UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.

FACULTY OF BEHAVIOURAL MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (BMS)

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WILHELMS-UNIVERSITÄT
MÜNSTER

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MASTER THESIS for the attainment of the Double Degree Diploma:
Master of Science and Master of Arts in European Studies

Title:

Behavioural patterns of EU-Member States' National Parliaments/Chambers when issuing Reasoned Opinions within the Early Warning System (EWS) of the European Union

Münster, 14 August 2015

Amount of words from the Introduction until the Conclusion: 16.808 on 37 pages

Management Summary

With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Early Warning System (EWS) of the subsidiarity reprimand was officially introduced. From then onwards national parliaments/chambers are allowed to issue Reasoned Opinions towards the European Commission when they suspect a subsidiarity breach within one of the legislative drafts of the European Union.

Ever since, it has to be noticed that first of all, the amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by Member States' national parliaments/chambers differed/s enormously among each other and even within the chambers of one single state. Second, the literature review indicates that structural factors may be a cause of this phenomenon. Thus the research question arose/arises: *To which extend do different structural factors trigger the usage of Reasoned Opinions (ROs) within the Early Warning System?*

The diverse behavioural patterns of the parliaments/chambers are tried to be explained by using the theory of Rational Choice Institutionalism, out of which, seven hypotheses regarding the importance and responsibility of structural factors could be driven. Those are: Type of **1) Parliamentary Chamber** (Upper/Lower House; i) all bicameral chambers; ii) chambers of regional/federal states only); **2) Governmental System** ((semi-)presidential/non-presidential); **3) EU-budget contribution** (Net-Contributors/Net-Beneficiaries); **4) Financial Aid** for Eurozone Member States participation; **5) Relative Power of Member States** in the Council of the European Union; **6) Institutional Strength** of parliamentary Chambers; and **7) Attitude towards EU-Membership** (a)Euroscepticism/b)Europhilia);

To test these seven hypotheses/structural factors, non-experimental quantitative research had to be conducted, applying bivariate analyses in order to be able to analyse the behavioural patterns of the 27[1] EU-Member Sates (40 chambers) regarding the 275 Reasoned Opinions issued so far.

The results will show that with the exception of H2 (type of governmental system), H5 (relative power of Member States), and H7b (Europhilia), all hypotheses can be relatively stable approved. Therefore the answer of the main research question is that structural factors *do* matter when it comes to the issuance of Reasoned Opinions. Nevertheless, they do so to a different extend. The strongest structural factor is the type of EU-budget contribution (H3), followed by the type of Parliamentary Chamber (regional/federal states only) (H1ii), type of Financial Aid participation (H4), type of Attitude towards EU-Membership (Euroscepticism only) (H7a), type of Institutional Strength (H6), and type of Parliamentary Chamber (all bicameral parliaments) (H1i). All in all, taking every structural factor into account, they matter from a weak to a medium size.

At the end, it has to be suggested to further examine the already established hypotheses using multivarative analyses, in order to be able to find out their correlation among each other and also to exclude spurious relationships.

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1 Without Croatia; for further information, see footnote 15.

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List of Abbreviations in alphabetical Order

Amsterdam Treaty	Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related Acts
Art.	Article
Avg.	Average
Constitutional Treaty	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
COSAC	Conférence des Organes Spécialisés dans les Affaires Communautaires
EAC	European Affairs Committees
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO)	Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor's Office
EWS	Early Warning System
Maastricht Treaty	Treaty on European Union (TEU)
Monti II-Regulation	Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services
MSs	Member States
Protocol on Subsidiarity	Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality
Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments	Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union
ROs	Reasoned Opinions
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Treaty of Lisbon / Lisbon Treaty	Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community

1. Introduction

1.1. Subject of Investigation

The latest reform treaty of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 2009, shifted the balance of powers within the European Union in favour of parliamentary information-, participatory, and control rights. The status of the European, as well as of the Member States' national parliaments (or respectively chambers) got enhanced (all-from-Calliess,2010:184). This is why the reform treaty is also called the 'Treaty of Parliaments' (europarl.europa.eu,n.d.). The latter ones are now attributed to 'guardians' (Heise,2012:Title) of subsidiarity[2], the fundamental principle of the Union, enshrined in article 5(3)TEU. This is due to the newly introduced Early Warning System (EWS), which allows national parliaments to protect this principle ex-ante[3] by warning the European Commission of a possible subsidiarity-breach before a legislative act can possibly get passed.[4] The parliaments[5] shall do so by means of the so-called *Reasoned Opinions* (ROs), official statements in which they declare why a respective legislative proposal is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity (bundestag.de,n.d.). In order to be able to scrutinise legislative proposals, they shall receive any legislative drafts directly from the Commission (Art.2,Protocol-on-the-Role-of-National-Parliaments).

This new 'watchdog' function (Cooper,2006:Title) should compensate the loss national parliaments suffered from, due to a partly transmission of their legislative function to the European level, which the ongoing 'Europeanisation' process entailed. This is why they received the titles: 'main losers' or 'victims' of European integration (Dimitrova,2013:1;Cygan,2011:481). European national parliaments were trying to liberate themselves from this image and to take an active part in the EU-legislative process by making usage of this new instrument. During the first five years since the introduction of the EWS (2010-2014) altogether 275 ROs have been issued. But not all national parliaments or chambers have been similarly active[6]; contrarily there have been immense gaps between national parliaments/chambers and even between the Lower and Upper Houses within national Member States (MSs). (all-from-European-Commission,2011a,2012a,2013a,-2014a,2015a). Thus one could ask *why* some parliaments/chambers issue more ROs than others (see chapter 1.4.) and *why* the usage of the EWS matters (see chapter 1.2.).

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2 The EU may only intervene if it is able to act more effectively than Member States and if clear advantages to treat the respective issue on a transnational scale, exist (europa.eu,2010).

3 The Early Warning System describes the ex-ante subsidiarity-reprimand of the national Member States' parliaments before a legislative proposal might possibly be adopted. Anyhow, the Lisbon Treaty also introduced an ex-post subsidiarity-reprimand for already adopted legislative proposals for national parliaments to accuse in front of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Art.8,Protocol-on-Subsidiarity).

4 Before the introduction of the EWS, national parliaments' only and indirect role within EU-legislation was to hold their respective government accountable for its EU-policies (Kiiver,2006:43).

5 Within the EWS, both chambers of bicameral parliaments are allowed to issue ROs, independently of their national legislative rights.

6 From 2010-2014, the Swedish unicameral parliament for instance, issued 45 ROs, while the Hungarian unicameral parliament issued just one, and the Slovenian Upper House issued none.

1.2. The Early Warning System

1.2.1. Importance and Criteria of the EWS

The EU is a special political construct sui generis ("unique"/"special",Wermke-et-al,2000:961). As it has intergovernmental as well as supranational elements, it shares characteristics with confederal and federal entities (Phelan,2012). Nevertheless it is neither a confederation of states nor an International Organisation as such, as – in the case of the EU – Member States have to transfer parts of their national sovereignty. Nor is it a nation-state/federal state as it does not possess an own nationality. Thus it is rather a supranational organisation or a federation of countries (bpb.de,n.d.). Due to this special construction, the EU needs a profound legitimisation (Dittgen,2011:5).

The European Parliament as such is not sufficient in order to legitimise this construct, as not only its members are voted by different national electoral procedures and its plenum is composed unequally (therefore unevenly represents European citizens) (id.:20). Also, the EU's 'Upper House', the Council is – even after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty – still more powerful than its 'Lower House', the European Parliament (Lijphart,2012:43f.). But the bigger issue is that the EP does not represent a nation-state, thus it is not a parliament in the sense of a national parliament as such (Cygan,2011:6f.). It is – in contrast to national parliaments – for instance not fully capable of using the parliamentary public function as discussing EU-related topics on a nationwide scale (Dittgen,2011:11f.).

Consequently national legislatures are needed to supplement the EP (id.:5). In order to do so, not only information rights, but also, participatory and control rights are needed, which the Lisbon Treaty introduced with the EWS. (all-from-id.:11f.). National parliaments serve as a basic foundation of the democratic legitimisation of the EU as democratic legitimacy is build upon parliamentary participation. Thus enhancing the role of national legislatures is necessary to fight the well known EU-democratic deficit; especially because the parliaments further suffer from the transmission of their legislative function to the European level due to a continuing 'Europeanisation' process. According to the so-called 'deparliamentarization-thesis', the development of European integration has led to the erosion of parliamentary control over the executive branch (Raunio,2011:204).

Thus the newly established Early Warning System shall serve as a platform in order to further democratise and legitimise EU-integration. Although this system did not change the fact that national parliaments are no EU-institutions, it acknowledged them as an increasingly important part of the EU-system (Dinan,2010:295). Due to the newly introduced EWS in the 'Treaty of Parliaments', they are now attributed to "guardians" (Heise,2012:Title) or "watchdogs" of subsidiarity (Cooper,2006:Title).

Even though at the beginning of the EWS just 34 ROs were issued, the amount of ROs issued has been steadily increased until 2013, reaching its peak with 88 ROs. Anyhow in the year 2014, the amount of ROs issued fell drastically to 20, being the lowest number so far (2011: 63; 2012: 70; 2013:88; 2014: 20) (European-Commission,2011a,2012a,2013a,-2014a,2015a) (see-Appendix-A:Figure-1).

Because of the drastically incision in 2014, the average amount of ROs issued per chamber

is only 6,88 for the whole period of time and just 1,48 per chamber per year (see Appendix A). This seems very little and one may think that MSs' chambers do not make appropriate use of the EWS. Anyhow this small number arose not only because of the collapse in 2014, but also due to the fact that 21 out of 40 chambers (52,5%) issued less than five ROs (see Appendix A), thus diminishing the average amount (for likely explanations of the unequal distribution see chapter 4.2.). A possible justification for the abrupt and sharp decline of ROs is not a sudden disinterest in subsidiarity breaches or the EWS as a whole, but may rather be attributed to the smaller amount of legislative proposals, the Commission issued in 2014. Due to the change of Commission on first November 2014, an overall less activity[7] was noticed regarding new initiatives over the course of the year (European-Commission,2015a:2).

According to article 5(3)TEU, the following criteria have to be considered by national legislatures before issuing a Reasoned Opinion: **First**, the proposed legislative act cannot fall in policy areas, being part of the Union's exclusive competences,[8] as the Member States transferred sovereign rights of these areas to the EU. **Second**, the aims of the legislative acts need to be worse achievable on the European than at the nation-state or even regional level (= negative criterion). **Third**, the issue needs to be better achievable at the national or even regional level (= positive criterion). (all-from-Koch&Kullas,2010:13).

1.2.2. Procedure and already issued 'Yellow Cards'

National parliaments have eight weeks of time to check if legislation drafts from the European Parliament, the Commission, or the Council contain any subsidiarity-breach (Art.6,Protocol-on-Subsidiarity).

According to article seven of the Protocol, two procedures exist:

'Yellow-card'-procedure (Art.7(2)): Should there be more than one third (a fourth in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice) of national parliaments (two votes per country, one vote per chamber in bicameral systems) considering to be a breach of the principle of subsidiarity, the respective legislation proposal must be reviewed. After this 'check', the Commission "[…] may decide to maintain, amend, or withdraw the draft."

'Orange-card'-procedure (Art.7(3)): If more than the half of national parliaments consider a subsidiarity-breach (within the ordinary legislative procedure only), and the Commission maintains the unchanged legislative draft, then the parliaments' ROs together with the Commission's statement of maintaining have to be transmitted to the EP and the Council. They will then need to take a decision. "If, by a majority of 55% of the [Council members]

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7 The Commission introduced 966 (34 ROs issued) legislative proposals in 2010; in 2011: 1,220 (63 ROs); in 2012: 815 (70 ROs); in 2013: 1,023 (88 ROs); and in 2014 only: 741 (20 ROs) (ec.europa.eu,2010,2011,2012,2015a,2015b).
8 The EU's competences are separated between exclusive (i.a. customs union, competition policy) Art.3,TFEU; shared (i.a. internal market, social policy) Art.4,TFEU; and supporting (i.a. human health, cultural policy) Art.6,TFEU ones (ec.europa.eu,2015c).

or a majority of the votes cast in the European Parliament, the legislator is of the opinion that the legislative proposal is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, the legislative proposal shall not be given further consideration."

Altogether the threshold for a subsidiarity-reprimand was reached twice – for the so-called Monti II-Regulation[9], as well as for the EPPO-Proposal[10] (European Public Prosecutor's Office). Anyhow the Commission only withdrew the first proposal, but decided to keep the second one. (European-Commission,2013a,2014a). Even though the Commission had to reply to the parliaments/chambers issuing ROs, explaining and justifying its approach (European-Commission,2014a), this way of proceeding also showed that it is still the Commission which has the final say.

1.2.3. Critique

Regarding **positive** criticism: Some scholars like Cooper (2013) see the EWS as a chance of creating a virtual third chamber next to the Council and the EP. Others believe that national parliaments could potentially act as some sort of "Conseil d'état"[11] of the EU (Kiiver 2011).

When it comes to **negative** critiques, one has to distinguish between two main types:
The first group of critics (like Högenauer,2008; Raunio,2005a,2009; Raunio&Auel,2012; Kiiver,2011,2012; or Cygan,2011) prefer a stronger influence of national parliaments than the current system provides. In their view, the EWS equips them only with an 'advisory veto power', as their demands are still restricted to the will of the Commission (yellow-card-procedure, seen at the continuation of the EPPO-Proposal), or the EP and the Council (orange-card-procedure). Thus it would not re-centre national legislatures and therefore not assure improved legislative legitimacy, nor would it adequately address 'deparliamentarisation' (Cygan,2011:480).

The second group of critics see a danger within the increasing rights of national parliaments as such, as this would create a problem of democracy and legitimacy. According to Höreth&Sonnicksen (2008:9f.), the EWS would create a tricameral system without establishing a third chamber as national parliaments would be integrated in the European legislative process without being an institution of the EU. Besides, the EWS would further obscure the lines of responsibility and competences in the EU, instead of contributing to a clearer delineation of powers between the existing various levels of European governance. By awarding national parliaments with this additional power, the EU would intrude into individual national constitutional legal orders by heighten Upper Houses of MSs, independent of their national status (ibid.). Also this would empower administrative actors rather

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9 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services; the Commission received 19 ROs for that proposal, the threshold being 18 (European-Commission,2013a).
10 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor's Office; the Commission received 14 ROs, the threshold being 13,75 (European-Commission,2014a).
11 Sort of advisory board for the EU.

than elected representatives due to the creation of new bureaucratic networks (Christiansen-et-al.,2014:136).

1.3. Literature Review

This thesis lies within the research field of quantitative European parliamentary studies. The initial parliamentary research (both quantitative and qualitative) within the European Communities was at first restricted to the European Parliament (EP) itself and its significance for the legitimacy of the European integration. This only changed at the beginning of the 1990s, especially after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Ever since, research studies started analysing the role of national parliaments in the European political system in connection with debates about the EU's democratic deficit (Auel&Raunio,2012:7) and the principle of subsidiarity as such. This was due to the fact that the Treaty enshrined the latter as a basic principle of the Community and mentioned national parliaments for the first time in European primary law (Treaty of Maastricht,1992). Most studies were qualitative analyses.

Gradually (especially after the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty[12] in 1997 and the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004[13]), comparative studies between European national parliaments got carried out. Those studies took mainly place within the framework of the COSAC[14] (Auel&Raunio,2012:7). Even though the Europeanisation of national parliaments after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) has become an important concern of a number of scholars in recent years, most often a narrow focus laid on the functioning of the EWS (see-Kaczyński,2011;Barett,2012;DeWilde,2011;Kiiver,2012) (Christiansen-et-al.,2014:136). A real publishing hype (mostly qualitative) occurred after the first and until now only successful subsidiarity-reprimand of the Monti II-Regulation and the unsuccessful subsidiarity-check of the European Public Prosecutor's Office Regulation. Most important qualitative research was done by Raunio (2005,2009), Auel&Raunio (2012), Kiiver (2011,2012), and Cygan (2011).

Anyhow it took until 2013 to conduct large n-quantitative studies to this topic for the first time (Gattermann&Hefftler,2013). Other quantitative cross-national studies were carried out by Auel&Tacea (2013) and Auel-et-al (2015).

Generally, most parliamentary research in relation to the principle of subsidiarity and the

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12 Within the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU strengthened the subsidiarity principle in an own protocol. From then onwards, the Commission had to justify the relevance of its proposals with regard to the principle of subsidiarity in a short notice aside the document (Art.9,Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality).
In the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union, also annexed to the treaty, Article 1(1) stated that "[a]ll Commission consultation documents […] shall be promptly forwarded to national parliaments of the Member States". (all-from-Treaty of Amsterdam,1997).
13 The rejected Constitutional Treaty was an important precursor of the Lisbon Treaty. Generally it already entailed most principles regarding the subsidiarity principle, the role of the national parliaments, and the COSAC, for which the Lisbon Treaty is now famous for. (all-from-Constitutional Treaty,2004)
14 COSAC is the official cooperative institution between the European national parliaments. Its main issue is to increase national parliamentary control of EU-affairs and to enable regular exchange of information (all-from-Kaczyński-et-al.,2010:109f.).

EWS has been qualitative (single case studies, comparative case studies, etc.). In particular, no comparative studies about the influence of structural factors influencing behavioural patterns of national parliaments/chambers of all 27[15] EU-Member States, when issuing Reasoned Opinions within the Early Warning System, could be found.[16] Either structural factors have been analysed on few countries at the same time only, or just two to three structural patterns have been analysed simultaneously. Anyhow, those indicated already that they *do* matter when issuing Reasoned Opinions.

1.4. Research Questions

Due to the fact that the published literature already indicated the importance of structural factors, while a lack of cross-national studies on all 27 EU-member states measuring several ROs prevailed, this analysis aims at filling this research gap, by trying to find out, which structural patterns exist and how strong they influence the parliaments/chambers of the then 27 Member States when it comes to the usage of ROs. Thus, one has to deal with the question *why* some parliaments/chambers issue more ROs than others. Therefore the **main research question** is: *To which extend do different structural factors trigger the usage of Reasoned Opinions (ROs) within the Early Warning System?*

The main research question is divided into the following seven **sub-question(s):** *How strong are structural factors like type of* **1)** *Parliamentary Chamber (Upper/Lower House);* **2)** *Governmental System ((semi-)presidential/non-presidential);* **3)** *EU-budget contribution (Net-Contributors/Net-Beneficiaries);* **4)** *Financial Aid for Eurozone Member States participation;* **5)** *Relative Power of Member States in the Council of the European Union;* **6)** *Institutional Strength of parliamentary Chambers;* and **7)** *Attitude towards EU-Membership (Euroscepticism/Europhilia; responsible for the amount of ROs issued within the Early Warning System?*

The **dependent variable** of this thesis' analysis is the amount of Reasoned Opinions issued. The seven **independent variables** are type of: (1) Parliamentary Chamber, (2) Governmental System, (3) EU-budget contribution, (4) Financial Aid for Euroarea Member States participation, (5) Relative Power of Member States in the Council, (6) Institutional Strength, and (7) Attitude towards EU-Membership. As the variables are neither: controllable, manipulable, nor alterable; this Master thesis deals with non-experimental research. Consequently, the analysis must rely on correlations and cannot demonstrate an exact cause-and-effect relationship. Non-experimental analyses tend to have a high level of external validity, which means that it can be generalised to a larger population or in this case, parliaments. (all-from-Sousa-et-al.,2007:503f.).

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15 Croatia will not be part of this paper's analysis. It just joined the EU in July 2013 and had therefore only the possibility to participate in the EWS for a period of time (1,5 years) being too short to draw conclusions from it; as this paper analyses data until December 2014 only.

16 Raunio,2005b issued a quantitative analysis of EU-MSs' parliamentary strength in EU affairs, analysing the EU-15.; Auel&Tacea,2013 and Auel-et-al.,2015 issued cross-national studies, but with other research focuses.

1.5. Outline of the Thesis

In order to answer the above mentioned research questions, the core issue of this Master thesis lies on the analysis of the behaviour of national parliaments when issuing reasoned opinions. Thus the structure, which is based on the previously defined study object, is designed in its main features as follows: The introductory chapter (1.) explains the subject of investigation as an entry into the topic (1.1.), and provides background information of the Early Warning System (1.2.) - which is the framework for issuing ROs - by examining its importance, criteria, procedure, and critique. Besides, the first chapter also shows the topic's current state of research (1.3.), the research questions (1.4.), and the outline of the paper (1.5.).

The theoretical framework will be described in chapter two because it is helpful in selecting and explaining the hypotheses and variables from a multitude of information. This section will be divided in a general overview of the applied theory of rational choice institutionalism (2.1.), in a sub-chapter about its advantages as well as its weaknesses (2.2.), and in a part explaining possible hypotheses derived from it (2.3.).

Chapter three provides the discussion of methodology with the data collection (3.1.) in order to show why it is best to use bivariate quantitative statistical methods for the research (3.2.); also possible disadvantages will be pointed out.

The data will be organised and analysed statistically in chapter four (data and analysis); the previously defined hypotheses will be tested in order to be able to answer the sub-research questions in the same chapter (4.1.). Besides, possible explanations of the findings will be indicated and a first short summary given (4.2.).

The overall results will be demonstrated in the concluding chapter (5.), and therewith the main research question answered (5.1.). The limitations of the research strategy will be discussed (5.2.), and suggestions for further statistical analyses on this topic will be given (5.3.).

2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

2.1. The Theory of Rational Choice Institutionalism

When one is dealing with the overall question of *why* national parliaments/chambers issue ROs and *why* some do more than others, it makes sense to draw hypotheses from rational choice assumptions in general, and from Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) in particular, as it deals with gain in power, re-election, maximisation of benefits, and minimisation of costs within the institution of the parliament. The theory helps to select and explain the hypotheses and variables from a multitude of information (Jahn,2006:251).

RCI started in the late 1980s with Fritz Scharpf's 'joint-decision traps' in federal political systems, such as Germany and the EU, and continued into the 1990s and 2000s with work by George Tsebelis (1990) and Geoffrey-Garrett (1992,1995). RCI-scholars have analysed legislative, executive, as well as judicial politics. As this paper will test hypotheses about the behaviour of national parliaments within the EU-legislation process, a closer look will be taken at legislative analyses, also being the best-developed. Most of them have been carried out about the Member States' voting power within the Council of the European Union (Council) under different decision rules, as well as the ever-changing legislative role of the European Parliament, its legislative organisation, and the voting behaviour of its deputies. Besides, studies about the inter-institutional relations between the Commission, the Council, and the EP have been conducted. (all-from-Pollack,2009:129f.). Thus national parliaments or chambers have not been at the centre of legislative RCI-analyses so far.

As the name already states, RCI contains rational choice assumptions, adopting a *deductive* methodology, which means that explanations and working hypotheses are 'deduced' from abstracted first principle assumptions about the motives and behaviour of actors. Both theories assume that actors are rationally calculating their actions through a cost-benefit-analysis. (all-from-Bell,2002:5f.). Tsebelis (1990:92) defines *rationality* as a goal-oriented optimal behaviour. In RCI, institutions are not only an important cause of behaviour but are also an effect of it. RCI-scholars argue that institutions are created by individual actors for rational purposes who engage in changing and shaping institutional environments to suit their goals. (all-from-Bell,2002:5f.). Thus they are treated as endogenous and examined as outcomes of conscious political activities (Tsebelis,1990:92). But in contrast to prior pre-vailing rational choice approaches, RCI focuses on the strategic interaction between actors in the determination of political outcomes. This represents a major advance on traditional approaches, which explain political outcomes largely in terms of the force that structural variables (e.g. level of socioeconomic development) play. Thus, RCI overcomes the relatively simplistic image of human motivation which may miss many of the living being's important dimensions. (all-from-Hall&Taylor,1996:18).
Besides, RCI-scholars argue that political actors' rational choices are constrained ("bounded rationality") (Simon,1985-as-cited-in-Kaiser,2009:319) due to the conceptualisation of the institutions as collection of rules and inducements. Individuals accept those constraints on

their own actions (thus institutions shape their behaviour) because they know that also other actors are constrained by institutional rules. Besides, they try to use them in order to maximise their own utilities inside the institutional framework. (all-from-Peters,2005:48;66). On the one hand, institutions are equilibria: they are the outcomes of the interactions between individuals and are thus determined by their will. On the other hand, institutions determine the consequences of various possible actions, and therefore affect agents' preferences and behavioural patterns (Ericsson,2011:140f.).

2.2. Advantages and Critics of the Theory

The advantages of RCI are theoretical clarity and parsimony, as explanations are cast in institutional terms, as opposed to psychological or cognitive process terms. Outcomes are explained as deliberate choices rather than as mistakes. (all-from-Tsebelis,1990:40). In Tsebelis' (id.,43) view, also the interchangeability of individuals – due to their rational behaviour – is a beneficial aspect of the theory, as it would constitute to a conscious effort to apply standards of scientific explanation in social sciences (Tsebelis,1990:45). Against its critics (see further below) he (id.,237) defends the theory by stating that processes, such as learning, natural selection, heterogeneity of individuals, and statistical averaging can lead to the same outcomes as rationality. Tsebelis argues further that his books would have indeed concretely demonstrated the explanatory power of rational choice assumptions.

Nevertheless, RCI is still considered to be a mid-level theory, concerned with the effects of institutions as intervening variables in EU-politics. Therefore, it does not constitute adequate theory of European *integration.* Besides, the application of RCI to the EU is based on a highly restrictive set of assumptions about the nature of actors and institutions. Those assumptions have been fundamentally questioned by sociological institutionalists and constructivists, who believe that RCI is blind to the most important constitutive and transformative effects of EU-institutions on the preferences and identities of those people interacting within them. (all-from-Pollack,2009:141f.). As Koelble (1995:235,as-cited-in-Bell,2002:6) put it: "Individuals are viewed as 'embedded' in so many social, economic and political relationships beyond their control and even cognition that it is almost absurd to speak of utility-maximising and rational behaviour in a strictly economic sense." In addition, Shepsle (2005:11) criticises the simplification of human behaviours by stating that: "The research program of Rational Choice Institutionalism is founded on abstraction, simplification, analytical rigor, and an insistence on clean lines of analysis from basic axioms to analytical propositions to empirical implication." Even Tsebelis (1990:30f.) himself admitted that in the real world – being different to the RC-world – people are willing to pay the price for their mistakes and beliefs. They might also sometimes be incapable of making all necessary calculations and computations, as the level of complexity may be too high and the levels of information too low.

Yet, another problem lies within the falsification[17] of the approach, as it is difficult to find any situation in which individuals could be said not to be acting rationally in the context of some possible set of incentives; outsiders may just not understand the premises of the acting individuals. Thus it can be said, that they are merely acting within their own interpretation of the institutional values. (all-from-Peters,2005:41;67). All kinds of motivations can be seen as self-interest since they are desires of the individual agent. So also cultures, costumes, values, and any other form of ethical considerations could count as self-interest since the individual acts ethically only if he/she wants to. (all-from-Eriksson,2011:66).

Despite the substantial contributions of RCI-approaches to the understanding about the EU, much of RCI-literature arguably underemphasises the neo-functionalist concept of European integration as a process, as former unintended consequences of early integration decisions become difficult to control or overturn today (Pollack,2009:136).

Although RCI – is like every other theory – not free from criticism, it is advantageous for this Master thesis, as seven hypotheses regarding the behavioural patterns of European national parliaments/chambers can be drawn from it (see further below). According to the theory of RCI, parliaments are acting rationally; they are goal-oriented and choose the optimal means to achieve these goals (Tsebelis,1990:235). Thus it is hypothesised that they would use the EWS and issue a lot of Reasoned Opinions in order to take advantage of it. By issuing them, they have the possibility to demonstrate their power via the European Commission and influence its decision-making to their own benefit. As their actions are rationally defined through a cost-benefit-analysis to maximise their utility, structural factors, independent of regime type, party system, culture, electoral system, etc., matter (id.,2002:5).

2.3. Derivation of the Hypotheses

The seven hypotheses to test are the following:

1) Parliamentary Chamber (Upper/Lower House)

Since the introduction of the Early Warning System in the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments are allowed to issue Reasoned Opinions, when they suspect the Commission of having breached the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative proposal. In Member States with bicameral parliamentary systems, each chamber is allowed to raise their opinion equally. This automatically favours Upper Houses, as in most[18] European bicameral systems, Lower Houses are constitutionally superior to them (Kiiver,2012:144). This is also one of the main

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17 The possibility to observe anything that the hypotheses did not predict (Galderisi,2015:7).
18 The Italian Upper and Lower House are formally equally powerful within the Italian legislative process (Lijphart,2012:192). In practice however it is only the latter which has the possibility to introduce laws, while the Upper House controls them and has the power to veto them. Thus although theoretically equal, the Lower House is practically more powerful, also because it can take a final decision in some sort of legislative proposals (Tsebelis&Money,1997:50). Therefore Italy will be part of the analysis.

critics about the EWS (see chapter 1.2.3.).

Looking at the theory of RCI, it would make sense to see national Upper Houses as rational actors who try to maximise their power and influence within the national political system. As their position within most national systems is relatively weak, by acting as rational actors, independently of party or electoral system, they will take the opportunity the EWS gives them to demonstrate their newly gained influence and to expand their power within their national legislative system respectively. Besides, notably senates seem to have enough energy and time to make use of the EWS as their political agenda seems to be less extensive than those of 'normal' parliamentarians (Kiiver,2012:131). Thus by issuing more Reasoned Opinions than their counterparts, they will try to maximise their utility within the bounded rationality of the institution which constrains their choices.

Therefore, the first hypothesis which arises is:

Hypothesis 1i): Upper Houses of EU-Member States with bicameral parliamentary systems issue more Reasoned Opinions than Lower Houses of EU-Member States with bicameral parliamentary system.

Thus a positive relationship between being an Upper House and issuing ROs is expected.

Since Upper Houses of European bicameral Member States are not only elected differently, but were/are also established due to different purposes, it makes sense to test the same hypothesis only for bicameral chambers which represent national federal states or regions.[19] Rationally thinking, those should be even more active when it comes to the issuance of Reasoned Opinions, as – within their own (federal) state – they could use the mechanism not only to gain power towards their respective Lower House, but also in regard to the national position of the regions they represent. By issuing ROs they will strengthen the voice, regions play as they constantly fight for more independence from the (central) government.

Thus the first hypothesis 1i) can be narrowed to the following one:

Hypothesis 1ii): Upper Houses of EU-Member States with bicameral parliamentary systems, representing national regions/federal states, issue more Reasoned Opinions than Lower Houses of EU-Member States, representing national regions/federal states.

Thus a positive relationship between being an Upper House which represents a national region/federal state and issuing ROs is expected.

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19 Federalism is usually described as a spatial or territorial division of power in which the component units are geographically defined. Federal states may have different names: states, regions, provinces, or cantons. As in most EU-states one of the first two terms is used, this paper will utilise them respectively for all sorts of federal states. (all-from-Lijphart,2012:176).

2) Governmental System ((semi-)presidential/non-presidential)

In Western governmental systems, the relationship among the parliament and the government can be distinguished between parliamentary and (semi-)presidential systems (Steffani,1979:37,39). The most diagnostic character is the (in-)dependence of the government from the parliament. If the parliament has the constitutional right to recall the government without necessarily dissolving itself, its system can be considered to be parliamentary. If the parliament does not have the right to recall the government without dissolving itself, its system can be considered to be presidentially. (all-from-Steffani,1979:39). In presidential systems, the president, who appoints its ministers/government and the parliament emerge from two different elections. Their democratic legitimacy is thus independent of each other.

As - in presidential systems - the president is elected directly by the electorate and not by the parliament, the latter does neither appoint him, nor has it the possibility to remove him from office. The president is only responsible to his direct voters and not to the parliament (Siefken,2013:54f.). Besides, the president has more power than heads of governments of parliamentary systems, like for instance being the head of the national military.

Thus according to the theory of RCI, parliaments of (semi-)presidential systems shall issue more ROs than parliaments from non-presidential systems, as the first group has less control rights in regards to its own government and state-leader than the latter. Thus parliaments of (semi-)presidential systems are more likely to 'abuse' the EWS in order to demonstrate power in regard to their government and president.

Therefore the hypothesis which arises is:

Hypothesis 2): Parliaments of EU-Member States with (semi-)presidential systems issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of EU-Member States with non-presidential systems.

Thus a positive relationship between being a (semi-)presidential system and issuing ROs is expected.

3) EU-budget (Net-Contributors/Net-Beneficiaries)

When it comes to the EU-Budget, Member States have to be separated between net-contributors and net-beneficiaries. Derived from the theory of RCI, net-contributors shall issue more Reasoned Opinions than net-beneficiaries: First of all, because they posses more financial resources (otherwise they could not contribute more to the EU-budget than they receive) and can thus afford enough civil servants to help the parliaments carrying out the issuance of ROs in good time and manner. Second, by showing that they are able to raise their voice towards the beneficiary states, parliaments of budget-contributors can demonstrate their power over them and therewith appease their own citizens, who might claim that too much of their national budget is spend for other EU-Member States. There-

fore the parliamentarians of net-contributory countries try to keep their power and make sure to be re-elected, by appeasing their (possible) voters. Thus they are using the EWS for maximising their utility and minimising their costs.

Therefore the hypothesis which arises is:

Hypothesis 3): Parliaments of EU-budget's net-contributory Member States issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of net-beneficiary Member States.

Thus a positive relationship between being a net-contributory Member State and issuing ROs is expected.

4) Financial Aid for Euroarea Member States (Creditors/Debtors)

Due to the Eurozone crisis, the then 17[20] Euroarea Member States (EAMS) established the temporary EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) in 2010, which was replaced by the permanent ESM (European Stability Mechanism) in 2012 (efsf.europa.eu,n.d.,a). According to the theory of RCI, parliaments of donor countries will issue more ROs than debtor countries, as they have more financial resources, which they can use to maximise their power over the borrower countries. Besides they use the EWS for showing their electorate that – even though they provide a large amount of money for MSs who did not 'manage their own finances' – they do not necessarily agree with every other step the EU takes. They do so, as they try to keep/win votes.

The hypothesis which arises is:

Hypothesis 4): Parliaments of Member States, which are Creditors to the financial assistance programs EFSF/ESM issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of Member States, which are Debtors.

Thus a positive relationship between being a Creditor to financial EU-assistance programs and issuing ROs is expected.

Nevertheless this hypothesis is just currently valid, as the future might change the financial stability of Member States as well as their participation in EU-financial programs.

5) Relative Power of Member States in the Council of the European Union

While in all bicameral EU-Member States, the Lower House yields more legislative power than the respective Upper House, in the EU it is the Upper House (Council of the European

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20 Even though Estonia did not use the Euro as official currency before January 2011, it was already a creditor within the EFSF founded in June 2010 (efsf.europa.eu,n.d.,b) and is therefore part of the analysis. Latvia and Lithuania are however left out of the analysis as they joined the Eurozone not before 2014 and 2015 respectively (bbc.com,2014;bbc.com,2015).

Union), which can be considered to be more powerful than the Lower House (European Parliament) – even after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, which raised the power of the EP (Lijphart,2012:43f.). Thus the relative power MSs possess within the EU will be measured on the basis of their power in the Council.

Besides, the Treaty of Nice (2004) increased the relative voting power of bigger Member States at the expense of smaller member states within the qualified majority voting (QMV).[21] At the same time QMV increased at the expense of unanimity voting in almost every policy area except for taxation and foreign policy (Mattila,2010:23). Consequently bigger Member States (having more voting share) are/were able to outbid smaller members in nearly all policy areas.

Due to those two reasons (reinforcing each other) - according to RCI - parliaments of smaller, less powerful members would use the EWS and issue a lot of Reasoned Opinions as this gives them the chance to change/stop legislation when their governments were not able to do so and to maximise the power of the respective states.

Therefore the hypothesis which arises is:

Hypothesis 5): <u>Parliaments of EU-Member States with low level of relative power within the Council issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of EU-Member States with high level of relative power within the Council.</u>

Thus a positive relationship between being a (smaller) Member State with low level of relative power within the Council and issuing ROs is expected.

6) Institutional Strength of Parliamentary Chambers

European parliamentary chambers can be classified according to the institutional strength[22] they hold in EU-affairs, although there is little agreement within legislative studies on how to define and measure parliamentary strength (Sieberer,2011-as-cited-in-Auel,2015:289). Based on the theory of RCI, chambers as rational actors would try to maximise their utility through a cost-benefit-analysis. Therefore chambers with higher institutional strength issue more Reasoned Opinions, as in contrast to chambers with low institutional strength they would have more resources to do so. Besides, by using the EWS they were able to demonstrate their power in resources and to use them in order to play a bigger role in the EU-legislative process and therefore expand their influence and power.

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21 Until 1 November 2014, Qualified Majority was obtained if at least 15 MSs or 260 votes out of the total 352 voted in favour. Bigger Member States like Germany, France, the UK, or Italy held more votes than smaller ones like Malta or Slovenia. (all-from-consilium.europa.eu,n.d.).
22 The parliamentary strength in EU-affairs will be defined by the study of Auel&Tacea (2013:9) because they measured it, based on eleven different resources chambers obtain in different strength. For further information see chapter 3.

Thus the hypothesis which arises is:

Hypothesis 6): <u>EU-Member States' Parliamentary Chambers having high institutional strength in EU-affairs issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliamentary Chambers having low institutional strength in EU-affairs.</u>

Thus a positive relationship between chambers having high institutional strength and issuing ROs is expected.

7) Attitude towards EU-Membership (Euroscepticism/Europhilia)

European Member States' citizens can be classified in those having a rather eurosceptic[23] and others having a rather europhile[24] attitude towards their EU-Membership. Looking at RCI assumptions, parliamentary representatives of both groups and thus in all EU-countries could use the EWS in their rationally calculated cost-benefit analysis as all of them strive for re-election[25] and retention of power, independent of their party membership. Besides, the fear that the non-governing opposition could overtake the majority's attitude and win the next election, creates an electoral incentive for the governing parliamentarians to be more active within the EWS: The same reaction is to be expected from parliamentarians of the opposition.

Therefore all parliamentarians of eurosceptic Member States shall issue a lot of Reasoned Opinions as by the help of the EWS they try to demonstrate their electorate that they do not only disagree with the decisions 'made in Brussels', but also try to fight against them. Furthermore they also aim to win the 'eurosceptical' voters, other parties may possess. Thus by demonstrating that they stand behind their voters and the electorate in general, by acting in their people's interest, they are trying to retain and expand their power.

The same could be true for parliaments in countries in which the level of europhilia among citizens is high. Parliamentarians of those countries would also want to be re-elected and would try to win more votes, as the majority's thought tends towards europhilia. Besides, they would also use the EWS in order to raise public awareness for EU-related issues and to demonstrate its importance in national politics. On the other hand, national parliamentarians representing europhile citizens might not issue ROs due to the fact that they see the scrutiny of EU-legislation as a task of the European Parliament solely as they wish to strength its competences and political weight (Kiiver,2006:67).

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23 Eurosceptics are citizens or politicians who present themselves as 'sceptical' (greek "critical"/"doubtful", Wermke-et-al,2000:921) of the union, which they say, takes powers away from their national government and poses a threat to their national sovereignty (euractiv.com,2015).

24 Europhiles are citizens or politicians who admire (*phile* comes from greek "affection"/"love", Wermke-et-al,2000:760) the European Union due to several reasons (dictionary.reference.com,n.d.).

25 Even though senates of Upper Houses are usually not directly elected by the electorate, they are still included in the analyses, as they are mostly elected or appointed by directly elected representatives who, themselves, strive for re-election (Lijphart,2012:192f.).

Consequently two contradictory hypotheses can be drawn from RCI:

Hypothesis 7a): <u>Parliaments of EU-Member States with citizens having a rather Eurosceptical attitude towards their EU-Membership issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of EU-Member States with citizens having a rather Europhile attitude towards their EU-Membership.</u>

Thus a positive relationship between being a Member State with citizens having a rather eurosceptical attitude and issuing ROs is expected.

Hypothesis 7b): <u>Parliaments of EU-Member States with citizens having a rather Europhile attitude towards their EU-Membership issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of EU-Member States with citizens having a rather Eurosceptical attitude towards their EU-Membership.</u>

Thus a positive relationship between being a Member State with citizens having a rather europhile attitude and issuing ROs is expected.

3. Discussion of Methodology

3.1. Data Collection

The necessary data in order to test these seven hypotheses will be taken from official European Commission documents: *Annual Report(s) on Relations between the European Commission and National Parliaments* from 2010 until 2014.[26] As those provide one already with all ROs issued for every year and national parliament/chamber, no additional national data has to be collected and a secondary analysis will be conducted. Altogether, during that period, 275 Reasoned Opinions have been issued for 125 legislative proposals (European-Commission,2010b,2011b,2012b,2013b,2014b).

3.2. Research Methods

3.2.1. Bivariate Analysis

This data will be analysed quantitatively, as this paper generalises the findings for all EU-Member States. These studies involve techniques converting data to a numerical form and subjecting it to statistical analyses (Babbie,2007:427). To test the seven hypotheses (n=275, number of ROs issued), it is appropriate to use large-N statistical studies[27] in order to construct generalisations about political phenomena like the issuance of Reasoned Opinions (Ragin,1998:159). Besides, with 27 countries and 40 parliamentary chambers, those hypotheses can be drawn on a reliable basis (12-50 countries would have to be within the total entity,Jahn,2006:248). They will be tested bivariatively, which means that the respective x-axis-variable of each hypothesis will be tested with the same y-axis-variable (amount of ROs issued) separately. Therewith it can be found out if the two variables are statistically correlated/associated.[28]

For all hypothesis-tests a contingency table (cross-tabulation)[29] will be used in order to show the calculated results in columns and rows (Diaz-Bone,2006:66). For the first four of the seven independent variables, which are nominally scaled, a column and a pie chart each, and for the last three, which are metrically scaled, a scattered diagram will be used to visualise the results.[30] Note that all variables will be tested for the added ROs of the years 2010 until 2014 and not separately per year. When possible, the decimal digits after the comma will be rounded to two digits only.

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26 Due to the time span of five years, this analysis will result in a cross-sectional study (MIcheel,2010:57); From 2010 (first time Reasoned Opinions could be officially issued) until 2014 (latest report being issued so far, until August 2015).

27 Possible to carry out, when at least n>50, but better with n>100.

28 Originally the term *association* was assigned to the description of the relation between categorical variables and the term *correlation* to metrical variables. However research practices have shown that the second one is used for both terms now (all-from-Micheel,2010:135).

29 A format, presenting the relationships among two or more variables as percentage distributions or absolute numbers, where values of the dependent variable are contingent/depend on values of the independent variable. As it has never been standardised, a variety of formats are legitimate. (all-from-Babbie,2007:423).

30 Most appropriate graphical displays for nominal data are pie and column charts (Galderisi,2015:39), whereas scattered diagrams are best for metric variables (Diaz-Bone,2006:83).

The respective effect size and variance measurement between the x-axis- and y-axis-variable is dependent on the scale of each variable. As the first four x-axis-variables are nominally scaled, while their respective y-axis-variable is metrically scaled, the appropriate measurement will be eta(η)/eta-squared (η^2). For the last three hypotheses, Pearson's r and the Regression R (r^2) will be calculated as both axis-variables will be metrically scaled. (all-from-Babbie,2007:460).

3.2.2. Eta(η)/eta-squared (η^2)

In order to determine the possible relationships between the different independent nominal variables and the dependent metric variable (ROs issued), it is necessary to calculate the strength of the relationship via Eta (Treiman,2009:99). Eta-square describes the ratio of variance explained in the dependent variable by a predictor while controlling for other predictors, making it similar to r^2 (see chapter 3.2.5.). Its disadvantage is that it estimates only the effect size in the sample and that is upwardly biased when the sample size is small (Levine&Hullett,2002:620), which is not the case here. Eta[2] is calculated by the statistical analysis program SPSS and double-checked by the spreadsheet program Excel[31] in order to reduce reliability problems (see chapter 3.2.6.). Its calculation is $\eta^2 = SS_{effect}$(sums of squares for a special effect of interest)/SS_{total}(total sums of squares for all effects). (all-from-jalt.org,2008). In behavioural science, values over 0,5 are normally not common (Cohen,1988:284). Also generally speaking, values over 0,8 are treated as tautological[32] as both variables are likely to measure exactly the same[33] (sso.uni-muenster.de,n.d.) (for an overview of the classification of effect size values, see-Appendix-A:Table-1).

3.2.3. The Correlation Coefficient r

The correlation coefficient $r_{xy} = cov(x,y)/s_x s_y$[34] (Micheel,2010:145) is a mean to show the strength of correlation[35] of at least two metric variables. It can take values between -1 (having a fully negative relationship; all values lay on the decreasing linear regression line) and 1 (having a fully positive linear relationship; regression line increases). Thus the correlation's strength is visible by the amount of values lying on the regression line. If the value is zero, then both variables do not correlate with each other. The calculations are done via Excel and double-checked with SPSS. In social studies, a value of r=(-)0,20 already shows a medium strong correlation. Values over 0,8 are generally treated as tautological as both

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31 Note that the Appendices only show the SPSS calculations, as the results are identical with the double-checked Excel calculations in every case.

32 "Tautology" is a Greek term which means *repetition of what has been said* (Wittgenstein,1996:blackwellreference.com).

33 In this bivariate analysis, tautology might not be a danger, as the (in-)dependent variables are by definition too different from each other, that they might measure the same. In multivariate analysis however, independent variables may correlate among each other that strong that the problem might occur.

34 *Cov* = covariance; *s* = variance (Micheel,2010:145).

35 Correlation is an interrelational relationship between two variables. Changes in the distinctness of one variable correlates with the changes of the other variable. This condition is not enough to proof causality. The two other conditions are: The independent variable needs to go on ahead of the dependent variable and a spurious relationship needs to be excluded. (all-from-Micheel,2010:32f.).

variables are likely to measure exactly the same (see footnote 32) (sso.uni-muenster.de,n.d.) (see-Appendix-A:Table-1). Nevertheless, the disadvantage of this methodology is that both variables can still depend on each other in a non-linear way which cannot be found out herewith. Thus the correlation coefficient is not useful for testing purely stochastic dependency. (all-from-Diaz-Bone,2006:87-91).

3.2.4. Regression Analysis

If the covariance test showed that both variables correlate linearly, a bivariate regression analysis will be used, as in both cases the x-variable seems to be the cause of the y-variable (Diaz-Bone,2006:92). *Y* is thus regressed to *x*. The regression of each value will be calculated with Excel and double-checked by SPSS and graphically illustrated by the help of a scattered diagram[36]. The formula is $y_i=a+bx+e_i$; (*x*)y_i stands for the vector of the (in-)dependent variable; *a* represents the amount of the y-value when *x* is zero, named regression constant or y-intercept. e_i stands for the residuum/predictive error; *b* represents the degree of the line's gradient, it is the non-standardised regression coefficient, it tells how the estimated value y_i is changing when x_i is changing.[37] (all-from-Babbie,2007:456f.). *B* does not tell anything about the effect size, but measures the slope of the regression-line. When b=0, *x* has no effect on *y*, and is thus statistically independent on x, as there will be no linear correlation (regression line will not de-/increase). When b≠0, y is statistically dependent on x. If b<0, *x* has a negative effect on *y*, and an increase in *x* has a diminishing effect on *y* (graph decreases). If b>0, the opposite is true. (all-from-Diaz-Bone,2006:99f.).

3.2.5. The Determination Coefficient r²

R² tells one by how much percent security one can predict a y-value with a given x-value. It quantifies the explanatory efficiency of the regression model and sets the variance of each y-variable in relation to its total variance.[38] There will be no explanation efficiency when r²=0, whereas the maximum level of explanation will appear when r²=1 (all values would directly lie on the regression line). (all-from-Diaz-Bone,2006:100ff.; Babbie,2007:457). Those values will also be calculated with Excel and SPSS.

3.2.6. Advantages and Disadvantages of Bivariate Analysis

The advantages of quantitative bivariate analysis are the establishment of behavioural patterns and the degree of generalisation of the findings. In contrast to univariate analyses, bivariate ones examine two variables (independent and dependent) simultaneously for the purpose of describing and determining the empirical relationship/statistical association between them (Babbie,2007:419,427).

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36 In a scattered diagram, a regression line represents, with the least amount of discrepancy, the actual location of points (Babbie,2007:485).

37 For instance one can find out, by how much the amount of ROs issued (y) changes when the institutional strength of parliamentary chambers changes (x).

38 If e.g. r²=0.5, half of the y-axis-variable-variance will be explained by the x-axis-variable-variance (Babbie,2007:457).

Since the parliamentary patterns of the then all 27 Member States will be analysed, the entire statistical data of every Member State will be used and the total entity will be analysed, no random sample has to be carried out and thus no selection bias will occur. This thus minimises the chance of reliability problems[39] to the issue of miscalculation(s) and typing errors. To reduce this problem further, all calculations have been made twice; with Excel as well as with SPSS.

Coming to validity issues;[40] as regards external validity,[41] the thesis' analysis does not aim to generalise the behavioural patterns of EU-parliaments to other non-EU parliaments around the globe and is therefore diminishing external validity issues. Regarding construct-validity,[42] artefacts and measuring mistakes are always possible. For instance, it is possible to measure institutional strength (hypothesis 6) differently, than Auel&Tacea did, or that Euroscepticism might not be measured using eurobarometer-data. Anyhow the operation-alisation[43] of all x-axis-variables will be done by using well-established and accepted measurements, which have been replicated several times. Thus also potential construct validity problems are diminished.

Nevertheless internal-validity[44]-problems may occur. First of all, there is the possibility that some important independent variables are incorrectly left out of the analysis, which may have an effect on the outcome variable. Therefore the hypotheses developed above should be seen as neither complementary nor as necessarily competing. Second, in the case of spurious relationships,[45] omitted variable(s) will have an effect on the outcome variable instead of the predicted independent variable and therefore there might be the chance that wrong assumptions about causality may be drawn (soc.iastate.edu,n.d; Diaz-Bone,2006:63ff.). Mere association/correlation does not in itself establish causation[46] (Babbie,2007:116). Thus the main disadvantage of bivariate analysis is that it cannot examine simultaneous relationships among several variables (multivariate analysis), which may be needed in order to understand the relationship between two variables more fully (Babbie,2007:427) and to diminish spurious relationships. Thus further studies with multiple regression analysis[47] could consolidate or refuse the findings of this analysis.

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39 High reliability occurs if repeated measurements with the same measuring instrument yield the same measurement result (Paier,2010:73).
40 Validity describes the approximate truth of an inference (Shadish-et-al,2002:53).
41 Has the researcher accurately identified the boundary between the class of cases to which the findings can be validly generalised and beyond which valid generalisations are unlikely? (Mitchell&Bernauer,2002:118).
42 Does the collected empirical information accurately capture the concepts or variables contained in the theoretical model or propositions nominally being investigated? (Mitchell&Bernauer,2002:118).
43 Operationalising data is necessary in order to make abstract terms or concepts sizeable and measurable (Paier,2010:51).
44 Does the analytic method demonstrate that, for each hypothesised causal relationship, variation observed in the independent variable correlates with observed variation in the dependent variable, and that no other variable provides a more plausible explanation of variation in the dependent variable? (Mitchell&Bernauer,2002:118).
45 A spurious causal relationship is an association that in reality is caused by one or more other variables than the predicted one (Babbie,2007:116).
46 See footnote 35.
47 A form of statistical analysis, representing the impact of two or more independent variables on a single dependent variable (Babbie,2007:458).

4. Data and Analysis

4.1. Hypothesis Testing and Answering of the Sub-Questions

General Overview

In order to fully understand the analyses below, a general overview of the amount of ROs issued by European parliaments' from 2010 until 2014 will be given.

The **X-Axis-Variable** (independent & nominal) consists of the *27 EU-Member States* in order to show which country issued how many ROs. The **Y-Axis-Variable** (dependent & metric) shows the *amount of ROs issued*.
In a contingency table, in which the magnitudes of both variables will be assigned to columns and rows (Diaz-Bone,2006:66), the amount of ROs from 2010 until 2014 will be summarised for each country separately (see-Appendix-A:Table-2).
Due to the fact that the independent variable is nominal and strongly polytomous, the best way of visualising the distribution of ROs among MSs is to use a column chart, having one column for each country (see-Appendix-A:Figure-2). The average amount of ROs issued per country is **10,19** for the whole five year period and **2,04** per country and year.

In order to understand further steps, it makes sense to divide the x-axis magnitudes into the *40[48] parliamentary chambers of the Member States*, instead of only showing 27 member-countries, and doing exactly the same as above, but with 40 chambers[49] on the x-axis (see-Appendix-A:Table-3;Figure-3). The average amount of ROs issued per chamber is **6,88** for the whole time period and **1,48** per chamber per year.

First Hypothesis: Type of Parliamentary Chamber (Upper/Lower House)

i) The 27 EU-national parliaments can be divided into 40 chambers. Countries with unicameral chambers are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden; bicameral chambers consist in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and in the United Kingdom (Kiiver,2012:64).
The **X-Axis-Variable** (independent & nominal) is the *type of parliamentary chamber*, as this Master thesis tries to find out whether Upper Houses issue more ROs than Lower Houses.

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48 Note that *I* stands for Lower House and *II* for Upper House (for a detailed list with official names, Appendix J).

49 All of the Spanish and some of the Irish and Dutch ROs were issued together by the respective Upper and Lower House. Thus for this analyses, the half of each amount will be assigned to each chamber. Therefore values of *0,5* may occur.
The common issuing of ROs by the Spanish Upper and Lower House might indeed be problematic, as both chambers have only four weeks each to send their possible RO(s) to the joint commission of the parliament (Cortes Generales), which then decides on its own if it is going to issue a RO or not within the overall eight-week-timeframe. First, this results in time problems for weaker regional parliaments; Second, the ROs of the chambers are not binding for the Spanish joint commission. (all-from-Vandamme,2012:523f.).

The **Y-Axis-Variable** (dependent & metric) is *the amount of ROs issued*.

In a cross-tabulation, the amount of ROs issued by all Upper Houses and Lower Houses are summarised from 2010 to 2014 respectively and then divided by the amount of chambers in order to obtain the average amount of ROs issued by each Upper and Lower House. Then the average amounts are compared, in order to see whether Upper or Lower Houses issued more ROs (see-Appendix-B:Table-4).

The result shows that the average amount of ROs issued by each Upper House of the 13 EU-states which have a bicameral parliament, is **7,15**[50] and **5,69** by Lower Houses. This means that on average, Upper Houses issue slightly more ROs than Lower Houses. As percentages, Upper Houses issue **55,69%** of all ROs and Lower Houses **44,31%** (see-Appendix-B:Figure-4&5).

To calculate the strength of the relationship, thus the effect size, Eta and Eta-squared in order to receive the ratio of the explained variance, will be used; as the x-axis-variable is nominally scaled and the y-axis-variable is metrically scaled. Excel- and SPSS-calculations show the following values: η=**0,15**[51] and η^2=**0,02** (see-Appendix-B:Table-5[52]). Both proof only a **low connection** (Cohen,1988:390), as only 2% of the y-axis' variance is explainable by the variance of the x-axis (unt.edu,2010).

Nevertheless **hypothesis 1i):** *Upper Houses of EU-Member States with bicameral parliamentary systems issue more Reasoned Opinions than Lower Houses of EU-Member States with bicameral parliamentary systems* can be poorly approved, as the excepted positive relationship between being an Upper House and issuing ROs is true on a weak basis.

ii) After the first hypothesis-test, a second, narrower one will be implemented in order to find out whether the hypothesis can be denied or fulfilled more clearly: Instead of including all bicameral countries in the analysis, just parliamentary chambers of Member States in which Upper Houses represent national regions will be analysed and compared. According to Kiiver (2012:64), only the German and Austrian Upper Houses were established in order to solely represent their regional federal states respectively. As this would be too little data to analyse, the legislatures of Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and Slovenia will be added, as their Upper Houses i.a. also represent their national regions. For the cross-tabulation see-Appendix-B:Table-6.

The result shows that the average amount of ROs issued by each Upper House of the nine EU-states which have a regional bicameral parliament is **7,72** and **4,39** by Lower Houses. This means that on average Upper Houses issue substantially more ROs than Lower Houses. As percentages, Upper Houses issue **63,76%** of all ROs and Lower Houses **36,24%** (see-Appendix-B:Figure-6&7).

Eta is **0,35** and eta² is **0,12** (see-Appendix-B:Table-7). Both values show a **medium-sized connection** (Cohen,1988:390), as at least 12% of the variance of the y-axis is explainable by

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50 Note that the values are rounded to two decimal places after the comma.
51 See previous footnote.
52 Note that the Appendices only show the SPSS-calculations as the results are identical with the double-checked Excel-calculations in every singlecase.

the variance of the x-axis (unt.edu,2010).

Thus **hypothesis 1ii):** *Upper Houses of EU-Member States with bicameral parliamentary systems, representing national regions/federal states, issue more Reasoned Opinions than Lower Houses of EU-Member States, representing national regions/federal states*, can be approved, as the expected positive relationship between being an Upper House which represents a national region/federal state and issuing ROs is true.

Therefore the answer of the first sub-question: *How strong are structural factors like type of* **1)** *Parliamentary Chamber (Upper/Lower House) responsible for the amount of ROs issued within the Early Warning System?*; is that the type of Parliamentary Chamber matters little when taking into account all bicameral parliaments, but matters much more, when only analysing bicameral parliaments representing federal states/regions; thus this structural factor is medium strong.

Second Hypothesis: Type of Governmental System ((semi-)presidential/non-presidential)

The EU-governmental systems can be classified in (semi-)presidential and non-presidential Member States. The first group consists of: Cyprus, France (2 chambers), Lithuania, and Romania (2 chambers) (6 chambers all together). To the second one belong all remaining 23 EU-Member States (34 chambers), which are non-presidential systems. Due to the fact that Cyprus is the only fully presidential Member State, the semi-presidential Members: France, Lithuania[53], and Romania[54] will be added to the same group,[55] as they also have a directed voted president, equipped with relatively high power, who can act independently of the parliament (Mayer,2012:12). Those presidents are mostly responsible for foreign policy, have the right of legislative initiative as well as to appoint and recall the government.

The **X-Axis-Variable** (independent & nominal) shows the *type of Governmental System*, because this paper tries to find out whether (semi-) presidential governmental systems have a positive/negative effect on its parliamentary issuing of ROs. The **Y-Axis-Variable** (dependent & metric) shows the *amount of ROs issued*.

The mathematical way in finding out if chambers of (semi-)presidential issue more ROs than their counterparts is to summarise the amount of ROs issued by them during the period of 2010 and 2014 and to divide them by the six chambers; thus receiving the average amount of ROs issued by each (semi-)presidential chamber. After having done the same

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53 Even though Lithuania's government is responsible to the parliament and not the president, the latter's powers are rather strong (responsible for foreign policy, right to appoint and recall the government, right of legislative initiative, lrp.lt,2015) and therefore it can be sorted into the (semi-)presidential group (Steffani,1979:43).

54 The Romanian president is elected directly by the electorate and has the right to appoint the ministers and the prime minister. Besides, the president is also the head of armed forces. (all-from-psd-europa.eu,2015).

55 Former semi-presidential republic Finland does not belong anymore to this group as – due to the new constitution of 2000 – the rights of the president were limited drastically. Ever since, the government is i.a. accountable to the parliament and not appointed by the president. (all-from-Raunio,2007:26).

with the remaining 34 chambers, their average amount of ROs issued per chamber can be combined. Thus it can be stated which chambers of which governmental system issued more ROs. A cross-tabulation illustrates the composition of the individual values (see-Appendix-C:Table-8).

The result shows that the average amount of ROs issued by each chamber of a (semi-)presidential system is **7** and of all others is **6,85**. Due to the fact that both values are too close, one can neither say that (semi-)presidential nor non-presidential chambers/parliaments issue more or less than their counterparts. As percentages, (semi-)presidential chambers issue **50,54%** of all ROs and non-presidential chambers **49,46%** (see-Appendix-C:Figure-8&9).

Eta is **0,007** and eta² is **0** (see-Appendix-C:Table-9). Both **do not show any connection** (Cohen,1988:390), as nearly 0% of the variance of the y-axis is explainable by the variance of the x-axis (unt.edu,2010).

Thus **Hypothesis 2)**: *Parliaments of EU-Member States with (semi-)presidential systems issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of EU-Member States with non-presidential systems*, can be completely rejected and the expected positive relationship between the issuance of ROs and being a (semi-)presidential system is too small to be valid.[56]

Therefore the answer of the second sub-question: *How strong are structural factors like type of 2) Governmental System ((semi-)presidential/non-presidential) responsible for the amount of ROs issued within the Early Warning System?*; is that the type of Governmental System has no influence on the amount of ROs issued by national chambers/parliaments; thus this structural factor is not valid.

Third Hypothesis: Type of EU-Budget Contribution (Net-Contributors/Net-Beneficiaries)

The Commission issues each year a financial report about the EU-budget, in which it distinguishes between net-contributors of the EU-budget (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and UK) and net-beneficiaries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). The classification will be made on the basis of the data between 2010 and 2014 (European-Commission,2010c:75,2011c:102,2012c:110,2013c:127).

The **X-Axis-Variable** (independent & nominal) shows the *type of EU-budget contribution* because this paper tries to find out whether being a net-beneficiary has a positive/negative effect on the parliamentary issuing of ROs. The **Y-Axis-Variable** (dependent & metric) shows the *amount of ROs issued*.

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56 At a first look one could think that the hypothesis (H2) might at least be valid for France (20 ROs). At a second look however, one has to notice that only the French Upper House issued indeed a large amount of ROs (17), whereas the Lower House just issued 3. Thus the high amount of ROs issued by France (Upper House) is rather explainable by hypothesis 1ii) than by H3).

In a cross-tabulation (see-Appendix-D:Table-10), the number of ROs in each of the two groups are divided by the amount of chambers respectively in order to obtain the average and to compare the two groups and to see which group issued more ROs.

The result shows that the average amount of ROs issued by each chamber of a net-contributor is **10,28** and of net-beneficiaries **4,09**. Thus chambers of net-contributory countries issue more than the double amount of ROs than their counterparts. As percentages, net-contributory issue **71,54%** of all ROs and net-beneficiary chambers **28,46%** (see-Appendix-D:Figure10&11).

Eta is **0,40** and eta² is **0,16** (see-Appendix-D:Table-11). Both show a **strong connection** (Cohen,1988:390), as 16% of the variance of the y-axis is explainable by the variance of the x-axis (unt.edu,2010).

Thus **Hypothesis 3)**: *Parliaments of EU-budget's net-contributory Member States issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of net-beneficiary Member States*; can be approved. The expected positive relationship between being a net-contributor and the issuance of ROs is true.

Therefore the answer of the third sub-question: *How strong are structural factors like type of 3) EU-budget contribution responsible for the amount of ROs issued within the Early Warning System?*; is that parliaments of net-contributory MSs issue far more ROs than parliaments of net-beneficiary MSs; thus this structural factor is strong.

Fourth Hypothesis: Type of Financial Aid for Euroarea Member States Participation (Creditors/Debtors)

Within the period between 2010 and 2014 Cyprus, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain borrowed money from either the EFSF (efsf.europa.eu,n.d.,b) or the ESM (esm.europa.eu,2015). Those countries have seven chambers. The donor countries were/are Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Netherlands (19 chambers).

The **X-Axis-Variable** (independent & nominal) shows the *type of credit user (creditor/debtor)* as this analysis wants to find out whether creditors or debtors of EU-financial Aid issue the most ROs. The **Y-Axis Variable** (dependent & metric) shows the *amount of ROs issued*.

In a cross-tabulation (see-Appendix-E:Table-12), the number of ROs in each of the two groups are divided by the amount of chambers respectively in order to obtain the average and to compare the two groups and to see which group issued more ROs.

The result shows that the average amount of ROs issued by each chamber of a Creditor is **6,37** and of Debtors **3,29**. Thus chambers of net-contributory countries issue nearly the double amount of ROs than their counterparts. As percentages, parliaments of Creditors issue **65,94%** of all ROs and of Debtors **34,06%** (see-Appendix-E:Figure-12&13).

Eta is **0,28** and eta² is **0,08** (see-Appendix-E:Table-13). Both show a **medium-sized connection** (Cohen,1988:390), as 8% of the variance of the y-axis is explainable by the variance of

the x-axis (unt.edu,2010).

Thus **Hypothesis 4)**: *Parliaments of Member States, which are Creditors to the financial assistance programs EFSF/ESM issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of Member States, which are Debtors*; can be relatively stable approved. The expected positive relationship between being a Creditor to financial EU-assistance programs and issuing ROs is true.

Therefore the answer of the fourth sub-question: *How strong are structural factors like type of 4) Financial Aid participation responsible for the amount of ROs issued within the Early Warning System?*; is that parliaments of Creditors issue far more ROs than parliaments of Debtors; and that this structural factor is medium strong.

Fifth Hypothesis: Type of Relative Power of Member States in the Council of the European Union

The relative power of Member States within the EU can be measured by their amount of absolute/relative votes in the Council of the European Union. This relative Member State-power can – according to their demographic weight – be classified in five categories (europa.eu,2009).[57] France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom have 29 votes and each of them obtains 8,4% of all votes together; Poland and Spain: 27 votes and 7,8%; Romania: 14 votes and 4,1%; the Netherlands: 13 votes and 3,8%; Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal: 12 votes and 3,5%; Austria, Bulgaria, and Sweden: 10 votes and 2,9%; Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, and Slovakia: 7 votes and 2,0%; Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovenia: 4 votes and 1,2%; and Malta: 3 votes and 0,9%. (all-from-bundesfinanzministerium.de, 2015).

The **X-Axis-Variable** (independent & metric) shows the *relative power of EU-Member States within the Council*,[58] because this paper tries to find out if Member States with low relative power within the EU, issue more ROs than MSs with higher values. The **Y-Axis-Variable** (dependent & metric) shows the *amount of ROs issued*.

In a cross-tabulation (see-Appendix-F:Table-14), each state's amount of ROs is added the value of relative power it has within the Council, in order to see if parliaments of MSs with a high level of relative power issue more ROs than parliaments of MSs with a lower level of relative power. At a first view on the tabulation, one can see that neither a low, nor a high amount of power correlates with a high amount of ROs.

A scattered diagram (see-Appendix-F:Figure-14) shows first of all that most countries do not lay closely on the regression-line, most recognisably the parliaments of Sweden and

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57 This system of vote weighting was changed by the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) into a dual majority system. Nevertheless the prior system remained in place until 30 October 2014 and thus is the one used in this analysis. (all-from-europa.eu,2009).

58 Note that the hypothesis assumes that with a declining value of relative power in the Council, the amount of ROs issued increases, as powerless MSs are supposed to issue more ROs than more powerful ones. But due to the fact that in a coordinate system, lower values appear prior to higher ones, for this hypothesis only, a declining regression line and a negative value of r are expected.

Luxembourg, and the Austrian Upper House. Second, one has to notice that the graph goes slightly upwards and not downwards as expected (see footnote 58). The calculation of SPSS and Excel (see-Appendix-F:Table:15) show the following results: r=**0,14** and r²=**0,02**. This means a weak connection (Diaz-Bone,2006:91), as only 2% of the variance of the y-axis is explainable by the variance of the x-axis (Diaz-Bone,2006:100ff). Anyhow due to the fact that – in this case only – a negative r was to be expected (see footnote 58), this weak connection makes this hypothesis **invalid**. The result of the regression analysis is the following: y=0,3468x+5,1357 (see-Appendix-F:Figure-14).

Therefore **Hypothesis 5)**: *Parliaments of EU-Member States with low level of relative power within the Council issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of EU-Member States with high level of relative power within the Council*; is not valid. The expected positive relationship between being a Council-member with low relative power and the issuance of ROs is not the case.

Therefore the answer of the fifth sub-question: *How strong are structural factors like type of 5) Relative Power in the Council responsible for the amount of ROs issued within the Early Warning System?*; is that parliaments of relatively powerful MSs do not issue more ROs than parliaments of relatively weak MSs; thus this structural factor is not valid.

Sixth Hypothesis: Type of Institutional Strength of Parliamentary Chambers

The different European parliamentary chambers can be classified according to their institutional strength. With the value *one* being the most perfectly organised and *zero* not being organised at all, Auel&Tacea (2013:9) measured parliamentary strength in EU-affairs based on eleven indicators organised along three dimensions: access to information (access to documents, explanatory memorandum, ex-ante-reports on both Councils), parliamentary infrastructure (type of European Affairs Committee, role of standing committees, share of MPs involved) as well as oversight and influence rights (binding character of the opinions, reserve, scope, ex-post-reports on both Councils).[59] For their analysis they used data from 2010 to 2012. For this paper the studies' pre-classification of all 40 EU-chambers will be taken over.

The **X-Axis-Variable** (independent & metric) shows the *level of institutional strength* of all 40 EU-chambers, because this paper tries to find out if each chamber's level of institutional strength has a positive/negative correlation with their amount of ROs issued. The **Y-Axis-Variable** (dependent & metric) shows the *amount of ROs.*

In a cross-tabulation (see-Appendix-G:Table-16), each chamber's amount of ROs is added the respective value of institutional strength, it has according to Auel&Tacea (2013:9), in order to see if chambers of MSs with a high level of institutional strength issue more ROs than chambers of MSs with a lower level of institutional strength. At a first view, one can

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59 Other scholars, such as Karlas,2012; Raunio,2005b; Maurer&Wessels,2001; Raunio&Wiberg,2000; Bergman,1997; and Norton,1995; also categorised parliamentary strength (or strength of the respective EAC) of EU-MSs, but used far less indicators and mainly limited their analyses to the EU-15.

see that a high amount of institutional strength does only correlate little with a high amount of ROs issued.

A scattered diagram (see-Appendix-G:Figure-15) shows that most countries lay relatively close on the regression-line with Sweden, Luxembourg, and Finland as the most noticeable exceptions. The calculations (see-Appendix-G:Table-17) show the following results: r=**0,29** and r²=**0,09**. This is a **weak mid-sized connection** (Diaz-Bone,2006:91), as 9% of the variance of the y-axis is explainable by the variance of the x-axis (Diaz-Bone,2006:100ff). The result of the regression analysis is the following: y=14,816x-0,3922 (see-Appendix-G:Figure-15).

Thus **Hypothesis 6)**: *EU-Member States' Parliamentary Chambers having high institutional strength in EU-affairs issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliamentary Chambers having low institutional strength in EU-affairs.*; can be relatively stable approved. The expected positive relationship between having high institutional strength and the issuance of ROs is valid.

Therefore the answer of the sixth sub-question: *How strong are structural factors like type of 6) Institutional Strength responsible for the amount of ROs issued within the Early Warning System?*; is that chambers with high institutional strength issue more ROs than chambers with low institutional strength; thus this structural factor is medium-sized strong.

Seventh Hypothesis: Type of Attitude towards EU-Membership (Euroscepticism/Europhilia)

Euroscepticism/Europhilia can be defined differently as well as empirically operationalised and measured. Eurobarometer[60] (a generally accepted and quoted population inquiry of the European Union) is a helpful tool in finding out whether a country can be defined as rather eurosceptical or europhile as it measures and operationalises political support of the European integration through representative population surveys (Tiemann-et-al.,:21f.). Its usage is legitimised as democratically elected parliamentarians of EU-nation states represent their citizens proportionally, and the citizens' attitude towards their membership in the EU has a direct link to their parliamentary representatives. Eurobarometer asks several questions regarding EU-integration. As this hypothesis is about the citizens' attitude towards their EU-membership, the Eurobarometer-question: "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is: a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"; will be picked as it fits absolutely. In order to historically base the attitude of EU citizens and make it less dependent from recent EU-crises like latest financial depressions, the average attitude of each country's citi-

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60 The population inquiry of Eurobarometer has been raised twice a year by national opinion research institutes since 1970 in order to obtain quantitative data for the acceptance of the European integration, its enlargement and consolidation. For answering Eurobarometer-questions, in most European Member States a representative group of 1,000 people gets randomly selected, in smaller members like Malta or Luxembourg, the amount of people is only 500. (all-from-Tiemann-et-al.,2011:21f.).

zens for the period between 2004 (first time when surveys of all new 12 East European MSs were issued) and 2011 (last time, the EU-Membership-question was asked by Eurobarometer), thus a eight year long period (surveys being raised twice a year), will be calculated, before classifying EU-countries. As two hypotheses (7a&7b) will be tested against each other, EU-countries will first be classified according to their percentages of agreement with the following statement: "EU-Membership is a bad thing."; to use it for hypothesis 7a) and secondly, EU-MSs will be classified according to their percentages of agreement with the statement: "EU-Membership is a good thing."; to use it for hypothesis 7b). Besides, in order to strengthen the argument of the type of ranking the Eurobarometer displays, other classifications of the literature will be consulted and compared.[61]

The **X-Axis-Variable** (independent & nominal) of both hypothetical cases shows the *attitude of EU-citizens towards their membership in the EU,*[62] as this paper tries to find out whether parliaments of Member States with a high amount of eurosceptic or europhile citizens issue the most ROs. The **Y-Axis-Variable** (dependent) is the *amount of ROs issued*.

In a cross-tabulation (see-Appendix-H: for-Euroscepticism-Table-18; for-Europhilia-Table-20) each state's amount of ROs will be added the value of euroscepticism/europhilia it has according to the Eurobarometer surveys, in order to see if parliaments of MSs with a high level of eurosceptical/europhile citizens issue more ROs than their counterparts. At a first view on the tabulations, one can see that a high level of euroscepticism correlates with a high amount of ROs issued. But a high amount of eurosphilia does not have any connection with a high amount of ROs.

Two scattered diagrams (see-Appendix-H: for-Euroscepticism-Figure-16; for-Europhilia-Figure-17) show that most countries lay relatively close on the regression-line with the exception of Sweden and Luxembourg. The calculations (see-Appendix-H: for-Euroscepticism-Table-19; for-Europhilia-Table-21) show for Euroscepticism the following results: r=**0,31** and r²=**0,1**; and for Europhilia: r=**0,02** and r²=**0.** Euroscepticism shows a **medium-sized connection** (Diaz-Bone,2006:91), as 10% of the variance of the y-axis is explainable by the variance of the x-axis (Diaz-Bone,2006:100ff). Europhilia shows a *very weak connection* (Diaz-Bone,2006:91), as 0% of the variance of the y-axis is explainable by the variance of the x-axis (Diaz-Bone,2006:100ff). The result of the regression analyses are the following: Euroscepticism: y=0,4002x+1,4975; Europhilia: 0,0111x+6,27 (see-Appendix-H:Figure-16+17).

Thus **Hypothesis 7a)**: *Parliaments of EU-Member States with citizens having a rather Eurosceptical attitude towards their EU-Membership, issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of EU-Member States with citizens having a rather Europhile attitude towards their EU-Membership.*; can be relatively stable approved. Thus the expected positive relationship between being eurosceptic and the issuance of ROs is valid.

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61 Recently published literature agrees more or less with the ranking the Eurobarometer displays about Euroscepticism and Europhilia, see-Wendler,2013:815; Auel&Raunio,2012:54-56; Dinan,2010:297; Cygan,2001:4f.
62 For the first hypothesis, the classification of the negative statement and for the second hypothesis, the classification of the positive statement will be taken.

Whereas **Hypothesis 7b)**: *Parliaments of EU-Member States with citizens having a rather Europhile attitude towards their EU-Membership, issue more Reasoned Opinions than Parliaments of EU-Member States with citizens having a rather Eurosceptical attitude towards their EU-Membership.*; cannot be approved. The expected positive relationship between being rather europhile and the issuance of ROs is not valid.

Therefore the answer of the seventh sub-question: *How strong are structural factors like type of 7) EU-Membership-Attitude responsible for the amount of ROs issued within the Early Warning System?*; is that on one hand, parliaments of relatively eurosceptic MSs issue far more ROs than parliaments of MSs with low levels of euroscepticism; on the other hand, parliaments of relatively europhile MSs do not issue notably more ROs than parliaments of MSs with low levels of Europhilia. Thus the structural factor *Euroscepticism* is medium-sized strong, whereas the structural factor *Europhilia* is not valuable.

Thus altogether all hypotheses can be relatively stable approved; except H2 (type of governmental system), H5 (relative power of Member States), and H7b (Europhilia).

4.2. Discussion of the Results and possible Explications of Outliers and Riots

In many of the analytical cases, the respective hypothesis can "only" be medium-sized approved due to certain outliers, most noticeable Sweden. But also Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Poland, and Slovenia step out of the expected line in several hypotheses. The most noticeable riots are the following ones:

Austria (Lower House only): Even though Austria is after the UK, the most eurosceptical (22,77) EU-MS, and should therefore according to H7a) issue a lot of ROs, or at least more than countries with lower eurosceptical values, its Lower House only issued three.

Belgium (Lower and Upper House): Even though its Upper House represents regions/federal states and should therefore according to H1ii) issue a lot ROs or at least more than its Lower House, it only issued two, whereas its Lower House issued five. Also as a net-contributor, Belgium should according to H3) issue a lot of ROs, or at least more than net-beneficiaries (avg. 4,09).

Luxembourg (Parliament): As it has one of the lowest values of institutional strength H6) (0,4), as well as of euroscepticism H7a) (8,15), it should according to H5) only issue a few ROs or at least less than MSs with higher power in the Council but after all it issued 16 ROs, which is a relatively high amount when compared to the average issuing of ROs by chambers (6,88).

Finland (Parliament): Even though it has the highest level of Institutional Strength (0,84), and should according to H6) issue a lot of ROs, or at least more than chambers with lower institutional strength, and, as it is one of the most eurosceptical countries (20,77), it should

according to H7a) issue a lot of ROs, or at least more than countries with lower eurosceptical values, it just issued three.

Poland (Lower and Upper House): Even though its Upper House does not represent regions/federal states, and should according to H1ii) not issue many ROs, it issued 11 (avg. 4[63]). Also as being a net-beneficiary-country, it should according to H3) not issue many ROs, or at least less than net-contributors (avg. 10,28), and as both houses have one of the lowest institutional strength, it is also expected to not issue many ROs. Nevertheless its Upper House (0,45) issued 11 and its Lower House (0,44) 12 ROs. Besides, with a value of 7,31 it belongs to the least eurosceptical MSs and should therefore not either issue a high amount of ROs according to H7a).

Slovenia (Upper and Lower House): Even though its Upper House represents regions/federal states (avg. 7,72) and should therefore according to H1ii) issue a relatively high amount of ROs, or at least more than its Lower House, it does not issue any, whereas its Lower House issued one. Besides, Slovenia should as a non Financial-Aid participant according to H4) issue a lot of ROs or at least more than Financial-Aid participants (avg. 3,29). It should also, according to H5) issue a lot of ROs, as it does not have much power in the Council (But remember that H5 was not valid). Anyhow Slovenia nearly issued any ROs at all.

Last but not least **Sweden (Parliament)**: With its 45 ROs issued, it is well above the average amount of ROs issued per chamber (6,88) and is therefore an outlier of every hypothesis.

The actual literature provides one already with some explanations for the findings; in other cases, already analysed hypotheses of this thesis might be an explanation.

Austria's Lower House' small amount of ROs issued (3) might be due to the fact that it has only medium-sized institutional strength (0,51), thus H6 may be intervening hypothesis 7a). Another problem could be the general attitude of certain national parliaments towards EU-related issues, who are good enough equipped to issue ROs, but put national issues on the agenda first (Mayer,2012:515). Another possible explanation is that the Austrian Lower House belongs to the so-called "mandate-givers" (see explanation of Finland).

The most plausible answer of **Belgium**'s small amount of ROs is that both chambers have the lowest values of institutional strength (Lower House: 0,24; Upper House: 0,16); thus H6 is intervening H1ii), and H3).

In the case of **Luxembour**g, which issued a lot of ROs despite the fact that it is neither eurosceptic, nor has a high level of institutional strength, also intervening hypotheses of the already analysed ones, might be the reason, as it has after Malta one of the lowest power in the Council of the EU (H5), and is a net-contributor to the EU-budget (H3) as well as a

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63 The four Upper Houses not representing regions/federal states, are the Polish (11 ROs), the British (7 ROs), the Czech (4 ROs) and the Irish (1,5 ROs) ones. Their average amount of ROs issued is 4.

non Financial-Aid participant (H4). Besides, it has the highest amount of europhilia of all countries (H7b) (76). So for Luxembourg the Europhilia-hypothesis (H7b) might be applicable, although it could just be weakly approved in the test above.

A possible explanation for the non-issuing of ROs by the **Slovenian** Upper House could be that it appears to be the only chamber that receives governmental documents, which may be relevant for their decision-making process concerning EU-matters, not directly from its government, or via an access to a governmental database, but from the president of the Lower House (Buzogány,2013:400). In that case the eight-weeks time span of the EWS might be too little time for the Slovenian Upper House to scrutinise. But it does not explain why the Lower House has not issued more than one RO only.

One explication why **Finland** issued only three ROs even though it is relatively eurosceptic (20,77) and the institutional strength of this parliament has the highest value of all chambers (0,84), might be that the Parliament focuses only on EU-proposals that concern policy areas for which the parliament would have been competent on a inner-state basis (Kiiver,2006:89), and thus limiting the scope of scrutiny area. Another explanation, which is also valid for Denmark (7 ROs) is that regarding EU-legislation, their parliaments are directly involved in the decision-making process of the respective government prior to its vote within the Council (Raunio,2007:32) and thus the likelihood that they do not agree ex-post with the decisions of the EU is somehow reduced. To some extend this is also valid for Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (so-called mandate-givers, Tans,2007:232; or policy-shaping parliaments, which can alter or veto government propositions prior to their enforcement, Ahlbäck-Öberg&Jungar,2009:361). The Lower Houses/parliaments of those countries all issued a small amount of ROs.

The **Swedish** parliament is the only parliamentary chamber which issued more than 20 ROs (next are the British Lower and the French Upper House with 17 ROs each). Besides, it does not fit to the group of the generally very powerful Nordic parliaments, which are characterised by only issuing a small amount of ROs (Ahlbäck-Öberg&Jungar,2009:359). A reason for that might be that in contrast to them, the Swedish parliamentary formulation of an opinion prior to the governmental negotiations in the Council is not mandatory (id.,364). Besides, the standing committees of the Swedish parliament are not that much included within the opinion-formulating and scrutiny of EU-affairs of the Swedish European Affairs Committee (EAC),[64] when compared for instance with the Finnish ones. In Sweden there are no formal requirements stipulating that the EAC is obliged to obtain information from the standing committees. It can thus not profit from the expertise of the particular policy area of the respective standing committee. (all-from-id.,:363f.). Reality shows that this is also the case in practice, whereas in Finland, the whole parliament is integrated into the work of EU-affairs (id.,375).

All this contributes to the fact that the Swedish parliamentarians perceive greater difficulty in influencing its government's decisions regarding EU-policy, prior to the decision-making

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64 The official name of the Swedish EAC is: Committee of EU Affairs (Ahlbäck-Öberg&Jungar,2009:365).

process within the Council (id.,363f.). Consequently the possibility that they do not agree with the decisions made by their government within the Council is much bigger than in other Nordic countries. This could lead to the need of higher ex-post scrutiny acts and therefore explain the high amount of ROs issued by the Swedish parliament.

This argument is reinforced by the desire of the Swedish parliamentarian members to enhance the power of the parliament (from its actual value of 52 to 82 from possible 100 points) over that of the government (wish: 76, actual value: 82). This shows a study conducted by Ahlbäck-Öberg&Jungar (361f.) based on surveys to Swedish and Finnish parliamentarians during 2001 and 2002. They also reveals that neither the Swedish EAC, nor the Swedish parliament as such have much power (52 percentage points each; whereas the government has 82), when compared with the Finnish parliament, which has 73 and the Finnish EAC, which has even 77 points (Ahlbäck-Öberg&Jungar,2009:365).

Another possible explanation regarding the high amount of Swedish ROs issued could be the fact that during the examined period, a minority government was prevailing in Sweden.[65] Therefore, the amount of government's opponents and thus the will to punish its decisions, is supposed to be much bigger than under a majority government. This argument is supported by the actuality that in 2010 (when the Reinfeldt-cabinet was still a majority government; until 3 October 2010), Sweden issued only three ROs, but 11 in 2011; 20 in 2012; 9 in 2013; and 2 in 2014[66]).

All in all, one has to notice three findings:

First of all, 20 out of the then 27 Member States fit into the previously established patterns, as they react more or less as expected. For six of the remaining seven MSs, alternative explanations could be found.

Second, bivariate analysis has its limits; as it only analyses one hypothesis at a time without taking into account other possible intervening hypotheses.

Third, the thesis showed the general impossibility in political/social studies to find all potential reasons/hypotheses and to reduce omitted variables to zero. Therefore also multivariate analyses would not eliminate the second case's problem as it cannot analyse unknown, but existing causes.

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65 The Reinfeldt-minority government was in office between October 2010 and October 2014 (focus.de,2010). Afterwards another minority government came into office (kas.de,2014).
66 Latest small amount may be attributed to the smaller amount of legislative proposals by the Commission (see chapter 1.2.1.).

5. Conclusion

5.1 Main findings

In order to answer the **main research question**: *To which extend do different structural factors trigger the usage of Reasoned Opinions (ROs) within the Early Warning System?*; the previously answered seven sub-questions have to be taken into account.

The analysis showed that the first structural factor: t*ype of Parliamentary Chamber (Upper/Lower House)*; is **relatively weak** when taking into account all bicameral parliaments, but **medium strong** when only applying it to MS which's Upper House represent federal states/regions.

The second structural factor: *type of Governmental System ((semi-)presidential/non-presidential)*; seems to be **not valid**.

The third structural factor: t*ype of EU-budget contribution (Net-Contributors/*Net-Beneficiaries*)*; is **strong**.

The fourth structural factor: *type of Financial Aid participation for Eurozone Member States* (Creditors/Debtors); is **medium strong**.

The fifth structural factor: *type of Relative Power of Member States in the Council of the European Union*; is **not valid**.

The sixth structural factor: *type of Institutional Strength of parliamentary Chambers*; is **medium strong**.

Last, but not least, the seventh structural factor*: type of Attitude towards EU-Membership (Euroscepticism/Europhilia)*; is **not valuable** when based on the factor Europhilia, but **medium-sized strong** when based on the factor Euroscepticism.

Thus all together most of the structural factors are medium-sized strong, which means that they do matter. Therefore the answer of the **main research question**: *To which extend do different structural factors trigger the usage of Reasoned Opinions (ROs) within the Early Warning System?*; can be answered by stating that on average they trigger the usage of ROs from a weak to a medium-sized extent. For an overview of the findings see also Appendix I.

First of all, one can see that the newly introduced Early Warning System by the Treaty of Lisbon has developed further from 34 Reasoned Opinions in 2010 to 88 in 2013. This shows a steady increase in the usage of ROs on an annual basis. Even though its number declines in 2014 to 20, the EWS has become a well used, accepted, and appreciated instrument for national parliaments/chambers to defend the principle of subsidiarity, to contribute to a constant dialog with the Commission and also to limit the power of the latter, or at least to bring it back into line when it exceeds its competences. This well functioning of the EWS is a necessary part for diminishing the EU's democratic deficit. The Commission acknowledged this by responding to the ROs issued of the MSs and thus extending the dialog with them (see chapter 1.2.2). Nevertheless one can also see that reaching the threshold of the 'Yellow-card' does not necessarily mean that the Commission withdraws its proposals. Thus the EWS remains only a "de facto-" or "advisory veto power" for national parliaments.

Coming to the actual analysis, at first sight, the results seem to be weak, but taking a closer look, one has to notice that having found factors that are able to explain one alone eight to fourteen percent of the variance (η^2/r^2) is relatively good, especially in political/social sciences, where there are always a multitude of factors involved. Also obtaining a correlation coefficient (r) with values between 0,20 and 0,40 is very much appropriate for social sciences (Diaz-Bone,2006:91). Besides, receiving values of eta beyond 0,5 are not either common in behavioural sciences (Cohen,1988:284). Moreover, it is not unusual for social studies to refuse a certain amount of own formulated hypotheses (Plümper,2008:62,71). Anyhow one should not forget that most countries (20 out of 27; and 30 out of 40 chambers)[67] fit into the previously established patterns as they react more or less as expected. Thus the model of the seven previously carried out institutional factors (type of: Parliamentary Chamber, Governmental System, EU-budget contribution, Financial Aid for Euroarea Member States participation, Relative Power of Member States in the Council, Institutional Strength, and Attitude towards EU-Membership) provides a reasonable explanation of the national parliaments' variance when issuing reasoned opinions.

Ideal combinations seem to be if chambers belong to a country which is a net-contributor (H3) and a non-financial aid receiver (H4). All of the chambers, which issued more than 10 ROs fall within both categories at the same time, except Poland, which is a net-beneficiary country, but was already previously defined as a riot (see chapter 4.2.); Sweden: 45; France II: 17; UK I: 17; Luxembourg: 16; Austria II: 15; The NL I: 13,5; Poland I: 12; Poland II: 11; Germany II 10; With the exception of Luxembourg and Poland also all of those chambers have high institutional strength (H6); and still many of them represent a country with rather eurosceptic citizens (H7b). Thus these factors seem to be a pro-issuing combination.

The opposite seems to be true for chambers of MSs which have a low level of institutional strength (H6), are mostly net-beneficiaries (H3), possess only little power in the Council (thus opposite of H5), and are mostly europhile (H7b) at the same time. Nearly all of the chambers having less than four ROs issued, fulfil those hypotheses more or less: Cyprus: 3; Greece: 3; Portugal: 3; Slovakia: 3; Austria I: 3; Ireland I: 2,5; Belgium II: 2; Bulgaria: 2; Latvia: 2; Ireland II: 1,5; Estonia: 1; Hungary 1; Slovenia I: 1; Slovenia II: 0.

Thus one can see which combination of structural factors have the most influence in the issuance and the non-issuance of ROs. Nevertheless the analysis does not show the influence among the factors themselves, which is nevertheless appropriate as this was indeed not the aim of this thesis. Thus one should not draw generalisations or leap too hasty conclusion out of it; because for the latter, further multivariate analyses would have to be carried out.

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67 Riots and outliers were the Lower House of Austria, both houses of Belgium, Poland, and Slovenia, the parliament of Finland, Sweden, and Luxembourg. (n=10).

5.2 Limitations of the Research

Limitations prevail in every research application and in all types of analyses. Chapter 3.2.6. as well as 4.2. have shown the limits of bivariate analyses.

Regarding validity and reliability problems, using bivariate analysis methods for this thesis: As already explained in detail in chapter 3.2.6., reliability, as well as external and construct validity problems will be diminished, but not internal validity issues. Those alone could further be diminished with multivariate analyses.

Nevertheless it is appropriate for this Master thesis to use bivariate analyses as its aim was to carry out individual structural factors, which might be responsible for national parliaments/chambers to issue Reasoned Opinions. In further multivariate studies, it would be possible to examine the influence of those already carried out structural factors among themselves. They would reduce the problem of intervening hypotheses as seen in chapter 4.2. and thus explain why certain countries fit to the prescription of certain hypotheses, but did not issue the predicted amount of ROs; as the reasons for issuing ROs might be dependent on several factors/hypotheses.

As four of the seven hypotheses are nominally and three metrically scaled, either the scale of the first four or the last three hypotheses would have to be changed for multivariate analyses. There are two possibilities to change the variables in order to be able to conduct multivariate analyses in this particular case.
One option would be to apply an analysis of variance (ANOVA[68]) for mulltiple factors, in which the metrically scaled variables would have to be reclassified as nominal ones (methodenberatung.uzh.ch,2010). This would consequently lead to a loss in values (Treiman,2009:121). Also, the more factors (independent variables) have to be taken into account, the unclearer the depiction gets (this thesis would already entail seven factors).
Another alternative would be to classify the nominal variables as dummy variables[69] (0/1) and then do a standard multivariate regression analysis. Nevertheless this works only for dichotomous[70] nominal variables. (all-from-Diaz-Bone,2006:104f.). Besides, some distinctiveness will be lost, when analysing the variables together (Galderisi,2015: 277).

This reclassification of the variables lies outside the scope of this Master thesis, but is a possible field of analyses for further studies (see chapter 5.3.).

Anyhow the general impossibility in political/social studies to find all potential reasons/hypotheses and to reduce omitted variables to zero persists also with multivariate analyses. Those studies could neither analyse unknown, but existing intervening variables,

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68 The examination of the influence of several independent variables, as well as their interactions with a dependent variable. The independent variables (so-called factors) are generally nominally or ordinally scaled. The dependent variable should be metrically scaled. (all-from-www.empirical-methods.hslu.ch,n.d.).
69 A nominal, dichotomous variable that can be used as an independent variable in a regression model (Galderisi,2015:277).
70 A variable for which only two categories exist (Galderisi,2015:165).

nor could they for sure prove causality. This is due to the fact that three criteria have to be fulfilled when proofing causality (see chapter 3.2.4.): 1) Correlation, which was anyhow already proofed with the thesis' bivariate analysis; 2) Anteriority of the independent variable prior to the dependent variable (neither bivariate, nor multivariate analyses can confirm this in non-experimental studies); 3) Exclusion of spurious relationships. As already said, also multivariate analyses would not be able to find all omitted variables and therefore exclude all spurious relationships. (all-from-Micheel,2010:32f.).

5.3 Outlook to further Research

As stated in chapter 5.1., even though bivariate analysis is appropriate for this thesis, it does not show the influence among the structural factors themselves, nor can it reduce internal validity issues (chapter 5.2.). Therefore further studies could analyse the topic multivariately. This would also reduce the problem of intervening hypotheses as seen in chapter 4.2. and thus explain why certain countries fit to the prescription of certain hypotheses, but did not issue the predicted amount of ROs; as the reasons for issuing ROs is dependent on several factors/hypotheses. Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter 5.2., in non-experimental research, it would still not be feasible to find all possible intervening omitted variables and proofing causal relationships would therefore also be impossible. Besides, due to the fact that the thesis analyses nominally scaled as well as metrically scaled variables, complex mechanisms would have to be applied to let the variables become more alike. They do not only lie outside the capacity of this thesis, but will also result in loosing values and distinctiveness (see chapter 5.2.) and have therefore not been applied.

Additionally further studies shall also have a closer look into the content of the 110 legislative proposals, which were rejected, as for instance landlocked countries do not pay much attention to proposals about fishery issues, whereas rather even countries may not pay attention towards proposals containing ski-resorts; and therefore the probability to take the time and effort to issue ROs might be diminished.

Another hint for further research would be to further classify EU-Member States in those having been ruled by a minority government within the time period from 2010 to 2014. Due to necessary dismantling of this time period in years or even months (depending on the elections of every country MS) respective for every one of the 27 members and the following complexity of the analysis, this was not included yet. Anyhow further studies possessing the necessary time and scope would also need to take this factor into account.

Last but not least, the analysis shows that also the theory of Rational Choice Institutionalism reaches its limits at a certain point when showing the results of Sweden or Poland for instance. Those can only be explained to a certain extend within this theoretical framework. This also demonstrates that theories are always "just" a certain simplified generalisation of complex issues. In the real world, a difference to the academic world *does* exist and not everything can always be explainable. These are the reasons why theories are frequently altered or newly established.

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7. Appendices

Appendix A: General Overview

Table 1: Classification of effect size values

Type of Connection	η	η²	r	r²
Not valuable	$0 - 0,1$	$0 - 0,01$	$0 - 0,20$	$0 - 0,04$
Weak	$0,1 - 0,25$	$0,01 - 0,06$	$0,20 - 0,30$	$0,04 - 0,09$
Medium	$0,25 - 0,40$	$0,06 - 0,16$	$0,30 - 0,50$	$0,09 - 0,25$
strong	$0,40$ -	$0,16$ -	$0,50 - 0,80$	$0,25 - 0,64$
Very strong/tautological	$- 1$	$- 1$	$0,80$ - 1	$0,64 - 1$

Sources for η[2]: own calculations after Cohen,1988:390; for r[2] see: Diaz-Bone,2006:91.

Note that the sources for all following tables and figures are self-made, either by the help of the statistical analysis program SPSS or by the spreadsheet program Excel, based on the analysed data from the Commission between 2010 and 2014 (2011a,2012a,2013a,2014a, 2015a).

Figure 1: Overview of the amount of Reasoned Opinions issued per year (2010-2014)

Table 2: Overall amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by country (contingency table)

2010-2014		
By Country	**Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued**	
Sweden	45	
Poland	23	
UK	24	
The NL	21	
France	20	
Luxembourg	16	
Austria	18	
Germany	13	
Italy	10	
Lithuania	10	
Romania	9	
Spain	10	
Malta	8	
Belgium	7	
Denmark	8	
Czech Rep.	7	
Ireland	4	
Cyprus	3	
Finland	3	
Greece	3	
Portugal	3	
Slovakia	3	
Bulgaria	2	
Latvia	2	
Estonia	1	
Hungary	1	
Slovenia	1	
27 MSs	**275**	**ROs together**
275/27= 10,19	**10,19 ROs**	per country

Figure 2: Overall amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by country (scattered diagram)

Overview of all 27 EU-Member States 2010-2014

Table 3: Overall amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by chamber (contingency table)

2010-2014		
By Chamber and Country	**Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued**	
Sweden	45	
France II	17	
UK I	17	
Luxembourg	16	
Austria II	15	
The NL I	13,5	
Poland I	12	
Poland II	11	
Germany II	10	
Lithuania	10	
Malta	8	
Denmark	8	
Italy II	8	
The NL II	7,5	
UK II	7	
Belgium I	5	
Romania II	5	
Spain I	5	
Spain II	5	
Romania I	4	
Czech Rep. II	4	
Cyprus	3	
Czech Rep. I	3	
Finland	3	
Germany I	3	
Greece	3	
Portugal	3	
Slovakia	3	
Austria I	3	
France I	3	
Ireland I	2,5	
Belgium II	2	
Bulgaria	2	
Italy I	2	
Latvia	2	
Ireland II	1,5	
Estonia	1	
Hungary	1	
Slovenia I	1	
Slovenia II	0	
40 chambers	**275**	**ROs together**
275/40= 6,88	**6,88 ROs**	**per country**

Note that *I* stands for Lower House and *II* for Upper House (for a detailed list with official names, Appendix J.)

Figure 3: Overall amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by chamber (scattered diagram)

Overview of all 40 EU-Chambers 2010-2014

Appendix B: Hypothesis 1) Type of Parliamentary Chamber (Upper/Lower House)

i) All Bicameral Chambers

Table 4: Amount of Reasoned Opinions issued separately by Upper/Lower Houses (all bicameral Chambers)

2010-2014		
Upper Houses	**Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued**	
France II	17	
Austria II	15	
Poland II	11	
Germany II	10	
Italy II	8	
The NL II	7,5	
UK II	7	
Romania II	5	
Spain II	5	
Czech Rep. II	4	
Belgium II	2	
Ireland II	1,5	
Slovenia II	0	
13 chambers	**93**	**ROs together**
93/13=7,15	**7,15**	**ROs each**
Lower Houses		
UK I	17	
The NL I	13,5	
Poland I	12	
Belgium I	5	
Spain I	5	
Romania I	4	
Czech Rep. I	3	
Germany I	3	
Austria I	3	
France I	3	
Ireland I	2,5	
Italy I	2	
Slovenia I	1	
13 chambers	**74**	**ROs together**
74/13=5,69	**5,69**	**ROs each**

Figure 4: Average amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by Upper/Lower Houses (all bicameral Chambers)

Figure 5: Percentages of Reasoned Opinions issued by Upper/Lower Houses (all bicameral Chambers)

Table 5: Eta(²)-calculations (SPSS) for Type of Parliamentary System (Upper/Lower House)

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Type of House	26	66,7%	13	33,3%	39	100,0%

Report - Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued

Type of House	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Lower House	5,6923	13	5,06021
Upper House	7,1538	13	5,09242
Total	6,4231	26	5,02930

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Type of House	Between Groups	(Combined)	13,885	1	13,885	,539	,470
	Within Groups		618,462	24	25,769		
	Total		632,346	25			

Measures of Association

	Eta	Eta Squared
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Type of House	,148	,022

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ii) Federal/Regional Chambers

Table 6: Amount of Reasoned Opinions issued separately by Upper/Lower Houses (Federal/Regional Chambers)

2010-2014		
Upper Houses	**Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued**	
France II	17	
Austria II	15	
Germany II	10	
Italy II	8	
The NL II	7,5	
Romania II	5	
Spain II	5	
Belgium II	2	
Slovenia II	0	
9 chambers	**69,5**	**ROs together**
69,5/9=7,72	**7,72**	**ROs each**
Lower Houses		
The NL I	13,5	
Belgium I	5	
Spain I	5	
Romania I	4	
Austria I	3	
Germany I	3	
France I	3	
Italy I	2	
Slovenia I	1	
9 chambers	**39,5**	**ROs together**
39,5/9=4,39	**4,39**	**ROs each**

Figure 6: Average amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by Upper/Lower Houses (Federal/Regional Chambers)

Figure 7: Percentages of Reasoned Opinions issued by Upper/Lower Houses (Federal/Regional Chambers)

Table 7: Eta(²)-calculations (SPSS) for Type of Parliamentary System (Upper/Lower House)

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Type of House	18	46,2%	21	53,8%	39	100,0%

Report - Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued

Type of House	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Lower House	4,3889	9	3,65529
Upper House	7,7222	9	5,60753
Total	6,0556	18	4,90165

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Type of House	Between Groups	(Combined)	50,000	1	50,000	2,232	,155
	Within Groups		358,444	16	22,403		
	Total		408,444	17			

Measures of Association

	Eta	Eta Squared
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Type of House	,350	,122

Appendix C: Hypothesis 2) Type of Governmental System ((semi-)presidential/non-presidential)

Table 8: Amount of Reasoned Opinions issued separately by (semi-)presidential/non-presidential states

2010-2014		
(semi-)presidential	**Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued**	
France II	17	
Lithuania	10	
Romania II	5	
Romania I	4	
Cyprus	3	
France I	3	
6 chambers	**42**	**ROs together**
42/6=7	**7**	**ROs each**
non-presidential		
Sweden	45	
UK I	17	
Lux	16	
Austria II	15	
The NL I	13,5	
Poland I	12	
Poland II	11	
Germany II	10	
Malta	8	
Denmark	8	
Italy II	8	
The NL II	7,5	
UK II	7	
Belgium I	5	
Spain I	5	
Spain II	5	
Czech Rep. II	4	
Czech Rep. I	3	
Finland	3	
Germany I	3	
Greece	3	
Portugal	3	
Slovakia	3	
Austria I	3	
Ireland I	2,5	
Belgium II	2	
Bulgaria	2	
Italy I	2	
Latvia	2	
Ireland II	1,5	
Estonia	1	
Hungary	1	
Slovenia I	1	
Slovenia II	0	
34 chambers	**233**	**ROs together**
233/34=6,85	**6,85**	**ROs each**

Figure 8: Average amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by (semi-)presidential/non-presidential countries

Figure 9: Percentages of Reasoned Opinions issued by (semi-)presidential/non-presidential countries

Table 9: Eta(²)-calculations (SPSS) for Type of Governmental System ((semi-)presidential/non-presidential)

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Type of Governmental System	40	100,0%	0	0,0%	40	100,0%

Report - Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued

Type of Governmental System	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Non-Presidential	6,8529	34	8,20987
(Semi-)Presidential	7,0000	6	5,54977
Total	6,8750	40	7,80922

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Type of Governmental System	Between Groups	(Combined)	,110	1	,110	,002	,967
	Within Groups		2378,265	38	62,586		
	Total		2378,375	39			

Measures of Association

	Eta	Eta Squared
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Type of Governmental System	,007	,000

Appendix D: Hypothesis 3) Type of EU-Budget Contribution (Net-Contributors/Net-Beneficiaries)

Table 10: Amount of Reasoned Opinions issued separately by Net-Contributors/ Net-Beneficiaries

2010-2014		
Net-Contributors	**Amount of Rasoned Opinions Issued**	
Sweden	45	
France II	17	
UK I	17	
Lux	16	
Austria II	15	
The NL I	13,5	
Germany II	10	
Denmark	8	
Italy II	8	
The NL II	7,5	
UK II	7	
Belgium I	5	
Finland	3	
Germany I	3	
Austria I	3	
France I	3	
Italy I	2	
Belgium II	2	
18 chambers	**185**	**ROs together**
185/18=10,28	**10,28**	**ROs per chamber**
Net-Beneficiaries		
Poland I	12	
Poland II	11	
Lithuania	10	
Malta	8	
Romania II	5	
Spain I	5	
Spain II	5	
Romania I	4	
Czech Rep. II	4	
Cyprus	3	
Czech Rep. I	3	
Greece	3	
Portugal	3	
Slovakia	3	
Ireland I	2,5	
Bulgaria	2	
Latvia	2	
Ireland II	1,5	
Estonia	1	
Hungary	1	
Slovenia I	1	
Slovenia II	0	
22 chambers	**90**	**ROs together**
90/22=4,09	**4,09**	**ROs per chamber**

Figure 10: Average amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by Net-Contributors/Net-Beneficiaries

Figure 11: Percentages of Reasoned Opinions issued by Net-Contributors/Net-Beneficiaries

Table 11: Eta(²)-calculations (SPSS) for Type of EU-budget Contribution (Net-Contributors/Net-Beneficiaries)

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued EU-Budget	40	100,0%	0	0,0%	40	100,0%

Report - Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued

EU-Budget	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Net-Beneficiaries	4,0909	22	3,32607
Net-Contributors	10,2778	18	10,19548
Total	6,8750	40	7,80922

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued EU-Budget	Between Groups	(Combined)	378,946	1	378,946	7,202	,011
	Within Groups		1999,429	38	52,617		
	Total		2378,375	39			

Measures of Association

	Eta	Eta Squared
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued EU-Budget	,399	,159

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Appendix E: Hpothesis 4) Type of Financial Aid for Euroarea Member States Participation (Creditors/Debtors)

Table 12: Amount of Reasoned Opinions issued separately by Creditors/Debtors

2010-2014		
Creditors	**Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued**	
France II	17	
Lux	16	
Austria II	15	
The NL I	13,5	
Germany II	10	
Malta	8	
Italy II	8	
The NL II	7,5	
Belgium I	5	
Finland	3	
Germany I	3	
Slovakia	3	
Austria I	3	
France I	3	
Belgium II	2	
Italy I	2	
Estonia	1	
Slovenia I	1	
Slovenia II	0	
19 chambers	**121**	**ROs together**
121/19=6,37	**6,37**	**ROs per chamber**
Debtors		
Spain I	5	
Spain II	5	
Greece	3	
Portugal	3	
Cyprus	3	
Ireland I	2,5	
Ireland II	1,5	
7 chambers	**23**	**ROs together**
23/7=3,29	**3,29**	**ROs per chamber**

Figure 12: Average amount of Reasoned Opinions issued by Creditors/Debtors

Figure 13: Percentages of Reasoned Opinions issued by Creditors/Debtors

Table 13: Eta(²)-calculations (SPSS) for Type of Financial Aid Participation (Creditors/Debtors)

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Position towards Financial Aid	26	65,0%	14	35,0%	40	100,0%

Report - Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued

Position towards Financial Aid	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Debtor	3,2857	7	1,28638
Creditor	6,3684	19	5,50717
Total	5,5385	26	4,91716

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Position towards Financial Aid	Between Groups	(Combined)	48,612	1	48,612	2,099	,160
	Within Groups		555,850	24	23,160		
	Total		604,462	25			

Measures of Association

	Eta	Eta Squared
Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued Position towards Financial Aid	,284	,080

Appendix F: Hypothesis 5) Type of Relative Power of Member States in the Council of the European Union

Table 14: Amount of Reasoned Opinions issued based on each country's relative Power in the Council

2010-2014	Relative Power in the Council in %	Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	
Malta	0,9	8	
Estonia	1,2	1	
Cyprus	1,2	3	
Latvia	1,2	2	
Lux	1,2	16	
Slovenia I	1,2	1	
Slovenia II	1,2	0	
Denmark	2	8	
Finland	2	3	
Ireland I	2	2,5	
Ireland II	2	1,5	
Lithuania	2	10	
Slovakia	2	3	
Austria I	2,9	3	
Austria II	2,9	15	
Bulgaria	2,9	2	
Sweden	2,9	45	
Belgium I	3,5	5	
Belgium II	3,5	2	
Czech Rep. I	3,5	3	
Czech Rep. II	3,5	4	
Greece	3,5	3	
Hungary	3,5	1	
Portugal	3,5	3	
The NL I	3,8	13,5	
The NL II	3,8	7,5	
Romania I	4,1	4	
Romania II	4,1	5	
Poland I	7,8	12	
Poland II	7,8	11	
Spain I	7,8	5	
Spain II	7,8	5	
France I	8,4	3	
France II	8,4	17	
Germany I	8,4	3	
Germany II	8,4	10	
Italy I	8,4	2	
Italy II	8,4	8	
UK I	8,4	17	
UK II	8,4	7	
40 chambers		**275**	**ROs together**

Figure 14: Scattered Diagram showing each chamber's amount of Reasoned Opinions based on its country's power in the Council

All 40 EU-Chambers

$y = 0,3468x + 5,1357$
$R^2 = 0,0198$

Axis labels:
- Y-axis: Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued
- X-axis: Relative Power in the Council in %

Table 15: R(²)-calculations (SPSS) for Type of Relative Power of MSs in the Council

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Relative Power in the Council in % Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	40	100,0%	0	0,0%	40	100,0%

Report

Relative Power in the Council in %

Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
,00	1,2000	1	.
1,00	1,9667	3	1,32791
1,50	2,0000	1	.
2,00	4,0000	4	3,09085
2,50	2,0000	1	.
3,00	3,9333	9	2,65707
4,00	3,8000	2	,42426
5,00	5,8000	4	2,32236
7,00	8,4000	1	.
7,50	3,8000	1	.
8,00	3,7667	3	4,05010
10,00	5,2000	2	4,52548

11,00	7,8000	1	.
12,00	7,8000	1	.
13,50	3,8000	1	.
15,00	2,9000	1	.
16,00	1,2000	1	.
17,00	8,4000	2	,00000
45,00	2,9000	1	.
Total	4,2600	40	2,76088

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Relative Power in the Council in % mount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	Between Groups	(Combined)	138,963	18	7,720	1,024	,475
		Linearity	5,874	1	5,874	,779	,387
		Deviation from Linearity	133,088	17	7,829	1,038	,461
	Within Groups		158,313	21	7,539		
	Total		297,276	39			

Measures of Association

	R	R Squared	Eta	Eta Squared
Relative Power in the Council in % Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	,141	,020	,684	,467

Appendix G: Hypothesis 6) Type of Institutional Strength of Parliamentary Chambers

Table 16: Amount of Reasoned Opinions issued based on each chamber's level of Institutional Strength

2010-2014	Level of Institutional Strength	Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	
Finland	0,84	3	
Germany BT	0,78	3	
Lithuania	0,73	10	
Sweden	0,72	45	
Denmark	0,69	8	
Estonia	0,67	1	
The NL I	0,66	13,5	
Germany BR	0,62	10	
Slovenia I	0,6	1	
Czech Rep II	0,59	4	
Czech Rep. I	0,58	3	
France II	0,56	17	
France I	0,55	3	
The NL II	0,54	7,5	
Italy II	0,54	8	
Latvia	0,53	2	
UK I	0,52	17	
Austria I	0,51	3	
Slovakia	0,49	3	
Hungary	0,48	1	
UK II	0,47	7	
Italy I	0,46	2	
Malta	0,46	8	
Austria II	0,45	15	
Poland II	0,45	11	
Poland I	0,44	12	
Portugal	0,43	3	
Ireland II	0,42	1,5	
Ireland II	0,41	2,5	
Bulgaria	0,41	2	
Spain I	0,4	5	
Lux	0,4	16	
Spain II	0,39	5	
Romania I	0,35	4	
Romania II	0,34	5	
Cyprus	0,27	3	
Greece	0,26	3	
Belgium I	0,24	5	
Slovenia II	0,21	0	
Belgium II	0,16	2	
40 chambers		**275**	**RO together**

Figure 15: Scattered Diagram showing each chamber's amount of Reasoned Opinions based on its Institutional Strength

Table 17: R(²)-calculations (SPSS) for Type of Institutional Strength

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Level of Institutional Strength Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	40	90,9%	4	9,1%	44	100,0%

Report

Level of Institutional Strength

Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
,00	,2100	1	.
1,00	,5833	3	,09609
1,50	,4200	1	.
2,00	,3900	4	,16104
2,50	,4100	1	.
3,00	,5233	9	,19799
4,00	,4700	2	,16971
5,00	,3425	4	,07320
7,00	,4700	1	.
7,50	,5400	1	.
8,00	,5633	3	,11676
10,00	,6750	2	,07778
11,00	,4500	1	.

12,00	,4400	1	.
13,50	,6600	1	.
15,00	,4500	1	.
16,00	,4000	1	.
17,00	,5400	2	,02828
45,00	,7200	1	.
Total	,4905	40	,15447

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Level of Institutional Strength Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	Between Groups	(Combined)	,442	18	,025	1,054	,450
		Linearity	,080	1	,080	3,433	,078
		Deviation from Linearity	,362	17	,021	,914	,570
	Within Groups		,489	21	,023		
	Total		,931	39			

Measures of Association

	R	R Squared	Eta	Eta Squared
Level of Institutional Strength Amount of Reasoned Opinions Issued	,293	,086	,689	,475

Appendix H: Hypothesis 7) Type of Attitude towards EU-Membership (Euroscepticism/ Europhilia)

a) Euroscepticism

Table 18: Amount of Reasoned Opinions issued based on each country's level of Euroscepticism

2010-2014	level of Euroscepticism	amount of ROs issued	
UK I	29,23	17	
UK II	29,23	7	
Austria I	22,77	3	
Austria II	22,77	15	
Sweden	21,85	45	
Finland	20,77	3	
Cyprus	18,62	3	
France I	17,85	3	
France II	17,85	17	
Hungary	17,15	1	
Malta	16,69	8	
Latvia	16,62	2	
Portugal	15,85	3	
Italy I	15,15	2	
Italy II	15,15	8	
Greece	14,08	3	
Denmark	13,69	8	
Czech Rep. I	12,46	3	
Czech Rep. II	12,46	4	
Germany I	12,46	10	
Germany II	12,46	3	
Slovenia I	10,46	1	
Slovenia II	10,46	0	
Lithuania	10,38	10	
Belgium I	10,23	5	
Belgium II	10,23	2	
Spain I	9,62	5	
Spain II	9,62	5	
The NL I	9	13,5	
The NL II	9	7,5	
Lux	8,15	16	
Estonia	7,92	1	
Bulgaria	7,69	2	
Ireland I	7,46	1,5	
Ireland II	7,46	2,5	
Poland I	7,31	12	
Poland II	7,31	11	
Romania I	7,08	4	
Romania II	7,08	5	
Slovakia	5,92	3	
40 chambers		**275**	ROs issued

Figure: 16: Scattered Diagram showing each chamber's amount of Reasoned Opinions based on its country's level of Euroscepticism

Table 19: R(²)-calculations (SPSS) for Type of Attitude towards EU-Membership (Euroscepticism)

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Attitude towards EU-Membership amount of ROs issued	40	90,9%	4	9,1%	44	100,0%

Report

Attitude towards EU-Membership

amount of ROs issued	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
,00	10,4600	1	.
1,00	11,8433	3	4,76796
1,50	7,4600	1	.
2,00	12,4225	4	4,17380
2,50	7,4600	1	.
3,00	15,6422	9	5,10023
4,00	9,7700	2	3,80423
5,00	9,1375	4	1,40148
7,00	29,2300	1	.
7,50	9,0000	1	.
8,00	15,1767	3	1,50018
10,00	11,4200	2	1,47078
11,00	7,3100	1	.

12,00	7,3100	1	.
13,50	9,0000	1	.
15,00	22,7700	1	.
16,00	8,1500	1	.
17,00	23,5400	2	8,04688
45,00	21,8500	1	.
Total	13,4385	40	6,00283

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Attitude towards EU-Membership amount of ROs issued	Between Groups	(Combined)	1007,717	18	55,984	2,957	,010
		Linearity	132,965	1	132,965	7,023	,015
		Deviation from Linearity	874,752	17	51,456	2,718	,016
	Within Groups		397,609	21	18,934		
	Total		1405,326	39			

Measures of Association

	R	R Squared	Eta	Eta Squared
Attitude towards EU-Membership amount of ROs issued	,308	,095	,847	,717

b) Europhilia

Table 20: Amount of Reasoned Opinions issued based on each country's level of Europhilia

2010 -2014	level of Europhilia	amount of ROs issued	
Lux	76	16	
The NL I	74	13,5	
The NL II	74	7,5	
Ireland I	72,31	1,5	
Ireland II	72,31	2,5	
Belgium I	66,69	5	
Belgium II	66,69	2	
Spain I	65,77	5	
Spain II	65,77	5	
Romania I	64,15	4	
Romania II	64,15	5	
Denmark	62,85	8	
Lithuania	61,08	10	
Poland I	59,92	12	
Poland II	59,92	11	
Germany I	59	10	
Germany II	59	3	
Slovakia	58,69	3	
Estonia	55,08	1	
Greece	52,15	3	
Bulgaria	52,08	2	
Portugal	51,69	3	
Sweden	51,38	45	
Slovenia I	50,46	1	
Slovenia II	50,46	0	
France I	50	3	
France II	50	17	
Italy I	49	2	
Italy II	49	8	
Malta	47,62	8	
Finland	44,85	3	
Cyprus	43,92	3	
Czech Rep. I	43,85	3	
Czech Rep. II	43,85	4	
Hungary	38	1	
Austria I	37,69	3	
Austria II	37,69	15	
UK I	33,23	17	
UK II	33,23	7	
Latvia	32,85	2	
40 chambers		**275**	**ROs issued**

Figure 17: Scattered Diagram showing each chamber's amount of Reasoned Opinions based on its country's level of Europhilia

Table 21: R(²)-calculations (SPSS) for Type of Attitude towards EU-Membership (Europhilia)

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Attitude towards EU-Membership amount of ROs issued	40	90,9%	4	9,1%	44	100,0%

Report

Attitude towards EU-Membership

amount of ROs issued	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
,00	50,4600	1	.
1,00	47,8467	3	8,83480
1,50	72,3100	1	.
2,00	50,1550	4	13,87935
2,50	72,3100	1	.
3,00	49,0933	9	7,15405
4,00	54,0000	2	14,35427
5,00	65,5950	4	1,05646
7,00	33,2300	1	.
7,50	74,0000	1	.
8,00	53,1567	3	8,42298
10,00	60,0400	2	1,47078
11,00	59,9200	1	.

12,00	59,9200	1	.
13,50	74,0000	1	.
15,00	37,6900	1	.
16,00	76,0000	1	.
17,00	41,6150	2	11,85818
45,00	51,3800	1	.
Total	54,5095	40	12,06564

ANOVA Table

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Attitude towards EU-Membership amount of ROs issued	Between Groups	(Combined)	4040,081	18	224,449	2,878	,011
		Linearity	1,670	1	1,670	,021	,885
		Deviation from Linearity	4038,411	17	237,554	3,046	,009
	Within Groups		1637,526	21	77,977		
	Total		5677,607	39			

Measures of Association

	R	R Squared	Eta	Eta Squared
Attitude towards EU-Membership amount of ROs issued	,017	,000	,844	,712

Appendix I: Strength of individual Structural Factors

Type of Factor	Strength	Values*
1) Parliamentary Chamber (Upper/Lower House)	weak (all bicameral chambers); medium strong (regions/federal states) -> medium when combined	1+2=3/2= 1,5
2) Governmental System ((semi-)presidential/non-presidential)	not valid	0
3) EU-budget contribution (Net-Contributors/Net-Beneficiaries)	strong	3
4) Financial Aid participation for Eurozone Member States (Creditors/Debtors)	medium strong	2
5) Relative Power of Member States in the Council of the European Union	not valid	0
6) Institutional Strength of parliamentary Chambers	medium strong	2
7) Attitude towards EU-Membership (Euroscepticism/Europhilia)	medium strong (Euroscepticism); not valid (Europhilia)	2; 0
		Ø≈1,31

Source: Self-made table on the basis of the Master thesis' findings.

The value of 1,31 shows a weak connection, which is nevertheless close towards a medium one.

* Values

Not valid	0
Weak	1
Medium	2
Strong	3
Very strong	4

Source: Self-made compilation on the basis of the classification by Cohen,1988:390; and Diaz-Bone,2006:91.

Appendix J: List of Parliaments/Chambers with Official Names

Austria I	Nationalrat
Austria II	Bundesrat
Belgium I	Chambre des Représentants
Belgium II	Sénat
Bulgaria	Narodno Sabranie
Cyprus	Vouli ton Antiprosopon
Czech Rep. I	Poslanecká sněmovna
Czech Rep. II	Senát
Denmark	Folketing
Estonia	Riigikogu
Finland	Eduskunta
France I	Assemblée Nationale
France II	Sénat
Germany I	Bundestag
Germany II	Bundesrat
Greece	Vouli ton Ellinon
Hungary	Országgyűlés
Ireland I	Dail Eireann
Ireland II	Seanad Éireann
Italy I	Camera dei Deputati
Italy II	Senato della Repubblica
Latvia	Saeima
Lithuania	Seimas

Luxembourg	Chambre des Députés
Malta	Kamra tad-Deputati
Poland I	Sejm
Poland II	Senat
Portugal	Assembleia da República
Romania I	Camera Deputaţilor
Romania II	Senatul
Slovakia	Národná Rada
Slovenia I	Državni zbor
Slovenia II	Državni svet
Spain I	Congreso de los Diputados
Spain II	Senado
Sweden	Riksdag
The NL I	Tweede Kamer
The NL II	Eerste Kamer
UK I	House of Commons
UK II	House of Lords

Source: Self-made table with data from the European Commission 2011-2014.