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

COUNTER-(RE)FORMATION IN DUTCH LOCAL POLITICS?

MODELLING THE INCLUSION OF DUTCH INDEPENDENT LOCALS IN MUNICIPAL BOARDS

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Summary

In March 2014 the elections or the Dutch municipal councils have taken place. During the last two decades the independent local party has seen a huge rise in popularity in the Netherlands. But is this recent popularity also observable within the walls of the Dutch municipal councils? This thesis observes to what extent Dutch independent locals are included in municipal boards after the 2014 municipal elections. Moreover, this thesis tests three hypotheses containing factors that might explain inclusion in municipal boards. The three factors combined try to answer the following main research question and subsequently present a model that estimates the probability of a party being included in a municipal board:

"What factors determine whether or not an independent local party will be included in the municipal board after municipal elections?"

I base the hypotheses on previous coalition formation research done recently in predominately Scandinavia and North-West Europe. The three factors possibly explaining coalition formation outcomes for independent locals are: relative size of the party in a municipal council, the diversity of issues the independent local covers and the position of the party on a two-dimensional space. I was able to make three hypotheses from the theory:

1. Independent locals with relative (%) more number of seats in the municipal council are more likely to be included in the municipal board than independent locals with a relative (%) smaller number of seats.
2. Independent locals that address relatively (%) more issues are more likely to be included in a municipal board than local parties that address relatively (%) less issues.
3. Independent locals with a central ideological position are more likely to be included in a municipal board than independent locals that have a more extreme ideological position.

In order to test the hypotheses I collect data from several sources and I subsequently conduct a statistical analysis. Data regarding election outcomes is collected using the Dutch national elections database. Data concerning diversity of issues is generated by analyzing party manifestos of the parties , using computer-coded content analysis, and data needed for positioning the parties is provided by the Stemwijzer Voting Advice Application (VAA). Stemwijzer provides data containing statements of all parties in 41 municipalities on various topics. These municipalities and all the 367 local political parties make up the sample for this thesis. The political parties are divided into either independent local parties or branch parties of national level political parties.

Using logistic regression analysis, I find that the position of the party has no statistically significant influence on the probability of being included in the municipal board. On the other hand, I show that relative size and issue-diversity do matter for a party's chances of being included in a municipal board. Summarizing, this means that hypotheses 1 and 2 are confirmed and hypothesis 3 is rejected. This outcome raises question whether this research overlooks an important variable in modelling local coalition formation outcomes. Suggested is that the personal preference of politicians for a certain coalition partner and independent locals being the relative newcomers on the block of municipal politics are also of influence in the coalition formation outcome. This is to be researched in the future with mixed quantitative-qualitative research designs, using methods like process tracing.

Preface

It's been about ten months since I first started writing the result which you are now reading. During this time the topic, aim and overall content of this thesis has seen some significant changes. Starting out as an thesis studying the municipal coalition formations in the province of Overijssel, the scope was broadened and now coalition formation out of the entire Dutch municipal political landscape have been taken into account. I myself believe that although some of the results were to be expected, sometimes perhaps even obvious, the findings in this research give a good view of the Dutch local political landscape in accordance with my own view on this political arena.

During the process of writing this thesis I have had some help which really got me past the dead end points one sometimes has when writing a thesis. First and foremost I would like to thank my two supervisors during the process of doing this research, dr. Martin Rosema for helping me get started and finding me a topic that I myself find interesting to write about and dr. Kostas Gemenis for helping me a lot with data collection and the statistical analysis during the later stages of writing this thesis. Second I would like to thank ProDemos and the Stemwijzer VAA for providing me with a lot of crucial information necessary for doing the data analysis, resulting in the outcomes below. I hope you enjoy reading this thesis.

Best regards,

Leon Heuzels

Student Master Public Adminstration

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1. Introduction

1.1. Research background and -aim

In March 2014 the last elections for the Dutch municipal councils (Dutch: *Gemeenteraad*) took place. When voters cast their votes, selecting their political party and politician of choice the elected parties receive a mandate to form a municipal coalition in the municipal council that will be in charge of taking decisions on behalf of municipal affairs. As in all Dutch elections, in Dutch municipal elections a system of proportional representation is in effect. The election comes with an effective threshold that equals the number of voters/number of seats in a local council, depending on the population (Boogers & Voerman, 2010). After the election results are announced and the division of seats in a municipal council is presented, the elected parties start the deliberations as to who will participate in the municipal board (Dutch: *College van Burgemeester en Wethouders)* for the next four years. This thesis focuses on a specific aspect of that coalition formation, namely the role of independent local parties. I define as "independent" the local parties that are not affiliated in one way or another to a political party that is active on a national and/or regional level. Parties that are locally active, but are also affiliated to a political party that is active on a national or regional level are referred to as local "party branches".

Local politics in the Netherlands have seen a major change during the last two decades. During this period there has been an enormous growth of independent local parties and their electoral support. In 1990 the electoral support for the total of all independent locals was 13%, only to rise to nearly 24% in 2006. This meant that the independent locals jointly were the best represented parties in Dutch municipal councils (Boogers & Voerman, 2010, pp. 75-76). Yet, despite of this growth in electoral support it is not guaranteed that this electoral support is translated in independent locals taking more positions in municipal offices.

This thesis focuses on this specific aspect of local coalition formation: to what extent are independent locals included in municipal boards and what are the factors that determine the outcomes of these processes? Over the last decades a lot of research has been done on behalf of predicting the outcome of coalition formations: which party will get to lead the government and/or will be included in the winning coalition? The majority of these theories however focus on national-level politics, using post-war western European countries for empirically testing hypotheses, while very little has been done to address the same question at the local level (Bäck, 2003, p. 441; Skjæveland & Serritzlew, 2009, p. 189). However, over the past two decades some research towards local coalition formation has been done, using data from most notably Nordic countries like Sweden (Bäck, 2003) and Denmark (Skjæveland et al., 2007; Skjæveland & Serritzlew, 2009). Skjæveland and Serritzlew (2009, p. 204) recommend that they would like to see that their research on Danish local politics is to be carried out in other countries.

This is what this thesis aims to do: to see what the determining factors behind the inclusion of Dutch independent local parties in local municipal boards are. How often are they included in municipal boards after coalition formations and what factors influence the chance of these parties joining the coalition in the municipal board? These questions, formulated in a research question, aim to contribute to the knowledge of coalition formation in Dutch local politics, and as said more specifically on the role of independent local parties in this specific section of the Dutch political landscape.

By analyzing data of Dutch local election results and municipal coalition formation outcomes, this research seeks to extend the research of Bäck (2003), Skjæveland et al. (2007) and Skjæveland and Serritzlew (2009) in the context of the Netherlands. The findings of researches in the Nordic countries

function as the starting point. Whereas the outcomes and conclusions of these papers function in this research to formulate hypotheses for testing, a possible difference in results may be reason for further research to see where differences originate.

Skjæveland & Serritzlew (2009, p. 190) base their research on data of Danish local government formations of 2001, and more specific the formation process of the coalition that is responsible for providing the mayor for the upcoming four year term. Although in the Netherlands the mayor is not directly elected by the municipal council and the goals of municipal board formation are slightly different, in both Denmark and the Netherlands a coalition has to be formed which provides the municipal board for the next term. In both countries the basis for local governments is normally a majority coalition (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005, p. 175). In Denmark the formation process involves, in two-thirds of the cases, several parties and ends up in a majority coalition (Skjæveland & Serritzlew, 2009). Skjæveland et al. (2007) observe that Danish coalitions are usually winning coalitions. Besides the tendency for forming winning coalitions, the style of the formation process is also similar in both Denmark and the Netherlands. Other similarities are: in both countries the largest party has the edge in the formation, being the dominant player in the bargaining process (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005; Skjæveland & Serritzlew, 2009). There are however some differences: in the Netherlands a formateur is appointed for the duration of the formation period, while in Denmark the formateur is absent and the formation is more free-style. A critical point regarding the comparison of the two countries as pointed out by Skjæveland et al. (2007, p. 727) is that "coalition formation should work in a municipal context". They state that these theories thrive well in the Danish municipal context, since the Danish municipalities have a lot of autonomy and are responsible for 40% of the public budget. This in contrast to the Netherlands of which they state that municipal policies are tightly regulated by a centralized system of the Dutch national government. However, they base this statement on a study published in 1992, and since then the Dutch municipal system has undergone a significant amount of decentralization (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005, p. 175).

In overall this thesis assumes that the local formation processes in Denmark and Sweden are a good vantage point for analyzing the Dutch local formation processes, to the extent of providing input for the formulation of hypotheses. This despite the countries having a different formation goal in some cases (appointment of mayor, e.g.). Taking the aforementioned into account there is no direct fear to assume that results will drastically differ between local coalition formations and the inclusion of certain political parties between the Netherlands and Denmark.

More on the theoretical aspects, the methodology and the case selection can be found in the next chapters of this thesis. The following chapter presents the main research question. The main research question is subsequently divided up into a number of sub-questions that will help answer the main research question and aid in achieving the research aim and goals.

1.2. Research questions

Now that it has been made clear what the aim of this thesis is and why this research is relevant, I shall outline the research questions in the following paragraphs. In order to structure the thesis, I formulate one main research question and four sub-questions. The main research question covers the questions raised in the research background and aim, whereas the sub-questions follow from the main research question.

The main research question is the following:

"What factors determine whether or not an independent local party is included in the municipal board?"

The dependent variable in this question is the inclusion of independent locals in the municipal boards. The independent variables are the factors which could possibly explain variation in the dependent variable. The sub-questions below elaborates on these factors. The first sub-question has a descriptive character and is used to gain insight in the current situation in the municipal councils and boards of the selected municipalities. After answering this first descriptive question, the thesis turns to testing the different hypotheses related to the factors that could explain the dependent variable. The last three sub-questions are all of an explanatory nature and provide for possible explanations why independent locals are represented in municipal boards or why they are not. The hypotheses for the latter three sub-questions are based on the previously done research, mentioned in the introduction. The following chapter – the theoretical framework - elaborates more on why these variables have been chosen. The sub-questions are the following:

1. How often are independent locals included in the municipal boards of the selected municipalities after the 2014 municipal elections?

2. To what extent does the relative number of seats (%) of an independent local party in the municipal council explain whether this party is included in a municipal board?

3. To what extent does issue-diversity explain whether an independent local party is included in a municipal board?

4. To what extent does the ideological position explain whether an independent local party is included in a municipal board?

As said, the last three sub-questions need some additional background to explicate why this research chooses these variables and no other variables. The next chapter of this thesis presents the theoretical background of the research. Out of the theory the hypotheses that are tested in this thesis are deduced. The hypotheses are deduced from academic literature on local politics and coalition formation theories.

2. Theoretical Framework

The structure of this theoretical framework is the following: first theory is provided to explain the choice for the three possible factors determining the inclusion of independent locals in municipal boards. This is done for each sub-question. Additional theory and academic literature is used to formulate the hypotheses. The hypotheses provide for expectations regarding the inclusion of independent locals in municipal boards, and are subsequently tested in a statistical analysis.

2.1. Relative Size

The second sub-question of this research asks whether or not the size of the party in the municipal council is one of the possible explaining factors for whether or not independent locals are included in the municipal coalition. The variable of the size of a party (the number of seats) in the municipal council has been one of the first variables in coalition formation research.

Amongst the first political scientists who developed coalition formation theories were von Neumann & Morgenstern (1953) and Riker (1962) with the respective minimal winning and minimum size theories. These theories use the size of parties as the primary input for predicting the possible outcomes of coalition formation. Later, political scientists like de Swaan (1973) with the minimal winning connected coalition theory added dimensions that take policy viability into consideration for predicting possible coalitions, but these policy-viable theories are addressed later in this chapter. One condition the theories of von Neumann (1953), Riker (1962), de Swaan (1973) and others have in common is that they assume that none of the parties in the coalition formation game have the attained the absolute majority (more than 50% of the votes), making the coalition formation process a necessity in order to form a government with a majority status. The condition that a coalition formation is necessary in order to correctly analyze the inclusion of independent locals in municipal boards is also taken into account in this thesis and most predominantly in this first hypothesis.

In the minimal winning theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953) parties aim to form coalitions that have enough members to form a coalition, but excluding one of the parties will reduce the status of the potential coalition from majority to minority coalition. In other words: winning coalitions in which only those parties participate that are minimally necessary to give cabinet majority status (Lijphart, 1999, p. 92). The minimum size coalition theory of Riker (1962) is a refinement of the minimal winning theory. In the minimum size theory only those coalitions are formed that are minimal winning with the least amount of seats needed for a majority in cabinet. Riker (1962, pp. 32-46) uses his ‘size principle’ as the main argument for the formation of minimal winning/size cabinets: parties want to attain the greatest amount of influence in the cabinet. Lijphart (1999, p. 92) summarizes this in the following: “political parties are interested in maximizing their power […] maximum power means holding as many of the cabinet positions as possible […] a minority party will have to team up with one or more parties, but it will resist the inclusion of unnecessary parties in the coalition, because it will reduce its share of ministers in the cabinet.”

The aforementioned political scientists assume that parties are only interested in maximizing their power, and they predict minimal winning/size coalitions are thus the most likely outcomes of coalition formation. Unnecessary parties or including ‘larger than necessary parties’ that result in a decline of influence are excluded from a coalition or in the case of this thesis a municipal board. Still, although using size as the primary variable in their research, this does not fully explain the functioning of party sizes in coalition formation. Peleg (1981) defines this in a sharper fashion. He formulated the theory of the dominant player, where it is suggested that when a party is larger (e.g. has more seats in the council than other parties) it gains dominance over other smaller parties. Since this party is close to having a majority, it is hard for opposing parties to contest the dominant player, because this party will

need fewer parties to gain a majority than smaller parties. Thus, according to Peleg (1981), coalitions are more likely to be formed when consisting of a dominant player. So, taking the coalition formation theories of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1953), Riker (1962) and the dominant player principle of Peleg (1981) into account, size does matter.

But how to formulate the theory above into a testable hypothesis? The use of party sizes as a variable to research municipal coalition formations has also been done by Skjæveland et al. (2007) and Skjæveland & Serritzlew (2009). In their researches they wanted to see whether or not coalition formation theories were also applicable to predict the outcome of Danish local government formations and moreover which party would provide the mayor in a municipality. Bäck (2003) came up with a new methodological framework to test coalition theories on local coalition formation, including and testing size-oriented variables. Although the performance of coalition theories tends to be country-specific (Skjæveland et al., 2007, p. 726), its theory and methods can still be applied to a Dutch setting to see whether or not results match. The results of the Danish setting can be used to provide a hypothesis that is to be tested. As stated before in the introduction there is no direct reason to assume that there would be any major differences between results because of a lack of "compatibility" between these countries. This is also due to the fact that the Netherlands and Nordic countries like Denmark and Sweden share similarities in municipal coalition formations.

Observations by Skjæveland & Serritzlew (2009, p. 202) show that the larger a given party is the greater the chance is that they will provide the mayor in Denmark, given that no single party has gained a majority in the municipal council. Also the electoral success, measured in the gain in number of seats seems to have a positive effect on the likelihood of gaining a seat in the municipal board. When transferring these results to a Dutch setting one could state that the larger a party is, the more likely it is that they will be represented in the municipal board, providing for at least one of the aldermen (Dutch: *Wethouder)* in a municipal board. This thought is also shared in theory on dominant players in the coalition formation. The theory by Peleg (1981) states that coalitions are more likely to be formed with a dominant player. In other words: larger parties are more dominant and more likely to be included in coalitions.

Based on the abovementioned presumptions I conclude with the following hypothesis in the context of the inclusion of independent locals in Dutch municipal boards. As mentioned before this hypothesis is tested under the condition that coalition formation was necessary in order to obtain a majority for the to be formed coalition.

1. **Independent locals with relative (%) more number of seats in the municipal council are more likely to be included in the municipal board than independent locals with a relative (%) smaller number of seats.**

2.2. Issue diversity

The third sub-question of this research uses the number of issues an independent local party emphasizes as a possible explaining factor. Does is matter whether an independent local focuses on a small number of topics compared to having an opinion on a wide variety of municipal topics for the likelihood of being included in a municipal board? As with the previous possible explaining factor this paragraph first describes the reasons why this factor is incorporated in the thesis and secondly provide a hypothesis.

In the previous paragraph the use of size in coalition formation theories is mentioned. As stated other political scientists added new dimensions in order to increase the prediction value of coalition

formation theories, e.g. by Axelrod (1970) and de Swaan (1973). Whether or not an independent local focuses on a certain specific issue in their political program, might well be an influencing variable for the likelihood whether or not an independent local is included in a municipal board. In their research on British single-issue pressure groups Bottom & Crow (2011, p. 219) conclude that it is possible for these organizations to evolve from groups that seek to influence a single policy issue to organized representatives that are able to shape, and in some cases, lead policy from within. However, one can imagine that the specific issue that these parties are addressing has to be a topic that is important enough to keep the party in the spotlight. Moreover, given the case that the issue is not salient enough, the party may be overlooked in coalition formations by fellow municipal parties due to a lack of overlap and/or consent on political- and policy issues. Bottom & Crow (2011) emphasize: "Single-issue politics at the local level encourage greater levels of citizen engagement […] and they contribute, for as long as the issues remain salient, to a healthy and often improved local democracy".

The salience of an issue for these single-issue organizations is thus of crucial importance. In previous studies on government content, issue salience was used as an explaining factor to what extent people are satisfied with the government in office (Edwards III, Mitchell & Welch, 1995). Non-salience of an issue leads, according to Edwards, Michell & Welch (1995, p. 111), to an unlikelihood that it will play a role in government evaluations. Taking this observation into a broader definition it is likely that non-salience of particular issues leads to less electoral attention. In the case of an independent local confronted with the focus on a non-salient issue this leads to a loss of electorate. Moreover, in his article Green-Pedersen (2007) analyzes the competition for the electorate between different political parties in Europe. He states that in the last couple of years there is an increased importance of issue voting or voting based on issue ownership (Green-Pedersen, 2007, p. 609). Subsequently the competition between political parties has taken a flight where the emphasis lies more with issue competition: which issue is the most salient for voters and for the parties (Green-Pedersen, 2007)? Glazer & Lohmann (1999, p. 380) state in addition to the above: "candidates seek to further the electoral salience of issues on which their policy positions are popular and to remove from the electoral agenda issues which their policy positions are unpopular." It is therefore important for parties who focus on a relative small number of issues to keep their 'preferred' issues in the picture as much as possible.

But there are other struggles which a party with an issue preference may face. For instance, the longevity of an issue may not be enough for a party to maintain sufficient attention for their cause. Bottom & Crow (2011, p. 236) stress that single-issue oriented parties have to evolve a certain long-term relevance for their issue(s) in order to remain interesting enough for other parties and more importantly: the electorate. When a party doesn't appeal to possible coalitions as a reliable party with a long-term vision, other parties may be hesitant in forming a coalition. E.g. in case the issue the single-issue party is fighting for isn't relevant anymore and/or realized, for other parties it may be unknown how any further collaboration with the single-issue party will evolve. Uncertainty over future behavior of the single-issue party may incite hesitation amongst possible coalition partners. Another problem these parties face is whether or not they can adapt to the political landscape of coalition formation, bargaining positions and policy trade-offs. Bottom & Crow (2011): "The greatest test for them [single-issue parties] is how they cohere on council, become serious policy and decision makers and, ultimately, whether they institutionalize beyond the single issue in question."

The aforementioned implies that when an independent local party with a small number of addressed topics is unable to attain the attention on their particular issues, or their issues lacks the longevity necessary for a full municipal council term, it becomes increasingly difficult for these parties to gain or maintain a certain amount of influence. As Bottom & Crow (2011) state: if the issue isn't salient

enough, the contribution of single-issue politics at a local level is marginal. Besides the importance of issue salience the single-issue parties face other struggles in order for them to evolve into fully accepted and institutionalized political entities. Amongst these problems is the adaptability of the single-issue organizations to become an accepted local political party. If a party fails to evolve beyond their initial issue the party it is not unlikely that this party will be avoided in coalition formations or policy decision making. This research wants to see whether or not this also applies for Dutch municipal politics and in order to do so the following hypothesis has been formulated, based on the academic literature provided above.

2. **Independent locals that address relatively (%) more issues are more likely to be included in a municipal board than local parties that address relatively (%) less issues.**

2.3. Ideological extremeness

The fourth and final sub-questions looks at the ideological position of independent local for explaining whether or not independent locals are included in municipal boards. As already mentioned in this framework other dimensions are added to coalition formation theories besides the size of a party. Some of these coalition theories are mentioned in this paragraph. These coalition theories take a policy dimension into account. As with the other two paragraphs in the end a third and final hypothesis is formulated.

De Vries (1998, p. 207) summarizes the whole of these theories as policy-oriented coalition theories. One of the first political scientists to take up other dimensions in coalition theories was Axelrod (1970). He added a one-dimensional ideological scale - from extreme left to extreme right and everything within - to the minimum winning and minimal size theories. Axelrod argues that coalitions will form that are both connected, with the parties being adjacent on the policy scale, and devoid of unnecessary partners (Lijphart, 1999, p. 95). The main thought behind this theory is that an extreme left party A isn't likely to form a coalition with centre-right party D, because the trade-offs (in order to reach consensus) are too high for both parties to accept. This minimal winning connected coalition is composed of the minimal winning and the minimal range theories: no unnecessary partners will be accepted in the coalition and the ideological range, the distance between de parties on the one-dimensional ideological scale has to be as minimal as possible.

Core in this minimal winning connected coalition is the central actor (de Vries, 1998, p. 208). Like Peleg's (1981) dominant player plays a major role in the size variable, the central actor plays a large role in coalition formations predicted by coalition theories that take political positions into account. The central actor is positioned in the middle of the ideological scale from left to right and therefore has the best chance to be included in a coalition, since parties will most likely form coalitions with parties closely connected to them. The central party is connected to both the leftwing and the rightwing, thus having the most possible connections. The idea of the central actor being a major player in the coalition formation process is acknowledged by results in the research of Döring & Hellstrom (2013, p. 697) who observed that in Western Europe "large centre-left and centre-right parties with gains in the most recent election and previous executive experience become government members." Based on Döring & Hellstrom (2013) it may also be of additional value to see whether or not the ideological position of a party may interact with the size of a party. E.g. a small extremist party will have less chance of inclusion in a municipal board than a relatively larger extremist party which can't be overlooked by other parties. Skjæveland & Serritzlew (2009, p. 203) emphasize this, stating that in Danish local governments the chance of becoming a member of the municipal board is higher when a party is larger, gained electoral success and is ideologically median. In recent years several Voting Advice Applications (VAA's) have emerged in the Netherlands. Some of them extend and

differentiate the aforementioned concept of ideology into more than one dimension. More common dimensions are an economic left/right dimension and a social conservative/progressive dimension. This thesis uses multiple dimensions when looking at the ideological position of a party. More on the division of the dimensions in the following methodology chapter.

Now that it has been argued that being a (large) central actor has advantages when forming a (local) coalition and increases the chance of that party being included in government offices, to what extent does the concept of connected winning and ideological range matter in municipal coalition formation? Bäck (2003) investigated empirically the coalition outcomes of local elections in Sweden. She concluded that parties in Sweden are indeed aiming at connectedness on a left-right ideological scale when forming a coalition (Bäck, 2003, p. 465). She concludes moreover that parties are aiming for a coalition that is the smallest possible in range. Skjæveland & Serritzlew (2009) draw similar conclusions for the Danish municipal cases: "Our findings also confirm that actors are policy-oriented and, consequently, seek to establish connected coalitions and include the median party."

Thus, based on the studies mentioned above I would expect that, also in the Netherlands, local parties seek coalitions with a small range and that it includes the median party. For independent locals with an extreme ideological position the likelihood of them being included in a municipal coalition is henceforth smaller than their median counterparts. This leaves this thesis to present the last hypothesis that is to be tested.

3. **Independent locals with a central ideological position are more likely to be included in a municipal board than independent locals that have a more extreme ideological position.**

2.3. Conclusion

This theoretical framework has presented three hypotheses that are tested in this thesis. The hypotheses are foremost based on the results of previous studies done in Scandinavia, in the field of municipal coalition formations. Bäck (2003), Skjæveland et al. (2007) and Skjæveland & Serritzlew (2009) stress that it would be of additional value if their researches are done in other countries with different local political settings. This thesis uses their findings as expectations for the inclusion of independent locals in Dutch municipalities.

Now that the conceptualization of the variables is done, this thesis continues with the research methodology and operationalization of the variables. The presented methods for data collection and data analysis explain how the aforementioned hypotheses are tested. In the methodology the selection of the units of analysis is also presented.

3. Research methodology

Now that the aim and concepts of this thesis are made clear, the third chapter of this thesis continues with the research methodology. The methodology regarding sample, measurement and model estimation are presented below. In order to structure the chapter, the first part focuses on data collection and the second part on the model estimation.

3.1. Data collection

3.1.1. Sample

This thesis relies for the most part on data provided by the Stemwijzer VAA for the 2014 Dutch municipal elections. The dataset contains the position of all local parties on 30 statements in 41 Dutch municipalities and these positions are used in a number of ways. The 41 municipalities serve as the sample for this thesis, and the 367 political parties serve as the unit of analysis for all hypotheses. All hypotheses are tested using these data. A full overview of the municipalities, their demographics and size of their municipal council can be found in appendix A. In appendix B I provide the information regarding relative party sizes. Besides the positions of the parties I also use the statements used by Stemwijzer to place parties in the 41 municipalities to create a dictionary of keywords in order to measure issue diversity, which is used to test the second hypothesis.

The reason this research opts for this dataset and these municipalities is the wide variety of different municipalities selected by the ProDemos organization that implements the Stemwijzer VAA. In the Netherlands the number of seats in a municipal council depends on the size of the municipalities. The number of seats ranges from 9 for the smallest municipalities (with less than 3000 inhabitants) to 45 seats for the largest municipalities in the country. Municipalities analyzed by ProDemos provide data for either sides. In the sample on the one hand there are the larger, urban municipalities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam (45 seats) and on the other hand smaller municipalities like Baarle-Nassau (13 seats) are included. Besides that the sample ensures that a substantive amount of time is saved by not having to e.g. analyze every parties' manuscripts in order to find out their opinion on a very wide array of topics. The reason why Stemwijzer VAA was chosen and not others like Kieskompas VAA is because Stemwijzer is more willing to share their data, rather than a private company like Kieskompas who are more protective of their data.

3.1.2. Measurement

Now that it is made clear that the 41 municipalities used in Stemwijzer VAA will function as the sample for all research questions the data collection methods are presented below.

Inclusion of independent locals

The first research question is of a descriptive nature in order to obtain an overview of the division of seats in municipal councils and municipal boards in the selected 41 municipalities. Data regarding the division of seats and the outcome of the coalition formations is extracted from the websites of the selected municipalities and the Dutch election results database. The election results database contains the results of all national, regional and local elections from the mid-20th century till date and also adds the classification of "independent", when applicable, to the election result. Collecting this data results in both information on independent parties and whether or not they were included in a municipal board. A chi-square test subsequently shows whether there is a statistically significant relationship between whether a party is independent and whether they are included in a municipal board.

Although the composition of a municipal board is under the influence of change due to political reasons, e.g. a three party majority coalition may decide to continue as a two party minority coalition due to a political conflict, a change in composition of the municipal coalition over the four year term is not included in this thesis. The research question of this thesis is what factors determine the inclusion of independent locals in municipal boards. When the composition of a coalition changes this may have a lot of other reasons and variables, which are not taken into account in this thesis. Henceforth only the first coalition formation outcomes after the municipal election is used to test the hypotheses.

Relative Size

The first hypothesis focuses on the relative size of the parties, and whether or not this influences the inclusion of independent locals in municipal boards. The hypothesis expects that (relatively) larger independent local parties have more chance of being included in the municipal coalition formation process. The collected data for the first research question provides the necessary data, since the party sizes in councils and the overall size of municipal councils is measured for the first research question. The relative amount of seats is calculated by dividing the number of seats by the total number of seats in the council of a municipality. The resulting percentage is subsequently used in the statistical analysis.

Issue Diversity

The second hypothesis focuses on issue diversity as a possible explaining factor for inclusion in a municipal board. Key factor in the emergence of single-issue groups and parties is the focus on certain local grievances, e.g. the closure of a hospital or a perceived threat to the community (Bottom & Crow, 2011, p. 222). Besides focusing on a single or only a few issues, these groups and/or parties may also focus their programs on a single group in society, e.g. the elderly. In order to determine the issue diversity of the parties, the party manifestos of all 367 parties in the 41 municipalities are collected for analysis. A dictionary consisting of keywords, based on Stemwijzer VAA statements, is used to analyze to what extent various issues are mentioned in the party manifestos (Laver & Garry, 2000). Laver & Garry (2000) state that it is possible to use computer-coded content analysis to derive reliable and valid estimates of policy positions from political texts. "Even a very simple form of computer-coded content analysis […] can generate estimates of policy positions that can also be cross-validated" (Laver & Garry, 2000, p. 632). Henceforth, this thesis uses computer-coded content analysis to determine the issue diversity of parties. A total number of 11 issue categories is used to determine the issue diversity. The categories with keywords can be found in appendix C.

After collecting the party manifestos these manifestos are recoded into a Notepad (.TXT) extension, which makes them suitable for analysis in Yoshikoder (Lowe, 2006). Yoshikoder is an open source multilingual content analysis tool and one of its features is the possibility to count words in documents based on a dictionary (Lowe, 2006). The dictionary is inserted in Yoskikoder and the program subsequently analyzes to what extent the keywords are present in the manifestos. Yoshikoder then presents what categories are mentioned and/or if there is an absence of a certain policy area (e.g. soft drug or foreign policies). For the analysis, an index will be used to scale the issue diversity from 0, being plural-issue to 1, being a full single-issue party.

This scale used is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or Herfindahl Index (HHI). The Herfindahl Index is a statistical method of concentration and can be used to measure concentration in a variety of contexts (Rhoades, 1993). It is mostly used in Business Administration to measure to which extent a market is dominated by a single brand, product, service or firm. The HHI ranges from 0 to 1, where a higher index means that a market is more concentrated and dominated by a single company. The

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is first described by Hirschman and later reinvented by Herfindahl (see Hirschman (1964)). In this thesis a score of 1 on the HHI implies that a party is single-issue, since the party manifesto is concentrated solely on a single issue. On the other hand a score of 0 means there is an equal distribution amongst the categories. The HHI is calculated by filling in the Yoshikoder results in a prescripted Excel worksheet, with the results showing the HHI of the party program analyzed After the HHI is calculated for each party the indexes are used in modelling of the inclusion in municipal boards.

Ideological Position

The final hypothesis revolves around the ideological position of the included parties. For the final hypothesis the Stemwijzer VAA statements and the parties' answers regarding those statements are used. I used the parties' positions regarding the Stemwijzer statements to determine the position of a party on a two-dimensional space. For each of the 41 municipalities Stemwijzer has made 30 statements. An example of these statements can be found in the figure below.

Figure 1: Example of a question by the Stemwijzer VAA to position a voter amongst the local political parties' positions for the 2014 municipal elections.

As one can see the parties are given the option to answer the statements with either agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree. In order to scale the statements in to a position on a two-dimensional space the statements are divided into two dimensions. The dimensions are an economic left/right-dimension and a social GAL/TAN-dimension.

Step one of testing the final hypothesis is scaling the parties on the two-dimensional space to determine the positions of the parties, followed by calculating the distance to the center. In order to scale the positions of the parties only statements which are applicable to multiple municipalities are used. Statements which revolve around very specific local issues, e.g. the placement of a cycling route in one municipality, are not used in this thesis. The statements most frequently used by Stemwijzer VAA can be found in appendix C. For each municipality it is determined which of the statements in appendix C are applicable. This leads to an average of 15 statements which are applicable for each municipality. These overlapping statements were subsequently categorized in 11 issues and used to position the parties on a two-dimensional space.

The two-dimensional space has both a social GAL/TAN-dimension and an economic left/right-dimension. The dimensions is based on an article by Hooghe et al. (2002). The GAL/TAN dimension

measures to which extent parties are either Green, Alternative and Libertarian (GAL) or Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist (TAN) (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 967). GAL parties tend to favor personal freedom and rights and they support e.g. abortion, same-sex marriages and want to increase democratic participation. Traditional parties often reject these ideas. Hooghe et al. (2002) continue with the other dimension: The economic left/right dimension is classified by the attitude of a party towards the economy. Rightwing parties are more likely to reduce the role of the government in the economy and they favor lowering taxes, less regulation and privatization. Leftwing parties tend to favor the opposite.

Based on these definitions of the two dimensions a typical leftwing and GAL position for the overlapping statements can be deducted. Subsequently, this typical leftwing and GAL answer to a statement is used to determine the position of a party on the two-dimensional space by analyzing the answer of a party to a statement. Positioning is done by scaling the answers of parties from 1 to 3. 1 stands for either extreme leftwing and/or GAL. 3 stands for extreme rightwing and/or TAN. After all answers are rescaled into left/right and GAL/TAN the average is calculated for both dimensions. A party with the coordinates [1,25 ; 1,75] is considered a leftwing party with a moderate GAL position. A party with [2 ; 2]-coordinates is considered to be an absolute median party and is thus, according to the theory, more eligible to be included in a municipal board.

After the positioning for all parties is done the next step is determining the Euclidean distance to the center. The Euclidean distance is determined using the Pythagorean theorem ($A^2 + B^2 = C^2$). The figure below illustrates these calculations. The diagonal line represents the distance to the centre, which is calculated using the distances on the GAL/TAN and left/right-dimensions.



Figure 3: Schematic representation of possible party positions, ranging from (1, 1) to (3,3)

3.2. Model estimation

Now that it is clear how the data is collected and how the relevant variables are measured, in this subsection the statistical methods for the model estimation are presented. Afterwards a short summary concludes the methodology chapter, after which the results are presented.

3.2.1. Logistic Regression Analysis

As the title of this subsection suggests the statistical method to test the three hypotheses is logistic regression analysis. After a chi-square test is done to test the relation between the variable measuring whether a party is independent or not and inclusion in municipal board, the logistic regression analysis continues the analysis by testing the three hypotheses.

Logistic regression analysis is based on the assumption that the dependent variable (inclusion in a municipal board) has a binary outcome, either 0 – implying exclusion – or 1, implying inclusion. This is the case, a party is either included in a municipal board with result 1 or is excluded from a municipal board with result 0, meaning that the outcome is binary. The prediction for the outcome is based on the three feature variables (size, issue diversity and ideological extremeness), thus making logistical regression possible for the statistical analysis (Moore & McCabe, 2005).

The dependent outcome variable is inclusion in a municipal board. The independent variables are, according to the hypotheses: relative size, issue diversity measured by the HHI and the degree of ideological extremeness measured by the Euclidean distance of each party. Each of the independent variables are tested whether they are statistically significant in explaining the outcome of the dependent variable. Different models are used in order to see whether or not this influences results and the subsequent tests of the hypotheses. The first model only includes the three independent variables to see whether or not relative size, issue diversity and ideological position are statistically significant in explaining the inclusion in a municipal board.

A second follow-up model of the first model includes standard errors clustered at the municipal level in the analysis. Robust clustering is included because observations may be correlated within municipalities, but are independent between municipalities. One of the assumptions for using robust clustering is that e.g. the PvdA Amsterdam may make no chance in Utrecht due to a different political climate and different characteristics of municipal political parties in Utrecht. Robust clustering makes sure that all parties are tested alongside the parties in their respective municipality. Standard errors are computed based on aggregate scores for the 41 municipalities, since these municipal level scores should be independent. This may influence the outcome of the hypotheses tests, since standard errors may differ from the first model.

The third and last model adds conditional effects to the first model. Brambor et al. (2006, p. 64) illustrate conditional effects as follows: "An increase in X is associated with an increase in Y when condition Z is met, but not when condition Z is absent." In this thesis' case this applies to both issue diversity and ideological position. Independent variables issue diversity and an extreme ideological position could explain the dependent variable, but not when the condition that they must at least have 1 seat in the council is not met. Z is in this case relative size, since parties must at least have one seat in a council to be included in a municipal board. Z is in this case not dichotomous, but continuous, since it is assumed that a larger relative size leads to a larger chance of being included in a municipal board. Brambor et al. (2006, p. 65) state that conditional hypotheses can easily be tested using multiplicative interaction models. This is also done in this thesis.

All models are tested using the dataset compiled from different sources. For the graphs and logistic regression I use SPSS 22.0 whereas the analyses with standard errors clustered at the municipal level are performed in Stata 13.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter has shown the methods for measuring and analyzing the hypotheses. After the different models test the statistical significance of the independent variables in explaining the dependent variable the thesis continues with presenting the outcomes of the hypotheses testing, the conclusions and thoughts for future research. First however, the results of the data analysis are presented below.

4. Data Analysis

Now that it has been made clear what the goal of the thesis are, what the thesis expects based on theory (and formulated in hypotheses) and how the relevant data is collected it is time to present the results for each of the research questions. In this chapter Table 3 presents the results of the three models which are used to test the three hypotheses. After presenting the table this thesis analyzes the test results, followed by a conclusion regarding whether the hypotheses have to be confirmed or rejected. However before the testing of the hypotheses, the results regarding first research question are found below.

4.1. Research Question 1

The first research question of this thesis focuses on the current state of inclusion of independent locals in municipal boards. The question is: *How often are independent locals included in the municipal boards of the selected municipalities after the 2014 municipal elections?* Besides answering the research question this subsection also presents a comparison of figures regarding relative size, issue diversity and ideological position between the independent local parties and the party branches of national parties. It shows to what extent the features (of political parties) used in this research of independent locals are comparable to the conventional branches of national parties.

After processing the data, which can be found in appendix B, into a SPSS dataset I created a cross-tabulation table between the variable indicating whether a party is independent and the variable indicating whether a party was included in the municipal board. Table 1 shows that 101 of the total number of 367 parties analyzed are labeled as independent locals (27,5%). Out of these 101 independent local parties 30 are parties represented in a municipal board. In comparison to party branches of national parties 30 out of 101 (29,7%) is a lower percentage, given that 132 out of 266 (49,6%) branch parties made it in to a municipal coalition.

Table 1: Number of Independent Locals Represented in Municipal Boards

Municipal Board * Independent Party Crosstabulation

		Independent Local		
		No	Yes	Total
Inclusion in Municipal Board	No	134	71	205
	Yes	132	30	162
Total		266	101	367

Table 2: SPSS Output chi-square test Independency vs. Municipal Boards

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11,782[a]	1	,001		
Continuity Correction[b]	10,988	1	,001		
Likelihood Ratio	12,099	1	,001		
Fisher's Exact Test				,001	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	11,750	1	,001		
N of Valid Cases	367				

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 44,58.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

It appears that independent locals are represented less in municipal boards than branch parties. But is this difference between independent locals and branch parties also statistically significant? A chi-square test will show if there is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The test results are shown in Table 2 above. The hypotheses for the chi-square test are:

H(0) : There is no statistically significant relationship between the variables Independent Party and Municipal Board.

H(A): There is a statistically significant relationship between the variables Independent Party and Municipal Board.

Looking at the outcomes presented in Table 2, the Pearson chi-square table shows a chi-square value of 11,782, with a p-value of 0,001. This means that the hypothesis H(0) needs to be rejected. This implies that there is a statistically significant relationship between the variables Independent Party and inclusion in a municipal board.

In other words: the Pearson chi-square test shows that the observation that municipal boards are represented less in a municipal board is not based on "luck" or chance. There is a relationship between the variables independency and inclusion in a municipal board that explains why independent locals are represented less in municipal boards. In the sections below the thesis shows which of the independent variables tested in the three hypotheses are statistically significant explaining factors in the relationship between independent parties and inclusion in a municipal board.

This subsection continues with looking at some of the features of both independent locals and branch parties, which may explain a possible relationship. These features include the relative size, issue diversity and ideological position of the parties. Below graphs and figures go more in-depth regarding the difference in characteristics between the two types of parties. These figures may show signs as to what could explain the relationship of the two aforementioned variables.

Figure 4 below describes the difference between independent locals and branch parties in relative size within a municipal council. The statistically significant difference between whether a party is independent and the inclusion in a municipal board may be explained by the relative size of a party. If independent locals in general, compared to branch parties, have a share of seats that is too small to have any influence in the formation process this might explain why independent locals are less represented in municipal boards. The comparison is illustrated by a boxplot, seen below in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Boxplot showing the relative size for both independent locals and national party branches.



Looking at Figure 4 one can see that there is no major difference between the two party types at a first glance. Boxplots display variation in samples of a statistical population without making any assumptions of the underlying statistical distribution. The mean of both types of parties lies around a share of 0,10 (10%), with the mean of independent locals being lower, implying that they have a higher share of relative small parties compared to branch parties. Independent locals also show a greater variety in relative sizes. Their minimum and maximum relative sizes are wider dispersed and also the interquartile range (25%-75%) of their population is larger than the branch parties. The wider dispersion shows that independent locals both have a larger amount of parties with a lower and higher share of seats. Having both a lower mean and a higher share of parties with a relative low share of seats may explain why independent locals are less represented in municipal boards: the size hypothesis assumes that parties with a lower share of seats have less chance to be included in a municipal board.

So if the boxplot of the relative size shows that independent locals in overall are smaller, what about the other two features of parties, issue diversity and ideological position, of which a difference in these features might rise suspicion about why independent locals are represented less in municipal boards?

Figure 5 shows a comparison between independent locals and party branches based on their relative size and issue diversity. The figure shows that there is no difference at a first glance between independent locals and their party branch counterparts. Independent locals have no more issue diversity than their branch party counterparts, which is also illustrated by the boxplot in figure 6 below.

Figure 5: Scatterplot showing the relation between relative size and issue diversity categorized by whether the party is independent



Figure 6 : Boxplot comparing issue diversity based on whether the party is independent.



The boxplot shows in more detail than the scatterplot that there is only a very small difference between the issue diversity of all parties. Unlike the boxplot showing the variance in relative size, the difference between independent locals and branch parties on behalf of diversity is minimal. The quartiles, median and number of outliers show almost no difference, only just a slightly bit more dispersion for independent locals. A difference in issue diversity can henceforth not be suspected of being a factor in why independent locals are less represented in municipal boards. Perhaps the last variable of this thesis may explain a difference.

Figure 7 shows a similar comparison as Figure 5. In Figure 7 however, the variable of issue diversity is replaced by the ideological extremeness variable. The Euclidean distance represents the ideological extremeness. Unlike Figure 5, which shows that there is almost no difference between independent and branch parties: Figure 7 shows that independent locals tend to be more oriented towards the political centre. Branch parties tend to be oriented further from the centre. The boxplot in Figure 8 emphasizes this. This means that this difference is possibly an explanatory factor to the relationship why independent locals are represented less in municipal board. However, the results contradict the findings by Bäck (2003) and Skjæveland et al. (2007) who concluded that a party is more likely to be in a municipal board when the party is closer to the political center. More on this contradiction in the following subsection where the hypotheses are tested. Below Figure 7 and Figure 8 can be found which illustrate the comparison of ideological extremeness categorized by party type.



Figure 7: Scatterplot showing the comparison between independent locals and their branch party counterparts on behalf of relative size vs. ideological extremeness.



Figure 8: Boxplot showing the ideological distance of independent locals and national party branches.

Concluding one could state that there are only minor differences between independent locals and party branches regarding their political positions. The graphs and boxplots show no sign of major differences on behalf of relative size and issue diversity, the largest difference is regarding the relative size variable, with independent locals showing more variance, thus having more small parties.

These results however do not show whether or not the variables are statistically significant in explaining what factors contribute to inclusion in a municipal board. The following subchapter will go into more detail about this topic and subsequently tests the hypotheses. The results are accordingly presented in an overview table, which will be referred to throughout the rest of the chapter when testing the hypotheses. A small step-by-step explanation of the analysis methods is added to show how the results are produced.

4.2. Hypothesis testing

Presented on the next page is the table containing the results for the testing of the hypotheses. For each hypothesis three models are used to test the hypotheses.

All models test the hypotheses, analyzing the measured data with logistic regression analysis, to see whether the independent variables mentioned in the hypothesis are statistically significant in explaining the outcome of the dependent variable (inclusion in a municipal board). As explained in subchapter 3.2., the first model only takes the three independent variables into account. Modeled in an equation Model 1 looks as follows:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 X + \beta_3 X + \varepsilon$$

In the model above Y is the dependent variable inclusion in a municipal board. The independent variables are relative size (X_1), issue diversity (X_2) and ideological extremeness (X_3). The β is the coefficient for every independent variable and this coefficient is tested for statistical significance. If an independent variable is found to be statistically significant this implies that the coefficient (β) of this variable is big enough for the coefficient not to be attributed to chance. ε represents the standard error in the model.

The second model used is a follow-up of the first model. The equation is the same as the one presented above, only for this follow-up model the standard errors are robust clustered at the municipal level.

The third model adds conditional effects to the first model. Brambor et al. (2006, p 65) state that conditional hypotheses can easily be tested using multiplicative interaction models. They model these conditional effects as follows:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ + \varepsilon$$

The equation above, mentioned in Brambor et al. (2006), is used as the third model used to test the hypotheses. Again, Y is the dependent variable representing inclusion in a municipal board. The model is used twice testing the hypotheses. The first time Model 3 was used to analyze the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, X represented the issue diversity and Z the relative size. The second time Model 3 was used X represented ideological extremeness and Z the relative size. The results of these analyses are merged in the Model 3 column in Table 3.

SPSS 22.0 and Stata 13 function as the data analysis software to test the hypotheses. SPSS 22.0 tests all hypotheses and Stata 13 is used to robust cluster the standard errors at the municipal level for the second follow-up model. All results of the analyses can be found in Table 3 below. The results show the coefficient value (B), the standard error of the coefficient (SE(B)) and the p-value for all independent variables in explaining the chance of being included in a municipal board, presented per model. After Table 3 the thesis continues presenting the outcomes of the testing of the hypotheses.

Table 3: Results of testing the independent variables relative size, issue diversity and ideological extremeness for explaining the dependent variable inclusion in a municipal board.

Independent Variable	Model 1			Model 1 (Standard errors clustered at the municipal level)			Model 3 (Conditional effects)		
	B	SE(B)	P-value	B	SE(B)	P-value	B	SE(B)	P-value
Relative Size	18.936	2.422	.000	18.936	2.834	0.000	22.570	10.357	.029
Issue Diversity	-2.292	1.434	.110	-2.292	1.114	0.040	-.329	3.810	0.931
Ideological Extremeness	.117	.398	.770	.116	.456	.798	-.094	.945	.921
Relative Size*Issue Diversity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-17.066	30.694	.578
Relative Size*Ideological Extremeness	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.996	7.947	.802
N		351			351			351	
Nagelkerke R2		.301			.186			.302	

Note: Significant at $P < \alpha$. $\alpha = 0,05$.

4.2.1. Relative Size

The second research question focuses on the variable size. The research question goes as follows*:* To what extent does the relative number of seats (%) of an independent local party in the municipal council explain whether or not this party is included in a municipal board?

Unlike the first subchapter, which mostly compared the two types of local political parties, this subsection goes more in depth on the statistical significance of the relative size variable. The hypothesis tested is:

Hypothesis 1: Independent locals with relative (%) more number of seats in the municipal council are more likely to be included in the municipal board than independent locals with a relative (%) smaller number of seats.

The theory is clear on behalf of this hypothesis, the closer the party is to an absolute majority the more a party is a factor to deal with in coalition formation. In contrast to the other two one can state that size does matter, since a party needs to gain a certain minimum share of the votes to be eligible to enter the coalition formation processes. No votes mean no seats, which rules out coalition formation.

Table 3 shows that the p-value for the independent variable relative size is smaller than ,001 ($p < 0{,}001$) for both Model 1 and Model 1 (SE clustered at the municipal level). Model 3 shows a p-value of 0,029. This means that the p-values for all models are less than the alpha of 0,05. Therefore I can conclude that the coefficient of relative size is statistically significant in explaining the outcome of the dependent variable inclusion in a municipal board. In other words: the hypothesis is confirmed. This means that the results of the analysis support the prediction in the theoretical framework of this thesis.

Like in the Scandinavian researches of Bäck (2003), Skjæveland et al. (2007) and Skjæveland & Serritzlew (2009) in the Netherlands the relative size of a party in a municipal council is of high importance in explaining the chances of the party being included in a municipal board. This conclusion is backed by the coefficient (B) and the Standard Error of B, showing that the outcome variable inclusion is way more affected by the relative size of parties, rather than the other two variables (18,936 vs. -2,292 and .117). Concluding: parties with a relative smaller number of seats have less chance of being included in a municipal board than parties with a relative larger number of seats.

4.2.2. Issue Diversity

The third research question focuses on the number of issues that are being covered by the parties. The third research question is the following: To what extent does issue-diversity explain whether an independent local party is included in a municipal board?

Based on the theory it is expected that the more issues being covered by a party the better the chance a party has to be included in a municipal board. The following hypothesis is deducted from the theory:

Hypothesis 2: Independent locals that address relatively (%) more issues are more likely to be included in a municipal board than local parties that address relatively (%) less issues.

In order to measure the extent to which the parties address different issues the previously mentioned Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is used. A higher HHI value means that a party is more focused on relatively few issues.

Looking at Table 3 one sees that the p-value when using Model 1 to analyze the variable issue diversity is 0,11. The p-value is over 0,05, using Model 1, therefore there is no statistical evidence that

the hypothesis can be confirmed. However, when analyzing the data using Model 1 with the standard errors clustered at the municipal level, this affects the standard error and p-value (p = 0,040) for issue diversity in such a fashion that issue diversity becomes statistically significant in explaining the dependent variable (p < 0,05). Apparently the assumption that clustering the standard errors at the municipal level may influence the outcomes of the analysis is correct in the case of this variable. The results, when using Model 1 with SEs clustered at the municipal level, show that issue diversity is an explanatory variable for the dependent variable inclusion in a municipal board.

The negative coefficient B of -2.302947 implies that there is a negative relation between issue diversity and the chance of a party being included in a municipal board. This confirms previous predictions made in the theoretical framework of this thesis. When looking at the outcomes of Model 3 I conclude that conditional effects are not present when analyzing issue diversity. Although a B of -17.066 is quite comparable to the statistically significant B of relative size, the standard error is too large to make the p-value small enough to conclude that there is a conditional effect.

Concluding the thesis shows that the model used matters when analyzing issue plurality as an independent variable. When the standard errors are clustered at the municipal level, the p-value is low enough to assume there is a relationship between this independent variable and inclusion in a municipal board. In other words: if local parties form coalitions in their own municipality, then issue plurality is explanatory to the chances of parties being into a municipal board.

4.2.3. Ideological Extremeness

The final research question asks whether the ideological position of a party has an effect in explaining inclusion in a municipal board. The theory suggests that parties who are positioned towards the center of the political spectrum have a larger chance of being included in a municipal board. This leads to the following research question: To what extent does the ideological position explain whether an independent local party is included in a municipal board?

And the following hypothesis is deducted from the theory:

Hypothesis 3: Independent locals with a central ideological position are more likely to be included in a municipal board than independent locals that have a more extreme ideological position.

The ideology was measured by calculating the Euclidean distance of a parties' position to the center. After the positioning for all 367 parties was done the Euclidean distance was determined using the Pythagorean Theorem ($A^2 + B^2 = C^2$).

The outcomes in Table 3 for this independent variable are, like the relative size variable, more clear than the issue diversity variable. Whereas the issue diversity is only statistically significant when applying robust clustering of the standard errors at the municipal level to Model 1, the outcomes of analyzing the ideological extremeness variable using all three models are very clear. There is no statistically significant relationship between ideological extremeness and inclusion in a municipal board. P-values of 0.770, 0.798 and 0.921 are no way near the required alpha of .05. This means that an extreme political ideology for Dutch local parties has no effect on the chances of these parties to be included in a municipal board. The hypothesis that parties who are closer to the median have a larger chance of making it into office has therefore to be rejected.

Looking at the observations and outcomes of the first research question an extreme position cannot be used to explain the relationship between ideological extremeness and inclusion in a municipal board and as to why independent locals are represented less in municipal boards.

These outcomes are in contrast as to what the Scandinavian reports of Bäck (2003), Skjæveland et al. (2007) and Skjæveland & Serritzlew (2009) predicted. In Sweden and Denmark it was concluded that median parties tend to have a larger chance of being included in a municipal board. In the Netherlands this relationship is not present. Extreme left parties can easily form a coalition with rightwing parties and vice-versa.

5. Conclusions

This chapter concludes the thesis with an interpretation of the outcomes of the hypotheses testing and by presenting the conclusion to the main research questions. Moreover, in order to illustrate the findings an additional mixed methods case study is proposed. The illustration of the case study is based on a prediction classification table, with the chance of being included in a municipal board being the outcome variable and the three analyzed independent variables as predictor variables. After the conclusions are presented, the final chapter of this thesis presents some considerations for future research.

5.1. Main Research Question

First however, the outcomes of the hypotheses testing are briefly summarized. Looking at the measured data which was subsequently analyzed in SPSS 22.0 and Stata 13, it was observed that independent locals are less included in municipal boards than branches of parties active on a national level. Only 29,7% of the independent locals were included in a municipal board after the 2014 municipal elections, versus around 50% of the total number of branch parties who made it into office. A Pearson chi-square test showed that the relation between these two variables is not based on chance. After comparing party features (relative size, issue diversity and ideological position) between independent locals and branch parties, it appeared that there are only slight differences between independent locals and their branch party counterparts. Independent locals show a wider variance than branch counterparts regarding relative size and independent locals tend to be more oriented towards the political center.

However, after looking at the prediction value of the three factors, it appears that only the relative size and the issue diversity of a party in a municipal council are statistically significant in explaining inclusion in a municipal board. The position of a local political party does not matter at all for the chance of inclusion. With p-values of around 0,800 and higher, which were found using three different models; it is not even close to the required alpha of 0.05 in this thesis. The coefficient of the ideological extremeness variable also shows that the prediction value of an extreme ideological position is virtually none-existent. These outcomes contradict findings of researches done in Denmark and Sweden, which are the basis for the hypotheses tested. Bäck (2003), Skjæveland et al. (2007) and Skjæveland & Serritzlew (2009) expected that median parties have a higher chance of being included in a municipal board, this thesis shows that in the Netherlands this is of no signficance in the least.

It appears that the willingness for trade-offs to make it into office matters more for political parties (on a local level) than forming a coalition which is –according to the theory – better suited. A metaphor for these results could be that these outcomes represent the typically Dutch ‘poldermodel’ in figures, with parties looking for compromises with parties, also those parties in the opposite spectre, instead of forming coalitions with parties that are more ideologically “compatible”.

Relative size and issue-plurality matter and political positions don’t can be concluded out of the outcomes, which at the same time also answers the main research question of this thesis:

“What factors determine whether or not an independent local party will be included in the municipal board after municipal elections?”

But this leads to the assumption that somewhere there must be a missing variable, not taken into account in this thesis, which also explains why independent locals are overlooked in coalition formation. Because independent locals do not differ at all from branch parties regarding issue-diversity (see figures 5 and 6) which is a factor that does matter, there has to be concluded that there is another

explaining factor. This is where the qualitative-quantitative case study may prove to be effective in providing for an answer.

5.2. New Strategies

Bäck & Dumont (2007) state that combining statistical and case study analysis may be the way forward in coalition formation research. Their method involves a statistical analysis, where the analysis on coalition formation outcomes. After the statistical analysis the authors differentiate between correct predictions and incorrect predictions (Bäck & Dumont (2007) refer to these cases as deviant cases). Bäck & Dumont (2007) state that both the deviant as well as the correctly predicted cases can be used for further qualitative research. The deviant predictions can be picked out to find further explanatory variables. The correctly predicted cases can be used to find causal mechanisms that further explain coalition formation processes (Bäck & Dumont, 2007, p. 467). The method Bäck & Dumont (2007, p. 484) propose is process tracing, which is then divided into process verification and process induction. Process verification should be used to trace down causalities within correctly predicted cases, process induction should be used when existing literature has failed to provide a usable theoretical mechanism.

Case selection is possible by looking at either correctly predicted cases or incorrectly predicted cases. "By selecting cases that were 'off the line', we can potentially find new variables that could be included in future studies" (Bäck & Dumont, 2007, p. 479). The most deviant or correctly predicted cases should be selected for further analysis.

The prediction cross table seen below (Table 6) helps in selecting cases for finding the missing variable(s). Table 6 shows the prediction for the outcome of municipal board formation, categorized by whether a party is independent or not. Incorrectly predicted cases can be found by looking at parties who are expected to be in a board, but are not included and correctly predicted cases are expected to be in a board and subsequently are included.

Table 6: Classification table showing predictions for independent locals and branch parties.

Classification Table[a]

			Predicted					
			Independent Locals			Branch Parties		
			Municipal Board		Percentage	Municipal Board		Percentage
	Observed		No	Yes	Correct	No	Yes	Correct
Step 1	Municipal Board	No	62	5	92,5	127	6	95,5
		Yes	13	14	51,9	92	32	25,8
	Overall Percentage				80,9			61,9

a. The cut value is ,500

b. Selected cases IndependentParty EQ 1

c. Unselected cases IndependentParty NE 1

d. Some of the unselected cases are not classified due to either missing values in the independent variables or categorical variables with values out of the range of the selected cases.

When further analyzing the Table 6 by looking at the dataset again, two most deviant cases have been selected for further analysis. These are the municipalities Den Helder and Meppel. Based on the prediction table a new variable has been made: the probability to be included in a municipal board. The probability is based on the results of Model 1 with the standard errors clustered at the municipality level.

When looking at the tables below, one sees that in Meppel the largest party is the Sterk Meppel party , which is an independent party with an 85,18% probability to be included in the municipal board according to the best fitting model. However, they were not included in the municipal board, making them the independent local with the highest probability of being included in a municipal board but aren't included. Moreover, they are the party with the highest relative amount of seats, making them the dominant player in the coalition formation process. What variable is missed in predicting the inclusion of this independent local in the municipal board of Meppel?

The other municipality highlighted in this chapter is the municipality of Den Helder. In Den Helder the opposite situation of Meppel occurred. Parties with a very low probability of being included in the municipal board, GroenLinks with 9,68% and Behoorlijk Bestuur with 14,54%, were included in their respective municipality. Including them in a municipal board makes the coalition larger than necessary by 1 party, since D66 was expected to be in the board but wasn't included.

Table 4: Overview of most deviant case regarding inclusion a municipal board in Meppel

Municipality	Party	Number of seats	Relative Size	Municipal Board (1 = yes)	Independent Local (1 = yes)	Issue diversity (shown in HHI)	Probability of being included in a municipal board (using Model 1 with SEs clustered at the municipal level)	Expectation of being included in a municipal board (using Model 1 with SEs clustered at the municipal level)
MEPPEL	CDA	3	0,1304	1	0	0,4722	0,4159	0
	ChristenUnie	2	0,087	1	0	0,2216	0,3577	0
	D66	2	0,087	0	0	0,503	0,2256	0
	GroenLinks	1	0,0435	0	0	0,322	0,1625	0
	PvdA	4	0,1739	1	0	0,3878	0,6632	1
	Sterk Meppel	**5**	**0,2174**	**0**	**1**	**0,28**	**0,8518**	**1**
	SP	2	0,087	0	0	0,4514	0,247	0
	VVD	4	0,1739	1	0	0	0,8279	1

Table 5: Overview of the most deviant cases regarding inclusion in a municipal board in Den Helder

Municipality	Party	Number of seats	Relative Size	Municipal Board	Independent Local	Issue diversity (shown in HHI)	Probability of being included in a municipal board (using Model 1 with SEs clustered at the municipal level)	Expectation of being included in a municipal board (using Model 1 with SEs clustered at the municipal level)
DEN HELDER	D66	3	0,0811	0	0	0,266	0,3103	0
	Behoorlijk Bestuur	**1**	**0,0323**	**1**	**1**	**0,2871**	**0,1454**	**0**
	CDA	4	0,129	0	0	0,36	0,4731	0
	ChristenUnie	1	0,0323	1	0	0,2472	0,1572	0
	D66	**4**	**0,129**	**0**	**0**	**0,2464**	**0,5384**	**1**
	GroenLinks	**1**	**0,0323**	**1**	**0**	**0,4875**	**0,0968**	**0**
	Helder Onafhankelijk	2	0,0645	1	1			
	PvdA	2	0,0645	0	0	0,2867	0,2387	0
	Stadspartij Den Helder	11	0,3548	1	1	0,2149	0,989	1
	Vrije Socialisten	1	0,0323	0	1	0,2633	0,1523	0
	VVD	4	0,129	0	0	0,3515	0,478	0

Looking at Meppel again, the Sterk Meppel party has the second lowest issue diversity score and is regarding relative size the largest party. When looking at Den Helder, the GroenLinks party has the highest score in HHI and one of the lowest scores regarding relative size. The same goes, to certain extent, for the Behoorlijk Bestuur party. Therefore I can conclude that there is a variable missing which influences the probability of a party being included in a municipal board.

When applying the method of Bäck & Dumont (2007) it seems that the literature has failed to provide a useable theoretical mechanism for explaining why some parties are included and some aren't, in contrast to the prediction made by the model estimation. In such cases Bäck & Dumont (2007) advice to conduct further document analysis of personal documents, communication between politicians and other actors and take interviews with aforementioned actors. They state: "only by intensive research is it possible to trace the intentional behavior of actors and establish precise sequences of events and interactions (Bäck & Dumont, 2007, p. 485)."

This is also appears to be the case with the aforementioned cases of Meppel and Den Helder. Additional variables can be found by doing further research regarding coalition formation in the Netherlands. Local political traditions, whether or not the parties are already incumbent parties, personal relations between politicians and the municipal political culture in the Netherlands may prove to be additional variables which cannot be tested using this large-N dataset. This is where this chapter concludes, in the final chapter of this thesis some remarks regarding the above in future research are made.

6. Future research

Boogers & Voerman (2010) describe in their article on independent locals in the Netherlands a number of characteristics of independent locals. Perhaps it is these characteristics, combined with the political tradition and preferences of (political) actors in a municipality that could be used in a new model to estimate the probability of parties being included in a Dutch municipal board. Boogers & Voerman (2010) state that there has been an enormous growth of independent locals and their popularity in the Netherlands. They also conclude that independent locals are proving to be more resourceful in recruiting citizens to stand as candidates for municipal councillorship. Independent locals have close relationships with the community and the citizens and they contrast party branches because of this profiling. One of the conclusions in their article is that the electoral success of independent locals can be found in this rootedness within society.

But looking at the outcomes and conclusions in this thesis this might also be a trap for independent locals if they want to be included in a municipal board. After elections the coalition formation process takes place in a political arena behind doors which are mostly closed to the public. Back-door politics and personal preferences of politicians and political parties could overrule electoral successes of independent local parties. Seasoned branch politicians from incumbent parties may view the new stars of local politics as amateurs with a lot of goodwill but no political experience. The incumbent politicians might also have a preference for seasoned parties that have been coalition partners in previous municipal boards. Also independent local politicians may lack the experience and/or competence needed or expected to have in order to be successful in local politics. When looking at the two incorrectly predicted coalition formation outcomes, this might have been the case: massive electoral success for independent locals, but no success in the political arena during the formation process.

These factors above are perhaps the best vantage point for future research, which is to be based on the combined qualitative-quantitative strategies mentioned in Bäck & Dumont (2007) like process verification and process induction. Now that it is observed that independent locals are the rising star in Dutch municipal politics, but that they haven't had the success in the political arena as they have in the electoral arena, a new strategy for looking at the municipal coalition formation process could be fruitful. Interviewing political actors, looking in their personal documents to create a view on the local politics and politicians in the Netherlands could prove to be a valuable addition to the two independent variables which are found statistically significant in this thesis.

Some new hypotheses that could be tested would revolve around these presumptions. Examples of hypotheses that are to be tested are e.g. the following

1. In municipal coalition formation local political parties value personal competence of politicians better than the political compatibility with other local parties.

2. In municipal coalition formation parties and politicians who have a better relationship with fellow local parties and politicians have a better chance of being included in a municipal board than parties who have gained the most electoral success.

3. A party which is already incumbent in office has a higher chance of gaining a position in a Dutch municipal board than a party that is not incumbent in office.

Perhaps using these hypotheses in future research the missing variables will be unveiled and/or other variables will be discovered.

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Appendix A: Overview of the Stemwijzer VAA municipalities

No.	Municipality	No. of inhabitants	Province	Total no. of seats in municipal council	Largest City
1	Achtkarspelen	28.002	Friesland	21	Buitenpost
2	Amsterdam	810.909	Noord-Holland	45	Amsterdam
3	Baarle-Nassau	6.617	Noord-Brabant	13	Baarle-Nassau
4	Baarn	24.344	Utrecht	19	Baarn
5	Beuningen	25.254	Flevoland	21	Beuningen
6	Breda	180.053	Noord-Brabant	39	Breda
7	Den Haag	508.592	Zuid-Holland	45	Den Haag
8	Den Helder	56.553	Noord-Holland	31	Den Helder
9	Diemen	25.980	Noord-Holland	21	Diemen
10	Eindhoven	220.782	Noord-Brabant	45	Eindhoven
11	Etten-Leur	42.351	Noord-Brabant	27	Etten-Leur
12	Groningen	198.108	Groningen	39	Groningen (stad)
13	Haarlemmermeer	144.166	Noord-Holland	39	Hoofddorp
14	Helmond	89.346	Noord-Brabant	37	Helmond
15	Hengelo (OV)	80.975	Overijssel	37	Hengelo (OV)
16	Hoogeveen	54.680	Drenthe	31	Hoogeveen
17	Hoogezand-Sappemeer	34.360	Groningen	23	Hoogezand
18	Huizen	41.239	Noord-Holland	27	Huizen
19	Leiden	121.199	Zuid-Holland	39	Leiden
20	Leidschendam-Voorburg	73.392	Zuid-Holland	35	Voorburg
21	Loon op Zand	23.104	Noord-Brabant	19	Kaatsheuvel
22	Maastricht	122.331	Zeeland	39	Maastricht
23	Meppel	32.875	Drenthe	23	Meppel
24	Middelburg	36.695	Zeeland	29	Middelburg
25	Nieuwegein	61.017	Utrecht	33	Nieuwegein
26	Nieuwkoop	27.144	Zuid-Holland	21	Nieuwveen
27	Oldambt	38.558	Groningen	25	Winschoten
28	Pijnacker-Nootdorp	51.068	Zuid-Holland	31	Pijnacker
29	Rijswijk	47.680	Zuid-Holland	29	Rijswijk
30	Roosendaal	77.529	Noord-Brabant	35	Roosendaal
31	Rotterdam	618.467	Zuid-Holland	45	Rotterdam
32	Smallingerland	55.496	Friesland	31	Drachten
33	Tilburg	189.585	Noord-Brabant	45	Tilburg
34	Tytsjerksteradiel	31.980	Friesland	23	Bergum
35	Utrecht	328.577	Utrecht	45	Utrecht (stad)
36	Utrechtse Heuvelrug	47.939	Utrecht	29	Driebergen-Rijsenburg
37	Vlaardingen	71.059	Zuid-Holland	35	Vlaardingen
38	Vlissingen	44.450	Zeeland	27	Vlissingen
39	Wageningen	37.511	Gelderland	25	Wageningen
40	Zaanstad	150.911	Noord-Holland	39	Zaandam
41	Zeist	61.337	Utrecht	33	Zeist

Appendix B: Overview of seats in the municipal councils of the 41 Stemwijzer municipalities

*** = In municipal board**

#1 Achtkarspelen (21 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
FNP*		**3.030**	**25,29 %**	**6**	**28,58%**
CDA		2.730	22,79 %	5	23,82%
ChristenUnie		2.046	17,08 %	3	14,28%
GemeenteBelangen Achtkarspelen*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**1.796**	**14,99 %**	**3**	**14,28%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**1.611**	**13,45 %**	**3**	**14,28%**
VVD		766	6,39 %	1	4,76%

#2 Amsterdam (45 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66) *		**85.241**	**26,83 %**	**14**	**31,12%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		58.461	18,40 %	10	22,23%
VVD *		**35.639**	**11,22 %**	**6**	**13,33%**
SP (Socialistische Partij) *		**35.627**	**11,21 %**	**6**	**13,33%**
GROENLINKS		34.145	10,75 %	6	13,33%
Partij voor de Dieren		8.944	2,81 %	1	2,22%
CDA		8.852	2,79 %	1	2,22%
Partij van de Ouderen (P.v.d.O.)	IL (Independent locals)	6.762	2,13 %	1	2,22%

#3 Baarle-Nassau (13 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	% Seats
CDA *		**855**	**27,19 %**	**4**	**30,76%**
BAARLE!	IL (Independent locals)	801	25,47 %	3	23,07%
Keerpunt '98 (K'98)	IL (Independent locals)	505	16,06 %	2	15,39%
Vooruitstrevende Partij Baarle (VPB) *	**IL (Independent locals)**	**491**	**15,61 %**	**2**	**15,39%**
Fractie Ulicoten (F.U) *	**IL (Independent locals)**	**342**	**10,87 %**	**2**	**15,39%**

#4 Baarn (19 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Baarnse Onafhankelijke Partij*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**2.135**	**18,29 %**	**4**	**21,05%**
VVD		2.111	18,08 %	4	21,05%

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**1.894**	**16,23 %**	**3**	**15,79%**
CDA		1.547	13,25 %	2	10,53%
GROENLINKS*		**1.165**	**9,98 %**	**2**	**10,53%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**1.127**	**9,65 %**	**2**	**10,53%**
L T S (Lijst Tinus Snyders)	IL (Independent locals)	874	7,49 %	1	5,26%
ChristenUnie-SGP	ChristenUnie/SGP	820	7,02 %	1	5,26%

#5 Beuningen (21 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Beuningen Nu & Morgen*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**3.838**	**36,79 %**	**9**	**42,85%**
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**1.688**	**16,18 %**	**3**	**14,28%**
CDA		1.632	15,64 %	3	14,28%
VVD		1.233	11,82 %	2	9,53%
GROENLINKS		1.035	9,92 %	2	9,53%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		1.007	9,65 %	2	9,53%

#6 Breda (39 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
VVD		13.411	19,73 %	8	20,51%
Democraten 66 (D66)		12.332	18,14 %	8	20,51%
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**10.744**	**15,80 %**	**6**	**15,39%**
CDA*		**9.809**	**14,43 %**	**6**	**15,39%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**7.187**	**10,57 %**	**4**	**10,26%**
GROENLINKS*		**5.767**	**8,48 %**	**3**	**7,69%**
BREDA'97*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**3.381**	**4,97 %**	**2**	**5,13%**
TROTS/OPA	TROTS/OPA	2.072	3,05 %	1	2,56%
Bredase Ondernemers Ouderen-Partij	IL (Independent locals)	1.842	2,71 %	1	2,56%

#7 Den Haag (45 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**30.922**	**15,50 %**	**8**	**17,78%**
PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid)		27.938	14,00 %	7	15,56%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**24.705**	**12,38 %**	**6**	**13,33%**
Haagse Stadspartij*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**22.223**	**11,14 %**	**5**	**11,11%**
VVD*		**18.965**	**9,51 %**	**4**	**8,89%**
CDA*		**13.432**	**6,73 %**	**3**	**6,67%**

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Groep de Mos / Ouderen Partij Den Haag	IL (Independent locals)	11.468	5,75 %	3	6,67%
SP (Socialistische Partij)		10.934	5,48 %	2	4,44%
GROENLINKS		10.392	5,21 %	2	4,44%
Islam Democraten	IL (Independent locals)	7.664	3,84 %	2	4,44%
Partij van de Eenheid	IL (Independent locals)	6.305	3,16 %	1	2,22%
ChristenUnie-SGP	ChristenUnie/SGP	4.898	2,45 %	1	2,22%
Partij voor de Dieren		4.186	2,10 %	1	2,22%

#8 Den Helder (31 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Stadspartij Den Helder*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**7.028**	**32,64 %**	**11**	**35,49%**
VVD		2.780	12,91 %	4	12,91%
Democraten 66 (D66)		2.552	11,85 %	4	12,91%
CDA		2.372	11,02 %	4	12,91%
Helder Onafhankelijk! **Fractie Vermooten* (afsplitsing)**	**IL (Independent locals)**	1.729	8,03 %	1 **1***	3,22% **3,22%***
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		1.460	6,78 %	2	6,46%
ChristenUnie*		**1.145**	**5,32 %**	**1**	**3,22%**
GROENLINKS*		**959**	**4,45 %**	**1**	**3,22%**
Behoorlijk Bestuur*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**787**	**3,66 %**	**1**	**3,22%**
Vrije Socialisten*	IL (Independent locals)	719	3,34 %	1	3,22%

#9 Diemen (21 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**1.569**	**15,63 %**	**3**	**14,29%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**1.508**	**15,03 %**	**4**	**19,04%**
VVD		1.502	14,97 %	3	14,29%
Leefbaar Diemen	IL (Independent locals)	1.232	12,28 %	3	14,29%
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**1.222**	**12,18 %**	**3**	**14,29%**
GROENLINKS*		**1.022**	**10,18 %**	**2**	**9,52%**
Partij van de Ouderen (P.v.d.O.)	IL (Independent locals)	985	9,81 %	2	9,52%
CDA		751	7,48 %	1	4,76%

#10 Eindhoven (45 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**12.464**	**16,02 %**	**8**	**17,78%**
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**11.503**	**14,78 %**	**7**	**15,56%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**11.172**	**14,36 %**	**7**	**15,56%**
VVD		10.459	13,44 %	6	13,33%
Ouderen Appèl Eindhoven	IL (Independent locals)	7.581	9,74 %	5	11,11%
CDA		6.281	8,07 %	4	8,89%
GROENLINKS*		**5.904**	**7,59 %**	**4**	**8,89%**
Leefbaar Eindhoven	IL (Independent locals)	3.135	4,03 %	2	4,44%
Lijst Pim Fortuyn Eindhoven	IL (Independent locals)	2.941	3,78 %	1	2,22%
ChristenUnie		1.542	1,98 %	1	2,22%

#11 Etten-Leur (27 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
CDA*		**3.344**	**21,20 %**	**6**	**22,22%**
Algemeen Plaatselijk Belang*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**3.124**	**19,80 %**	**6**	**22,22%**
VVD		2.347	14,88 %	4	14,81%
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**2.183**	**13,84 %**	**4**	**14,81%**
Ons Etten-Leur	IL (Independent locals)	1.947	12,34 %	3	11,12%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		1.368	8,67 %	2	7,41%
Leefbaar Etten-leur	IL (Independent locals)	1.293	8,20 %	2	7,41%

#12 Groningen (39 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	% Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**19.167**	**21,46 %**	**9**	**23,08%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)		13.203	14,78 %	6	15,38%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**12.549**	**14,05 %**	**6**	**15,38%**
GROENLINKS*		**8.465**	**9,48 %**	**4**	**10,26%**
VVD*		**7.799**	**8,73 %**	**3**	**7,70%**
STADSPARTIJ	IL (Independent locals)	7.238	8,10 %	3	7,70%
CDA		5.648	6,32 %	3	7,70%
ChristenUnie		5.079	5,69 %	2	5,12%
Student en Stad	IL (Independent locals)	4.269	4,78 %	2	5,12%
Partij voor de Dieren		3.690	4,13 %	1	2,56%

#13 Haarlemmermeer (39 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
VVD*		**9.733**	**17,87 %**	**7**	**17,95%**
HAP*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**8.597**	**15,79 %**	**6**	**15,39%**
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**7.409**	**13,60 %**	**6**	**15,39%**
CDA		6.812	12,51 %	5	12,83%
Forza! Haarlemmermeer	IL (Independent locals)	6.005	11,03 %	4	10,26%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**4.695**	**8,62 %**	**4**	**10,26%**
GROENLINKS		4.320	7,93 %	3	7,68%
ChristenUnie-SGP	ChristenUnie/SGP	2.441	4,48 %	1	2,56%
EEN Haarlemmermeer	IL (Independent locals)	1.774	3,26 %	1	2,56%
Sociaal Rechts Haarlemmermeer (SRH)	IL (Independent locals)	1.392	2,56 %	1	2,56%
Christen-Democratische Volkspartij (CDVP)	IL (Independent locals)	1.280	2,35 %	1	2,56%

#14 Helmond (37 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**5.002**	**16,42 %**	**6**	**16,21%**
CDA*		**4.998**	**16,41 %**	**6**	**16,21%**
VVD*		**4.050**	**13,29 %**	**5**	**13,51%**
SDH/OH/HELMONDSE BELANGEN/LH	IL (Independent locals)	3.593	11,79 %	5	13,51%
HELDER HELMOND	IL (Independent locals)	2.729	8,96 %	3	8,11%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		2.445	8,03 %	3	8,11%
Democraten 66 (D66)		2.216	7,27 %	3	8,11%
Helmond Aktief	IL (Independent locals)	1.799	5,91 %	2	5,41%
GROENLINKS*		**1.601**	**5,26 %**	**2**	**5,41%**
Senioren 2013	IL (Independent locals)	1.487	4,88 %	2	5,41%

#15 Hengelo (OV) (37 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Pro Hengelo	IL (Independent locals)	6.536	19,49 %	7	18,92%
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**6.003**	**17,90 %**	**7**	**18,92%**
CDA*		**5.198**	**15,50 %**	**6**	**16,21%**
VVD		4.267	12,73 %	5	13,51%
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**4.186**	**12,49 %**	**4**	**10,82%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**3.040**	**9,07 %**	**4**	**10,82%**
Burger Belangen	IL (Independent locals)	1.822	5,43 %	2	5,40%
GROENLINKS		1.093	3,26 %	1	2,70%
ChristenUnie		970	2,89 %	1	2,70%

#16 Hoogeveen (31 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
CDA*		**6.039**	**25,53 %**	**8**	**25,81 %**
Gemeentebelangen Hoogeveen en omstreken*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**5.054**	**21,37 %**	**7**	**22,59 %**
SP (Socialistische Partij)		2.922	12,35 %	4	12,90%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		2.788	11,79 %	4	12,90%
ChristenUnie*		**2.311**	**9,77 %**	**3**	**9,68%**
VVD		2.235	9,45 %	3	9,68%
Democraten 66 (D66)		1.137	4,81 %	1	3,22%
GROENLINKS		739	3,12 %	1	3,22%

#17 Hoogezand-Sappemeer (23 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**2.667**	**19,24 %**	**5**	**21,74%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**1.844**	**13,30 %**	**3**	**13,04%**
VVD		1.815	13,09 %	3	13,04%
HS Centraal!	IL (Independent locals)	1.714	12,36 %	3	13,04%
ROODGEWOON	IL (Independent locals)	1.433	10,34 %	2	8,70%
Democraten 66 (D66)		1.418	10,23 %	3	13,04%
ChristenUnie*		**1.015**	**7,32 %**	**1**	**4,35%**
GROENLINKS*		**983**	**7,09 %**	**2**	**8,70%**
CDA*		**973**	**7,02 %**	**1**	**4,35%**

#18 Huizen (27 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
VVD		3.850	20,05 %	5	18,52%
CDA*		**3.391**	**17,66 %**	**5**	**18,52%**
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**2.916**	**15,19 %**	**4**	**14,81%**
Dorpsbelangen Huizen*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**2.157**	**11,24 %**	**3**	**11,11%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		1.670	8,70 %	3	11,11%
GROENLINKS*		**1.665**	**8,67 %**	**2**	**7,41%**
ChristenUnie*		**1.493**	**7,78 %**	**2**	**7,41%**
Leefbaar Huizen	IL (Independent locals)	1.378	7,18 %	2	7,41%
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (S.G.P.)*		**678**	**3,53 %**	**1**	**3,70%**

#19 Leiden (39 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**15.673**	**28,42 %**	**12**	**30,77%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**6.856**	**12,43 %**	**5**	**12,82%**
VVD*		**6.479**	**11,75 %**	**5**	**12,82%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**6.388**	**11,58 %**	**5**	**12,82%**
GROENLINKS		5.718	10,37 %	4	10,26%
CDA		4.528	8,21 %	4	10,26%
Leefbaar Leiden	IL (Independent locals)	3.531	6,40 %	2	5,13%
Partij voor de Dieren		2.063	3,74 %	1	2,56%
ChristenUnie		1.665	3,02 %	1	2,56%

#20 Leidschendam-Voorburg (35 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	% Seats
GBLV/Gemeentebelangen*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**7.598**	**23,50 %**	**8**	**22,86%**
VVD*		**7.395**	**22,87 %**	**8**	**22,86%**
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**6.196**	**19,16 %**	**7**	**20,00%**
CDA		4.401	13,61 %	5	14,28%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		3.045	9,42 %	3	8,57%
GROENLINKS		2.628	8,13 %	3	8,57%
ChristenUnie-SGP	ChristenUnie/SGP	1.072	3,32 %	1	2,86%

#21 Loon op Zand (19 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	% Seats
Gemeentebelangen*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**2.398**	**27,19 %**	**5**	**26,32%**
CDA*		**1.670**	**18,94 %**	**4**	**21,05%**
VVD		1.654	18,76 %	4	21,05%
"VOOR LOON"*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**1.619**	**18,36 %**	**3**	**15,79%**
Pro3	PvdA/GroenLinks	1.477	16,75 %	3	15,79%

#22 Maastricht (39 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	% Seats
Senioren Partij Maastricht*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**7.083**	**15,04 %**	**6**	**15,39%**
CDA		6.176	13,11 %	5	12,82%
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**6.059**	**12,86 %**	**5**	**12,82%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**5.787**	**12,29 %**	**5**	**12,82%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		5.284	11,22 %	5	12,82%

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	% Seats
GROENLINKS*		**4.151**	**8,81 %**	**4**	**10,27%**
Partij Veilig Maastricht (PVM)	IL (Independent locals)	3.775	8,02 %	3	7,69%
VVD*		**3.366**	**7,15 %**	**3**	**7,69%**
Stadsbelangen Mestreech	IL (Independent locals)	2.074	4,40 %	1	2,56%
Maastrichtse Volkspartij (MV)	IL (Independent locals)	1.431	3,04 %	1	2,56%
Liberale Partij Maastricht	IL (Independent locals)	1.119	2,38 %	1	2,56%

#23 Meppel (23 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Sterk Meppel (SteM)	IL (Independent locals)	3.290	22,00 %	5	21,74%
VVD*		**2.364**	**15,81 %**	**4**	**17,39%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**2.024**	**13,54 %**	**4**	**17,39%**
CDA*		**1.856**	**12,41 %**	**3**	**13,03%**
Democraten 66 (D66)		1.564	10,46 %	2	8,70%
SP (Socialistische Partij)		1.559	10,43 %	2	8,70%
ChristenUnie*		**1.535**	**10,27 %**	**2**	**8,70%**
GROENLINKS		760	5,08 %	1	4,35%

#24 Middelburg (29 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Lokale Partij Middelburg (ILM)	IL (Independent locals)	3.381	15,18 %	4	13,80%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**3.278**	**14,72 %**	**4**	**13,80%**
CDA*		**2.934**	**13,18 %**	**4**	**13,80%**
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (S.G.P.)*		**2.488**	**11,17 %**	**3**	**10,34%**
VVD*		**2.307**	**10,36 %**	**3**	**10,34%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)		2.219	9,96 %	3	10,34%
Democraten 66 (D66)		2.095	9,41 %	3	10,34%
ChristenUnie*		**1.910**	**8,58 %**	**3**	**10,34%**
GROENLINKS		1.191	5,35 %	2	6,70%

#25 Nieuwegein (33 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
VVD*		**3.686**	**16,03 %**	**5**	**15,15%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**3.398**	**14,78 %**	**5**	**15,15%**

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
ieders Belang	IL (Independent locals)	3.134	13,63 %	5	15,15%
D66*		**2.674**	**11,63 %**	**4**	**12,12%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**2.279**	**9,91 %**	**3**	**9,09%**
CDA		2.218	9,65 %	3	9,09%
Verenigde Senioren Partij		2.085	9,07 %	3	9,09%
ChristenUnie		1.434	6,24 %	2	6,06%
GROENLINKS*		**1.129**	**4,91 %**	**2**	**6,06%**
Stadspartij Núwegein	IL (Independent locals)	951	4,14 %	1	3,04%

#26 Nieuwkoop (21 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Samen Beter Nieuwkoop*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**3.231**	**26,75 %**	**6**	**28,56%**
CDA*		**2.309**	**19,12 %**	**4**	**19,05%**
MPN-PN	IL (Independent locals)	2.253	18,65 %	4	19,05%
VVD		1.719	14,23 %	3	14,29%
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**1.717**	**14,21 %**	**3**	**14,29%**
SGP/ChristenUnie	ChristenUnie/SGP	850	7,04 %	1	4,76%

#27 Oldambt (25 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**3.213**	**18,60 %**	**5**	**20,00%**
Verenigde Communistische Partij (VCP)	IL (Independent locals)	2.757	15,96 %	4	16,00%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**2.320**	**13,43 %**	**4**	**16,00%**
CDA*		**1.966**	**11,38 %**	**3**	**12,00%**
Partij voor het Noorden*		**1.700**	**9,84 %**	**3**	**12,00%**
VVD		1.576	9,12 %	2	8,00%
Democraten 66 (D66)		1.372	7,94 %	2	8,00%
ChristenUnie		910	5,27 %	1	4,00%
Oldambt Aktief	IL (Independent locals)	905	5,24 %	1	4,00%

#28 Pijnacker-Nootdorp (31 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
VVD*		**3.391**	**16,54 %**	**5**	**16,13%**
CDA*		**3.230**	**15,75 %**	**5**	**16,13%**
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**3.115**	**15,19 %**	**5**	**16,13%**
Gemeentebelangen*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**2.665**	**13,00 %**	**4**	**12,89%**

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Eerlijk Alternatief	IL (Independent locals)	2.200	10,73 %	3	9,68%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		1.565	7,63 %	2	6,45%
GROENLINKS		1.090	5,32 %	2	6,45%
ChristenUnie-SGP	ChristenUnie/SGP	971	4,74 %	2	6,45%
Partij voor de Dieren		813	3,96 %	1	3,23%
Leefbaar Pijnacker-Nootdorp	IL (Independent locals)	789	3,85 %	1	3,23%
TROTS Pijnacker-Nootdorp	TROTS (Trots op Nederland)	676	3,30 %	1	3,23%

#29 Rijswijk (29 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Gemeentebelangen Rijswijk (GR)*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**3.335**	**16,34 %**	**5**	**17,24%**
BETER VOOR RIJSWIJK (BVR)	IL (Independent locals)	3.282	16,08 %	5	17,24%
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**2.355**	**11,54 %**	**4**	**13,80%**
VVD*		**2.280**	**11,17 %**	**3**	**10,34%**
CDA		2.008	9,84 %	3	10,34%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		1.931	9,46 %	3	10,34%
Onafhankelijk Rijswijk	IL (Independent locals)	1.881	9,22 %	2	6,90%
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**1.837**	**9,00 %**	**2**	**6,90%**
GROENLINKS		1.497	7,34 %	2	6,90%

#30 Roosendaal (35 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Roosendaalse Lijst*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**6.094**	**21,74 %**	**9**	**25,71%**
CDA*		**3.956**	**14,12 %**	**5**	**14,29%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**3.643**	**13,00 %**	**5**	**14,29%**
VRIJE LIBERALE PARTIJ (V.L.P.)	IL (Independent locals)	3.583	12,78 %	5	14,29%
VVD*		**3.271**	**11,67 %**	**4**	**11,43%**
Democraten 66 (D66)		1.952	6,96 %	2	5,71%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		1.929	6,88 %	2	5,71%
Nieuwe Democraten	IL (Independent locals)	1.711	6,11 %	2	5,71%
GROENLINKS		824	2,94 %	1	2,86%

#31 Rotterdam (45 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Leefbaar Rotterdam*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**59.505**	**27,53 %**	**14**	**31,12%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		34.193	15,82 %	8	17,78%
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**27.433**	**12,69 %**	**6**	**13,33%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)		22.685	10,50 %	5	11,11%
VVD		16.120	7,46 %	3	6,67%
CDA*		**12.753**	**5,90 %**	**3**	**6,67%**
GROENLINKS		10.631	4,92 %	2	4,44%
Nida Rotterdam	IL (Independent locals)	10.322	4,78 %	2	4,44%
ChristenUnie-SGP	ChristenUnie/SGP	6.902	3,19 %	1	2,22%
Partij voor de Dieren		5.389	2,49 %	1	2,22%

#32 Smallingerland (31 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**4.395**	**17,65 %**	**6**	**19,35%**
CDA		4.111	16,51 %	5	16,13%
ChristenUnie*		**3.831**	**15,39 %**	**5**	**16,13%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**3.279**	**13,17 %**	**4**	**12,90%**
Eérste Lokale Partij (EIL)	IL (Independent locals)	2.329	9,35 %	3	9,68%
VVD		1.744	7,00 %	2	6,45%
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**1.724**	**6,92 %**	**2**	**6,45%**
Smallingerlands Belang	IL (Independent locals)	1.391	5,59 %	2	6,45%
FNP		1.251	5,02 %	1	3,23%
GROENLINKS		842	3,38 %	1	3,23%

#33 Tilburg (45 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**13.742**	**18,69 %**	**9**	**20,00%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**9.727**	**13,23 %**	**6**	**13,33%**
Lijst Smolders Tilburg (LST)	IL (Independent locals)	8.411	11,44 %	5	11,11%
VVD		7.812	10,62 %	5	11,11%
CDA*		**7.344**	**9,99 %**	**5**	**11,11%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		6.698	9,11 %	5	11,11%
GROENLINKS*		**6.507**	**8,85 %**	**4**	**8,88%**
Tilburgse Volkspartij (TVP)	IL (Independent locals)	4.319	5,87 %	2	4,44%
Voor Tilburg	IL (Independent locals)	2.202	2,99 %	1	2,22%
Verenigde Senioren Partij Tilburg	Verenigde Senioren Partij	2.029	2,76 %	1	2,22%
OPA		1.782	2,42 %	1	2,22%

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
TROTS	TROTS (Trots op Nederland)	1.415	1,92 %	1	2,22%

#34 Tytsjerksteradiel (23 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
CDA*		**3.646**	**25,12 %**	**6**	**26,09%**
FNP*		**2.829**	**19,49 %**	**5**	**21,73%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**2.557**	**17,61 %**	**4**	**17,39%**
VVD		1.674	11,53 %	3	13,04%
GrienLinks	GROENLINKS	1.476	10,17 %	2	8,70%
ChristenUnie		1.359	9,36 %	2	8,70%
Gemeentebelangen Tietjerksteradeel	IL (Independent locals)	976	6,72 %	1	4,35%

#35 Utrecht (45 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**36.829**	**26,48 %**	**13**	**28,90%**
GROENLINKS*		**23.531**	**16,92 %**	**9**	**20,00%**
VVD*		**15.127**	**10,88 %**	**5**	**11,11%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		14.121	10,15 %	5	11,11%
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**13.223**	**9,51 %**	**4**	**8,89%**
CDA		8.667	6,23 %	3	6,67%
Stadsbelang Utrecht	IL (Independent locals)	5.808	4,18 %	2	4,44%
ChristenUnie		5.400	3,88 %	2	4,44%
Student & Starter	IL (Independent locals)	4.993	3,59 %	1	2,22%
Partij voor de Dieren		3.426	2,46 %	1	2,22%

#36 Utrechtse Heuvelrug (29 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**4.503**	**18,85 %**	**5**	**17,24%**
VVD		4.046	16,94 %	5	17,24%
CDA*		**3.763**	**15,75 %**	**5**	**17,24%**
GROENLINKS/Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*	**PvdA/GroenLinks**	**3.091**	**12,94 %**	**4**	**13,80%**
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (S.G.P.)*		**2.660**	**11,13 %**	**3**	**10,34%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)		2.410	10,09 %	3	10,34%
BVH (Burger Vertegenwoordiging Heuvelrug)	IL (Independent locals)	2.356	9,86 %	3	10,34%
ChristenUnie		1.061	4,44 %	1	3,46%

#37 Vlaardingen (35 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**3.777**	**13,82 %**	**5**	**14,29%**
VV2000/Leefbaar Vlaardingen	IL (Independent locals)	3.690	13,50 %	5	14,29%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**2.982**	**10,91 %**	**4**	**11,42%**
ONS Vlaardingen	IL (Independent locals)	2.579	9,43 %	3	8,56%
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**2.396**	**8,76 %**	**3**	**8,56%**
CDA*		**2.246**	**8,22 %**	**3**	**8,56%**
Algemeen Ouderen Verbond (AOV)	IL (Independent locals)	1.937	7,09 %	3	8,56%
VVD		1.914	7,00 %	2	5,71%
ChristenUnie/SGP*		**1.871**	**6,84 %**	**3**	**8,56%**
GROENLINKS		1.668	6,10 %	2	5,71%
StadsBelangen Vlaardingen	IL (Independent locals)	1.208	4,42 %	2	5,71%

#38 Vlissingen (27 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Lokale Partij Vlissingen*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**3.075**	**17,79 %**	**5**	**18,52%**
Partij Souburg-Ritthem*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**2.697**	**15,60 %**	**4**	**14,82%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)*		**2.211**	**12,79 %**	**4**	**14,82%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		1.621	9,38 %	3	11,11%
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**1.489**	**8,61 %**	**3**	**11,11%**
VVD		1.204	6,96 %	2	7,41%
CDA		1.203	6,96 %	2	7,41%
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)		942	5,45 %	1	3,70%
GROENLINKS		886	5,13 %	1	3,70%
Progressief Ondernemend Vlissingen*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**886**	**5,13 %**	**1**	**3,70%**
ChristenUnie*		**627**	**3,63 %**	**1**	**3,70%**

#39 Wageningen (25 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**3.564**	**19,76 %**	**5**	**20,00%**
GROENLINKS*		**3.323**	**18,43 %**	**5**	**20,00%**
Stadspartij Wageningen*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**3.157**	**17,51 %**	**5**	**20,00%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		1.955	10,84 %	3	12,00%
CDA		1.737	9,63 %	2	8,00%
VVD		1.665	9,23 %	2	8,00%
SP (Socialistische Partij)		1.529	8,48 %	2	8,00%
ChristenUnie		1.049	5,82 %	1	4,00%

#40 Zaanstad (39 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**7.472**	**13,26 %**	**5**	**12,82%**
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)*		**7.135**	**12,66 %**	**5**	**12,82%**
VVD*		**7.007**	**12,43 %**	**5**	**12,82%**
SP (Socialistische Partij)		5.965	10,59 %	5	12,82%
Democratisch Zaanstad	IL (Independent locals)	5.949	10,56 %	4	10,26%
Politieke Partij voor Ouderen en Veiligheid	IL (Independent locals)	5.609	9,95 %	4	10,26%
ROSA	IL (Independent locals)	4.145	7,36 %	3	7,69%
CDA*		**3.106**	**5,51 %**	**2**	**5,13%**
GROENLINKS		2.783	4,94 %	2	5,13%
Zaanse Onafhankelijke Groepering*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**2.328**	**4,13 %**	**1**	**2,56%**
ChristenUnie*		**1.922**	**3,41 %**	**2**	**5,13%**
Zaanse Inwoners Partij	IL (Independent locals)	1.264	2,24 %	1	2,56%

#41 Zeist (33 seats)

Party	Aggregate Party	# Votes	Percentage	# Seats	%Seats
VVD*		**5.298**	**19,79 %**	**7**	**21,21%**
Democraten 66 (D66)*		**4.536**	**16,95 %**	**6**	**18,19%**
Seyst.Nu*	**IL (Independent locals)**	**3.118**	**11,65 %**	**4**	**12,12%**
GROENLINKS		2.891	10,80 %	3	9,09%
CDA*		**2.841**	**10,61 %**	**4**	**12,12%**
NieuwDemocratischZeist	IL (Independent locals)	2.181	8,15 %	2	6,06%
Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.)		2.091	7,81 %	3	9,09%
ChristenUnie/SGP		1.951	7,29 %	2	6,06%
SP (Socialistische Partij)		1.859	6,95 %	2	6,06%

Appendix C: Manifesto analysis dictionary

Socio-Economic Left/Right dimension

Taxes

Statement	Keywords
De onroerendezaakbelasting (OZB) moet omlaag, ook als dit leidt tot extra bezuinigingen.	Onroerendezaakbelasting, OZB
De hondenbelasting moet blijven.	Hondenbelasting
Betaald parkeren moet ingevoerd worden.	Parkeren, parkeertarieven, parkeertarief, parkeergeld, betaald parkeren
De hoogte van de afvalstoffenheffing moet afhangen van hoeveel afval je aanbiedt.	Afvalstoffenheffing, afval
De gemeentelijke belastingen mogen onder geen enkele voorwaarde omhoog.	Gemeentelijke belastingen, gemeentebelastingen, lokale belastingen

Regulation

Statement	Keywords
Winkeliers en horeca moeten zelf kunnen bepalen wanneer hun winkel open of dicht is.	Sluitingstijden horeca, openingstijden, horecagelegenheden open
De gemeente moet de welstandscommissie afschaffen.	Welstandstoets, welstandscommissie
Burgers moeten zelf meer verantwoordelijkheden en/of budgetten krijgen om voor de leefbaarheid in hun buurt te zorgen.	Leefbaarheid budget,
Het moet makkelijker worden voor bedrijven om een vergunning te krijgen.	Vergunning(en)

Government Spending

Statement	Keywords
De gemeente moet stoppen met bezuinigen op cultuur.	Cultuurbezuinigingen, cultuur, kunst
Er moet weer schoolzwemmen komen, ook al kost dat de gemeente geld.	Schoolzwemmen, zwemmen
De gemeente moet geld opzij zetten voor de zorg of minder bezuinigen in de zorg.	Zorg, ouderenzorg, thuiszorg, WAO, WMO
De gemeente mag bezuinigen op het aantal ambtenaren.	Ambtenaren

Social Security

Statement	Keywords
Ouderen (65+) moeten gratis met het openbaar vervoer kunnen reizen.	OV, gratis openbaar vervoer, ouderen
De gemeente moet minder geld uitgeven aan armoedebeleid.	Armoede, armoedebeleid
Mensen met een (bijstands)uitkering moeten worden verplicht een tegenprestatie te leveren.	Tegenprestatie, bijstand, bijstandsuitkering
De gemeente moet bezuinigen op de kortingspas voor gezinnen met een laag inkomen.	Kortingspas, pas
Het aantal beschikbare sociale huurwoningen is genoeg.	Sociale huurwoning, sociale woningbouw

GAL/TAN dimension

Referenda

Statement	Keywords
Bij grote investeringen moet de gemeente de inwoners raadplegen via een referendum.	Referendum, raadplegen, volksraadpleging
Wijk- en dorpsraden moeten democratisch door de inwoners worden gekozen.	Wijkraden, dorpsraden, democratisch gekozen

Foreign Policy

Statement	Keywords
De gemeente moet asielzoekers van wie de procedure nog loopt, blijven opvangen.	Uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers, asielzoekers, allochtonen, arbeidsmigranten

Softdrug Policy

Statement	Keywords
Het aantal coffeeshops in de stad of het dorp moet omlaag.	Coffeeshop(s)
De gemeente mag experimenteren met het zelf kweken van wiet om illegale handel tegen te gaan.	Wiet, legaliseren, gemeentelijke proef

Safety

Statement	Keywords
De gemeente moet het cameratoezicht uitbreiden.	Cameratoezicht, camera
Er mag meer preventief gefouilleerd worden.	Fouilleren, gefouilleerd
Er mogen meer stadswachten/BOA's/toezicht komen.	BOA, stadswacht(en), toezicht(houders)

Religious Topics

Statement	Keywords
Winkels mogen op zondag geopend worden.	Zondag, winkeltijdenwet

Green Energy

Statement	Keywords
De gemeente moet investeren in windmolens	Windmolen, windmolenpark
De gemeente moet investeren in groene energie en/of energiezuinige huizen (nieuwbouw)	Energiezuinig, energieneutraal, groene energie, duurzame energie, energiezuinig

Environmental Policy

Statement	Keywords
Er moeten meer 30km-zones komen in woonwijken en/of de politie moet hier meer op handhaven.	Snelheid, drempels, snelheidslimiet, snelheidsbeperking, maximumsnelheid
Bezuinigingen en investeringen van de gemeente mogen ten koste gaan van groen.	Groen, speeltuin
De gemeente moet meer milieubewuste maatregelen nemen.	Milieubewust, groene energie, intensieve veehouderij, milieu

Appendix D: Example page of the SPSS dataset



141002SPSSDATALHEUZELS.sav [DataSet1] - IBM SPSS Statistics Data Editor

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	MunicipalityCluster	Municipality	Party	NumericalSize	RelativeSize	MunicipalBoard	IndependentParty	GALTAN	LEFTRIGHT	DISTANCE	HHI	SizeHHI	ProbMunicipalBoard	ExpMunicipalBoard
1	1		ACHTCDA	5	,2381	0	0	2,5556	2,2857	,6247	,2695	,0642	,8970	1
2	1		ACHTCU	3	,1429	0	0	2,3333	2,1429	,3627	,2949	,0421	,5754	1
3	1		ACHTFNP	6	,2857	1	1	1,7778	1,8571	,2642	,3906	,1116	,9420	1
4	1		ACHTGBA	3	,1429	1	1	1,7778	1,8571	,2642	,2431	,0347	,6043	1
5	1	ACHT	ACHTPVDA	3	,1429	1	0	1,1111	1,2857	1,1403	,3731	,0533	,5309	1
6	1		ACHTVVD	1	,0476	0	0	2,0000	2,4286	,4286	,3600	,0171	,1613	0
7	2		AMSCDA	1	,0222	0	0	2,8000	2,2857	,8495	,2619	,0058	,1297	0
8	2		AMSD66	14	,3111	1	0	1,4000	2,4286	,7373	,2362	,0735	,9740	1
9	2		AMSGL	6	,1333	0	0	1,6000	1,0000	1,0770	,2559	,0341	,5532	1
10	2		AMSPVDA	10	,2222	0	0	1,4000	1,4286	,8286	,2752	,0612	,8643	1
11	2		AMSPVDD	1	,0222	0	0	1,2000	1,8571	,8127	,1914	,0043	,1492	0
12	2		AMSPVDO	1	,0222	0	1	1,7000	1,8571	,3323	,4876	,0108	,0814	0
13	2		AMSSP	6	,1333	1	0	1,4000	1,8571	,6168	,2373	,0316	,5637	1
14	2	AMS	AMSVVD	6	,1333	1	0	2,6000	3,0000	1,1662	,3745	,0499	,4851	0
15	5		BEUNCDA	3	,1429	0	0	2,2500	2,0000	,2500	,3139	,0448	,5647	1
16	5		BEUND66	3	,1429	1	0	1,7500	2,8333	,8700	,2128	,0304	,6208	1
17	5		BEUNDVVD	2	,0952	0	0	2,1250	2,5000	,5154	,3747	,0357	,3141	0
18	5		BEUNGL	2	,0952	0	0	1,0000	1,6667	1,0541	,2317	,0221	,3889	0
19	5	BEUN	BEUNNU	9	,4286	1	1	1,7500	2,3333	,4167	,2677	,1147	,9969	1
20	5		BEUNPVDA	2	,0952	0	0	1,6250	1,3333	,7649	,4257	,0405	,2893	0
21	6		BREDB97	1	,0270	1	1	2,4286	1,5000	,6585	,1960	,0053	,1597	0
22	6		BREDBOP	1	,0270	0	1	2,5714	2,6000	,8286	,3250	,0088	,1237	0
23	6		BREDCDA	6	,1622	1	0	2,7143	2,1000	,7213	,3989	,0647	,6058	1
24	6		BREDD66	8	,2162	0	0	1,8571	2,0000	,1429	,2419	,0523	,8599	1
25	6		BREDGL	2	,0541	1	0	1,0000	1,2000	1,2806	,3077	,0166	,1968	0
26	6		BREDPVDA	4	,1081	1	0	1,8571	1,8000	,2458	,5010	,0542	,3040	0
27	6		BREDSP	6	,1622	1	0	1,0000	1,6000	1,0770	,2982	,0484	,6596	1
28	6		BREDTROT	1	,0270	0	0	2,1429	1,6000	,4247	,2779	,0075	,1360	0
29	6	BRED	BREDVVD	8	,2162	0	0	3,0000	2,8000	1,2806	,3575	,0773	,8246	1
30	3		BRLBRLE!	3	,2308	0	1	1,8000	2,2857	,3488	,3333	,0769	,8675	1
31	3	BRLNAS	BRLCDA	4	,3077	1	0	1,8000	1,8571	,2458	.	.	.	.
32	3		BRLK98	2	,1538	0	1	1,6000	1,1429	,9459	,3962	,0610	,5692	1
33	3		BRLULI	2	,1538	1	1	2,4000	2,4286	,5862	,4922	,0757	,5144	1
34	3		BRLVPB	2	,1538	1	1	2,6000	1,5714	,7373	,2411	,0371	,6538	1
35	4		BRNBOP	4	,2105	1	1	2,0000	2,1667	,1667	,4201	,0884	,7852	1
36	4		BRNCDA	2	,1053	0	0	2,6250	2,0000	,6250	,1911	,0201	,4580	0
37	4		BRNCUSCD	1	,0526	0	0	2,5000	1,6667	,6000	,3755	,0145	,2044	0

Data View | Variable View