcome types pursued are thus aligned to some extent toward this commonly stated purpose. With a stronger positive correlation between the outcomes being pursued by different partners expected to lead to a stronger incentive for the partners to coordinate their actions to mutual benefit (Gray, 1985), the need for common ground leads to the next research question:

**Sub-question 2b: how are different goals of the different parties involved being aligned for the PPP for development?**

#### WHERE IT ALL STARTED

To explain how all these different goals of the partners involved came to be aligned to such an extent that a functioning PPP could emerge, we first need to go back to where it all started. As explained in the Methodology section, AIM was initiated by an NGO, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the CEOs of three corporations, based on an informal declaration of intent declaring that these organizations would jointly strive toward making a large impact in combating malnutrition. GAIN initiated the meeting, driven by its mandate to end malnutrition through supporting public-private partnerships. This process of starting up AIM mimics the *Partnerships formation stage* in Clarke & Fuller's (2011) process model of collaborative strategic management as explained in the theoretical framework. The CEOs and the government officials subsequently became enthusiastic because of the opportunity the subject provided to work together:

*"The intention was that we would do something together, but what exactly, how this should look like, and where it should happen, we had no clue. That needs a lot of time."*

The ambition for the initiative was formulated as 'to have 100 million malnourished people reached in 6 countries by 2015'. This statement of what AIM is aiming to achieve, i.e., the goal for the common cause of the collaboration, thus constitutes the *meta-goal* (Huxham & Vangen, 1996) of AIM. This ambition, providing the identity of the initiative, is broad enough for many (potential) partners from both a business perspective and a societal perspective to identify itself with, and provides sufficient scope for the partners to relate to their own organizational objectives. The broadness and relevance of the subject, the degree of ambition, the availability of funding, but especially the novelty of the initiative at that time in the Netherlands, created a strong momentum:

*"We all had the feeling in the beginning that we had gold in our hands, a big opportunity. We wanted to make an enormous impact by working together and had 22 million to help us."*

Getting from formulating a joint ambition to actual collaboration however, proved to be much more difficult:

*"It has taken a long time before we managed to define what AIM was exactly. At the time, it simply started as an intention of five partners to increase access to a better quality of food for 100 million people in six countries, especially women and young children. This ambition came up suddenly and was not based on a thorough deliberation. It was based on what we might do."*

AIM was based on a commitment between high-level executives and the private sector organizations in particular got involved in a very top-down manner. When participants entered the stage in which the collaborative strategic plan was to be formulated (Clarke & Fuller, 2011), it proved to be a challenge to get the high-level organizational goals of CEOs translated down into the business line. The CEOs had been keen to sign the letter of intent, but it was a top-down process which needed to be tied in with real, country-based activities. New business ideas need internal approval in competition with projects that target the traditional customer segments. Lower margins associated to the BoP market pose a challenge to secure the needed business contributions, and for serving the BoP additional investments needed to be made, rendering the business case even more unattractive. Moreover, individuals initially involved did not know each other very well in the beginning, and due to interorganizational competition there was a reluctance to open up. Some concrete interventions were being proposed, but none was found in which all the partners saw sufficient scope and benefit to bundle their efforts. One could say that the meta-goal of the collaboration was not tight enough to provide sufficient direction for the organizational goals to translate down into concrete collaboration goals, and too tight at the same time to generate sufficient buy-in from all the partners.

#### CHANGING SCOPE

Within AIM, the realization grew that the current course of the initiative was not the way forward. A shift of focus was proposed during one of the partner meetings, which was relatively easily agreed upon by all the partners. AIM was no longer trying to do everything with all partners together, but instead broadened its theme and country scope and opened up. The new model, termed AIM 2.0, was developed much more from a bottom-up approach, with partners stating their interests and exploring what would work for their business models. New partners were invited, representing different points along the value chain leading to improved nutrition. The value chain approach did not only represent a broadened scope, but also provided increased opportunities for companies to work together. AIM started looking at existing ideas within the private sector partners to see what was needed to get these ideas implemented. Sub-groups with matching interests and complimentary expertise were set up to focus on particular projects, which helped to inspire joint thinking.

Through changing direction toward AIM 2.0 by expanding the scope of AIM and involving more partners, AIM managed to enter the stage of *deliberate and emerging strategy implementation* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011). Not all partners had to walk in lockstep anymore; instead, the partners that could find common ground gravitated towards each other. Inviting new partners led to new dynamics and gave a push to the incubator function of AIM, generating new project ideas. AIM realized that it was not possible to align all of the goals of all partners on a platform level, and the focus of goal-alignment on a platform level shifted to a focus on goal-alignment on a project level, making buy-in of partners a lot easier:

*“What we have tried to do is to allow partners to develop their own agenda and their own interests around that topic, and not tell them what to do and ask them to march on order.”*

There are thus two levels within AIM on which goals are being aligned; the platform level and the work stream level, which appear to be subject to similar, but slightly different dynamics. Where dynamics are different between the platform and the project level, these dynamics are described separately.

#### THE META-GOAL

After broadening its scope, AIM's official ambition stayed the same. Based on the direction AIM is going and the collaborative goals that were stated by different partners, it becomes clear however that his ambition ceased to be the meta-goal of the platform:

*“Sincerely, we were putting projects in place to reach an impact. Metrics were not often discussed. I was not driven by that number. We were not measuring how far we are from getting there. The goal set the tone of the founders. Maybe time has come now to look for a more realistic, measurable goal.”*

None of the respondents, not even the ones that are involved since the initial phases of AIM, recall a process of goal alignment. Many of the partners that joined in later stages do not even appear to be aware of the earlier shift in focus of AIM, or the reasons behind this shift. Instead, there is confusion and disagreement among the partners about what AIM is exactly and what meta-goal is being, or should be, pursued by the platform. Although other variables are involved, such as limited communication and decisiveness that is lacking behind, the frustration that is building among the partners of AIM may be attributed partly to disagreements between partners about the meta-goal and the collaborative goals of AIM. Whereas some partners have very clear opinions on their envisioned purpose of AIM, others are diminishing their involvement toward a project level. One of the partners indicated to consider leaving the platform due to disagreement over the direction of AIM.

Many of the respondents indicated the importance of having a shared vision, a shared agenda, and ownership of the goals of the platform. Beyond the declaration of intent, an explicit collaborative strategic plan for the platform level has not been formulated. The current dynamics on a platform level among partners within AIM clearly demonstrate the crucial functions a cleverly formulated meta-goal and a collaborative strategic plan fulfill in a PPP for development. Achieving goal-alignment on a work stream level was perceived to be a lot easier, which is expected to have been facilitated by the fact that work streams have clearly stated and much more concrete meta-goals and collaborative strategic plans that are formulated during the incubation process.

Still, even while lacking a concrete and explicitly stated meta-goal or collaborative strategic plan providing direction for the overall platform, there are commonalities in understanding of the partners about collaboration goals for AIM. Somehow the goals of the different partners got aligned in the platform to such an extent that different work streams could be generated. The factors contributing towards the alignment of the goals on both a platform and the work stream level have been identified through an iterative coding process and are further explained below.

## COORDINATION

A PPP the size of AIM, involving so many different partners, requires coordination to function effectively. Overall coordination of the platform is being done by the AIM secretariat, which is staffed by 2 NGO representatives, a company representative, and a student trainee. The secretariat is funded in large part through the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other partners moreover contribute both in cash and in kind. Responsibilities of the secretariat revolve around maintaining the link with funders, platform-level administration and monitoring, coordination, organizing meetings, and internal communication. The secretariat is moreover actively involved in creating awareness around nutrition. Its most important role for the process of goal alignment however is its role as a broker, which is further explained below.

## BROKERING

The key role of the AIM secretariat is a “brokering” role. The secretariat engages with outside actors to convince them to become involved as a partner in AIM. It engages with various partners to enthuse them, to manage their expectations, and to keep them engaged:

*“In their role, they have to babysit sometimes. They have to keep the interaction between the partners going, they are someone who can mediate, someone who knows the interest and motivations of all partners.”*

The brokering role of the secretariat moreover serves to build trust between the partners. The secretariat does not only build trust by ensuring regular dialogue, but also serves as an entrance check for new partners, with existing partners expecting that when the secretariat invites new partners to join the initiative, their credentials have already been checked and deemed sufficient. Whether the secretariat actually does so remains unclear.



The secretariat furthermore plays a key role in facilitating the idea mining process, both by organizing in-country visits and by bringing the partners together and supporting them in finding opportunities and mutual interest, and structuring and shaping their ideas for the development of concrete plans and bankable proposals. When opportunities are identified, the AIM secretariat works with the partners to further define the concept and to develop collaborative strategic plans for concrete interventions, constituting the driving force to finalize the project proposals. The secretariat has moreover contributed substantively towards getting 6 of the projects eligible for FDOV funding.

AIM partners see the secretariat as the driving force bringing and keeping partners together. Various partners praised the work of the secretariat and the head of coordination in particular, for her determination, her persistence, her enthusiasm, her diplomatic power, and her ability to bridge the various partners. What is also perceived to be very instrumental for the functioning of the secretariat is that it is managed by one of the NGOs that has extensive expertise on nutrition, so that it is capable of contributing on the content side wherever necessary. Moreover, this NGO has extensive experience in the field, and a broad network it can leverage. It is an established and recognized name in most of the targeted countries, so that it can credibly mediate between AIM partners and local governments. This mediating role between partners and local governments is moreover partially fulfilled by the Dutch government. These findings about the importance of a broker or “linking-pin” organization are in line with previous findings (e.g., Arya & Salk, 2006; Miraftab, 2004; Westley & Vredenburg, 1991) as explained in the theoretical framework.

## TRUST

All partners recognize the importance of trust among the partners in order to be able to cooperate effectively. In order to build trust, partners indicate that it is important that they get to know each other well. Doing so takes a lot of time, which is underlined by the lengthy *partnership formation stage* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011) of AIM. Partners recognize that openness about goals and intentions is paramount for building trust, in concordance with previous statements of scholars (e.g., Arya & Salk, 2006; Glasbergen, 2011; Malena, 2004) as mentioned in the theoretical framework. Many respondents indicated that they feel that they can trust each other, facilitated by the open atmosphere during meetings, the coordination of the secretariat, and the time that has passed during which the partners got to know each other. When new partners enter the initiative however, it appears that it takes some time before current partners start to trust them. Moreover, when funding became available this appeared to lower the level of mutual trust, in particular between partners that were competing for available funding.

## BUY-IN

To get potential partners interested in the initiative, and to keep current partners engaged and committed, some sort of buy-in process needs to take place. Usually a cleverly stated meta-goal is facilitating buy-in of partners, but in AIM other processes are in place influencing potential partners becoming engaged and partners remaining committed to AIM.

While a clearly stated, functioning meta-goal is lacking, there is still a common theme to AIM to which various types of partners can relate. When approaching potential partners, the AIM secretariat is communicating the scope of AIM. Malnutrition is a broad issue in which many potential partners see urgency and scope to contribute towards. Furthermore, because of extensive promotion of AIM by MFA, AIM is becoming a high-profile initiative that many potential partners are keen to be associated with.

Respondents that joined AIM in later stages indicated that there was no explicit process during which their goals were aligned to the collaboration goals on a platform-level. Instead, they had to adjust themselves to, or buy into, the goals that were already there. Because of the flexibility inherent in AIM 2.0, as explained in the section about the change of scope above, partners may either buy into the platform, or they may buy into a specific project or project idea. The level of buy-in appears to influence partners’ degree of involvement in AIM, with partners buying into a specific project usually consciously or subconsciously limiting their degree of

involvement to the respective project. It must be noted however that AIM still resides in an early stage of its life cycle, and that extended buy-in may thus occur in later stages.

Sufficient buy-in of partners was moreover found to be influencing how goals of different parties stay aligned on both the platform and the project level, which will be further elaborated upon under Sub-question 3.

#### LEADERSHIP

Partners that are involved at the platform level recognize that the decision-making process in AIM is very much consensus oriented. The secretariat tries to ensure that all partners get the opportunity to contribute and that all opinions and goals are being sufficiently weighted. Individual partners are hesitant to overrule each other. This spirit of equality and consensus is contributing towards buy-in of partners, whereas at the same time partners are complaining that this is leading to a lack of leadership and decisive action. Most partners see a natural leadership role for the secretariat. There appears to be a paradox however between leadership and power, which is further explained below.

Whereas the AIM secretariat is responsible for the overall coordination of the (pre)project portfolio, most work streams have one key partner taking the lead in driving the intervention forward. Typically, this is the partner who contributes the most to resourcing and funding the intervention. Which parties are involved varies according to the separate work streams; GAIN is the only partner that is involved in all projects. Usually Dutch companies are in the lead. One of the companies indicated however that it would be more efficient when project management would be transferred to the secretariat so that companies can focus on content and their part of expertise, whereas in another work stream corporate leadership appears to be ineffective. In general, companies appear to have stepped back a bit, and are not taking up their leadership role.

#### POWER DYNAMICS

Although many of the partners indicated that they are experiencing a lack of decisive leadership at the platform level, at the same time the analysis highlights indications of significant power differences present in AIM. In concordance with the argument of Lankatilleke (1999), some of the partners indicated that they feel that the NGO coordinating the AIM secretariat and acting as a liaison on behalf of the other partners is exerting undue influence on agenda setting of the platform:

*“A risk of the AIM secretariat is that sometimes they are too much X. The interest of X and AIM might interfere, the question is how to prevent this. X of course is very much aided by having a good relationship with MFA, and they receive funding of MFA also outside of AIM. There are different persons involved, but it does provide some risk for conflicts of interest.”*

Whereas partners perceive the leadership role of this NGO to be natural due to its expertise and network in the field of nutrition, and thus its ability to mobilize a constituency around the issue (Waddell, 2000), the difference between this NGO and AIM is not clear for all the partners and decision-making on a platform level is not always transparent. AIM attempted to mitigate this imbalance of power due to a leading role of one partner in the secretariat somewhat by setting up a governance structure. The governance structure is however still under discussion and has to date not yet crystallized. Meanwhile, another partner seconded one of its employees to the secretariat.

The NGO running the secretariat reports to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to many of the partners, because of its role as main funder, through the power of the purse-string MFA can exhibit a large influence on the direction of the platform, which is in line with observations by Bezanson & Isenman (2012) as explained in the theoretical framework. Several partners indicated however that the Dutch government is being very positive and open, and promoting the long-term objective and goal with all partners working together. It is plausible however that MFA is exerting its influence through the coordinating organization instead of directly and explicitly.

Corporations involved appear to have more power than NGOs and research and knowledge institutions, which is in line with expectations of other scholars (e.g., Zammit, 2004). Power accrued by corporations is partly caused by the business focus of the interventions and the recognition that the private sector constitutes a pull factor. Part of it however can be attributed toward the attitude of the non-commercial partners themselves; with non-commercial partners being on the recipient side of funding, they tend to be reserved with contributing toward decision-making. Most NGOs indicated to find it natural that commercial partners have the largest decision power:

*“There is a power difference between corporate and non-corporate partners. The reality is that corporate partners lead the discussion. Those are the ones that are in the market, and that have the potential to drive enormous impact and scale of improvements. Therefore they naturally have the power. This is a fact that should be talked about openly and that should be acknowledged by all the partners. For non-commercial partners it is key to recognize this if they want to affect change through the market; working within the system rather than trying to change it. This involves harnessing the power of the private sector; no one harnesses the power of a non-commercial partner.”*

Still, the platform appears to be open enough for all partners to make a valuable contribution. All partners indicated to be convinced of the need of different sector partners and to be open for their input. The knowledge and research institutions however seem to be less content with the distribution of power and indicated to be under the impression that often they have to fight for their role and position, which may be caused by companies not sufficiently valuing the importance of M&E.

AIM has been very much a Dutch initiative. Northern partners possess the resources, the biannual partner meetings take place in the Netherlands, and mainly Northern partners are involved in the decision-making process. Although national host governments have been involved as stakeholders in the platform, power appears to be unequally distributed toward Northern partners, which may possibly complicate buy-in from Southern stakeholders.

In concordance to some extent with arguments by among others Waddell (2000), some of the partners state that at different times during the project implementation processes, there should be varying degrees of influence granted to the different partners involved in the project:

*“The partnerships have been developed for different stages of the process – with a view of the whole development path, but some partners are interfering too much at the start when their roles really only come in half way. Others will be more important at the beginning.”*

As explained before, six out of seven work streams are funded through FDOV grants causing the work streams to operate according to FDOV standards, which is different to how the work streams may have operated independently. Again, funding leads to power in determining collaboration and operational goals. Partners moreover expressed frustration about all the strict FDOV conditions that have to be adhered to and all the due diligence that has to be done, which has severely slowed down the process of implementation:

*“The FDOV procedure involves so many procedures, rules and regulations, etc. After the kickoff workshop in Arusha, there was a lot of energy in the group to get things started, but then we still had to wait for eight months for the second round of funding. The imposed process was lethal for the results, the collaboration, and the momentum.”*

Despite FDOV requirements slowing down the process of implementation, it was recognized that the FDOV facility did provide an incentive to get the various partners to agree to contribute to and work toward a common deadline, and it provided AIM with a concrete goal to work towards.

Within the projects, there is a clear attribution of power toward the partner that is having the lead. Other partners were said to have little or no information on or say over the allocation of the budget. Academia and NGOs need financial back-up to be able to move forward, leading to the organizations that contribute the most having the most power in the work streams. As the private sector parties have to invest 50% of the funding – in cash or in kind – naturally, in most instances these partners have the most power. Because the private sector needs to be a pull factor, the selection of the focus countries moreover has been based to a large extent on the availability and positioning of the companies involved.

Another partner which appears to have significant power on a project level is again the NGO that leads the AIM secretariat:

*“In the end X is the real portfolio. X has the contracts with FDOV. I know that all work streams are deciding who has to do what, and when. They make their own proposal, but X has to steer such processes and make sure everything works well. At the same time, when I say this, I am doubting whether X should be that important. Sometimes X interferes in a strange way, undermining all efforts of the leader of the work stream. Why not make the work streams independent. The responsibilities between X and the work stream are not clear.”*

Meanwhile, the local context and partners appear to have had little influence over the project definitions, whereas partners do recognize that they have valuable lessons to share. Too much of the projects was said to have been developed from the Netherlands, which may be due to the sense of urgency in meeting FDOV requirements in time to secure funding.

## MEETINGS

At the platform level AIM partners meet twice a year in face-to-face meetings, which are stated by the coordinating NGO to have created a common understanding and a common vision. These F2F meetings mainly revolve around sharing ideas, joint planning, and exchange of knowledge and experiences. Monthly teleconferences are moreover organized to discuss progress and address risks and issues. Multiple partners recognize the energy, the positive interaction among the partners and the cross-fertilization of ideas during F2F meetings. These meetings moreover contribute toward relationship building among the partners and a better understanding and appreciation of each other. Many partners appreciate the degree of openness and the informal and personal contact during the meetings, although some corporate partners acknowledge that they cannot share all information.

All of the meetings have a different character; some focused on discussing the different roles in small working groups, whereas others were instrumental for preparing the proposal for FDOV funding. Some partners indicated however to consider the meetings to have too much of a ‘show and tell’ format, and that they would like to see a stronger focus on working on a shared vision, agenda, and programming. Due to full schedules of the individuals involved, there is never full attendance of Northern partners during these meetings, whereas Southern partners rarely manage to join in. Minutes of the meetings are however circulated for questions and comments.

Upon initiation of most projects, local workshops are organized during which reasons for involvement of the different partners are stated, goals are set, and roles and expected results are being defined. These meetings are considered to be crucial for a successful implementation of the projects.

### SUB-QUESTION 3

#### **HOW DO GOALS STAY ALIGNED DURING THE COURSE OF THE PPP FOR DEVELOPMENT?**

Before providing an analysis of how goals of the different partners stay aligned during the course of AIM, it is first important to know that AIM, despite having been implemented several years ago, is still in its early PPP stages. Specifically, AIM is currently hovering between the stage of collaborative strategic plan formulation and the early phases of the implementation stage (Clarke & Fuller, 2011). It is therefore only possible to identify factors that may influence how goals stay aligned during these early stages. Although many of these factors may be expected to remain relevant throughout the PPP process, it may be that during later stages other factors turn out to be at play that to date have not been recognized by the partners. Factors which are considered to have been relevant during the early stages of AIM have been identified through an iterative coding process of the document and interview data, and will be further described below.

#### THE META-GOAL

Several respondents recognized that alignment of goals in AIM is an ongoing and dynamic process, both on the project and the platform level:

*“We had to do some goal alignment, but it is probably an ongoing process. What you expect to be the goal at the initial stage, really has to evolve. And it did, as we learned more. All organizations go through their own changes and challenges. So things will change. As long as you keep in mind the overall goal and the ultimate outcome, we have to allow that things will change and adapt in between. Things don’t always go as expected.”*

The above respondent thus stresses the importance of keeping the overall goal and the ultimate outcome of AIM in mind, as do most other partners. Keeping the overall meta-goal in mind provides for focus and prevents that partners get side-tracked into smaller things. A shared goal was moreover said to help overcome compromises that sometimes have to be made. Many partners explicitly or implicitly recognize however that a clear meta-goal for the AIM platform is lacking. Whereas it was already explained that the lack of this meta-goal and collaborative strategic plan causes disagreements and frustration among the partners, some partners indicate that this lacking meta-goal moreover leads to fragmented projects with unexploited synergies and a lack of cross-fertilization. It may thus be very plausible that, while the separate projects may lead to positive *strategy implementation outcomes*, the lack of a collaborative strategic plan will lead to predominant *emergent strategy implementation* (Clarke & Fuller, 2011) by individual organizations on a platform level, and to a continuously mounting frustration among partners. When the partners do not manage to formulate an explicit meta-goal and collaborative strategic plan, AIM may eventually be in danger of dissolving, i.e., enter the *extinction phase* as described by Roloff (2007).

#### COMPLEMENTARITY

To achieve a sum that is greater than its parts, it is being recognized that partners need to complement each other in crucial areas. Such recognition of complementarity helps to retain internal trust and to increase partners’ willingness to make necessary compromises and to adjust themselves to each other’s working styles. AIM on the one side tries to secure its experimentation base by including as many new and different stakeholders in the platform as possible. Partners with complementing skills and expertise are then expected to gravitate toward each other or are brought together by the secretariat to undertake a project. Many of the partners recognize that complementarity between partners undertaking the project facilitates that goals stay aligned. Knowledge and research partners, while being complementary because of the necessity of M&E, feel however that they are being pushed out by the other partners. What is interesting is that they indicated to experience this with private partners in particular, whereas more than half of the private partners mentioned M&E as an operational goal.

With so many different partners in the platform, effectiveness and decisiveness on a platform level may be compromised and strong governance is required to ensure effective functioning and full leverage of complementary skills.

## GOVERNANCE

As explained in the theoretical framework, Bezanson & Isenman (2012) stress the necessity of a strong governance framework in PPPs for development, among others to ensure that there are appropriate strategies in place with realistic and attainable goals. Such strategies then could make sure that goals of the different partners stay aligned toward a common end. Official AIM documentation sets out a strong governance structure that is well thought through. A Supervisory Council is described in which each sector and key contributors are being represented. A management Board for delivery is moreover mentioned, again involving partners from each sector. Separate steering committees are described for each intervention, in which main project partners are involved, meeting on a monthly basis. It is moreover stated that clear roles and responsibilities are agreed upon upfront, including decision power on optimal usage of allocated budget on intervention level. Finally, it is mentioning the draft of a Consortium Agreement stipulating compliance and reporting requirements, liability provisions, and IP issues. Because of the extensive description of governance provisions in documentation, one may assume that there is awareness within AIM of the need of effective governance.

In practice however, partner responses indicate that the draft of the Consortium Agreement is a long and frustrating process due to various legal issues. Governance structure of AIM is moreover perceived to be weak and allocation of roles and responsibilities (i.e., setting strategy, management oversight, resource mobilization, risk management, etc.) are unclear:

*“This board – we haven’t really put that into practice yet. It is also meant as a possible escalation point if there are any conflicts between partners. It’s also to be used to create some class around the partnership – targeting higher level people. To get some more communication within and outside the organization and also to share synergy and get ideas for new projects. We try to avoid a partner that is not involved in a particular project to have veto rights on that project. We try not to make it too heavy at the top.”*

Such a lacking governance structure may be contributing toward the perceived power struggles and lack of effective leadership in AIM. Bezanson & Isenman (2012) moreover found that one of the indicators of weak governance are weak M&E systems to track program outputs and outcomes. Whereas the importance of M&E is being recognized by many partners and there is a separate work stream for M&E, indeed as explained before academia feel that they are not given sufficient scope to fulfill their task.

## BUY-IN

As explained before, sufficient buy-in of partners does not only facilitate the alignment of different organizational goals, but can also contribute toward these goals staying aligned. Corporate partners in particular recognize the need for buy-in throughout all levels of their organization to ensure ongoing commitment of their organization to AIM, in line with findings of Austin (2000b) who argued that internal support is necessary to ensure enduring involvement. For businesses, projects and partnerships often constitute merely a very small element of their overall business portfolio, and when organizational goals change this may lead to a loss of commitment:

*“There have been conflicts within X. The same goes for Y, which had an iron component, which was only a very small part of its business, when they were facing budget cuts. It was very much about business manifesting itself in such a way that they could actually do something with their partners. The problem of commitment and conflicts was more inside companies than between partners.”*

AIM attempts to ensure sustained buy-in of businesses by focusing on generating projects that find traction and interest with the core business of private sector partners, i.e., that provide *collaborative advantage* (Glasbergen, 2011; Huxham, 1993; Huxham & Macdonald, 1992; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Kanter, 1994; Vangen & Huxham, 2006) as explained in the theoretical framework. Furthermore, it is recognized throughout the private partners that it is very important to maintain contacts and relationships on all levels of the organization. The secretariat therefore moreover helps business liaisons to advocate AIM within their organizations, and tries to involve high level executives in the governance of AIM.

Another factor that is mentioned by AIM partners to be important to maintain commitment is ongoing internal communication, both regarding progress and successes. Partners indicated to often be very busy working on the individual projects, which carries the risk of losing sight of the platform. External communication is moreover important to create a feeling of 'hey, I belong to this initiative!'. Both internal and external communication was indicated by many of the partners to currently be insufficient within AIM.

#### STAFF ROTATIONS

Very few of the individuals involved in AIM at its start-up are still involved due to frequent staff rotations at most partners. Such staff rotations complicate the process of goals staying aligned in multiple ways. First, many partners claim that there is a lack of institutional memory. Decisions and progress are often not sufficiently documented, so that when new representatives join the process starts all over again. Several partners moreover indicated that connections between partners happen at the level of individuals. It may be that when an individual rotates, trust has to be rebuilt or the new representative does not have a 'click' with the other individuals. This latter finding is in line with claims made by Lister (2000) on the influence of staff rotations on trust as explained in the Theoretical Framework. For organizations that have less staff rotation, e.g., SMEs, it may moreover be difficult to frequently adjust to different individuals. Although new people can bring refreshment, different individuals moreover have different ideas and interpretations which may cause a shift in (operational) goals.

#### BROKERING

Brokering by the AIM secretariat, as described before, does not only facilitate the alignment of goals, but could moreover contribute toward goals staying aligned. However, whereas several partners stress the importance of re-evaluating and revising platform-level goals, to date such an explicit revision has not happened. Conflicts between partners are intended to be mediated through several provisions in the governance system although to date, as explained before, this governance system has not been sufficiently developed.

#### MEETINGS

Regular meetings on both the platform and project levels are not only instrumental in getting goals aligned, but are necessary to ensure that all partners remain on the same page. Whereas some partners indicate that in order to keep AIM top of mind, meetings should be organized more frequently, others complain about the incompatibility of the high frequency of meetings with their busy schedules. A balance thus needs to be found and other factors as identified need to be leveraged to ensure that goals stay aligned in between meetings.

#### FLEXIBILITY

Finally, many partners recognize the flexibility in AIM as one of its strengths. Partners may choose to be involved on a project level, in multiple projects, or on a platform level, whatever aligns with their priorities and organizational goals. The AIM secretariat moreover indicated that in ensuring buy-in, they are sometimes being opportunistic; whereas they communicate that AIM activities of companies should be related to their core business, when at a certain moment these activities seem to align better with corporate CSR goals they 'go with the flow'.

Main factors facilitating and complicating the dynamic process of goal alignment as identified under sub-question 2 and 3 are summarized in table 2 below:

| <b>Facilitating factors</b>  | <b>Complicating factors</b>           |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Concrete meta-goal           | Rigidity                              |
| Collaborative strategic plan | Funding requirements                  |
| Flexibility                  | Staff rotations                       |
| Complementarity              | Power struggles                       |
| Brokering                    | Lack of a strong governance structure |
| Trust                        |                                       |
| Institutional Memory         |                                       |
| Communication                |                                       |
| Meetings                     |                                       |
| Leadership                   |                                       |

**Table 2:** Factors facilitating and complicating the dynamic process of goal alignment.



## CONCLUSION

The research at hand has set out to provide insight into to how the alignment of goals is achieved and maintained throughout the course of collaboration between various organization types in Public-Private Partnerships for development. Through an extensive document analysis and semi-structured interviews with partners involved in the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition it became clear that there is a divergence between the outcomes pursued by different classes of organizations. Single organizations moreover appear to pursue multiple goals and outcome types at the same time.

Private sector partners were found to be pursuing plan-centric and outside stakeholder-centric outcomes in particular, whereas plan-centric outcomes pursued mainly appear to emanate from individual motivation. Non-governmental organizations, on the other hand, are mainly pursuing plan-centric outcomes, i.e., impact the issue at stake. Some of the goals stated by their representatives can also be related to partner-centric, process-centric, and outside stakeholder-centric outcomes, however. Academia appear to lie somewhere in between private sector organizations and NGOs, with a main focus on generating knowledge with may be characterized as both plan-centric, partner-centric, and process-centric outcomes. The government then, mainly involved for political symbolism motivations, particularly pursues process-centric outcomes.

What is moreover interesting is that interventions generated by AIM are directly related to private partners' core businesses, contradicting prior findings of Kolk et al. (2008). It may be that AIM constitutes one of the first PPPs of an emerging new class of PPPs for development, consistent with the contemporary conception that development aid should be combined with trade, and with a growing realization among non-profit actors that for solutions to be sustainable, core business interests need to be involved.

The iterative coding procedure revealed three levels at which stated goals of different organizations involved in PPPs for development may be categorized: organizational goals, referring to the motivations of organizations for participating in such collaborative initiatives; collaboration goals, encompassing goals of the organization for the respective initiative, or the purpose the PPP for development should serve; and operational goals, encompassing the goals related to the process of collaboration or operation of the PPP. Organizational goals appear to translate down into collaboration goals. Goal alignment then, may be said to occur when collaboration goals align to such an extent that mutually shared operational goals originate.

A majority of respondents acknowledge the differences in goals and outcomes pursued by different organizations, and moreover recognize the importance of getting and keeping these different goals aligned. Goal alignment was shown not to occur at one moment in time, but instead to be an ongoing and dynamic process. Semi-structured interviews and the document analysis revealed however, that at least in the PPP for development under investigation no explicit goal alignment process occurred. Instead, goal alignment appears to happen implicitly, influenced by various factors. Through an iterative coding process analyzing the collected data, these factors were revealed.

First and foremost, the analysis showed the importance of a concrete and explicitly stated meta-goal and a commonly agreed upon collaborative strategic plan to provide direction to the PPP for development and its partners, and to prevent emerging strategy implementation by individual organizations to dominate. Such a meta-goal and collaborative strategic plan moreover facilitate implementation and prevent disagreements on both collaboration and operational goal level. In particular in large PPPs for development involving many partners and projects, having a secretariat acting as a coordinator, facilitator, and broker appears to be very instrumental to get goals aligned. A broker serves to bring partners together, facilitate discussion, and keep partners aligned.

Trust was moreover found to be an important factor facilitating effective collaboration. Respondents recognize that to build trust, openness of partners about goals and intentions is paramount. Whereas trust was expected

to both be influenced by the degree of goal alignment and to be influencing the process of goal alignment in a sort of vicious circle (e.g., Arya & Salk, 2006; Malena, 2004), the analysis revealed that for trust to build up among partners, a large degree of consensus over collaboration and operational goals may be instrumental, but is not a necessary condition. Instead, other factors such as a good familiarity among individuals involved, a reliable broker and facilitator, and meetings with an open character may serve to build the necessary trust.

Buy-in of partners into a common theme or purpose of the PPP for development both facilitates goal alignment, and contributes toward keeping goals aligned and ensuring sustained commitment of partners. In particular in the case of private sector partners, such buy-in needs to be ensured throughout all organizational levels. Factors contributing toward buy-in may be a broker helping to lobby within the respective organizations and involve high-level executives, and ongoing internal and external communication. Internal communication helps to keep the partnership top-of-mind within the partners, whereas external communication contributes towards a high profile of the partnership, through which partners may be extrinsically motivated to initiate or continue commitment. Flexibility in degree of commitment and (potential) outputs of the partnership was moreover found to contribute toward buy-in of both new and current partners. There needs to be complementarity between the partners to retain internal trust and increase partners' willingness to compromise and to adjust themselves to each other's styles of working.

A need for strong leadership was identified to ensure effective decision-making and if necessary, force agreement on operational goals. There was a paradox found between leadership and power, however; a broker may exert undue influence over the decision-making and financiers may steer the initiative toward their goals through the power of the purse string. A dependency relationship was moreover identified between non-profits and funders, with non-profits knowingly relinquishing some decision-making power toward private-sector partners. A strong governance system appears to be instrumental in mitigating power struggles and providing a leadership and decision-making structure. Finally, regular meetings and workshops strongly facilitate goal alignment, although to ensure ongoing commitment a careful balance between frequency and accommodating the busy schedules of individuals involved needs to be sought after.

Funding requirements may distort the process of goal alignment but at the same time may accelerate it by providing common goals for the partners to work toward. Goal alignment may moreover be distorted by frequent staff rotations implying a loss of trust and a loss of institutional memory on agreements made, intentions of others, and the motivation behind operational goals.

## DISCUSSION & LIMITATIONS

The intention of this research has been to create a picture of the process of goal alignment in PPPs for development. Data on which the conclusion above is based has been derived from a single case, being the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition. There are several limitations associated with research based on a single-case study, and the study at hand is subject to all of these. The main limitation is the potential lack of generalizability (Yin, 2009); the case may not be representative of the 'population' of PPPs for development as a whole and results may thus not be generalizable beyond the specific case of AIM. Future studies may want to investigate and compare the process of goal alignment in a broader range of PPPs for development, preferably covering a longer time period and moving beyond the Dutch context of AIM.

AIM is a large PPP for development involving many partners, both Northern and Southern and from different sectors. The initiative as a whole consists of a platform involving all partners to a more or less extent. Under the platform, there are several separate projects in which partners work together in varying constellations to deliver a solution contributing toward ending malnutrition. In its form, AIM constitutes a fairly unique form of PPP for development. Because of the large number of partners involved on the platform level, this part of AIM resembles a Multi-Stakeholder Platform (MSP), a form of collaboration revolving around addressing a particular issue, thereby involving all stakeholders of that issue (e.g., Hemmati, 2002; Roloff, 2007; Steins & Edwards, 1999). Results found, particularly those at the platform level, may therefore be applicable to the process of goal alignment in MSPs as well. MSPs however, are described to encompass a very democratic process revolving around consensus building, and may thus involve different dynamics than AIM leading to different, or adjusted, goal alignment processes.

The different projects, or work streams, under AIM involve a smaller number of partners and may be better comparable to other PPPs for development. Most factors found to be influencing the process of goal alignment were found to be applicable to both the platform level and the lower-level projects, leading to the expectation that factors identified apply to the process of goal alignment in a broad range of collaborative initiatives, ranging from small, very concrete PPPs for development to large and very broad PPPs. This expectation should however be confirmed by further research.

Dynamics may moreover be different in partnerships addressing different issues; PPPs addressing commodity chains, health or social issues for instance may know different or adjusted factors contributing and complicating the process of goal alignment. Partnerships that focus on a limited issue may moreover show different dynamics than partnerships focusing on a very wide issue such as AIM. Research involving comparative analysis and different PPPs for development may reveal the extent of generalizability of the results found here.

Asking respondents about the process of goal alignment through semi-structured interviews asks for retrospective recall, involving the possibility of hindsight bias, leading to a decreased validity of the data. Respondents may moreover not have been completely straightforward into where their priorities lie in their motivations for involvement in AIM. They may for example actually have been more strongly motivated by partner-centric outcomes whereas they state to be motivated by plan-centric outcomes. Stated operational goals partly helped to estimate priority, full internal validity could however still not be ensured.

The methodology used has tried to compensate for this risk somewhat by balancing the statements and validating interview results through a document analysis. Still, documents may not include all goals, motivations, and processes and it may be that not all motivations or a correct weighing of motivations has surfaced. What is more, extremely contentious and/ or divisive topics may have been excluded from documents and remained unmentioned during interviews. Hidden aims may moreover not have been revealed. Full anonymity has been ensured to respondents to allow them to talk freely, but constraints for doing so may have not been fully removed. The methodology used moreover did not generate sufficient data to reliably

identify individual goals pursued through involvement in AIM. In some instances assumptions about possible individual goals were made. When this was done, it was explicitly mentioned. The picture that has been provided in the results section may thus be incomplete. Action research may provide a valuable addition in further research to verify results and potentially identify other factors of importance.

AIM involves a knowledge institution and a research institute, which for the sake of clarity were taken together under the heading of 'academia'. The research institute involved however, has an 'NGO-ish' mandate and mode of operation, with its mission to generate knowledge on and facilitate sustainable business models for the BoP. Its stated collaboration goals of advocacy and lobbying may thus possibly be better attributed toward NGO collaboration goals. This does not influence further conclusions but must be kept in mind when interpreting results.

It moreover must be kept in mind that AIM still resides in an early stage of its life cycle. Goal alignment was found to be a dynamic process, and it may be that in later stages of PPPs for development other factors influencing the process of goal alignment gain prominence. The methodology used was intended to overcome issues arising with research conducted at one moment in time by looking back in time using document analysis and asking for retrospective recall. Still, data was collected at one moment in time and does not allow to look forward into later stages in a PPP life cycle. There is still a need for more longitudinal research to capture the complete process of goal alignment in PPPs for development, throughout their entire life cycle.

Qualitative research offers investigators the possibility to comprehensively observe the phenomenon under study, deepening the understanding of it. Making sense of a large quantity of qualitative data however, needs to be done in a structural manner to avoid overlooking important aspects. NVIVO was used to code the data, allowing for a more structured analysis than when data analysis would have been undertaken without software tools. The danger when using a coding program however, is that a researcher may be hesitant to go back through the data when new coding categories emerge. For the research at hand, the researcher was aware of this risk beforehand and ensured that this risk was mitigated by repeatedly going back through the data and recode where necessary.

As becomes clear from the above, whereas the research at hand has provided a picture of the process of goal alignment in PPPs for development, this picture is not complete. This is caused partly because in the process of describing this picture, some of the richness of reality has inevitably been lost. Still, the illustration of some key dimensions of the process of goal alignment have given a sense of factors at play, from which implications for research and practice may be drawn.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE

Whereas PPPs for development have increased enormously in popularity in recent times, such PPPs are still a relatively young instrument. While knowledge on the tactical aspects concerning the management of such partnerships is slowly increasing (e.g., Andonova, 2010; Nisar, 2013; Vangen & Huxham, 2006), how goals of different partners get and stay aligned to date remained largely unaddressed in prior research. By providing insight into the process of goal alignment in PPPs for development, the research at hand has filled this knowledge gap to some extent. Such insight contributes toward a more fine-grained understanding of the working of such PPPs.

Prior research has been using a multiplicity of terms and definitions, classifying different phenomena under the same term, and using a variety of different terms and definitions for the same phenomenon. As a first contribution to theory, the theoretical framework of the thesis at hand gives a definition integrating common notions about Public-Private Partnerships for development. Moreover, a clear demarcation is provided of the concept of these PPPs for development as compared to other forms of interorganizational collaboration.

An iterative coding process has led to the emergence of a conceptual framework untangling the multiplicity of goals for collaborative initiatives. This framework categorizes these goals into a hierarchy of three levels, being organizational goals, collaboration goals, and operational goals. In doing so, it contributes to literature in allowing a more structured process for goals analysis by future researchers. The conceptual framework may moreover aide parties involved in PPPs for development in concretizing the goals they pursue through involvement and in analyzing and correctly interpreting goals pursued by their counterparts, potentially leading to a more explicit and streamlined process of goal alignment.

The research moreover provides insight into the various goals pursued by different organization types through their involvement in PPPs for development. Such insight adds to theory in confirming prior claims on goals pursued, and extends existing theory by indicating previously unidentified goals, e.g. for academia. These findings moreover contribute to practice by creating a better understanding among different parties involved of goals potentially pursued by their partners, which may contribute toward strengthened mutual understanding and better anticipation of their partners' actions.

Finally, the thesis highlights several factors contributing toward and constraining the dynamic process of goal alignment. Clearly this list of factors is not a panacea for collaboration, as it does not entail a set of clear rules for collaborating successfully. Collaboration, and specifically that of the intersectoral kind, is influenced by too many other variables. However, in addition to filling a knowledge gap by indicating some principles that may be applicable to a wide range of partnerships, findings may help practitioners to more effectively address contingencies. They provide insight into how PPPs for development may be shaped to ensure that the efforts of all partners are geared toward successful achievement of the partnership's goals and by doing so, they potentially contribute toward the success of future PPPs for development. When these partnerships manage to fulfill their promise, they may lead to (private sector) development in developing countries and eventually, poverty alleviation.

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## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1 – INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

#### Questions

**1. Why is your organization involved in the AIM network?**

Possible aspects:

- What is the responsibility of your organization within AIM?
- How does your organization contribute to the success of AIM?
- What are your specific organizational goals to achieve through participation in AIM?
- Do you perceive your organization as a part of AIM or part of a specific project within AIM?
- How did your organization become part of AIM?

**2. What is your opinion about the current ambition of AIM: to have 100 million malnourished people reached in 6 countries by 2015?**

Possible aspects:

- Could you describe the process in which this ambition and its sub-goals have been established?
- What is your opinion about this ambition?
- What should be the ambition towards 2020?
- How do you think this ambition should be realized?
- What are the main hurdles to overcome?
- What is the role of your organization in reaching this ambition?

**3. Could you describe the process through which the goals of the actors involved were aligned for the platform?**

Possible aspects:

- Were there any conflicts in this goal-alignment process? If so, when, and (how) were these resolved?
- To what extent is your organization involved in the strategic discussion on AIM?
- In which body does this discussion take place?
- Did your organization have to make compromises when aligning goals with the other partners?
- Do you believe that some parties had to make more compromises than others?
- Has there been re-evaluation or renegotiation of the goals in later stages of AIM? What was the reason for that? If not, do you think a re-evaluation was needed?

**4. What factors do you believe contribute towards a fruitful collaboration in AIM?**

Possible aspects:

- Do you feel that there is mutual trust among the actors in AIM?
- Does each partner have a clear understanding of each other's motives and expectations for AIM?
- Do you feel that benefits and risks are equally, or fairly, distributed in AIM?
- Do power inequalities among the actors play a role in AIM?

**5. What should AIM look like in 2020, at the end of the next 6-year period?**

Possible aspects:

- Does AIM still exist as a public-private platform?
- What kind of projects will be executed within the AIM network?
- Which earning model will be established by 2020? Or do you expect AIM to be self-financing in 2020?
- What is the role of your organization within the AIM network in 2020?

**6. What is your opinion about AIM's current and future's management & organisation structure: e.g. role of secretariat, meetings with the entire AIM network, learning & sharing of information**

Possible aspects:

- What is your opinion about the (current) role of the AIM secretariat?
- What should be the role of the secretariat reaching the 2020 goals? , what should stay the same and what should be changed?
- What do you consider to be the optimal AIM management structure?
- What is your opinion about the way information is collected & shared in the AIM projects, between projects and outside the projects?

**7. How do you perceive the role of the different partners (public and private) now and in the future?**

Possible aspects:

- In what way are the stakes of the ultimate beneficiaries of AIM represented by the partners included in AIM?
- What do you consider to be the best balance between northern and southern partners?
- Is there between the partners a difference in commitment to AIM, and how is this commitment ensured? Does the joining of new partners in later phases of AIM influence its effectiveness?
- What should be the role of the Dutch government in 2020?
- Should other governments be equally involved?
- What is, according to you, the best format of cooperation between business and non-business partners within AIM?

**8. Could you give 3 examples of how AIM differs from other public-private cooperation forms?**

**9. What is in your view the most important factor determining AIM's success in the coming six years?**

**10. Could you tell us what is your biggest personal learning in working with AIM?**

**11. Do you have any other remarks?**



## ANNEX 2 - BRIEFING AND PRE-SENT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

### Background information interviews AIM strategic analysis

The AIM secretariat has been requested to develop a strategy for AIM for 2015-2020. This strategy needs to take into account; AIM's ambition, a roadmap towards this ambition, how it will be organized, the role of the secretariat, future funding etc. AIM asked Schuttelaar & Partners to conduct a strategic analysis that will provide the basis towards the new strategy.

As a part of this analysis we will interview the different partners of AIM. The goal of the interviews is to get more insight in the following topics:

- The reasons for the partners to join AIM and the goals, expectations and experiences aligned with that.
- Key success factors and constraints of the AIM process and activities.
- Focusing on the future, ideas about AIM's ambition, organization and funding: what runs well, what should be improved and adapted?

To gain this insight in this, we will focus in the interview on the following topics:

1. Why is your organization involved in the AIM network?
2. What is your opinion about the current ambition of AIM: to have 100 million malnourished people reached in 6 countries by 2015?
3. Could you describe the process through which the goals of the actors involved were aligned for the platform?
4. What factors do you believe contribute towards a fruitful collaboration in AIM?
5. What should AIM look like in 2020, at the end of the next 6-year period?
6. What is your opinion about AIM's current and future's management & organisation structure: e.g. role of secretariat, meetings with the entire AIM network, learning & sharing of information
7. How do you perceive the role of the different partners (public and private) now and in the future?
8. Could you give 3 examples of how AIM differs from other public-private cooperation forms?
9. What is in your view the most important factor determining AIM's success in the coming six years?

Could you tell us what is your biggest personal learning in working with AIM?

## ANNEX 3 – ADJUSTED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

### Questions

**1. Why did your organization initially decide to get involved in the AIM network?**

Possible aspects:

- How did your organization get involved with AIM?
- Was there consensus within your organization about the desirability of the involvement of your organization within AIM?
- What was the (envisioned) responsibility of your organization within AIM?
- How was your organization supposed to contribute to the success of AIM?
- What were your specific organizational goals to achieve through participation in AIM?
- How long has your organization been involved in AIM?

**2. What is your opinion about the current ambition of AIM: to have 100 million malnourished people reached in 6 countries by 2015?**

Possible aspects:

- Could you describe the process in which this ambition and its sub-goals have been established?
- What is your opinion about this ambition?
- What was the envisioned role of your organization in reaching this ambition?

**3. Why did your organization decide to leave the AIM platform?**

Possible aspects:

- To what extent was your organization involved in the strategic discussion about the direction and organization of AIM?
- Was there consensus within your organization about leaving the platform?
- Do you feel that other actors in AIM had a clear understanding of your motives and expectations for AIM?
- Did you have a clear understanding of the motives and expectations of other actors for AIM?
- What was your eventual organizational contribution towards AIM?

**4. Could you describe the process through which the goals of the actors involved were aligned for the platform?**

Possible aspects:

- Were there any conflicts in this goal-alignment process? If so, when, and (how) were these resolved?
- Did involvement in AIM eventually contribute towards the goals you set to achieve through participation in AIM?
- Was there clarity about the goals and intentions of other actors in AIM?
- Was there sufficient alignment between the goals of the actors in AIM?
- If so, how was this alignment achieved? If not, what should have been done to achieve this alignment?
- Do you feel that some parties had to make more compromises than others?
- Has there been re-evaluation or renegotiation of the goals in later stages of AIM? What was the reason for that? If not, do you think a re-evaluation was needed?

**5. What factors do you believe would contribute towards a fruitful collaboration in AIM?**

Possible aspects:

- Do you feel that there is mutual trust among the actors in AIM?
- Does each partner have a clear understanding of each other's motives and expectations for AIM?
- Do you feel that benefits and risks are equally, or fairly, distributed in AIM?
- Do power inequalities among the actors play a role in AIM?

**6. How should AIM have been organized for your organization to stay a member of the platform?**

Possible aspects:

- Should AIM pursue different objectives?
- Should AIM be organized differently financially?
- What do you consider to be the optimal AIM management structure?
- What is your opinion about the (current) role of the AIM secretariat?
- What is your opinion about the way information is collected & shared in the AIM projects, between projects and outside the projects?

**7. How do you perceive the role of the different parties involved in AIM?**

Possible aspects:

- Do you feel that the stakes of ultimate beneficiaries are sufficiently represented in AIM?
- Do you feel that there is an appropriate balance between private and public actors in AIM?
- Do you feel that there is an appropriate balance between Northern and Southern actors in AIM?
- Does the joining of partners in later stages influence the effectiveness of AIM?
- How do you feel about the role of the government in AIM?
- Do you feel that there is a difference in power of the different actors involved in AIM?
- What is, according to you, the best format of cooperation between business and non-business partners within AIM?

**8. Is your organization involved in other public-private cooperation forms?**

Possible aspects:

- If so, which?
- if so, why is involvement in these PPPs considered to be more desirable than involvement in AIM?
- If not, why not?
- If not, how should a public-private partnership be organized for your organization to be interested in involvement?

**9. Could you tell us what your biggest personal learning was in working with AIM?**

**10. Do you have any other remarks?**

## ANNEX 4 - CODEBOOK

- Category label
  - Interview transcript
  - Document
    - Internal document
    - External document
- Undefined/ revisit
- AIM timeline
- Organization type
  - Government
  - Private sector
    - Africa Bio Medica Ltd.
    - Akzonobel
    - Dadtco
    - DSM
    - Hilina
    - Intertek
    - PHSL
    - Rijkzwaan
    - Spar International
    - Unilever
  - NGOs
    - Aqua4All
    - Amref
    - Faida Mali
    - GAIN
    - Hivos
    - ICCO
    - Rabobank Foundation
    - SNV
    - WSUP
  - Academia
    - WUR
    - BoPInc
- Origin organization
  - North
  - South
- Level
  - Platform
  - Project

- Goals pursued
  - Organizational goals
  - Collaboration goals
  - Operational goals
  - Individual goals
  - Indications of implicit goals
- Goal alignment
  - As described by respondents
  - Initial alignment
    - Ambition/ meta-goal
      - Voiced opinions about ambition/ meta-goal
    - Buy-in
    - Competition
    - FDOV funding
    - Formalization
    - Leadership
    - Meetings
    - New partners
    - Openness
    - Power dynamics
    - Secretariat
      - Coordination
      - Brokering
      - Facilitation
  - Staying aligned
    - Brokering
    - Buy-in
    - Communication
      - Internal
      - External
    - Complementarity
    - Flexibility
    - Formalization
    - Governance
    - Meetings
    - Meta-goal
    - Power dynamics
    - Trust
    - Staff rotations
- Deleted codes