To what extent can the current British outsider status within the EU be explained by a conception of group dynamics?

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Statement of Affirmation

I declare that the bachelor thesis submitted here was in all parts exclusively prepared on my own, and that any other resources or other means (including electronic media and online sources), than those explicitly referred to, have not been used.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Outline of the problem

When British Prime Minister David Cameron promised his citizens on 23 January 2013 to put the decision about leaving the European Union (EU) to a referendum, which should be held in 2017 in case of a precedent re-election of the Conservative Party in the coming general elections, the decade-long debates about a British outsider status had hit their peak.

Acceding the European Communities (EC) on 1 January 1973 as its ninth member state, the United Kingdom (UK) has been considered to be a "reluctant" member of the Union ever since. (Gamble, 2012, p. 472) At the beginning, as Robert Cooper puts it, there was no such "readiness to think in radically new terms" in Britain as it was in the six founding member states when negotiations over the European Coal and Steel Community began in the 1950's. Even in 1973 it seemed that the reason for joining was more an attempt to reduce the decline of British political influence than a vision of a common European policy determined by a supranational institution. (Cooper, 2012, p. 1191) Moreover, joining the common market seemed to be the solution for economic problems that had to be faced in turbulent times of domestic affairs like the Northern Ireland 'Troubles'[1] and miners' strikes[2] on the one hand, as well as external developments such as war in the Middle East and the oil crisis on the other hand. Certainly, the Thatcher Government put a lot of effort in the completion of the European Single Market that was completed in 1993 and the UK has been a Member State of the EU for more than 40 years now. But the British ambition for further integration achieved its limits when, according to stage three of the European Monetary Union (EMU), a single European currency, the Euro, should be introduced in the Member states of the EU.

Currently, the UK has negotiated four opt-outs from European treaties or legislation[3], for example it can stay a member of the second stage of the EMU and has a say in negotiations of that matter without having to introduce the common currency. Thus, the UK was accused of a "pick and mix"-policy towards EU cooperation. (Parkes, 2012, p. 2) The British role within the EU has over the years turned from a "constructive veto-player" attitude to a British "peripheral status". (Parkes, 2012, p. 7/11) Researchers and the written press call the UK a "stranger in Europe" (Wall, 2008) or "the lonely man in Europe". (Newswatch, 2011) Interested in repatriation of certain EU competences, the British seem to have lost influence on European policy making while the "Franco-German-tandem", in times of the

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[1] The term "the Troubles" refers to a violent ethno-nationalist conflict in the Northern Ireland that arouse in the
[2] Due to unsuccessful negotiations on raising miners' wages between the government and the National Union of Miners in January 1972, British miners went on strike nationwide. In the light of power shortages and the declaration of a state of emergency the government finally gave in to the miner's call for a significant wage increase.
[3] The UK has opt-outs from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), from the Schengen Agreement, from the Area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) as well as from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. For further information on the British opt-out clauses see the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

financial crisis, strives for further integration for example in form of a banking union for their economic benefit. (Cooper, 2012, p. 1196)

According to Putnam's *Two-Level game theory 1988*, the national government's policy making on the European level cannot be understood without reference to the conditions and dispositions on the national level. Therefore, the public opinion in the UK has to be taken into account when assessing British effort towards integration. There are, for example, the political parties in the UK and the media, particularly the written press. While the latter is assumed to be rather Eurosceptical (Dorn/Dittmer, 2007, p. 11), the former hold different attitudes towards a British membership.[4] On the one hand, there is the coalition consisting of the pro-European Liberal Party and the former pro-European Conservatives that now seem to be divided on that matter.[5] On the other hand, there are the Labour Party that does not support an in/out referendum and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) that campaigned for a British exit in the elections in 2010 and who are both able to put the Conservative Party under pressure by spreading negative propaganda about the EU. On the whole, the majority of the Members of Parliament is in favour of a further British membership as a vote on 24 October 2011 showed.[6] But the rebels within the Conservative Party up the pressure on their Premier Minister. (See Gamble, 2012)

As the EU analyst Roderick Parkes described it, the UK is "stuck in the exit". (Parkes, 2012) A membership of a political and economic Union makes no sense if the influence is limited and other member states push for further integration with or without the British. (See Rennie, 2012) Unlike other "EU analysts [who] treat the UK as an exception, a country destined always to be the outsider due to immutable constitutional and policy incompatibilities" Parkes adopts a different perspective. He views the matter from a group dynamic perspective and argues that Britain's outsider status within the EU is not "unilaterally defined" but a result of group dynamics. (Parkes, 2012, p. 4)

1.2   Research Question

This research aims at contributing explanations for the emergence of the UK's outsider status within the EU by viewing the matter from the perspective of group dynamics. Roderick Parkes, head of the EU Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw, argued that viewing the issue from the perspective of group dynamics could give new impetus and enrich the field of research in this matter as it focuses on the EU's group structure and involves both parties' characteristics and behaviour in the relationship concerned. (Parkes, 2012) Thereby he referred to Norbert Elias' and John Scotson's study on a local residential community of old-established and

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[4] http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf
[5] Following a petition, there was a vote in the House of Commons on 24 October 2011. Asked on whether there should be a referendum on Britain's membership of the EU 81 of then 306 Conservatives voted in favour of a referendum while 15 abstained. (Gamble, 2012, p. 468)
[6] Altogether, 111 MPs voted in favour of an in/out referendum, while 483 MPs voted against it. (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmvote/111024v01.pdf)

newcomers in England in the 1950s and '60s and the reasoning for the latters' integration problem. The sociologists' conclusions were published in "The Established and the Outsiders" in 1965.

Can the assumptions derived from this enquiry be projected on group dynamics within the EU? As Parkes claims, the UK as a newcomer to the EC in the 1970's has been subject to the same group dynamics as the newcomers of the local residential community. If that were true, this would reveal the British integration problem in a different light. If group dynamics are in charge of the emergence of Britain's outsider status, it can be stated that the UK's status has "not inevitable or indeed [been] unilaterally defined" as analyses with focus on the British structural matters and policy strategy suggest. (Parkes, 2012)

Thus, testing the relevance and explanatory power of group dynamics with regard to the development of the British outsider status within the EU is sought. The research question that is to be answered is as follows:

To what extent can the current outsider role of the UK within the EU be explained by Elias' and Scotson's concept of group dynamics?

1.3 Approach

In this dissertation the UK's outsider status will be viewed from the perspective of group dynamics.

The study of group dynamics is a quite recent discipline of the social studies dealing with the formation of groups, their developments and relations to other groups, individuals or institutions, but also with the dynamics and conflicts within a group itself. (See Cartwright/Zander, 1968) Moreover, researchers of group dynamics pay special attention to the interaction among group members, the structure, size and goals of groups, their degree of cohesiveness as well as their temporal change. (See Forsyth, 1990)

In their enquiry "The established and the outsiders" (1965) Elias and Scotson have dealt with group dynamics within a British residential community and detected an insider-outsider-figuration among its neighbourhoods that they found out had developed not because of differences in terms of cultural or structural differences between these groups but because of the duration of the groups' residence within the community. In order to find out whether the British outsider status has emerged for the same reasons as it did in "Winston Parva", it has to be tested whether the crucial observations made by Elias and Scotson also emerge in the relationship between the UK and the other EU member states, especially the founding member states who can be regarded as the "old-established" of the EC.

Hitherto, the EU itself has been object of countless analyses in terms of leadership, political influence and intergroup relations. (See Hayward, 2008; Beach et al., 2007; and others) However, most of the articles published have dealt with these issues mostly by analysing its "institutional structure and procedures" or by focussing on certain personalities that had a high impact on the process of European

Integration. (Hayward, 2008) A similar approach has been made in terms of explaining why and how the British outsider status within the Union has developed: researchers have concentrated on structural matters and policy contents or even on high-ranked politicians' individual domestic and external policy-strategies. (See Gamble, 2012; Cooper, 2012; George, 1998; Rennie, 2012; Wall, 2008; Valasek, 2012; and others) This dissertation aims at complementing those previous studies that have dealt with the "stranger in Europe" (Wall, 2008) or "awkward partner" (George, 1998) by viewing the issue "from the perspective of the EU's 'group dynamics'." (Parkes, 2012, 1) This new point of view seeks to enrich the research on the matter and to encourage further detailed analysis.

Therefore, the following approach seems reasonable. First, this research concentrates on group dynamics as a field of study and point out its emergence, development and relevance for social science in Chapter 2. Also, key aspects of this research field are pointed out. Then, the above-mentioned enquiry by Elias and Scotson will be focus of attention. Observations and assumptions of the emergence of an insider-outsider-configuration are presented. By means of the procedure known as "analytical induction" which is "common use of qualitative researchers in their efforts to generalize about social behaviour" a list of criteria will be developed. This list will help to assess to what extent the group dynamics detected in the case study of "Winston Parva" are also to be found in the relationship between the UK and the EU founding member states.

In the next step, it will be examined whether there are objective hints that point at an outsider-status of the UK. Therefore, we will take a closer look at the opt-outs of the UK from European legislation. Thereafter, as a complementation of the examination of legal exceptions, by means of a content analysis of British and German media, the perception of both parties concerning the EU will be analysed. Finally, it will be tested whether the criteria set up in Chapter 2.2.2 can also be detected in the EU. The result will enable us answering the research question regarding the explanatory power of group dynamics in the case of the British outsider status.

2.   The concept of group dynamics

In order to be able to assess whether a particular conception of group dynamics can explain the emergence of the British outsider status in the European Community, we should, prior to an in-depth analysis, take a look at group dynamics as a field of research in general. What do researchers of group dynamics deal with? What are they interested in and in how far are their findings relevant for social sciences? An outline of group dynamics' history, the key aspects and the researcher's methodology should give an overview of the field of enquiry and reveal whether group dynamics research includes the issues' main problem - the development of a certain structure (insider-outsider-figuration) of a group.

In the next step, the conception of Elias and Scotson, which is about the emergence of an insider-outsider-figuration among old-established and newcomers of a group, will be presented. Is this conception suitable for further analysis on the emergence of the British outsider status?

Prior to presenting the history and key aspects of group dynamics as a field of enquiry, it seems reasonable to first define the term which will be used throughout this research, as there are three main distinctions to make.

Firstly, "group dynamics" refers to a sort of political ideology that deals with the question in what ways (political) groups should be organized. Thereby, democratic leadership and possible ways of participation play a central role. It is particularly about society's and individuals' gains derived from cooperative activities in groups. (See Cartwright/Zander, 1968, p. 4)

Secondly, "group dynamics" can also describe a set of techniques like role-playing, feedback of group process etc. that were developed in order to facilitate the functioning of work in groups or to improve skill in human relations. These skills play an important role in business and industry.

Thirdly, the term of "group dynamics" as it is used and worked on in this research defines "a field of inquiry dedicated to achieving knowledge about the nature of groups, the laws of their development, and their interrelations with individuals, other groups, and larger institutions." (Cartwright/Zander, 1968, p. 4) Likewise, "group dynamics" can also refer to the "actions, processes, and changes that occur within and between groups" which are studied by group dynamicists. (Forsyth, 2010, p. 2) However, the use of the term becomes apparent on the basis of the context.

2.1   Group dynamics as a field of enquiry

The discipline's beginning is to be dated back to the late 1930's in the United States (U.S.) and is closely linked to the person of Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) who established the "Research Center for Group Dynamics" at MIT in 1945 and thereby institutionalised group dynamics as a field of enquiry.

However, the "relevant knowledge in this area has been the concern […] in the domains of sociology, anthropology, and social psychology" (Bonner, 1959, p. 3) and other disciplines of social science even decades before.[7] (Forsyth 2014, p. 19) Discoveries and developments especially within modern sociology since the 19th century and psychology around 1900 paved the way for this field of enquiry.[8] Within sociology, for example, there was a shift from a static to a dynamic understanding of the social process, while psychologists became interested in the role of groups and their impact on the individual which they studied in experiments.[9] In the concept of field theory Kurt Lewin finally provided the basis for the foundation of group dynamics by setting up a "conceptual scheme and the basic formulations regarding human behaviour" with special regard to the individuals' interactive dynamic relations among each other and with their environment. (Bonner, 1959, pp. 18-19)

Moreover, the rise of group dynamics has generally been supported by the cultural and economic conditions in the U.S. during the late 1930's, as Cartwright and Zander claim. They detected three major conditions that facilitated its rise and growth. Firstly, there was a supportive society and a general belief, that the growth of the American industry was result of technological and administrative "know how". Therefore, research expenditures increased also in social science, even during years of the depression, so that institutional resources could be provided. Secondly, many new professions to whom the work with groups was essential (e.g. Social Group Work, Group Psychology, Education and Administration) came into being. It was these "people working in those professions" who began to write about groups systematically in order to get a deeper understanding of them. A third reason why the research of group dynamics could emerge was the development of social science during the past decades (see above). This development also included the new understanding that empirical research could be conducted on groups of people and the view that human behaviour could be enquired systematically by certain scientific methods. (Cartwright/Zander, 1968, p. 11)

Due to its interest in human behaviour and social relationships group dynamics is to be located within the social sciences but it is mistakenly often regarded as a subpart of any traditional academic discipline like psychology or sociology. Rather, as Cartwright and Zander claim, it is a "branch of knowledge" or "intellectual specialization" (Cartwright/Zander, 1968, p. 5) with "interdisciplinary orientation" (Forsyth, 2010, p. 24). Besides their emphasis on empirical research, researchers of group dynamics are highly interested in dynamics of groups and the interdependence among specific phenomena (i.e. a change of membership and its influence on the group's functioning) that enables them to discover principles of groups' dynamics. (See Cartwright/Zander, 1968, p. 6) However,

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[7] The discipline's research on group dynamics differ in terms of the „level of analysis" chosen, which describes the focus of study when examining a multilevel process or phenomenon as group dynamics. While psychologists for example focus on the individual (individual-level analysis), sociologists tend to undertake group-level analyses. (Forsyth, 2014, 19)
[8] In this context, reference is made to „collective determinism" which is linked to the person of Durkheim, „Interactionism" by Simmel. For detailed information see: (Bonner, 1959)
[9] Norman Triplett initiated the first experimental investigation of social influences on individual performance in 1897. (See Bonner, 1959, 14)

research in group dynamics goes beyond the formulation of "abstract principles which underlie group behaviour", by devising "techniques for effecting group decisions and group actions." (Bonner, 1959, p. 6)

Before looking at the key aspects of the research on group dynamics, it is sensible to first define the term "group" from a group dynamics perspective. What characterises a number of individuals as a group is, according to Kurt Lewin, an interdependence among its members. Forsyth calls interdependence as "the hallmark of a group". (Forsyth, 1990, p. 9) Above that, when analysing a group, further characteristics play a crucial role. Apart from the size and the goals of a group, special attention is paid to the interaction of the group members, the structure of the group, the group's cohesiveness and temporal change.

The key aspects studied in group dynamics are categorized by Forsyth. (See *Annex*: *table 1* and *table 2*) Group dynamics research deals with the *formation* and *development of groups*, *groups' structure* and in how far groups develop cohesion among their members. Moreover, and most interesting to political science, groups' influence on individuals and the *power structure* within groups are crucial elements of the research on groups. Especially the rise and functioning of *leadership* within a group has been of great attraction to researchers so far. Furthermore, the working in groups as well as conflict issues are focussed by group dynamics.

As mentioned before, the study of group dynamics is highly relevant to other social sciences. A survey given by Forsyth gives an impression of relevant topics for several disciplines. (See Annex: table 3) While anthropologists are particularly interested in groups in cross-cultural contexts, social and collective identities and evolutionary approaches to group livings, business and industry can benefit from findings on management of and leadership within groups as well as teachers who can improve their teaching thanks to the acquired knowledge concerning groups of the size of a classroom group.

The most important measurement tools in the field of group dynamics are observational strategies and self-report measures. The former relies on a researcher's observation of a group that can either be conducted from the outside of a group or as a participant of the group under observation.[10] It is up to the observer to plan the structure of his observation from the outset, which can prevent his records from being influenced (implicitly or explicitly) by his expectations. Self-report measures are about "asking a question and recording the answer." (Forsyth 1990, pp. 32-33) A common technique of measuring "the social relationship linking group members" is sociometry. (Forsyth, 1990, p. 33) Depending on the group members' answers to specific questions regarding their preferred relationship within the group the researcher draws a diagram, e.g. a sociogram.

The research designs mainly used by group dynamicists are in-depth case studies of single groups, correlational analyses of the relationship between various aspects of groups, and experimental studies

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[10] In the case of a participant observation, one differentiates between over and covert observation.

that require manipulating aspects of the group situation. (See Forsyth, 1990, p. 38) While in case studies researchers get an in-depth understanding of the concerned group, their information about groups in general is limited and their interpretations can underlie objective interpretations. Moreover, assumptions on causal relationships among variables cannot always be proved in a case study. In correlational studies relationships between variables can be measured, but information about their causal relationships is limited, too. In an experiment the researcher can manipulate the independent variable and, by measuring the magnitude of the dependent variable, make a statement on causal relationships of the variables. The disadvantage of experimental study is their artificiality that can differ too much from reality. (See Forsyth, 1990, pp. 38-48)

2.2   Group dynamics: "The established and the outsiders"

Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson carried out an enquiry on a suburban community near London at the beginning of the 1960's. Originally, their object of investigation was the delinquency rate that differed between the municipality's three neighbourhoods. But as soon as they got engaged with "Winston Parva"[11], a town of 5,000 inhabitants altogether, a different phenomenon caught the sociologists' attention. They detected a "sharp division within [the community] between an old-established group and a newer group of residents, whose members were treated as outsiders by the established group." (Elias/Scotson, 2008, p. 1) As Elias and Scotson wondered about the motives and power of resources of the old-established they carried out a case study on "Winston Parva". The study is "used as a basis of a more general model, developed through constant comparison […] with other established-outsider figuration in different classes and in other areas." (Elias/Scotson, 2008, p. xii)

There were three "zones" of neighbourhoods in "Winston Parva". Zone 2 and 3 were both working class areas. While zone 2 was created in the 1880's by the founder of Winston Parva, Charles Wilson, zone 3 was formed in the 1930's by a private investment company. In the meantime, zone 1, a residential area was established in the 1920's and 30's. At the time of observation, most of the families of the "village" (zone 2) had been living in this place for generations and therefore had known each other since decades. The newcomers who inhabited the "estates" (zone 3) had moved there from different places from England, for different reasons.[12] Some had come to Winston Parva because of the higher employment rate there; others had been evacuated from the bombing of London in World War II.

For their enquiry on group dynamics the researchers relied mainly on a qualitative analysis. Besides interviewing inhabitants randomly, a "systematic observation" executed by a trained participant observer (in this case one of the researchers himself) seemed sensible. Their research went beyond the mere collection of statistical data since "the actual configuration, the complex relationship between

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[11] To keep the city and its population anonymous the researchers decided to give it that alias.
[12] "Village" and "Estates" were the names given by the inhabitants of Winston Parva referring to zone 2 and zone 3.

these three zones could neither be adequately explained by other than verbal symbols." (Elias/Scotson, 1965, p. 11) According to Elias and Scotson, plain statistical correlations could not explain to what extent for example configurations of established and outsiders affected the people of both zones in their everyday life.

2.2.1 Observations and explanations

The inhabitants of zone 2, the old-established, expulsed the newcomers of zone 3 and "stigmatised them generally as people of lesser human worth." (Elias/Scotson, 2008, p. 1) The newcomers themselves "with a kind of puzzled resignation" seemed to accept their (social) exclusion by the old-established and did not take any action against the exclusion.[13] (Elias/Scotson, 2008, p. 2) Remarkably, there were no differences between these two groups in terms of nationality, ethnic descent, colour, religion, race or other "conventional indices of social stratification" ("social class"), so that any of these characteristics could not be the explanatory variable for the insider-outsider-figuration, as Elias called it.[14] Rather, the old-established seemed to perceive the newcomers of zone 3 to be a possible threat to their established way of life, which includes a "common mode of living and a set of norms." (Elias/Scotson, 2008, p. 8) For many of the established families the "sense of their own standing and of their own belonging was bound up with their communal life and its tradition" which required protection from influence from the outside. (Elias/Scotson, 2008, p. 8) Therefore, they "closed ranks" and the newcomers became outsiders. For example, it was impossible for a newcomer to get any position in a local organisation. The stigmatization of the newcomers by the established could only be conducted because of the "differentials in the degree of internal cohesion and communal control", as Elias and Scotson noted. Because of their high inner cohesion, the established could "attribute negative characteristics of [the others'] group's 'worst' section" to the entire group while they could establish and maintain a positive self-image for themselves.[15] (Elias/Scotson, 2008, p. 5) As long as they believed in their own superiority over the newcomers, they could maintain that status because all members would be willing to close ranks, exclude the outsiders and 'protect' their community life. Furthermore, to keep the newcomers from non-occupational contact with the member of the established groups, means of social control were exerted. While group members complying with the rules were rewarded by praise-gossip, group members breaching the codex would be cursed with blame-gossip that could lead to the lowering of their own status within the group.

As one can see, the power differentials between the two groups did not base on a monopolistic possession of non-human objects, which had been object of research before. Rather, the established-outsider-figuration reveals an "uneven balance of power" that enables the established to stigmatize the

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[13] Elias and Scotson argued, that the group of newcomers lacked cohesion that is necessary in order to act as a group and fight back in this case.

[14] In Elias' version of a relational sociology, human beings are „always embedded in figurations which are interdependent webs and networks which are always moving, changing and developing." (Kaspersen/Gabriel, 2008, p. 374)

[15] This positive self-image often grounds on this group's ‚best' members' traits. (See Elias/Scotson, 2008, p. 5)

newcomers. (Elias/Scotson 2008, p. 6) That again secures and strengthens their superior position within the relationship network of the two interdependent groups of residents over the long term.

To summarize, both motivation and power resources derive from one principal difference between the two groups: the length of their residence. Putting the findings in an equation the "length of residence" is the independent variable *X*, while the "emergence of outsider status" constitutes the dependent variable *Y*.

2.2.2 Criteria for the application of this conception on the EU

In their enquiry Elias and Scotson have observed and analysed exclusion mechanisms within a community of individuals living in the same suburban area. Before setting up a list of criteria that enables testifying whether the insider-outsider-figuration in question can be found in other groups as well, the question is whether observations and findings on group dynamics within a group of individuals can be applied also on a (political) community of states at all.

Certainly, individuals of a suburban community and states within a (political) community cannot be compared one-to-one as they differ in several characteristics. A state, for example, is more complex than an individual because of the variety of its (e.g. social) functions and field of actions alone. These concern domestic as well as external matters, regional as well as national matters. Thus, it eventually has to face contradictory interests that need to be outbalanced. From the outside, a democratic state's preference structure might be more difficult to detect than the one of an individual. A change of government can also bring about a preference shift concerning a state's functions and field of actions, which would make an analysis over a longer term even more complicated.

But more important, since it is about group structure and group dynamics in this research, these actors - states and individuals- as member of communities both find themselves in a network of dependence and power relations in which they have to assert themselves. In this respect, it makes sense trying to apply the findings/knowledge on group dynamics gained from a local residential community on a community of states. How do old-established actors respond to newcomers? What opportunities do newcomers have to integrate into an established group? A thorough analysis of the EU's group dynamics on the basis of the following criteria will show whether the same forces of exclusion detected in the communal living of "Winston Parva" also obtain in the European Union with regard to the founding member states' relationship to the UK.

Firstly, in the suburban community observed by Elias and Scotson, the old-established had over decades of living together developed a *"common mode of living"* and a *"set of norms"* that the newcomers did not know about when moving to that area and therefore did not share. (Elias/Scotson, 2008) In a political union of states, common internal rules would be reflected in terms of joint political decisions and a common attitude towards political issues. A member state that does not share this set of norms should be identifiable deviating from the common line, for example when deciding upon

military invasions or the appointment of a person to an important office. Identified deviance among group members has to be analysed for its reasons. Do the others exclude the deviator from the "set of norms" or does the latter deny adopting these rules? To the newcomers of the municipality in the case study, the set of norms was not accessible so that they could have not complied with it even if they had wished to.

Secondly, the established group in "Winston Parva" maintained an *"uneven balance of power"* with themselves as the superior party by excluding the newcomers from their village life. Whether there is an uneven balance of power in a political community like the EU could be verifiable by examining the member states' influence on joint decisions. In how far does the outcome of a negotiation accord with or derive from the position of the states in question? Who is taking part in negotiations at all? Are there particular opinion leaders? Do backroom deals between the governments of particular member states (regularly) bring about a decision in community negotiations and thereby excluding others from influencing the outcome? Do certain member states prevail more often than others in negotiations and can therefore be regarded as "superior" to them?

Moreover, the insiders of the local community stigmatized the newcomers as people of lesser human worth (*"stigmatization of the newcomers"*). While establishing a self-image which "tends to be modelled on the minority of its 'best' members", the outsider group was "attributed the 'bad' characteristics of its group's 'worst' section". (Elias/Scotson, 2008, 5) This "distortion" of reality enables the established group to prove their point to themselves as well as to others. It provides them with evidence to show that their group is 'good' and the other one is 'bad' in any situation. In order to make the "badge of human inferiority" stick on the group of newcomers, the established exerted "means of social control". (ibid.) Social contact with the outsider group was punished by *blame-gossip* leading to a lowering in status. If the founding member states of the EU were making use of stigmatization and the means of social control, it possibly is difficult to prove since these mechanisms are hardly directly observable. Elias and Scotson detected these phenomena in "Winston Parva" by interviewing members of both groups ensuring anonymity. This procedure is impossible in the case of the EU, at least in the scope of this dissertation. The public image of the founding member states in the European press might give a hint of the self-perception of the former. How do they present themselves and the outsiders in interviews etc.? Additionally, a *lack of cooperation* among insiders and outsiders possibly give a hint that "means of social control" are exerted. However, showing proof of both mechanisms appears to be impossible in this case.

Furthermore, Elias and Scotson observed that in "Winston Parva" the outsiders did not cooperate with each other in order to overcome their outsider status at the periphery of the group. As the sociologists found out, the outsiders of "Winston Parva" failed in allying with each other because of a lack of coherence. In order to find out if this is also the case in the EU, it has to be examined whether there have been any attempts by the supposed outsider states within the political community to form an

alliance against the established member states in negotiations or at any other occasion.

Finally, the outsiders of "Winston Parva" had accepted their inferior status within the community with a "kind of puzzled resignation". (Elias/Scotson, 2008, p. 2) Translated to the situation of outsiders within the EU or other political communities the acceptance of their outsider status could manifest itself in decreasing efforts to veto or block decisions initiated by the established as they know that it is nearly impossible to compete against the superior group.

2.3   Findings

First of all, this chapter has revealed the relevance of group dynamics for the issue under observance, as the *formation* and the *development* of groups as well as groups' structure are major topics in the field of group dynamics. Dealing with the British special role regarding the EU (= the EU's group structure) necessarily requires the consideration of the group's history (= *formation* and *development*) in order to find out the reasons for this exclusion.

Moreover, the conception presented in Chapter 2.2 explains the emergence of an insider-outsider-figuration among old-established and newcomers of a local community. Just as the newcomers of "Winston Parva" have become outsiders of the local residential community, the UK who had joined the EC decades after their foundation is said to hold an outsider role as well. The conceptions' transferability on a community of states has been argued in Chapter 2.2.2. Therefore, it can be said that at this point it seems legit to test the conception for its explanatory power in the case of the British outsider existence.

The main mechanisms identified behind the newcomers' exclusion in the case of "Winston Parva" have been transferred into a list of criteria that should enable us to assess whether this particular conception derived from the group dynamics within a local community can also explain the British outsider status within the EU.

3.   The UK in the European Communities

Only a few years after the end of the Second World War that had destroyed the entire European continent, on 9 May 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman submitted a governmental proposal, later known as the Schuman Plan, intending to create a common European Coal and Steel policy aiming at the unification of the European countries. The following negotiations between France, West Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries lead to the Treaty of Paris (signed 18 April 1951) establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

Meanwhile, the British government had declined Schuman's invitation to discuss his plan. This was for several reasons: First of all, Jean Monnet, one of the architects of that plan, insisted on the implications of supranationalism as "non-negotiable" which had meant a shift of power from the national level to a higher authority and thus a loss of national sovereignty. (George, 1998, p. 21) Secondly, the British self-image did not include being a part of a community of European states ("England still stands outside Europe." Quotation from Keynes in 1947 in: Gamble, 2012, p. 472) Instead, the British policy makers thought of their country as to "have a separate and distinct task" deriving from a hundreds of years old history of imperialism. (Gamble, 2012, p. 473) Thirdly, according to Churchill's conception of the 'three circles' from 1948 that defined British power and interest, a united Europe stood back behind the Empire and the relations to Anglo-America. (See George, 1998, p. 14)[16] Sustaining close relations to the U.S. was indispensable in order to fight "the major threat to the stability of the capitalist world" coming from the Soviet Union. (George, 1998, p. 14) In the UK, one was interested in ensuring a balance of power in Europe, especially a Franco-German rapprochement, which should be implemented by establishing "a kind of United States of Europe", but that did not necessarily mean to be part of a community itself ensuring that peace. (Churchill 1946[17]) Cooper even argues that in Britain there had not been a readiness to think 'Europe' in new terms, the vision for doing so was lacking. (Cooper, 2012, p. 1191)

The foundation of the ECSC was the basis of the European Integration process. With the Treaty of Rome coming into force on 1 January 1958, that process advanced quickly. Besides the ECSC, the member states became (economically) connected by the European Economic Community (EEC) that established a Common Market and by the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Again, Britain was no part of it.

In 1973, after their first application ten years before, which had been vetoed by the French president General Charles de Gaulle, the UK, finally, became the ninth member state of the EC. About fifteen years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome, the UK joined for economic as well as for political matters, but "this concept of the European Community as a political vehicle […] was probably the

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[16] „ […] by Summer 1949 the U.S. and Commonwealth were viewed as more solid and reliable pillars on which to build British political and economic security." (Young, 1993, p. 25)
[17] http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/winston_churchill_en.pdf

major motive". (Bulmer et al., 1992, p. 5) Developments on external and domestic level threatened the UK's status as a political and economic superpower. (ibid.)

Moreover, the British government was convinced it would take over the lead in the EC and thereby maintain a powerful status in a changing political power structure, as one thought to be head and shoulder above the other member states thanks to its own native pragmatism and parliamentary experience.

By the time of joining the EC, the organisation was already "framed without Britain's aims in mind." (Young 1993, p. 182) As a consequence, some arrangements would become subject of serious controversies between the UK and the other member states later on, for example the budgetary arrangements and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), introduced in 1962, as well as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Until this day, the relationship between the UK and the EU has provided material for countless analyses. The British attitude towards European Integration has been described as "reluctant" and the UK has been considered to be an "awkward partner" or "stranger in Europe". (Wall 2008) Even today the British membership appears to be a serious test for the present coalition of Conservatives and Liberals in Britain that was elected in 2010 as the first coalition government in post-war history.

In this chapter it will be investigated whether there are indeed exclusion mechanisms to be detected between the UK and the core member states of the EU. For that purpose, not only a closer look at the British opt-outs (3.1), which should provide objectified hints for the UK's exceptional status within the EU, but also dealing with both (old-established and newcomer) sides' perception of European group dynamics on the basis of a recent event on the European level seems promising. Therefore, the nomination of a new President of the European Commission by the European Council in 2014 and its perception by the German and the British media will be the focus of interest. Finally, on the grounds of the content analysis, it will be reviewed to what extent the criteria derived from Elias' and Scotson's enquiry in Chapter 2.2.2 are fulfilled in the case of the presented European group dynamics.

3.1   A special role within the EU?

Searching for objectifiable hints for a special or even exceptional status of the UK within the EU and in order to get an idea of the British attitude towards European Integration, it makes sense to take a closer look at the binding agreements between the EU member states approved voluntarily and democratically - the treaties. These set out the EU's „objectives, rules for EU institutions, how decisions are made and the relationship between the EU and its member countries."[18] On the basis of the treaties conducted so far the European Integration process can be traced back as new treaties inter

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[18] http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm

alia oftentimes introduce new areas of cooperation in different policy fields and therefore shifts power from national institutions to the European Institutions.

Usually, these treaties are agreed on by all member states after intensive negotiations. However, even after months of negotiation the situation may arise that the majority of member states agrees on a new treaty that advances the integration process but one or two governments refuse to relinquish their sovereignty in a specific policy field. In that case the "political, institutional and legal solution is treaty opt-out". In a protocol, which is added to and enters into force with the new treaty, the concerned member state is given an exemption from the treaty.[19]

So far, there are four member states that hold at least one treaty opt-out. These are in alphabetical order: Denmark (3), Ireland (2), Poland (1) and the United Kingdom (4). Remarkably, the United Kingdom has negotiated the most opt-out clauses among all member states, while none of the founding member states has ever made use of that opportunity so far.

First of all, the UK has opted out from the Schengen Agreement that was implemented into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. This Agreement established a borderless EU enabling European citizens to move freely between European member states. Also non-EU member states like Norway and Island have signed an association agreement and therefore are part of the borderless Europe.

Secondly, and subject of diverse discussions and debates, the UK holds another opt-out clause from participating the third stage of the EMU. Not having to adopt the common currency was the UK's condition for signing the Maastricht Treaty (1992). In the scope of the financial crisis that has particularly hit the Eurozone member states for years now, not participating in the common currency has considerably divided the EU founding member states, particularly France and Germany, from the UK. While the Franco-German-tandem is forcing new regulation measurements in the interest of Eurozone members (i.e. the introduction of a single bank supervisor for the Eurozone, a European financial transaction tax etc.), the UK's interests are different if not opposed to the these plans. Additionally, the UK runs the risk of being excluded from negotiations about such measures together with other "Euro-guzzling member states" when persisting in its opposing status. (Parkes 2012, 4)

Thirdly, the UK also secured an opt-out on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Under pressure of the UK and Poland a protocol was added to the Charter stating that the charter "does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws […] of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedom and principles that it reaffirms."[20]

Last but not least, the UK has a so-called flexible opt-out from the Area of freedom, security and

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[19] http://www.iwm.at/wp-content/uploads/jc-16-07.pdf
[20] Charter of Fundamental Rights

justice (AFSJ). That means, it can on a case-by-case basis decide whether it wants to adopt European legislation in that policy field or not.

These four British opt-outs from common European legislation have brought the UK critics' reproach of a "pick-and-mix"-attitude regarding EU cooperation. (Parkes, 2012, 2) Opting out from common legislation in order to maintain its autonomy makes the impression of lacking vision and engagement for the European Integration process. Therefore, the UK is perceived as an unreliable and not totally committed partner by the other member states, especially by the founding member states who have not negotiated a single opt-out from European treaties. As a result, the UK finds itself at the periphery of the community. This marginalisation became apparent for example on the European summit in December 2011 when David Cameron vetoed a new EU treaty aiming at introducing financial market regulations that were forced by France and Germany. As a consequence, "leaders promptly agreed to bypass Britain and establish a new accord on the euro among themselves by March."[21] The British impact on legislation outcome has observably shrinked.

3.2   Perception in the media

The "battle" about the nomination of the next head of the European Commission in the aftermath of the European elections has revealed highly different standpoints among the negotiating states regarding the EU's future, particularly among the supposed outsider the UK and core member states like Germany. News coverage gives the reader the opportunity to get an idea of the concerned actors' self-perception, reveals how they might think about their 'counterpart' and, finally, how/what they think about the EU as a whole. Especially the reporting's reasoning (and transparency) is suitable for revealing the respective attitude and perception.

This approach complements the one in Chapter 3.1, as it now concentrates on subjective parameter. The perception of group members plays a crucial role when analysing a group's structure, as the enquiry on "Winston Parva" in Chapter 2.2 has shown. Perceiving oneself as being of higher human worth than others has in the case of the residential community been a reason for excluding others from community life.

In the run-up to the European elections on May 25, 2014 each of the European parties had nominated a "top-candidate". The "top-candidate" of the party winning most of the seats in the European Parliament (EP) should, in their opinion, become the new head of the European Commission. Arguing in favour of the "Spitzenkandidat" of the winning party EPP (European People's Party), Jean-Claude Juncker, the EP called on the Council to nominate him for that office. This request caused a serious debate in the European Council which dominated the European media for weeks. Finally, after several negotiations in Council and meetings of heads of governments, Juncker was nominated as head of

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[21] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/09/david-cameron-blocks-eu-treaty

commission by a 26-2 vote by the Council on June 27, 2014. While the 'core group' around Germany and France voted in favour of Mr Juncker, it was only the UK and Hungary who voted against his nomination. On July 15, 2014 the EP in Strasbourg voted the politician into office by a clear majority. Juncker's appointment to the office of the head of the European Commission has been regarded as an increase of the EP's power and importance.

3.2.1   Content Analysis

The aim of the following content analysis is to find out whether the UK and Germany, as a representative of the core group of the EU, have a different perception of the candidate's nomination for the European Commission's presidential office. A "systematic examination of communicative material" shall in this case help to answer this research question. (Mayring 2007, 266) In order to attain the above-mentioned aims, a structuring content analysis of German and British newspapers is carried out.

The methodological approach, a qualitative analysis of newspaper articles, was chosen for several reasons. First of all, the data was easily to acquire at the concerned newspapers' archive, it has been available at any given time and the analysis could be conducted repeatedly. However, qualitative analyses run at risk to lack intersubjective verifiability. But since the codification process is described in detail in the following chapter a replication of the analysis could be carried out in case of doubt.

Moreover, newspaper articles typically provide information on an issue from different points of view and are therefore more informative than, for example, an interview of a politician since the politician would most probably represent only his personal view on the matter. Furthermore, dealing with the media of the countries delivers insight into the public discourse in Germany and the UK and not just personal views on the issue. Here, we are not interested in particular person's view on the matter but in the perception of the German and British public.

This analysis concentrates on the news coverage in print media, focussing on high-circulation quality newspaper in both countries. In order to control for the possible impact of different political ideologies, the two main centre-left and centre-right newspaper in each country were selected: *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*F.A.Z.*) for Germany and *The Guardian* as well as *The Times/The Sunday Times* for the UK.

Research on the archives of the concerned newspaper concentrated on the space of time from the European elections (May 25, 2014) to the nomination of the head of commission by the Council (June 27, 2014). To facilitate the search for newspaper articles that discuss the topic by putting forward the two sides' arguments in favour of or against the nomination of Jean-Claude Juncker as the new head of the commission, the keyword search option was used. Searching for "Juncker", "EU Commission" and "head of commission" (and their German equivalent) in the appointed space of time had different results regarding the number of hits.

After screening the hits for their suitability for the intended analysis (comments and letters to the editor were removed, as well as articles with a too limited number of words (under 300 words)) finally seven newspaper articles per newspaper discussing and arguing about the (then planned) nomination of the politician Juncker for the concerned office remained for the analysis.

We then examined each of the seven articles per newspaper on its perception of the debate by coding it into manageable content categories, arguments in favour of or against Juncker's nomination. This procedure is known as "selective reduction". The arguments coded for were as follows. Argument 1 (*A1*) is called the "top-candidate"- argument. Statements that argue that Juncker should become the new head of the commission since he has been the "top-candidate" of the winning coalition of the European elections are coded for *A1*. Argument 2 (*A2*) is named the "unsuitable candidate". An article arguing or citing a politician arguing that Mr Juncker is personally unsuitable for the office for political and/or personal reasons is coded for *A2*. Argument *A3* - the "treaty-argument" - is broken down into *A3.1* and *A3.2*. Both these arguments are about the procedure of nominating the head of commission but stress different aspects of the contractual provision. Newspaper articles stressing that the Council has to take the result of the European election into account when nominating a candidate are coded for *A3.1*. Those contributions underlining that the nomination is up to the Council is coded for *A3.2*. Both underline their argument by referring to the treaty but interpret it differently. *A4* is coded when it is argued that Juncker's nomination would not be democratically legitimatized by the European elections, as voters did not vote for a Spitzenkandidat but only for a party of their country and this party's candidates for becoming a Member of the European Parliament (MEP). Finally, there is the last argument, *A5*, which is coded when it is put forward that there would be no genuine support in the European Council for Juncker but that other government's approval was attained by backroom deals.

The categories coded for could consist of a single word like "Spitzenkandidat" or "Europawahl-Sieger" (*A1*) (*F.A.Z*), a set of words like "Juncker's drinking habits" (*A2*) (*The Times*), or even patterns as "fair weather friends" who 'betrayed' the UK (*A5*) (*The Times*). The arguments made in an article were examined for their presence only and not for their quantity as for answering the research question the former approach is sufficient. Furthermore, it has to be noted that within the analysis no distinction was made between arguments made by the authors themselves and arguments cited in the articles. The job of an author of a newspaper article is to inform the readers about on-going debates etc. and therefore to provide the latter with the information necessary to judge on the case on his own. Thus, any argument given is generally capable of influencing the reader's mind about the issue discussed.

3.2.2 Findings

Table 4 in the annex presents the result of the analysis. As it shows, the two German newspapers analysed have mainly put forward the "top-candidate"-argument *A1* (13 times) and also one of the

treaty-arguments, *A3.1* (8 times), that stresses the importance of the European elections' result. Meanwhile, the British media under observance has focused on emphasizing Juncker's unsuitability for the office (*A2*) and his missing genuine support in the Council (*A5*) (11 and 13 times). While the German media has stressed the EP's role in the nomination/election-process of the head of commission, the British media gave more room for arguments that pointed out the leading role of the Council in that process (6 times). Although there has been a slight difference in both countries concerning the quantity of the arguments *A3.2* (in Germany) and *A1* (in Britain*)*, this does not result in a larger difference in the main argumentation between the centre-left and centre-right newspapers of each country.

To summarize, the British and the German media have provided room for different kinds of arguments in the debate. The result of the qualitative analysis allows inferring that there are different perceptions of the debate between the UK and Germany, the representative of the core member group here.

In the German media the arguments that the top-candidate of the winning coalition in the European elections should become the head of commission and that according to the Lisbon treaty (2009) the result of the elections have to be taken into account by the Council when nominating a candidate for that office were presented more often than any other arguments. On the contrary, the British media focussed on the arguments about Juncker's unsuitability for the office concerned as well as on him not having the Council's genuine support.

What conclusions can be drawn from the analysis regarding the countries' self-perception, their attitude towards the 'counterpart', the EU and the European Integration in general?

The German press' focus on the "top-candidate"-argument and its emphasis on the EP's competences in the process of the election of a new head of commission provided by the latest treaty points at a German commitment for a more democratic EU which also includes the development of its institutional structure. Strengthening the -democratically elected- parliament's role within this institutional structure can increase the EU's attractiveness to its citizens which again can pave the way for further transfer of power from national to supranational level as it would attain larger public support. It was primarily German politicians cited by the German media who pled for the elected "Spitzenkandidat" to become the new head of commission. Moreover, Angela Merkel was told in the British media to have changed her mind in favour of Juncker's nomination and to have convinced other member states to support her view, regardless of how she managed that. This clearly speaks for a pro-European attitude with the aim of an ever-closer Union.

In the British media, Juncker is referred to as a "eurocrat", a "federalist" (*The Times*) and "the career insider of Brussels" (*The Guardian*) which would make him unsuitable for the important office. These terms seem to be terms of abuse in the eyes of the British, who fear that Juncker as a committed European would block the British's attempt to repatriate powers from the EU level. The British call

for a reform of the European union in favour of the nation states. Insisting on the fact that the EC is in charge of the candidate for the head of commission underlines their attitude against further integration.

While the German press is derisive towards the UK, the British press underlines several times that there would be other states who share the British concern about Juncker being unsuitable for the office but could be won over by backroom deals. ("[…] reinterpret rules on austerity in return for backing Mr Juncker", *The Times*)

To summarize, the British and the German public do not share a common view on the selection process for picking the EU Commission's next president. Their arguments reveal a pro-European attitude in the case of Germany, while the UK sees itself confronted with the EP's attempt to "power-shift through the back door". (Cameron cited by *The Times*)

These findings correspond with the observations made by Elias and Scotson on "Winston Parva". While the core group -here represented by Germany- advances a pro-European view, the British outsider cannot identify itself with this attitude, these norms (ever-closer Union) and the "common mode of living".

3.2.3 To what extent are Elias' and Scotson's criteria fulfilled?

After having analysed the UK's and Germany's perception and attitude towards the EU in general, it is now to find out whether the criteria derived from Elias' and Scotson's conception "The Established and the Outsiders" (see 2.2.2) can be detected in the European group dynamics as well. For that purpose, also the findings of the content analysis will be used.

First of all, the "established" in "Winston Parva" were detected to have developed a "*common mode of living*" and a certain "*set of norms*". In a political community, such internal rules can be made out when voting on a policy issue or other decisions like the appointment of a crucial political office.

In the case of Mr Juncker's nomination for the office of the European Commission's president, it is obvious that the UK holds a view on that issue which is different from the core member states as its vote in the Council derives from the majority vote.

The argumentation of the British concentrates on other issues than the German argumentation, exemplary for the European mainstream, does. The latter's vote in favour of the "Spitzenkandidat" (*A1*) of the biggest European party emphasizes the efforts for more integration as the EP's will is taken into account in the nomination process. Furthermore, it interprets the Lisbon Treaty (2009) for the benefit of a more powerful parliament (*A3.1*). Contrary to this, the British stressed the Council's right to nominate a candidate (*A3.2*) and voted against Juncker even in the consciousness of not being able to block the decision.

A citation from a German politician, Yasmin Fahimi, general secretary of the Social Democrats, describes this issue. Fahimi is cited saying that the UK would not understand 'Europe' and would vigorously campaign against the EU's success.[22] (*FAZ*)

As the UK deviates from the common line in this matter due to its different perception of the process (preservation of the power of the nation states), it can be said that the UK has not adopted the common norms which the other member states of the EU seem to share, as the 26-2 vote in the Council shows.

The second criterion defined in Chapter 2.2.2 was an "*uneven balance of power*" within the community. As the British media reported, also other member states than the UK have had reservations regarding Junker's nomination at first (*A5*). At the end, 26 member states voted in favour of Juncker and only Hungary, obviously not a big player within the EU, stayed at the UK's side. PM Cameron failed building a "stop Juncker coalition", while chancellor Merkel managed to bring Sweden, the Netherlands and Poland in line, as particularly the British media reported. *(The Guardian)* It is said that the hesitating member states were granted concessions regarding austerity measures, though there is no explicit proof of it yet. But if so, this procedure underlines the "*uneven balance of power*" within the EU. By granting concessions to the other member states, which in fact can only be done by a powerful party that has control over the future policy making, the UK's power to persuade these states to join the opposition was limited. Therefore, it can be said that the debate about Juncker has revealed an uneven balance of power within the EU.

As already pointed out in Chapter 2.2.2, the next criterion, the "*stigmatization of the newcomer/s*" of a group, is difficult to be proven. Yet, there are hints in this case that point at some bad-mouthing about the UK. In the German reporting the UK is accused of blackmailing the EU, being opposed to the European Integration in general and unwilling to compromise.[23] Since those states that expressed their scepticism towards Juncker have finally joined the pro-Juncker group around Germany (A5) it can at least not be excluded that means of social control were exerted. Whether backroom deals have made them voting in favour of Juncker or social pressure has been the decisive factor cannot be finally decided here. However, the bad-mouthing mentioned above is not one-sided. In the British newspaper, for example, Germany and other states are described as "fair-weather friends"[24] and accused of concluding backdoor deals. Therefore, it cannot conclusively been decided whether the criterion in question is truly fulfilled. Further investigation is required here.

In "Winston Parva" outsider were not able to form alliances. As the nomination of Juncker by a 26-2 vote in the EC has shown, the UK was not able to form an opposition together with other member states that could have blocked the nomination for which a qualified majority-vote was required. (A5)

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[22] The citation was translated by the author of this thesis
[23] See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung from June 6, 2014 „SPD: Merkel soll Juncker unterstützen"; *F.A.Z* from June 7, 2014 „EVP-Fraktionschef Weber attackiert Cameron" and from June 13, 2014 „Cameron will gegen Juncker stimmen"
[24] The Sunday Times, June 29, 2014 „Odds mount against the UK in Europe"

"Mr Cameron has only himself to blame, because potential allies over the Juncker issue had abandoned him". (Ed Milibrand, quoted in *The Guardian*[25]) Instead, the UK appears to be isolated from the group more than ever.[26]

Finally, the outsiders of the residential community in Eias' and Scotson's enquiry had accepted their inferior status within the community with a kind of "puzzled resignation". (Eias/Scotson, 2008, p. 2) Judging by the UK's behaviour in the "battle" of the Juncker-candidacy, a British resignation is not observable. The media's Anti-Juncker-campaign, in which the politician was even accused of being an alcoholic and heavy smoker, as well as PM Cameron's obvious opposition to the majority even during the unwinnable vote in the Council, does not reflect the resignation of an inferior party.

To summarize, there is evidence that at least three of five criteria are fulfilled. Just as in "Winston Parva" the "established" group of the EU seems to have developed their own rules of living and common values the UK is excluded from. The debate about the new head of the European Commission has revealed an uneven balance of power within the EU with a German opinion leader and a quite isolated UK. Although there has been no proof of a stigmatization of the British in the EU, it cannot be completely ruled out that the UK's reputation within the EU, especially in the EP, has suffered as certain public statements by European politicians have shown. Furthermore, the UK has not managed to find cooperation partners in favour of its position regarding Mr Juncker's nomination just as the "outsiders" of "Winston Parva" who lacked coherence and therefore could not oppose the superiority of the old-established. Finally, the debate about the next Commission President has revealed that the British do not seem to have accepted an inferior status. Even if its position seems unpromising the UK does not seem to hesitate to criticise and fight the majority's view.

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[25] The Guardian, July 1, 2014 "Britain and Europe: Learning the lessons of defeat"
[26] "When you are at the outer edges of Europe […]" (*The Sunday Times*, June 29, 2014, Odds mount against the UK in Europe")

4. Conclusions

For now it can be said that this research has attained its goal to complement the research on the overall topic of the British outsider status by adding a new approach to the debate. While previous research on this matter had concentrated on policy issues and structural matters, particularly by concentrating on British exceptions, this research has taken into account the EU's group structure including its power relations. Moreover, both parties' behaviour and their interaction were examined taking into account social principles like perception and attitude.

The application of a particular conception derived from observations of a local residential community has revealed two important mechanisms within the EU that are to be linked to the British exclusion from the core group (of the EU). The British deviation from the *"set of norms"* of the European member states which include a pro-integration-attitude and the *"uneven balance of power"* for the benefit of the core member states underline the explanatory power of Elias' and Scotson's conception of group dynamics which explains the emergence of newcomer's outsider status in the case of the British outsider status. A stigmatization of the British newcomer could, however, not conclusively been proven in the case of the EU in this research. Further investigation on this issue, which would require a different kind of analysis than a content analysis, could eventually increase the conception's explanatory power.

As the testing has shown, Elias' and Scotson's conception of group dynamics may not be applicable on European politics as a whole. However, the similarities detected between the group dynamics of "old-established" and "newcomers" in the local residential area of "Winston Parva" and those within the EU suggest the assumption that Britain's late entry in the 1970's has released group dynamics which are likely to have had an impact on the country's (current) exclusion. Therefore, group dynamics in general can be assumed to have influenced the EU's group structure. Especially the conception of "The Established and the Newcomers" by Elias and Scotson can to a large extent explain the development of the European group structure with a British outsider. The core group's exclusive *"mode of living"* and the *"common set off norms"* as well as an *"uneven balance of power"* within the EU for the benefit of the established group have, over decades, caused the development of an "insider-outsider-figuration". As a consequence, the "reluctant" and "awkward" British member state might not be as "awkward" as it appears to be, but at least partly a "casualty" of group dynamics.

The results of this dissertation highly support Parkes' (2012) thesis stating that Britain has been subject to the same group dynamics as the newcomers of the local residential community. However, results of previous research claiming to have found evidence for the difficult relationship between the UK and the core member group of the EU in structural matters and content issues cannot be turned down at this place. Therefore, the next step should be to find out whether a combination of group dynamics, content and structural issues can attain an even wider range in terms of explanatory power.

This dissertation has shown that no party is solely to be blamed on the development of the current group structure, as the British outsider status has not been unilaterally defined. Since group dynamics are proved to have played an important role in the development of the current group structure of the EU, this dissertation's practical implication for UK-EU relationships is that an approach aiming at changing the difficult relationship for the better logically requires considering the findings of group dynamics research.

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Annex

T A B L E 1.6	Major Topics in the Field of Group Dynamics
Chapter and Topic	**Issues**
Foundations	
1. Introduction to group dynamics	What are groups, and what are their key features? What do we want to know about groups and their dynamics? What assumptions guide researchers in their studies of groups and the processes within groups?
2. Studying groups	How do researchers measure group processes? How do researchers search for and test their hypotheses about groups? What general theoretical perspectives guide researchers' studies of groups and the people in them?
Formation and Development	
3. Inclusion and identity	Do humans, as a species, prefer inclusion to exclusion and group membership to isolation? What demands does a shift from individuality to collectivity make on people? How do group experiences and memberships influence individuals' identities?
4. Formation	Who joins groups, and who remains apart? When and why do people seek out others? Why do people deliberately create groups or join existing groups? What factors influence feelings of liking for others?
5. Cohesion and development	What factors promote the increasing solidarity of a group over time? What is cohesion? As groups become more unified, do they develop a shared climate and culture? How do groups develop over time? What are the positive and negative consequences of cohesion and commitment?
6. Structure	What are norms and roles, and how do they structure interactions in groups? How and why do social networks develop in groups, and what are the interpersonal consequences of relational networks in groups?
Influence and Interaction	
7. Influence	When will people conform to a group's standards, and when will they remain independent? How do norms develop, and why do people obey them? Do nonconformists ever succeed in influencing the rest of the group?
8. Power	Why are some members of groups more powerful than others? What types of power tactics are most effective in influencing others? Does power corrupt? Why do people obey authorities?
9. Leadership	*What is leadership? Who do groups prefer for leaders? Should a leader be task-focused or* relationship-focused? Is democratic leadership superior to autocratic leadership? Can leaders transform their followers?
Working in Groups	
10. Performance	Do people perform tasks more effectively in groups or when they are alone? Why do people sometimes expend so little effort when they are in groups? When does a group outperform an individual? Are groups creative?
11. Decision making	What steps do groups take when making decisions? Why do some highly cohesive groups make disastrous decisions? Why do groups sometimes make riskier decisions than individuals?
12. Teams	What is the difference between a group and a team? What types of teams are currently in use? Does team building improve team work? How can leaders intervene to improve the performance of their teams?

Table 1

(Forsyth, 2014)

TABLE 1.6   Major Topics in the Field of Group Dynamics (Continued)

Chapter and Topic	Issues
Conflict	
13. Conflict in groups	What causes disputes between group members? When will a small disagreement escalate into a conflict? Why do groups sometimes splinter into subgroups? How can disputes in groups be resolved?
14. Intergroup relations	What causes disputes between groups? What changes take place as a consequence of intergroup conflict? What factors exacerbate conflict? How can intergroup conflict be resolved?
Contexts and Applications	
15. Groups in context	What impact does the social and physical setting have on an interacting group? Are groups territorial? What happens when groups are overcrowded? How do groups cope with severe environments?
16. Groups and change	How can groups be used to improve personal adjustment and health? What is the difference between a therapy group and a support group? Are group approaches to treatment effective? Why do they work?
17. Crowds and collective behavior	What types of crowds are common? Why do crowds and collectives form? Do people lose their sense of self when they join crowds? When is a crowd likely to become unruly?

Table 2

(Forsyth, 2014)

TABLE 1.5   Interdisciplinary Interest in Groups and Group Processes

Discipline	Topics
Anthropology	Groups in cross-cultural contexts; societal change; social and collective identities; evolutionary approaches to group living
Architecture and Design	Planning spaces to maximize group–environment fit; design of spaces for groups, including offices, classrooms, venues, arenas, and so on
Business and Industry	Work motivation; productivity in organizational settings; team building; goal setting; management and leadership
Communication	Information transmission in groups; discussion; decision making; problems in communication; networks
Computer Science	Virtual groups, computer-based groups support systems, computer programming in groups
Criminal Justice	Organization of law enforcement agencies; gangs and criminal groups; jury deliberations
Education	Classroom groups; team teaching; class composition and educational outcomes
Engineering	Design of human systems, including problem-solving teams; group approaches to software design
Mental Health	Therapeutic change through groups; sensitivity training; training groups; self-help groups; group psychotherapy
Political Science	Leadership; intergroup and international relations; political influence; power
Psychology	Personality and group behavior; problem solving; perceptions of other people; motivation; conflict
Social Work	Team approaches to treatment; community groups; family counseling; groups and adjustment
Sociology	Self and society; influence of norms on behavior; role relations; deviance
Sports and Recreation	Team performance; effects of victory and failure; cohesion and performance

Table 3

(Forsyth, 2014)