PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION:

A REFLECTION OF ONE'S INDIVIDUAL ECONOMIC SITUATION?

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Abstract

This study intends to investigate whether European citizens' support for the European Union (EU) can be explained by their personal economic circumstances. Therefore, the following research question is investigated: *To what extent can the citizens' support for the European Union in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands be explained by the subjective perception of their individual economic situation in 2010?* In order to answer this research question, a secondary quantitative data analysis is performed on the basis of a cross-national survey conducted by the European agency Eurobarometer in 2010. Quantitative micro-data measuring the citizens' support for the EU as well as citizens' subjective economic perception were collected by the Eurobarometer through face-to-face interviews, using a Simple Random Sampling method. With the help of variance analysis, it is observed to what extent the dependent variable (citizens' support for the EU) can be explained by the independent variable (subjective perception of one's individual economic situation) among the six founding countries of the EU: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 2010. The analysis showed four main results: [1] Citizens' level of support for the EU is partially influenced by their subjective perception of their individual economic situation in 2010. [2] European citizens appear to act as rational actors, who base their support for the EU more on economical cost-benefit calculations rather than on emotional attachment. [3] National identity is an important parameter that forms people's attitude towards the EU. [4] A high percentage of citizens' support level can be explained by their subjective perception whether their country's economy gains from its EU membership or not.

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Gratefully,
Franziska Eckardt

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List of Abbreviations

EU – European Union

SEM – Single European Market

DE – Germany

FR – France

IT – Italy

LU – Luxembourg

BE – Belgium

NL – The Netherlands

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1. Introduction

'*As politicians we have to react to the fact that many people do not feel that they can relate to the EU.*'
– Angela Merkel, 'Transcript of Angela Merkel interview', 2005

According to Hix (2008), a dramatic transformation in public support for the EU has occurred in the last decade. Whereas European citizens used to trust their government to represent their interests in Brussels during the 90s, nowadays a majority of citizens in all member states indicate that they are not committed to the 'European project' anymore and therefore do not 'blindly accept European-level deals done by their governments' (Hix, 2008, p. 50). This shrinking popular support for the EU is also reflected in the failed attempt to ratify an EU Constitution in all European member states in 2005 (Hix, 2008). According to Hix (2008), the EU with its currently extremely low level of public support is struggling with a democratic deficit, since it lacks popular legitimacy. However, as argued by Franklin & Wlezien (1997), 'one […] requirement for the proper functioning of democratic institutions is public responsiveness to policy', since one could not expect 'politicians to pay attention to what the public wants if the public does not pay attention to what politicians do' (Franklin & Wlezien, 1997, p. 374). As expressed by the German federal chancellor Angela Merkel, politicians therefore have to react to the current low level of public support and find answers to two questions, posed by Hix: 'What's wrong with the EU and how to fix it ?' (Hix, 2008).

A considerable amount of studies have already looked into this problem to find a way to resolve the EU's democratic deficit. As a result, recent studies have led to two main findings: first, the level of public support for the EU varies among the European member states (Inglehart & Rabier 1978; Mathew 1980; Hewstone 1986; Dalton & Eichenberg 1991; Palmer & Gabel 1993). Second, researchers have different and conflicting approaches concerning the question which factors might influence European citizens to support the EU (Inglehart, 1977; Janssen, 1991; Anderson and Reichert, 1996 and Gabel, 1998). According to Gabel & Whitten (1997), economic growth and development were and still are central motivations for the European project and therefore are also among the predominant responsibilities of the EU. Hix (2008) argues that citizens' support for the EU can be seen as a 'fair-weather phenomenon', which implies that European citizens would support the European project when the economy is booming and would refuse to support it when the economy is declining (Hix, 2008, p. 52). According to these economic approaches, European citizens would therefore evaluate the EU and its policies based upon economic criteria.

Recent existing economic models can be divided into macro- and micro-level models (Ehin, 2001). Whereas macro-economic models assume that citizens' support for EU is influenced by the economic performance of its member states, measured in terms of GDP growth, unemployment and inflation, micro-level economic studies hypothesize that the effects of integrative reforms would vary across different regions and segments of the population (Ehin, 2001). Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) found in their study that objective economic conditions would not significantly influence citizens' support for the

EU.[1] However, it is argued by Gabel & Whitten (1997) that this result is not unexpected, since objective national conditions would not capture sub-national variation (regional variations) in economic conditions and the inconsistency of citizens' subjective perceptions of their economic condition with the objective economic reality at national level. Therefore, European 'citizens [who] experience the same economic conditions [could] perceive the economy differently' (Gabel & Whitten, 1997, p. 84). However, whereas Gabel & Whitten (1997) argue that citizens' subjective economic perception is influenced by sub-national variations, such as high regional numbers of unemployment, this study follows a new approach. Here, it is argued that citizens' subjective perceptions of their individual economic situation are influenced by their subjective attitude and feelings about their individual economic performance and the national economic performance. Support for the EU is therefore assumed to be more a projection of a person's subjective economic well-being based on rational and non-rational factors, rather than a response to national or sub-national variations only. Consequently, people would support the European project when satisfied with their own economic situation and reject it when their personal economic situation changes for the worse. In order to answer the question whether differences in citizens' support level can be explained by their different individual economic circumstances, this study will add to the existing body of micro-level economic studies. Consequently, the research objective of this study is to investigate whether the dramatic transformation in public support for the EU in the last decades can be explained by citizens' subjective perception of their individual economic situation at the micro-level. This study will make use of Eurobarometer data collected in the year 2010 by focusing on the six founding countries of the EU: Belgium (BE), Italy (IT), France (FR), Germany (DE), Luxembourg (LU) and the Netherlands (NL).

1.1 Research question and sub-questions

The research objective outlined above leads to the following explanatory research question:

To what extent can the citizens' support for the European Union in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands be explained by the subjective perception of their individual economic situation in 2010?

In order to answer the research question, the following sub-questions will be addressed:

1. *How can the citizens' level of support be described in 2010 among the six founding countries of the EU?*
2. *How do citizens perceive their individual economic situation in 2010 among the six founding countries of the EU?*
3. *To what extent can variances in support for the EU be explained by the citizens' subjective perception of their individual economic situation in 2010?*
4. *Which third factors possibly influence the relationship between the citizens' subjective perception of their individual economic situation and their level of support for the EU?*

[1] A statistically significant relationship with national-level variation in support was only shown in inflation among other tested macro-economic factors (GDP and unemployment).

1.2 Research outline

In order to answer the research question posed above, this thesis will proceed as follows. In the theoretical framework, first, the relationship between EU support and economic conditions is discussed based on existing literature. Second, the concept of EU political support is defined and specified. Third, possible public support determinants at the micro-level, based on the group-conflict theory, utilitarian thesis and group-interest theory are outlined and summarized. Furthermore, possible confounding variables are presented for which it will be controlled in the later statistical analysis. This study will proceed with a research and methodology section, by first, explaining the chosen research design, data and case selection, and limitations to the study. Second, the dependent and independent variable as well as control variables are operationalized. Finally, using variance analysis, existing quantitative Eurobarometer data are analyzed at the micro-level. Based on these results conclusions will be drawn and the relevance of the findings will be discussed.

2. Theoretical framework

In order to investigate whether 'citizens' support for the EU' can be explained by 'citizens' subjective perception of their individual economic situation', relevant theories and concepts from existing literature are reviewed in the following theoretical framework. First, a short literature review on the relationship between economic conditions and support for the EU is provided. Second, the concept of EU popular support is defined and discussed. Third, based on the group conflict theory, the utilitarian thesis and the symbolic politics thesis, determinants of public support are presented. Finally, third factors that might influence the relationship between the key variables are discussed.

2.1 Economic conditions and support for EU

According to Gabel & Whitten (1997), economics have been the central motivation of the EU since its outset. After the end of the Second World War, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations established the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), and later the European Economic community (EEC) (1957), because of two reasons. First, western European economic integration was perceived to be a collective benefit for all member countries with regard to their post-war redevelopments; the rebuilding of western European economies. Through trade liberalization, countries had equal access to rebuild infrastructure, and had an expanded production market. This was expected to lead to more economic growth and an improved competitiveness of European products in the world market. The second reason for more economic integration was a matter of international security. After the occurrence of two world wars, European elites decided to integrate their economies to prevent future inter-state conflicts and wars, especially between Germany and France. It was therefore believed that, as argued by Jean Monnet, 'the institutionalization of economic links between western European states would dilute nationalistic tendencies and promote a supranational European community' (Gabel & Whitten, 1997, p. 83).

With the years, international security among the western European countries was secured and therewith the likelihood of a future war declined. However, European integration has proven to be successful and therefore, economic concern became the 'primary responsibility of European integration' (Gabel & Whitten, 1997, p. 83). New European countries joined the EEC, predominantly for economic reasons. In addition, the EEC increasingly integrated, calling upon its members to respond to unemployment problems and to provide public investment to stimulate further economic growth (Gabel & Whitten, 1997). With the implementation of the Single European Market (SEM) in 1993, deeper economic integration was reached through the elimination of inter-state barriers and the establishment of the free movements of goods, services, workers and capital.

Considering the strong economic focus of the European project, especially its onsets, it is argued by Gabel & Whitten (1997) that it would be 'reasonable to expect that citizens will use economic criteria

to evaluate European integration' (Gabel & Whitten, 1997, p. 83). This argument is reinforced by Brule (1992), who found that city's economic downturn can be seen as a consequence of French opposition to the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (Gabel & Whitten, 1997). However, recent literature on how economic conditions might influence public perception of integration is limited.

According to Ehin (2001), existing studies on economic gain measure expectations one either a macro- or micro-economic level. In their theoretical framework on economic voting behaviour, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) assumed that 'EU citizens' support for integration depends on evaluations of the national GNP, employment, and inflation' (Gabel & Whitten, 1997, p. 83). More specifically, they investigated whether objectively measured national economic conditions (macro-level) and national net return from the EU budget are related to the national-level variation in support for European integration. However, little empirical evidence was found that objective economic conditions would influence citizens' support. A statistically significant relationship with national-level variation in support was only shown in inflation among other tested macro-economic factors (GDP and unemployment). According to Gabel & Whitten (1997), the findings of Eichenberg and Dalton would be 'misspecified', since objective measures of the national economy would be poor proxies for citizens' economic sensitivities. Consequently, it is argued by Gabel & Whitten (1997) that objectively measured national conditions would not capture two aspects: first, citizens would consider sub-national variation (regional variations) in economic conditions to be more important than national ones. Second, because of these sub-national variations in economic conditions, citizens' subjective perceptions of their economic conditions would be inconsistent with the objective economic reality at national level. Deducted from these assumptions, Gabel & Whitten (1997) found that the subjectively measured economy (micro-level), as perceived by EU citizens, not the objectively measured economy (macro-level), as measured by economic indicators, would influence support for integration. Furthermore, their results showed that citizens' support for the EU would vary with their perception of the economy, regardless of how beneficial EU policies would be for its citizens (Gabel & Whitten, 1997).

2.2 Concept of EU political support

Previous literature on political support leads back to Artistotle and argues that political support requires congruence between the form of governing institutions and the political culture (Klingemann, 1998). This view, however, was questioned by the modern democratic theorists, in particular by David Easton and his conceptualization of public support. According to Easton (1975), the concept of support can be described 'as an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favourably or unfavourably, positively, or negatively' (Easton, 1975, p. 436). In addition, he argues that a distinction can be made between the 'objects of support' and the 'types of support' (Klingemann, 1998). Consequently, within objects, he distinguishes between support for the *political community*, the *regime*, and the incumbent *authorities*. Between the types, he distinguishes between *specific* and *diffuse* support (Klingemann, 1998, p. 6). Specific support or object-specific support builds on the level of satisfaction that 'members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political

authorities' (Easton, 1975, p. 437). Consequently, the general performance of the object of support is evaluated by a person, who evaluates whether his/her demands are perceived to be met by the object of support (cost-benefit analysis). According to Easton (1975), the level of specific support would vary with a person's perceived benefits or level of satisfaction, implying that when these decline or increase, the level of support would do likewise. Furthermore, the level of specific support also varies because of cognitive incapacity. According to Easton (1975), an average person would lack the 'cognitive capacity to be able to relate his own political attitude or behaviour to the behaviour or polities of the authorities', since people are either not involved enough or are guided by the masses (Easton, 1975, p. 439). Diffuse support, on the other hand, refers to the evaluation of what an object is or represents. This refers, therefore, rather to the question what general meaning the object has for a person and not what it does. This kind of support would be more durable, since it is not dependent on outputs and performances in the short turn. Diffuse support is based on two sources: first, it is formed by one's own childhood and continued adult socialization. Second, later, it is influenced by direct experiences. According to Easton (1975), the level of diffuse support to the object of support is typically expressed by a person in two forms: first, in the level of a person's trust in a political object and second, whether a person believes that a political object is legitimate or not.

Easton's definition of political support as a two-dimensional concept is also adopted by Hix (2008), who argues in line with Easton that one can distinguish between two types of political support: *affective support* (or in the wording of Easton: diffuse support) and *utilitarian support* (or specific support). Whereas affective support is based on one's 'ideological, sociological or cultural attachment', utilitarian support is based on one's 'rational calculations of material costs and benefits' (Hix, 2008, p. 58). The level of affective support can vary among citizens, since the basic reservoir of goodwill towards a political system varies among people. Subsequently, the utilitarian rational calculations determine whether the basic reservoir of support goes up or down. This implies that if an individual feels that he/she benefits from a political system, his/her underlying level of support increases, while if someone perceives that he/she loses from a political system, his or her underlying level of support decreases. With regard to economic conditions, this means that an individual calculates whether he/she gains or loses financially from the EU (Hix, 2008).

In this study, the concept of support is therefore defined as a two-dimensional concept, composed of an affective (emotional) and utilitarian (calculated) component. This distinction will be further operationalized in the operationalization section (see section 3.5).

2.3 Literature on EU public support determinants at the micro-level

According to Verhaegen, et al. (2014), much attention in previous literature on European integration has been given to economic utilitarian considerations. According to this utilitarian approach, citizens are seen as rational actors who base their attitudes regarding the EU on a rational cost-benefit calculation (Verhaegen, et al., 2014). A positive outcome of this calculation, by taking the perceived economic benefits into consideration, is expected to lead to more support for the EU. According to Hix (2008), this cost-benefit calculation would explain variations in public support at the individual level. Considering the fact that labour market liberalization favours people unequally, it is argued by Hix (2008) that economic, political, and social elites of a society perceive the greatest benefits of European integration. Whereas the general support of the masses has declined during the last decades, elites remain strongly in favour of the European project, since they can make use of the new opportunities, such as travelling, working, and living within Europe. In line with these elite-mass differences in society, it is also found by Hix (2008) that socio-economic indicators such as income level and a personal skill's level would influence one's support for the EU. Consequently, it is argued that skilled workers would benefit more from market liberalization in Europe than manual workers. With regard to the income level, he concludes that higher-paid skilled workers would benefit more from the EU than less well-paid skilled workers, whereas higher-paid manual workers benefit less from the EU than less well-paid manual workers. In line with this, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) argues that lower financial satisfaction and lower employment rates would lead to a lower level of European support. In his theory of the silent revolution, Inglehart (n.d.) argues that political skills also determine the attitude formation at the individual- or micro-level (Janssen, 1991). Furthermore, it is argued that political skills would also determine whether a person is capable of processing information at a certain level of abstraction. According to Inglehart (n.d.), information about the EU and international politics would acquire a high level of abstractive reasoning. From this, Inglehart concludes that a person with high political skills would be more positively related to the EU. This is important with regard to the earlier made elite-mass distinction, since elites with a higher level of education would also be more capable of understanding international politics and the EU, which requires a high level of abstractive reasoning.

According to the group-interest theory or symbolic politics thesis, one's national identity is an important parameter that forms people's attitudes towards the EU. According to this view, people would not only take their personal economic conditions, but also collective ones in their cost-benefit calculation into account. Therefore, according to Arikan (n.d.), perceived material benefits to the nation from further European integration was found to have an impact on the level of support for the EU. Nevertheless, Evans and Andersen (2001) found that despite national aggregate economic improvements, many people still felt vulnerable, because they lacked an economical 'feel good' factor. Hence, although from an objectively point of view people should be satisfied with their economic circumstances, some people perceived a personal economic insecurity. According to Evans and Andersen (2001), this feeling of economic insecurity can be explained by two reasons. First, people felt uncertain about their future financial situation because of negative property equity. Second, they felt insecure about their personal job- or employment situation in the future. In line with this, it is argued by group conflict theorists that

the level of citizens' European support is also related to the level of a persons' perceived out-group threat. Vreese and Boomgarden (2005) found in their study empirical evidence that anti-immigration feelings are related to European unification reluctance. According to Blalock (1967), the 'level of perceived group threat is influenced by a context of actual competitive conditions' (Meuleman, et al., 2009, p. 3). Recent group conflict literature often operationalizes the actual competition conditions into two variables: [1] the minority group size, and [2] the economic conditions. According to Blalock (1967), a greater minority group size first implies a 'larger number of ethnic competitors' and therefore a more 'intensive struggle for scarce goods', such as a well-paid job (Meuleman, et al., 2009, p. 3). Second, the larger the minority group, as argued by Blalock (1967), the stronger the perceived threat from this group will be, since a larger minority group poses a 'greater potential for political mobilization' (Meuleman, et al., 2009, p. 3). Next to the size of the minority group, the level of perceived threat also depends on the economic context. Therefore, it is argued that a less favorable economic condition, such as the emergence of an economic crisis, would cause a situation in which material goods (e.g. jobs) become scarce.

Based on the above presented theory, the following individual-level hypotheses are drawn that might influence a person's subjective perception of his or her individual economic situation:

H_1: *People with a higher level of financial, employment, and job satisfaction show a higher level of support for the EU than people with a lower level of financial, employment, and job satisfaction.*

H_2: *People who benefit from the freedom to travel, study, and work abroad within the EU in their daily life show a higher level of support for the EU than people who do not benefit from these freedoms.*

H_3: *People who perceive economic gains for their national society as a result of further European integration show a higher level of support for the EU than people who perceive economic losses for their national society as a result of further European integration.*

H_4: *People who perceive a higher level of inter-group job-competition show a lower level of support for the EU than people who perceive a lower level of inter-group job-competition.*

A major threat to the internal validity in this study is that the relationship between the dependent and independent variable could be affected by confounding variables (third factors) that adversely affect the relation between the independent and dependent variable (see Figure 1). Based on the theory outlined above, this study will therefore control for the following confounding variables:

$H_{1control}$: *People with a higher education, and occupation-level show a higher level of support for the EU than people with a lower education, and occupation-level.*

$H_{2control}$: *Men and younger people show a higher level of support for the EU than women and older people.*

Figure 1. Confounding variables adversely affecting the relationship between X and Y.



Note. The confounding variable may either strengthen or weaken the apparent relationship between the independent and dependent variable. Adapted from: Shuttleworth, M. (2008). *Confounding Variable/Third Variable*. Retrieved December 1, 2014, from https://explorable.com/confounding-variables.

2.4 Summary

The following can be deducted from the theories and concepts outlined above: first, this study defines support as a two-dimensional concept, composed of an affective and utilitarian component, which will be further operationalized in section 3.5. Second, in this study, citizens' support determinants for the EU are derived from existing literature, by referring to the group conflict theory, the utilitarian thesis, and the group-interest theory. Based on these theories individual level predictors of EU support are deducted, measuring the citizen's subjective economic perception. These predictors are: [1] financial, national employment and job satisfaction, [2] perceived benefits from the freedom to travel, study and work abroad [3] perceived economic gains for one's national society from the EU, and [4] level of inter-group job-competition. Finally, in addition to this, the statistical model will control for the following confounding variables: gender, education, occupation, and age.

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Research design

In order to answer the above posed research question, a secondary quantitative data analysis based on a cross-national research design will be conducted. For the secondary analysis, an existing dataset is provided by the European agency Eurobarometer that performs cross-national studies. Data are collected at the micro-level. This implies that the unit of observation is individuals, who live in the six founding countries of the EU.

The chosen research design seems to be appropriate in this context, because of the following reasons: first, the use of already existing data sets saves the researcher resources regarding time, money, and other people's assistance. Second, it would not be possible to collect a data set with such a great range of quantitative cross-national data within the limited time period of this study. Third, since it is assumed in this study that there are cross-country differences in the support level among the selected member states, the chosen research design, based on a micro-data set, seems to be appropriate to make cross-national comparisons at one single point in time (year = 2010). Finally, external validity is warranted in this study, since the data provided is based on random sampling, which makes a generalization of the findings to a greater population possible.

3.2 Eurobarometer data and sampling process

The secondary analysis is based on Eurobarometer series data, financed and gathered by the European Commission. Data are gathered by the Eurobarometer annually in two waves (spring and autumn) by conducting qualitative face to face interviews in people's homes. Internal validity was secured by conducting the interviews in the appropriate national language. In the cases of Belgium and Luxembourg, which are multi-linguistic countries, the interviews were additionally conducted in two (or more) languages. Furthermore, with the help of back-translation controls, internal validity was secured. The Eurobarometer makes use of a Simple Random Sampling technique, implying that 'in each country a number of sampling points were drawn with probability proportional to population size and to population density' (probability sampling) (Moschner, 2014). Therefore, results from the sample (e.g. randomly selected German citizens) can be generalized to the entire population (e.g. Germany) from which the aforementioned sample was taken. The sampling process is based on a random selection of sampling points after 'stratification by the distribution of the national, resident population in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas' (Moschner, 2014). The target population of the Eurobarometer is the 'population of any nationality of a European member state' that is resident in any of the member states and is aged 15 years and over (Moschner, 2014). Until 1995, the regular sample size was n=1000 respondents per country, except for Luxembourg, which is a too small country. After 1995 the

standard sample size was raised to 6000 respondents for the largest countries to achieve a higher level of confidence for the analysis at the sub-national (regional) level.

3.3 Case and data selection

This study focuses on the six founding countries of the EU: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. These countries have been selected for the analysis of this research for the following reasons: first, it is assumed in this study that all the selected countries received a comparable amount of economic benefits from the economic cooperation since the countries share the same economic history, starting from the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, via the European Economic Community (1957) until the European Single Market in 1993. Second, since the European Single Market was launched in 1993, this study assumes that most measureable economic benefits from the four freedoms of goods, capital, services and people can be observed for the selected countries in 2010. Since new member states (joined after 1952) differ from the founding countries of the EU, regarding their history and time period they received economical benefits from the economic collaboration, these countries are intentionally excluded from the case selection. Third, since the selected countries differ with regard to their national and regional economic conditions, differences in the relationship between the dependent and independent variable among the selected member states can be made more visible. Fourth, the year 2010 was selected for this analysis based on a theoretical and a practical reason. Theoretically, it was assumed to find the expected cause-effect relationship for the year 2010, since people were still suffering from the consequences of the financial and economic crisis in 2007/8, which could be reflected in the respondents' level of support for the EU as well as their subjective economic perception. Practically, the year 2010 was selected since during this year the Eurobarometer survey contained the questions necessary to measure the dependent as well as independent variable chosen in this study.

3.4 Limitations of the study

This thesis is bases on existing Eurobarometer data, which implies that this study does not have control over the way how questions were formulated. Since existing Eurobarometer questions[2] were matched to the relevant theory and not vice versa, the used data in this study do not provide a direct measurement of the dependent and independent variables. As a consequence, the citizens' level of EU support and their subjective perception of their individual economic situation are traced using indirect measures. Next to internal validity, this also threatens the external validity of this study, since questions used to measure both variables might fail to ensure a proper representation of the theories and concepts on which conclusions will be drawn. This can be seen as a major limitation to this study. Further studies could avoid this problem by using primary instead of secondary data. Using proprietary questionnaires

[2] The Eurobarometer surveys are developed on behalf of the European Commission in order to observe the development of the EU as it is reflected in public opinion. Questions asked are therefore developed to measure the European population's attitudes about various issues related to the EU.

makes it easier to draw conclusions about variables and concepts, since they ensure a valid measurement.

Furthermore, the validity of face-to-face interviews can be challenging, since the respondents can be influenced by a range of factors that are difficult to control. Although major threats to internal validity were controlled for (such as probability sampling, translation and back-translation controls), a person's answers might be influenced by the interviewer or the order in which certain questions were asked. Furthermore, as argued by Nissen (2014), back-translation does not control for the 'equivalence of meaning', since the meaning of 'a word in one country cannot ensure that questions formulated in different languages are identical in meaning' (Nissen, 2014, p. 719).

The chosen research design can be seen as a further limitation to the study. Since a cross-national (sectional) research design aims to compare different population groups at one single point in time, definite information about the cause-and-effect relationship between the dependent and independent variable cannot be provided. This is because of the fact that the study offers one snapshot of a single moment in time, implying that no statements can be made about the support level and the citizens' subjective perception of their individual economic situation before or after the observed year. In order to be able to test whether an observed change is accurate among the countries over a longer time period, further studies should opt for a longitudinal cross-national research design (panel study).

Larger models with more than three or four variables have the risk of multicollinearity, since two or more predictors in the model could be correlated and therefore provide redundant information about the response. Beside the later performed bi-variate variance analysis, therefore, an additional multi-variate variance analysis will be performed, which controls for interaction effects.

Finally, in order to be better able to measure and interpret variations in citizens' subjective economic perceptions within the selected member states, further studies should also take the influence of objectively measured national economic conditions as well as regional economic conditions into account.

3.5 Operationalization

As mentioned above, one major limitation of Eurobarometer studies is that they have not been conducted to meet the requirements of a specific project. Since no direct measurement of the dependent variable (citizens' support for the EU) is provided, this study can trace support for the EU only by using indirect measures. In the following both variables will be operationalized in more depth (for a general overview: see appendix I).

3.5.1 Dependent variable

In this study, the concept of support is defined as a two-dimensional concept, composed of an affective (emotional) and utilitarian (calculated) component (see section 2.2). In order to operationalize the dependent variable of this study (a citizen's support level for the EU), for both components, a scale measuring the level of support is constructed. These scales are presented in detail in the next paragraphs.

3.5.1.1 Affective support component

The first scale, measuring the citizens' ***affective support*** towards the EU, is based on one variable that is present in the Eurobarometer surveys, starting in 2000. People's emotional stance towards the EU can therefore be measured from responses to the following question in the Eurobarometer surveys:

1. *In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?*
   1.0 very positive
   2.0 fairly positive
   3.0 neutral
   4.0 fairly negative
   5.0 very negative

The question has an ordinal scale, ranging from one (very positive) to five (very negative). For the purpose of the later variance analysis, the ordinal scale are recoded and reversed into an interval scale, ranging from one (minimum of affective support) to ten (maximum of affective support).

Figure 2. Histogram of affective support component distribution.



Note. The level of affective support ranges from zero (minimum level of affective support) to 10 (maximum level of affective support). Data from: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

This is done as follows: each individual's responses for the question is summed, normalized, and then multiplied by ten, so that the measure of EU affective support ranges from zero to ten.

Figure 2 shows how the affective support component is distributed. As can be seen, the affective support data resemble an approximately symmetric distribution (skewness = -.416; kurtosis = -,161). This implies that, approximately, there are as many respondents emotionally in favour of the EU as against.

3.5.1.2 Utilitarian support component

In the construction of the second scale, measuring ***utilitarian support***, this study adopts the same measure as Gabel and Palmer (1995). The level of utilitarian support is therefore constructed from responses to the following two questions in the Eurobarometer surveys:

1. *Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing, neither good nor good, or a bad thing?*
   1.0 a good thing
   2.0 neither good nor bad, or don't know
   3.0 a bad thing
2. *Taking everything into consideration would you say that (your country) has benefited from being a member of the European Union?*
   1.0 benefited
   2.0 neutral/don't know
   3.0 not benefited

The first question whether *it is a good or a bad thing that the respondent's country is a member of the EU,* has answers ranging from one to three, but is recoded and reversed to range from zero (a bad thing) to two (a good thing). Similarly, the second question, whether *the respondent's country has benefited from European membership,* is recoded and reversed to range from zero to two (the country has not benefited (0) or has benefited (2)). To calculate the utilitarian support component, each individual's responses for the two questions are summed, normalized, and then multiplied by ten, so that the level measure of EU utilitarian support ranges from zero (minimum of utilitarian support) to ten (maximum of utilitarian support) (interval scale).

Figure 3 shows how the utilitarian support component is distributed. As can be seen, the utilitarian support data is asymmetrically distributed, with a majority of high scores (skewness = - -,66; kurtosis = -1,22). Consequently, a higher number of respondents evaluated the EU as beneficial for their own or their country's sake than as non-beneficial.[3]

[3] One assumption of the later conducted analysis of variance is that the used data are assumed to fit a normal distribution. Consequently, a measurement variable that is not normally distributed, increases the chance of a false positive result, since the test assumes normality. Regarding the skewed distribution of the utilitarian support component, this aspect will be take into consideration in the later analysis of the data.



Figure 3. Histogram of utilitarian support component distribution. The level of affective support ranges from zero (minimum level of utilitarian support) to 10 (maximum level of utilitarian support). Data from: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E

3.5.1.3 Two dimensions of citizen's public support

As a result, nation's mean level of both public affective and utilitarian support range from zero (minimum support among all its respondents) to ten (maximum support among all its respondents). In Table 1, the mean scores for the two components of support are presented. As can be seen from the Table, the affective support-component lies on average one point below (Y_1: M = 5.71, SD = 2.27, n = 5538) the utilitarian support-component (Y_2: M = 6.75, SD = 3.94, n = 4969).[4][5]

Table 1. Mean-scores of affective and utilitarian support component.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Y_1 affective component	5538	0,00	10,00	**5,71**	2,27
$Y_{2,1}$ utilitarian component	5030	0,00	10,00	6,35	4,81
$Y_{2,2}$ utilitarian component	5468	0,00	10,00	7,04	3,82
Y_2 utilitarian component[6]	4969	0,00	10,00	**6,75**	3,94
Valid N (listwise)	4937				

[4] An association between the two quantitative utilitarian support-components was expected, which was confirmed by a moderate positive Kendall's Tau-c association coefficients between the two variables (Kendall's tau-c = .636). Therefore, the two items were combined into one single variable (ranging from zero to ten; 0 = lowest score to 10 = highest score) measuring the general mean level of utilitarian support in six founding countries of the EU in 2010.

[5] In order to investigate whether there is an association between the two support-components Kendall's Tau-b test was conducted. Although a moderate positive association coefficients between the two variables (see Appendix II, **Table 2**, Kendall's tau-b = .536) was found, this study will further measure a citizen's support for the EU as a two-dimensional concept, as proposed by the literature outlined above (see section 2.2).

[6] combined

3.5.2 Independent variable

In order to measure the subjective economic perception of the European citizens within the selected countries, the hypotheses drawn above are tested by using the following survey questions of the Eurobarometer (see Appendix I for question selection). In order to measure the first hypothesis (H_1), two Eurobarometer survey-questions were selected. First, the question '*how would you judge the current situation in each of the following' (1)* '*financial', (2)* '*national employment*' and *(3)* '*job situation*' is used to measure one's subjective perceived individual economic situation. Second, in order measure whether people expect their personal economic situation to change in the future is assessed by the question '*what are your expectations for the next twelve months with regard to'(1)* '*your financial situation', (2)* '*the general employment situation in your country*', and (3) '*your personal job situation*'. Since it was expected that a person who perceives his/her current financial situation as either 'good', 'the same' or 'worse', would not expect that this situation would change in the future, both questions were combined to three new variables, measuring a person's financial, employment, and job satisfaction (see Appendix I for the new variable distributions).

Whether citizens perceive to benefit from the EU (H_2) is tested by one question from the Eurobarometer survey: '*What does the EU mean to you personally?*' Here, the answer possibility '*freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU*' is used. Since this answer possibility has two values, '*not mentioned*' and '*mentioned*', it can be used to investigate whether the respondents perceive to benefit from travelling, studying and working abroad, or not.

The third hypothesis (H_3), investigating whether citizens perceive that their country's economy gains from being a member of the EU, is measured using the following Eurobarometer question: (1) *What does the European Union mean to your personally?* In this case the following two answer possibilities are taken into account: (1) '*economic prosperity*' and (2) '*stronger say in the world*'.

In order to test the last hypothesis (H_4), the following question from the Eurobarometer is selected: *And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment?* Here, it is expected that people who perceive a high level of inter-group job-competition would have mentioned at least one of the two or both answer possibilities (1) 'unemployment' and (2) 'immigration'. In order to measure to what extent a citizen perceives inter-group job-competition both answer possibilities were combined to one variable (see appendix I for the new variable distributions).

Finally, in this study, the standard set of demographic variables of the Eurobarometer surveys data are used to control for the confounding variables outlined earlier: gender, occupation, education, and age.

4. Data analysis

4.1 Citizens' level of EU support level in 2010

In the following section, the levels of affective as well as utilitarian support among the six founding countries of the EU in 2010 are compared for the years 2005 -2009. Furthermore, it is assessed how the member states, observed in this study can be placed along the two support components.

Figure 4 shows the mean-score levels of affective and utilitarian support among the six founding countries of the EU between 2005 and 2010. For the year 2010, on which this study is focused, the mean level of affective support for the EU in the six founding countries is 5.71 (SP = 2.27, n = 5538). This implies that, on average, respondents are emotionally in favour of the EU, although only to a certain extent (5.71 out of 10) in 2010. Furthermore, the mean level of utilitarian support for the EU lies with 6.75 (SP = 3.94, n = 4969) one point above the affective support component, which implies that citizens among the observed member states, on average, show a higher level of utilitarian support than affective support for the EU in 2010. This is also the case for the years 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009. Only in 2006, the picture is reversed (M_{AF} =5.98; M_{UT} = 5.67). Furthermore, Figure 4 shows for both support components that the highest level of affective and utilitarian support can be observed for the year 2007 (M_{AF} = 6.13; M_{UT} = 7.07) and that for both components the level of support is slightly declining until 2010. Despite these decreasing support levels, it can be seen that with exception of the year 2006, the level of support for both support components stay fairly stable between 2005 and 2010. The affective support component is fluctuating along a mean-score of six, whereas the utilitarian support components vary among a mean-score of seven, except for the year 2006.

Figure 4. Public affective and utilitarian support among the six founding countries of the EU between 2005 and 2010.



Note. Mean scores for both support components are obtained from the Eurobarometer surveys 2005 – 2010. Data from: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2005-2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

Figure 5 shows how the six founding countries of the EU can be placed on the two support component dimensions, observed in this study. With regard to the affective support dimension, it can be observed that Italian respondents show the highest level of affective support, followed by Luxembourgian, Belgian, Dutch, and French respondents (IT: m = 6.12, SD = 2.19; LUX: m = 6.10, SP = 2.27; BE: m = 5.88, SD = 2.16; NL: m = 5.60, SD = 2.05; and FR: m = 5.41, SP = 2.43). In contrast, the lowest level of affective support is observed for the German respondents (GER_{AF}: m = 5.37, SP = 2.39).

Figure 5. Placement of the six EU member states among the two support dimensions.



Note. The Y-axis shows a citizen's mean-utilitarian support level. The X-axis shows a citizen's mean-affective support level. Data from: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

With regard to the utilitarian support component, the highest level of support can be observed in Luxembourg (m = 7.77, SD = 3.30). Furthermore, high levels of utilitarian support can be observed for the Netherlands (m = 7.59, SD = 3.60) and Belgium (m = 7.25, SD = 3.71). Italy shows on average an utilitarian support level which scores one point below the support level of the Belgian respondents (m = 6.25, SD = 4.09). The lowest utilitarian support levels can be observed for France (m = 5.89, SD = 4.15) and Germany, where Germany, with a mean score of 5.37 (SD = 4.12), scores the lowest level of utilitarian support. Furthermore, German respondents therefore show the lowest level of support on both support dimensions among all observed member states (GER_{AF}: m = 5.37, SP = 2.39 and GER_{UT}: m = 5.37, SD = 4.12) (for a full overview over the mean-scores, the reader is referred to Appendix II, Table 3-5).

Based on these observations, the following can be noted: first, people indicated for both dimensions that they are in favour of the European project (mean level above 5.00 out of 10). Furthermore, despite the fact that the level of affective and utilitarian support slightly decreased between 2007 and 2010, the extremely low or drastically shrinking level of public support for the EU, as claimed by Hix (2008), has not been found in this study. In the contrary, both support components were found to stay fairly stable between 2005 and 2010, except for the year 2006.

Second, a clear difference between the citizens' affective and utilitarian support levels is observed (except for 2006). In general, this implies that people among the observed countries show a higher level of support, based rather on their rational considerations than on their emotional attachment to the European project. According to Hix (2008) and Easton (1975), differences in observed support level between the two dimensions are not surprising, because of the following two reasons: first, larger variations in the respondents' affective support level show that their basic reservoir of goodwill towards the EU varies from one person to another. More specifically, since one's 'ideological, sociological or cultural attachment' to the EU is influenced by different factors that might vary among people and/or nations (such as one's own childhood, socialization, and direct experiences), variations among the respondents' affective support level are not surprising. Second, according to Hix (2008), smaller variations among the respondents' utilitarian support level can be expected, since people who rationally evaluate their own or their country's benefits from the EU would rather show a high level or a low level of support for the political system.

Third, from the above observations, one should note that the support levels differ across the different member states. Such cross-national differences have been predicted by previous literature (Inglehart & Rabier 1978; Mathew 1980; Hewstone 1986; Dalton & Eichenberg 1991; Palmer & Gabel 1993). Furthermore, it can be noted that there are groupings among the member states. Taking both dimensions into account, a higher level of utilitarian as well as affective support can be observed for the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) than for France and Germany. Italy can be placed in between these two groups. According to Goetschel (1998), a higher level of utilitarian support among the Benelux countries for the EU is not surprising, considering the fact that these countries have a smaller country size and therewith market size. Due to their limited resources, smaller countries would rely more on external strength derived from their interaction with other states. Furthermore, as argued by Handel (n.d.), one important element of external strength is the participation of smaller states in an international organization, such as the EU. In line with this, a higher utilitarian support level for the Benelux countries can be explained by the fact that smaller countries of the EU perceive more external strength in the world economy from their EU membership than larger countries, such as Germany, France, and Italy.

4.2 Public subjective perception of their individual economic situation in 2010

The citizens' subjective perception of their individual economic situation among the six founding countries of the EU is measured in this study using four hypotheses. In the following section, it is investigated how the citizen's among the six founding countries of the EU perceive their individual economic situation in 2010.

Table 6. Mean and standard deviations of the six independent variables, measuring the independent variable.

Independent variables	mean	SD
$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	3,64	(1,06)
$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	3,60	(0,97)
$x_{1,3}$ nat. employment satisfaction	4,09	(1,06)
x_2 four freedoms	1,91	(0,63)
x_3 national gains	0,42	(0,61)
x_4 inter-group job-competition	0,19	(0,41)

Source: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

Table 6 shows the average-mean scores for the set of independent variables, investigated in this study. As can be seen, respondents among the selected member states assess and expect their personal job and financial situation on average as more or less steady in 2010 (job: M = 3.64, SD = 1.06, n = 4347; financial: M = 3.60, SP = .97, n = 5396). The national employment situation, on the other hand, is evaluated as slightly negative (M = 4.09, SP = 1.06, n = 5327). In Table 7, the mean-scores for the set of independent variables are presented for each of the six founding countries of the EU, seperately (for a more detailed description see Appendix II, Table 8). As can be seen, on average people living in France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy judge their national employment situation to be or become negative, whereas Dutch and Luxembourgian respondents evaluated their national employment situation as neither positive nor negative. One should note that because of the economic crisis in 2007/8, which caused unfavourable economic conditions within the EU, a general lower satisfaction level was expected. However, on average respondents living in the six founding countries of the EU are more or less satisfied (slightly negative) with their job, their financial and national employment situation in 2010.

During the interview, respondents were asked whether they would assess the meaning of the EU as 'freedom to travel, study and work abroad' or not. On average, half of the respondents mentioned this answer possibility (M =0.47, SD = 0.50, n = 5602). As can be seen in Table 7, Dutch, German, and Luxembourgian respondents (M_{NL} = 0.53, M_{GER} =0.52, and M_{LUX} = 0.57) mentioned this item on average more often than respondents from France, Belgium, and Italy (M_{FR} = 0.46, M_{BE} = 0.44, M_{IT} = 0.33). On average, about half of the respondents have indicated that they perceive national gains from their countries' EU membership (M = 0.42, SD = 0.61, n = 5602). More specifically, respondents living in the Benelux countries have mentioned this item more often than respondents from the other observed member states. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 6, among all member states, a very low number of respondents indicated that they would perceive a high level of inter-group job competition (M = 0.19, SD = 0.41, n = 5602).

By looking at Table 7, it can be seen that grouping becomes visible: respondents from the Benelux countries are on average more satisfied with their employment situation than respondents from France, Germany, and Italy. Furthermore, the item '*freedom to study, travel and word abroad*' was more often mentioned by respondents from France, Italy, and Germany than by respondents from the Benelux countries. In addition, Dutch, Luxembourgian and Belgian respondents believe on average more strongly that their countries gain economically from its EU membership than Italian, German, and French respondents. Only for the independent variable '*inter-group job-competition*' (X_4), the pattern cannot be observed, since respondents in Italy, Belgian, and France perceive more inter-group job-competition than respondents from Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Germany. Nevertheless, based on these observations it can be stated that respondents living in the Benelux countries assess their individual economic situation to be better than people living in France, Germany and Italy.

Table 7. Mean and standard deviations of the six independent variables for the six founding countries of the EU.

	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	$x_{1,3}$ nat. employment satisfaction	x_2 four freedoms	x_3 national gains	x_4 inter-group job-competition
FR						
mean	3,61 [3]	3,65 [3]	4,49 [1]	2,02 [1]	0,32 [6]	0,18 [3]
SD	(1,05)	(0,96)	(0,93)	(0,63)	(0,52)	(0,39)
BE						
mean	3,60 [4]	3,56 [4]	4,10 [4]	1,83 [6]	0,45 [3]	0,24 [2]
SD	(1,02)	(0,95)	(0,96)	(0,63)	(0,64)	(0,44)
NL						
mean	3,39 [6]	3,33 [6]	3,47 [6]	1,86 [4]	0,57 [1]	0,14 [5]
SD	(1,10)	(0,96)	(1,06)	(0,61)	(0,68)	(0,35)
GER						
mean	3,67 [2]	3,71 [2]	4,16 [3]	1,90 [3]	0,33 [5]	0,14 [6]
SD	(0,99)	(0,86)	(0,99)	(0,62)	(0,55)	(0,36)
IT						
mean	3,96 [1]	3,87 [1]	4,45 [2]	1.99 [2]	0,41 [4]	0,29 [1]
SD	(1,10)	(1,06)	(1,03)	(0,63)	(0,57)	(0,48)
LUX						
Mean	3,49 [5]	3,40 [5]	3,65 [5]	1,85 [5]	0,51 [2]	0,17 [4]
SD	(0,93)	(0,89)	(0,91)	(0,63)	(0,64)	(0,38)

Note. For each independent variable, the mean-scores for the six founding countries of the EU are ranked. This is symbolized by the numbers from 1(highest mean-score) to 6 (lowest mean-score). Data from: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

Altogether, from these observations the following can be concluded: first, among the six founding countries of the EU, people judge their individual economic situation on average as neither very good nor very bad. However, respondents from the Benelux countries on average assess their individual economic situation as better than respondents from Italy, France and Germany. These findings are in line with the finding from the previous section (4.1), showing that respondents from the Benelux countries show on average a higher level of support for the EU than respondents from Italy, France, and Germany. In the following section it will be statistically investigated whether these independent variables are significant predictors of a person's support level for the EU.

4.3 Bi-variate variance analysis

In this study, a set of four antecedents of EU support are used to explain the two different dimensions of EU support that can be distinguished according to the theory outlined earlier (see Section 3.5.2). In order to investigate whether a person's subjective perception of his/her individual economic situation has an effect on his/her support level for the EU, a bi-variate variance analysis is conducted. This type of analysis was chosen as the most appropriate analysis as the aim of the study was to simultaneously examine four independent variables and one dependent variable.

Table 9 and 10 display the results of the conducted bi-variate variance analysis for both support dimensions. In the following, for each support component, it will be investigated whether the hypotheses drawn above can be confirmed or not.

Table 9. Bi-variate variance analysis. Affective support component.

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
$X_{1,1}$ job	658,847	5	131,77	26,42	,000
$X_{1,2}$ financial	761,767	5	152,35	30,26	,000
$X_{1,3}$ national employment	961,600	5	192,32	38,45	,000
X_2 study/travel/work abroad	1174,133	1	1174,13	237,78	,000
X_3 national economic gains	3132,988	2	1566,49	341,67	,000
X_4 job competition	87,565	2	43,78	8,53	,000

Data from: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

The first independent variable, '*job, financial, and employment satisfaction*' (X_1), was measured by six questions, including levels: (1) highly positive (2) positive (3) less positive (4) less negative (5) negative and (6) positive. Table 9 and 10 show that one's level of job, financial and national employment satisfaction are significant predictors of a person's affective (F_{JOB} (5, 4312) =26.42, p = .000; $F_{FINANCIAL}$ (5, 5338) =30.26, p = .000; and $F_{NAT.\ EMPLOYMENT}$ (5, 5277)=38.45, p = .000) as well as utilitarian support level (F_{JOB} (5, 4312) =32,86, p = .000; $F_{FINANCIAL}$ (5, 5338) =43,82, p = .000; and $F_{NAT.\ EMPLOYMENT}$ (5, 5277)= 48,66, p = .000). Therefore, it can be concluded that the first hypothesis is confirmed. As can be seen in Figure 6 (for the full details of the calculations and figures, the reader is referred to Appendix II, Table 11 – 13 and Figures 7 - 8), this implies that among all member states those who indicated that they would be more satisfied with their job, financial, and the national employment situation, also showed a higher level of support than those who indicated that they would not be satisfied.

Table 10. Bi-variate variance analysis. Utilitarian support component.

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
$X_{1,1}$ job	2422,60	5	484,56	32,86	,000
$X_{1,2}$ financial	3246,50	5	649,30	43,82	,000
$X_{1,3}$ national employment	3593,54	5	718,71	48,66	,000
X_2 study/travel/work abroad	5278,41	1	5278,41	364,66	,000
X_3 national economic gains	9891,69	2	4945,85	365,04	,000
X_4 job competition	415,13	2	207,56	13,43	,000

Data from: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

The second independent variable, 'one's perceived *benefit from the freedom to travel, study, and word abroad*' (X_2) was measured by one question, including levels (0) not mentioned and (1) mentioned. As can be seen in Tables 9 and 10, one's perceived benefit from the freedom to travel, study and word abroad is significantly related to one's affective ($F(1, 5537) = 237{,}78$, $p = .000$) as well as utilitarian support component ($F(1, 4968) = 364{,}66$, $p = .000$). Consequently, the second hypothesis is confirmed, stating that people who indicated to benefit from the freedom to travel, study, and work abroad in their daily life do show a higher level of support for the EU than people who indicated not to benefit from these freedoms (for an overview over the mean-scores, the reader is referred to Appendix II, Table 14).

Figure 6. Relationship between one's level of job satisfaction and one's affective and utilitarian support level.



Data from: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

The third variable 'one's *perceived national economic gains*' (X_3) was measured by two questions, including levels (0) not mentioned and (1) mentioned, and (2) mentioned twice. Tables 9 and 10 show that a persons' perceived national economic gain from its country's EU membership is a significant predictor of one's affective ($F(2, 5537) = 341{,}67$, $p = .000$) as well as for one's utilitarian support level ($F(2, 4968) = 365{,}04$, $p = .000$). Consequently, as can be seen in Figure 9, the third hypothesis was confirmed, which stated that people who perceive economic gains for their national society

resulting from further European integration show a higher level of support for the EU than people who perceive economic losses for their national society (for an overview over the mean-scores, the reader is referred to Appendix II , Table 15).

Figure 9. Relationship between one's perceived national economic gains from the EU and one's affective and utilitarian support level.



Data from: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

The fourth and final variable '*one's level of inter-group job-competition*' (X_4) was measured by two questions, including level (0) not mentioned, (1) mentioned once, and (2) mentioned twice. Also this hypothesis can be confirmed, since, as can be seen in Table 9 and 10, it was found that one's level of inter-group job-competition is a significant predictor of one's level of affective ($F(2, 5537) = 8.53$, $P = .000$) as well as of utilitarian support ($F(2, 4968) = 13{,}43$, $P = .000$). Figure 10 (see appendix II) shows the mean-scores for the independent variable X_4. As can be seen, the last hypothesis is confirmed, stating that people who perceive a higher level of inter-group job-competition, also show a significant lower level of support for the EU than people who perceive a lower level of inter-group job-competition (for an overview over the mean-scores, the reader is referred to Appendix II , Table 16).

4.4 Multi-variate variance analysis

The bi-variate variance analysis has shown that both dimensions of EU support can be explained by the set of independent variables investigated in this study. In order to investigate whether the above found significant group means stay significant after adding all independent variables into one model, a mutli-variate variance analysis is conducted in the following section. The multi-variate analysis is also used to investigate which independent variable from the set of antecedents of EU support works best for predicting a citizen's level of affective and utilitarian support for the EU.

The multi-variate analysis (see Appendix II, Table 17-18) shows that the explained variance by the set of four antecedents of EU support differs considerably for the two EU support dimensions. The set of antecedents works best for predicting the utilitarian support level of an individual, with 23 percent explained variance. The affective support dimension, in particular the people's emotional stance towards the EU, is less well explained by the independent variables, with 17 percent explained variance. The conducted multi-variate variance analysis shows that both level of a person's affective and utilitarian support therefore can be partially predicted through the set of independent variables used in this study. More specifically, this implies that one's level of support for the EU can partially be explained by one's subjective perception of one's individual economic situation.

Figure 11 and 12 provides an overview over how the total variances of both the affective and the utilitarian support components are distributed for the set of four independent variables, investigated in this study. By comparing the two figures, it can be observed which of the independent variables from the set of antecedents works best for predicting a citizen's level of affective and utilitarian support for the EU. As can be seen, both a person's affective as well as utilitarian support level are most strongly explained by the '*perceived national economic gains from further European integration*' (H_3), with those perceiving more national gains also expressing more emotional as well as rational support for the EU. In line with the findings of De Vreese et al. (2008), this shows that one's national identity is strongly related to emotional and rational EU support considerations. Therefore, a citizen's support is not only based on his or her personal economic conditions, but also on the national economic condition. A second multi-variate analysis for all six founding countries of the EU for the both support components showed that '*one's perceived national economic gains from further European integration*' forms the largest proportion of the total variance of a person's affective as well as utilitarian support in all observed member states (see Appendix II, Table 19-20).

Figure 11. Affective support component. Partial Eta squared scores for the set of independent variables with a total explained variance of 17%.



Source: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

Figure 12. Utilitarian support component. Partial Eta squared scores for the set of independent variables with a total explained variance of 23%.



Source: GESIS, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. (2014). *Standard and Special Eurobarometer 2010* [Data file]. Retrieved from Retrieved January 24, 2015, from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0008&DB=E.

The Figures 11 and 12 show that the second strongest predictor among both support dimensions is one's '*perceived benefits from the freedoms to study, travel and work abroad*' (H_2). Figures 11 show that the affective support dimension is less well explained by the independent variable than the utilitarian support dimension (see Figure 12). As can be seen in Table 16 and 17 (see Appendix II), an individual's perceived benefit from the freedom to travel, study, and work abroad leads to a stronger level of affective as well as utilitarian support among all observed member states,[7] with one exception: only for Luxembourg it was found that respondents are not influenced in their utilitarian support level by their perceived benefits from the freedoms to travel study, and work abroad ($F(1, 346) = 31.66$, $p = .071$).

As can be seen in Figures 11 and 12, a person's '*financial, employment, and job satisfaction*' (H_1) are weak significant predictors of one's affective as well as utilitarian support level for the EU. However, as can be seen in Table 16 and 17 (see Appendix II), this is not the case among all observed member states. For instance, one's financial satisfaction was not found to be related to one's affective level of support among all the observed member states in this study. In contrast, for France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg, it was found that one's level of financial satisfaction is significantly related to one's level of utilitarian support. Furthermore, whereas one's job satisfaction was found to be no significant predictor of one's affective support in the Netherlands, Germany, and Luxembourg, one's national employment satisfaction was found to be unrelated to one's affective support level in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. More specifically, whereas Dutch, German, and Luxembourgian respondents are not influenced in their level of affective support by their level of job satisfaction, French, Belgian, and Italian respondents are influenced in their level of emotional support. A different picture was found for the utilitarian support dimension. One's job satisfaction was not found to be a significant predictor of one's utilitarian support among all observed member states. Furthermore, whereas French, Belgian and Luxembourgian respondents are not influenced in their affective support level by their level of national employment satisfaction, Dutch, German, and Italian respondents are influenced in their level of emotional support. On the other hand, the model shows that Belgian, German, Italian respondents are not influenced in their utilitarian level of support by their perceived level of national employment satisfaction, whereas French, Dutch and Luxembourgian respondents are. From these observations made above, it can therefore be concluded that the explained percentage of variance of the independent variable (X_1) and its components ($X_{1,1}$; $X_{1,2}$, and $X_{1,3}$) differs for the observed countries and for the two support components, respectively.

Figures 11 and 12 show that '*one's perceived level of inter-group job competition*' (H_4) is not related to one's affective support level, and only a weak predictor of one's utilitarian level of support. Furthermore, it was found that the independent variable (X_4) is not a significant predictor of one's level of utilitarian support among all six founding countries of the EU (seen Appendix II, Tables 16 - 17). This

[7] Affective component: $F_{FR}(1,621) = 27.29$, $p = .000$; $F_{BE}(1,794) = 9.24$, $p = .002$; $F_{NL}(1,726) = 8.54$, $p = .004$; $F_{GER}(1,740) = 18.63$, $p = .000$; $F_{IT}(1,791) = 28.21$, $p = .000$; and $F_{LUX}(1,371) = 5.68$, $p = .018$; Utilitarian component: $F_{FR}(1, 346) = 17.05$, $p = .000$; $F_{BE}(1, 346) = 24.19$, $p = .000$; $F_{NL}(1, 346) = 16.77$, $p = .000$; $F_{GER}(1, 346) = 28.66$, $p = .000$; $F_{IT}(1, 346) = 45.19$, $p = .000$; and $F_{LUX}(1, 346) = 3.29$, $p = .018$.

result is surprising in the light of previous literature, stating that one's support for the EU is influenced by anti-immigration feelings (Vreese and Boomgarden, 2005). Nevertheless, the results of this study show that one's anti-immigration attitude and one's perceived level of inter-group job competition are no significant predictors of one's level of affective support and a weak predicator of one's level of utilitarian support.

Finally, also the control variables exhibit some relationships. Whereas one's level of occupation is significantly related to the 'affective' dimension ($F(1,4048) = 11.76$, $p = .001$), it is a negative explanatory factor for utilitarian support ($F(1,3712) = .42$, $p = .517$). Similar, gender is no significant predictor for affective support ($F_A(1,4048) = 1.49$, $p = .223$), but a significant one for 'utilitarian' support ($F_U(1,3712) = 10.86$, $p = .001$). Education and age, on the other hand, are significant predictors for both a persons' affective and utilitarian support ($F_{E(A)}(1,4048) = 23.3$, $p = .000$; $F_{E(U)}(1,3712) = 88.94$, $p = .000$; $F_{A(A)} = F(1,4048) = 4.24$, $p = .042$; $F_{U(A)}(1,3712) = 8.6$, $p = .003$). In line with Inglehart's (n.d.), a higher level of education and a younger age are therefore predictors for a higher level of affective as well as utilitarian support for the EU. According to Inglehart's (n.d.), this might be caused by the fact that a younger and better educated person is more capable of understanding international politics and the concept of the EU.

In addition, the analysis shows that the explained variance of the control variables differs among the observed countries and the two support components considerably (see Appendix II, Table 16-17). The analysis shows that a person's level of education was only found to be related to the Dutch respondents' affective support level among the observed member states ($F(1, 371) = .002$, $p = .014$) (see Appendix II, Table 16). With regard to the utilitarian support component, it can be observed that gender is a significant predictor for French and Belgian's level of support ($F_{FE}(1, 556) = 9.02$, $p = .003$; $F_{BE}(1,556) = 12.14$, $p = .001$), whereas it is unrelated to the utilitarian support level of respondents, living in the other observed member states. Finally, a respondent's age was only found to be related to a person's utilitarian support level in Italy and Luxembourg ($F_{IT}(1,556) = 4.53$, $p = .034$; $F_{LUX}(1,556) = 8.22$, $p = .004$). From these observations, it can be concluded that the effect of the set of control variables, used in this study, differs across the observed member states, respectively.

4.4.1 Discussion of the results

From the observations above the following can be concluded: among the set of antecedents of EU support, the independent variable '*one's perceived national economic gain*' (X_3) was found to be the best predictor of one's level of support for the EU. Consequently, one's national identity was found to play a greater role in a person's support considerations than the other independent variables investigated in this study. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the high percentage of explained variance of the independent variable X_3 could be caused by the asymmetric distribution of the variable, since a measurement variable that is not normally distributed, increases the chance of a false positive result. Further research should investigate whether the significant predicting power of X_3 found in this study remains by using normal distributed data.

The second main predictor of one's level of affective and utilitarian support for the EU was found to be '*one's perceived benefits of the freedom to study, travel and work abroad in daily live*' (X_2). This is not surprising considering the fact that new freedoms, such as studying, traveling and working abroad, are the direct benefits of the open borders between the member states. Therewith, they represent predominant effects of the new established collaboration between countries, firms and universities, which can be perceived by the EU citizens in daily life.

The third factor which was found to predict a citizen's support level for the EU is '*one's job, financial and national employment satisfaction*' (X_1). This is in line with previous literature (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000 & Janssen, 1991), stating that a lower job, financial, and national employment satisfaction would be negatively related to a person's support level, and vice versa. However, it should be noted that this factor was found to be a weak predictor of one's support level, only. Furthermore, the factors partial predicting power for a person's support level differs considerably among the observed member states.

The last factor '*one's perceived level of inter-group job-competition*' (X_4) was found not to be related to one's level of utilitarian support and weakly related to one's level of affective support. The significance of this result is questionable, as this result may be a consequence of the modest measurement used in this study. More specifically, respondents were asked, what are the two most important issues they are facing at the moment. Consequently, they had to choose two items from a set of answer possibilities. This study assumed that a person, perceiving a high level of inter-group job-competition would chose for the two answer possibilities (1) immigration, and (2) unemployment. The distribution of the independent variable X_4 is, however, skewed to the left, which implies that most of the people asked have not given either the first nor the second answer possibilities. Consequently, the used method to measure the independent variable X_4 have failed its purpose.

5. Conclusion

In recent years, there has been an increasing awareness of the importance of public support for the legitimacy of the EU and its further integration. Consequently, the study on public support formation for the EU has gained great relevance (Boomgaarden, et al., 2011). This bachelor thesis aims to contribute to the existing body of literature on Europeans' public support formation, by adopting a micro-level economic approach and by answering the following research question: '*To what extent can the citizens' support for the EU in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands be explained by the subjective perception of their individual economic situation in 2010?*'.

One major incentive for conducting this study is based on the need to react on claims by previous politicians and researchers that the EU would suffer from a shrinking level of popular support and therefore would struggle with a democratic deficit (e.g. Hix, 2008). Contrary to these claims, the analysis (see section 4.1) demonstrates that people among all the six founding countries of the EU are in favour of the European project in 2010, although not exceptionally strong. Also, while investigating the time period 2005 until 2010, neither an extremely low nor a drastically shrinking level of public support for the EU has been found. In addition, our findings indicate that people among all observed member states appear to show a higher level of support for the EU based on rational consideration rather than emotional attachment to the European project. Our findings confirm the theoretical concept used in this study, indicating the importance of seeing public support as a two dimensional concept. Furthermore, as predicted by previous literature (Inglehart & Rabier 1978; Mathew 1980; Hewstone 1986; Dalton & Eichenberg 1991; Palmer & Gabel 1993), cross-national differences and groupings in the level of EU support become visible among the observed countries. In addition, in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis in 2007-8, it was expected to find that people among the observed member states would perceive a bad individual economic situation in 2010. Surprisingly, the analysis (see section 4.2) shows that although there are slight differences among the observed member states, all citizens indicate that they were more or less satisfied with their individual economic situation in 2010.

In contrast to previous studies in this field (Phan & Levy, 2012), which included a person's economic perception of his or her individual economic situation as a confounding variable and therefore controlled for it, this study investigates one's economic perception as a key independent variable. The results of the analysis (see section 4.3 and 4.4) show the value of this approach: we demonstrate that a positive perception of one's individual economic situation does partially explain a higher level of EU support. More specifically, we find that a person's level of support is markedly influenced by one's perceived national economic gains from the country's EU membership. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that the more a person perceives to benefit from his or her country's EU membership, the higher his or her level of support for the EU tends to be. This also indicates that one's own national identity substantially influences a person's EU support considerations, which is in line with the findings from previous literature (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Gabel and Palmer 1995, Anderson and

Reichert 1995, Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996, Gabel 1998). Further factors measuring one's own individual economic situation, such as a higher level of financial, national employment, and job satisfaction, were also found to affect a person's support level for the EU, however to a much lesser extent. This is also the case for the other factors tested 'one's perceived benefits from the freedom to travel, study, and work abroad within the EU in daily life' and 'one's perceived level of inter-group job-satisfaction'. Our findings therefore show that one's national cost-benefit considerations seem to have a stronger effect on a person's EU support considerations than one's perceived individual economic circumstances. To put it differently, we demonstrate that support for the EU is partially influenced by two factors: a person's national identity perspective and his or her utilitarian self-interest, where the former exerts more influence than the latter. Finally, with regard to the confounding variables (see section 4.4) controlled in this study, no clear picture is found. The results show that some control variables exert more influence than others, however, their effect differs for the two support components as well as for the observed member states respectively.

This study contributes to the existing body of literature on Europeans' public support formation in four ways: first, we demonstrated that one's level of support for the EU is partially explainable by one's subjective perception of their individual economic situation. Second, we demonstrate that European citizens appear to act as rational actors, who base their support for the EU more on economical cost-benefit calculations (utilitarian support) rather than on emotional attachment (affective support). Third, we find that in line with the group-interest theory, one's national identity appears to be an important parameter that forms people's attitudes towards the EU. This implies that people do not only take their personal economic circumstances, but also the collective ones into account in their cost-benefit calculation. Fourth, our analyses confirm the findings of Arikan (n.d.) that perceived material benefits to the nation from further European integration have an impact on a person's level of support for the EU. Furthermore, it is observed that these perceived material benefits influence a person's level of support to a much greater extent than one's perceived individual economic satisfaction, benefits from study travel and word abroad, and inter-group job-competition.

This conclusion will end with some suggestions for future research. First of all, the most interesting result of this study is that one's level of support can be partially explained by citizen's subjective perception of their individual economic situation. It would be of great interest to repeat the study using a direct measurement to find out whether more variance among citizens' support level can be explained by using a direct measurement. Second, in line with previous research, the conducted analysis shows that there are considerable cross-national differences and groupings among the respondent's support level for the observed member states. Further research should investigate whether more patterns can be found by taking all member states of the EU into account. Third, since this study is based on a cross-national research design, further studies should investigate whether one's level of support can be partially explained by the independent variable over a longer time period and whether the percentage of explained variance by the predictor variables varies among the years.

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Appendix I

Dependent variable	***Description***
Citizens' support for the European Union (EU support)	Index of four items below, scaled from 0 (least supportive) to 10 (most supportive of the EU).
Affective support	
EU image	QA15: In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? ... (1) Very positive, (2) fairly positive, (3) neutral, (4) fairly negative, and (5) very negative.
Utilitarian support	
Benefits of EU membership	QA10a: Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union? … (1) Benefited and (2) Not benefited.
EU membership good/bad	QA9a: Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is? … (1) A good thing, (2) A bad thing, and (3) Neither good nor bad.

Independent variables	*Description*
Hypothesis 1: financial, employment and job satisfaction	
Financial satisfaction	QA4a: How would you judge the current situation in each of the following...(5) The financial situation of your household. Very good (1), Rather good (2), Rather bad (3), and Very bad (4). Recoded to: Very good (1), Same (2), and Very bad (3).
Employment satisfaction	QA4a: How would you judge the current situation in each of the following...(6) The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY). Very good (1), Rather good (2), Rather bad (3), and Very bad (4). Recoded to: Very good (1), Same (2), and Very bad (3).
Job-satisfaction	QA4a: How would you judge the current situation in each of the following... (4) Your personal job situation. Very good (1), Rather good (2), Rather bad (3), and Very bad (4). Recoded to: Very good (1), Same (2), and Very bad (3).
Expectations for the next twelve months … financial situation	QA6a: What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better worse or the same, when it comes to... (3) The financial situation of your household. Better (1), worse (2), and Same (3). Recoded to: Better (1), Same (2), and Worse (3).
Expectations for the next twelve months … employment situation	QA6a: What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better worse or the same, when it comes to... (2) Employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY). Better (1), worse (2), and Same (3). Recoded to: Better (1), Same (2), and Worse (3).

Expectations for the next twelve months … job situation	QA6a: What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better worse or the same, when it comes to... (5) Your personal job situation. Better (1), worse (2), and Same (3). Recoded to: Better (1), Same (2), and Worse (3).







Hypothesis 2: Perceived benefits from the travel, study and work abroad

Meaning of EU	QA16: What does the EU mean to you personally? ... (5) Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU. Not mentioned (0) and Mentioned (1).

Freedom to study, travel and work aborad

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
X_2	5602	0,00	1,00	,4666	,49893
Valid N (listwise)	5602				

Hypothesis 3: Perceived economic gains

National economic gains (1)	QA16: What does the European Union mean to you personally? … (2) Economic prosperity. Not mentioned (0) and Mentioned (1).
National economic gains (2)	QA16: What does the European Union mean to you personally? … (7) Stronger say in the world. Not mentioned (0) and Mentioned (1).



Hypothesis 4: Inter-group job-competition

Most important issues (1)	QA8a: And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment? … (5) Unemployment. Not mentioned (0) and Mentioned (1).
Most important issues (2)	QA8a: And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment? … (8) Immigration. Not mentioned (0) and Mentioned (1).



Control variables	***Description***
Gender	Male (1), female (0)
Income/ Occupation	(1) Self-employed, (2) Managers, (3) Other white collars, (4) Manual workers, (5) House persons, (6) Unemployed, (7) Retired, and (8) Students.
Education	(1) Up to 14 years, (2) 15 years, (3) 16 years, (4) 17 years, (5) 18 years, (6) 19 years, (7) 20 years, (8) 21 years, (9) 22 years +, (10) Still studying, and (11) No full time education. Recoded to: (1) Up to 15 years, (2) 16-17 years, (3) 18 years, (4)19-21 years, (5) 22 years +, and (6) Still studying. (11) → missing values
Age	(1) 15-24 years, (2) 25- 39 years, (3) 40-54 years, and (4) 55 years and older.

Appendix II

Table 2. Cross-tabulation of affective and utilitarian support. A moderate strong positive Kendall's Tau-b association coefficients between the two variables was found (Kendall's tau-b = .536).

			level of utilitarian support (in counts & percentage)					
			0	2,5	5	7,5	10	Total
level of affective support (in counts & percentage)	0	125	28	6	0	6	165	165
		16%	4%	1%	0%	0%	3%	3%
	2,5	348	196	80	40	95	759	759
		45%	29%	18%	10%	4%	15%	15%
	5	221	377	197	231	645	1671	1671
		29%	56%	44%	57%	24%	34%	34%
	7,5	70	73	146	129	1630	2048	2048
		9%	11%	33%	32%	62%	41%	41%
	10	2	3	19	4	266	294	294
		0%	0%	4%	1%	10%	6%	6%
Total		766	677	448	404	2642	4937	4937
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Tabel 3. Descriptive statistics for utilitarian support for the six founding countries of the EU.

Sample	N	Mean	Median	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
FR	1005	5,41	5,00	2,43	0,00	10,00
BE	1006	5,88	5,00	2,16	0,00	10,00
NL	1006	5,60	5,00	2,05	0,00	10,00
GER	1017	5,37	5,00	2,39	0,00	10,00
IT	1002	6,12	7,50	2,19	0,00	10,00
LUX	502	6,10	7,50	2,27	0,00	10,00

Table 4 . Descriptive statistics for utilitarian support for the six founding countries of the EU.

Sample	N	Mean	Median	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
FR	874	5,89	7,50	4,15	0,00	10,00
BE	954	7,25	10,00	3,71	0,00	10,00
NL	946	7,59	10,00	3,60	0,00	10,00
GER	906	5,37	7,50	4,12	0,00	10,00
IT	824	6,25	7,50	4,09	0,00	10,00
LUX	465	7,77	10,00	3,30	0,00	10,00

Table 5. Mean and standard deviations for affective and utilitarian support.

country	affective support		utilitarian support	
	mean	SD	mean	SD
FR	5,41	(2,43)	5,89	(4,15)
BE	5,88	(2,16)	7,25	(3,71)
NL	5,60	(2,05)	7,59	(3,60)
GER	5,37	(2,39)	5,37	(4,12)
IT	6,12	(2,19)	6,25	(4,09)
LUX	6,10	(2,27)	7,77	(3,30)

Table 8. Descriptive statistics for the independent variables for the six EU founding countries.

Sample		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
FR	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	656	1,00	6,00	3,6128	1,04819
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	972	1,00	6,00	3,6533	,96283
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	963	1,00	6,00	4,4933	,93372
	x_2 four freedoms	979	1,00	3,00	2,0215	,63355
	x_3 national gains	1020	0,00	2,00	,3147	,52230
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	1020	0,00	2,00	,1775	,38986
	Valid N (listwise)	604				
BE	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	851	1,00	6,00	3,6016	1,01515
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	991	1,00	6,00	3,5610	,95243
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	991	1,00	6,00	4,0959	,96079
	x_2 four_freedoms	978	1,00	3,00	1,8344	,63113
	x_3 national gains	1013	0,00	2,00	,4511	,64179
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	1013	0,00	2,00	,2349	,44242
	Valid N (listwise)	801				
NL	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	770	1,00	6,00	3,3935	1,10075
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	999	1,00	6,00	3,3313	,95769
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	960	1,00	6,00	3,4708	1,06278
	x_2 four_freedoms	970	1,00	3,00	1,8629	,60507
	x_3 national gains	1013	0,00	2,00	,5706	,67727
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	1013	0,00	2,00	,1372	,34710
	Valid N (listwise)	711				
GER	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	781	1,00	6,00	3,6709	,98478
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	993	1,00	6,00	3,7120	,86348
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	962	1,00	6,00	4,1590	,98515
	x_2 four_freedoms	1002	1,00	3,00	1,8992	,62164
	x_3 national gains	1023	0,00	2,00	,3304	,55458
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	1023	0,00	2,00	,1427	,35550
	Valid N (listwise)	731				
IT	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	890	1,00	6,00	3,9618	1,10256
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	947	1,00	6,00	3,8659	1,05552
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	974	1,00	6,00	4,4456	1,02518
	x_2 four_freedoms	831	1,00	3,00	1,9904	,62856
	x_3 national gains	1028	0,00	2,00	,4144	,57323
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	1028	0,00	2,00	,2909	,48143
	Valid N (listwise)	687				
LUX	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	399	1,00	6,00	3,4912	,93201
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	494	1,00	6,00	3,4008	,89243
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	477	1,00	6,00	3,6478	,91076
	x_2 four_freedoms	490	1,00	3,00	1,8469	,63233
	x_3 national gains	505	0,00	2,00	,5109	,63651
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	505	0,00	2,00	,1663	,38325
	Valid N (listwise)	365				

Table 11. Mean and standard deviations for one's level of job satisfaction.

$X_{1,1}$	mean (affective support)	mean (utilitarian support)
very positive	6,18 (SD = 2,51)	7,77 (SD = 3,46)
positive	6,16 (SD = 2,16)	7,58 (SD = 3,54)
less positive	6,01 (SD = 2,27)	7,06 (SD = 3,84)
less negative	5,78 (SD = 2,17)	6,92 (SD = 3,86)
negative	5,13 (SD = 2,38)	5,23 (SD = 3,86)
very negative	4,32 (SD = 2,30)	4,24 (SD = 4,05)

Table 12. Mean and standard deviations for one's level of financial satisfaction.

$X_{1,2}$	mean (affective support)	mean (utilitarian support)
very positive	6,38 (SD = 2,25)	7,99 (SD = 3,36)
positive	6,23 (SD = 2,18)	7,67 (SD = 3,52)
less positive	5,80 (SD = 2,28)	6,96 (SD = 3,87)
less negative	5,75 (SD = 2,23)	6,87 (SD = 3,89)
negative	4,97 (SD = 2,23)	4,96 (SD = 4,12)
very negative	4,26 (SD = 2,68)	3,42 (SD = 3,68)

Figure 7. Relationship between one's level of financial satisfaction and one's affective and utilitarian support level.



Table 13. Mean and standard deviations for one's level of national-employment satisfaction.

$X_{1,3}$	mean (affective support)	mean (utilitarian support)
very positive	6,40 (SD = 2,30)	7,17 (SD = 3,40)
positive	6,49 (SD = 2,12)	8,47 (SD = 2,97)
less positive	6,28 (SD = 2,08)	7,71 (SD = 3,48)
less negative	5,65 (SD = 2,23)	6,73 (SD = 3,90)
negative	5,43 (SD = 2,31)	6,11 (SD = 4,11)
very negative	4,87 (SD = 2,50)	4,93 (SD = 4,23)

Figure 8. Relationship between one's level of national employment satisfaction and one's affective and utilitarian support level.



Table 14. Mean and standard deviations for one's perceived benefits from the freedom to study, travel, and work abroad.

X2	mean (affective support)	mean (utilitarian support)
not mentioned	5,28 (SD = 2,37)	5,76 (SD = 4,15)
mentioned	6,20 (SD = 2,04)	7,82 (SD = 3,39)

Table 15. Mean and standard deviations for one's national economic gains.

X3	mean (affective support)	mean (utilitarian support)
not mentioned	5,15 (SD = 2,27)	5,66 (SD = 4,11)
mentioned once	6,60 (SD = 1,91)	8,38 (SD = 2,99)
mentioned twice	7,12 (SD = 1,81)	9,24 (SD = 2,11)

Table 16. Mean and standard deviations for one's level of inter-group job-competition.

X4	mean (affective support)	mean (utilitarian support)
not mentioned	5,77 (SD = 2,25)	6,88 (SD = 3,92)
mentioned once	5,46 (SD = 2,34)	6,28 (SD = 3,98)
mentioned twice	5,18 (SD = 2,54)	4,35 (SD = 4,14)

Figure 10. Relationship between one's perceived inter-group job- competition and one's affective and utilitarian support level.



Table 17. Multi--variate analysis: Affective support component.

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Model	3589,221[a]	24	149,551	34,662	,000	,171
Intercept	1851,346	1	1851,346	429,089	,000	,096
$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	92,418	5	18,484	4,284	,001	,005
$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	71,914	5	14,383	3,334	,005	,004
$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	124,393	5	24,879	5,766	,000	,007
x_2 four freedoms	300,486	1	300,486	69,644	,000	,017
x_3 national gains	1577,282	2	788,641	182,785	,000	,083
x_4 inter-group job-competition	2,835	2	1,417	,329	,720	,000
$X_{CONTROL}$ education	100,673	1	100,673	23,333	,000	,006
$X_{CONTROL}$ age	17,873	1	17,873	4,143	,042	,001
$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	50,719	1	50,719	11,755	,001	,003
$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	6,417	1	6,417	1,487	,223	,000
Error	17361,924	4024	4,315			
Total	155693,750	4049				
Corrected Total	20951,145	4048				

a. R Squared = ,171 (Adjusted R Squared = ,166)

Table 18. Multi-variate: Utilitarian support component.

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	13027,885[a]	24	542,829	46,236	,000	,231
Intercept	1852,367	1	1852,367	157,779	,000	,041
$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	134,171	5	26,834	2,286	,044	,003
$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	274,501	5	54,900	4,676	,000	,006
$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	336,611	5	67,322	5,734	,000	,008
x_2 four freedoms	1508,635	1	1508,635	128,501	,000	,034
x_3 national gains	4129,343	2	2064,672	175,862	,000	,087
x_4 inter-group job-competition	31,133	2	15,566	1,326	,266	,001
$X_{CONTROL}$ education	1044,220	1	1044,220	88,943	,000	,024
$X_{CONTROL}$ age	101,026	1	101,026	8,605	,003	,002
$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	4,940	1	4,940	,421	,517	,000
$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	127,489	1	127,489	10,859	,001	,003
Error	43298,199	3688	11,740			
Total	228956,250	3713				
Corrected Total	56326,084	3712				

a. R Squared = ,231 (Adjusted R Squared = ,226)

Table 19. Multi- variate analysis for all six EU founding countries. Affective support component.

Sample		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
FR	Corrected Model	902,366[a]	23	39,233	8,489	,000	,246
	Intercept	130,080	1	130,080	28,144	,000	,045
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	58,019	5	11,604	2,511	,029	,021
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	12,129	5	2,426	,525	,758	,004
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	22,659	4	5,665	1,226	,299	,008
	x_2 four freedoms	126,147	1	126,147	27,293	,000	,044
	x_3 national gains	245,239	2	122,620	26,530	,000	,081
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	27,978	2	13,989	3,027	,049	,010
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	103,995	1	103,995	22,501	,000	,036
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	11,968	1	11,968	2,589	,108	,004
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	11,863	1	11,863	2,567	,110	,004
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	8,481	1	8,481	1,835	,176	,003
	Error	2763,882	598	4,622			
	Total	21843,750	622				
	Corrected Total	3666,248	621				
BE	Corrected Model	631,016[b]	24	26,292	6,333	,000	,165
	Intercept	371,923	1	371,923	89,578	,000	,104
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	47,901	5	9,580	2,307	,043	,015
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	27,975	5	5,595	1,348	,242	,009
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	20,082	5	4,016	,967	,437	,006
	x_2 four freedoms	38,368	1	38,368	9,241	,002	,012
	x_3 national gains	175,534	2	87,767	21,139	,000	,052
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	25,213	2	12,607	3,036	,049	,008
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	6,406	1	6,406	1,543	,215	,002
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	,031	1	,031	,007	,931	,000
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	16,381	1	16,381	3,945	,047	,005
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	12,910	1	12,910	3,109	,078	,004
	Error	3197,003	770	4,152			
	Total	31643,750	795				
	Corrected Total	3828,019	794				
NL	Corrected Model	555,990[c]	23	24,173	6,897	,000	,184
	Intercept	300,072	1	300,072	85,618	,000	,109
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	4,985	5	,997	,284	,922	,002
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	8,601	5	1,720	,491	,783	,003
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	57,669	5	11,534	3,291	,006	,023
	x_2 four freedoms	29,912	1	29,912	8,535	,004	,012
	x_3 national gains	243,518	2	121,759	34,741	,000	,090
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	4,793	1	4,793	1,368	,243	,002
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	34,950	1	34,950	9,972	,002	,014
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	3,967	1	3,967	1,132	,288	,002
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	11,530	1	11,530	3,290	,070	,005
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	1,170	1	1,170	,334	,564	,000
	Error	2463,869	703	3,505			
	Total	25637,500	727				
	Corrected Total	3019,859	726				
GER	Corrected Model	957,489[d]	24	39,895	8,732	,000	,226
	Intercept	160,477	1	160,477	35,126	,000	,047
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	37,532	5	7,506	1,643	,146	,011
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	33,718	5	6,744	1,476	,195	,010
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	79,458	5	15,892	3,478	,004	,024
	x_2 four freedoms	85,095	1	85,095	18,626	,000	,025
	x_3 national gains	259,605	2	129,803	28,412	,000	,074
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	18,049	2	9,025	1,975	,139	,005
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	61,392	1	61,392	13,438	,000	,018
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	18,862	1	18,862	4,129	,043	,006
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	,700	1	,700	,153	,696	,000
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	2,143	1	2,143	,469	,494	,001
	Error	3271,155	716	4,569			
	Total	25956,250	741				
	Corrected Total	4228,644	740				
IT	Corrected Model	1166,315[e]	24	48,596	14,088	,000	,306
	Intercept	635,550	1	635,550	184,242	,000	,194
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	39,514	5	7,903	2,291	,044	,015

	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	6,520	5	1,304	,378	,864	,002
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	122,263	5	24,453	7,089	,000	,044
	x_2 four freedoms	97,314	1	97,314	28,211	,000	,035
	x_3 national gains	338,540	2	169,270	49,070	,000	,113
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	20,189	2	10,094	2,926	,054	,008
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	11,184	1	11,184	3,242	,072	,004
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	4,284	1	4,284	1,242	,265	,002
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	4,106	1	4,106	1,190	,276	,002
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	7,526	1	7,526	2,182	,140	,003
	Error	2645,798	767	3,450			
	Total	34531,250	792				
	Corrected Total	3812,113	791				
LUX	Corrected Model	361,579f	24	15,066	3,284	,000	,185
	Intercept	161,614	1	161,614	35,230	,000	,092
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	25,341	5	5,068	1,105	,357	,016
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	42,907	5	8,581	1,871	,099	,026
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	34,248	5	6,850	1,493	,191	,021
	x_2 four freedoms	26,039	1	26,039	5,676	,018	,016
	x_3 national gains	131,256	2	65,628	14,306	,000	,076
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	11,380	2	5,690	1,240	,291	,007
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	1,580	1	1,580	,344	,558	,001
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	2,931	1	2,931	,639	,425	,002
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	14,995	1	14,995	3,269	,071	,009
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	,269	1	,269	,059	,809	,000
	Error	1591,832	347	4,587			
	Total	16081,250	372				
	Corrected Total	1953,411	371				

a. R Squared = ,246 (Adjusted R Squared = ,217)
b. R Squared = ,165 (Adjusted R Squared = ,139)
c. R Squared = ,184 (Adjusted R Squared = ,157)
d. R Squared = ,226 (Adjusted R Squared = ,200)
e. R Squared = ,306 (Adjusted R Squared = ,284)
f. R Squared = ,185 (Adjusted R Squared = ,129)

Table 20. Multi- variate analysis for all six EU founding countries. Affective support component.

Sample		Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
FR	Corrected Model	2410,539[a]	23	104,806	8,209	,000	,262
	Intercept	264,845	1	264,845	20,744	,000	,037
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	138,898	5	27,780	2,176	,055	,020
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	49,724	5	9,945	,779	,565	,007
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	60,028	4	15,007	1,175	,321	,009
	x_2 four freedoms	217,681	1	217,681	17,050	,000	,031
	x_3 national gains	588,597	2	294,299	23,051	,000	,080
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	68,424	2	34,212	2,680	,070	,010
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	283,855	1	283,855	22,233	,000	,040
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	,078	1	,078	,006	,938	,000
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	6,416	1	6,416	,503	,479	,001
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	115,210	1	115,210	9,024	,003	,017
	Error	6804,878	533	12,767			
	Total	28618,750	557				
	Corrected Total	9215,417	556				
BE	Corrected Model	2412,927[b]	24	100,539	9,391	,000	,235
	Intercept	719,600	1	719,600	67,219	,000	,084
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	83,660	5	16,732	1,563	,168	,011
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	197,866	5	39,573	3,697	,003	,025
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	60,264	5	12,053	1,126	,345	,008
	x_2 four freedoms	258,923	1	258,923	24,186	,000	,032
	x_3 national gains	473,652	2	236,826	22,122	,000	,057
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	21,657	2	10,829	1,012	,364	,003
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	64,303	1	64,303	6,007	,014	,008
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	37,600	1	37,600	3,512	,061	,005
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	,070	1	,070	,007	,936	,000
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	129,934	1	129,934	12,137	,001	,016
	Error	7868,446	735	10,705			
	Total	50993,750	760				
	Corrected Total	10281,373	759				
NL	Corrected Model	1890,796[c]	23	82,209	8,032	,000	,216
	Intercept	213,400	1	213,400	20,849	,000	,030
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	55,456	5	11,091	1,084	,368	,008
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	44,395	5	8,879	,867	,503	,006
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	178,675	5	35,735	3,491	,004	,025
	x_2 four freedoms	171,632	1	171,632	16,768	,000	,024
	x_3 national gains	629,915	2	314,958	30,770	,000	,084
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	20,763	1	20,763	2,029	,155	,003
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	256,000	1	256,000	25,010	,000	,036
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	40,391	1	40,391	3,946	,047	,006
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	7,011	1	7,011	,685	,408	,001
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	2,617	1	2,617	,256	,613	,000
	Error	6868,161	671	10,236			
	Total	49100,000	695				
	Corrected Total	8758,957	694				
GER	Corrected Model	2841,227[d]	24	118,384	9,097	,000	,251
	Intercept	216,559	1	216,559	16,641	,000	,025
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	171,746	5	34,349	2,639	,023	,020
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	53,091	5	10,618	,816	,539	,006
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	147,667	5	29,533	2,269	,046	,017
	x_2 four freedoms	373,022	1	373,022	28,663	,000	,042
	x_3 national gains	694,146	2	347,073	26,669	,000	,076
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	123,806	2	61,903	4,757	,009	,014
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	178,952	1	178,952	13,751	,000	,021
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	35,050	1	35,050	2,693	,101	,004
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	4,830	1	4,830	,371	,543	,001
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	44,869	1	44,869	3,448	,064	,005
	Error	8485,102	652	13,014			
	Total	36950,000	677				
	Corrected Total	11326,329	676				
IT	Corrected Model	3858,420[e]	24	160,768	14,387	,000	,346
	Intercept	298,537	1	298,537	26,716	,000	,039
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	66,555	5	13,311	1,191	,312	,009
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	199,979	5	39,996	3,579	,003	,027
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	92,348	5	18,470	1,653	,144	,013
	x_2 four freedoms	504,988	1	504,988	45,192	,000	,065
	x_3 national gains	1133,537	2	566,769	50,720	,000	,135
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	46,013	2	23,006	2,059	,128	,006
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	114,458	1	114,458	10,243	,001	,015

	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	50,629	1	50,629	4,531	,034	,007
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	12,066	1	12,066	1,080	,299	,002
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	5,343	1	5,343	,478	,490	,001
	Error	7285,708	652	11,174			
	Total	38806,250	677				
	Corrected Total	11144,129	676				
LUX	Corrected Model	689,321[f]	24	28,722	2,984	,000	,182
	Intercept	73,011	1	73,011	7,585	,006	,023
	$x_{1,1}$ job satisfaction	109,899	5	21,980	2,283	,046	,034
	$x_{1,2}$ financial satisfaction	43,783	5	8,757	,910	,475	,014
	$x_{1,3}$ national employment satisfaction	43,682	5	8,736	,908	,476	,014
	x_2 four freedoms	31,656	1	31,656	3,289	,071	,010
	x_3 national gains	99,824	2	49,912	5,185	,006	,031
	x_4 inter-group job-competition	11,641	2	5,820	,605	,547	,004
	$X_{CONTROL}$ education	92,312	1	92,312	9,590	,002	,029
	$X_{CONTROL}$ age	79,116	1	79,116	8,219	,004	,025
	$X_{CONTROL}$ occupation	6,001	1	6,001	,623	,430	,002
	$X_{CONTROL}$ gender	,007	1	,007	,001	,978	,000
	Error	3099,620	322	9,626			
	Total	24487,500	347				
	Corrected Total	3788,941	346				

a. R Squared = ,262 (Adjusted R Squared = ,230)
b. R Squared = ,235 (Adjusted R Squared = ,210)
c. R Squared = ,216 (Adjusted R Squared = ,189)
d. R Squared = ,251 (Adjusted R Squared = ,223)
e. R Squared = ,346 (Adjusted R Squared = ,322)