# European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan

Marco van Burik (s1078429)

Examination Committee
First Supervisor: Dr. Meershoek
Second Supervisor: Dr. Ossewaarde

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<u>Abstract</u>

In the dawn of the cold war and the wake of 9/11, did the discussion around security and its efficient governance become of great concern to every nation. Especially with the increasing globalization of our world, do national security concerns reach further than the visible borders. Conflict and resulting insecurity was a byproduct of such globalization, and as such, now calls for an integrated and coherent solution. In this environment did a school of thought evolve around the best practices of sustaining physical security of citizens and the process of democratizing such goals.

The European policing mission in Afghanistan is a milestone for the school of thought on security and serves as a role model for the implementation of an SSR abroad. Its potential is theoretically dominant and thus a good basis to solving a conflict situation as difficult as that of Afghanistan. In practice however are many limitations to such theories evident. This paper will analyze and try to find a solution to the security problem in Afghanistan by using the theory of security sector reform. The study will evolve around the cases of the Netherlands and Germany and their respective contribution towards the European Policing Mission (EUPOL).

Contents

1
<u>Background</u>

Foreign intervention in the light of the 21st century has dominantly been disguised by the urge to establish a system of democracy. Most influential type of intervention has always focused on the military form, following a pattern of defeating and rebuilding accordingly. Much alike was the Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan war. The difference sparks from the evolution the intervention undergoes and to the degree of beneficiality for the locals. Both the Gulf and Iraq war consisted of a strategy to defeat the visible enemy and 'free' its people from oppression. In other theories is energy a prominent motivation. Afghanistan needed a different approach to the intervention after the failure of the military scheme to 'free' its citizens from the perceived oppression and the gaining of superior control of the countries' problems. Especially with the increased media attention was the public on the 'home front' better informed than ever and to a greater deal keener to see targets met with an efficient use of resources, including human.
The results of the Cold War collapse allowed for a more adapted approach to a security issue situation, namely that of a policing intervention with focus on societal impacts. Afghanistan is a new situation for this kind of concept and has thus been prone to in depth analysis. The unique nature of the intervention was that it replaced and partly complimented a state of war, making the task additionally demanding for the international community.

Due to a debatable reasoning for the involvement are several factors with regard to a possible achievement of targets hard to come by. To circumvent the influence of the founding reasons to the intervention, is it necessary to establish a research angle which leaves open angles and questions for future debate. Thus, this paper focuses on the relative success of the policing intervention by the European Union and to what extent the mandate was achieved. Focus will lie with the analysis of the existing theory of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and how it allows for a different approach of analysis than conventional reports. Previous analysis has focused on a factual evaluation of the mission and disregarded a foundational theory. Henk Sollie evaluates with great detail, the Dutch civil policing mission, but emphasizes its global strategy and effectiveness. Due to the complex nature of Afghanistan, is it crucial to zoom into the civil policing missions and find out whether these follow an effective pattern.
Within this context should knowledge be sought on both the internal aspect (EU) and the external aspect of the mission (Afghanistan). To allow for a more in-depth conclusion and focus point, are Germany and the Netherlands important angles with regard to this analysis.

Introduction to research

Afghanistan has been the showcase of three decades of foreign and domestic occupation. Authority never carried a democratic and transparent image in the citizens minds. Such a history results in a limited impression of such values and makes acceptance of external reform increasingly difficult. Distrust of central authoritative power is therefore a key issue in the long term reform process of the country. Afghanistan is also an abstract example of foreign intervention as economic interests were never a priority. This contrasts the reoccurring American intervention strategy, built upon exploitation of resources, as Kuwait and Iraq prove. The European presence is ambiguous in nature as well, as no clear threats or profits were to be drawn from that region and political interests were not evident. As such does this topic gain significant value with regard to its necessity and relative potential. The European approach focuses on a civil policing aspect and stresses the mentoring and training component instead of a supporting one.

The relative success of the policing intervention in Afghanistan has been heavily analyzed and evaluated. There is however a lot of room for interpretation regarding effectiveness and whether the achievement of the mandate is actually forthcoming and more importantly, whether this will have a positive long term influence. The long term stability of the achievements is currently under heavy debate, as the deadline of the troop deployment is ending and insurgency is developing.

Analyzing the relative success of the mission will have to involve a comparative instrument, acknowledged globally and extensively debated. The theory in this paper will concentrate on the concept of 'Security Sector Reform', which provides for an academic and theoretical foundation. The concept has wide-ranging applicability and with it global recognition. Drawbacks include the ambiguous nature of the concept and the lack of critical insight it could give. The concept has great importance in modern security intervention and allows for a more complex insight into the nature and functioning of such undertakings. Far more important to this research is the concepts potential in answering the complex question of the European policing mission's success and its relative effectiveness.

In order to conclude upon the European accomplishments should a sample be drawn. The research will therefore focus on the two main actors of the mission, namely the Netherlands and Germany. The two actors will therefore be evaluated with regard to their contribution in achieving the set mandate and the effectiveness thereof.

The reasons for choosing the actors mentioned relate mainly to the lead positions, which Germany and the Netherlands hold within the European policing mission (EUPOL) and what significance these carry regarding their potential of implementing a Security Sector Reform (Bayley, 2005).

The two also provide for a more solid foundation of information due to the experience gained in Afghanistan and the amount of dedication to the mission. The comparative aspect of the research is furthermore useful and gives a more broadly acceptable conclusion, whilst not broadening the research topic. In addition can these two actors be related to the SSR theory

and with it allow for a good analysis.

These factors are important to this research as the scope of analysis is limited by length and time allowed for this paper. As such is a measure of Dutch and German effectiveness an arguable conclusion for the EUPOL mission as a whole. This carries great importance, as the analysis can therefore commence with SSR comparison to Dutch/German efforts and results. Limitations to the application of the conclusion drawn should state that regional differences prevail in Afghanistan and with it do the approaches of external actors. Relativity is therefore a key description of the situation and the conclusions drawn thereof.

Core to this paper is the intrinsic value of the topic, since many questions arise on the news as to the context and necessity of the missions. Established questions also refer to the limited information being received from the front, and relate to issues of meager organization and cooperation. The research paper should therefore allow for a better insight into the activities in Afghanistan and provide a neutral angle of looking at the accomplishments abroad in relation to the government reports. This is the right of every citizen, to be informed and be able to inform about issues directly affecting them. Such is the democratic and transparent nature of our civilization that we live in. To implement such values abroad should therefore be enforced with commitment to such at home.

Unlike the reports by institutions and governments, should this paper focus on a more qualitative research perspective to answering the effectiveness of the mission. One step in doing so will include the usage of interviews with officers stationed in Afghanistan. Another is by looking at the social and societal situations met prior to mission start and evaluate success of mission results. The theory will serve as a tool in relating to the mandate and actions of European actors in reforming the security sector and its sustainability. Using such measures should this paper be able to come up with a different but nevertheless important conclusion on the policing mission.

For this research paper the focus will lie on the effectiveness of the German and Dutch intervention and how its implementation of the mandate is hindered. Established factors have been acknowledged to be EU bureaucracy, cooperation within the EU mission, the scope and depth of the mandate as well as the environment of Afghanistan and how these relate to the contribution of the member states, which in turn face internal political and economical challenges. The current debate on the extension of the mission is what redraws the analysis of what has been achieved and whether long term stability is possible. Although complex in nature, is this research limited to its scope and will therefore outline external factors such as international cooperation as a means of consideration for the reader. Many aspects of analyzing the success of the mission are extensive in their own relative environment. Conclusions drawn from this research should try to provide a reasonably ranging conclusion and yet serve as an answer to the relative research question including its detailed sub parts.

<u>Research Question and explanation</u>

Drawn from the introduction to this topic, do several aspects regarding the European intervention arise. To give a conclusion on the broad success of the mission would stimulate lack of detail and create more questions. The focus of this research is to enable a first time account of the situation with its analysis of failures, especially prior to mission start. Analysis has previously only regarded the mission actions and their relative effect. Considering the environment of operation and provided the theory for implementation, should analysis focus on pre mission failures and success. Disproving the current nature of debate on the mission and providing a neutral analysis are key elements to this paper. The mission`s current status is a result of pre-mission failures and realizations and will thus contribute to a research question of such format:

   a. *Main Research question:*

   "To what extent have the German and Dutch participants in the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan reached their objectives and what explains their shortcomings?"

In order to create a coherent analysis will several steps be conducted to answering this complex research question. These will take an intertwined nature within the process of the paper but will evidently be concluded upon.

   b. *Sub-questions:*
   1. What explains success and failure in foreign Security Sector Reform according to the literature?

   2. What were the objectives of the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan and what were the difficulties in establishing them?

   3. What were the objectives of German and Dutch contribution to the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan and to what extent have these been reached?

   4. What explains success and failure of the mission?

The potential of this question consists of its disregard to messages in previous reports on mission progress and the sought future thereof. Although important, are official reports used for provision of factual information, which in turn will be compared to the theory of an SSR. The paper will conclude on the relative success of the Dutch and German police training mission with its potential in regard to prior complications. Nevertheless should this come in contrast to opinions published by official reports, stating clear facts and figures on officers trained and crimes prevented. The conclusion should therefore be of a different nature as has previously been drawn in academic research, being independent of governmental reports and the conclusions thereof. As such is this paper a step towards regarding the afghan police mission in a different light and presented a neutral standpoint with the aid of the acknowledged SSR theory.

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Approach

The research question *"To what extent have the German and Dutch participants in the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan reached their objectives and what explains their shortcomings?"* has a complex method of answering.

As previously described will the research design include aspects of a descriptive as well as explanatory nature. To combine both, will they first need to be divided in line with the introduction to the topic and the presentation of the current and past quantitative facts. These include data on the mission itself but also on the legislative process within the EU as well as the support from the public representing and influencing national policy processes. In order to gain knowledge from these sets of data, will a qualitative analysis focus on combining these sets to seek a possible correlation. This means that policy shaping the mandate is subject to intense political and public debate. Afghanistan is a rather ambiguous case in which not all processes relate to those of other post conflict situations. External factors are therefore important factors in the national foreign policy process. Additionally should qualitative analysis give a more solid foundation to the data, in order to form and sustain a line of argument consistent with maintaining a neutral standpoint. Within this reasoning should a more reliable and accurate account be established regarding the answering of the research question.

With regard to the research question, will I try to compare and establish a link between the German and Dutch missions and their relative success in literature of implementing their mandates. Because such a link has not been discussed it possesses a certain interest to analyze especially in regard to the significant angles already evaluated regarding the broader policing missions ongoing. This link however might also bring significant difficulties such as the lack of correlation or the weak data relating specifically to the either missions and to what extent progress can be related to one country's achievements. Especially with the case of Afghanistan has much information been subject to significant external pressure and has thus been corrupted or ignored. Regarding such nature of the mission, is it even harder to account for the individual missions within EUPOL (such as the Dutch and German mission) and conclude on their effectiveness. In order to counter this will an extensive amount of information be obtained from significant sources other than Dutch and German official reports but also from scholarly articles as well as possible interviews and accounts from primary sources. Interviews have been set up with the aid of the Dutch police foreign intervention office in Apeldoorn and private connections. Primary sources on this topic have mainly been obtained via the use of online search engines, with exceptions following a word to mouth approach. These will allow for a differentiation of achievements but also conclude on possible similarities and how these help in achieving the mandate. In general terms, towards answering the research question, is it not of primary importance to create a sterile differentiation between the two, but is it feasible for gaining a detailing account for the creation on the results presented.

Possible threats to the research design include the lack of data, which might be kept from the public by the national or European institutions. Not gaining these data sets could be countered by relating to more secondary source based arguments and facts, hereby circumventing a possible primary data gathering. With secondary sources does the main problem arise of reliability on bias; however will each source be evaluated according to its relative importance to the topic and an evaluation of the author him/herself regarding the background and previous knowledge on the topic. Although much has been written on the theoretical aspect of the SSR, do certain authors dominate the research with extensive publishing and presentation of new argumentations. David Bayley and Michael Brzoska are renowned authors in this research area and will therefore be used to present argumentations.

A lack of information would in the worst case lead to a lack of clarity on the topic and thus possibly neglect certain units or variables. By using secondary sources can this worst case scenario be contained, as these sources would have also gathered a series of datasets and would try to cover all angles of their research. Thus, incorporating more sources, will a possible disregard of factors be limited. The ampleness of sources and information is increased with the broadening of the variables analyzed, being both the Dutch and German mission.

The design type of the research follows a mixed process with descriptive, review and semi-experimental aspects. Although mostly following a literature review style, will aspects of semi-experimental nature be included in the form of primary sources. The angle of the research should allow for a qualitative as well as quantitative analysis to be conducted. Using both aspects will allow for a more substantial conclusion to the research question.

Although not related to a direct experiment, can this research be grouped as a longitudinal design with a comparative nature. Two or more variables are being compared to another factor and from it can a pattern be sought. The Dutch and German missions are being compared to another but mainly to the theory of an SSR and the pre-conditions stated. In this regard could one argue that a pre and post test are being used, which in the cases of evaluation reports do tend to be the case. This paper however seeks to analyze the complete process leading up to a possible answer of effectiveness.

The analysis of the data collected will follow a process of description and explanation. In following sections will the data and information be evaluated according to its purpose in the research and provide for an answering argumentation.

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<u>**Theory**</u>

What is Security Sector Reform?

Describing and debating the concept of Security Sector Reform will provide for the theoretical background to the analysis of this paper with regard to the strengths and weaknesses. In addition is the history of the concept a pre requisite to understanding current security reform and intervention as well as provide for a clearer perception of the policing mission in Afghanistan and others alike. Reasons are that the SSR concept has been widely accepted as a realistic model of intervention and has thus been used by the Dutch and German contributors. Realizing the theories weaknesses and strengths will relate to the shortcomings and successes of donors using this model and long term feasibility of reform. It thus serves as a tool of analysis in the research.

Although an important feature in conflict studies today, is the SSR concept a very young one and is still being developed. Nevertheless has this concept been elaborated and adjusted to fit several situations and environments of insecurity, whether domestically or foreign, and can thus be shaped and trimmed to perform in this research.

The Security Sector Reform is a concept which sprout from the 1990's after the state of insecurity and distrust in Europe ceased. It is essentially comprised of a list of activities and issues which stimulate the internal and external security of the public sector. Hence it is "aimed at the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance" (Hänggi, 2004). Due to the ambiguous nature of such descriptions and its increasing applicability globally is there not one fit model but are there several concepts and ideas. This analysis should bring the essential concepts together and formulate a clear account of an SSR and apply that to the case of Afghanistan. This means that a clear model for Afghanistan was never been founded but gathered via theoretical analysis without the practical experiences to back it up. The extent to which this dilemma influences the outcome of an SSR mission will be answered in this paper.

Due to the large history of the concept should a step-wise description narrowly zoom in on a clear outline of an SSR as used in Afghanistan. At first should a broad definition of 'security governance' be established preceded by the disentanglement of the concept into definitions of 'security' and 'governance'. Thereafter should a closer analysis focus on the 'security sector reform' and in following the application in Afghanistan.

Security and Governance

In order to understand the reasoning behind foreign intervention in the form of police training missions, the history and establishment of the Security Governance Theory have to be presented. The first account of the concept security arose from Arnold Wolfers article in 1952, whereby he clearly established an account for national security, which for its time, was a change in momentum for academics and future analysts. His influential account for foreign policy gave rise to the school of thought we know today and allows us to proceed even today in our analysis and thereby create criteria of evaluation for concepts like the SSR.

Wolfers notably defined foreign policy as being foremost dictated by national interests as a result in times of insecurity, especially when external threats dominate the agenda in regard to internal threats. During that time these internal struggles concentrated on social reform and the evaluation of the depression. He particularly addresses an important quote from Walter Lippmann stating: "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war" (Lippmann, 1943, p.51). Although this statement arguably holds true even today, meaning that countries suspecting its national security tested if such norms/value are infringed, it will merely be used to support the pre-deployment analysis of the Afghanistan mission(s).

Since the end of the cold war has the world witnessed a change in the school of thought on the concept of security. As previously neglected, has the concept risen to include non-military facets such as political, societal or economic security (Hänggi, 2003). Nevertheless has the military aspect of security witnessed immense development as well, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Foremost has the idea of national security been heavily undermined by the increased globalization of our society and with it the degree of connectivity of its citizens. As such has national security observed a blurring of borders and with it a disappearance of a known or visible enemy with all results thereof. Such is the nature of the globalized world, that conflicts, regardless of location, witness global effects in either of the stated security facets (economical, political, societal etc.). Foreign policy was therefore related evermore to domestic policy and as such related more upon citizens. An increased connection between the two policy regimes called for a reforming of the security issue. 'Societal' and 'human' security were results of the new school of thought.

Human security is a core concept to understand regarding a formulation of an SSR and as such has obtained a dynamic definition. Significant analysis has resulted in an agreement on the fact of a paradigm shift in the traditional national security regime towards human security. The state now carries the responsibility of security for the individual, as was traditionally opposed (Brzoska, 2000). In broad terms does human security refer to the "security of individuals and communities, expressed as both 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' (Kaldor, 2007). Human security does not only develop on the idea of physical security much like the development of a security force does not depend on material means only. The prospects seen by the EU in this regard are very much justified, due to its neutral stance on international alignment and its experience with indirect aid provisions. Many failing states (as defined by Wulf in the later section) are hostile to human security with reasoning lying with human rights violations such as the right to vote or go to school. Furthermore is gender equality and the status of women a very culturally sensitive issue. Especially fragile is the externally influenced reform process in a country like Afghanistan (Gross, 2009).

Wulf argues that a security sector reform stems from the processes of governmental institutions, arguing for a top-down approach (2004). He clearly outlined that security is achieved via democratic and accountable decision making and the civilian control over the security sector. If such structures fail to provide for the necessary mechanisms, does civil

unrest and insecurity prosper. The concept of human security thus has the ability to not only complement but also transform into a matter of state/national security (Wulf, 2004).The focus then relies on the core values of stability, sustainability and justice and adds that conflict prevention, crisis management and civil–military coordination are means to achieving such ideals (Kaldor, 2007). The latter is of great importance to the Afghanistan case and will create the link between mission success and compliance with SSR theory.

Another definition of human security, with focus on European capabilities abroad, was presented by the Barcelona report of the study group on European security capabilities (2004), presented to the Common Foreign and Security Policy representative at that time, Javier Solana. Besides their argument to strive for a common European security force do they outline several principles which need to be handled in environments of insecurity globally. These include the establishment and maintenance of; "human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force" (Glasius et.al. 2006).

These are key measures which reoccur throughout the literature on security studies as well as that of the SSR. It is clear that human security follows a pattern of creating democratic accountability with a foundation of norms such as human rights, rule of law and transparency. It is evident that this environment is hard to achieve as violations of such norms are even present even in Europe.

Governance, similar to *security*, is a relatively new concept arising from the globalization and changing political ideals globally. Heiner Hänggi (2003) distinguishes between three different layers of governance, namely those at national, sub-national and international. In short, does governance relate to the design and system in which a social institution is able to maintain a centralized and self-regulated form of rule by consent. As Rosenau puts it: "the capacity to get things done" (1992). Governance is thus a system run with public and private interest intertwining to allow a sustainable policy making without central political intervention. Phenomena stimulating such a system of self governance include self government at local levels, outsourcing of central government functions (decentralization), privatization of security, networking between governments, international institutions and private actors and the post-conflict reconstruction under the umbrella of international institutions (Hänggi, 2003). Governance at the state and sub state level is mainly conducted by a central authoritative institution. In post-conflict states such as Afghanistan can this also operated by a criminal organization or donor such as the EU. On the international level precedes a series of rules and agreements which substitute the lack of a 'global government', aiding a mutual cooperative system. Non-governmental organizations like the United Nations aid in such processes of missing authoritative actors (Hänggi, 2003). Today we witness single government structures taking a lead role on the international stage, as with Germany leading European foreign policy or the United States.

Coming back to the issue of security, will this relate and be influenced by the type of governance dominant in that region. The degree of 'fragmentation of authority in security policy making' is a predominant measure of the governance level (Krahmann, 2003).

This implies that it is essential to know the level of governance in order to find the corresponding security policy amendments. For reasons of length and importance to the

research, will this analysis focus on the state level security governance as opposed to an international or sub-state level, although aspects of all will inevitably reemerge in the analysis due to the level of affinity in this topic.

As previously outlined does *security governance* combine the concepts of 'security' and 'governance' at the state level, discussed by Hänggi (2003). The focus on a state-centric model of security governance will, as discussed, involve the aspect of human security, measured by the safety of the individual, group or society.

In contrast to the traditional concept of security involving mostly military, does the security concept need to encompass non-military aspects as well. Especially after the wake of 9/11, did internal and external threats overlap and thus call for more adjustment the new world order. One adjustment to the analysis arose with the division of the security sector into two pillars; a) the security forces and b) the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them (DAC Task Force, 2000). The latter include 'state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions) and elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the Defense Ministry, etc.)' (DAC Task Force, 2000).

The change in school of thought from government to governance left many aspects of a security sector ambiguous and did not account for security situations in 'failed states' where guerilla or private security companies were assertive. As such did the Human Development Report in 2002, strives to include such influential groups by defining five major categories whereof the first two compliment the previous definition by the OECD:

1. *Organizations authorized to use force*: armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, gendarmeries, intelligence services (military and civilian), secret services, coast guards, border guards, and customs
Authorities, reserve and local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, presidential guards, militias);
2. *Civil management and oversight bodies*: president and prime minister, national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees, ministries of defense, internal affairs and foreign affairs, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units), civil society organizations (civilian review boards, public complaints commissions);
3. *Justice and law enforcement institutions*: judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudspersons, correctional services, customary and traditional justice systems;
4. *Non-statutory security forces*: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private bodyguard units, private security companies, political party militias; and,
5. *Non-statutory civil society groups*: professional groups, the media, research organizations, advocacy organizations, religious organizations, non-governmental organizations, community groups.

The involvements of the actors within the categories differ for each region and even environment. General agreement however concludes that the more non-statutory security forces are active, in combination with lesser non-statutory civil society groups to counter them, the poorer the general governance of the security sector in question (Hendrickson, 2002). This phenomenon reinforces the concept of 'human security' in the globalized world, and calls to national governance to strengthen its civil society. With this notion does the question arise as to the meaning and perception of system running under 'good governance'. General acceptance from published definitions has brought five key attributes to answering the question of good governance: 1. Transparency; 2. Responsibility; 3. Accountability; 4. Participation; and 5. Responsiveness (to the needs of individuals) (UNCHR Resolution, 2000). To simplify and thus generalize, is it difficult to differentiate between good governance of the security sector and the concept of democratic governance. This means that a model for a donor receiving country is found within the norms established and accepted in our community. Any capacity building mission of such nature is thus a question of exporting these values abroad, with all the cultural and moral dilemmas included. Justification of such morals was provided by the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action in 1993, which calls out to the international community to 'support the strengthening and promoting of democracy in the entire world' (UNHR, 1993). Since then has membership to any regional or international organization, such as NATO, EU and OSCE, been linked to entry requirements consisting of good governance of the security sector and that of democratic governance. Currently, the definition, due to heavy analysis, of good governance of the security sector has reached elaborate and far reaching contours. So vast is the definition that not one nation has yet achieved all principles and practices effectively and thus enforce the concept and its exportation. With no clear boundaries will intervention for good governance of the security sector abroad fall short and with it the acceptance of such measures.

Security Sector Reform
Security Sector Reform is the overarching concept of the previously established theories and puts means to an end. Simply put does an SSR explain the measures needed to reach the goals of democratic governance of the security sector with all its definitions (Winkler, 2002).
In other words does SSR refer to the establishment and improvement of democratic governance of the security sector with close ties between the concepts of security and development. We cannot have development without security and not security without democracy and development (Ekengren, 2013).
The task involves far greater measures than to merely institutionalize laws and practices to meet the framework of governance, but to include a social process, giving rise to a developmental phenomenon. The difficulty for foreign or donor countries circulates around the differences in reform methods needed to meet the individual needs of receiving countries, as these differ in most important factors. Therefore it is crucial to allow for a healthy distance towards the intervention, as democracy is 'an ongoing process in which no society will ever achieve perfection' (Hänggi, 2003). The challenge according to Hänggi stems from the need for provision of security and democratic governance simultaneously. It is not be feasible to advance policing methods in order to more professionally capture criminals, if the judicial system cannot cope due to capacity or quality reasons (Hänggi, 2004).

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If donor countries cannot attain impeccable systems of such concepts, how would a post-conflict or 'failed state' relate to this shortcoming and in what timeframe. This being a hard view, should it be noted that foreign intervention can only tackle problems to the extent to which they are capable and accepted. Tackling a problem rooting in decades of war and imbedded in a culture is very hard with mere materialistic and motivational tools, which the European capacity building mission entails.

Although the concept of an SSR has been defined and shaped over countless years and with it gaining recognition as a policy model, does it lack a solid framework of measures regarding its reform. Clear practices are always fluid and tend to take shape during the operation itself, but Brzoska indentified key dimensions, adding to the concept of security governance. He cleared several definitions into a spectrum of 4 dimensions; Political dimension: civil control, Economic dimension: appropriate consumption of resources, Social dimension: guarantee of citizens physical security, Institutional dimension: professionalization of actors in the security sector (Brzoska 2000). Although relating to previously established definitions of security governance, do these dimensions allow for the establishment of a scheme of measures to confront these problems, due to the combination of previous definitions of the concept. In fact were these dimensions and the active academic debate a fertile breeding ground for a model for security reform to sprout. As such did the OECD establish a scheme with definite and realizable areas of development and reform (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Primarily is the crux of the reform of the security sector the development of both effective civil oversight and creation of institutions capable of providing security (Ball et. al. 2003). The term security sector reform however focuses on a long term establishment of a democratic society and can only function on that basis. It can thus not function as a stand-alone policy and goes hand in hand with the development of the society (Wulf, 2004).

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Any short term intervention will merely scratch the surface of the problem and will most likely fail, according to the theory. Wulf therefore pleads for local ownership, which allows for a better cooperation between Donor countries and recipients, as the latter are more willing to adjust to the new norms proposed, by having a control over the system. This can be traced back to the previous definition of security governance.

The key to establishing and maintaining a state of legitimate and transparent authority falls and rises with the ability to provide for a functioning security and justice system (Gross, 2009). An SSR involves a security approach to enabling democratic and accountable institutions to be established. It should therefore be seen as a beginning step to reforming the holistic situation in Afghanistan. The core areas tackled (as presented by the OECD) include core security actors, security oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement and non statutory forces such as private security companies (PSC) and rebellious forces (Gross, 2009). In broad terms does this translate into the four dimensions outlined by Brzoska; political, economic, social and institutional.

Potential of SSR
Having established the definition of the SSR theory should the next section conclude on the relative potential for the case of Afghanistan. What explains success and failure in foreign SSR according to the literature? Especially in the wake of the cold war and the European difficulties of foreign intervention, especially in the Middle East, it is of great concern to know whether lessons have been learned and available information is being used.
First will a series of SSR implementation be given and in short their relative success, followed by a post-conflict situation analysis of SSR potential. The final part will conclude on the external actor influences in post-conflict SSR with its strengths and weaknesses.

Having established a foundation of the SSR theoretical debate and knowing its ambiguous and yet widely applicable nature, can we focus on the case of Afghanistan. Although there are several situations in which an SSR can be conducted, are most cases confronted with a post-conflict nature. For Afghanistan have most authors agreed to a post-conflict situation although there are voices that claim conflict is still evident. Although a separate debate can be conducted on this issue, is the main reasoning for post-conflict one of an existing authoritative body, which holds a form of democratic monopoly of force (Brzoska, 2006). In addition can the case of Afghanistan be compared to other acknowledged cases like Iraq, Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). In such cases have cease fires or mediated agreements by international actors ended an organized and large scale armed conflict (Brzoska, 2006).
In cases of post-conflict reconstruction via an SSR, is the provision of security in the created vacuum a prerequisite to establishing any legitimate institutions. Organized crime, paramilitary activity, drugs and weapons, terrorism and abuse of power by state branches are problems faced with post-conflict reconstruction. As stated with the OECD guidelines is the agreement that "the more non-statutory security forces are active, in combination with lesser non-statutory civil society groups to counter them, the poorer the general governance of the security sector in question" (Hendrickson, 2002).

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As previously stated does external driven SSR call for an immediate closing of the security vacuum created after a period of conflict. Reconstruction or sometimes construction, as with the case of Afghanistan, of the security apparatus is essential to obtain a monopoly of power in order to repel insurgency by unreformed forces (Brzoska, 2006). In the case of Afghanistan were a lot of militias and local warlords in fear of giving up their security to yet another external actor. Democratic oversight and transparency are following measures that need to be put into action. The chicken and egg problem arises from the question of the level of democratization of the security sector in contrast to the increasing capacity building of its monopoly on force. As seen in BiH and central Asia, are many security apparatus lacking clear democratic oversights, resulting in corruption and limited transparency. Results thereof are clearly a lack of trust from citizens and the resulting insecurity of individuals.

The clear message should be that an SSR cannot, neither in theory nor practice, create a political regime based on democratic values. Such changes are society driven and follow a bottom-up scheme. Democratic consolidation within a state must follow mutually reinforcing values of 'human rights, rule of law, development and multi party political' realms (Brzoska, 2006). A SSR in post conflict situations is thus a measure of creating and/or conforming a security apparatus which meets democratic norms and allows for a transparent provision of human rights, rule of law and political awareness. The SSR established up to date, regarding the theory and models created, does not yet meet a democratic consolidation scheme, and is therefore limited in the output created.

The final section will look at the SSR implementation in Afghanistan from an external actors point of view and outline the key challenges and necessities to overcome such.

Firstly does routing the security vacuum issue also relate to the means of doing so. Especially after a state of conflict are tensions, sometimes imbedded in cultures, a prerequisite of being dealt with. If no 'clean slate' or 'point zero' is established between warring sides, can conflict sprout again. Examples of failing to overcome such a dilemma can be seen in the cases of BiH, Sudan, Nigeria and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Second comes the issue of transferring responsibility from the external actor (or Donor) to the domestic stakeholder. Too often is foreign intervention being relied upon and received passively. Recipients do not take matters into own hands and therefore tend to exploit the system. External actors therefore tend to keep interventions as short as possible with the highest efficiency of transferring responsibility. To counter this should it be said that almost all foreign interventions are not demand driven, meaning they do not adhere to the wishes and needs of the recipient state. This results often in a perception of belligerents towards foreign actors making the task ever more difficult. Afghanistan is no different, and has one of the deepest routed cultures today, with limited capability of changing (Crocker, 2007).

Thirdly are foreign actors often themselves not presenting a role model status, with violations of democratic norms much like they are preaching to the locals. Although effectiveness of restoring security and providing for oversight bodies takes priority, are such targets met with lack of the values deemed to be implemented (Hänggi, 2003).

Fourth comes an aforementioned point, namely that of prioritizing certain agendas. As established, is the creation of security and the 'clean slate' creation a primary concern, but due to limited resources and forces, are agendas prioritized. Human security, democracy and good

governance of the security institutions are mostly seconded to the establishment of an SSR. As previously discussed is the establishment of security reform in need of simultaneous democratization of its branches (Carothers, 2011).

Fifth in line is the self interest driven agenda of external actors. Besides international community based mission such as EUPOL, are many bilateral missions coexisting. This adds to the confusion on agenda setting and the prioritizing of measures. With different actors come different interests and agreements, which mostly fail to mutually benefit and therefore result in negative outcomes for all actors involved, mainly the recipient.

The sixth and final dilemma entails the conflicting interests of external actors in a post-conflict environment. This relates not only to national levels, but also sub-national institutions failing to align policies. Main conflicts arise between the military and civil capacity building missions, whereby each has a different objective, sometimes hindering the other (Brzoska, 2006).

The main force behind the SSR, as Ban Ki Moon stated, is that it 'helps build more accountable, effective and efficient institutions, thereby facilitating early recovery in the aftermath of conflict' (The United Nations SSR perspective, 2012)

Concluding this chapter does the ambiguous nature of the SSR, due to its limited practical experiences obtained, reoccur. Arguably does the quantity of analysis devoted to this theory cause for the diverse and porous definition of the concept. However, do external actors create their own agenda with regard to their interests and perceptions of good governance and security reform. The initial stage of demilitarization and filling of the security vacuum does not take much consolidated effort on behalf of the international community. The problems arise with the democratization and building of essential oversight bodies conform with the correct transfer of responsibility to the right bodies. A long term commitment is the ideal method of implementing a successful SSR. Although part of the theory adapts to a immediate post-conflict securitization, does the democratization of the progress require a long term dedication. An SSR should also be created with the bottom-up method and requested by the population. Although the SSR is not political reform, should it provide for a solid democratic foundation of a security sector conform to the norms and values of human security.

In this respect are there many problems facing the Dutch and German mission in Afghanistan, as previous examples show lack of solidity of the SSR concept and significant gaps in the theory of externally provided security sector reform. On the other hand does SSR theory outline an ideal environment and sets certain goals, however fails to mention suitable and adaptive methods. As such can the theory be held as a analytical tool more than it would serve as a model for reform.

3
<u>**Results and Discussion**</u>

EUPOL objectives, difficulties and results
This chapter will answer the question on what the objectives of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan were and what the difficulties in establishing them are. The results outlined by EUPOL encompass the achievements of its member states. This section therefore outlines a brief history of the mission and its perceived results. Later analysis will indulge into the methods of achieving these results with further focus.

Pre-Mission dilemmas
The internal problems facing the EU institutions upon assessing and constructing a feasible strategy for a security sector reform in Afghanistan, show the beginning cracks of a debatable EUPOL mission.
The problems started in the preparatory stages which were so misleading that the European parliament called for a clarification on the mission planning and more transparency within the EU institutions. Only recently has the EP gained institutional power, relative to the other bodies, with the 2007 agreement over the cooperation in budgetary matters. As such was it able, in legal terms, to participate and consult in matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Participation in establishments of the Crisis Management Concepts (CMC) or the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) has witnessed limited presence by the EP (Gya, 2007). Another major weakness of the EU foreign policy structure was highlighted by the division of tasks in establishing the mission outlines. The EU's concept of SSR has been established under two pillars following the two dimensions of intervention (Larive, 2012). The Council contributes to the managing of CSDP mission whereby the Commission takes charge of the assistance in the development of a strategy (Rehrl, 2014). Furthermore is a broad mandate subject to extensive exchange of interests from the member states standpoint and are as such, incorporated in the policy process.

In July 2006 the EU sent out an exploratory mission to Afghanistan to evaluate the security and institutional situation, probing its strength and durability. Sample tests were planned to continue throughout the implementation phase and set reviews on a six-month basis. Previous failures in the EU foreign affairs body were known and include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo and the Palestinian territories (Gya, 2007). Kuwait and Iraq were both stepping stones to understanding foreign intervention from a military point of view and experiencing its limited scope of potential. Due to the increase in civil security reform literature and debate, did the EU focus its strengths according to such values. These however demonstrated severe lack in examples and therefore contained a weak theoretical foundational with limited experience.

Mandate(s)
The mandate for the EUPOL mission was one broadly set to allow enough room for interpretation but sufficient detail to counter criticism and be able to evaluate.
The EU adopted a strategy fit to a post-conflict situation and with the intention of establishing

rule of law and capacity building of its security forces. Although the mission relates to the theory of SSR, is it hard to find official documents relating to it. One argument for EU SSR implementation was provided by the former afghan president Karzai, stating: 'SSR, is the basic pre-requisite to recreating the nation that today's parents hope to leave to future generations' (Sedra, 2003). Although a political quote, does it define a key element for understanding the mission's mandate: that of a long term investment for 'future generations' and more importantly outlines the demand for such an intervention. Much has been discussed and agreed upon by the international community; even the G8 donors meeting in 2002 developed a framework of 5 pillars to implement an SSR. In it the 5 pillars seen by common

SSR theory with relation to the relative tasks for donor countries: military reform by the US, police reform by Germany (later EUPOL), counter-narcotics by UK, judiciary reform by Italy and disarmament and reintegration by Japan (Gross, 2009). Reasons for a favor towards civil intervention were provided by David Law: one being the EU's leading role as a global aid donor, and second its status or reputation after the creation of the CFSP (2007). Due to high international pressure on targeting the problems in Afghanistan, was there limited understanding of the environment to be confronted, and severe lack of understanding the necessity. Arguably could US dominance cause for political divisions and inactivity damage relations.

A good measure for analyzing the necessity of intervention can be received from public opinion. As the table shows, did opinion regarding US foreign policy increase, even after 6 years of the Afghanistan intervention. This being the case, can the US be seen as one argument for the acceptance of a EUPOL mission. Reasoning for foreign intervention is still ambiguous and much analysis has been dedicated to this topic as to

Favorable Views of the U.S.			
	2007 %	2008 %	Change
France	39	42	+3
Britain	51	53	+2
Germany	30	31	+1
Spain	34	33	-1
Poland	61	68	+7
Russia	41	46	+5
Turkey	9	12	+3
Lebanon	47	51	+4
Egypt	21	22	+1
Jordan	20	19	-1
S. Korea	58	70	+12
Indonesia	29	37	+8
India	59	66	+7
China	34	41	+7
Pakistan	15	19	+4
Japan	61	50	-11
Argentina	16	22	+6
Brazil	44	47	+3
Mexico	56	47	-9
Tanzania	46	65	+19
Nigeria	70	64	-6

Figure 3. Source: Pew, 2008, p.3

the necessities and processes leading up to external indulgences.
Nevertheless should focus lie with the European opinions on the mission and its form. Although opinion polls and surveys are lacking about the actual support for the mission and the perception of the mandate, do polls like those of Pothier help. He claims that 63% of those surveyed in France and in Britain, 66% in Italy and 69% in Germany think the war against the Taliban has been a failure (2008). With this perception in mind, can the question be raised as to the expectations for the EUPOL mission, especially considering the intelligence gathered prior to mission launch. With the ambiguous nature of EU support for the mission and the establishment thereof will focus realign on the established mandate.

Considering the nature of the debate prior the mission deployment, is it understandable that a mandate is crucial to aligning the donor countries in a realistic and sustainable manner.

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The official statement used by EU institutions regarding the EUPOL mandate reads as follows:

*"The aim of the mission is to contribute to the **establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing** arrangements that will ensure appropriate **interaction with the wider criminal justice system** under Afghan ownership. The mission is supporting the reform process towards a **trusted police service** working within the **framework of the rule of law and respect of human rights"** – Press Office EUPOL Afghanistan*

Highlighted are the key elements to the mandate, establishing ground which can be tackled in further analysis. These can be traced in the objectives outline below, establishing the three pillars of the EUPOL mission:

1) Institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior 2) Professionalization of the Afghan National Police (ANP) 3) Connecting police to justice reform.	In these three pillars, EUPOL is working towards six objectives: 1. police command, control and communications; 2. intelligence-led policing; 3. criminal investigation department capacity building 4. implementation of the anti-corruption strategy; 5. police-justice cooperation; 6. strengthening gender and human rights aspects within the afghan national police (ANP)

The objectives outlined by the EUPOL office stress the main aspect of cooperation and communication, between and within institutions. Although hard to measure, will analysis combine past sources on this matter as well as interviews with officers stationed.
Overall are these objectives rather broad in definition and weak regarding adherence of the theoretical aspects of an SSR. In fact is the alignment of demilitarization and the creation of a security sector, as a primary concern in the theory, ignored in the set objectives. These seem to focus on a tactic based on the establishment of security. Formulations within this mandate therefore differ as shown with the European Council report outlining the following tasks:

- To assist the afghan government in implementing a strategy towards sustainable and effective civilian policing
- improve cohesion and coordination among international donors
- developing the strategy with frequent reviews to allow a better adaptation to changes in the local environment and thereby better cooperate with other donors
- cooperate closely with other forces present such as NATO, ISAF and various private or individual donor missions
- support the linking of police with rule of law (Council, 2010, Cash, 2012)
Details on exact implementation are left to the individual task forces and with it does the EU mandate distance itself from the implementation. Conformity with the SSR model seems to be left with task creation on the ground by EUPOL. Although the EU's structure allows for a

top-down approach, is there a significant confusion as to the process which enables the actual activities.

Financing
The financing of the mission is a key element to sustaining a long term intervention. As provided earlier, is an SSR a long term investment, with diverse demands of financing. With the dispersion of interests from the international community comes the division of funds to the separate priorities. As such, is the issue of prioritizing and the resulting conflicts of agendas a more critical issue when financial provisions are scarce. The EUPOL budget is outlined as follows:

Up to 2009-64 million
31 May 2010 to 31 May 2011 - 54.6 million
1 September 2011 to 30 June 2012 - 61 million
1 August 2012 to 31 May 2013 – 56.91 million
1 June 2013 to 31 December 2014 – 108 million
(Sources: EUPOL Press Office factsheets; Cash, 2012)

The budget timeline shows a net increase in financial means for the EUPOL mission. It should be mentioned that first years fell short on budget by about 3 million and later by 1 million in regard to the established number (Cash, 2012). These facts create doubt towards the intent and dedication of the mission and therefore the establishment of the mandate. Such thoughts reemerge the questions of necessity of the mission and it's creating factors.
It is furthermore important to stress the European mission relative to others. The US training mission on counter insurgency and training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) obtains a funding of far greater dimensions. Indicated is the budget for the equipping and training of the ANA by US personnel from 2002 until 2008.

In USD (millions)

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
76.9	362.7	723.7	1736.6	767.1	4884.2	1721.7	10.273

Source: GAO Report, 2008

The question on dedication and intent reoccur with these facts and omit curious questions with regard to the effectiveness of the EUPOL mission. On the other hand might one argue that the US has a far more expensive task in Afghanistan including equipping and supporting troops but numbers far exceed the two-fold of any EUPOL budget. On the other hand does the civil capacity building require more wide-spread funds at opposed to purely military funding. Ideally would the US budget serve the purpose of civil reform better than the EUPOL mandate.

Mission Composition
The EUPOL Afghanistan mission started with a total of 160 personnel, from 18 EU member

states and exceptions from Canada, New Zealand and Norway. This number is relatively small compared with the number of contributing countries and especially meager with regard to the mandate and objectives of the mission. Relating to the budget, does understaffing proceed as an issue throughout the mission's duration. In 2008 there was an agreement to work towards a staff of 400 secondees; however the count up to 2011 never reaches further than 306. As such was full strength and full capability to commit to the tasks set, never reached, and provides breeding grounds for criticism and analysis (Committee, 2011).

 The mission is run by the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), chaired by the afghan minister of interior affairs (Gya, 2007). The main task set out for the board consists of coordination, prioritizing and guiding international police reform processes. The secretariat of the IPCB (IPCB-S) is a permanent structure which facilitates and coordinates the procedures of the IPCB. It thus serves as an incoming and outgoing body of information, bringing information into the international stage, and bringing new processes into Afghanistan (IPCB website). Although this body does not receive much attention is it a beating heart of communication between donors and the processes in Afghanistan.

The training component of EUPOL resulted in a short-term alignment on basic lectures and trainings on human rights, legal norms and the basic policing tasks (Gya, 2007). Stress fell upon the civilian or community policing strategy, engaging more closely with the citizens and their communities. Although this was a key criterion of the mandate, is the establishment of trust between institutions and layers of governance a long term objective.

Results
The European mission in Afghanistan has always been a small contribution to the SSR reform in Afghanistan. With 27 different contributors, is it one of the most diverse missions globally. Its staffing and funding however show severe lack of contribution from the EU's CSDP but also from its member states. It is hard to accommodate the fact that Germany has a greater staff and better funding than that of the entire EUPOL mission. Nonetheless should the achievements of the mission be measured, in relation to its size. Facts and figures on exact achievements are hard to establish and thus should accounts from the EUPOL press office and select government statutes be used.
According to the EUPOL press office were the main achievements summarized as follows :
- establishment of training institutions - the Crime Management College and the Police Staff College - for senior leaders of the ANP and detectives;
- Development of policies and strategies at the MoI, including on female police, that constitute a firm strategic and operational framework to the overall police reform process;
- More community oriented policing practices;
- enhanced cooperation between police and prosecutors in investigations;
- Establishment of the Office of the Police Ombudsman and the Department of Human Rights and Gender in the MoI;
- Establishment of Family Response Units of the ANP;
- advanced awareness on human rights, including women and child rights within the ANP;

- New Afghan Penal Code through the Criminal Law Reform Working Group;
- Improved legal framework for police disciplinary procedures

Analyzing the police training and the quality thereof, can major improvements be witnessed, as with the numbers trained. The ANP had a total strength of 157.000 by the end 2012, with three major branches. The Afghan uniformed police (AUP) with 84.000, the afghan border police (ABP) with 22.500 and the afghan national civil order police (ANCOP) with 16.500 officers (Permanseder, 2013).
An important a viable objective was the tackling of the gender issue. There is a significant amount of women employed in the ANP, with a change from 180 women out of 53,400 in 2005, to 1,551 out of 157,000 in 2013. When put into context is this a mere 1 percent of ANP total in Afghanistan whereby few a deployed in rural areas (Hancock, 2013).
To oversee such forces, is the EUPOL mission engaged in advising the ministry of interior, which in joint action created over 260 police reform policies (EUPOL press office, 2012). The reforming of the rule of law sector and its linkage to the afghan people has witnessed a slow start. At the beginning of the mission were 40 law experts active under EUPOL, whereas EULEX in Kosovo obtained 2000 experts in its initial years (International Crisis Group, 2007). This number increased to only 49 in 2011 with no information as to the numbers between (House of Lords, 2011). The reoccurring difficulty of gaining facts on composition is very questionable and leaves much room for improvement with regard to transparency of the process. It is due to such reasons that insights will be obtained from national accounts in the following chapter.

The mandate clearly leaves room for interpretation and with it allows for the misalignment of national interests and the implementation thereof, as the analysis of the SSR concept indicates. Especially with the diversity of actors is a solid mandate important in creating a foundation for cooperation and strategy of implementation. The SSR theory outlines that cooperation is the method of achieving effectiveness in activities. The budgetary differences resulting in a differentiated approach to security reform repels the theory's aspect of prioritization. With it the dilemma of creating security forces trained but the lacking oversight to direct them. The factual account of officers trained should stand in contrast to the bodies established to oversee them. Although established, is the sufficiency thereof another topic. These accounts clearly show a lack of dedication to the actual reforming of a security sector, in contrast to training police and transferring responsibility. With the EU's civil mission are mandates far wider than with a military mission such as the US conducts. This means that results of the EU should be perceived with regard to the civil aspect it deems to reform and the size of its EUPOL mission.

4
<u>Dutch and German contributions</u>

The extent to which the Dutch and German mission has reached their objectives relates to the relative achievements made. The results which stem from the efforts will be outlined in this chapter.

The main problem of analyzing these two missions stems from the difference in mandate and therefore results strived for. This section advances with the argumentation that EUPOL achievements are a result of its contributing actors. For this research will Dutch and German efforts be concluded as factors creating EUPOL success, with the reasoning established previously.

The Netherlands

Starting with the Dutch mission within EUPOL, can we indentify a set of clear objectives outlined in the form of 4 points: "(1) strengthening the capacity of the Afghan civilian police; (2) improving cooperation between the Afghan civilian police and the judicial system, particularly prosecutors; (3) improving the capacity of the Afghan judicial system; and (4) boosting the public awareness and accessibility of the country s rule of law institutions" (Frerks, 2013).

As already noticeable from the formulations do the Dutch focus on the rule of law component within the EUPOL mission. With the international criminal court in the Hague, is it a Dutch expertise which can enlighten afghan officers, such as lawyers, prosecutors and national police, on the democratic rule of law. In this respect is SSR provided from a specific expertise standpoint and allows for high quality training.

Cooperation with the host nation is key to the EUPOL mission, as it provides for the invitation of a foreign intervention and provides for the necessary means of successful implementation of the mandate. Accordingly was the Afghanistan Compact of 2006 a stepping stone to providing the agreement for the intervention which both sides would support. The compact also establishes the common perception on tasks to be conducted, and thus provides the legal framework for the training officers.

Important to the Dutch mission is the emphasis on cooperation with the international community in Afghanistan and the NGO's present. The Dutch mission therefore follows a description of 'integrated mission' within EUPOL, and follows the closest ties to the German mission. This is due to the 'lead nation' role of Germany and the responsibility they carry in the security of the Kunduz area, in which the Dutch are active in the 'German Police Training Center' (Frerks, 2013). Even in the final evaluation report, does cooperation with Germany stand as the main strategy and focus with regard to implementing the mandate.

Prior to mission onset did each donor state conduct a status-quo, or baseline account, which should specify, to further detail than the EUPOL account, the problems to be tackled. According to the Dutch evaluation can the afghan situation be established via the politics and society and the security situation, prior to mission begin.

The letter to parliament in 2007, outlining the situation in Afghanistan describes the judicial system as lacking en the police force as weak. Additionally is the police not able to tackle the law and order due to restricted size, training received, material equipped (or not), weak

organization and widespread corruption (Verhagen, 2007). Additional concern regards the numbers of ANP active, measuring only 120 in the Uruzgan province, with estimates considering 1200 necessary for basic tackling of order. The quality of the police force was at a minimum, as many police executives did not even have basic police training, and those few who did only had the basic six week training. Furthermore was there a great problem with illiteracy of police officers which was due to the lacking command structure, a near impossible hurdle to overcome. The figure estimated stood at 60-70% illiteracy for the police sector (Middelkoop, 2007). Finally, was the police force more of static security personnel than operational police officers. This was especially evident by the inaccessibility of the police service by the citizens. Leading to a corrupt and biased image of the ANA by the afghan citizens (Frerks, 2013).

The judicial system encountered was also of the likes of the police sector, with high corruption and limited know-how of the duty. Again there was a trust issue, this time between justice and police sector, leading to a standstill in criminal investigations and prosecutions. The afghan citizens were in addition to this also not knowledgeable of their rights and the police and justice sector was not aware of defending these rights in their duties. These leads to inequality, especially related to gender, were women were far underrepresented in nearly all sectors of employment (Frerks, 2013).

A final problem area for Afghanistan pre-mission was that of the drug criminality and its related areas. According to the afghan minister of internal affairs, did the poppy harvest contain between 165.000 to 195.000 hectares, which is equally big as the year before. Confiscation and destruction of poppy's stood at 26.000 hectare in 2007 and 15.800 in 2006 (Verhagen, 2007). Even though there is an increase witnessed, is it so small, that multiple factors could have influenced it.

The Dutch mission within EUPOL takes priority in the reforming of the justice sector and its related functions regarding the ANP. Training of officers is outlined in the objectives, but regarding its size, a limited enterprise. At the start of the mission, did the Dutch contingency consist of ten Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar), one judicial expert and one gender advisor (Verhagen, 2007). The contingency after the initial stages gained a consistent strength between 40 to 50 staff. The recent position, within EUPOL, covered by the Dutch include: Head of police command, vice-head of mission, head of field command, head of field office kunduz, replacing head of police reform and several mentoring roles within the afghan government by institutions like domestic affairs and police commission. Among the latter duty, include the reforming of a more efficient working manner and the establishment of closer ties internally and externally (Frerks, 2013). The Dutch financial contribution was planned at 81, 104 and 96 million Euros for the period 2011 until 2013. Realized amounts however stand at 69, 98 and 47 million Euros (Frerks, 2013).

Civilian Police
Of the afghan population, deducted from a sample, do 63% in 2013 and 65% in 2012 believe that there is a need for more police officers active. On the other hand do 86% of the officers asked, regard there a shortage in colleagues (this stood at 40% and 36% in 2012 and 2011).

In addition does currently more than 31% of the population believe that women can function as police officers, this stood at 25% in 2011.

These numbers compliment the figures, which state an increase in successful completion of the advanced training, which was lengthened from 6 to 8 weeks, including courses on gender equality, human rights and basic hygiene. The figures stand at 370 men and 15 women, who completed the advanced training, being an obvious increase in size for both sides, however still meager looking at the proportions. In addition did women have to train at a different location and training, due to lack of acceptance from male officers (Hancock, 2013).

More importantly is the perception that the withdrawal of Dutch personnel would not influence the quality of training given thereafter (Frerks, 2013). Arguments should however focus on the study conducted with regard to the interviewees and the situation they were conducted in. For example are there waves of Taliban (or other) insurgency, relating to times of insecurity for different regions. On the other hand is the situation in Kunduz and Uruzgan in contrast to 2007, far more manageable. As such was the afghan national army (ANA) dominant in this region due to lack of capabilities of the ANP, lacking training and equipment (Verhagen, 2007).

This argument continues in the form of *community policing*, which the population expects more of from the ANP than before. The police in question however believe their task to be more of putting down insurgencies or uprisings, than in previous years (Frerks, 2013). This questions the relative security aspect of local areas with regard to insurgencies and the trust in police resolution, in contrast to what is being presented by official reports. This argument is strengthened by the opinion of the police sector being able to prosecute criminal matter, which stood at 63% voting no. This level has seen no change throughout the previous years of Dutch presence (Frerks, 2013).

Some factors are hard to measure in regard to the relative achievements of the donor. One of these key factors is the literacy rate, which could not be effectively measured with regard to Dutch achievements but will be concluded as a national achievement under EUPOL functioning. The Dutch however achieved a national award of achievement but the ministry of internal affairs for their efforts, whereby some statues and procedures were implemented nationally (Frerks, 2013). On a measurement by CPAU, was concluded that most citizens however still relate to local solutions in criminal matters, such as the *Shura's*, which has been the tradition in afghan history. The question then arises as to the actually difference foreign intervention should achieve, knowingly of such a fact.

Cooperation police-prosecutor

The Dutch established a special joint training called the *Cooperation of Police Prosecutor* training in the areas active, at which 89 people took part. Also the quality of criminal pursuit, according prosecutor statements, improves as police relate more closely to legal deadlines. However is this hard put in context, as no previous numbers were established, the number of law suits brought to the judiciary stands at 350 for 2012 to 2013 (Frerks, 2013). Also was the exchange with prosecutors and judiciary positions relatively common, according to police officers in Kunduz.

Judiciary
The CPAU analysis established a pre-mission baseline, stated that about 30% of the judicial sector was schooled in their respective expertise. The number of layers in the Kunduz region consisted of only 58 in 2011 and 67 in 2013. This shows a slight increase, however the legal reform is a more difficult and long term issue than that of police training. Nevertheless was a key concern to the Dutch mission, and was thus treated at priority.
Huqooqs are informal bodies, which help mediate legal advice and help from the community to the court. Like with many actions in Afghanistan, is mediation a predominant form of process and was thus hard to halt. The Dutch therefore incorporated these bodies in their reform, by adapting the schooling methods (Frerks, 2013). Being popular did *huqooqs* solve 374 cases (26%) in 2011 and 912 cases in 2013. This argues for an increase in legal processes, however is no information given with respect to the actual quality of the verdicts. There was however a huge increase in local conflicts solved by *shura's* and other mediating bodies, with 31 in 2012 and 115 in 2013 (Frerks, 2013). Problems however prevail with the level of corruption, as 43% of the respondents claimed corruption as being the main reason of inequality and failure to achieve justice. Countering this argument is the facilitated help of lawyers for citizens, however does not nearly half of the population receive a lawyer, due to quick and unfair verdicts, or the insufficient amount of lawyers active (Frerks, 2013).

Awareness, acceptance and access to justice system
One of the main aims of the Dutch mission was to increase the awareness and accessibility of the judicial system. Although very dominant in afghan culture, is conflict resolution and justice, not always transparent enough. Nevertheless was the afghan culture in essence a positive working ground for the Dutch mission. The aim then changed to incorporate women rights and dialogue to the foundation of a justice mechanism, and allow more transparency. As such was reform of the mentality achieved and 65% of the local leaders asked, claimed to be more knowledgeable of women rights and 98% being more aware of them (Frerks, 2013). Although a rather unrealistic percentage could it yet is seen as an improvement. To be critical would not only the manner of questioning be of importance but also the actual understanding of women rights. To adhere to such critique were several societal dialogues established. Examples include theater programs, working groups and the radio.
Final results were that citizens claimed that *shura's* had more influence on their and others lives than the police did, with 62% against 57%. Police encounters are also a costly manner in Afghanistan, resulting in 67% in 2012 claiming that a call for the police was too expensive, which changed to 46% in 2013, still being too expensive. In addition was the chance of unequal treatment of male and female, still of great concern to citizens (Frerks, 2013). This concludes that nearly half of the citizens in kunduz maintain a mentality of distrust for police and would rather solve problems locally via *huqooq's*, where 53% believed to find answers.

The main problems thus, in obtaining judicial help not only includes the big physical distance to court houses, but also the corruption thereof, insecurity of local uprisings, major warlords controlling route to courts and the social-cultural taboos of Afghanistan. One could argue that these problems cannot be solved by a foreign intervention, however great the percentages

provide to be. Judicial services need to be available to all citizens if a justice system is to prevail. Regions left untouched by such reform will maintain to be breeding grounds of different schools of thought and will continue to provide weak resistance against radical ideas. As the report states, is hunger for information on the reform aspects great, however will actual progress outlined by actions and not only statistics, be of a long term mandate.

The long term vision of the Dutch mission seems to be positive as is provided a 'good' basis for future adoption of methods taught by the Afghans. Reasons include: afghan trainers have been school to provide police training, the curriculum established by the Dutch emphasizes cooperation between police and judiciary and is accepted by the afghan authorities and cooperation has been thought in all major institutions. The Dutch mission is then small with regard to its capabilities of SSR but shows a clear adherence to the mandate. The analysis then should shift to the SSR feasibility which the results carry, and whether they serve as a long term commitment. Because the rule of law component is hard in establishing is it comparatively hard to extinguish. Nevertheless does a solid basis of legally educated afghans need to exist in order to repel a possible campaign of reversing foreign reform. The Dutch success is thus hard to measure with regard to the bigger picture of civil reform and will have to prove in the long term. Clear is that the mandate has been achieved and change has been conducted.

Germany
Germany, unlike the Netherlands, has a clear outlined dedication towards achieving an SSR and due to its mission composition has the capacity of doing so. Outlined are the same principles, which Hänggi motivated, and are envisaged in the theory presented, and would only need adjustment to the afghan situation. As such are the tasks established in line with the SSR concept. The main difference to the Dutch mission is that Germany has been in Afghanistan, reforming the police sector, since 2002 with its bilateral mission the German Police Project Team (GPPT). As such does Germany have the most experience of the EUPOL and other donors in Afghanistan with police reform. Therefore can a more critical look be related to the German mission within EUPOL, due to lessons learned and investments made. The German contingency within EUPOL is then also the largest with currently 22 officers active, whereby this number stood at 60 only in 2013. In relative terms, does the GPPT, which is still ongoing, consist of 68 officers currently active (Bundespolizei, 2014). This should show the level of dedication to the mission, but also the relative dedication to a successful contribution to an EU effort. This being relatively limited, would the argument be one of 'saving face' and making most progress with its own mission. Having been said, should it be noticed that Germany has been active for more than a decade, and with EUPOL, achieved a new mission and mandate.
Germany has also exceeded most funding schemes, with annual total of about 77 million Euros. The police reform from the German intervention carries a broad range of civil investments, including economy, energy, education, health, governance and judicial aspects, with a total budgetary availability of 430 million Euros annually, making Germany the third largest investor in Afghanistan (Aussenministerium, 2012). To put the policing aspect in perception, is Germany paying 5 percent of an afghan police officers salary, making it the 4th

largest contributor after the USA, Japan and the European Union (Permanseder, 2013). Such is the scale at which Germany operates providing doubt to the engagement of the EU, with its donor total amounting to the largest contingency in Afghanistan under EUPOL.

German objectives:	As part of EUPOL:
• Creating sustainable training capacities: - building training centres and academies -training and mentoring Afghan police instructors - mentoring those in charge of training at national and local level - drawing up standardized curricula for the entire country - training technical staff at the training facilities • improving the infrastructure of the Afghan police (police headquarters, stations and checkpoints) • contributing to appropriate and transparent remuneration for Afghan police officers • basic education and literacy programmes for Afghan police officers	• training senior officers of the Afghan police force • further developing leadership structures of the criminal investigation branch • improving cooperation between the police and public prosecution offices • making the police more professional • bringing the police closer to the people • combating corruption. Source: Aussenministerium, 2012

As the objectives on the left indicate, is there a broad mandate for reforming not only the security sector with regard to the executive branch. Unlike the Dutch, is there no place for legal or governance reform. This is verified by the EUPOL mandates, following a strict line of training the executive and combating corruption. Therefore, should the German mission be seen as a one part of the SSR implementation foreseen by the EU for Afghanistan. Even with its largest contingency, is the German mandate focused on a small reform within the SSR, namely that of the executive branch. This results in a limited availability of information on the German EUPOL mission and instead, is much an encompassing analysis, including the main mission, GPPT. One main difference is the location of the missions; EUPOL functions in Kabul and twelve other provinces (out of 34 in total), whereas the GPPT operates mainly in northern Afghanistan and Kabul (Aussenministerium, 2012). An analysis of the Kunduz region, where the Dutch are amongst others stationed, will thus overlap with the GPPT achievements. Another influential player in security sector reform is the NATO mission (NTM-A), concluding the three key players in SSR in Afghanistan. Analysis will thus continue to strive for purely EUPOL related achievements.

The German have thus established the following tasks as a means to achieving the police reform aspect of an SSR in Afghanistan:
- the reorganization of the police with the recirculation of key objectives
- salary and training of professional police
- restructuring of key branches to security within the internal affairs office
- rebuilding of buildings and its furnishing

- transfer of police reform to all provinces in Afghanistan and creation of a national police structure
- establishment of a ethical code for police which is bound to the norms of a judicial foundation
- enforcement of national authority by official security bodies of the state (Steck, 2005)

Although Germany was the initiator of European interventions in Afghanistan, did it maintain a course of bilateral support instead of international. The German budget for a building of the ANP related in 2006 to 15.9 million, 2007 to 11 million, 2008 to 34.5 million and 2009 to 53.7 million (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010). This budget encompassed the set goals outlined and were spread among the GPPT and EUPOL, as well as bilateral support in the form of LOTFA and NTM-A. Although a rise in budgetary means can be witnessed, was the initiating period of EUPOL one of limited staffing. The numbers thus do not reflect upon the staff available and the related problems like capping on police training without loss of quality. Germany increased its funds in 2010 for the GPPT to 50 million annually and 30 million to the LOTFA. The contributions to EUPOL in 2008 related to 43.6 million, with decreasing trends (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).
Evident from these perspectives is the decreasing optimism, Germany dedicated to the European mission. Causes relate to the European failure to effectively contribute to the EUPOL mission due to lack of cooperation and communication. Especially during a surge of German successes in police reform prior to 2007, did Germany stand for a long term contribution by bilateral means. This was strengthened by high ranking representatives in the afghan ministry of interior, who often confused the EUPOL mission with the GPPT (Friesendorf, 2010).

The security issue was from the German perspective a major hinder in focusing on police reform. Due to the close cooperation with international actors, such as NATO, did German training often overlap with the military capacity building of the US and NATO. Especially with the sharing of bases and the genuine broad training the ANP received, was a military tone to German police trainers evident. Police trainers were asked to conduct coop training missions with NTM-A and thus stepped out of their respective call of duty. ANP had their own bases were they were often trained and as such, visited by donor actors. To do so were they equipped with military gear and support, envisaging a militarization of their mission. Results were seen by a decrease in volunteers in 2010 from the expected 200 to only 165. One GPPT officer quoted that he cannot do his duty while sitting in an armored vehicle (Friesendorf, 2010). The problem continues with dependency on military security as EUPOL trainers could not leave the base without ISAF security. However does immobility arise if these troops do not have the time or capacity to indulge in a EUPOL securitization for leaving the base. As such could training not take place resulting in demotivation, as seen with German efforts shifting to their bilateral mission. One upside of the German EUPOL mission consisted of the military influences provided by the NTM-A or the US mission. Results in 2010 can be seen with EUPOL efforts enabling, to 90% illiterate afghan officers, practical three week training on weapons and explosive searches in different settings. Relating to the set targets in

2007, can this be seen as a major breakthrough in afghan police training capabilities, as not only civil but partly military type skills were being provided (Friesendorf, 2010).

The German mission also encompassed a legal statute, even though their pre-EUPOL objectives were those of reforming the police. A joint venture with the Netherlands, allowed for the 'Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit' (GIZ) GmbH to support a rule of law and judicial reform to take shape. This contribution strengthens the establishment of an SSR as envisioned by the theory, giving the police reform an important tool for criminal prosecution. With GIZ funding and german-dutch training, has the number of layers in Kunduz increased from 12 to 70 since its foundation in 2004. The number of huqooqs in Kunduz rose resulting in the increase of cases processes from 1,439 in 2011 to 1,498 in 2012 and to 1,596 in 2013 (GIZ, 2014). In addition did GIZ train 450 female police officers in 2012 and 2013. University courses and trainings in legal studies have been established, and trained 550 female students up to date. Women can take issues to local womens councils and umbrella organization, being given legal advice and workshops (GIZ, 2014).
Overall does this trilateral organization build bridges for the civilian population, especially women, to engage in society and part take in their personal development.

Although a joint venture, is it a german initiative with major training being conducted by German officers. As with so many donors, are resources spread amongst several missions and contributions. As seen with the case of Germany, are financial resources spread to several institutions in order to encompass a wide variety of training provided. Nevertheless does Germany perceive the EUPOL mission as too wide-minded and therefore shifts efforts to bilateral missions, were results are measured more easily. Especially with a skeptical home front and political stakes, are facts and figures key to an Afghanistan intervention. Although not all of German efforts have been visibly conducted via EUPOL, is it hard to find any contradicting evidence. German intervention is seen as a whole, and results are presented accordingly. Clear is that Germany provides a significant contribution to the SSR in Afghanistan, searching for methods complimenting easy measurement.

To conclude on the mandate and results of the German SSR implementation, should the broad nature of German support be acknowledged. Germany set up various support groups and institutions like the IPCB, allowing for a more coherent analysis of community needs. In addition were many goals achieved via financial contributions to for example LOTFA, which in turn provided for training, facilities and equipment. A key weakness to the training of afghan security personnel was the initial DDR method strived, calling for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Only with a clear knowledge of the security sector, can corruption and infiltration be condemned. As such are there still many (ex) Taliban present in legislative and executive functions like the ANP. This led to the inevitable lack in trust from the community to the ANP, and vice versa, thereby wasting the potential of the quality training received. The main obstacle to a SSR in Afghanistan is not the quality of training, or numbers of institutions created, but the cooperation and oversight over these bodies. Although an oversight body like the IPCB was created did it mainly run on international support and lacked the acceptance of regional schedules and policies to be adhered. The results achieved,

visible by the fact, do not show conformity with SSR theory. Although most bodies were created and reformed, do they show lack of effectiveness and therefore cast doubt over a long term feasibility.

<u>Interview responses</u>

Although a good backing of results and argumentation, was the conducting of interviews severely hindered by non-responding recipients. Only a few managed to provide answers to the questionnaire giving the analysis at least some point of reference. The initial idea was to confront a range of ranks with the identical questions in order to observe a pattern of some sort with regard to the perception of the mission. Additionally was access to German officers declined and thus will a purely Dutch angle be provided with the interviews.

The responses align perfectly even though the ranks and duties within the mission differed. Agreement existed over the poor transferal of positions, with officers having to adjust by themselves and figuring out their role. This was a budgetary result as double occupancy was prevented, leaving an efficiency gap in the transferring system. For one officer was the position acquired one of lower rank, with which he could not work. As such was another disconnected transfer necessary. The duties conducted were also perceived as a lesser challenge to the officers, with results of boredom and even anger about the inability to make a change.

All agree that cooperation with EUPOL leads as well as afghan and international counterparts was very good and mutually benefitted progress of capacity building.

Like the theory outlined, did the Afghans perceive the European efforts as a humanitarian aid, with results of lenient acceptance of orders and underestimation of training. Nevertheless was there a broad consensus that training and mentoring was crucial and respect for external actors was present. Another alignment to the theory stems with regard to the perception of the American forces. Afghans perceived the Europeans less of an occupational force due to their closer civil engagement.

The security they received was excellent and in no time did they feel insecure. This also relates to their perception of the elaborate and superior training received prior to mission start and during their presence. Security was for the Dutch officers stationed in Kabul provided by Private security companies (PSC's), with whom limited contact was established. Another officers received protection from Nepalese soldiers (Gurkha's).

Respondents were optimistic on the mission purpose and achievements as well as its potential in the future. Neither deems it feasible to withdraw from the responsibility which the international community still holds in Afghanistan, but progress is made with its transferal.

The Dutch respondents realized that their impact was limited and hardly measurable on a national scale, but nonetheless insist on their efforts to be of a positive effect.

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Analysis

"To what extent have the German and Dutch participants in the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan reached their objectives and what explains their shortcomings?" Having gathered all necessary information regarding the theory of an SSR in order to analyze the capacity building mission, knowing the mandates and means to achieve them and witnessing the results thereof, can a final analysis gather on the combined success and failures. The theory of the SSR gives an acknowledged comparative tool, from which the potential was highlighted and its definitions outlined.

Introducing the analysis should prior emphasis be devoted to the angle at which analysis is conducted from. As previously established is the notion of a post-conflict situation subject to theoretical debate. Due to every conflict, region or individual being unique in its manner, should the case of Afghanistan not be compared too swiftly. Although conflicts might have the same roots, does it not indicate that the solutions are the same. Afghanistan has witnessed three decades of war and with it increased its sensitivity towards foreign intervention. The main challenge to the European policing mission as well as other external missions, relate to the security issue currently still in place. The security vacuum, which was not tackled in a manner conform to the SSR concept and now creates sever instability, arguably undermines the success of the mission. Critics state that the civil training mission started far too soon, with military operations still ongoing and activities planned falling under scrutiny. The environment in which the mission was established is of primary importance to the relative achievements which are being measured. As such, should the European efforts be evaluated according to the relative environment from which they commenced. Additionally should any conclusion with regard to success or failure of the Dutch and German mission, and therefore the EUPOL mission, be put in contrast to the military missions ongoing simultaneously. To analyze the effectiveness and relative success of the European mission with regard to the SSR theory, should primary concern lie with the exact formulation of the criteria. Due to the wide-ranging definition of the SSR concept, are there no pre-cut criteria which allow for an acknowledged answer. Looking at the definitions given to the concept does a trend arise setting the following criteria: enhancing state capacity, training of security forces, demilitarization and democratic governance with the rule of law (For details see Figure 1). The difficulty in analysis all criteria lie with the limited scope of EUPOL and the measured results presented.

Demilitarization
The primary concern of any civil capacity building mission is the relative environment is should be implemented and should operate. For Afghanistan was the crux of a suitable civil reform the demilitarization of the country. The problem of EUPOL lies with its failure to allow for such measures within the stated mandate. The European mission outlines a post-conflict SSR in which civil mechanisms are able to fully deploy with regard to the training received. Although reports and research has found Afghanistan to be of post-conflict nature, is there limited argumentation for such a situation. Although this research bases on the

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assumption of such, is it clear that policing duties conducted, do not adhere to norms of community or civil policing. As seen currently, with number of insurgencies and attacks rising, is a security situation, as established with EUPOL, very fragile.

Disarmament, Reintegration and Regulation are military aspects to the police work and mainly fall under American tasks. EUPOL bases have neither the capacity nor the fitting mandate to deal with such tasks due to their pre-established degree of freedom under afghan authority. Furthermore is it near to impossible to map any achievements in this regard, as facts and figures on weapons and armed citizens are lacking. Demilitarization is therefore a very difficult subject and dependent on the security situation at hand. Violence is rising again since 2012, and critics deem the situation worsening. In this respect is it questionable, whether the EUPOL mandate actually maintains an influential reform base and more importantly, a primary one.

Police trained

The primary component of the mission consists of training the afghan national police (ANP) in matters conform to civil policing. As previously established is military training provided by the US forces. The strength of the European training component lies with its regionally adapted agenda. As such is the Dutch training focused on more specialized skills such as police raiding and intelligence based policing. The German training component outlined a clear focus on civil engagement and community policing. Such trainings were supported with lectures and workshops, emphasizing the importance of mutual respect and demand driven service. Officers are to act lawfully and respectfully in interactions with local communities. Occupational forces behavior, as sought with US training emphasis on counter insurgency and unrest control, are off the European training agenda. The numbers trained are also corrupted by their measurement, which fails to include Special Forces teams and branches, and focuses on the three branches of the ANP. The numbers might outline success but quality is of greater importance. The Government response to House of Lords select committee on the European Union report on EU's police mission Afghanistan highlights that the Operating environment proved to be infertile ground with high illiteracy, drug taking and abuses of human rights (2011). The report claimed that these attributes contributed to the high attrition rate with officers in training leaving or switching sides. This relates to the issue of infiltration, which dominates the afghan perception of official bodies. Infiltration by Taliban representatives is not only hard to discover but also hinders an internal cohesion with lack of trust amongst officers. *Green on blue attack* is a common notion, not only in the ANP, and effectively obtrudes an efficient execution of their duty. Such occurrences include and therefore affect the external actors as well, as reliance on ANP or ANA security provisions, clearly provide for concern. Effective cooperation is therefore limited as distrust easily hinders progress. Looking at the theory, does this argument reoccur. An SSR is highly sensitive to the environment in which it is being implemented, meaning that consideration to the local context is of great importance.

Women

One weakness of SSR theory is the actualization thereof. Although reform in several branches is important does it lack to adaptation to the needs of local contexts. As part of the quality measure in the training component and party seen as a democratization measures, is the inclusion of women in the security forces a key milestone. Strength of the European mission is that it strived to include women in their reform, in all branches of the security sector. Most difficulty was posed in the practical training component of police officers. Although women were given the right to vote in 1964 and the first policewomen were on duty in 1967, did the period of conflict and Taliban rule reverse this achievement (Hancock, 2013). The argument therefore rises from the claim that the afghan people were already accepting women rights before western interventions claimed to have done so. Even if rural areas still have a different outlook, is there always a contrast between the rural and urban areas, even in western democracies. An accomplishment for the European mission is therefore the inclusion of the gender issue in their agenda, even though an SSR model does not outline socio-economic aspects and merely regards the first implementation of security reform. As such should it also be argued as to the extent that such reform is actually deemed important, regarding the major security threats in the area, and whether such measures might reverse with their increase. Arguably can the gender issue be regarded in the SSR framework as outlined in the theory. Gender quality revolves around the implementation of changes in accordance with the norms and value strived for by a democratic civilization. Furthermore is demand driven reform a possible explanation for such measures, as witnessed with the 1967 clauses. The numbers on female officers trained is therefore a sign of success as a baseline account was witnessed prior to mission launch. Any increase in number therefore can be seen as a success and with it achieves the necessary reform on the position of women in the afghan society.
Furthermore is the gender issue the only aspect in the afghan tradition which was successfully broken. Corruption, marital issues, societal ranks and trust in government are key features outlining that an SSR can only surface the holistic democratically sustainable reform of a country. The gender issue is therefore deemed as a great success, especially with German efforts (like the GIZ) to stimulate workshop and lecture attendance. The example therefore provides for a successful aspect to the European efforts and allows for a measure of future sustainability. Such measures are hard to reverse, even if foreign actors withdraw and political unrest evolves, will the mindset on the inclusion of women maintain. This example has the capacity to change the thinking on the SSR theory with regard to its limitations in scope, and proves Afghanistan to be a fertile ground for adjusting the theoretical base of the concept.

Rule of Law

The rule of law component is of great importance to any security sector reform as it provides for the legal foundation on which security forces can act upon. More importantly is it the mechanism which connects the citizens to the state and allows for a fair exchange of voices. The legal foundation is a primary value of a democratic and developed state, functioning on behalf of the people and acting on their behalf. The afghan example provides for two main dilemmas which hinder the reforming of such system. The first one being the traditional method of with the *sharia* system acting as a body to achieving some sort of justice in all

matters of civil disparity. Second being the lack of trust in government and with it the acceptance of western influenced justice system, based upon the same corrupt officials, which have been declined by locals with use of local *Shura's* and *Huqooq's*. These two problems outline the factors of tradition, distrust, corruption and illiteracy, which burden the establishment of a new externally driven reform to a justice system.

The example of the Dutch and German missions provide for a visible divide in results booked due to their relative mandate within the EUPOL mission. The Dutch were especially concerned with the rule of law and imposed several changes thereof. Examples are the increasing percentages showing acceptance of legal institutions and the capabilities they possess. *Shura's* and *Huqooq's* were therefore not questioned but emphasized to allow for a bottom-up approach to reforming the justice system. Although it can be seen as naïve and intolerant to reform a system of law that has existed for decades and has been imbedded in the local culture, should it be noted that reform was essential in the urban centers such as Kabul. These strive for a more western culture and the necessary systems to run such situations. The divide should therefore be made with the divide within the country in regard to its environment and the necessity of change. This is a reoccurring argument, as mission activity is sought mainly in areas of significant international presence and therefore of higher demand for democratization. Although no measure was conducted as to the demand for security sector reform, or justice reform, did political exchange between afghan heads of state and European states provide for such demand.

Regarding the efforts of German and especially Dutch staff, is improvement visible. Besides the increasing numbers of court houses and the officials to run them, is there a broad acceptance of such legal norms by the population. Again, is it hard to conclude such demand on a country-wide scale, nevertheless is support evidently available and with it the mindset to adhere to such reform. Following the Dutch mission, is judicial training at a high level, with exchanges of legal experts to the Netherlands in trainings conducted in the Hague and local courtrooms. Such exchange of trainees to European countries for expert training and experiencing European foundations, are evident in training components of police and political officials as well. It allows for a rare opportunity for Afghans to witness a culture different to their traditionally oriented system and brings knowledge and word to mouth reform back into Afghanistan. It should be stressed that legal officials and other higher ranking positions, are mostly occupied by people of power who have the means to witness western civilization and are in that respect already reformed. This emphasizes the issue of traditional division of positions of power but the means of status and connectivity. Although not part of this research is such a tradition harmful to the sustainability of a security sector reform, based on European aspects of training and achievement. Norbert Koster, EUPOL's Head Rule of Law Component, described the advances made in the following quote: "…over the years we have established a good working relationship with our partners in the Ministry of Interior, Attorney General's Office, Ministry of Justice and of course the Supreme Court. That in itself was a challenge because, as in any system, the hard part is getting the different parts to work as a whole" (EUPOL website). The SSR theory dedicates emphasis on reforming sectors with alignment to related structures. Reforming the police structures, resulting in more arrests, requires a legal capacity to prosecute such cases. The police-prosecutor dilemma in

Afghanistan results from the failure to coherently adjust reforming agendas, resulting in misalignment of capabilities. With increasing arrests made but slow progress in judicial reform, are many suspects falsely accused or released. Civil unrest with regard to unjust verdicts or failure to provide justice are results hard to measure, but evidently plausible. The rule of law component is an indicator for the democratic reform in the country. Although elections are being held and arguably conducted in a democratic manner, are practices hard to oversee. Especially important is the extent to which afghan authorities maintain power and the reform achievements once European actors have withdrawn. The same maintains for the democratic elections, which enjoy great international attention and are as such a stage for presented good conduct. What happens behind the scenes or after the show is to be argued, as critics claim there to be too great a gap between system processes that a self-sustainment process is fragile. A democratic process also involves the support of a civil society with norms and values conform to human rights, transparency and equality. Such norms have been emphasized by training schemes but the exact measure of achievement is up to psychological or societal analysis. According to the results, are elements sustaining such values severely lacking, with examples being corruption, infiltration and lack of dedication. Such cultures have not been of primary concern to the limited scope of the mission and are arguably still present. The exact justification will have to be gained from future action.

External actor dilemma
The theory of SSR pre-establishes a difficulty of an externally driven SSR. Especially with a society tired of foreign intervention is reform hard to measure and more importantly rather ambiguous with regard to effectiveness. SSR theory states that international activities need to be coherent and mutually beneficial in their objectives and implementation. As shortly outlined is there a significant gap between the US and EU intervention, arising mainly from the military-civil context. With regard to Afghanistan is this also the most crucial divide, indicating the lack of a secure environment in which reform can be adopted. Although established from pre-mission analysis and outlined in multiple accounts of SSR conceptualization, did the EU chose for a civil mandate in the arguable 'post-conflict' environment of Afghanistan. This is automatically the main criticism of the mission, as it currently shows a reversing of results as violence increases and insurgency gains pace. EUPOL officers were reliant on international, private or local security assistance when conducting training, and relied on an exchange of information and resources thereof. Although interview responses show that internal EUPOL cooperation was effective, does such situation only allows for results of European capacity. This means that greater reform, with regard to the SSR theory on reforming a security sector, involves far more actors and capabilities. The US is therefore an important point of analysis but lacks factual provision in this research. The conclusion however focuses on the reform scope envisioned in the EUPOL mandate, which relies on the inclusion of sectors falling under different capabilities and can therefore not be devoted to. The GPPT however is an example of a bilateral mission, conducted simultaneously to the same nation's contribution to EUPOL. As such are there more examples of French and Italian bilateral reform missions, following a different mandate and therefore different approach with regard to SSR theory.
 Returning to the European focus and the German example, is it visible that officers were

operating at GPPT and EUPOL missions simultaneously, which provides for the argument of prioritization. Part of this culture arises from the massive political pressure on the international scale, asking for results and quick transferal of responsibility. The Dutch example, with regard to the interviews, shows that positions were sometimes left vacant in order to avoid double occupation. This had inevitable financial reasoning as budgets for European actors were limited. As such was effectiveness of reform limited and room for provision of misalignment. Prioritizing is therefore not an issue on the international scale only, but evident in local contexts as well. Resources limited the capacity of the mission and are therefore important contextual problems reoccurring in the analysis of European effectiveness.

Drawing from this is an evident trend visible, that efforts are not holistically coherent and lack the scope to deal with the issue of prioritizing. Efforts should be more concentrated and preferably extended, as was agreed by in the interviewees. Another divide stems from the theoretical standpoint, whereby military and civil fronts have been built in Afghanistan's capacity building agenda. Interview responses confirm the theory that external intervention should be demand driven, and not decline a democratic manner of reforming the security sector. It should thus not be to any surprise that the American forces with its military training agenda were seen more as an occupational force than did the Europeans.

The administration and internal problems of EUPOL were outlined with examples of understaffing, under budgeting and meager communication with Brussels. The pre mission conundrum was previously outlined and shows hinder to an external actor driven SSR. Especially considering the mandate and what was to be achieved, did EU institutions not align in the initial stages. Also during the mission did contributing states emphasize and push their amendments to the mission, and did so with financial motivations. The cooperation on the ground was thus made even harder with political confusion at home (Gross, 2009). According the personnel on the ground however, was cooperation good and fertile, resulting in good working conditions striving at efficiency. There is however little emphasis on the importance of cooperation, especially when conducting an external SSR, and limited possibilities were provided by mission compositions. Besides the evident personal cooperation in the compounds with afghan locals, was little room provided for discussing cohesion of measures and adjustment thereof. According to the literature is a dense international mission with all its different interests and mandates, a liability to the effectiveness and therefore to the local population. The establishment of the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) allowed for such cohesion measures to take place. This body however had little capacities to influence and control all missions and lacked the acceptance from the officers it was supposed to oversee. The problem of limited and regional local support for police reform added to the problems of an external actor SSR. Compliance with the theory is an important aspect, but accepting limitations to such theory and acting upon it, shows the success of European intervention. Adapting to local changes and cultures thereof was partly due to budgetary constrains resulting in transfer of positions redefining the tasks demanded, and partly due to the civil aspect of the mission. Analysis is most effective in comparison and therefore has inclusion of the US mission been of a dominant nature. Such comparison allows for a visible

divide between the demand-driven European reform and the external demanded US reform. Interview responses concur with such divides, as locals regard US intervention taking a more intruding form. On the other hand is European presence seen as a provision of long term aid instead of the acceptance of reform. Although the Dutch and German reform missions have shown to be successful in terms of their achievements and results, is there a severe lack of overall improvement. This means that with some aspects of the security sector being reformed, are democratization and transparency undesired reform objectives, especially from an external actor point of view, due to the inability to measure such progress and the needed long term alignment. The SSR concept clearly outlines that a neglect for the overall reform process of a post-conflict SSR will provide fertile grounds for misalignment of the system with problems in future responsibility transfer being pre-programmed. The argument should however also encompass the limited scope of the SSR, which the theory proclaims. It is aimed at reforming the initial stages of a post-conflict situation and provide for the essential pillars to democratize and develop a country. To align dutch and german success with SSR theory is therefore a risky prospect. Although achievements were evident in results stated, does SSR require a long term dedication to reform. As such is the European commitment far too small and limited in its dedication. Long term effects are therefore visible through the analysis of SSR adherence. For the case of Afghanistan is the limited EU mission, targeting a vast civil reform mandate, a meager reforming factor and creates much responsibility with afghan authorities.

6
<u>**Conclusion**</u>

To answer the question *to what extent have the German and Dutch participants in the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan reached their objectives and what explains their shortcomings* do we have to take into account the relative size of the research and its limited scope of capability.
The aim of this research was to provide for a different angle to analyzing and looking at the policing mission in Afghanistan, namely one provided by the SSR theory. The applicability of the SSR is already limited in its nature and should therefore be used carefully with regard to outlining a broader mission success. Reasons for choosing the SSR concept include the capability to view a policing mission from a civil and human perspective in contrast to a military and political perspective. In addition is SSR theory devoted to analyzing a long term reform structure. As described does a SSR provide four main pillars of reform including the political dimension, institutional dimension, economic dimension and the societal dimension. Even if all pillars were being tackled would it not provide for a holistic reform of the country. Post-conflict reconstruction is aimed primarily at achieving the security reform needed. This has preferred perceptions from the international community, as results can be measured and are targeted through a short term commitment. Another important aspect to consider with regard to the security situation in Afghanistan is the necessity of a civil mission in a post-conflict situation as complex as that of Afghanistan. Current reports state an increasing trend in violence, posing the question of demand for civil reform.

This is evidently the first argument, revolving around the perception that civil reform was necessary. Even though results have been achieved and SSR implementation has partly been successful, with regard to the EUPOL scope, does the sustainability of such reform come into question. Although one might argue that such conclusion draws from a different research, should success of Dutch and German missions depends on the sustainable aspect of reform. Hereby does the argument reignite as to the mandate of European actors with regard to SSR in the long term. Donors aim at transferring responsibility as soon as possible, whereas locals tend to lean on the support received without committing to its values. As discussed is this an issue of SSR theory, which fails to tackle core linings in a countries culture and tradition. Certain values are simply not conforming to external reform and show limitation even if mandates are subject to flexible implementation. Such arguments tend to dim the relative success of the reform process, rendering it unnecessary and wasteful at times.

The European mission has produced significant changes to the security situation in Afghanistan and done so via the efforts of its contributing states. As mentioned are efforts effective and to some extent carry long term effects. Examples include the perception on gender equality and the acceptance of a form of rule of law. These are cornerstones to carrying a civilization into a transparent and democratic future, but cannot do so on their own. Neglecting a coherent strategy will cause for a missing alignment of reforms, creating cracks of weakness in which failures in the form of corruption and incompetence can nest. SSR theory outlines such circumstances a dilemma of prioritizing and coherence of international

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efforts in external actor SSR. The European mission can be criticized relative to its size and mandate, but acceptance of such nature is also a viable option. Because the mission concluded on significant achievements is it questionable whether such conform with a long term SSR.

Looking once again at the mandate of the European mission and the analysis of SSR components, can it be stated that success has been achieved. The aim of the mission was to contribute to the **establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing system, interaction with the wider criminal justice system**, **trusted police service** and **framework of the rule of law with respect of human rights**. Although all aspects have been tackled, is there great differentiation with respect to the degree to which.
Facilities and bodies to overcome corruption and crime have been established and show early signs of success. The numbers trained and the quality with which, clearly compliment the international efforts. Rule of law has witnessed great difficulties but relative to the harsh environment has acceptance of such reform increased. Democratization and respect of human rights are measures of long term commitment and therefore not viable aspects of analysis with regard to Dutch and German contributions The argument stems from the analysis of two actors within a relatively small European commitment to reform a significant civilian aspect of Afghanistan. It is therefore a question on future developments, when external actors withdraw and responsibilities of enacting reform lie with the afghan authorities. Successes, visible via mandate achievement do not necessarily compliment a civilian reform process desperately needed in Afghanistan. The SSR theory allows us to analyze only a part of the answer, as post-conflict models end with the creation of bodies to enact further reform.

The answer to the research question is rather simple: the Dutch and German missions have to a great extent achieved their objectives and done so in a coherent and effective manner. All achievements stand relative to the environment of Afghanistan and the dilemmas outlined in external actor post-conflict SSR. The European mission is deemed a success based on facts and figures but also according to the perceptions of the Afghans. Although one could argue for a failure to adhere to certain SSR criteria, should it be stressed that the SSR concept fails to adhere to certain reform needs including situational changes in the security situation of Afghanistan. Failure to adhere to certain inflexible criteria of SSR by means of adapting reform to the demand of the citizens is therefore an argument of successful European reform, based on open-minded and adaptive thinking.

The emphasis is therefore shifting towards the next phase of reform, which the EUPOL mission and SSR cannot tackle in its current form. SSR maintains the feature of providing the first-aid to a post-conflict situation and does not include tools so versatile to confront nation building and democratization as well. This reasoning aligns to the European mandate of conducting civil reform and therefore shows the limitation of long term analysis. Debate on the future of Afghanistan and the reforms established is a question of finding a new model to map post-SSR criteria. Vital for long term feasibility is the development of issues related to corruption, infiltration and the acceptance of foreign intervention. As such issues are not of a theoretical analysis and fail to be visible targets for external actors, can mission success only focus on relativity. Regarding the composition and dedication of EUPOL is it not a beneficial

commitment to reforming Afghanistan in the long term. Serious change requires serious commitment and with it a coherent model. We have therefore witnessed a limitation of EUPOL capabilities and SSR theory with regard to allowing reform. Further analysis should focus on new theoretical debates on the aftermath of post-conflict reform and the possibilities thereof. For Afghanistan does such a model find increasing difficulty of classification as recent outburst of violence coincide with increasing dominance of the Taliban in southern provinces. Notably are such developments occurring with the steady withdrawal of troops and pose a test to the military as well as civil foundations established by international actors. If civil and military reform should prevail in the long term, are initial stages of SSR crucial and should civilian capacities be expanded.

Although this research allows for the answering of the effectiveness question from a European perspective, does it leave many questions unanswered. More importantly does it allow for a creation of substantial amount of doubt and concern. Answering questions regarding the future or further possibilities in Afghanistan demand extensive research encompassing examples of similar situations globally. Even then is the case of Afghanistan completely different and should oversimplification and lumping together be deemed as hindrance to achieving such answers.

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