

Bachelor Thesis

# **VOTING FOR RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES**

– an explanatory study of right-wing populist voting  
by the example of the United Kingdom  
Independence Party

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## **Abstract**

This thesis focuses on the question why people vote for right-wing populist parties, in the light of the rising electoral success of right-wing populist parties in Europe. In order to find answers to this question in a limited frame, the focus is on the voters of the United Kingdom Independence Party in the United Kingdom. The “losers of modernization theory” is applied to build a theoretical foundation for an approach to explain UKIP voting in the United Kingdom. A special focus is put on the different forms of deprivation, which are part of the losers of modernization theory and supply the basis for the core hypotheses as well as for the independent variables. The necessary data is obtained from the British Election Study 2014-2017, which interviewed over 30,000 British citizens. By analyzing each independent variable with the help of cross tabulations and chi-square tests and ultimately employing a multivariate analysis, in the form of a logistical regression, it is found that the losers of modernization theory does explain UKIP voting to some extent. However, its explaining power is rather small and it is assumed that other factors have a higher impact on UKIP voting. The focus on euroscepticism or the impact of protest voters may be more influencing factors, as other studies suggest. The thesis draws the final conclusion that the losers of modernization theory cannot explain voting for right-wing populist parties solely and that there are most likely further factors, depending on the society or country of interest.

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# 1. Introduction

On the 26<sup>th</sup> of May 2014, one day after the European Parliament election of 2014, the German news magazine “Der Spiegel Online” published an article under the headline “Europawahl: Der Rechtsruck”<sup>1</sup> (Spiegel Online: Europawahl). It thematized the wide ranging success of right-wing populist parties from all over Europe. Parties like the FPÖ from Austria, the Danish Peoples Party from Denmark, the Front National from France or the United Kingdom Independence Party were all able to gain 19% or more of the national votes (European Parliament: Results by country). In comparison to the previous election for the European Parliament, all of the named parties improved their results, in some cases by stunning gains (ibid.). This development aroused concern among the established European parties, due to the represented points of view of the right-wing populist parties. They have a strong focus on the national level and often feature resentments against minorities, like immigrants for example (Schönfelder, 2008: 7 f.). Among others, these two characteristic elements of right-wing populist parties indicate that they represent a growing threat to the ideals and moral believes of the modern European community. Due to the above given reasons this bachelor thesis can be located within the field of European Studies. It is of special interest to investigate the causes for the rise of right-wing populist parties. In order to improve the understanding why right-wing populist parties all over Europe are able to attract voters and also to find starting points for solutions regarding this growing issue, the overarching research question **“Why do voters vote for right-wing populist parties?”** will be posed.

This research question is however extremely broad and thus exceeds the boundaries of the thesis at hand. Consequently the research question will be examined by using the example of the right-wing populist party “United Kingdom Independence Party”<sup>2</sup> from the United Kingdom. UKIP was chosen because of two reasons.

First, it classifies as a right-wing populist party according to the definition stated in chapter 2.1. Some indicators for its right-wing populist characteristics are found in its manifesto for the 2015 United Kingdom general election. Stated demands like “Take back control of our borders” (UKIP Manifesto 2015) or “Ending the EU freedom of movement of people” (ibid.) are signs for a focus on the national level and the will to partially seal off from Europe and the rest of the world. The manifesto from 2010 reveals more aspects underlining the right-wing populist character. Demands like

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<sup>1</sup> Translation (by the author): “European Parliament election: Swing to the right”

<sup>2</sup> Abbreviated as UKIP

“End the active promotion of the doctrine of multiculturalism by local and national government and all publicly funded bodies” (UKIP Manifesto 2010), the statement that policies passed by the Labour government were meant to “[...] water down the British identity and buy votes” (ibid.) or the call to “Scrap the misconceived Human Rights Act” (ibid.) in order to “[...] make Britain safer by removing obstacles that prevent the deportation of dangerous Imams, terror suspects and criminals” (ibid.) depict the resentments against minority groups, who are not “truly” British. Their right-wing orientation is also present in their economic believes which focus on free markets, free trade, tax cuts, less bureaucracy and welfare reforms (Abedi; Lundberg, 2015: 83). Furthermore, the central topic of UKIP is the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, which is seen as a threat to the national sovereignty (Clark, 2012: 110). Besides the content related signs, the party features other indicators, like its charismatic leader Nigel Farage, who can be described as a crowd puller for the party (Ford; Goodwin, 2014: 3 f.). These are just some aspects, which indicate the parties’ right-wing populist character. Based on the underlying theory of right-wing populism (see chapter 2.1) and the leading opinion in most scientific literature, UKIP is regarded as a right-wing populist party.

The second reason to choose UKIP is its increasing success and the topicality of the United Kingdom general election 2015. As already mentioned, the party was one of the big winners of the European Parliament election of 2014. With 26.77% of the votes, UKIP was able to win the election on national level in front of the Labour and Conservative Party. In comparison to the election of 2009, they were able to improve by 10.68 percentage points (European Parliament: Results by country). But UKIP was not just able to attract voters during the European Parliament elections, which usually struggle with low voter turnout. They also became the third strongest party by winning 12.4% of the votes during the recent United Kingdom general elections in May 2015. This result depicts an increase of 9.3 percentage points in comparison to the general election of 2010 (Parliament UK: Election results). One might argue that UKIP just won one seat in the general election of 2015 and thereby cannot be labeled as a winner. Yet, this is accounted for by the *first past the post* electoral system. If the positive trend for UKIP continues or in case the electoral system would be reformed, as some British political scientists demand (Garland; Terry, 2015: 31), they might be able to become one of the determining political powers in the United Kingdom.

Beside these two reasons in favor of UKIP, the excellent availability of research data in the United Kingdom was an additional factor of decision making. The British Election Study offers a large variety of different datasets on electoral behavior and is

easy accessible for English speaking researchers, which is an advantage compared to other countries with right-wing populist parties like France, Denmark or the Netherlands.

One theory trying to explain why right-wing populist parties like UKIP achieved success in the past years is the “losers of modernization” theory. It focuses on the so called “losers of modernization”, who are individuals struggling to adept to the changes linked to modernization processes. The theory focuses on a wide variety of aspects, like socio-economic status, believed societal disadvantages and political attitudes, which it combines in different forms of deprivations (Schönfelder, 2008: 47). In the case of the United Kingdom it appears to be a promising theory to explain UKIP voting, because the United Kingdom is, as a modern industrial nation, continuously exposed to modernization processes, influencing economy, society and culture.

The research paper will start with a theoretical discussion of the definition of right-wing populism and the introduction of the losers of modernization theory. This theoretical discussion will result in the formulation of several hypotheses. The dataset as well as the research design will be introduced in the methodology chapter. Furthermore, the operationalization of variables will be explained in detail. The core of this thesis is the analysis chapter, in which the data will be analyzed in regard to the underlying theory and the earlier introduced hypotheses. In a last step, the results of the paper will be summarized and a final answer to the research question will be given in the conclusion.

## **2. Theoretical Foundation**

In order to answer the research question adequately, it is necessary to introduce the theoretical foundation of this paper. This foundation comprises three major elements. First of all, the definition of right-wing populism, which is of high importance for this research. The second element is the employed theory to answer the central research question. In this case it is the “losers of modernization” theory, which focuses on the impact of modernization processes in modern post-industrial nations on electoral behavior. Because the United Kingdom can be labeled as a modern post-industrial nation, which is exposed to modernization processes, like globalization, the losers of modernization theory is suitable in this context. The last aspect is the introduction of the hypotheses, whose verification or falsification will be the key aspect of this study. These three elements lay the foundation for the analysis.

## 2.1 Right-Wing Populism

In today's media, politics and political science, right-wing populism is a more frequently used, but often not substantially sufficient defined, term (Decker, 2004: 21). Even in scientific literature and articles, covering the subject of right wing politics, many different terms like *far right*, *national populism*, *ethno-nationalism*, *neofascism*, *right-wing populism* and many more are used without a clear definition (Mudde, 2007: 11 f.). This chaos of terminology paired with a lack of clear definition stresses the importance of a precise definition, when the subject of right-wing populism is addressed. In the case of right-wing populism it is important to define the term step by step, first the *populism* and secondly the political orientation attribute *right-wing* (Geden, 2006: 19 f.). In a third step it is necessary to close off right-wing populism from extremism, with which it is often mistakenly equated (Klein, 2012: 31 f.).

### 2.1.1 Populism

Populism usually features four core characteristics: the claim to represent the people, the agitation against predestined opponents, a charismatic leader and a movement like organizational character (Spier, 2010: 20).

The Latin root word *populous*<sup>3</sup> indicates that the claim to represent the *people* is an universal feature of populism. In the populist case, the *people* are perceived as a homogenous crowd and most differences in social class or occupational groups are ignored. Furthermore, the *people* are usually characterized with a very positive, almost romantic, undertone as: "Es ist einfach, ehrlich und vernünftig, arbeitet hart und lebt grundanständig."<sup>4</sup> (ibid.). By emphasizing these attributes, populism aims at integrating individuals in an imaginative collective, making them feel as part of a group. Altogether, the populist approach of claiming to be a representative of the *people* is supposed to address and appeal to as much voters as possible. Nonetheless it has to be stressed that the populist image of the people is undifferentiated and stereotyped (Spier, 2010: 20 f.).

Another defining element of populism is the agitation against predestined opponents. These opponents are usually described as the *establishment*. Most of the time, the *establishment* refers to the political, economical and intellectual elite of a country and is described in a clichéd way as: "(...) korrupt, selbstsüchtig und nur

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<sup>3</sup> Translation (by the author): "The people"

<sup>4</sup> Translation (by the author): "It is modest, sincere and reasonable, hard-working and lives thoroughly decent."



am Machterhalt orientiert.”<sup>5</sup> (Spier, 2010: 21). The relation between the *people* and the *establishment* can be understood as a vertical antagonistic dimension, in which the *people* are on the bottom and the *establishment* on top. By creating this emotionally charged relationship, populism tries to intensify the feeling of belonging to a suppressed group among the potential voters and calls for more political power for the common man. (Klein, 2012: 19 f.). The importance of this aspect of populism is stressed by Cas Mudde, who defines populism

“[...] as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté general* (general will) of the people.” (Mudde, 2004: 543).

The third characteristic of populism is the charismatic leader, who depicts himself as an advocate of the people. This charismatic leader needs to be able to ensure the cohesion inside a party and between voters and the party. If the leader brings along attention gaining rhetorical skills and understands how to use available media channels to build a close connection to the possible voters, the chances are high that he will become the crowd pulling figurehead. However, a charismatic leader may only just be responsible for the rise, but also for the fall of a populist party. Due to the high dependency on one person, little disagreements among the party leadership can lead to big problems, if the leader decides to leave, which can ultimately result in the breakup of a populist party (Spier, 2010: 22).

A movement like organizational character is the fourth trait of populist parties. Owing to their denial of the self defined *establishment*, which was already described, populist parties try to represent themselves as *anti-party parties* by appearing as political movements instead of political parties. Because of this, many populist parties tend to avoid the term party and refer to themselves as *league*, *alliance* or *movement*. Furthermore, institutionalization is unwanted and often shunned, because it is perceived as a typical characteristic of an established political party. This lack in institutionalization and bureaucracy usually results in hierarchic and authoritarian structures, which are ironically contrary to the populist believe that the people should acquire more participation and political power (Decker, 2004: 33 f.).

### 2.1.2 Right-Wing

The attribute *right-wing* in the term right-wing populism describes the political orientation of a populist organization. It adds a further dimension to the earlier

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<sup>5</sup> Translation (by the author): “(...) corrupt, selfish and focused on the retention of power.”

introduced vertical antagonistically dimension. The horizontal dimension of right-wing populism implements an outward delimitation. On the one hand there are the *people* and on the other hand are the *others*, usually referring to immigrants, religious groups or other minority groups. Right-wing populism often justifies this line of conflict by bringing up the responsibility to protect the national culture and identity, which is supposedly infiltrated by the *others*, who do not belong to the self defined group of the *people*. Besides, the *others* can also refer to institutions, like the EU, or even processes, like the globalization, which are also seen as a threat to the people. These *others* are regularly blamed for social injustices or economic issues, which is supposed to unify the electoral support base against those intruders (Klein, 2012: 19 ff.).

Even though there are some extremist parties who deploy populist elements, it is false to assume that all right-wing populist parties are equally extremist. For that reason, it is important for a definition of right-wing populism to dissociate it from extremism. The main difference is that right-wing populist parties are usually not anti-democratic or subversive, but rather aim at using the democratic structures to obtain political power in order to realize their agenda. Whereas many of their political demands are similar at the core to the ones of right-wing extremist parties, they usually try to communicate these demands in a more conformal and socially accepted form. As an example, right-wing populist parties call for the protection of the national culture and identity, instead of the defense of the race. By distancing themselves from right-wing extremism, right-wing populist parties aim to become more socially accepted and electable (Schönfelder, 2008: 23 f.). However, right-wing populist parties cannot gain popularity without possible supporters or voters. Thus, the following section provides insight into an explanatory approach why people vote for those parties.

## **2.2 Losers of Modernization Theory**

The loser of modernization theory tries to explain why people vote for right-wing parties. Its foundations are attributed to Erwin Scheuch and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, who searched for an explanation of right-wing support in 1967. They found out that all industrial societies hold potential for the rise of a right-wing movement. One reason for this “pathological condition” (Scheuch; Klingemann, 1967: 29) is, according to their results, that continuously changing industrial societies impose contradictory challenges on individuals. Some people or even entire groups might react with rigidity and closed-mindedness to these changes and

potentially support right-wing movements, which often represent the old conservative views (Hadler, 2004: 10).

In the 1990s, when right-wing parties had a revival in Germany, the losers of modernization theory gained more attention and was introduced to the international scholarly discussions (Spier, 2010: 57). The core element of the theory is still the change of societies and the way how individuals react to these changes and challenges. Globalization and multiculturalism lead to the structural change, or modernization, of post-industrial societies and might result in conditions of imbalance (Schönfelder, 2008: 47). These conditions of imbalance are perceived as a form of deprivation by individuals and groups, who are not able to adapt to the economical, social and cultural changes. Deprivation does not necessary describe actual shortage, but also imaginary threats to ones status or subjective feelings of disadvantage (ibid.). Individuals, who experience forms of deprivation and fear socio-economic devaluation, often look for a scapegoat to blame. Usually immigrants and foreigners, who are perceived as the reason for economic, social and cultural change, and established parties, unions and the nations bureaucracy, who are accused to not sufficiently solve the problems and imbalances of modernization, are accused to be the guilty ones. Right-wing populist parties step in and offer easy explanatory models and solutions for those experiencing deprivation, for example by blaming the establishment or minority groups. (Schönfelder, 2008: 49 f.). In the following, the different forms of deprivation will be closer examined.

## **2.3 Hypotheses**

Due to the core importance of deprivation for the losers of modernization theory, there are four different deprivation approaches trying to explain who might become a loser of modernization and what reasons could possibly cause these processes (Schönfelder, 2008: 51 f.). The different forms of deprivation, which are derived from the work of Sven Schönfelder (2008), are *objective absolute deprivation*, *subjective status deprivation*, *subjective relative deprivation* and *subjective relative deprivation*. They are the groundwork for the constructed hypotheses of this research paper and will be specified closer in this section.

### **2.3.1 Objective Absolute Deprivation**

Objective absolute deprivation describes an actual lack of supply (for example low income, unemployment or education), which is caused by the continuous modernization processes in modern industrial societies. These social, cultural, economic and technological changes demand an equally continuous adaptive

performance of each member of society. Some individuals and groups fail to adapt which can lead to material deterioration and job loss. These losers of modernization might react with a defense mechanism of blaming certain social groups, often foreigners and immigrants, for their failure. It appears that potential losers of modernization particular belong to one of the following social groups: the unemployed, the unskilled workers, the less-educated, the (young) people without educational qualification or vocational training, the occupational less successful or the people with low income. If the national government fails to protect the losers of modernization against such negative effects of modernization, right-wing populist parties are more likely to attract voters (Schönfelder, 2008: 52 ff.).

According to this, the first hypothesis is H1: *People with a higher level of objective absolute deprivation, in the form of lack of income, employment and education, are more likely to vote for the United Kingdom Independent Party.*

### **2.3.2 Subjective Status Deprivation**

Another form of deprivation is the subjective status deprivation. The difference to the objective absolute deprivation is that in this case, there is not necessarily an actual lack of supply, but a subjective perception of an individual's economic and social situation, which is sensed to be threatened. Furthermore there is a difference in the time dimension because subjective status deprivation focuses on the future outlook, while objective status deprivation focuses on the present situation of an individual. This form of deprivation can be seen as characteristic for the middle class, in which some individuals feel threatened by members of the lower class or minorities, whose social status is rising. Their compulsion, caused by the subjective sensation of a threat to their status, to stand up to the upper class and defend against the lower class makes them to losers of modernization. As a reaction, they might turn to political movements or parties, who promise to protect their status. However these movements rarely introduce actual approaches to solve social problems but usually blame other groups, like ethnical or religious minorities, who are symbolized as the threat (ibid.).

Following this, the second hypothesis is H2: *People with a higher level of subjective status deprivation, in the form of self assumed danger to their social status, are more likely to vote for the United Kingdom Independent Party.*

### **2.3.3 Subjective Relative Deprivation**

Subjective relative deprivation also focuses on a form of deprivation without an actual lack of supply. In this case it is a matter of imagined deficiency signs and the

feeling to belong to a disadvantaged part of society. In contrast to the subjective status deprivation, which focuses on the threat towards social positions, this form addresses comparison processes within or among social groups. According to this approach, individuals who have a sense of disadvantage in comparison to their *ingroup* (for example: people of the same nationality) or an *outgroup* (for example: immigrants) are more susceptible to develop scapegoat strategies, in the form of seeking someone to blame because of envy. These so called scapegoat strategies are developed to upvalue one's position and to explain the, as unjust perceived, situation of disadvantage. The subjective impressions of disadvantages might let affected individuals merge into groups against the apprehended causer of the disadvantage. A consequence could be the solidification of xenophobic attitudes or resentments against minority groups, especially if there is a right-wing party offering easy explanations for the subjective unjust treatment at first sight (ibid.).

The accompanying hypothesis to this form of deprivation is H3: *People with a higher level of subjective relative deprivation, in the form of self assumed disadvantages in society, are more likely to vote for the United Kingdom Independent Party.*

#### **2.3.4 Subjective Political Deprivation**

The last form of deprivation is the subjective political deprivation, which emphasizes political discontent and perceived political powerlessness. These feelings result from unfulfilled or disappointed expectations on the established political parties and institutions. Furthermore, the previously described deprivations, which might have been experienced by an individual but have not been solved by the political parties in charge, amplify the political discontent. Because of dissatisfaction and a sense of political impotence, right wing populist attitudes might become more attractive and reasonable. The reasons why the political offers of right wing populist might appear more appealing is the simplification of typically complex problems, like high levels of unemployment or economic issues, the presentation of a guilty party, often the so called *establishment*, and a scapegoat, in the form of some kind of minority. Furthermore, political deprivation has a negative effect on democratic values and norms of an individual. This might cause a state of political ignorance, which in turn erodes the foundation of democracy (ibid.).

On the basis of this deprivation theory the last hypothesis is H4: *People with a higher level of subjective political deprivation, in the form of political discontent, are more likely to vote for the United Kingdom Independent Party.*

### 3. Methodology

The following chapter will introduce the methodological aspects of this research paper. First, the used data, on which this thesis relies, will be critically examined. Afterwards, the research design will be discussed. In a last step, the operationalization of the variables will be explained in detail.

#### 3.1 Data

The dataset, on which this thesis builds, is obtained from the British Election Study. The British Election Study exists since 1964, which makes it the longest running social science survey in the United Kingdom. It focuses on providing data for electoral research and has contributed for a better understanding of voter motivation and behavior (British Election Study: Information.).

The required data for this paper were obtained from the fourth wave of the 2014-2017 British Election Study Internet Panel<sup>6</sup>. The survey was carried out in March 2015 under the supervision of E. Fieldhouse, J. Green, G. Evans, H. Schmitt and C. van der Eijk. By utilizing the fourth wave isolated, it can be defined as cross-sectional data taken at one point of time. In this case, this point of time was about two month before the United Kingdom general election of 2015, which was held on the seventh of May. It can be assumed that most interviewed were aware of the upcoming election at that point. In total, 31,328 individuals across the United Kingdom were interviewed and filled out the extensive questionnaire (British Election Study: Data). The interview itself was executed by the external British opinion research institute *YouGov* in the form of an internet survey (British Election Study: FAQ).

The fourth wave of the British Election Study 2014-2017 was chosen especially because of its large sample size, the very comprehensive and for this thesis compatible questionnaire and its well timed implementation just before the general elections of 2015. Nonetheless, the data also need to be reviewed from a critical point of view. There are some problems about internet surveys, which need to be taken into account. First of all, the samples of internet surveys are not a completely random selection of the electoral, because the participants are drawn from a large pool of citizens, who agreed to partake in surveys carried out by companies like *YouGov*. Opinion research institutes, who apply this form of interview, are aware of this problem and work hard to guarantee a high level of representativeness in their

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<sup>6</sup> Dataset was retrieved on the 04.06.2015 from <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>

studies. By actively recruiting members from underrepresented groups, they aim to achieve a representative pool of possible participants (Ford; Goodwin, 2014: 290)

Another problem of online surveys is that they often underrepresent certain groups of people, who are difficult to recruit. These groups are mainly people with a lack of internet access, often older citizens or individuals with extremely low incomes. Furthermore, people with very low levels of education or English language proficiency might struggle to complete online questionnaires adequately. Accordingly, groups with higher levels of internet access and education are likely to be overrepresented. The opinion research companies try to tackle this issue by weighting the results to reduce the possible bias (Ford; Goodwin, 2014: 291).

It becomes obvious that these issues cannot be ignored, yet it appears that *YouGov* is eager to supply data of high quality. *YouGov* is the largest and longest running opinion research institute, specialized on online interviews, in the United Kingdom and is commissioned with social science surveys by leading academics on a regular basis (Ford; Goodwin, 2014: 290). Furthermore, a study from 2007, which researched the differences between internet surveys and traditional in-person interviews, came to the following conclusion:

“Estimating model parameters reveals that there are few statistically significant differences between coefficients generated using the in-person and internet data, and the relative explanatory power of rival models is virtually identical for the two types of data. In general, the in-person and internet data tell very similar stories about what matters for turnout and party preference in Britain.” (Sanders; et al., 2007: 257).

In conclusion it can be stated that the dataset of the fourth wave of the British Election Study 2014-2017 might not be the absolute perfect data source, due to its possible, but if so minimal, flaws regarding its representativeness. Nonetheless, it is the best choice in regard to availability, usability and reliability in the context of this thesis.

### **3.2 Method of Data Analysis**

The underlying research design of the present thesis is the explanatory research design, as the core aim of this paper is to explain why voters vote for right-wing populist parties, using the example of UKIP voters. For that reason, voters are the units of analysis and their voting decision for or against UKIP is the dependent variable of this research. In order to find explanations for this voting behavior, the earlier introduced losers of modernization theory is applied in combination with its

different variations of deprivations. The four kinds of deprivation are in this case the independent variables of the research. Each independent variable features several different indicators, which will be aggregated in an index in order to make the different deprivations more comparable. The exact operationalization of the variables will be addressed in depth in the operationalization section. Throughout the analysis, each variable will be presented with the help of cross-tabulations to give an overview on the distribution of this particular deprivation among UKIP voters and non-UKIP voters. In a further step, a chi-square test will be applied in order to find any relationship between the voting decision for or against UKIP and the respective deprivation and to draw further inferences about the population. After analyzing all forms of deprivation separately, a multivariate analysis, in the form of a logistic regression, will be utilized to evaluate which dimensions of deprivation have the most influence on the voting behavior and ultimately validate if the losers of modernization theory is able to explain right-wing populist voting in the case of UKIP in the United Kingdom.

### **3.3 Operationalization**

In the following the operationalization for each of the four independent variables will be presented. All stated questions are taken from the official Questionnaire or the SPSS dataset for the fourth Wave of the British Election Study 2014-2017 itself (British Election Study: Data.). A table at the end will give an overview on the operationalization of the independent variables.

#### **3.3.1 Vote Decision UKIP**

The first and most important variable is the dependent variable, in this case the *vote decision UKIP*. The value of this variable will determine whether the certain individual decided to vote for UKIP or for one of the other parties. The data used for this variable is derived from the question "Which party is that?", which was posed to the interviewed who answered the question "If you do vote in the General Election, have you decided which party you will vote for, or haven't you decided yet?" with "Yes, decided". Furthermore, the cases, who answered the question with "No, not decided yet" or "Don't know", were asked "Which party do you think you are most likely to vote for?", which is also relevant for the variable. The variable *vote decision UKIP* will receive the value 1 for every individual, who chose the possible answer "United Kingdom Independence Party" for one of the two questions asking for the intended party to vote for. In every case, in which another party was named, the variable receives the value 0. People, who answered with "I would not vote" are also labeled with the value 0 and "Don't know" will be handled as a missing value.



It has to be noted that not every eligible voter was able to vote UKIP. This is due to the fact that they just run for seats in 624 of all 650 constituencies in the United Kingdom. Certainly this might result in missing cases. However UKIP did run in all of the constituencies in England and Wales and in the majority of constituencies in Scotland (41 of 59 constituencies) and Northern Ireland 10 of 18 constituencies) (The Telegraph: Election 2015 full results). Because of that it is assumed that the amount of missing cases due to the unavailability of UKIP candidates is not high enough to seriously bias the results of this research.

### **3.3.2 Objective Absolute Deprivation**

The independent variable *objective absolute deprivation* differs from the other three independent variables due to the fact that it features three dimensions. These three dimensions are income, employment and education and each has its own indicators. Because they are all parts of the objective absolute deprivation, they will be merged in an index, describing the level of objective absolute deprivation.

Income, as the first dimension, has the indicator “gross personal income”, which comes with 14 different values ranging from “under £5,000 per year” to “£100,000 and over”. For the analysis the 14 different values will be compressed into 6 different values, in order to assure equal impact on the variable by each dimension. The new coding for “gross personal income” will be: 0 = “70,000 per year and over”, 1 = “£50,000 to £69,000 per year”, 2 = “£35,000 to £49,999 per year”, 3 = “£20,000 to £34,999 per year”, 4 = “£10,000 to £19,999 per year”, 5 = “under £5,000 to £9,999 per year”. The cases in which the answers “Prefer not to say” or “Don’t know” were chosen, will be classified as missing, because every other kind of procedure would distort the index.

The second dimension, employment, will be a combination of the two indicators “working status” and “ns\_sec analytic categories”. *Ns\_sec* stands for *National Socio-economic Classification* and is a measure of employment relations and conditions of occupations, developed by the *UK Economic and Social Research Council* (Rose; Pevalin, 2001: 13 ff.). Both indicators will be merged in a new indicator, which will be named “employment”. If the interviewed answered the question regarding his working status with “Unemployed and looking for work” or “Not in paid work for any other reason”, “employment” will be valued as 5. For every other case, in which a different answer was given, the national social analytic categories apply. These categories will be valued as following: 0 = “Employers in large organisations and higher managerial” or “Higher professional occupations”, 1 = “Lower professional and managerial and higher supervisory”, 2 = “Intermediate

occupations” “Employers in small organisations and own account workers”, 3 = “Lower supervisory and technical occupations” or “Semi-routine occupations”, 4 = “Routine occupations”. Cases with the working status “retired” are in almost every case included in the national social analytic categories, based on their past occupation. In order to include cases with the working status “Full time university student” or “Other full time student”, they will be valued as 2, because it is assumed that studying is no extreme form of employment deprivation and that students will probably obtain at least an intermediate occupation once they graduate.

Education represents the last dimension and has the indicator “highest qualification”, which features 18 different values. Because of the wide scope of values, which are vocational as well as academic qualifications, it is rather difficult to combine the different qualifications in an index. Due to this difficulty, the categorization of academic and vocational qualifications in the United Kingdom by the British Household Panel Survey serves as a model (Jenkins; Sabates, 2007: 15). According to the model, the indicator will be recoded with the following five values: 0 = “University or CNAAB higher degree (eg M.Sc, Ph.D)”, 1 = “University or CNAAB first degree (eg BA, B.Sc, B.Ed)” and “University diploma “ and “Teaching qualification (not degree)” and “Nursing qualification (eg SEN, SRN, SCM, RGN)” and “Other technical, professional or higher qualification”, 2 = “GCE A level or Higher Certificate” and “Scottish Higher Certificate” and “City and Guild certificate - advanced” and “onc”, 3 = “CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, School Certificate” and “Scottish Ordinary/ Lower Certificate” and “City and Guild certificate” and “Recognised trade apprenticeship completed”, 4 = “Clerical and commercial” and “CSE grades 2-5 “ and “Youth training certificate/skillseekers”, 5 = “No formal qualifications”. Again, cases with the value “Prefer not to say” or “Don’t know” were chosen, will be handled as missing data.

In a final step, all three dimensions will be added up in an index depicting the value of the independent variable *objective absolute deprivation*. After mean centering the variable, the possible value ranges from -7.45 to 7.55 with steps of 1, whereby a value of -7.45 is the lowest and 7.55 the highest possible level of objective absolute deprivation.

### 3.3.3 Subjective Status Deprivation

The second independent variable *subjective status deprivation* holds two different indicators. First, the self assumed risk of poverty, which derives from the answer to the question “During the next 12 month, how likely or unlikely is it that there will be times when you don’t have enough money to cover your day to day living costs?”.

This indicator encompasses five values, which will be recoded like this: 0 = “Very unlikely”, 1 = “Fairly unlikely”, 2 = “Neither likely nor unlikely”, 3 = “Fairly likely”, 4 = “Very likely”. The second indicator, the self assumed risk of unemployment, features five values too and will be recoded in the same way as the self assumed risk of poverty. For both indicators, it takes effect that cases with the value “Don’t know” will be handled as missing data.

Both indicators will be added up in a subjective status deprivation index. After mean centering, the index will range from -2.70 to 5.30 with steps of 1, whereby -2.70 is the lowest and 5.30 the highest possible level of subjective status deprivation.

### **3.3.4 Subjective Relative Deprivation**

The independent variable *subjective relative deprivation* consist of three different indicators, which will be fused in one index. The first indicator is the answer to the question “How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?”. It is assumed that, if this question is answered with a negative response, it is a sign of believed disadvantage in society. The indicator will be valued as following: 0 = “Got a lot better” 1 = “Got a little better” 2 = “Stayed the same” 3 = “Got a little worse” 4 = “Got a lot worse”. Cases with the response “Don’t know” will be handled as missing. The other two indicators are depicted by the response to the question “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?”. These statements are “Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off” and “Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth”. It is believed that agreement, especially strong agreement, to these statements is an indication for an assumed personal disadvantage in society. Both of these indicators are coded as following: 0 = “Strongly disagree”, 1 = “Disagree”, 2 = “Neither agree nor disagree”, 3 = “Agree”, 4 = “Strongly agree”. For both of these indicators, the cases with the value “Don’t know” will be handled as missing data too.

The mean centered index for the variable *subjective relative deprivation* will range from -7.57 to 4.43 with steps of 1, with -7.57 as the lowest and 4.43 as the highest manifestation of subjective relative deprivation.

### **3.3.5 Subjective Political Deprivation**

The last independent variable *subjective political deprivation* features three different indicators. Two of the three indicators are responses to the question “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?”. The two statements are “Politicians only care about people with money” and “Politicians don’t care what

people like me think". It is assumed that an agreement with these statements is a sign for the loss of trust in the political elite. These two indicators will be coded as following: 0 = "Strongly disagree", 1 = "Disagree", 2 = "Neither agree nor disagree", 3 = "Agree", 4 = "Strongly agree", with "Don't know" labeled as missing data. The third indicator is represented by the answer to the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the job that the government is doing?" and will be valued as following: 0 = "Strongly approve", 1 = "Approve", 2 = "Neither approve nor disapprove", 3 = "Disapprove", 4 = "Strongly disapprove". Again, the response "Don't know" is handled as missing data.

All three indicators will be merged in a subjective political deprivation index, ranging from -7.70 to 4.30 with steps of 1, after being mean centered. -7.70 shows the lowest and 4.30 the highest form of subjective political deprivation.

Some of the independent variables share a high contentual proximity, which might result in correlation among each other. Because highly correlating variables could influence the final multivariate analysis, a correlation matrix will be presented in the analysis chapter (see Chapter 4.5).

Overview on the Operationalization of the Independent Variables		
	Indicators	Operationalization
Objective absolute deprivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Income</li> <li>- Employment</li> <li>- Education</li> </ul>	Indicators are summarized in an centered Index ranging from -7.45 to 7.55
Subjective status deprivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Self assumed risk of poverty</li> <li>- Self assumed risk of unemployment</li> </ul>	Indicators are summarized in an centered Index ranging from -2.70 to 5.30
Subjective relative deprivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Retrospective view of households financial situation compared to 12 month ago</li> <li>- Believe that government should redistribute income from the better off to the less well off</li> <li>- Believe that working people do not get their fair share of the wealth</li> </ul>	Indicators are summarized in an centered Index ranging from -7.57 to 4.43
Subjective political deprivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Believe that politicians only care about people with money</li> <li>- Believe that politicians do not care about what the respondent thinks</li> <li>- Approving or disapproving the job that the government is doing</li> </ul>	Indicators are summarized in an centered Index ranging from -7.70 to 4.30

Figure 1: Overview on the Operationalization of the independent Variables

## 4. Analysis

This chapter focuses on the analysis of the relationship between the voters' decision for UKIP and the possible forms of deprivation, which are the core elements of the underlying losers of modernization theory. In a last step, a multivariate analysis will show if there is any existing correlation between the variables and ultimately determine to what extent the losers of modernization theory can explain populist right-wing voting.

### 4.1 Objective absolute deprivation and UKIP voting

*Objective absolute deprivation* is the most complex among the four different independent variables, due to its three dimensions of income, employment and education. The cross tabulation (see Appendix 1: p. 32) gives an impression of how UKIP voters distribute among the various level of objective absolute deprivation.

First, it is noticeable that the relative amount of UKIP voters is unsteady, in the range from the score -7.45 to -1.45. On the -7.45 level, where no objective deprivation is assumed, there are 8.6% UKIP voters. This rather high amount is contrary to the posed hypothesis based on the losers of modernization theory. Nonetheless, when inspecting the table in its full range a trend can be detected. The difference between the lowest and highest levels of objective absolute deprivation sums up to 15.2 percentage points, with a low of 4.9% at -6.45 and a high of 24.7% at 5.55. Another notable fact is the little amount of cases compared to the overall dataset. 15,329 cases compared to 31,328 amounts to just 48.9%. The reason for this low level of valid cases is accounted for by the high amount of indicators. If an interviewee just had one missing indicator, he/she turns out missing in the whole index. Fortunately the dataset is large enough, that 15,329 cases are still valid, which should be enough to obtain representative and reliable results. Overall, the cross tabulation for the independent variable *objective absolute deprivation* suggests that there could be a coherence between the voting decision for UKIP and the objective absolute deprivation of a voter. To verify this assumption, a chi square test will be adduced.

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	277,149	15	,000
N of Valid Cases	15329		

Figure 2: Chi-Square Test Objective Absolute Deprivation

This research will focus on Pearson's chi square test. The crucial information is found in the *Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)* column. The calculated amount in this column indicates the probability that the null hypothesis is true. In this case the null hypotheses is: "There is no coherence between UKIP voting and objective absolute deprivation.". Usually results below 0.05 are sufficient to reject the null hypothesis. In this case the result is even below 0.01, which is described as highly significant, meaning that the probability to mistakenly rejecting the null hypothesis is below 1% (Janssen; Laatz, 2013: 259 ff.). According to the results of the chi square test, the null hypothesis can decidedly be rejected. In reverse the first hypothesis H1 that people with a higher level of objective absolute deprivation, in the form of lack of income, employment and education, are more likely to vote for the United Kingdom Independent Party can be approved.

#### **4.2 Subjective status deprivation and UKIP voting**

The cross tabulation (see Appendix 2: p. 32) shows the distribution among UKIP voters and non-UKIP voters depending on their level of subjective status deprivation.

It appears that the relative amount of UKIP voters rises with a higher level of subjective status deprivation. Although the growth is not constant, due to the little decline from the subjective status deprivation score from -2.70 to -0.70, an overall growth of 8.7 percentage points from -2.70 to 5.30 is visible. The lowest percentage of UKIP voters is measured at -0.70 with 12.0%, the highest at 5.30 with 21.5%. These findings are a first indication, that subjective status deprivation has an impact on the voters' decision either to vote UKIP or not. With the help of a chi square test, it will be examined if there actually is coherence between the two variables.

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	91,619	8	,000
N of Valid Cases	24245		

Figure 3: Chi-Square Test Subjective Status Deprivation

In this case the tested null hypotheses is: "There is no coherence between UKIP voting and subjective status deprivation.". Due to the result below 0.01, the null hypothesis can be rejected without a doubt. Consequently the hypotheses H2 that people with a higher level of subjective status deprivation, in the form of self assumed danger to their social status, are more likely to vote for the United Kingdom Independent Party can be approved.

#### **4.3 Subjective relative deprivation and UKIP voting**

The distribution of UKIP voters and non UKIP voters among the different scores is shown in a cross tabulation (see Appendix 3: p. 33).

The evaluation of the cross tabulation results in the observations that the distribution of UKIP voters over the different levels of subjective relative deprivation is much more balanced compared to the previous two forms of deprivation. A positive trend from low scores to high scores is still visible with an overall growth of 6.3 percentage points. The lowest relative amount of 11.4% UKIP voters is measured at score -7.57 and the highest at 4.43 with 17.7%. Regardless, it can be assumed that the coherence between UKIP voting and subjective relative deprivation is not as clear as in the cases before, due to the more uniform distribution of UKIP voters. The chi square test will clarify if this assumption proves true.

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	22,603	12	,031
N of Valid Cases	25635		

Figure 4: Chi-Square Test Subjective Relative Deprivation

The null hypothesis this chi square test is testing is: "There is no coherence between UKIP voting and subjective relative deprivation". Right away it is noticeably that the



test result is not as clear as the results before. The result of 0,031 is not below 0,01 and hence does not feature high significance. Yet a result below 0,05 is still considered as significant and gives sufficient cause to reject the null hypothesis ((Janssen; Laatz, 2013: 260.). With a probability of 3.1% to mistakenly reject the null hypothesis, it is still reasonable to state that the hypothesis H3 that people with a higher level of subjective relative deprivation, in the form of self assumed disadvantages in society, are more likely to vote for the United Kingdom Independent Party can be verified. Anyway, it is necessary to recognize that the proof for coherence is not as striking and reliable as for the earlier tested independent variables.

#### 4.4 Subjective political deprivation and UKIP voting

A cross tabulation (see Appendix 4: p. 34) gives a first impression on how UKIP voters are allocated from score -7.70 to 4.30.

At first glance the low relative amount of UKIP voters among the scores -7.70 to -5.70 attract attention. It is a first indication that voters, who still trust the politicians and approve the job of the government, are rarely voting for UKIP. When the examination is extended over the whole cross tabulation, this assumed indication becomes even more probable. Overall a trend can be identified. The relative amount of UKIP voters increases from score -7.70 to 4.30 by 19.4 percentage points, with a low of 1.3% at score -5.70 and a high of 24.3% at score 3.30. These results are the highest among the four different independent variables and therefore give a clear suggestion that UKIP voting and subjective political deprivation is coherent. It will be evaluated with the aid of a chi square test, if the indicated coherence can be confirmed.

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	888,816	12	,000
N of Valid Cases	26083		

Figure 5: Chi-Square Test Subjective Political Deprivation

This chi square test assays the null hypothesis “There is no coherence between UKIP voting and subjective political deprivation”. Furthermore, the requirements of the chi square test were met, just as in all the previous chi square tests. The result below 0.01 confirms the already indicated coherence. As a consequence the null

hypothesis can be rejected without a doubt and the hypothesis H4 that people with a higher level of subjective political deprivation, in the form of political discontent, are more likely to vote for the United Kingdom Independent Party can be verified.

#### **4.5 Multivariate analysis**

The chi square tests of the four different independent variables were able to verify all hypotheses constructed in the theoretical chapter. Even though the relationship between the independent variables and UKIP voting was proven right, it is unclear to what extent the independent variables and thus the losers of modernization theory is able to explain UKIP voting. In order to evaluate the impact of the losers of modernization theory on UKIP voting, a multivariate analysis will be brought into operation.

There are many different approaches to a multivariate analysis, for example the well known multiple regression analysis or the variant analysis. In the case of this research paper, the logistical regression is the right approach, due to the dichotomous characteristic of the dependent variable *vote decision UKIP*. The logistical regression aims to determine how probable a certain outcome is depending on different influencing factors (Backhaus et al., 2008: 244 f.). In this context the outcome is the voting decision for UKIP. The influencing factors are the four different independent variables, *objective absolute deprivation*, *subjective status deprivation*, *subjective relative deprivation* and *subjective political deprivation*. The result of the logistical regression will indicate to what degree the losers of modernization theory explains UKIP voting in the United Kingdom.

One major risk, when applying a multivariate analysis, is that the independent variables highly correlate among each other. Multicollinearity would threaten the results of the analysis and therefore need to be checked before the logistical regression is applied. In order to check, if multicollinearity is given, a correlation matrix of the independent variables is presented.

**Correlation Matrix**

	Objective absolute deprivation	Subjective status deprivation	Subjective relative deprivation	Subjective political deprivation
Correlation Objective absolute deprivation	1,000	,295	,226	,211
Subjective status deprivation	,295	1,000	,356	,316
Subjective relative deprivation	,226	,356	1,000	,601
Subjective political deprivation	,211	,316	,601	1,000

Figure 6: Correlation Matrix Independent Variables

The correlation matrix shows that all variables are correlated to a certain degree but in most cases the correlation coefficient is below 0.356 which indicates that multicollinearity should be of no concern. Only the combination of subjective political deprivation and subjective relative deprivation scored a correlation coefficient of 0.601, which is clearly higher than for the other combinations of variables, but still not high enough to indicate multicollinearity, which would be the case, if a correlation coefficient is close to be 1 (Backhaus et al., 2008: 96). According to these results it is assumed that multicollinearity will not be a thread to the following logistical regression.

**Case Processing Summary**

Unweighted Cases		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	13145	42,0
	Missing Cases	18183	58,0
	Total	31328	100,0
Unselected Cases		0	,0
Total		31328	100,0

Figure 7: Case Processing Summary - Logistical Regression

The first element of the logistical regression, which has to be examined, is the case processing summary. The summary gives an overview over the missing and the included cases before the actual logistical regression is executed. The high amount of missing cases is quite noticeable. This may be explained due to the fact that the logistical regression just includes cases in the analysis, which do not exhibit any missing values for any of the included variables. Obviously this results in a large amount of missing cases and calls for further examination. After a closer look at the dataset it is found that especially the variable *objective absolute deprivation* is responsible for 13,926 missing cases. This high amount of missing cases is

primarily caused by the dimensions *form of employment* (8483 missing cases) and *personal income* (7084 missing cases). Possibly the sensitive character of these dimensions might be a reason for this high amount of missing cases. Nonetheless the missing cases do not bias the relative amount of included United Kingdom Independence voters, which is 13.9% regarding the *personal income* and 14.7% regarding *form of employment* compared to an overall amount of 14.5% regarding all valid cases of the dependent variable. Furthermore the 13,926 missing cases were checked regarding the three other forms of deprivation to ensure that they would not score completely different on the indices than the valid cases. It was found that the dispersion over the different deprivation indices differed for a few values by a maximum of about 3 percentage points, most of the values differed by 0 to 2 percentage points. Consequently it can be stated that these missing cases do not have a negative impact on the representativity. A solution to lower the overall amount of missing cases would be to exclude the dimensions *form of employment* and *personal income*. However this would make the variable *objective absolute deprivation* useless. It is assumed that this would have a higher negative impact on the results of this thesis than the high amount of missing cases and nonetheless, 13,145 cases still met the requirements and remain in the analysis. Of these are 11,358 non UKIP voters and 1,787 UKIP voters. Based on these amounts, it can still be presumed that the analysis produces representative and reliable results. In spite of that, the high amount of missing cases cannot be ignored completely and might lead to slightly different results for each variable compared to the single chi square tests applied previously.

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	723,688	4	,000
	Block	723,688	4	,000
	Model	723,688	4	,000

Figure 8: Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients - Logistical Regression

The first relevant result of the logistical regression is the omnibus tests of model coefficients. This test is comparable to the already used chi square test and computes a significance level, which can be interpreted as the probability to mistakenly reject the null hypothesis (Kopp; Lois, 2012: 174). In this case the null hypothesis is: "There is no coherence between UKIP voting and all the independent variables combined". The result of this test is significance below 0.01, thus a probability of 1% to mistakenly reject the null hypothesis. Therefore the null

hypothesis can be rejected and it can be recorded that there is coherence between all independent variables and the voting decision for UKIP.

Variables in the Equation					
	B	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Objective absolute deprivation	,101	129,751	1	,000	1,106
Subjective status deprivation	,010	,623	1	,430	1,010
Subjective relative deprivation	-,215	238,870	1	,000	,807
Subjective political deprivation	,285	467,652	1	,000	1,330

Figure 9: Variables in the Equation - Logistical Regression

This chart is part of the logistical regression and displays relevant measures regarding each individual variable. First of all, it is important to take a look at the significance of each variable. The significance is based on the Wald statistic, which is similar to the chi square test and allows the evaluation, if an independent variable from the group has an impact on the dependent variable (Backhaus et al., 2008: 273). The significance reveals differences between the logistical regression and the earlier individually executed chi square tests. In this case, all variables, but objective status deprivation, score significance below 0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis for each of these three variables can be rejected and coherence with the dependent variable is given. On the contrary, subjective status deprivation receives a score of 0.430, meaning that the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis by mistake aggregates to 43%. According to this result, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore subjective status deprivation has, in this group of variables, no impact on the vote decision and will therefore be ignored in the further evaluation. This outcome might be surprising, because in the individual chi square test this independent variable scored a perfect 0.000 significance. It is assumed, that this variance of results is accounted for by the large amount of missing cases, which led to a different set of valid cases compared to the previous individual chi square test.

The most important information displayed by this chart is the b-coefficient, found in the column labeled "B", and the odds ratio, found in the column labeled "Exp(B)". The b-coefficient is the result of the logistic regression equation and indicates by its value and algebraic sign the strength and direction of an impact on the dependent variable by an independent variable. The odds ratio, which is the exponentiation of

the b-coefficient, is easier to interpret and indicates how high the chance for the dependent variable to become 1 is, when the independent variables value raises by 1 (Kopp; Lois, 2012: 175 f.).

The first independent variable, *objective absolute deprivation*, scored a b-coefficient value of 0.101 and received therefore an odds ratio of 1.106. This means that the chance to vote UKIP raises by 10.6% for every score gained in the objective absolute deprivation index. The next independent variable, *subjective relative deprivation*, scored a b-coefficient value of -0.215, making it an interesting case. The negative algebraic sign indicates that this independent variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable. By subtracting the odds ratio, which is 0.807, from 1, a chance of 19.3% is calculated. This means in effect that for every score gained in the subjective relative deprivation index, the chance to vote for UKIP drops by 19.3%. The last relevant independent variable is *subjective political deprivation*, which received a b-coefficient value of 0.285 and an odds ratio of 1.330. This odds ratio is rather high compared to the other two variables and indicates that for every score gained in the subjective political deprivation index, the chance to vote for UKIP raises by 33%.

These results can be described as double sided. On the one hand, two independent variables seem to have a positive impact on UKIP voting. On the other hand, there is one independent variable which features no coherence with UKIP voting and one independent variable showing a negative effect on UKIP voting, regarding to this logistic regression analysis. In consequence, a final statement, if the losers of modernization theory, represented by the four different forms of deprivation, is a useful approach to explain UKIP voting, cannot yet be given. In fact there are indicators, in the form of the two deviating independent variables, that it might not be able to explain it universally. One further element of the logistic regression analysis might be able to give a final evaluation.

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	9727,482	,054	,098

Figure 10: Model Summary – Logistical Regression

This model summary chart displays the Cox & Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square. Both of these are pseudo R-squares and can be compared to R-square known from the linear regression. They try to quantify the impact of the logistic regression model, in regard to the chosen group of independent variables, on the

dependent variable. Contrary to Cox & Snell R Square, Nagelkerke R Square can obtain a maximum value of 1 and therefore allows a clearer interpretation. Because of this, Nagelkerke R Square is the preferred approach in this research paper. Regarding to the standards of R-square from the linear regression, a score above 0.5 would be considered as very good (Backhaus et al., 2008: 263 ff.). In this case the model receives a score of 0.098, which cannot be interpreted as a good result. This means that the explanatory power of the group of independent variables, and therefore of the losers of modernization theory, for the vote decision for UKIP is not very strong.

It should be noted that the analysis could have been improved by including control variables. Especially gender and age are commonly adduced variables for this purpose. Several studies have shown that there is very often a gender gap among the voters of right wing populist parties, whereby men were found to vote for these parties more often than women (Spier, 2010: 146 f.). The impact of age is controversial but there are cases in which the electorate of right wing populist parties was predominantly young or in other cases predominantly old (Spier, 2010: 147). Because these two variables might have an influence on the voting decision for the United Kingdom Independence Party, independently from the losers of modernization theory, testing for these variables would have improved the outcome of the study. However, this would have gone beyond the constraints of this thesis.

The results of the analysis can be concluded in so far that coherence between UKIP voting and each individual independent variable was proven. Furthermore, coherence between the combined independent variables, representing the losers of modernization theory, and the vote decision for UKIP could be verified as well. Nevertheless, the logistic regression revealed that the explanatory power of the losers of modernization theory is not very high. These findings suggest that there must be other factors explaining UKIP voting in the United Kingdom. The rather high impact of subjective political deprivation on the vote decision indicates that more powerful explanations for UKIP voting might be rather found in the political sphere than in the socio-economic. Moreover, it has to be mentioned again that the valid amount of cases for the logistic regression analysis only made up for 42% of the total amount of cases in the dataset. This might have influenced the results of the logistic regression analysis. Yet, the absolute number of cases was still very high and in the extent of this research paper the results are assumed to be representative to draw final conclusions.

## 5. Conclusion

This paper examined the phenomena of right-wing populist voting in England with the help of the losers of modernization theory, in order to find answers to the question why people vote for right wing populist parties.

In a first step a definition for the term right-wing populist party was set. Roughly, a right-wing populist party comprises four defining elements, which are: the claim to represent the people, the agitation against predestined opponents, a charismatic leader and a movement like organizational character. Furthermore, a horizontal dimension separates populist from right-wing populist parties.

The underlying losers of modernization theory, which focuses on modernization processes in post-industrial nations, was introduced and the several forms of deprivations were explained. Deriving from the theories of deprivation, four hypotheses were formulated. The exact indicators for each form of deprivation and the ways how they were operationalized were presented in the methodology chapter.

The core of this thesis is the analysis, in which the different hypotheses were tested by various means. First, an overview over the distribution of UKIP voters among the different levels of deprivation were given, by the help of information gained from cross tabulations. To evaluate if there is any coherence between the presence of deprivation and UKIP voting, a chi square test was deployed. After each form of deprivation was processed this way, it could be stated that all hypotheses could be verified. In a last step a multivariate analysis in the form of a logistic regression was applied, to give a conclusive answer regarding the explanatory power of the losers of modernization theory for UKIP voting.

Multivariate analysis showed that the losers of modernization vote more frequently for UKIP. However, the impact of being a loser of modernization on the voting decision turned out to be small. Therefore, it can be concluded that the explanatory power of the losers of modernization theory for right-wing populist voting in the United Kingdom is rather weak. It was conspicuous that the logistic regression found that subjective political deprivation has the highest impact on UKIP voting. This finding can be interpreted in the way that it appears that the reasons for UKIP voting are rather located in the political dimension than in the socio-economic dimension, on which the losers of modernization theory primarily focuses. One assumption is that especially the principal topic of euroscepticism attracts voters. Besides, a further assumption is that many voters vote for UKIP out of protest and not because



of political belief. Both of these assumptions could explain the high impact of subjective political deprivation. Analyzing these assumptions regarding their explanatory power would go beyond the scope of this thesis, but have already been discussed in “A Theory of Protest Voting” by David P. Myatt (2015). Myatt focuses on the theory that eurosceptic British voters vote for UKIP out of protest, in order to put pressure on the large mainstream parties to include and prioritize the discussion of United Kingdom EU membership in their party program (Myatt, 2015: 3). This theory is supported by the findings of Whitaker and Lynch (2011), who researched UKIP support at the 2009 European Parliament election. They concluded that euroscepticism is a key element for the parties’ electoral success, but also their stance on immigration issues and their anti-establishment attitude proved to be contributive. Furthermore they found that many disappointed supporters of the Conservative Party decided to vote for UKIP, which further supports the theory of protest voting (Whitaker; Lynch, 2011: 12).

Finally, the research question why voters vote for right-wing populist parties cannot be answered in a simple way. Definitely, there is not just one phenomenon explaining voting behavior. The losers of modernization theory appears to give some suggestions why people decide to give their vote to a right-wing populist party. Nonetheless, the theory can by far not explain right-wing populist voting by itself. In the case of the United Kingdom there are certainly other aspects, which have a higher influence on the voting decision, as other studies indicated too. All in all, the final statement can be made, that the losers of modernization theory can explain right-wing populist voting to a small degree, but it is by far not a universal answer. It is most likely that there are several other reasons, depending on the country and present situation, why people vote a right-wing populist party. Because of this, there is much more to be examined by electoral researches, in order to fully understand populist right-wing voting in each country. It remains to be seen, whether right-wing populist parties gain more popularity in the period to come. However, one thing is clear: the field of voter research is of special interest for the future.

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## Appendix

### Appendix 1

**Crosstabulation: UKIP voting and Objective absolute deprivation**

			Objective absolute deprivation							
			-7,45	-6,45	-5,45	-4,45	-3,45	-2,45	-1,45	-,45
UKIP voting	No	Count	53	253	401	820	1165	1633	1639	1437
		% within Objective absolute deprivation	91,4%	95,1%	89,7%	92,3%	90,8%	90,0%	89,1%	86,3%
	Yes	Count	5	13	46	68	118	182	200	229
		% within Objective absolute deprivation	8,6%	4,9%	10,3%	7,7%	9,2%	10,0%	10,9%	13,7%
Total		Count	58	266	447	888	1283	1815	1839	1666
		% within Objective absolute deprivation	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

			,55	1,55	2,55	3,55	4,55	5,55	6,55	7,55	Total
UKIP voting	No	Count	1284	1344	908	955	579	441	152	125	13189
		% within Objective absolute deprivation	83,5%	85,6%	80,2%	83,2%	79,3%	75,3%	76,4%	76,2%	86,0%
	Yes	Count	253	227	224	193	151	145	47	39	2140
		% within Objective absolute deprivation	16,5%	14,4%	19,8%	16,8%	20,7%	24,7%	23,6%	23,8%	14,0%
Total		Count	1537	1571	1132	1148	730	586	199	164	15329
		% within Objective absolute deprivation	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

### Appendix 2

**Crosstabulation UKIP voting and Subjective status deprivation**

			Subjective status deprivation							Total		
			-2,70	-1,70	-,70	,30	1,30	2,30	3,30		4,30	5,30
UKIP voting	No	Count	4559	3017	4053	2322	2805	1588	1205	632	20834	
		% within Subjective status deprivation	87,2%	87,7%	88,0%	84,9%	84,6%	84,1%	83,7%	83,7%	85,9%	
	Yes	Count	670	424	554	414	511	301	235	123	3411	
		% within Subjective status deprivation	12,8%	12,3%	12,0%	15,1%	15,4%	15,9%	16,3%	16,3%	21,5%	14,1%
Total		Count	5229	3441	4607	2736	3316	1889	1440	755	832	24245
		% within Subjective status deprivation	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

## Appendix 3

**Crosstabulation UKIP voting and Subjective realtive deprivation**

			Subjective realtive deprivation						
			-7,57	-6,57	-5,57	-4,57	-3,57	-2,57	-1,57
UKIP voting	No	Count	39	149	364	800	1329	1872	2596
		% within Subjective realtive deprivation	88,6%	87,6%	88,1%	86,9%	86,9%	86,4%	85,8%
	Yes	Count	5	21	49	121	201	294	431
		% within Subjective realtive deprivation	11,4%	12,4%	11,9%	13,1%	13,1%	13,6%	14,2%
Total		Count	44	170	413	921	1530	2166	3027
		% within Subjective realtive deprivation	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

			-,57	,43	1,43	2,43	3,43	4,43	Total
UKIP voting	No	Count	3118	3606	3023	2570	1614	830	21910
		% within Subjective realtive deprivation	84,9%	85,6%	85,8%	85,0%	84,0%	82,3%	85,5%
	Yes	Count	556	609	499	453	307	179	3725
		% within Subjective realtive deprivation	15,1%	14,4%	14,2%	15,0%	16,0%	17,7%	14,5%
Total		Count	3674	4215	3522	3023	1921	1009	25635
		% within Subjective realtive deprivation	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

## Appendix 4

**Crosstabulation UKIP voting and Subjective political deprivation**

			Subjective political deprivation						
			-7,70	-6,70	-5,70	-4,70	-3,70	-2,70	-1,70
UKIP voting	No	Count	64	167	444	1430	1555	2302	2437
		% within Subjective political deprivation	97,0%	97,1%	98,7%	95,8%	94,9%	92,5%	89,8%
	Yes	Count	2	5	6	62	84	186	276
		% within Subjective political deprivation	3,0%	2,9%	1,3%	4,2%	5,1%	7,5%	10,2%
Total		Count	66	172	450	1492	1639	2488	2713
		% within Subjective political deprivation	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

			-7,70	-6,70	-5,70	-4,70	-3,70	-2,70	-1,70
UKIP voting	No	Count	2821	2708	2847	2118	1751	1663	22307
		% within Subjective political deprivation	87,1%	84,0%	81,7%	79,6%	75,7%	77,6%	85,5%
	Yes	Count	419	515	636	542	563	480	3776
		% within Subjective political deprivation	12,9%	16,0%	18,3%	20,4%	24,3%	22,4%	14,5%
Total		Count	3240	3223	3483	2660	2314	2143	26083
		% within Subjective political deprivation	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

## **Declaration of Academic Integrity**

I hereby confirm that the present thesis "Voting for Right-Wing Populist Parties – an explanatory study of right-wing populist voting by the example of the United Kingdom Independence Party " is solely my own work and that if any text passages or diagrams from books, papers, the internet or other sources or in any other way used, all references - including those found in electronic media - have been acknowledged and fully cited.

Place, Date:

Signature:

Münster, 10.08.2015



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