


BACHELOR THESIS



PREFERENCE FORMATION  
OF EU MEMBER STATES  
TOWARDS THE CENTRAL  
AND EASTERN EUROPEAN  
ENLARGEMENT

A CAUSAL EXPLANATORY RESEARCH ON THE  
RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM OF LABOUR MOVEMENT

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Abstract

The enlargement of the EU includes the opening of the labour market to the new EU Members, whereby some Member States decided to restrict the free movement of new EU workers for a transitional period. Focusing on the fifth enlargement wave, this thesis aims at finding factors having impact on the decision to restrict free labour movement. Under study are the variables national political party ideology in office, public opinion and unemployment rate of the Member States.

A small-N Qualitative Comparative Analysis with a crisp data set was conducted. A cross-sectional analysis controlled the persistence of the factors' constellation during both Central and Eastern European rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 2007. The attributes that were expected to be likely to result in restrictions were the traditional, authoritarian and nationalistic (TAN) ideology, a net disagreement towards the statement on enlarging the EU and unemployment rate higher than EU-15 average. The findings indicate that net disagreement of the public opinion and a high unemployment rate are causing restrictions. Additionally, the consistency and coverage for being a necessary condition is above thresholds for all combinations under study except for the absence of TAN, absence of net disagreement together with the presence of high unemployment. The resolution of contradictory cases is recommended.

*Keywords:* qualitative comparative analysis, Central and Eastern European Countries, enlargement, restriction, party ideology, public opinion, unemployment rate.

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## List of abbreviations

A2	Accession countries of the 2007 enlargement of the EU: Bulgaria and Romania
A8	Central and Eastern European accession countries of the 2004 enlargement of the EU: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia
AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CEE	Central and Eastern European
DK	Denmark
ES	Spain
EU-15	EU Member States before 2004 enlargement: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
FI	Finland
FR	France
fsQCA	Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.0, computer program
GAL	Green, alternative and liberal party ideology
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Germany
GR	Greece
HU	High unemployment rate (attribute of unemployment rate)
I	Italy
IRE	Ireland
LU	Luxembourg
ND	Net disagreement (attribute of public opinion)
NL	The Netherlands
PT	Portugal
QCA	Qualitative comparative analysis
RES	Restriction (effect under study)
RO	Romania
SE	Sweden
TAN	Traditional, authoritarian and nationalist party ideology (attribute of party ideology)
TFEU	Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom

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## Introduction

The EU has expanded to currently 28 Member States. The fifth wave of enlargement is the enlargement of interest and focus in this thesis. The first round of this enlargement was in 2004, while Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union (EU) on the first day of 2007. With this expansion, the inhabitants of the accession countries were able to access the EU labour market freely. Free movement of workers is a right provided by the EU through article 45 TFEU, meaning that no discrimination of employment candidates shall take place due to nationality of an inhabitant of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2008), developed by EU secondary legislation and the Case law of the Court of Justice (Chalmers, Davies & Monti, 2010). Despite this fact, the Member States are permitted to restrict the free movement of workers for a transitional period of up to seven years after entrance. These restrictions are based on national policies and intergovernmental agreements with accessing countries (Carrera, 2005). But considering the right of free movement, why are EU Members not taking the full package of a new Member State? Even though the justification of restrictions shall be based on economic concerns, the factors that lead to the decision to restrict and set-up the application shall be investigated. The main research question of this thesis therefore is:

To what extent do the factors of party ideology, public opinion and unemployment rate influence the decision of EU Member States to apply restrictions against the free movement of workers from Central and Eastern Europe?

As the theory will argue, political, social and economic factors have influence on national decisions. The public's fear of increased unemployment and exploitation of the social system due to the enlargement to Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and the wish for re-election of the decision-making authorities is the crucial impetus for my research. This study will focus on the influence of the three mentioned factors on the decision to apply restrictions on the CEE countries. More precisely, party ideology, public opinion and unemployment rates of the EU-15 states are the variables representing each factor that will be analysed.

Yet, the existing studies focus on the enlargement process itself or on the consequences of enlargement and the free labour movement. Schimmelfennig (2001) in his search for

determinants to expand to the East indicates that rationalism is the basic theory for explaining the preferences of decision-making actors, while constructivism accounts for enlargement. Further, the causes for workers to migrate as well as the consequences for the host country (Borjas, 1999) are explored. The focus lies especially on the national labour market (Guild & Carrera, 2012) and the change of migration flows after the implementation of restrictions (Dobson, 2009). Even research on explicit national consequences like fiscal costs for the UK due to migrating workers of the 2004 CEE countries (Dustmann, Frattini, & Halls, 2010) concentrate on the after-accession situation. In the contribution of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) a good overview of the given literature and of other aspects that have to be considered, is presented. They claim that the current research is not generalizable or too theoretic. Additionally, the focus is very narrow, considering for example only one Member or accession state. The work suggests analyzing the “pre-accession process” (ibid., p.501) with more comparative research designs. While widening the independent variable possibilities, the dependent variable should be operationalized more specifically. Based on this, this thesis highly contributes to the research literature.

The factors influencing decisions on restricting the free movement of workers for transitional periods are not yet studied explicitly, as far as the researches indicate. Of course, the Member States have to justify their request of restrictions before the Commission, but the decision to request is not yet analysed. For scientists my study shall provide a model of common patterns which give a degree of generalizability for former and future accession negotiations. Additionally, indicators to consider regarding decision-making processes are provided. But more importantly, it also aims at understanding decisions of the Member States.

The expectations of this research are that one of these three factors is prevailing as an influential factor on the decision to restrict. The thesis is build up as follows. First, the theoretical framework will present the theory behind the variables applied and the theoretical conjectures for each factor are discussed. This is the basis for the methodological part where the research design, case and data collection as well as the operationalization clarify the variables and the corresponding measurement. The analytical section will present and examine the data applied. Here, not only the analysis of the occurrence of the factors, but also the calculation of their consistency and coverage are carried out. The results will be expressed in the conclusion, stating

that net disagreement and high unemployment rates have influence on the decision to restrict. The suggestions are addressed to researchers, providing suggestions on further investigations.

## Theory

The free movement of workers from CEE countries, according to the Accession Treaties 2003 and 2005, can be restricted by the EU-15 countries<sup>1</sup>. Restriction here means that workers from the Member States need work permission to move and work freely within the EU borders. In both treaties a so-called 2+3+2 model is applied (Chalmers, et al., 2010, see also Carrera, 2005). It implies that Articles 1 and 6 of the Regulation 1612/68<sup>2</sup> shall not apply as long as the present Member States pose restrictions on the free movement (Kvist, 2004). More precisely, the first restriction can only be applied for two years, after which a Member State has to file a motion again for another three years. These are intergovernmental agreements that include quotas for specific sectors. This holds true for restrictions after this period, which can then only be expanded to another two years in case the Commission accepts the request of the Member State, which poses the founded suspicion of “disturbances of the labour market or a threat thereof” (Carrera, 2005, p. 707). At the latest from seven years of restriction the Regulation 1612/68 fully applies (European Union, 2014). Persons who were in an employment contract consistently for more than one year before the accession date are granted the full EU-citizenship right. If a person’s employment is interrupted before or within the restrictive period, the freedom of movement will be abolished (Carrera, 2005).

Even though restrictions on the free labour movement are criticized for being against the fundamental rights of free movement and the non-discrimination because of nationality and industrial action (Carrera, 2005, Dølvik and Visser, 2009), the decision to restrict or to adjust

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<sup>1</sup> Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded. OJ L 236, 23.09.2003, p. 33–988 and Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union. OJ L 157, 21.06.2005, p. 29–202

<sup>2</sup> Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community. Article 1 refers to the right to work in another EU country, while Article 6 refers to the right of non-discriminatory recruitment of EU nationals



social policies is at national level. In the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland, following the study by Krings (2009), social policies were prepared and rights were enforced adequately, so that restrictions were not necessary. This actually is the case for most receiving states, as typical workers migrating to another country are well-educated, young and without relatives (Carrera, 2005, p. 707, note 44). Germany and Austria, sharing borders with CEE countries, saw a delayed opening to workers as the only opportunity to cope with the wage differences (Krings, 2009)<sup>3</sup>.

Still, influential factors that evoke the decision to restrict need to be researched. In order to cover a spectrum of possible impacts, the factors that are inspected on their influence in the scope of this thesis are of political, social and economic nature. The political variable focuses on the attributes of the national government that are prevailing in the Member States. In charge of deciding to apply restrictions are national governments (European Commission, n.d.), which is why the political composition is assumed to be influential. Socially, governments act according to their perception of the society. The social variable hence is mirrored by the perception of the population. Additionally, the community of the EU is rooted in economic cooperation. Welcoming a new state to the EU means to expect economic benefits. This economic variable, focusing on the economic labour situation of the society, is therefore assumed to influence the implementation of restrictive measures. The theoretical model for this thesis is illustrated in figure 1.




Figure 1: Simple theoretical model. Source: Author.

<sup>3</sup> The nominal wages were “between one-tenth and one-seventh of the EU15” (Dølvik and Visser, 2009, p. 497).

The political, social and economic factors' influence on the decision to restrict will be tested in terms of representing factors, which will be party ideology for the political variable, public opinion for the social variable and unemployment rate for the economic variable of the particular existing Member States.

### The political factor: Party ideology

Not only is the legislative an organ for decision-making in political process but also is this the only path for the public to have direct influence (Lijphart, 1999). This is hence the pivotal factor to be analysed in this thesis. National parliamentary elections form new parliamentary constellations in varying political alignment. Political parties pursue different ideologies on national level in which they differ from each other. Because the various ideologies of the political party in office are also diverse in terms of the attitude towards enlargement (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002, p. 980), this factor is assumed to have influence on the decision to apply restrictions after enlargement has taken place.

Ideology in general is defined as “science of ideas” (Vincent, 2010, p.1). Political ideology is elaborated as presenting an interpretation as well as a prescription on how to arrange with the social context (Jost, Federico & Napier 2009, p. 309). Jost and his colleagues (2009, p. 310) see ideology as a device “of structuring political knowledge and expertise”, which also is applicable to political ideologies. Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) demonstrate that party ideology affects the position regarding enlargement. They show that the classic division of left/right is not as adequate as a new politics dimension they investigate against the attitude towards European integration, since there is no significant relationship between left/right and the attitude. Both, extreme left and extreme right parties have euroscepticism in common. The reason for this attitude on the extremes can be explained by the willingness of these parties to oppose the more successful parties that are more supportive for integration. As figure 2 shows, the relationship between these two variables (left/right dimension by support for integration) shows an inverted U-curve.




Figure 2: Positioning on selected EU policies, by left/right dimension, all parties in 1999 (N = 125). Source: Hooghe, et al., 2002, p.970. Modified by Author.

While the Left/Right dimension is more on economic classification, the new dimension is based on several non-economic/cultural attitudes of parties<sup>4</sup>. It is therefore also much more diverse than the economic classification (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and Edwards, 2006). In general, according to this model, parties categorized to GAL (Green/ alternative/ libertarian) are social democratic, liberal and green parties, while Christian democratic, conservative and populist/radical right parties can be categorized to the TAN (traditional/ authoritarian/ nationalist) side (Hooghe, et al., 2002). Like in figure 3, they give a more linear relationship between party ideology and the attitude towards integration:

<sup>4</sup> Marks and his colleagues (2006) give a more in depth description on the characteristics of the classifications




Figure 3: Positioning on selected EU policies, by new politics dimension, all parties in 1999 (N = 125). Source: Hooghe, et al., 2002, p.978. Modified by Author.

One has to mention that because enlargement of the EU is involved in the integration process the attitude towards European integration in general can be incorporated in the attitude towards enlargement (Karp & Bowler, 2006). In order to have a clearer distinction between the attitudes among the parties, the variable applied in the analysis will categorize the national parties according to the new dimension. Ideologies of the parties in government are assumed to influence the decision to restrict the free movement of workers. Deriving from the theory above, parties classified as TAN are considered to be more sceptical on European enlargement than parties classified as GAL. The TAN ideology relies on traditional and national values and is said to be less supportive of enlargement. Hence, the hypothesis is:

**H<sup>1</sup>: A country governed by a TAN party is more likely to implement restrictions than a country governed by a non-TAN party.**

The social factor: Public opinion

As stated before, democratic government is elected by the entitled citizens of the state. Social variables are about the members of a society, groups and individuals. Individuals form their

political attitude on the basis of beliefs, values and interests (Hix, 2005). Because of interaction, these attitudes are influenced by narrow groups and the society as a whole. The social factor is represented by the public opinion towards the enlargement of the EU. Public opinion is a reflection on individual opinions influenced by interaction with external opinions, say, the society (Glynn, 2011, p. 157). More precisely, it is “what the public thinks about a given issue, nothing more and nothing less” (Hague & Harrop, 2007, p. 134). In the “model of a self-governing republic” (ibid, p. 135) public opinion has more importance than only giving an overview of the inhabitants; it serves as moral reference. Hence, it is another variable influencing the political behaviour of the national government and simultaneously its enlargement policies (Gabel, 1998b).

Since the governmental decisions shall be legitimate, the public opinion is assumed to influence the decision. Nowadays, EU Member States are structured by indirect representative democracy. Elections and their associated campaigns offer direct communication between the society and the government. Because one goal of a party in office is the re-election in the next tenure, it tries to serve the will of the majority of its voters (Hague & Harrop, 2007). Therefore, next to campaigning for elections, the public opinion is considered in the government’s decision-making process. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) detect that there is an overall convergence in the public opinion towards the support for the EU among the Member States<sup>5</sup>. Additionally, the support is closely connected to the economic prosperousness of the Member States of the EU (Anderson & Reichert, 1995). National identity, being challenged in times of excessive political integration (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007), is also captured by opinion polls. Most commonly, and more regularly, public opinion is measured by opinion polls and sample surveys. A change in the general public opinion is a signal to the government that society is in transition as well (Hague & Harrop, 2007). Even though public opinion is not as important for the political decision-making in detail as “expert and organized opinion” (ibid, p. 136), it defines the direction of choices. Therefore, not only the consistency but additionally the changes in public opinion are interesting to observe.

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<sup>5</sup> In their study, the opinion on whether the EU is a ‘bad’ or a ‘good’ thing is analysed on the countries of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Great Britain.

A negative attitude shows discontent among citizens. Politicians are interested to avoid this in order to enhance the chance of re-election. Because one effect of enlargement is the free movement of workers, policy-makers might be anxious to reduce the magnitude of already decided enlargements to diminish negative attitudes among people. The opinion that enlarging the EU results in unemployment indicates a wish for restricting the additional competitive workers from the respective country. A restriction of free movement should hence be more likely if a country faces negative public opinion on enlargement:

**H<sup>2</sup>: A country in which public opinion towards enlargement is negative is more likely to implement restrictions than a country in which public opinion towards enlargement is positive.**

The economic factor: Unemployment rates

With the membership of the European Union countries not only open up their borders for free trade within the EU area, but also transfer some sovereignty to the EU institutions, which in turn means a high degree of adaptation. In the document of the Europe 2020 strategy, one of the five main targets which are set to be handled by the EU is the increase of the total employment rate up to 75% until the year 2020. Integrating new Member States that are less prosperous than the EU-15 is an extra challenge to the EU development (Kvist, 2004). Since this variable is logically linked to the movement of workers, the third independent variable of the thesis is the unemployment rate of the countries. Enlargement and the attached right of free movement within the EU area implicate additional fiscal costs to the host Member States (Dustmann, et al, 2010), be it in terms of administrative costs or social subsidy. New workers contribute to the national work force of the host country and are demonstrated (at least in the UK, see Dustmann et al, 2010) to be less likely to take advantage of social aid in comparison to national workers. Even though the unemployment rate in 2005 had risen in the UK, there is no statistically significant evidence that this is caused or influenced by migrant workers (Gilpin, Henty, Lemos, Portes & Bullen, 2006). In contrast, receiving countries can benefit from new workers as long as they fill the gaps of lacking workers in particular working areas and skills (Borjas, 1999). Even though migrating workers do not affect the national unemployment rate, they are more likely to be

unemployed than the host state nationals and also more likely to be unemployed than the labourers in the states of origin. It is also supposed that mobile workers have stimulated GDP in the EU in short- and long-term (Guild & Carrera, 2012). There have been migration flows to the EU Member States even before the opening of the labour market. Dobson (2009) found only little impact of the restrictions on these migration flows. Moreover, different wage levels of the CEE countries compared to the EU-15 (Krings, 2009) can lead to an increased influx from these countries. The rationale of states to apply for restrictive measures is based on fears of derogations of the labour market. States with a good labour situation, thus a high employment rate, have a more balanced allocation of labour forces across the required specialist fields. Therefore, states with a high unemployment rate are alleged to try to protect the national labour market and hence enforce restrictions. Here, a high unemployment rate is assumed to influence the decision to restrict positively:

**H<sup>3</sup>: A country with an unemployment rate higher than EU-15 average is more likely to implement restrictions than a country with an unemployment rate at and below EU-average.**

After the presentation of the variables an extended version of the theoretical model is applicable, as figure 4 demonstrates.




Figure 4: Extended theoretical model. Source: Author.

As the presentation of concepts shows, the three factors are interwoven to some extent. In reality, the variables cannot be separated completely like in an experimental environment. An evaluation of the economic conditions of the individual as benefitting from European membership has influence on the attitude towards this membership (Gabel, 1998a). These attitudes additionally have influence on the decision-making bodies of national governments. The independent variables cover the measurable facets of decision-making and therefore have to be investigated in their constellation in this thesis. This indicates that combinations of factors are able to have varying influence on the decision to restrict.

## Research methodology

In order to answer the research question cross-sectional data will be investigated, focusing on the constellation of the three independent variables (public opinion, political party ideology and unemployment rates) and the application of restrictions on the new Member States by the EU-15 countries as the dependent variable. Cross-sectional study is a nonrandomized observational design, focusing on one population at single point of time (Gerring, 2012).

## Case selection

The fifth enlargement wave, comprising the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, will be examined because the countries of Eastern and Central Europe are more similar to each other than to the rest of the EU Member States (Rybář, 2009). In 2004, ten countries from which eight are Central and Eastern European (A8) joined. In 2007 also Bulgaria and Romania (A2) entered the EU. Considering more enlargement waves of the EU, for instance the potentially future Balkan enlargement having begun with Croatia or even the previous wave in 1995, the historical validity of the study would be reduced, since global circumstances have been and will be different. Additionally, generations of participants for public opinion could have shifted. Malta and Cyprus are no Central and Eastern European countries. These countries are excluded from this study, because the European Commission did not give permission to the EU-15 countries to restrict free



movement of Maltese and Cypriot workers. Moreover, the homogeneity of the sample would be modified, since these countries do not possess a similar initial situation.

The independent variables of the ‘old’ Member States will be selected over a period of 2002 until 2013, a period including the year before accession and a year after the full application of Regulation 1612/68. The analysis will concentrate on the years around *2004, 2006 and 2009* and *2007, 2009 and 2012*. With this, six years will be controlled for the mentioned variables. The new and old Member States separately give a homogeneous group of countries in terms of being an EU Member or being a CEE country. The constellation of independent variables varies in the EU-15. A study on the EU-15 countries for each restriction/extension year results then in a table showing all possible combinations of the variables, as well as the cases where this combination occurs for each year (table V).

### Data analysis

The data analysis of the small number of individual cases facilitates a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The congruence testing is a within-case analysis. The advantage of this analysis is that real world observations are used to “develop general laws and theories about why certain political phenomena occur” (Clark, 2009, p. 19). The method is therefore pertinent for this study, investigating which factors influence the imposition of restrictions. It is based on the ‘Method of Agreement and Difference’ created by John Stuart Mills (Caramani, 2009), meaning that it compares cases in which the outcomes agree or disagree with the explanation. The conditions that have to apply are the necessary and sufficient condition (ibid.; Wolf, 2010). A variable or combination of variables can be evaluated as a sufficient condition for an outcome, this variable/combination cannot occur in the absence of the outcome (right-hand side of Figure 5). Likewise, if a variable or combination is a necessary condition for an outcome, this variable/combination cannot be absent in the presence of the outcome (left-hand side of Figure 5).




Figure 5: Venn diagram: necessity and sufficiency. C= cause; E= effect. Source: Schneider and Wagemann (2012, pp. 60, 72), modified by Author.

In order to confirm the hypotheses created before, both, necessity and sufficiency of the possible combinations have to be demonstrated.

The variables under study will be dichotomized in the next chapter of operationalization, so that the values of interest are either absent or present. This results in a truth table in which the absence/presence of a variable is indicated as *1* or *0*. Combinations that are accompanied by the presence of the outcome (restriction) as well as the absence of the outcome are contradictions, indicated by *C*. Additionally an equation including the possible combinations that are accompanied by the outcome is presented. For example, the equation  $RES = (TAN \cdot ND \cdot HU) + (TAN \cdot ND \cdot \sim HU)$  says that the combination of the presence of all causes under study<sup>6</sup> (TAN, ND and HU) result in the outcome (RES<sup>7</sup>) as well as the combination of the presence of the first two causes (TAN and ND) and absence of the third cause ( $\sim HU$ ). Absence is thus indicated by a tilde ( $\sim$ ), the simultaneous occurrence by a multiplication sign ( $\cdot$ ) and the different terms are separately shown by an addition symbol (+). The techniques of minimization, implication and factorization shall then modify the complex equation into a simpler and more informative expression. *Minimization* implies that causal conditions can be considered irrelevant. This means that if a sufficient combination of two causes results in an outcome as well as the sole sufficient

<sup>6</sup> The abbreviated causes under study, here: TAN = party ideology of TAN, ND = net disagreement of public opinion, HU = unemployment rate higher than EU average

<sup>7</sup> The abbreviated effect under study, here: RES = implementation of restrictions

presence of one of these causes, the absent cause can be eliminated for the effect. The exemplary equation can be minimized to  $RES = (TAN \cdot ND)$ . The next technique, *implication*, tries to compress several primitive statements into one. The cases where the effect occurs are minimized again, so that a combination of minimized statements is applicable. As Caramani (2009, p. 74) illustrates,  $RES = (TAN \cdot HU) + (ND \cdot \sim HU) + (TAN \cdot ND)$ , for instance, is covered by  $RES = (TAN \cdot HU) + (ND \cdot \sim HU)$ . Lastly, *factorization* is another technique, “highlighting necessary conditions” (ibid., p. 74) by detecting common factors:  $RES = (TAN \cdot HU) + (ND \cdot HU)$  is the same statement as the simpler form of it:  $RES = HU \cdot (TAN + ND)$ .

After the equation of sufficient conditions for the outcome is found, the extent of empirical evidence that this term is in set-theoretical relation is calculated - the consistency of the term being the sufficient condition (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Additionally, the coverage of the term being the sufficient condition shows the degree of occurrence, thus the extent to which the term can “cover” the occurrence of outcomes (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).

Ragin (2006) suggests a threshold of 75% which has to be exceeded to conclude consciously on the sufficient condition. An additional coverage higher than 50% implies that the term is more likely to produce the outcome than the corresponding reversed term. Only with a sound consistency, a high value of the coverage is meaningful for both, sufficient and necessary conditions.

Hence, after a term is concluded as being a sufficient condition for the outcome, also its ability to be a necessary condition for the outcome will be examined. For this, also the consistency and coverage with the same thresholds are calculated. The analysis is run via the computer program Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.0 (fsQCA) developed by Ragin, Drass and Davey (2006).

For the sufficient condition there is also the possibility that more than one solution formula can describe the effect. In this case, raw coverage and unique coverage are calculated (Kriwy & Gross, 2009). Raw coverage states to what extent one term of the solution formula can explain the outcome when no additional solution path is applied. The coverage of every term of the solution formula will then be calculated individually. Unique coverage, however, indicates to what extent one term of the solution formula is already covered by other solution terms. Here, all values of the raw coverage will be subtracted from the coverage of the whole solution

formula. A divergent result gives hints that the outcome is dependent on more than one solution term of the formula.

### Operationalization of variables

Providing the research with a clarified picture of the variables applied, an operationalization of each variable gives the source the data is gathered from as well as the measurement of the data in the thesis. Additionally, the concerning hypotheses provide the bases for the formulation of sufficient and necessary conditions that shall be analysed.

### *Restriction*

The dependent variable of restriction will be derived from the documents of the European Commission. The measurement is either “yes” for imposing restrictive measures or “no” for granting free movement. There will be neither distinction on the degree and kind of restriction, nor on the duration of the restriction, since the value will be estimated for each year of taking effect of the restrictions. The measurement therefore is dichotomous, indicating the presence of restriction by “1”. The Member States are not allowed to close their labour borders after they have opened it up for the new Member States’ workers. Therefore the cases where a country shows a combination after it has already ended their restrictions in the period before will be excluded. It cannot be clarified whether the country would have wished to restrict the workers’ free movement with respect to the constellation of variables or not.

### *Party Ideology*

The party in office will be categorized as belonging either to the GAL or the TAN for each Member State and tenure (dichotomous). Because elections take place in different years, the selection will consider every year from 2002 to 2013. The data is gathered from the European Election Database provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (European Election Database, 2014). Because coalitions in the formation of government are possible, it can happen

that the parties in office are not homogeneously classifiable to one dimension. In case of coalitions whose members do not all fit the classification above, the dominant partner(s) will be taken into account. The presentation in the analytical table will be a “1” for TAN and a “0” for no TAN but GAL.

### *Public Opinion*

Public opinion is measured by the Eurobarometer opinion survey data published bi-annually. Because both survey waves are important, the values for both surveys averaged into one value will be taken into account, for the years of 2002 to 2013. For example, in spring seasonal workers start their jobs and terminate it in autumn, which can have influence on the perception of unemployment. The survey gives comparable proportional statistics for all Member States and contains around 1000 face-to-face interviews for each country (Eurobarometer, 2013). The support for restricting the free movement of workers is not asked for in particular and the fear of rising employment competition from CEE countries is apparent from the theory. Therefore, the measure of interest here is the distribution of the agreement towards the statement “What is your opinion on the following statement? Please tell me whether you are for it or against it. The enlargement of the European Union to include new countries” among the inhabitants of the particular Member States. The variable hence has the attributes “agree”, “disagree” or “don’t know” and is therefore a nominal measurement. The analysis will take advantage from the net agreement, inspired by the study of Eichenberg and Dalton (2007), implying the difference between the percentage of agreement and disagreement. The occurrence of net disagreement will be indicated by a “1” in the analytical table, while “0” is a net agreement or balanced agreement/disagreement.

### *Unemployment rate*

For the economic factor, the unemployment rates of the EU-15 Member States are of interest. The changes of unemployment rates will be gathered from the Eurostat database (Eurostat, 2014). Here the average annual unemployment rate per Member State as well as for EU-15 is

accessible as ratio measurement in percentages. Because there are very different values distributed among the Member States, EU-15 average is a good reference value for the regarding year. The statistical analysis will classify the ratio into “above EU-15 average” and “not above EU-15 average”, while the latter includes values at average and lower than the average of the particular year. Correspondingly, a high unemployment rate is assumed to increase the fear of additional people seeking a job, which the government sees in concurrence to unemployed citizens. Thus, a high unemployment rate (above average) will result in a “1” and a non-high unemployment rate will be shown by a “0”.

In addition to the investigation of the individual variables, Mill’s method suggests the integrated effect of more than one variable. For instance, restrictions would not occur with the presence of TAN ideology and a high unemployment rate individually, but if they occurred simultaneously, a restriction would always be present. Because these combinations can give further implications, they are also taken into account.

The different years will be considered within the analytical table. The quality of the study *inter alia* is dependent on strong reliability and validity of the study (Babbie, 2010).

## Validity

The validity of a study indicates whether the research measures what is desired to measure (Babbie, 2010). Internal validity is referred to as “whether a finding is true for the chosen sample” (Gerring, 2012, p. 84). Possible threats to the research design applied are the influence of historical events and a reversed relation, thus, restrictions causing factors. These threats are assessed as low, since historical invalidity is reduced by paying attention on more points in time and the opportunity of restrictions causing one or more of the independent variables is irrelevant. Statistical regression is another potential threat. Transferred to this thesis, the variables are chosen based on their expectation to have high influence. It is possible that the decision to restrict is accompanied by one of these variables more often simply because it occurs very often in the EU. For this reason, the consistency and coverage are calculated.

The external validity is the extent to which the results of the study can be generalized to “the ‘real’ world” (Babbie, 2010, p.242). Since the EU-15 countries portray a homogeneous sample under the EU umbrella and will be able to apply restrictions on the Balkan states upon the same legal position, a high degree of generalizability is assumed. A cross-sectional study per se is a post-test-only study at one point in time, making it difficult to find generalizable longitudinal conclusions. However, in the case of this thesis, not only one point in time, but five different years and six events of restriction are considered, which weakens this source of invalidity. The generalizability of the research encourages additional study. The 15 Member States are diverse in many attributes, so that this thesis is especially aimed at finding common patterns among the EU Member States, why these states have decided in the way they did.

### Reliability

Reliability is given if “the same data would have been collected each time in repeated observations of the same phenomenon” (Babbie, 2010, p. 150). The reliability is judged as high, since the data will be the same for this population regarding these enlargement waves, because the sample covers all EU-15 countries. The data of the variables has a high reliability as well, since they are mostly based on established statistics. This is true for the restrictions, the unemployment rates and the party ideology in office. The data about the public opinion is based on a high-N, which makes the survey data highly representative. Thus, a re-test of the phenomenon will result in the same set of data.

### Qualitative analysis

The analysis is based on the absence and presence of the hypothesized causes. Beforehand, data of the variables will be presented separately and in non-analytical neutrality. Afterwards, data will be analysed according to the theory.

## Presentation of the data

The presentation of the data will follow the same structure as the former elaborations of the variables. Thus, first restrictions are described followed by the independent variables of party ideology, public opinion and unemployment rate. The detailed tables about all variables are retrievable from tables I to IV in the appendix.

### *Restrictions*

What is noticeable first is that most EU-15 decided to restrict either all or no country (table I). Only Spain decided to only restrict one of the A2 countries. The only country which decided to never restrict any of all ten accession states is Sweden. In the first round of 2004, also Ireland and the UK did not impose restrictions. At the first renewal in 2006, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, in 2007 also Luxembourg and The Netherlands terminated their restrictions. In 2009, the second renewal year for the A8 and the first renewal year for the A2, only Austria and Germany extended their restrictions on the A8, while Denmark and Portugal terminated all restrictive measures on free labour movement. The first CEE enlargement begins with a high number of restrictions (namely 12), and a low number of no restrictions. This increases the possibility to encounter sufficient causes for restriction, but also decreases the opportunity to find evidence of necessary causes. In 2009, this phenomenon is reversed. A high number of non-restrictions enhances the chance to state necessary causes, while a reduced number of restrictions diminishes the sufficient cause determination. Also the A2 enter the EU with a high number of restrictions. Only two times restriction is absent, giving a small number of cases, where the sufficient condition can be met. The restriction applied on the A2 enlargement started with one more restricting case than the A8 enlargement. These restrictions were extended to the limit of 2012 (ending in 2013) by eight countries. When the A2 joined the EU in 2007, they were exposed to restrictions by all countries except for Sweden and Ireland. For both of the A2, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the UK kept restricting for the whole period. Spain did renew the restriction on Romanian workers until the end of the restrictive period of seven years, but not for Bulgarian workers. This is hence the only case where a country differentiated between the accession countries.






Figure 6: Simplified overview of restrictions of EU-15 on A8 and A2 per year. ES stopped restricting BG in 2008. Source: European Commission, compiled by Author.

### *Party Ideology*

At a glance, the TAN dimension is prevailing among the EU-15 (table II). Because the parliamentary elections did take place in different points in time, it makes sense to present the data for each country. Clearly classified for the whole period to the GAL-ideology are Belgium and The Netherlands. In Austria a TAN-ideology was dominant in government until 2006 and experienced the GAL ideology from this election on. Thus, there was a clear change in between. This can be found back in Denmark, where the change from TAN to GAL took place in the 2011 elections; in France, with a change in 2012; and in Luxembourg with a change in 2013. In contrast, Germany experienced a change from a GAL ideology to the TAN ideology in 2005, Greece in 2004, Ireland later in 2012, Sweden in 2006 and the UK in 2010. A temporary replacement of GAL by TAN on the one hand happened in Finland between 2007 and 2010. On the other hand, a replacement from TAN to GAL for a period is detectable in Portugal between 2005 and 2010; and in Spain between 2004 and 2010. In Italy, starting with TAN, TAN and GAL alternated in 2006, 2008 and 2013, giving the most diverse classification of the cases.

*Public Opinion*

The overall trend of the EU-15, as figure 7 illustrates, shows a strong negative development from a net support for enlargement of 28.86% in 2002 to a net support of -23.9% in 2013.




Figure 7: Average support for enlargement in the EU-15 per year (2002-2013, in percentages). Source: Eurobarometer, compiled by Author.

Already starting the period under investigation with a negative net support is France with -7.5%, which decreases steadily until -48% in 2013 (table III). In 2003, Austria, Belgium, Germany and the UK join this attitude. In Denmark, the development registers an increase between 2005 and 2008. After this a decrease of support is observable in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands and Sweden. In the UK, the change from a positive to a negative support already takes place in 2006 and intensifies in 2008 as well. Interestingly, Portugal experiences a new peak of support developing from a value of 6% in 2007 and 2009 to 29% in the crucial year of 2008, but follows the decrease afterwards. Spain is the only country with an overall positive

net support, but this support also decreases after 2007. In the Swedish population, the single negative value occurs in 2004.

*Unemployment rate*

Figure 8 indicates that on average, the unemployment rate within the EU-15 experiences a concave development until 2007 followed by a strong increase as from 2008.




Figure 8: Average unemployment rate in the EU-15 per year (2002-2013, in percentages). Source: Eurobarometer, compiled by Author.

The Dutch and Swedish trend shows a similar curve in which a concave development lasts until 2008, followed by an increase (table IV). In Austria the concave progress exists as well, but the following increase is interrupted by a low until 2011. The process of the rate in Belgium shows two climaxes in 2005, 2010 and preliminary in 2013 and lows in 2008 and 2011. Also in Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Finland (after steady decrease), and the UK a raise is noticeable as from 2008. In Italy, a decreasing trend is replaced by an increasing trend in 2007. In 2013, the level doubles to 12.2% from 6.1% in 2007. The Luxembourgian unemployment rate increases until 2004, but does not change dramatically in the following years. In Portugal, the

unemployment rate continually increases and almost doubles from 5.7% in 2002 to 16.4% in 2013. Germany, by contrast, after a climax in 2005, has a decreasing unemployment trend.

Next to the general trend the development in comparison to the EU-15 average is important for this thesis. A low rate (below EU-15 average) is present over the whole period in Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and in the UK. Higher than EU-15-average at any time are the unemployment rates in Spain and Greece, while Portugal's rate rises above average in 2003. Finland escapes the high unemployment in 2008, followed by Belgium and Germany in 2009 and France in 2011. Sweden has an unemployment rate higher than average in the years of 2004 to 2006, but lies below average for the other years. Ireland, in contrast, shows a rate lower than average until 2007, while it is above average as for 2009. The unemployment rate in Italy falls until 2007, so that in this and the prior year is below average. The then rising trend of the rate results in a rate higher than the average in the years of 2008, 2012 and 2013. Hence, about the half of the countries under study show unemployment rates of both, higher and lower than EU-average.

### Causal analysis

The analytical part launches with a description of the data in table V. The interpretation of the table will follow the scheme of the conditional propositions. Also changes of the variables will be taken into account. As restrictions of one country are terminated for one of the enlargement periods, the mentioned changes are of no account anymore, since an opened labour market cannot be closed afterwards, even though a hypothetical wish to do so may exist in some Member States. Because the member states cannot implement restrictions after they have already opened up the labour market for the accession countries, the effective sharing is included, since it gives more implications about the decisions. The absence and presence of the dependent and independent variables result in the following Venn diagram, where the occurrences are presented for each possible combination of the variables. The years where cases show the particular combination are included. This diagram in figure 9 is the basis for the analysis.




Figure 9: Venn diagram: Solution for the [1] outcome (3 conditions). Produced by the “visualizer” tool, TOSMANA 1.3.2.0 software.

Looking at all combinations possible, they give different occurrences of restrictions. Most combinations are contradictory, which is why they are not suitable for creating the minimized statement. The combination of a high unemployment rate together with the absence of net disagreement and the absence of TAN is followed by the presence of restrictions; non-restrictions do not occur. This combination is thus a sufficient condition for restrictions. In the other combinations, both, restrictions and non-restrictions occur. They are therefore contradictions. This is why a further minimization is not possible. The minimized statement is:

$$RES = (\sim TAN \cdot \sim ND \cdot HU).$$

The analysis of the data offers only one minimized statement, since the one mentioned above is a sufficient condition for restrictions. Therefore, implication cannot be applied. Due to the fact that no necessary condition can be identified either, factorization is not possible to be conducted here as well.

*Absence of the combinations*

Absence of all attributes is accompanied by restrictions twice, namely in Ireland and Italy in 2007. In this year, restrictions are implemented by eleven further countries. No restrictions, in contrast, are applied eight times in total, while Ireland is involved three times in a row (2004<sub>1</sub> - 2009<sub>1</sub>). Evaluating accordingly to the countries, the combination of no hypothesized attribute occurs 2.5 times more often in combination of non-restrictions.

*Assessing the internal fit of the analysis*

More indication of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable of restricting afford the calculation of the consistency and coverage of the variables. The distribution of the variables for the whole period is as retrievable in table VI of the appendix.

At a glance, the minimized term of  $RES = (\sim TAN \cdot \sim ND \cdot HU)$  shows a consistency of 1, thus 100% (table VI). The raw coverage, nevertheless, is rather low with a value of 48.07% (table VII). Moreover, the possible consistency of all combinations with the occurrence of HU is below 75%, meaning that it does not explain all occurrences of the outcomes. Looking at the values for the minimized term being a necessary condition (table VIII), the consistency of this term is above the threshold of 75% and the coverage is above 50%, which holds true for all other combinations as well. Taking every combination possible into account, HU has no longer the highest consistency (table VII). The cause ND offers the only acceptable consistency to be the sufficient condition which is combined with coverage higher than 50%. It can therefore be concluded with enough evidence to be a sufficient condition for restrictions. Its consistency to be a necessary condition is also above 75%, while the coverage thereof is above 50%. It is thus a cause for restrictions. A division of the two enlargement rounds gives differing outcomes. In both rounds, logically, the high unemployment rate has a consistency of 100% (table IX).

*A8 enlargement*

For the A8 enlargement, the coverage of the minimized term being a sufficient condition for restrictions is above 50% (table X). Combined with the high consistency it can be concluded as a sufficient condition for restrictions in this enlargement round. There is no other combination that

has a consistency and coverage above thresholds. In terms of necessary condition, the occurrence of all variables simultaneously has a 100% consistency together with coverage higher than 50% (table XI). All other combinations show a high consistency and coverage as well, which is the reason to conclude that every combination is a necessary condition for restrictions.

### *A2 Enlargement*

In the A2 enlargement not only the minimized term, but also the pure occurrence of net disagreement has a 100% consistency (table XII). While HU does not pass the 50% threshold of coverage, ND does (table XIII). ND therefore merits to be analysed for necessary condition. In table XIV,  $RES = (\sim TAN \cdot ND \cdot \sim HU)$  has a high consistency and coverage for being a necessary condition. ND can therefore be evaluated as a sufficient and necessary condition for restrictions in this enlargement round. Next to this, all other possible combinations, except for  $(\sim TAN \cdot \sim ND \cdot HU)$ , show high consistency and coverage for necessity as well. They therefore can be evaluated as necessary condition additionally.

### Discussion

The TAN attribute occurs in many cases, so that it meets the necessary condition for all years under study. Throughout the developments of the countries, only Italy changed from TAN to GAL between 2004 and 2006 and did indeed terminate their restrictive measures against the A8 as for 2006. In combination with the other two attributes, restrictions occur more often in combination with net disagreement. The first hypothesis deals with a country governed by a TAN party, which according to this is more likely to implement restrictions than a country governed by a non-TAN party.

The assessment of the relationship of TAN being a cause for restrictions shows that it has no acceptable degree of consistency and occurrence of the sufficient condition. TAN has a low coverage of sufficiency, and hence a negligible consistency for being a sufficient condition. Because the cause cannot be stated as sufficient condition for restrictions, the hypothesis regarding the TAN attribute has to be rejected. Due to the low coverage and consistency, this

dimension does not give enough evidence. Nevertheless, the consistency and coverage as necessary condition is above thresholds, so that it can be stated as necessity for restrictions.

The overall discomfort against the enlargement of the EU increases among all EU-15 Member States during the decade under study, while the number of initial restrictions increased from 12 towards the A8 to 13 towards the A2. In the Netherlands, net disagreement disappears in 2007 and 2008, which occurred with the termination of restrictions against the A8 as of 2009. But, with the same absence of disagreement registered for the 2009-extension of the A2 restrictions, the termination of the restriction does not appear. The restriction decision of the Dutch argumentation cannot be based on this cause for this period. In Italy, regarding the A2 restrictions, a lower disagreement value is accompanied by the termination of restrictions. This suggests that not the values themselves, but the change rates of the values can have influence as well. Net disagreement has a high consistency of 100% to be a sufficient condition for restrictions in the A2 enlargement, together with a high coverage. Net disagreement is accompanied by restrictions more often when present unaccompanied than in combination with the other two attributes. Additionally, the consistency and coverage for being a necessity is higher than the set limit. Net disagreement is therefore also a necessary condition for restrictions. The split of the enlargements into separate focuses also supports the conclusion that net disagreement is a sufficient and necessary condition during the second enlargement. Correspondingly, a country in which public opinion towards enlargement is negative is hypothesised to be more likely to implement restrictions than a country in which public opinion towards enlargement is positive. This hypothesis cannot be rejected.

Lastly, the unemployment rates of the EU-15 are analysed. The average EU-15 unemployment rate decreases until the economic crisis hit in 2008. From this year on, the unemployment rates increase steadily. This development is perceptible in most of the countries. In 2005, Germany has a high unemployment rate and does indeed restrict. Additionally, Greece and Spain experienced a decreased rate below the higher EU average value and simultaneously did not extend their restrictive measures. Hypothesized for the unemployment rate is that a country with an unemployment rate higher than EU-15 average is more likely to implement restrictions than a country with an unemployment rate at and below EU-average. The unemployment rate is the sufficient condition for restrictions with high consistency towards the whole period. For the A2



enlargement, the coverage of sufficiency is no longer given. Due to the fact that also the necessity is given for all analyses, the hypothesis cannot be rejected. The single occurrence of a high unemployment rate is always accompanied by the application of restrictions; it is a necessary condition for the A2 enlargement and a cause for restrictions in overall analysis.

Regarding the combination of the attributes, all but the minimized statement ( $\sim$ TAN $\cdot\sim$ ND $\cdot$ HU) during the A2 enlargement are a necessity for restrictions. Because there is no evidence of this term being a sufficient condition for the overall investigation and the A2 enlargement, it cannot be confirmed as cause of restrictions. This minimized condition nevertheless is a necessity and sufficiency for the A8 enlargement, which is why it has to be mentioned as a cause of restrictions in this enlargement.

## Conclusion

The theoretical background of this thesis paves the way for narrowing down the broad classification of possible influential factors on the decision to restrict the free movement of workers. The choice of social, political and economic factors is based on the argumentation and apprehension on possible consequences by the opening of the labour market to the CEE countries. The political factor is represented by the party ideology in office. Because the classification of party ideologies based on the common left/right dimension seems not as adequate regarding the attitude towards enlargement, a classification on the GAL/TAN dimension is applied in this thesis. Public opinion on the enlargement of the EU is the social factor under study. The choice of the attitude towards the statement “The enlargement of the European Union to include new countries” is as proximate as possible to the attitude towards the free movement of workers throughout the entire period under study. Economically, the movement of workers is argued to be connected to the employment development on national level, which is the reason to focus on the unemployment rates of the EU-15 as pivotal economic factor.

Methodologically, the small number of cases endorses the practice of a qualitative comparative analysis. The attributes of the variables that seem to be more influential are the TAN ideology

and the net disagreement, since these oppose enlargement in general, and an unemployment rate higher than the EU average, where the average threshold is chosen for making the vague term of “high” more relative and comparable. A minimized statement of high unemployment rate accompanied by not TAN and no net disagreement being a sufficient condition for restrictions is concluded. Additionally, the set-theoretic relationships are calculated for each enlargement wave and for the entire data. The complete absence of the attributes is accompanied by non-restriction more often than with restrictions. This does not mean that the attributes are critical factors for restrictions. Nevertheless, their influence is calculable. In order to answer the research question, to what extent the factors of party ideology, public opinion and unemployment rate influence the decision of EU Member States to apply transitional provisions against the free movement of workers from Central and Eastern Europe, the assessment gives more evidence about the causal analysis. The causal analysis as well as the mathematical assessment state that the term ( $\sim$ TAN $\cdot\sim$ ND $\cdot$ HU) is a sufficient condition for restriction with 100% consistency. This is also the case for net disagreement in the A2 enlargement round. The second hypothesis about net disagreement as well as the third hypothesis about high unemployment rate being a cause for restrictions cannot be rejected. These two variables have influence on the decision to restrict with a high degree of consistency and coverage. The variable of party ideology shows little evidence for being a sufficient or necessary cause of restrictions. The corresponding hypothesis that a country governed by a TAN party is more likely to implement restrictions than a country governed by a non-TAN party has to be rejected.

### Suggestions for improvement

Before suggestions will be made about the examination of the analysis, the operationalization of the variables should be re-investigated. What is interesting to point out is that the equation of  $RES = (\sim$ TAN $\sim$ ND $\cdot$ HU) is a cause for restrictions in the first enlargement round of A8, but is the only equation which does not hold true for being a necessity in the second round of enlargement. Because of this contradiction, the third hypothesis has to be studied further. Is the application of the unemployment rate as variable still justifiable?

During the analytical section it became apparent that most of the combinations are accompanied by a contradictory outcome (table V). Therefore it is highly suggested to manage these contradictions. Rihoux and Ragin (2009) present different approaches to re-evaluate contradictory constellations. The first one applicable to this research is to add further conditions/variables so that the similar combinations become more distinct. A  $\sim\text{RES}=\text{RES}=(\text{TAN}\cdot\sim\text{ND}\cdot\text{HU})$  term for instance can be split up by this into  $\sim\text{RES}=(\text{TAN}\cdot\sim\text{ND}\cdot\text{HU}\cdot\text{VAR4})$  and  $\text{RES}=(\text{TAN}\cdot\sim\text{ND}\cdot\text{HU}\cdot\sim\text{VAR4})$ , while VAR4 indicates a fourth variable. It has to be taken care of the fact that the more conditions there are included, the higher the possibility that the diversity decreases among the constellations. A too complex model can reduce the generalizability to find common patterns of influence. A similar approach is hence not to increase the number of variables but to replace them. With this, complexity is stable. For example, it is argued in this thesis that a high unemployment rate above EU-15 average is an attribute increasing the concern towards the free labour movement from CEE countries, because they already have to handle this problem with a financial burden. Contrary to this, a country with a moderate or even low unemployment rate may have more influence in the background of a higher impact on the national labour market. Another recommended research is to investigate whether thriving Member States are more restrictive than less prosperous countries. Because migrating workers can fill in skill shortages, a country with low unemployment rates may not be willing to accept additional labourers on their market. The third approach is the adjustment of the dichotomization. The threshold for public opinion or the unemployment rate can be shifted based on another argumentation of logic. One strong suggestion is for example not to compare the unemployment rate with the EU-average but with the rates of the CEE countries. A country with a high unemployment rate compared to EU-average can still have a lower rate than a CEE country. The next suggestion to cope with contradictions is to narrow down the outcome variable. In terms of this study, the application of restrictions occurs to varying extent. A more intense operationalization can exclude some cases or shift them into other outcomes (from occurrence to absence of restrictions). Similar to this, the fifth way suggested is the exclusion of some cases. Thus, the population of case selection is narrowed down. One idea is the focus on extreme cases (the importance of the countries in EU parliament, for instance, based on the highest and lowest numbers of representative seats), that exclude moderate cases. Lastly, a recoding of contradictory combinations as [0], indicating that they do not result in the outcome

purely is a way of dealing with contradictory cases as ignorable cases. With this, the investigation of a significant minimized statement is reduced. Therefore this method, as suggested for all other methods as well, shall be justified carefully.

Another suggestion is the re-examination of the time factor involved in this study. Even though time is not a matter for the analysis itself, a lag of the variables' impact is also possible. A change of public opinion in one year may have an effect on national decisive level two or even four years afterwards. The consideration of all years of the period in focus leads to a tremendous amount of data, exceeding the scope of this study.

This is also the reason why a study making use not only of crisp set data, but the examination multivariate and fuzzy set analysis<sup>8</sup> is recommended. The advantage is that not the strict dichotomization of the variables but an investigation of various combinations of values is possible

Last but not least, the method is transferrable to other targeted countries. Focussing on other enlargement waves gives new insights on influential factors. It provides not only trends and developments, but also changes in the factors of influence. The GAL/TAN categorization applied in this thesis holds true for the Western European countries. In CEE countries, this classification is different; where some left parties can be arranged in the TAN quadrant (Hooghe, et al., 2002). Classification of communist parties especially proved difficult. The enlargement of the EU is a unique phenomenon, but a broad view also gives advice on focussing not on the free movement of workers only, but on enlarging itself. This paves the way for studies on the accession of countries in other supranational organizations, like the East African Community.

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<sup>8</sup> The methods are well described in the work of Rihoux and Ragin (2009).

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## Appendix

Table I: Restrictions per country per year

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU-15# RES												
Austria	-	-	8	8	8	10	10	10	10	2	2	2
Belgium	-	-	8	8	8	10	10	2	2	2	2	2
Denmark	-	-	8	8	8	10	10	-				
Finland	-	-	8	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	-	-	8	8	8	10	2	2	2	2	2	2
Germany	-	-	8	8	8	10	10	10	10	2	2	2
Greece	-	-	8	8	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	2	2		
Italy	-	-	8	8	-	2	2	2	2	2		-
Luxembourg	-	-	8	8	8	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Netherlands	-	-	8	8	8	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Portugal	-	-	8	8	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	8	8	-	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Table II: Party ideology per country per year

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU-15												
AT	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL
BE	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL
DK	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	GAL	GAL	GAL
ES	TAN	TAN	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	TAN	TAN	TAN
FI	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	GAL	GAL	GAL
FR	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	GAL	GAL
GER	GAL	GAL	GAL	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN
GR	GAL	GAL	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN
I	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	GAL	GAL	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	GAL
IRE	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	TAN	TAN	TAN
LU	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	GAL
NL	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN
PT	TAN	TAN	TAN	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	TAN	TAN	TAN
SE	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN
UK	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	GAL	TAN	TAN	TAN	TAN

Table III: Net public opinion per country per year (in percentages)

Country	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007	
	Net		Net		Net		Net		Net		Net	
EU-15 average	28,86		14,16		2,3		3,76		-1,5		-2,03	
AT	9,5	S: 45:36 / A: 51:31	-1	S: 43:44 / A: 41:42	-34	S: 25:59 / A: 28:62	-29	S: 31:58 / A: 29:60	-30	S: 27:61 / A: 31:57	-39,5	S: 28:64 / A: 24:67
BE	19,5	S: 51:32 / A: 53:33	-4	S: 38:44 / A: 43:45	-3,5	S: 37:49 / A: 50:45	0	S: 50:47 / A: 47:50	-6,5	S: 45:53 / A: 46:51	-5,5	S: 44:53 / A: 47:49
DK	48,5	S: 68:23 / A: 71:19	37	S: 63:25 / A: 63:27	-3	S: 40:43 / A: 43:46	1,5	S: 48:43 / A: 46:48	5,5	S: 51:42 / A: 48:46	6,5	S: 51:43 / A: 49:44
ES	49,5	S: 64:14 / A: 63:14	55	S: 60:17 / A: 62:15	45	S: 57:17 / A: 67:17	35,5	S: 56:21 / A: 55:19	35	S: 55:15 / A: 51:21	46,5	S: 65:13 / A: 59:18
FI	25,5	S: 56:32 / A: 58:31	8,5	S: 50:40 / A: 53:36	-	S: 35:55 / A: 45:52	-6	S: 45:51 / A: 45:51	-17	S: 35:60 / A: 43:52	-13	S: 39:56 / A: 43:52
FR	-7,5	S: 40:47 / A: 41:49	-21,5	S: 31:54 / A: 34:55	-16	S: 32:52 / A: 39:51	-	S: 32:58 / A: 31:60	-	S: 31:62 / A: 34:58	-27,5	S: 32:60 / A: 32:59
GER	9,5	S: 43:36 / A: 46:34	-0,5	S: 42:39 / A: 38:42	-	S: 24:60 / A: 36:57	-	S: 33:61 / A: 36:59	-36	S: 28:66 / A: 30:64	-31,5	S: 34:59 / A: 28:66
GR	55,5	S: 67:15 / A: 76:17	47	S: 71:19 / A: 65:23	30	S: 60:23 / A: 62:39	39	S: 60:32 / A: 74:24	28,5	S: 56:42 / A: 71:28	14,5	S: 56:34 / A: 53:46

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Country	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007	
	Net		Net		Net		Net		Net		Net	
I	43,5	S: 61:19 / A: 64:19	38	S: 59:22 / A: 61:22	29	S: 47:28 / A: 61:22	28	S: 59:24 / A: 53:32	18,5	S: 48:32 / A: 47:36	11	S: 48:34 / A: 43:35
IRE	46	S: 56:16 / A: 67:15	40	S: 60:19 / A: 59:20	22	S: 45:30 / A: 54:25	28	S: 52:26 / A: 54:24	16,5	S: 45:29 / A: 48:31	7,5	S: 42:38 / A: 45:34
LU	21,5	S: 55:34 / A: 56:34	6,5	S: 53:40 / A: 45:45	-	S: 34:53 / A: 38:54	-	S: 33:60 / A: 31:63	-35	S: 27:65 / A: 32:64	-31,5	S: 25:48 / A: 25:65
NL	28	S: 56:30 / A: 58:28	11	S: 48:38 / A: 50:38	5	S: 46:43 / A: 50:43	-1	S: 45:49 / A: 48:46	-5	S: 43:50 / A: 45:48	4	S: 50:44 / A: 48:46
PT	39,5	S: 57:18 / A: 60:20	30,5	S: 60:22 / A: 52:29	21	S: 51:28 / A: 51:32	31	S: 56:24 / A: 55:25	24	S: 47:25 / A: 54:28	21	S: 51:30 / A: 48:27
SE	38	S: 61:27 / A: 65:23	22	S: 56:34 / A: 54:32	-4	S: 41:48 / A: 44:45	7,5	S: 51:38 / A: 48:46	13	S: 49:39 / A: 53:37	16,5	S: 52:38 / A: 54:35
UK	6,5	S: 38:35 / A: 42:32	-1	S: 36:36 / A: 38:40	2,5	S: 31:40 / A: 50:36	4,5	S: 48:39 / A: 43:43	-6,5	S: 44:42 / A: 36:51	-10	S: 41:48 / A: 36:49

Table continued:

Country	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Net	Net	Net	Net	Net	Net	Net
EU-15 average	-4,76	-2,96	14,23	20,42	22,96	23,9
AT	-39 S: 27:63 / A: 25:67	-39,5 S: 25:67 / A: 28:65	-45,5 S: 21:71 / A: 26:67	-54 S: 23:72 / A: 18:77	-50,5 S: 21:73 / A: 23:72	-52,5 S: 23:69 / A: 17:76
BE	-3 S: 50:48 / A: 45:53	-10 S: 43:52 / A: 42:53	-18,5 S: 37:59 / A: 41:56	-21 S: 42:56 / A: 35:63	-27,5 S: 36:61 / A: 33:63	-26 S: 36:61 / A: 35:62
DK	8 S: 54:41 / A: 48:45	-11 S: 38:56 / A: 46:50	-6 S: 42:52 / A: 46:48	-9,5 S: 43:52 / A: 42:52	-10,5 S: 44:50 / A: 40:55	-8 S: 43:53 / A: 45:51
ES	40 S: 62:16 / A: 57:23	34,5 S: 56:27 / A: 63:23	19,5 S: 51:31 / A: 51:32	15 S: 51:30 / A: 45:36	7,5 S: 41:39 / A: 46:35	6 S: 43:38 / A: 44:37
FI	-8,5 S: 46:50 / A: 41:54	-13,5 S: 42:54 / A: 40:55	-28 S: 30:64 / A: 37:59	-38,5 S: 31:66 / A: 27:70	-41,5 S: 26:71 / A: 29:67	-38,5 S: 26:70 / A: 32:65
FR	-31 S: 31:60 / A: 31:62	-29 S: 31:63 / A: 34:60	-31 S: 26:66 / A: 35:57	-38,5 S: 32:61 / A: 23:71	-43,5 S: 25:70 / A: 26:68	-48 S: 22:71 / A: 23:70
GER	-32 S: 33:58 / A: 26:65	-34 S: 27:66 / A: 31:60	-45 S: 21:71 / A: 25:65	-54 S: 22:71 / A: 17:76	-53 S: 20:74 / A: 21:73	-51,5 S: 18:75 / A: 23:69
GR	11,5 S: 62:38 / A: 49:50	-7 S: 42:57 / A: 49:48	-2 S: 44:51 / A: 49:46	-2,5 S: 46:48 / A: 44:47	-6,5 S: 44:48 / A: 42:51	-9 S: 42:53 / A: 44:51
I	0,5 S: 41:37 / A: 39:42	-2 S: 42:45 / A: 42:43	0 S: 39:42 / A: 44:41	-5,5 S: 42:45 / A: 37:45	-18 S: 32:52 / A: 34:50	-24 S: 34:52 / A: 29:59

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Country	2008		2009		2010		2011		2012		2013	
	Net		Net		Net		Net		Net		Net	
IRE	5	S: 46:31 / A: 36:41	4	S: 42:40 / A: 43:37	-11	S: 35:50 / A: 38:45	-26	S: 30:50 / A: 24:56	-7	S: 34:47 / A: 43:44	-6	S: 40:48 / A: 42:46
LU	-34,5	S: 33:59 / A: 25:68	-27,5	S: 27:67 / A: 39:54	-23	S: 32:63 / A: 40:55	-31,5	S: 29:64 / A: 34:62	-41	S: 27:66 / A: 27:70	-34	S: 31:66 / A: 31:64
NL	2,5	S: 50:46 / A: 48:47	-6	S: 44:50 / A: 45:51	-17,5	S: 37:57 / A: 40:55	-28,5	S: 35:59 / A: 31:64	-26	S: 34:62 / A: 36:60	-35,5	S: 28:68 / A: 33:64
PT	6	S: 51:31 / A: 43:31	29	S: 51:24 / A: 57:26	6	S: 41:42 / A: 47:34	1,5	S: 46:36 / A: 37:44	-1,5	S: 44:41 / A: 40:46	-14	S: 33:50 / A: 38:49
SE	19	S: 55:36 / A: 56:37	10,5	S: 52:41 / A: 52:42	15	S: 55:41 / A: 56:40	9,5	S: 59:38 / A: 47:49	3	S: 51:45 / A: 48:48	6,5	S: 47:50 / A: 56:40
UK	-11	S: 36:50 / A: 40:48	-22	S: 32:56 / A: 35:55	-26,5	S: 33:54 / A: 27:59	-23	S: 37:53 / A: 29:59	-28,5	S: 29:60 / A: 33:59	-24	S: 33:58 / A: 32:55

Note: S = Spring wave of the survey; A = Autumn wave of the survey.

Table IV: Unemployment rate per country per year (in percentages)

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU-15 average	6,6	7,08	7,38667	7,28667	6,84667	6,32	6,4	8,42667	9,16	9,48	10,61333	11,16667
AT	4,2	4,3	4,9	5,2	4,8	4,4	3,8	4,8	4,4	4,2	4,3	4,9
BE	7,5	8,2	8,4	8,5	8,3	7,5	7	7,9	8,3	7,2	7,6	8,4
DK	4,6	5,4	5,5	4,8	3,9	3,8	3,4	6	7,5	7,6	7,5	7
ES	11,5	11,5	11	9,2	8,5	8,2	11,3	17,9	19,9	21,4	24,8	26,1
FI	9,1	9	8,8	8,4	7,7	6,9	6,4	8,2	8,4	7,8	7,7	8,2
FR	8,6	8,6	8,9	8,9	8,8	8	7,4	9,1	9,3	9,2	9,8	10,3
GER	8,7	9,8	10,5	11,3	10,3	8,7	7,5	7,8	7,1	5,9	5,5	5,3
GR	10,3	9,7	10,6	10	9	8,4	7,8	9,6	12,7	17,9	24,5	27,5
I	8,5	8,4	8	7,7	6,8	6,1	6,7	7,8	8,4	8,4	10,7	12,2
IRE	4,5	4,6	4,5	4,4	4,5	4,7	6,4	12	13,9	14,7	14,7	13,1
LU	2,6	3,8	5	4,6	4,6	4,2	4,9	5,1	4,6	4,8	5,1	5,9
NL	3,1	4,2	5,1	5,3	4,4	3,6	3,1	3,7	4,5	4,4	5,3	6,7
PT	5,7	7,1	7,5	8,5	8,6	8,9	8,5	10,6	12	12,9	15,8	16,4
SE	6	6,6	7,4	7,7	7,1	6,1	6,2	8,3	8,6	7,8	8	8
UK	5,1	5	4,7	4,8	5,4	5,3	5,6	7,6	7,8	8	7,9	7,5

Table V: Distribution of cases per year per combination of variables<sup>9</sup>.

Cases with occurrence (t=0)	TAN	ND	HU	RES	Years (t=1)	#RES
IRE, SE	0	0	0	0	2004 <sub>1</sub>	12
(IRE), ES, (UK)					2006 <sub>1</sub>	7
(IRE), PT					2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
PT					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
IRE, I	0	0	0	1	2007 <sub>2</sub>	13
(PT), (SE)	0	0	1	0	2006 <sub>1</sub>	7
(ES)					2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
GR, FI	0	0	1	1	2004 <sub>1</sub>	12
BE					2006 <sub>1</sub>	7
PT, ES					2007 <sub>2</sub>	13
ES, IRE					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
UK	0	1	0	0	2004 <sub>1</sub>	12
(UK)					2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
(DK), (FI)					2012 <sub>2</sub>	8
AT	0	1	0	1	2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
AT, UK					2007 <sub>2</sub>	13
AT, UK					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
AT, BE					2012 <sub>2</sub>	8
DK, NL, (SE)	1	0	0	0	2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
DK, (SE)					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
(SE)					2012 <sub>2</sub>	8
DK, LU, NL	1	0	0	1	2004 <sub>1</sub>	12
DK					2006 <sub>1</sub>	7
DK					2007 <sub>2</sub>	13
NL					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
FI	0	1	1	0	2006 <sub>1</sub>	7
BE					2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
FI					2007 <sub>2</sub>	13

Cases with occurrence (t=0)	TAN	ND	HU	RES	Years (t=1)	#RES
GER, BE	0	1	1	1	2004 <sub>1</sub>	12
BE					2007 <sub>2</sub>	13
BE					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
GR, I	1	0	1	0	2006 <sub>1</sub>	7
(GR), (I)					2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
SE					2007 <sub>2</sub>	13
GR					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
(PT)					2012 <sub>2</sub>	8
ES, I, PT	1	0	1	1	2004 <sub>1</sub>	12
GR					2007 <sub>2</sub>	13
I					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
ES					2012 <sub>2</sub>	8
LU	1	1	0	0	2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
(FI)					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
I					2012 <sub>2</sub>	8
AT	1	1	0	1	2004 <sub>1</sub>	12
AT, LU, NL					2006 <sub>1</sub>	7
LU, NL					2007 <sub>2</sub>	13
GER					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10
FR, GER, NL, LU, UK					2012 <sub>2</sub>	8
(FI), FR	1	1	1	0	2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
(GR), IRE					2012 <sub>2</sub>	8
FR	1	1	1	1	2004 <sub>1</sub>	12
GER, FR					2006 <sub>1</sub>	7
GER					2009 <sub>1</sub>	2
GER, FR					2007 <sub>2</sub>	13
FR, LU					2009 <sub>2</sub>	10

<sup>9</sup> T=1: year of restriction implementation, t=0: year before restriction implementation, <sub>1</sub>=A8 enlargement, <sub>2</sub>= A2 enlargement. Countries in brackets are repeatedly without restriction.



Table VI: Consistencies of causes (TAN, ND and HU) and effects (RES). Source: Author. Output produced by the "Crisp Truth Table Algorithm" tool, fsQCA 2.5 software.

tan	nd	hu	number $\nabla$	res	raw consist.
1	1	0	14 (19%)		0.857143
1	1	1	10 (33%)		0.800000
1	0	1	10 (47%)		0.600000
1	0	0	9 (59%)		0.666667
0	1	0	8 (70%)		0.875000
0	1	1	7 (80%)		0.571429
0	0	1	7 (90%)		1.000000
0	0	0	7 (100%)		0.285714

Table VII: Consistency and raw coverage of causes (TAN, ND and HU) and effects (RES). Source: Author. Output produced by the "subset/superset analysis" tool, fsQCA 2.5 software

Outcome: res			
	consistency	raw coverage	combined
	-----	-----	-----
tan*nd*hu	0.800000	0.153846	0.350823
tan*nd	0.833333	0.384615	0.578459
tan*hu	0.700000	0.269231	0.370551
nd*hu	0.705882	0.230769	0.346410
tan	0.744186	0.615385	0.627572
nd	0.794872	0.596154	0.681909
hu	0.735294	0.480769	0.541543

Table VIII: Consistency and coverage of necessary condition of causes (TAN, ND and HU) and effects (RES).  
 Source: Author. Output produced by the "Necessary Conditions" tool, fsQCA 2.5 software.

Analysis of Necessary Conditions		
Outcome variable: res		
Conditions tested:		
	Consistency	Coverage
tan+~nd+~hu	0.923077	0.738462
tan+nd+~hu	0.865385	0.692308
tan+~nd+hu	0.865385	0.703125
~tan+nd+~hu	0.884615	0.741935
~tan+nd+hu	0.884615	0.730159
~tan+~nd+hu	0.769231	0.689655
tan+nd+hu	0.961538	0.769231
~tan+~nd+~hu	0.846154	0.709677

Table IX: Consistencies of causes (TAN, ND and HU) and effects (RES) for the A8 enlargement. Source: Author.  
Output produced by the "Crisp Truth Table Algorithm" tool, fsQCA 2.5 software.


tan	nd	hu	number 	res	raw consist.
1	0	0	6 (17%)		0.666667
1	1	1	5 (32%)		0.800000
1	1	0	5 (47%)		0.800000
1	0	1	5 (61%)		0.600000
0	1	1	4 (73%)		0.500000
0	0	0	4 (85%)		0.000000
0	0	1	3 (94%)		1.000000
0	1	0	2 (100%)		0.500000

Table X: Consistency and raw coverage of causes (TAN, ND and HU) and effects (RES) for the A8 enlargement.  
 Source: Author. Output produced by the "subset/superset analysis" tool, fsQCA 2.5 software

Outcome: res			
	consistency	raw coverage	combined
	-----	-----	-----
tan*nd*hu	0.800000	0.190476	0.390360
tan*nd	0.800000	0.380952	0.552052
tan*hu	0.700000	0.333333	0.412311
nd*hu	0.666667	0.285714	0.316228
tan	0.714286	0.714286	0.626783
nd	0.687500	0.523810	0.485504
hu	0.705882	0.571429	0.545108

Table XI: Consistency and coverage of necessary condition of causes (TAN, ND and HU) and effects (RES) for the A8 enlargement. Source: Author. Output produced by the "Necessary Conditions" tool, fsQCA 2.5 software

Analysis of Necessary Conditions		
Outcome variable: res		
Conditions tested:		
	Consistency	Coverage
tan+~nd+~hu	0.904762	0.633333
tan+nd+~hu	0.857143	0.580645
tan+~nd+hu	0.952381	0.625000
tan+nd+hu	1.000000	0.700000
~tan+nd+~hu	0.857143	0.620690
~tan+~nd+hu	0.809524	0.586207
~tan+nd+hu	0.809524	0.607143
~tan+~nd+~hu	0.809524	0.586207

Table XII: Consistencies of causes (TAN, ND and HU) and effects (RES) for the A2 enlargement. Source: Author. Output produced by the "Crisp Truth Table Algorithm" tool, fsQCA 2.5 software.

TAN	ND	HU	number $\nabla$	RES	raw consist.
1	1	0	9 (23%)		0.888889
0	1	0	6 (39%)		1.000000
1	1	1	5 (52%)		0.800000
1	0	1	5 (65%)		0.600000
0	0	1	4 (76%)		1.000000
1	0	0	3 (84%)		0.666667
0	1	1	3 (92%)		0.666667
0	0	0	3 (100%)		0.666667

Table XIII: Consistency and raw coverage of causes (TAN, ND and HU) and effects (RES) for the A2 enlargement. Source: Author. Output produced by the "subset/superset analysis" tool, fsQCA 2.5 software

Outcome: RES			
	consistency	raw coverage	combined
	-----	-----	-----
TAN*ND*HU	0.800000	0.129032	0.321288
TAN*ND	0.857143	0.387097	0.593513
TAN*HU	0.700000	0.225806	0.339354
ND*HU	0.750000	0.193548	0.357410
TAN	0.772727	0.548387	0.628362
ND	0.869565	0.645161	0.770421
HU	0.764706	0.419355	0.541801



Table XIV: Consistency and coverage of necessary condition of causes (TAN, ND and HU) and effects (RES) for the A2 enlargement. Source: Author. Output produced by the "Necessary Conditions" tool, fsQCA 2.5 software.

Analysis of Necessary Conditions		
Outcome variable: RES		
Conditions tested:		
	Consistency	Coverage
TAN+~ND+~HU	0.935484	0.828571
TAN+ND+~HU	0.870968	0.794118
TAN+~ND+HU	0.806452	0.781250
~TAN+ND+~HU	0.903226	0.848485
~TAN+ND+HU	0.935484	0.828571
~TAN+~ND+HU	0.741935	0.793103
~TAN+~ND+~HU	0.870968	0.818182
TAN+ND+HU	0.935484	0.828571