

A Quest for Trust in the ILG process

A comparison between Overijssel and Brabant

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SUMMARY

The first of January 2007, the day the Investment Budget for Rural Areas (*Investeringsbudget Landelijk Gebied, ILG*) was introduced, was regarded by many as a milestone in the Dutch history of rural development. The responsible Dutch minister, Mr. Veerman, dubbed it “the biggest decentralization of policy in recent years”. The introduction of this *investment budget* did not just entail a change in the system of financing rural development, but foremost a change in how it was managed and how the different parties involved in it related to one another. The provincial governments were granted a lot of power to decide upon steering mechanisms fitting for their province; and as a result there were quite some differences between Dutch provinces. This created an excellent opportunity to research the effect steering mechanisms have on the relation between provinces and their partners in the rural area. In this paper we aim to answer the following research question;

“What influenced the relations between the provincial governments and their partners in the ILG policy networks and to what extent does the choice for government or governance oriented steering mechanisms affect this?”

We have used the literature to define what makes up “inter-organizational trust” and what sort of steering mechanisms are used in policy networks. On the basis of this, we came up with a number of factors that could possibly influence inter-organizational trust. On the basis of literature, we have picked two provinces to research: the province of Overijssel, as an example of steering according to the “government”-philosophy and the province of Brabant as an example of steering in accordance with the “governance”-philosophy. We have reviewed the steering mechanisms used by these two provinces to determine how different these really were, placing them both on the Government-Governance Ruler designed by Vreke et al. (2010).

We conducted semi-structured interviews with six policy officials from different organizations per province (adding up to a total of twelve interviews), and sent a survey out to members of area committees.

On the basis of these data, we concluded that there indeed seems to be evidence to support the thesis that more “governance-oriented” steering methods seem to positively influence trust relationships between the provincial government and partners. Furthermore, we have evaluated the ILG process in both provinces. We conclude that in both provinces actors are satisfied, but that overall the partners of the province of Brabant are more satisfied with the way their province steered in this process, and that they seem to have a more positive image of their provincial government.

PREFACE

Many people contributed to this research in one way or the other. Before we start with the introduction of the research, I would like to thank them here for their time and effort. First and foremost, I would like to thank all civil servants who decided to make space in their often busy agendas for an interview or to fill in the survey. Without exception I was received most hospitable wherever I went to conduct an interview, and without exception the respondents were enthusiastic to share their perception on the policy process, its pros and cons and the effect it had on relations. Without this enthusiasm and willingness to contribute from the part of civil servants in both Brabant and Overijssel, this thesis would not have been before you.

During the process of writing this thesis, there were plenty of bumps in the road. Throughout this my supervisors from the University of Twente, Dr. Pieter-Jan Klok and Dr. Veronica Junjan have helped me to keep the right focus and have motivated me to keep on going. They were extremely understanding about varying circumstances that delayed the process, always responded remarkably swiftly whenever I desired to meet and were always willing to share their ideas when I was in need for inspiration. For this, I want to thank them.

I have spent a number of months in Zwolle at the Province of Overijssel in the preparatory phase of this thesis. During these months I have learned a lot about the provincial government and the policy field of rural development. Throughout the process of writing the thesis, employees of the Province of Overijssel and more specifically the department of Nature & Environment were always willing to help whenever I had any question. I especially enjoyed working with Henri Slijkhuis, my supervisor from the Province. He was a source of inspiration and encouragement throughout the process, even after his retirement, and a very nice man to be around in general.

Finally I would like to thank my girlfriend, my roommates and my parents for their support throughout the process of writing this thesis. It was great to always have someone willing to help with any problem, and to share their ideas with me. A special word of thanks goes out to my brother, who using his own professional network in the area of rural development, was a great help in arranging interviews in the province of Brabant. This opened doors that would otherwise have probably stayed closed.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The first of January 2007, the date of the introduction of the Investment Budget for Rural Areas (*Investeringsbudget Landelijk Gebied, ILG*), was seen by many as a milestone in the Dutch history of rural development. The responsible Dutch minister, Mr. Veerman, spoke of “the biggest decentralization of policy in recent years” (Kuindersma & Selnes, 2008). The introduction of this *investment budget* did not just entail a change in the system of financing regional development, but foremost a change in how regional development was managed and how the different parties involved in regional development related to one another (Boonstra, et al., 2012).

In many policy areas and around the world, a trend of decentralization can be distinguished in the area of operational management while at the same time a trend of centralization and harmonization in policy, policy goals and the setting of parameters in which the system works can be distinguished (Vincent-Jones, 2007). Dutch examples of this trend are not only this decentralization in the field of rural development, but also the decentralization of health care and youth services that will take place on the first of January in 2015. This ILG decentralization can prove to be a valuable source of information and an opportunity to gain insights that can perhaps be used to make the decentralizations in other policy areas a success.

The introduction of the new tool of regulating rural development put the provincial governments in control of goal formulating, but also made them responsible for the outcomes of the regional development policy in their territory. The provincial governments received a large degree of freedom in how to design the policy framework. This first part of this research focuses on the decisions the provincial government made with regard to the use of steering mechanisms. Pleijte et al. (2009) distinguished between two ideal-types on the edges of a scale on which steering mechanisms in the ILG can be placed: *governance* and *government*.

Government, according to Vreke, et al. (2009), is a situation in which “a central government decides what goals need to be realized and how this needs to be done, and imposes this on lower levels of government and the population” (Vreke, et al., 2009, pg. 9). *Governance*, on the other hand, is defined as a situation in which “multiple public and private actors try to come to a consensus on the goals that need to be realized and how this needs to be done.” (Vreke, et al., 2009, pg.9). Vreke, et al. (2009) developed a “ruler government-governance” on which steering mechanisms can be placed.

It is of course interesting to review where the different provinces put the emphasis of their steering strategy; on *government* or on *governance* – and Boonstra et al. (2012) have indeed concluded that there are quite distinct differences in the emphasis of different provinces – but this research aims to go further than that. The different parties involved in formulating and executing ILG policy goals together form the ILG policy network of a province. Relations between parties in a policy network can be structured in different ways. A province can opt for restrictive agreements with its partners (perhaps in the form of legally binding contracts) to make sure they do what they promise; a method in line with the *government* philosophy, or it can opt to trust its partners not to defect from agreements; a method in line with the *governance* philosophy, and of course for anything that lays between these two extremes.

The literature does not supply us with one sensible way to deal with the dilemma the choice between control and trust in inter-organizational context offers. Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) point out, when we look from a purely transaction cost economics point of view, contracting or the use of control in general per definition enhances trust since it diminishes incentives to defect from agreements and thus it enhances the predictability of the other actor. From a social scientific point of view, however, contracting and other attempts to control another actor can be perceived as a notion of distrust from the contractor (Clegg, Pitsis, & Rura-Polley, 2002) or an attempt of micro-management by higher authorities (Vincent-Jones, 2006), something that seems quite undesirable in long lasting network relations in which trust is of vital importance (Provan & Kenis, 2007) (Vincent-Jones, 2006). It is also argued that working with contracts and other vertical forms of steering in networks could in fact encourage more opportunistic behavior, especially when agreements are difficult to capture in contracts (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Since trust is vital in policy networks, it is interesting to see how the relations between actors in the policy networks were influenced by the choice for certain steering mechanisms, and this research aims to do exactly that (van Kersbergen & van Waarden, 2004).

This research compares two Dutch provinces and their respective steering mechanism designs in the ILG policy network: the province of Overijssel and the province of Brabant. We have reviewed the decisions these provinces have made when designing steering mechanisms for the ILG network and whether this had a consequence for inter-organizational trust in their policy networks.

Research Question (RQ): What influenced the relations between the provincial governments and their partners in the ILG policy networks and to what extent does the choice for government or governance oriented steering mechanisms affect this?

In order to research the effect the steering mechanisms had on the relations between provincial governments and the other actors in the ILG policy network, we needed to find out what steering mechanisms were adopted by both provinces. We have used the government-governance ruler of Vreke et al. (2009) to position and compare the respective steering mechanisms. In order to do so, we reviewed policy documents and evaluation, and carried out expert interviews.

Q1: What steering mechanisms were used by the Province of Overijssel and the Province of Brabant in the ILG policy network?

- *Where on the government-governance ruler can the steering mechanisms be placed?*
- *Was the primary aim of these steering mechanisms to use deterrence as a control mechanism, or goodwill?*

The provinces of Brabant and Overijssel are selected because, according to Boonstra et al. (2012) and Pelijte et al. (2009), they represent, respectively, a horizontal and vertical style of steering. This offers an opportunity to review the effects and dynamics of using more government or governance oriented steering mechanisms in a policy network.

We have researched inter-organizational trust in each province, and we have looked at possible influencers of this during semi-structured interviews with representatives of different partners that were members of the area committees (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Also, we have distributed a questionnaire amongst all participants of the area committees to measure inter-organizational trust and a number of other variables that were distinguished in the theoretical framework. We reviewed all parts of the policy process, as well as other possible influencers of trust we have found in the literature. After conducting interviews and distributing a questionnaire, we have analyzed the data that we have gathered to answer the following questions:

Q2: What factors contributed to the inter-organizational trust the ILG policy process in these regions?

Q3: What factors could explain any differences in inter-organizational trust between provinces?

Q4: How could the provinces improve the trust relationship with their partners in the rural area?

1.1 STRUCTURE

Now that we have formulated our research question and the different sub-questions, I will shortly elaborate on the structure of the report. We will continue with constructing a theoretical framework in which important concepts are further clarified. In the third section we will clarify the methodology of this research. The fourth section will clarify the position of both provinces on the *government – governance* scale of Vreke, et al. (2009). The fifth section will give an overview and analysis of the data we have gathered. Finally in the sixth section we will draw conclusions, discuss strengths and weaknesses of this research and make recommendations for further research.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the following section we reveal the theories that form the foundation of this research. We start elaborating on the two steering philosophies we distinguish: governance and government. We will explain what we mean when we discuss steering mechanisms and what options a governmental organization has and what dilemmas it faces when designing steering mechanisms. Subsequently, we review theory on inter-organizational trust relations and we try to distinguish how exactly steering mechanisms might influence trust relations.

2.1 GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE: TWO ENDS OF A RULER

One of the most important developments in the field of public administration of the last decades, is the gradual shift from *government* to *governance*. Anyone studying the public sector has an idea of the meaning of these terms, and descriptions of the assets and implications of both methods are easy to come across, but it remains difficult to find a comprehensive definition of either one. All sources mention a shift towards involvement of civil institutions as an important aspect of governance, as well as more horizontal power relations (Kuindersma & Selnes, 2008) (van Kersbergen & van Waarden, 2004) (Bekkers, 2012) (Colebatch, 2009) (Vreke, et al., 2009). Colebatch (2009) adds that in governance, governing is accomplished by other than authoritative means. Because these aspects are clearly present in it, we will use the definition of Vreke, et al. (2009) for government and governance;

"Government: a single actor is the decides on and legitimizes policy, with the input of third parties (power, influence) being kept to a minimum. In a government situation one actor is placed above all other actors and it has the ability to dictate policy."

"Governance: multiple, different actors (whether or not formally equal) attempt to come to consensus, which implies a shift of responsibility from the central government towards other actors and, finally, towards society." (Vreke, et al, 2009, pg. 13).

Even though Boonstra, et al. (2012) have identified the steering mechanisms of the province of Overijssel as an example of *vertical* steering – labelling their decision as an example of *government* – and the steering mechanisms used by the province of Brabant as an example of *horizontal* steering – labelling them as an example of *governance* – we follow the reasoning of Vreke, et al. (2009), who label government and governance as ideal types and extremes of a ruler on which policy processes can be placed. We will establish the position of both provinces on this ruler. In order to do so, however, we first need to define what steering mechanisms consist of in order to be able to break the concept of steering mechanisms down into measurable pieces. We will use the *ruler government-governance* of Vreke, et al, (2009) as a basis for this. On this ruler, the ILG policy process is divided into five. More about this ruler will be explained in the next chapter, in which the steering mechanisms of both provinces will be further evaluated.

2.2 STEERING INSTRUMENTS OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ILG POLICY NETWORK

In the following section we will review what decisions the provincial governments of Overijssel and Brabant made when designing the ILG policy network. We have distinguished four aspects of steering mechanisms: actors, relations between actors, problem perception and intervention/steering.

ACTORS

The first major decision governments make when designing a policy process is the selection of partners. Who will be included in the decision-making process and who will not? The dilemma designers of a policy network face during the selection procedure is described by Provan & Kenis (2007). They dub that designers have to find a balance between inclusiveness and efficiency. It is easier to maintain efficient administration with a low number of actors involved. Especially when homogeneity of actors is high – for example when all actors are governmental actors – efficiency increases even further. At the same time, though, maximizing inclusiveness of decision making processes, which improves both accountability and legitimacy of the policy process, has merits of its own. Ansell & Gash (2007) add that including more partners in a policy process enhances creativity in a policy network.

In *government*, there is one actor with the ability to make decision: the (central) government. In *governance* this authority is distributed between multiple partners (Bekkers, 2012). In *government* relations are hierarchical, whereas in *governance* partners are considered to be equals. In the policy networks we study, representativeness is often an important issue when selecting actors. In a situation of perfect *governance*, access to a policy network is unlimited and thus representation is not an issue. In perfect *government*, representation is tackled via institutions such as (local) parliaments and as such not considered as important. A situation in which partners are selected on the basis of their representativeness is thus a hybrid between *government* and *governance*, but in the context of the ILG policy network we considered it to be an indicator of governance structures since further-going freedom of entrance cannot be expected (Vreke, et al., 2009) (Kuindersma, Boonstra, & Brunt, 2008).

RULES

The next step is deciding on how the relations between actors in the policy network will be structured and what rules will apply in interactions between actors. When designing a policy network, a range of decisions is made; ranging from the way of contracting between actors and the design of area committees to the position of actors in goal formulation and decision making. Earlier we have illustrated the difference between using trust and control as steering mechanisms. We can conclude that in *government* structures, control is the prevalent method of steering, whereas in *governance* structures, this is trust (Vreke, et al., 2009, pg. 15).

The first, fundamental decision is the power given to the different actors. Bressers & Kuks (2000) argue that authority should be distributed between different societal partners to be able to tackle problems at multiple layers of government. Such a statement is in line with *governance*. In *governance*, decision-making happens through reaching consensus between actors that are considered equals, whereas in *government* decision-making power is concentrated with one player – usually the central government (Bressers & Kuks, 2000) (Bekkers, 2012).

Because the area committees formed the backbone of the ILG strategy their design is perhaps the most important component of the steering mechanism used by the provincial government. Kuindersma, Boonstra & Brunt (2008) made an overview of a number of critical decisions provincial governments had to make in the design of the area committees. They distinguished two possible responses by the provincial governments: responses in line with the philosophy of *government* and responses in line with the philosophy of *governance*. Note that the examples are not necessarily examples of pure *government* or *governance*, since the choices of provincial governments were to some extent limited because of existing agreements with the national government, but examples of these philosophies within the context of the ILG.

Choices	Government perspective	Governance perspective
Borders of areas	Decided by the provincial government on the basis of their own criteria	Decided by actors from the area on the basis of the problems at hand and social cohesion in the area
Goals of the area committees (BGO)	Decided by the provincial government on the basis of its policy goals	Decided by actors from the area
Policy development or policy execution?	Policy execution only	Policy development as well as policy execution
Actors involved	Emphasis on governmental institutions such as municipalities and water boards	Actors selected on the basis of 1) their resources (money, knowledge, blocking power, etc.) or 2) representativeness

Role of the provincial government	Guardian of own policy goals	Stimulator/facilitator of the process of negotiation between the parties involved
Design of the civil service	Support by civil servants from the provincial government, directed by the provincial government	Support by employees of the involved parties, directed by the parties involved in the BGO
Institutional development	Area bureau as a department of the provincial government	Independent area bureau (foundation, cooperation)
Form of contracting	Government by contract/hierarchy (legally enforceable)	Government by agreement (not legally enforceable)
Contracting partner	(Performance)-contracts signed with individual actors	(Performance)-contracts/agreements signed with area committee

FIGURE 2.1; DECISIONS MADE IN THE DESIGN OF AREA COMMITTEES; SOURCE: BASED ON KUINDERSMA, BOONSTRA & BRUNT (2008)
TRANSLATED FROM DUTCH, EDITED BY AUTHOR

As the table above shows, the competences of the area committees and the way they are organized can vary greatly. The main task of area committees as appointed by the national government in the national ILG policy paper is designing area action plans (Dutch Council of Ministers, 2006). The goal of these action plans depends on the form the area committee takes – a cooperation body (*government*) or a body in charge of developing and executing policy (*governance*). Provan & Kenis (2007) describe three different ways of governing networks: shared governance, governance through a lead organization and governance through a network administrative organization. The table above shows the key predictors of the effectiveness of the different network governance forms. When the provincial governments only give coordinating power to the area committees, the governance form used is closest to the lead organization type described by Provan & Kenis (2007). When area committees receive formal competences, they can be regarded network administrative organizations. Opting for this latter option is likely to lead to goodwill since it decreases direct power of the provincial government over the process (compared to a situation in which they fulfilled the role of lead organization), which will be perceived as a willingness to accept vulnerability and thus a sign of trust (Provan & Kenis, 2007).

Table 1
Key Predictors of Effectiveness of Network Governance Forms

Governance Forms	Trust	Number of Participants	Goal Consensus	Need for Network-Level Competencies
Shared governance	High density	Few	High	Low
Lead organization	Low density, highly centralized	Moderate number	Moderately low	Moderate
Network administrative organization	Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High

FIGURE 2.2; KEY PREDICTORS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE FORMS; SOURCE: PROVAN & KENIS (2007)

The question who is in charge of the area committees is a valuable one. A fully independent board could be appointed by the area committee members, but it is also possible that such a board is appointed by the provincial government. If staff and chairman are aligned with the provincial government, this could easily be perceived as an attempt to micro-management of the provincial government, potentially decreasing goodwill (Clegg, Pitsis, & Rura-Polley, 2002). A neutral staff and chairman, on the other hand, is – just as any instance in which a higher government decides not to use its full formal powers – an acceptance of vulnerability by the provincial government and is thus likely to increase goodwill.

PRINCIPLE/AGENT THEORY AND CONTRACTING

The ILG was an operation that involved cooperation between many different actors. The national government shifted the responsibility for the execution of rural development to the provinces, but as the national government – and one of the major financiers of the ILG program – it remained responsible and accountable for reaching certain policy goals. Both the relationship between the national governments and the provincial governments and the relationship between the provincial governments and municipalities, water boards and non-governmental actors engaged in executing rural area policy could be regarded as that of a principal (the national government or the provincial government) and an agent (the provincial government or the municipalities, water boards and non-governmental organizations.).

The principal in such a relationship has certain goals and asks an agent to carry the task out so that his goals will be reached. Information in principal-agent settings is often asymmetrical, uncertain and imperfect. It is often difficult for the principal to fully understand the goals and background of the agent (Slangen, Jongeneel, & Polman, 2008). This particular information risk will in this setting most likely occur in a principal-agent relation between provincial governments and non-governmental actors. The second risk is a lack of opportunity for the principal to observe whether the agent carries out the task according to agreement. To counter this, evaluation programs are set up in both provinces.

We could compare the relation between the national government and the provincial governments with that of a buyer and seller; the national government buys developments in the rural area in return for its investments. Because the national government had a policy agenda of its own and wanted to be able to oversee what happened with the money it invested, it engaged in a contract with the provincial governments. According to Hart and Holström (1986; pg. 71) contracts become an integral part of the “buyer-seller” relation if there is a relatively long period of time between the moment of buying and the moment of delivering output, as is the case in the example of the ILG (Slangen, Jongeneel, & Polman, 2008) (Hart & Holmström, 1986).

Contracts are used in many different forms by governments and serve different goals. Internal contracting, contracting between government departments or between different layers of government, has only been introduced since the introduction of New Public Management in the eighties. Vincent-Jones (2006) notes that such contracts are usually tools to shift accountability from one government department or layer to the other, and to clarify expectations and agreements rather than documents that will be used in a court of law if one of the signatory parties defects from them.

One of the dilemmas with regard to contracting was the question who to engage in a contract with. The provincial government had the possibility to engage in a contract with area committees, but could also opt for contracts with the individual municipalities, water boards and, if applicable, non-governmental organizations. Taking the former option would give more authority to these committees. Considering that usually the municipalities had a formal voice and vote in these committees, setting up a contract with such a committee could be perceived as a sign of trust and the acceptance of more vulnerability by the provincial government, since it would shift authority from the provincial governments to the area committees. In contracts directly with the municipalities and water boards, on the other hand, the provincial government would be leading and more easily able to impose measures on partners (Vincent-Jones, 2006).

The way in which a contract is drawn up might also have implications in inter-organizational trust. In his book *New Public Contracting*, Vincent-Jones (2006) makes the distinction between what he dubs

“government by contract” and “government by agreement”. Government by agreement makes use of documents similar to the contracts used in procurement procedures, but instead of being legally enforceable they serve as a means of regulating specific activities on the basis of agreement between the two parties (Vincent-Jones, 2006, pg. 17). Whereas the use of formal, forced contracts will surely decrease goodwill of municipalities, water boards and NGO’s, the use of agreed contracts is unlikely to affect goodwill because such contracts will only be signed if both parties agree on their contents.

INTERVENTIONS/STEERING

There are differences in intervention and steering between *governance* and *government*. In *government*, a range of instruments is decided upon by a central actor. These instruments can be typified as generic and regulatory. The central actor will monitor the execution of policy carefully. In *governance*, specific instruments are used for specific circumstances. Intervention not only focuses on content, as in *government*, but also on processes. Finally, instead of monitoring, trust and loyalty should safeguard agreements are carried out (Vreke, et al., 2009) .

FLEXIBILITY/CONFLICT SOLVING

We cannot review control mechanisms by looking solely at their design. Covenants, for example, are as flexible as the two signatory parties allow them to be (Klok, 1989). During the process of implementing and executing the ILG policies, situations will arise that were unexpected at the start of the process. Municipalities might find that some policy tools, which were perhaps part of the agreements with the provincial government, are not as effective as expected or might discover an alternative that yields better results. In each of these cases, the provincial government has a decision to make: either to force the other actor to stick to prior agreements or to allow a deviation for the sake of efficiency or effectiveness (Klok, 1989). If a provincial government displays flexibility to alter agreements during the process this is likely to increase goodwill.

Vreke, et al. (2009), distinguish a difference in dealing with conflicts between government and governance philosophy. They argue that in *government*, authority is used to solve conflicts, whereas in *governance* reputation is used. We have to note that conflicts seem more likely to arise in situation of *government*, since it does not use consensus as a method to come to agreement and it misses the focus on the process *governance* has (Vreke, et al., 2009).

2.3 INTRODUCING TRUST

The focus of this research is on inter-organizational trust relations; and most specifically the relationship between the provincial governments and their partners. In this section we will zoom in on the dynamics of inter-organizational relations. Interactions between humans and organizations are the main topic of study for the social sciences, and have been analyzed and structured in numerous distinct ways. Traditionally, the main divide with regard to the structuring of social interactions between scholars as well as politicians has been between supporters of the market and its “invisible hand” and supporters of hierarchy through for example bureaucratic systems as the main structurer of social interaction. This divide is visible in every day politics (with liberal political parties often opting for the market and social-democratic parties often opting for hierarchy) and amongst scholars (where supporters of classical economic theory support the market and scholars from sociology and psychology backgrounds support hierarchy and the rationale of bureaucracies, with many intermediary schools). In modern society, interactions are often structured in systems that are neither fully hierarchical, nor fully directed through the mechanics of the market. Rather, many interactions take place in organizational networks (Sydow & Windeler, 2004).

In organizational networks, a group of actors with a certain common goal work together in long-lasting relationships. Organizational networks are neither purely structured through hierarchy, nor by the market. Interaction between actors in such networks always entails risk taking. Without the traditional structuring power of hierarchy or market, it is necessary to predict whether the other actor will behave according to expectation and/or agreement. Engaging in social interactions in an organizational network, in other words, requires at least a minimal amount of trust. The meaning of the concept of trust is debated between scholars of different schools of thought and from different disciplines.

Classical economic theory supporters usually see trust as something that can be calculated and based on knowledge: in market systems, they argue, risk needs to be limited through the use of contracts, the review of certificates and diplomas and other means of limiting the chance of opportunistic behavior. Trust for them is based on the (perceived) competences of the trustee – is the other able to do the job? - combined with the possibilities of deterring the other from defecting from agreements. Interactions based on anything else, they would argue, will not survive in the market (Rousseau et al., 1998) (Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997) (Seppanen, Blomqvist, & Sunqvist, 2005).

Scholars from the field of psychology and sociology tend to disagree with this notion of trust, claiming that it is too narrow. They do not see trust as something that can be calculated and they claim that it is often not based on objective observations but as a subjective idea about the intentions of the trustee. Whereas classical economists tend to believe that the other will always defect from agreements if this is in his best interest, scholars from the social sciences argue that the very meaning of trust is that the other is not perceived to only act in self-interest (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995)(Nooteboom et al., 1997, pg. 315). This latter form of trust, if present, could lead to a situation in which cooperation can succeed without (extensive) control mechanisms. This form of trust, other than knowledge-based trust, entails taking risks and showing vulnerability.

Trust is not a one-dimensional concept. Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn (2010) developed a five item scale that can be used to measure trust. In their article, they have tested this scale and have concluded that it is a well functioning scale for measuring trust. The scale consists of the following five items:

Table 3. Measurement of Trust

Measurement	Item
1. Agreement trust	The parties in this project generally live up to the agreements made with each other.
2. Benefit of the doubt	The parties in this project give one another the benefit of the doubt.
3. Reliability	The parties in this project keep in mind the intentions of the other parties.
4. Absence of opportunistic behavior	Parties do not use the contributions of other actors for their own advantage.
5. Goodwill trust	Parties in this project can assume that the intentions of the other parties are good in principle.

FIGURE 2.3; "MEASUREMENT OF TRUST" SOURCE: KLIJN ET AL. (2010)

In appendix VII we show how we will measure these 5 items on this scale.

2.4 STEERING THROUGH DETERRENCE

In this paper we are researching the effect of steering instruments on inter-organizational trust between organizations in the ILG policy network of Overijssel and Brabant. For steering organizations in policy networks one of the objectives is to get actors in the policy system to behave *predictable*; to make sure that the actors behave according to agreements or expectations. In the example of the ILG policy network, these agreements and expectations are the policy plans formulated by the provincial governments: both provincial governments want to make sure these plans are in fact carried out.

The ways in which the predictability of partners can be enhanced are directly linked to the two major schools mentioned earlier in this chapter and are also linked with the two ideal-types of steering we discussed earlier. Followers of classical economic theory would argue that deterrence, through for example contracts and sanctions, is the only way through which it is possible to enforce cooperation (Rousseau et al, 1998) (Nooteboom et al., 1997) (Seppanen et al, 2005). Traditionally, governments have used hierarchical methods when dealing with other governmental actors, and contracts when dealing with non-governmental actors. These instruments are part of the *government* steering

mechanisms (Ansell & Gash, 2007)(Vreke, et al., 2009). Scholars from the fields of psychology and sociology, on the other hand, would argue that it is also possible to create *goodwill* amongst your partners in a number of ways, which could make them predictable partners without the deterring effect of sanctions or contracts (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). We will review methods for this later.

Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) argue the use of deterrence is the most reliable way of minimizing the risk of unpredictable behavior. Fixed, legally binding contracts or the use of hierarchical instruments could diminish the (legal) *possibility of defection*. The use of sanctions after a defection from agreements, as well as the possible use of so-called hostages in other policy areas, could reduce the possible *benefits of defection*. (Klein Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, & Gilsing, 2005) All these tools combined should ensure that the actor complies with agreements, thus minimizing the risk of the steering organization. The use of extensive control mechanisms can come with a price, however. It can be perceived as a notion of distrust from the contractor or an attempt of micro-management by higher authorities (Vincent-Jones, 2006). It is also argued that working with contracts and other vertical forms of steering in networks could encourage more opportunistic behavior, especially surrounding aspects that are difficult to capture in contracts (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Figure 2.4 shows the methods to manage area committees adhering to a *government* philosophy; top down and relying in deterrence. A red line indicates a negative relationship between two variables, a green line a positive relationship.




FIGURE 2.4: STEERING THROUGH DETERRENCE

2.5 GOODWILL AS A STEERING MECHANISM

Even though an actor's predictability can be increased through the use of deterring measures, there are other ways to get other actors to behave cooperative. Cooperation based on trust, we argue, is cooperation in the belief that the other will behave according to agreements and expectations, even if this is against his or her self-interest. When we trust the other, we believe the other will cooperate even if he gains from defecting, because we believe he gives a certain weight to our interests (Edelenbos &

Klijn, 2007) (Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2010). We name this weight a trustee gives to the interests of the trustor *goodwill*. Actors can have higher or lower degree of goodwill in relation to specific actors, but also in relation to any actor. *Goodwill* does not equal trust, but the two concepts are very densely related. Klijn et al. (2010, pg. 196) formulated the definition for trust as follows: “trust is based on the expectation that actor A will take the interests of actor B into account, (...) refraining from opportunistic behavior, even if the opportunity arises”. In the next section, we will closely review how goodwill comes about.

Some people more than others give a high weight to the interests of others, irrespective of who the other might be. This *goodwill in relation to any partner* can be based on a set of norms and values of the trustee. Such a set of norms and values develops over time. Children, for example, develop trust as a result of seeking and receiving help from caregivers, resulting in a general tendency to trust (Harrison McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). Following on this, we expect institutions to develop goodwill in relation to any partner, or a lack thereof, through positive or negative experiences with others as well. A history of conflicts during cooperation will thus render an actor suspicious, whereas a history of successful cooperation will make an actor more trusting (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Goodwill in relation to any partner can also be influenced by the strategic or moral choice of an institution to behave according to a chosen set of values and norms, such as the values and norms of professionalism (Hosmer, 1995). Literature on professionalism argues that in certain situations, it is the duty of a professional to place the interests of the individual who is trusting higher than the self-interest (Barber, 1983). It makes sense for a governmental organization to make the decision to be a reliable partner during any interaction, since the government is often supposed to have an exemplary function in society. These characteristics of a certain actor are not something the province can influence on the short run, but we will take them into account as a possible third variable; an influencer of inter-organizational trust outside of the control of the provincial government.

Next to these general norms and values, a trustee might feel more or less *goodwill for a specific trustor*. First of all, experiences with actors in the past are likely to have an effect on actor-specific goodwill. When two actors have a relation of conflict, goodwill will most probably be significantly lower as in a situation in which two actors have a history of successful cooperation (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Harrison McKnight et al. (1998) mention the institutional design of the cooperation as a second source of actor-specific goodwill. The extent to which this lay-out provides security to the actor influences its goodwill towards the specific actor in a specific situation (Ansell & Gash, 2007) (Bachmann, 1999). Next to that, when an actor feels trusted, they will likely develop goodwill for the trustor in return (Cook, et al., 2005). When a trustor accepts vulnerability, by not opting for deterrence, for example, a trustee is likely to develop trustor specific goodwill. When a trustor invests heavily in the relations with the trustee, thus becoming more dependent on the trustee, goodwill is likely to develop as well (Cook et al., 2005). In *governance*, trust and loyalty are used as means of control. Since trust causes trust, we could expect governance structures to lead to higher inter-organizational trust. This trust relationship with, in this case, the provincial government specifically is at the heart of our research.

Governing through trust entails, as discussed above, taking risk. The most important risk that is taken is the risk of defection, which can potentially have devastating effects on outcome quality. Klijn et al. (2010) argue that despite this, there are four reasons still to opt for governing through trust.

- 1) The first reason is that it saves the trustor monitoring and contracting costs. Trust, so they argue, creates higher predictability, decreasing the likelihood of opportunistic behavior. This decreases the need for instruments to limit the possibility of such behavior, such as contracts, so allowing the opportunity for the trustor to economize on transaction costs.

- 2) The second reason to opt for governing through trust is the notion that it increases stability in relationships. This, in turn, will lead organizations to invest more money, knowledge and other resources into a relationship because they feel more likely to get return on investment.

- 3) The third reason mentioned by Klein et al. (2010) is that trust stimulates the sharing of information between actors. This can be especially valuable for public organizations that need to solve the wicked problems governments are faced with today (Hoppe, 2010) (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007).

Figure 2.5 gives a graphical overview of the relations we have discovered in the literature so far. Green arrows symbol a positive relation between the two concepts, red arrows a negative relation. The variable "goodwill towards this specific actor" is of importance in this research. We will aim to measure this later on in this paper.

```

graph TD
    A[Strategic or moral opinions regarding trustworthiness of trustee] --> B[Goodwill towards any actor]
    B --> C[Goodwill]
    D[Goodwill towards this specific actor] --> C
    E[Goodwill] --> F[Cooperative intentions]
    G[Competences] --> H[Cooperative behavior of trustee]
    F --> H
    I[Steering strategies] --> J[Possibilities of defection]
    I --> K[Benefits of defection]
    I --> L[Dependence of trustor on trustee]
    I --> M[Dependence of trustee on trustor]
    I --> N[Hostages trustor can use against trustee]
    J --> F
    K --> F
    L --> D
    M --> D
    N --> M
  
```

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2.6 OTHER SOURCES OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST

Inter-organizational trust is a concept that is difficult to define and that is influenced by many aspects. Even though it seems nearly impossible to capture all influencers of trust, in this section we will try to give an overview of influencers other than steering mechanisms we have found in the literature. This is important so we can take their influence on the inter-organizational trust in the policy networks we study into account.

POLICY SUCCESS

Policy success is likely to be a major contributor to inter-organizational trust (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Therefore, we will treat policy success as a possible z-variable and check for policy success when interpreting results. We will measure policy success by studying reviews of the ILG process in which policy success is summarized, as well as by interviewing policy experts that have worked in the areas of our research.

HISTORY

Actors active in the policy network of the ILG in the provinces of Overijssel and Gelderland have been cooperating in many areas, including the area of rural development, for many years. The inter-organizational trust in the ILG policy network cannot be studied without taking the history between different actors into account since the literature shows us that history has a significant effect on inter-organizational trust (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Therefore, we will include history as a variable in our research to be able to rule out its influence on inter-organizational trust in our conclusions.

PERSONAL RELATIONS

Even though this research aims at relations between *organizations*, interactions always take place between people (Bachmann, 1999). Some authors therefore argue that trust can only develop between people (Levi, 1998). Zaheer et al. (1998) researched the relation between inter-organizational and inter-personal relations in buyer-seller relationships. They concluded that inter-organizational trust is heavily dependent on and influenced by strong inter-personal relations. Inter-personal trust between members of the different actors in the ILG policy network is thus likely to influence the inter-organizational trust in this policy network. Therefore, we have to take the personal relations between representatives of the steering organization and the steered organization into account when performing our research.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Cook et al. (2005) researched differences in the building of trust relations between the United States and Japan, and concluded that the cultural differences between these two countries had an effect on the way trust relations were constructed between people and organizations. Even though cultural differences between the provinces of Overijssel and Brabant will probably be minimal, the cultural background of municipalities can still play a role. Organizational culture can differ greatly, even within small geographical areas, even though the difference is expected to be smaller (Hofstede, et al., 1990). Since, according to Cook et al. (2005) organizational culture influences the openness of organizations toward cooperation with others in general, we will include it as a variable in the research. This variable is interchangeable with the "goodwill towards any actor" variable we have discussed earlier, and that is part of figure 2.5.

COMPETENCES (FINANCIAL & NON-FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION)

Many authors state that inter-organizational trust might be related to the perceived competences of the other actor to comply with agreements (Bachmann, 1999)(Nooteboom et al., 1999). If the other is perceived to be unable to live up to an agreement, trust will be hampered. Therefore, we have included perceived competences in our research. In the setting of the ILG, these competences will not entail the diplomas or certificates of the provincial government, of course, but rather their perceived financial and non-financial capacity to bring the ILG process to a good end.




FIGURE 2.5: VISUALIZATION OF ALL FACTORS INFLUENCING COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR

2.7 CONCLUSION

We have started this section with a short overview of the concepts of government and governance; an overview of steering mechanisms in the ILG. We continued with an introduction of the two prevalent schools in the literature on trust; a school supporting classical market ideas about trust and a school supporting sociological/psychological conceptualizations of the term. We have shown the function of steering mechanisms: they should either function as a deterrence to breach agreements or cause more goodwill. Both types of mechanisms should, if they work properly, result in cooperative behavior of the steered party. We have shown that governing through trust can potentially have benefits over governing through stern control, since it increases information flow and it saves the controlling party contracting and monitoring costs. Of course, the downside of governing through trust could be defection, with potentially devastating effects on future trust, aside from other disadvantages. Later in this section, we have reviewed what decisions and dilemmas the provincial governments have faced when developing the ILG policy network and how the decisions that they have made could have influenced goodwill of network partners. Finally, we have reviewed other influencers of goodwill. Our theoretical framework is captured in figure 2.5, which shows all relations we have uncovered from the literature. As indicated earlier in this chapter, a red line stands for an expected negative relationship, a green line for an expected positive relationship. In the next section, we will operationalize the variables we have derived from the theory at hand and elaborate on the methodology we will use to carry out our research.

3. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In this section, we will lay down the foundations for the research we will carry out by transforming the expectations based on the theory into a research strategy that will allow us to obtain measurable data. I will shortly describe the methodological decisions I have made and the different steps we will take to complete the research. Subsequently, I will discuss the selection of cases, with the possible implications this decision had on the validity of the research. After this, I will discuss the selection of my units of observation and the way in which this influences the research. Finally, I will describe the methods I will use; document analysis, in depth semi-structured interviews and a survey.

3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

A solid research design fits the situation that is under research. Therefore, before designing the research methodology to be used it is imperative to look at the situation at hand and its opportunities and limitations. The phenomenon we study, inter-organizational trust, is not new to the world of social science. Questionnaires measuring all sorts of trust, including inter-organizational trust, are widely used in studies. These studies, however, tend to focus on business-to-business relations or, on some occasions, public-private relations. In the research at hand, many of the relations we are focusing on are public-public relations; relations between provincial governments and municipalities and water boards, for example. This relationship between provincial government and partners; and between different levels of government in general, is something that has not yet been extensively researched. Even though there are certain similarities between both situations, the higher dependence on each other and the fact that provincial governments, for example, cannot decide to stop cooperating with a certain municipality (by kicking it out of the province) are significant game-changers that should be taken into account during the research.

The policy process we will study, the ILG policy program, ran from 2007 until the 1st of January 2014. The program has thus been terminated relatively recently. The first major limitation we stumble upon is the fact that there is no data that shows us the inter-organizational trust in the policy networks we are going to research before the start of the ILG policy program. This makes it more difficult to rule out third variables other than steering mechanisms that influence the variable we measure: inter-organizational trust (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) (Babbie, 2007) We have tried to tackle this by including a number of third variables in our theoretical framework, as well as by altering our research design. A second limitation is the fact that the treatment we study (the steering mechanisms used by the provincial government) is not administered on a random basis, but rather dependent on the location of a municipality. Regional characteristics of municipalities (for example with regard to organizational culture) could cause a selection bias that should be taken into account (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).

Since the use of traditional (quasi-) experimental methods is impossible given the limitations described above, we have to turn to other methods to reach our goal; answering the research question drawn up at the beginning of this thesis:

What influenced the relations between the provincial governments and their partners in the ILG policy networks and to what extent does the choice for government or governance oriented steering mechanisms affect this?

The research question shows this research aims to describe; not necessarily explain what influences inter-organizational trust in the ILG policy networks. The second part, however, shows that we will take an extra look at the steering mechanisms, to see to what extent these can explain any observed differences in inter-organizational trust. We have opted for intensive qualitative case studies of two Dutch provinces. The use of intensive qualitative case studies is especially appropriate when dealing with complex concepts in areas that have not been subject of research often, since qualitative case studies tend to yield broader ranges of information (Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002). Because there has been little research on the effect of the use of steering mechanisms on inter-organizational trust, especially in government-dominated policy networks, the use of intensive qualitative case studies is justified. The broader range of information will also be necessary to determine the effect of third variables. Therefore, we have decided to compare two cases: the case of the province of Overijssel and the case of the province of Brabant. In the next section, we will shortly elaborate on the choice for these two cases, before expanding on the research methods we intend to use.

3.2 CASE SELECTION

When performing intensive qualitative case studies, case selection is perhaps the most important part of the research. In most case studies, cases should represent either a broader population or an ideal-type. Seawright & Gerring (2008) summed up a number of methods for case selection for researchers interested in performing a qualitative case study. This research has a descriptive nature, that aims to broaden the insights on what factors influence inter-organizational trust. We decided to pick two extreme, ideal- typical examples of Dutch provinces with regard to the use of steering mechanisms. The strategy to aim for maximal variance along a certain dimension is dubbed the "*diverse case selection strategy*" by Seawright & Gerring (2008, pg. 300 – 301) and is best used when this diversity can be easily noticed or when this has already been established in previous research.

The independent variable in this research is the steering mechanisms that are used by the provincial government, with the dependent variable being inter-organizational trust. Since we have no information yet with regard to the distribution of the dependent variable, we have decided to select our cases on the basis of diverse steering mechanisms, our independent variable. Boonstra et al. (2012) conducted an evaluation study on the ILG policy in the Netherlands. They concluded that the province of Overijssel, of all Dutch provinces, made the most use of vertical steering mechanisms. The province of Utrecht, on the other hand, made the most use of horizontal steering mechanisms, so they concluded. Circumstances made it impossible to carry out the research in the province of Utrecht. Therefore, we had to replace the province by another one representing "horizontal steering". A study by Pleijte et al., (2009), classified Brabant as a province that made use of horizontal steering. Therefore, we have decided to pick it as our second province. We will investigate this claim in this research, to see to what extent this difference can indeed be observed.

Many actors are involved in the ILG policy networks of Overijssel and Brabant. These actors, or rather people employed by these actors, will be our units of observation. Because of limitations to time and resources, we are unavailable to visit a representative of every participating actor in both provinces; again a selection of interview subjects needs to be made. Both in the province of Overijssel and in the province of Brabant, area committees have been installed, with competences in the design, execution and implementation of ILG policy. We have decided to conduct interviews with three respondents belonging to the same area committees, and three other respondents from the province, making a total of 12 interviews. This to give me an insight in the overall process in the provinces; while also allowing me an insight in the effect of actor-specific characteristics.

Our survey respondents were selected in a different way in both provinces; in Overijssel all *aanjaagteam*-members were asked to complete the survey. Appendix V shows the organizations that responded to the survey. In Eindhoven, there was limited information because it was impossible to get an overview of area committee members from the provincial government. To still be able to conduct interviews and do survey research, we directly approached members of the "Peelnetwerk", "het Kempenhuis" and "Area committee De Baronie", former ILG area committees that are still in function and we approached other actors we could find on the internet that had been involved in the ILG. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 give a visual oversight of our respondents.



FIGURE 3.1 : RESPONDENTS FROM THE PROVINCE OF BRABANT




FIGURE 3.2 : RESPONDENTS FROM THE PROVINCE OF OVERIJSEL

3.3 THE GOVERNMENT-GOVERNANCE RULER: A SHORT INTRODUCTION

The first part of this research aims to measure the differences between the steering mechanisms used by Overijssel and Brabant. Steering mechanisms are a difficult concept to measure, because they are comprised of multiple factors. The government-governance ruler developed by Vreke, et al. (2009, p. 24) enables us to respect the multi-faceted nature of the concept at hand as well as giving us the opportunity to position both provinces on a scale.




FIGURE 3.3; THE GOVERNMENT – GOVERNANCE RULER; SOURCE: VREKE, ET AL. (2009) TRANSLATED FROM DUTCH

Just like any other ruler, the government-governance starts at the left with the bottom value. The gradual steps can be compared to centimeters on a regular ruler, the more the measured steering strategy represents the governance style, the higher it will end up on the ruler. The stripes on the ruler here represent different steering strategies; being:

The Hierarchical government - Hierarchical government means that one central government is the only relevant actor. It decides on the most important issues, such as policy goals and what generic instruments will be used to reach these goals. The central government, that is legitimized purely through democratic means, uses hierarchical tools to control lower governments and the population. There is merely one policy discourse, which is debated and decided upon by the central government (Vreke, et al., 2009, p. 24).

Public cooperation - In public cooperation, decision making is still very much the sole domain of the government. The difference with the hierarchical government style is that in public cooperation, the government is not a single body. Civil society, represented by institutionalized interest groups, has the possibility to participate in the decision making process, even though final decisions are always made by governmental institutions. A few policy discourses can exist, but there is a clear dominant one and the actors tend to agree. Power is concentrated with a few actors (Vreke, et al., 2009, p. 24).

Interactive steering - In interactive steering, representativeness plays a decisive role when it comes to actor selection. As a result, other, less institutionalized actors could come into play, such as local entrepreneurial interest groups, neighbourhood associations and the likes. The aim is to include all discourses in the policy process. Decisions are often made on the basis of consensus. The initiative is likely to be with a governmental actor, and the government still holds quite a high concentration of power, even though it is more evenly distributed than in the latter two styles (Vreke, et al., 2009, p.25).

Steering in communities - In steering in communities, communities are formed in which decision making takes place. Members of governmental institutions can be members of communities, but governments are not the steering actor. Representativeness is of some importance (Vreke, et al., 2009, p.25).

Self-steering - Self-steering in civil society is the point on the ruler that marks complete "governance". Because in the setting of the Netherlands there will always be certain rules and frameworks that serve as boundaries for the civil society, it can be regarded as the position in which the governments takes the most passive role possible. Everyone who wants to participate can participate, there are no boundaries to access in self-steering (Vreke, et al., 2009, p.25).

In our theoretical framework we have identified concepts of a policy process, divided in the concepts actors, rules, content, steering and influence. In appendix I the 12 aspects (Some of which measured by multiple indicators, see appendix II) of steering mechanisms are operationalized into a number of indicators for the five steering philosophies described above. These 12 aspects are grouped per concept.

3.4 RESEARCH METHODS (1)

We use the government-governance ruler to answer the following sub-questions;

Q1: What steering mechanisms were used by the Province of Overijssel and the Province of Brabant in the ILG policy network?

- *Where on the government-governance ruler can the steering mechanisms be placed?*
- *Was the primary aim of these steering mechanisms to use deterrence as a control mechanism, or goodwill?*

We will use two methods to position the steering mechanisms of the two provinces on the government-governance ruler: an expert interview for both provinces, as well as a document review. I will analyze policy documents in order to classify each of the five concepts of steering mechanisms on the ruler on the basis of Appendix I and on a scale from -1 to +1.

Because the policy documents do not contain information on each of the five concepts used to determine a position on the government-governance ruler, I have decided to supplement the document review with an expert interview for each province. I have interviewed a senior policy officer from the province of Overijssel in Overijssel and a senior policy official from Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven in Brabant. The expert interviews will also function on the basis of appendix I; the experts will be asked to classify each of the five concepts of the steering mechanisms, and their answers will be coded on a scale from -1 to +1 (see fig. 3.3).. Because the scores are measured on this scale, a negative number will be an indication of a government-oriented policy process, whereas a positive number will be an indication of a governance-oriented policy process (Vreke, et al., 2009, p.30).

For every concept (for example, the aspect “actors”), each indicator (in this example, a total of 3) will be classified on this scale. We will add the scores of the indicators, and divide them by the total number of indicators. A hypothetical score could be $(0.5 + 0.25 + 0)$. A score of 0.25 is possible, since some aspects of a concept have multiple indicators, of which the mean is included in the calculations. The total score in such an example would be 0.25. The scores of all concepts will be added in a similar manner, and divided by the total amount of concepts. This will generate a total score. Again, a positive number will indicate a governance-oriented policy process, and a negative number will indicate a government-oriented policy process (Vreke, et al., 2009, p. 30 - 32). This total can then be used to place the steering philosophy of both provinces on the government-governance ruler.

To get a more detailed view of the steering philosophy, we will use the individual scores of the individual concepts actors, rules, content, steering and influence to construct a spider diagram that will allow an easy visual oversight of both steering philosophies. An example of a spider diagram can be seen in fig 3.4 (Vreke, et al., 2009, p. 141-142).




FIGURE 3.4; EXAMPLE OF SPIDER DIAGRAM; SOURCE: VREKE, ET AL. (2009)

3.5 RESEARCH METHOD (2)

When we have positioned the steering mechanisms (our independent variable) of Overijssel and Brabant on the governance-government ruler, we can start to measure our dependent variable, which is inter-organizational trust. By doing so, we aim to answer the following sub-questions.

Q2 t/m Q4: What factors contributed to the inter-organizational trust the ILG policy process in the provinces of our research

We will use two methods to measure inter-organizational trust and the factors that contributed to its constitution: a number of interviews with representatives of involved actors (3 per area) and a survey that will be circulated among all actors in the two areas. With actors we here mean institutions or interest groups that were involved in the *decision making process*. By doing this, we exclude actors that were only involved in the execution of policy.

INTERVIEW STRATEGY

Good interviews start with a good preparation. The design of a sound interview strategy is thus very much of importance for the success of this study. An interview strategy makes sure all important topics to the research are covered and is a tool for the interviewer to structure the interview (Dilley, 2000). In semi-structured interviews, the interviewer does not follow a rigid survey. A semi-structured interview is an interactive process in which the interviewer is free to ask follow-up questions or steer the interview when this seems useful for the research (Babbie, 2007). To make the most of this, it is important to probe after asking more general questions, and to ask the interviewee to specify his or her opinion further when this is necessary (Babbie, 2007). It is possible to prepare follow-up questions in advance, and this is suggested by many authors (Babbie, 2007) (Dilley, 2000). Our interview design can be found in appendix IV.

Interview research is prone to question bias. It is therefore of utmost important to avoid double-barreled questions and to keep the formulation of questions as neutral as is possible, as not to push interview subjects into a certain direction (Dilley, 2000). Even though this research is in English, I have decided to do the interviews in Dutch, out of the belief that doing them in English could potentially hamper the quality of the answers and cause communication problems. To avoid translation bias I worked out the transcripts in Dutch, but presented the analysis in English.

SURVEY RESEARCH

We have chosen to conduct interviews to be able to grasp the fine dynamics in the different areas and to be able to understand what were the most important influencers of inter-organizational trust. The measurement of many different variables (not all of whom might be known to the researcher beforehand) and getting a grasp of the importance of different aspects to the interview subjects is difficult in survey research.

Survey research, however, has the advantage of producing more easily measurable results. Comparing inter-organizational trust is one of the goals of this research. Purely on the basis of interviews, this is very difficult. Asking people about the "level" of trust they have in another actors in an interview setting is unlikely to yield interesting results. This is the reason we have decided to send out a survey to the ILG participants in both provinces. Since trust can be a sensible subject, the removal of interview bias is one more advantage of adding a survey to the research.

We have decided to use an internet survey, since this increases accessibility for respondents (Babbie, 2007). We have decided to measure trust as well as many other aspects that are also tackled during the interviews. This to increase our number of respondents, and so we can compare the findings in our interviews with the findings in our survey.

MEASURING TRUST

Our first challenge is measuring inter-organizational trust. As has been made explicit in the theoretical framework, Klijn et al. (2010) came up with five dimensions of trust and five subsequent items to measure it (see figure 3.5). We will use these items and have operationalized them into questions in both our survey (see Appendix III) and interview format (see Appendix IV). We will ask respondents to the survey to rate statements related to these items on a Likert-scale of 5. The mean number of the

respondents will be used as the score of the item in question (in case of multiple questions for a single item, the mean will be taken as the score). The five items will be regarded as equally important and as such a mean number of trust will be generated (by adding the scores of the items and dividing it by 5).

Table 3. Measurement of Trust

Measurement	Item
1. Agreement trust	The parties in this project generally live up to the agreements made with each other.
2. Benefit of the doubt	The parties in this project give one another the benefit of the doubt.
3. Reliability	The parties in this project keep in mind the intentions of the other parties.
4. Absence of opportunistic behavior	Parties do not use the contributions of other actors for their own advantage.
5. Goodwill trust	Parties in this project can assume that the intentions of the other parties are good in principle.

FIGURE 3.5; “MEASUREMENT OF TRUST”; SOURCE: KLIJN ET AL. (2010)

The second challenge is the measurement of the different influencing factors. In the theoretical framework section, we have come up with a number of hypotheses with regard to factors that could have an impact on inter-governmental trust. We will test these hypotheses during the interviews and he surveys. During the interviews, this will be done by asking in-depth questions, the answers to which can confirm or reject these hypotheses. The respondents to the survey will be asked to respond to statements that are related to the hypotheses on a Likert-scale of 5. As a result of both the survey and the interviews, we will be able to (temporarily) reject or confirm the hypotheses. Subsequently, we will conduct a factor analysis to research what factors contribute in a more or lesser manner to the institution of inter-organizational trust (Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2008). The operationalization of both the items of inter-organizational trust and the hypotheses of relations between steering mechanisms and third variables and inter-organizational trust are indicated in the survey (appendix III) and the interviews (appendix IV).

ANALYZING QUALITATIVE DATA

There are a number of ways to analyze qualitative data. Using quantitative ways of analyzing only; such as classifying and counting statements to find a general pattern, does little justice to the characteristics of qualitative research, since it ignores deeper insights that go beyond counts (Pope, Ziebland, & Mays, 2000). Rather, on the basis of theoretical operationalization; and in certain situations experience gained during the process of interviewing, analytical categories should be formulated. The data should be read and reread to make sense of these analytical categories and statements from the interviews should be used to paint a picture of the (different) opinions of interviewees that is as accurate as possible (Pope, Ziebland, & Mays, 2000) (Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003).

From the theory, we have derived a large number of variables that possibly influence inter-organizational trust. We operationalized all these variables in figure 3.6, to bring structure to our further analysis, and indicate how we will research the effect of these variables.

Variable	Conceptualization	Measured in
Inter-organizational trust	Goodwill felt towards provincial government by the respondent (also see appendix V for operationalization)	Surveys
General relation with the provincial government	The reported (positive or negative) relation of the respondents' organization with the provincial government	Interviews, surveys
Organizational characteristics	Characteristics of the respondents' organization, such as relative openness to cooperation, organizational focus (rural area or city) etc.	Interviews, surveys

History	The history of cooperation with the provincial government	Interviews, surveys
Opinion on selection of actors Document analysis: “ Actors ”	<i>Document analysis:</i> decisions with regard to selection of actors <i>Survey/Interviews:</i> Opinion on the selection of participating actors in the BGO	Interviews, surveys, document analysis
Design of the steering mechanisms Document analysis: part of “ Rules ”	<i>Document analysis:</i> decisions with regard to design of steering mechanisms <i>Survey/Interviews:</i> Opinion on how the steering mechanisms were developed and the way the respondents’ organization was consulted in this	Interviews, surveys, document analysis
Design Area committees (BGO) Document analysis: part of “ Rules ”	<i>Document analysis:</i> how were the BGO’s designed? <i>Survey/Interviews:</i> Opinion on how the BGO was designed, how the area was defined, the choice for chairmanship etc.	Interviews, surveys, document analysis
Contracting Document analysis: part of “ Rules ”	<i>Document analysis:</i> how were agreements formalized? <i>Survey/Interviews:</i> Opinion on mode of contracting, contracting parties, content of contracts, ways contract negotiations were carried out	Interviews, surveys, document analysis
Process Document analysis: “ Content ”	<i>Document analysis:</i> number of discourses in policy networks <i>Survey/Interviews:</i> Opinion on cooperation in the <i>aanjaagteam</i> , the BGO, between actors in projects	Interviews, surveys, document analysis
Evaluation Document analysis: part of “ Steering ”	<i>Document analysis:</i> Methods of evaluation <i>Survey/Interviews:</i> Opinion on evaluation criteria; evaluation on goals or output, strictness in evaluating	Interviews, surveys, document analysis
Flexibility Document analysis: part of “ Steering ”	The opinion of the respondents organization on the extent to which the provincial government displayed flexibility with regard to contracts and agreements	Interviews, surveys, document analysis
Conflicts Document analysis: part of “ Steering ”	The question whether there were any conflicts between the actor and the provincial government during the ILG process and the opinion of the respondents organization on how this conflict was solved.	Interviews, surveys, document analysis
Financial & Non-financial support Document analysis: “ Influence ”	<i>Document analysis:</i> Difference in financial and non-financial contribution of actors in network <i>Survey/Interviews:</i> Personal relations between the respondent and employees of the provincial government & Opinion on financial and (more importantly) other support from the provincial government during the ILG process	Interviews, surveys, document analysis
Policy success	The general opinion on the outcomes of the policy program, the integrality of the program, the way it improved relations between actors in the region.	Interviews, surveys

FIGURE 3.6; CONCEPTUALIZATION OF VARIABLES

During the interviews, we will watch out for explanations of policy success or inter-organizational trust that are not yet included in these variables. By doing so, we can make full use of the broad scope of

information that is yielded through conducting semi-structured interviews (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) (Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003).

3.6 CONCLUSION

In this section we have elaborated on the research methods we have chosen and will use to carry out this research. We have shortly explained why these methods are appropriate for the research at hand. We have linked the concepts from the theoretical framework with our research methods and shortly elaborated on the strengths and weaknesses of our research design. We will now continue with the actual research, starting with a policy document analysis. The next section will also include a short introduction into the ILG policy, in order to provide the reader with some necessary background information.

4. THE ILG IN OVERIJSEL AND BRABANT: A DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

In the setting of rural development policy – and many other policy fields – with regard to competences a trend of decentralization can be distinguished in the area of operational management while at the same time a trend of centralization and harmonization in policy, policy goals and the setting of parameters in which the system works can be distinguished (Vincent-Jones, 2007). In the ILG (investment budget rural area), this trend of decentralization translated in the formulated wish that this policy was executed in cooperation with local partners, including municipalities, civil society organizations, NGO's and water boards (Ministerraad, 2006). To harmonize the policy, performance contracts between the national and provincial governments, that became responsible for the execution of the policy, were used. The provincial governments were left the freedom to decide what steering instruments to use in the implementation of the policy (Boonstra, et al., 2012).

This freedom led the provinces to opt for a number of deviating approaches. In this section we will review the steering mechanisms used by the Provinces of Brabant and Overijssel. We have selected these two provinces because Boonstra et al. (2012) and Pleijte et al. (2009) highlighted them as opposite examples: whereas the Province of Overijssel used vertical methods of steering, the Province of Brabant used more horizontal methods. What exactly does this entail? We will shortly introduce the ILG policy and structures first, after which we will review how the ILG was implemented in the provinces of Brabant and Overijssel to answer our first subquestion:

Q1: What steering mechanisms were used by the Province of Overijssel and the Province of Brabant in the ILG policy network?

The basis of this review will be the policy documents both provinces published; “Investeren in een mooi, schoon en vital landelijk gebied: provinciaal meerjareplan landelijk gebied 2007-2013” for Brabant and the “Provinciaal Meerjarenprogramma Uitvoeringsplan Landelijk Gebied” for Overijssel. Additionally, we will use evaluations and semi-scientific publications on the ILG program in the provinces of our research, and two expert interviews with senior policy makers of both provinces.

4.1 THE POSITION OF THE ILG IN THE WORLD OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

The main aim of the ILG policy framework is to enable provincial governments to efficiently and effectively implement rural development policy in its territory, preferably in cooperation with a wide range of partners. Rural development policy focuses on agriculture, the environment, water management and recreation. There are a number of policies that focus on rural development, of which the ILG is only an example. Examples of other policies in the field are agricultural subsidy programs, European funds and entrepreneurial subsidy schemes. Whereas the latter programs tend to focus on entrepreneurs (mainly in the agricultural sector), the ILG focuses on the development of areas. The ILG can be combined with European agricultural development funds (POP), of which it is an integral part (European Council, 2005), and other policies within the provincial multi-annual plan (PMjP) such as the Spatial Note (Ministry of VROM, 2006). Though the main funder of the ILG program was the Dutch government, the framework thus offered the possibility to include funds from Europe, the provinces, water boards, municipalities and third parties to reach the ILG goals. Participation of lower government and third parties was one of the main goals of the ILG, and one of the reasons why the ILG decentralization was carried out (Ministry of VROM, 2006).

4.2 IMPORTANT ACTORS IN THE ILG POLICY FRAMEWORK

The ILG project is a result of a cooperation between three ministries (LNV, V&W and VROM) and the umbrella organizations of the Dutch water boards (UVW), municipalities (VNG) and provincial governments (IPO). Four important actors can be distinguished in the national ILG policy framework, though many other players can be distinguished on the provincial and local level. The actors that play a role throughout the Netherlands are the national government, the provincial governments, the DLG (Dienst Landelijk Gebied) and the Groenfonds.

- Provincial government: responsible for the implementation and realization of rural development policy. Its responsibilities are laid down in covenants signed by both the national government and the provincial government. The provincial government has the right to

delegate responsibilities to lower government levels and can request the services of the DLG (see point 4).

- National government: responsible for drawing guidelines and broader strategy with regard to rural development. Also responsible to monitor that the funds are in fact spend to reach the intended goals and politically accountable for the results.
- Groenfonds: plays the role of the bank in the ILG system. Holder of the funds. Holds little formal power.
- DLG: the DLG is an integral part of the ministry of Economic Affairs. The provincial governments had the possibility to use its manpower and specific knowledge to realize rural development policy (DLG, 2013).

4.3 GOALS OF THE ILG POLICY FRAMEWORK

In the introduction of this section we have already touched the goals of the policy framework; it can be seen in the light of a larger development signaled by Vincent-Jones (2007) in which policies and policy goals are centralized and harmonized, whereas responsibility for implementation and execution is decentralized. The ILG arose out of the belief that the field of urban development had become swamped with different subsidy schemes, funds and policy instruments as well as the belief that there was a need to improve cooperation between different layers of government (Boonstra, et al., 2012). This so-called "ILG-philosophy" opted for an approach that targeted areas, transferred competences to the provinces and merged national funds in order to do so (Provincie Overijssel, 2006) (Provincie Utrecht, 2006).

These two aims, to improve cooperation between layers of government and to harmonize rural development policy, are goals on macro level. The ILG program aims to provide a higher quality of living for people living in or visiting the countryside. Central in the cooperation between the national government and the provincial governments is the document "rijksmeerjarenprogramma Vitaal Platteland (2007 – 2013)" (multi-annual program for a vital countryside). In this document the national goals are translated in a concrete performance contract for each individual province (Ministerraad, 2006) (Selnes, Kuindersma, & Boonstra, 2009).

One of the distinguishing features of the ILG policy program was the degree of freedom given to provincial governments in the choice of policy methods and tools to ensure an efficient execution of the ILG. As a result, provinces opted for different steering mechanisms (Boonstra, et al., 2012). In the next section we will take a look at the methods used by the provinces of Overijssel and Brabant. We will make a comparison between the two provinces on the basis of their policy plans, audit committee reports, the expert interviews we conducted and evaluation reports to get a better picture of the choices that were made in the both provinces.

4.4 THE ILG AS IMPLEMENTED IN THE PROVINCE OF OVERIJSEL

In the following section we will paint a picture of the ILG in the Province of Overijssel. We have based this on the policy plan laid down by the province before the start of the ILG and a number of interviews conducted within the province, as well as an expert interview with an official working at the provincial government.

We have seen that an area directed approach is one of the pillars of the ILG. In figure 4.3 the BGO's (areal cooperation board) selected by the Province of Overijssel are displayed. In these BGO's managers from municipalities, water boards and the provincial government are represented. They are supported by a team of civil servants called the "aanjaagteam" (propelling team, support team) from all involved organizations. The organizational structure can be viewed in figure 4.1 (Rekenkamer Oost-Nederland, 2010). These BGO's hold little formal power, even though they are responsible for drawing up area plans. The three main competences of the BGO as described in the policy plan are agenda-setting, prioritizing and goal formulating (Provincie Overijssel, 2006). These area plans form the basis for agreements drawn up between the provincial government and municipalities and water boards and have the goal to foster regional policy coherence (Provincie Overijssel, 2006).

The Province of Overijssel made the following depiction of the relations between the different actors and institutions in the ILG network (see figure 2). On the executive level, the provincial cabinet (GS) has direct ties with the BGO's. In the start of the process, the chairmen of all area committees were members of the provincial cabinet. This was later altered when it became apparent that this, perhaps, could be perceived as an attempt of micro-management by the provincial government (Rekenkamer Oost-Nederland, 2010).

The area committees are supported by so-called *aanjaagteams*, consisting of members of the department of agriculture and environment as well as employees of relevant municipalities and water boards. The department of agriculture and environment also played the role the area bureaus played in many other provinces.

In the theoretical framework, we have made a distinction between different aspects of steering mechanisms. These were actors, rules, problem perception, intervention/steering and conflict solving. The following section will focus on decisions made by the Province of Overijssel in the design of the process. We will first analyze relevant documents, then tell more about the findings during our interviews.

ACTORS

The province of Overijssel only granted the official role of "partner" to a limited number of organizations; to be more precise only to the municipalities and water boards operating within the borders of the Province (Rekenkamer Oost-Nederland, 2010). Non-governmental actors were not granted a say in the decision-making process and had little opportunities to influence the ILG policy. They did, however, play a role in the execution of ILG policy.

The province of Overijssel has decided not to open the BGO's (area committees) for non-governmental organizations for two reasons. First, they believe that the formulation of goals and targets (the primary task of the BGO) is something that should be the responsibility of governmental organizations. Second, they believe including non-governmental organizations would have led to a more difficult, less efficient process. They see a role for non-governmental organizations only in the implementation phase. It is unclear whether municipalities and water boards would have rather seen the inclusion of certain NGO's in the BGO's (Rekenkamer Oost-Nederland, 2010). We will investigate this.

The Province of Overijssel did little to involve its ILG partners in the design phase of the ILG process. Official documents show that discussion evenings were organized, but civil servants working at the Province of Overijssel stated that these evenings were not at all well-visited and did in the end have little impact on the design of the policy framework (Provincie Overijssel, 2006) (Provincie Overijssel, 2013). On a more concrete basis, the partners did have the opportunity to give feedback on the covenants that were signed between them and the Provincial government. Excerpts of conversations between civil servants from the provincial government and various municipalities show that the feedback given by the partners was taken into account. These conversations did also show that the Province had the most decisive say in the matter, but we can still conclude that the contracts were not forced upon the partners but were a product of mutual consent (Provincie Overijssel, 2013).




FIGURE 4.1; ORGANIZATION SOURCE: REKENKAMER OOST-NEDERLAND (2006)
TRANSLATED FROM DUTCH

RULES

Design

The province of Overijssel decided to base much of the new rules for the pmjp structure on the basis of what structures already existed. Attempts were made to get the different actors involved in the development of the rules; provincial government officials did a tour around all municipalities and spoke with the responsible aldermen, but there was generally little feedback or disagreement. Some municipalities do not agree with this notion; arguing that the municipalities were not consulted sufficiently beforehand.

The province of Overijssel allowed little influence of other actors in the decision-making process. It did not consult with municipalities or water boards for the drawing of the subsidy guidelines, for example.

Contracting

The province of Overijssel made a conscious decision not to opt for legally binding contracts, but rather for covenants with its partners. In practice, these covenants were considered binding agreements by both the provincial government as its partners, however (Rekenkamer Oost-Nederland, 2010). The province of Overijssel stated its goal to “draw up an agreement that leaves no room for misunderstandings (..) and to make clear that the partners become co-responsible for the implementation of the policy” (Provincie Overijssel, 2006, p. 13).

The fact that the provincial government had clearly fenced off what acceptable instruments were and what were not, left little room for municipalities to include other projects in the agreements that fell outside the scope of these provincially endorsed instruments (Provincie Overijssel, 2006).

Design of the area committees

Choices	Government perspective	Governance perspective	Situation in Overijssel
Borders of areas	Decided by the provincial government on the basis of their own criteria	Decided by actors from the area on the basis of the problems at hand and social cohesion in the area	Chosen on the basis of existing cooperation – some altered to fit boost coherence or efficiency
Goals of the BGO's	Decided by the provincial government on the basis of its policy goals	Decided by actors from the area	The area programs were written by the actors from the area, but based on covenants between the provincial government and different actors as a means to increase area coherence
Policy development or policy execution?	Policy execution only	Policy development as well as policy execution	The BGO only co-developed policy, but was not involved in policy execution
Actors involved	Emphasis on governmental institutions such as municipalities and water boards	Actors selected on the basis of 1) their resources (money, knowledge, blocking power, etc.) or 2) representativeness	Only governmental institutions: water boards and municipalities
Role of the provincial government	Guardian of own policy goals	Stimulator/facilitator of the process of negotiation between the parties involved	The provincial government aimed to function as a facilitator and stimulator, but also pursued own policy goals

Design of the civil service	Support by civil servants from the provincial government, directed by the provincial government	Support by employees of the involved parties, directed by the parties involved in the BGO	Support by <i>aangaagteam</i> , consisting of both government professionals and civil servants of area partners
Institutional design	Area bureau as a department of the provincial government	Independent area bureau (foundation, cooperation)	Area bureau as a department of the provincial government

FIGURE 4.2; DESIGN AREA COMMITTEES OVERIJSSSEL; BASED ON: KUIJNDERSMA, ET AL. (2010)

The table above shows the decisions the Province of Overijssel made with regard to the design of the area committee. I will shortly elaborate on these decisions here:

- The borders of the areas were chosen out of convenience: most of the area committees were already in place. In some cases areas were altered or added to increase coherence and efficiency (Netwerkstad Twente, Netwerkstad Zwolle-Kampen, Stedendriehoek). See the borders of the different areas in figure 4.3
- The area programs were written in cooperation between the governmental actors from each area, by civil servants of the provincial government.
- The area committees were responsible for policy development, but not for policy execution. One of their responsibilities was the creation of policy goals, another was to increase policy coherence and to be a platform for discussion between the different actors in the area. Even though they were responsible for creating policy goals, the actual projects were executed by the partners: agreements were made with individual actors rather than with the area committees (Provincie Overijssel, 2006).
- The Province of Overijssel chose only to include governmental actors to maximize efficiency of the process.
- The provincial government both saw itself as the guardian of its policy goals and as stimulator and facilitator. These both roles are described in their policy paper of 2006. (Provincie Overijssel, 2006, pp. 11 - 12)
- The civil service (or *aanjaagteams*) consisted of employees of the provincial government as well as civil servants from municipalities and water boards.
- The area bureaus were designed as a department of the provincial government and directed as such by the provincial government.

CONTENT

During the course of the ILG, there was little discussion or conflict within the BGO. The provincial government had agenda-setting powers, decided upon goals and had the final say in most decisions that were made. Only in the *aanjaagteams* conflict happened sometimes, but never on the executive level.

STEERING

The only conflicts that arose were about execution and subsidy guidelines. When there were problems with the execution of projects, the provincial government played a monitoring role and was able to cut back on funding as a sanction if no solution could be found. Usually, though, conflicts were settled in a matter that satisfied all actors.



FIGURE 4.3; SOURCE: PROVINCE OF OVERIJSSSEL (2006)

Monitoring

The Province of Overijssel recognized the monitoring of agreements and goal realization as a major component of its steering role in the ILG policy process. It focused on preventive monitoring: by regularly checking up on its partners the provincial government hoped to be able to intervene in time whenever it seemed unsure if partners were going to be able to reach the goals agreed upon in the covenants. If this was the case, the provincial government could intervene by altering (financial) agreements, by looking for different partners more capable of reaching the goals in question or by offering more comprehensive support (Provincie Overijssel, 2006). The monitoring was the responsibility of the provincial cabinet, who had the obligation to present progress reports to the provincial parliament. Yearly, a progress report needed to be presented to the national government (this obligation was in place for all provinces) and a midterm review was used as an additional moment for monitoring.

Evaluation

Sound evaluation was regarded a key role of the provincial government by the Province of Overijssel. An important evaluation moment was the midterm review of 2009. Additionally, an evaluation report was written by the Audit Commission East-Netherlands, reviewing the steering mechanisms used by the provinces of Overijssel and Gelderland (Provincie Overijssel, 2006, pp. 13, 71) (Rekenkamer Oost-Nederland, 2010).

The Province of Overijssel emphasized the belief that evaluation should happen on whether goals were achieved; not how they were achieved. They stated that “program goals and targets should be the main focus of the steering philosophy” (Provincie Overijssel, 2006, p. 51). In reality, however, the specific goals of projects and in agreements with partners were often formulated so specifically, that they left little room for creativity (Rekenkamer Oost-Nederland, 2010). This indeed contradicts the goal as formulated above – when goals are so explicitly formulated and evaluated, it is impossible to maintain the statement that they do not focus on the way goals are achieved. The statement was further contradicted by the way in which the provincial government limited the instruments available to the municipalities and water boards by explicitly describing them in their policy paper and in the UBS (Uitvoeringsbesluit Subsidies) (Provincie Overijssel, 2006, pp. 58 - 61).

Flexibility & Conflict solving

The final component of the steering philosophy of the Province of Overijssel we will study here is whether the province of Overijssel took a flexible stance whenever partners wanted to alter agreements after they were agreed upon. An example of such a moment was November 2013, the end of which marked the end of the ILG process. A number of municipalities was not yet ready with all of its projects – sometimes with legitimate reasons. The Provincial government decided, after some deliberation, to grant the municipalities some longer to complete their projects (Overijssel, 2013). Whether this act of giving the partners the benefit of the doubt is exemplary for the relations between the provincial government and its partners in the province of Overijssel is yet to be concluded. There is little about what to do in situations like this in official documents.




FIGURE 4.4; SPIDER DIAGRAM OF STEERING PHILOSOPHY OF PR. OF OVERIJSSSEL

The only conflicts that arose were about execution and subsidy. When there were problems with the execution of projects, the provincial government played a monitoring role and was able to cut back on funding as a sanction if no solution could be found. Usually, though, conflicts were settled in a matter that satisfied all actors.

GOVERNMENT-GOVERNANCE RULER

On the basis of our analysis of policy documents as well as on the basis of the expert interview, we have qualified the steering philosophy of Overijssel on the government-governance ruler of Vreke, et al. (2009). The spider diagram above shows the outcomes of our analysis. A score of -1 indicates pure "government" on the ruler, a score of 1 pure "governance", as explained in the methodology section.

Figure 4.5 shows how the different categories were scored and where the scores were based upon. When we add all scores and calculate the average, the steering philosophy of the province of Overijssel scores -0,75 on average, which supports the statement by Boonstra et al. (2012) that the steering philosophy of Overijssel can be described as "vertical".

	Aspect	Source	Summary	Score	Average score per category
Actors					-0,75
	What actors played a role in the ILG policy process?	Literature (PMIP 2006)	Only governmental actors were involved in drawing up the area programs (provincial government, municipalities, water boards); only in the execution other partners were involved	-1	
	How was the cooperation organized?	Literature (PMIP 2006)	The area committees were responsible for drawing up an area program.	-0,5	
Rules					-0,75
	How were the rules decided upon?	Interview	The provincial took a leading role in this. Many structures have been copied from previous programs. There was informal negotiation with partners, but they had little input and suggestions.	-0,5	
	What was the decision making process during the ILG program? Did the provincial government take decisions or were other actors involved?	Interview	This was very much the domain of the provincial government. The provincial government was responsible for the design of the rules, for the design of subsidy guidelines and there was little room for critique from the partners. "When a municipality needed a screwdriver for a certain job, when the provincial government found a hammer more fitting, the municipality had to use the hammer and see how far they would come..."	-1	
Content					-1
	To what extent was there debate, discussion and disagreement in the BGO's?	Interview	Almost never. The provincial government was very dominant in the BGO: it had an agenda-setting and goal formulating function and on top of that it had the power to decide what decisions would be taken. And surprisingly enough, there was little resistance from the partners. Sometimes from civil servants, but never from aldermen.	-1	
Steering					-0,5
	How did the provincial government deal with conflicts?	Interview	There were no real conflicts I was aware of, except situation in which the execution of a project did not go according to plan. In such a case, the provincial government functioned as a (financial) controller.	-0,5	
Influence					-0,75
	What was the financial contribution from the different partners?	Literature (PMIP 2006)	The PMIP program costed approximately 793 million euros. 30% of this was paid by the national government, 27% by the provincial government, 14% by municipalities, 19% by water boards, 4% by the EU and 6% by third parties.	-0,5	
	What was the non-financial contribution from the different partners?	Interview	The provincial government put in a significantly higher amount of effort and FTE's than its partners	-1	

FIGURE 4.5

CONCLUSION

We follow the conclusion of Boonstra et al. (2012) that the Province of Overijssel used rather "vertical", or government-focused, steering mechanisms to give shape to the ILG process. It chose to put an emphasis on direct interaction with its partners instead of interaction with the area committees, for example, and it excluded non-governmental organizations from the process of policy making. In the analysis of the surveys and interviews conducted with partners, we will try to determine if this had an effect on the inter-organizational trust between the provincial government and its partners and – if so – what factors were the foremost contributors to this.

4.5 THE ILG AS IMPLEMENTED IN THE PROVINCE OF BRABANT

The province of Brabant decided before the start of the ILG policy process to put a heavy emphasis on the power of area committees. Nine area committees were formed in Brabant: Brabantse Delta, Wijde Biesbosch, De Baronie, De Meierij, Kempenland, Maas & Meierij, Peel & Maas, De Peel and Boven Dommel. Many different actors played a role in these broad area committees, civil organizations as well as governmental organizations (Provincie Brabant, 2008). The borders of the different areas were based on existing structures and cooperations in the rural area. The goal of these area committees was to aim for the reaching of goals in the area of rural development. Not only provincial goals, but also European goals, national goals and even goals of municipal governments, water boards and civil organizations were the responsibility of the area committees. As long as the goals were focused on rural development, they were the responsibility of the area committees (Kuindersma, Boonstra, & Brunt, 2008).




FIGURE 4.6; SOURCE: PROVINCE OF BRABANT (2008)


The role the Province of Brabant envisioned for the provincial government was the role of director (Provincie Brabant, 2008). They decided to keep a grip on the different area committees, however, and not to allow complete freedom and give away all power (Kuindersma, Boonstra, Arnouts, Stuiver, & Fontein, 2010). The area committees were not perceived as provincial-controlled bodies, however. Kuindersma et al. (2010, P. 42) quote an area committee member of De Baronie area committee: "The framework was drawn by the national and provincial government, but the area committee translated that to the area. They used their leeway when necessary."

The area committees in the Province of Brabant differed greatly in the way in which they were designed. In Kempenland, for example, an area bureau was constructed with formal responsibilities. In De Baronie, the actors opted for a more loose design in which the area committee had a largely advisory role (Kuindersma et al., 2010). The different areas come up with multi-annual area plans. These plans are the basis for the agreements the provincial government makes with the different actors (Brabant, 2008).

ACTORS

When selecting partners to take place in the area committee, the most important goal of the provincial government was increasing regional support. They succeeded in this and included a wide range of partners, including civil organizations; but according to different sources they forgot to include the interests of citizens, while actors with environmental and economic interests were included (Royal Haskoning, 2010).

FIGURE 4.6; SOURCE: PROVINCE OF BRABANT (2008)



RULES

Design

The province of Brabant based the design of the ILG process mainly on the negotiations in Cork, that happened well before the start of the ILG. The Cork-agreement came to being during a joint study trip to the Irish city that had as a sub-goal to bring certain partners – specifically ZLTO (an agricultural organization) and BMF (an environmental organization) that had recently left the area committees out of discontent with recent policy – back to the table. This resulted in the Cork-agreement that would serve as the basis for further policy in the rural area of Brabant (Royal Haskoning, 2010). Next to these two interest groups, a representation of municipalities and water boards were present at the Cork talks (Provincie Brabant, 2003). The lack of transparency of the talks led some to criticize the Cork-agreement; especially environmental organizations (Royal Haskoning, 2010).

FIGURE 4.7

Contracting

The way in which agreements between the provincial government and partners were made, was less structured then it was in Overijssel. Only in certain fields, contracts were signed (Provincie Brabant, 2008). Often, the way agreements were formalized depended on the subsidy scheme. For the IDOPs program, agreements were usually flexible, while in physical projects the provincial government used more strict methods. The agreements the provincial government entered into were based on areal plans and the provincial policy plan (Provincie Brabant, 2008).

Design of the area committees

Choices of the Province of Brabant	Government perspective	Governance perspective	Situation in Brabant
Borders of areas	Decided by the provincial government on the basis of their own criteria	Decided by actors from the area on the basis of the problems at hand and social cohesion in the area	Decided on the basis of existing structures of cooperation
Goals of the BGO's	Decided by the provincial government on the basis of its policy goals	Decided by actors from the area	Decided by the actors from the area in annual plans
Policy development or policy execution?	Policy execution only	Policy development as well as policy execution	Policy development as well as policy execution
Actors involved	Emphasis on governmental institutions such as municipalities and water boards	Actors selected on the basis of 1) their resources (money, knowledge, blocking power, etc.) or 2) representativeness	Actors selected on the basis of representativeness and resources
Role of the provincial government	Guardian of own policy goals	Stimulator/facilitator of the process of negotiation between the parties involved	The provincial role was the role of stimulator/facilitator of the process of negotiation between the different parties, but they also pursued own policy goals

Design of the civil service	Support by civil servants from the provincial government, directed by the provincial government	Support by employees of the involved parties, directed by the parties involved in the area	Supporting role for both a provincial department and civil servants from area partners
Institutional design	Area bureau as a department of the provincial government	Independent area bureau (foundation, cooperation)	Different per area

FIGURE 4.8; BASED ON: KUIINDERSMA, ET AL. (2010)

The table above shows the choices the Province of Brabant made in the design of the area committees. I will shortly elaborate on the choices made by the Province of Brabant:

- The borders of the different areas were decided on the basis of existing cooperating bodies in the areas (Royal Haskoning, 2010)
- The area committees were responsible for drawing up multiannual plans.
- The area committees were both responsible for the development of policy and for the execution of policy.
- Actors were selected on the basis of resources and representativeness, to ensure support for the policies (Provincie Brabant, 2008) (Royal Haskoning, 2010)
- The provincial government regarded itself as a facilitator as well as a stimulator of cooperation between different partners, but it also guarded its own policy goals (Kuindersma, et al., 2010).
- The Province of Brabant organized support centrally; it was distributed by the province itself, often through DLG. In the SRE-area, it was partly the responsibility of the SRE.
- The institutional design of the area committees differed between the areas (Provincie Brabant, 2008).

Figure 4.7 shows the way in which the ILG process was organized in the province of Brabant. A contact person was appointed for each area. This contact person was supposed to help partners find their way within the provincial organizations. When a project needed to be discussed with several provincial departments, the "Arena" was invented. In the "Arena" different departments were represented, who could give quick feedback on a project or policy problem, so that it was more easy for actors to get an overview of (legal) possibilities (Provincie Brabant, 2012) (Royal Haskoning, 2010).

CONTENT

Vreke et al. (2010) included "content" of a policy process as one of the indicators of its position on the government-governance ruler. According to multiple interview respondents, there were generally two prevalent discourses in the area committees: that of the environmental organizations and that of agricultural organizations. In the end, however, actors were striving to achieve consensus.

STEERING

Monitoring

One of the tools developed by the province of Brabant to monitor the progress of the ILG process was the "Barometer Landelijk Gebied". This creates an insight in the progress of projects for policy makers and civil servants, which allows more effective steering. A problem is that it gives information on output only, not on outcome. Therefore, additional monitoring information is sometimes needed (Royal Haskoning, 2010). The way in which additional monitoring was carried out, differed per project.




FIGURE 4.9 SPIDER DIAGRAM OF STEERING PHILOSOPHY OF PR. OF BRABANT

Evaluation

In the Province of Brabant, projects are evaluated on a yearly basis. On the basis of this evaluation, funds can be withdrawn. The evaluation of all projects together forms the basis of the progress report on the execution of the ILG policy.

Variabele	Aspect	Source	Summary	Score	Avg. Score per category
Actors					-0,25
	What actors played a role in the ILG policy process?	Literature (Provinciaal meerjarenprogramma Landelijk Gebied 2007 - 2013)	Both governmental organizations and institutionalized (regional) non-governmental organizations had a seat in the area committees.	0	
	How was the cooperation organized?	Literature (Provinciaal meerjarenprogramma Landelijk Gebied 2007 - 2013)	The cooperation was structured through area committees that had as main task to propel and support projects and to find support for the ILG policy	-0,5	
Rules					-0,125
	How were the ruled decided upon?	Interview Staatsbosbeheer; Interview Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven; Interview Nuenen; Literature (Provinciaal meerjarenprogramma Landelijk Gebied 2007 - 2013)	The rules were decided upon in cooperation with all actors that took place in the area committees.	-0,25	
	What was the decision making process like during the ILG program? Did the provincial government take decisions or where other actors involved?	Interview Nuenen; Interview Geldrop; Interview Laarbeek; Interview Staatsbosbeheer	According to the respondents, there was always a willingness to find consensus	0	
Content					-0,25
	To what extent was there debate, discussion and disagreement within the area committees?	Interview Staatsbosbeheer; Interview Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven; Interview Gemeente Reuzel-de Mierden	There was a moderate amount of discussion because actors with different ideas took place in the area committees. Most important discourses where those of the environmental organization and those of the more financially (agriculturally) oriented organizations.	-0,25	
Steering					0
	How did the provincial government deal with conflicts?	Interview	Sometimes problems were solved in cooperation; sometimes the provincial government solved problems.	-0,25	
Influence					-0,5
	What was the financial contribution from different partners?	Literature (Provinciaal meerjarenprogramma Landelijk Gebied 2007 - 2013)	1.2 billion euros were invested. 36% of this money was invested by the national government; 33% by the provincial government; 18% by "others", 6% by water boards, 5% by municipalities and 2% by the EU.	0	
	What was the non-financial contribution from different partners?	Interview Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven	The non-financial contribution was divided relatively evenly in comparison to other provinces; with SRE, third parties and local governments contributing. Still, the provincial government (through DLG) was the biggest contributor non-financially.	-0,5	

Flexibility

The Province of Brabant strives to be an open, flexible and transparent government, while still being able to guard own policy goals. According to our interview respondents during the ILG process, the Province of Brabant did its best to retain this flexible attitude.

We will go into depth on the division of finances later on this chapter. The non-financial contribution was distributed relatively evenly, according to our interview respondent from Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven, we claimed his own organization, organizations as Staatsbosbeheer, municipalities and water boards all made decent contributions in the form of manpower. The largest source of non-financial contributions was still the province, who also controlled the DLG.

FIGURE 4.10 SPIDER DIAGRAM OF STEERING PHILOSOPHY OF PR. OF BRABANT

CONCLUSION

As figure 4.9 shows, the province of Brabant indeed used a more horizontal approach when design its steering mechanisms for the ILG network, scoring an average of -0,225. It put a heavy emphasis on finding support in the areas and it gave quite a lot of freedom to the different partners with regard to the execution of projects. It strived to be a flexible actor whenever context desired it to be so and was not perceived to be the leading actor in the area committees.

4.6 A SHORT FINANCIAL COMPARISON OF THE ILG PROCESS

One of the goals of the ILG budget was to relieve pressure on national budgets by accruing more funds from lower governments and third parties (Ministry of VROM, 2006). In this section we will quickly review whether the provinces succeeded in convincing lower government to invest. We have used the financial paragraphs of the provincial multiannual plans (pmjp) for this.

Provincial multiannual budget 2007 – 2013 (€ mln.) Brabant								
Theme	European Union	National government	Provincial government	Water boards	Municipalities	Third parties	Total	Percentage of total
Environment	10	342	218	52	1	125	748	62.3%
Agriculture	9	56	54	3	18	32	172	14.3%
Soil & Water		14	11	11		8	45	3.8%
Landscape & cultural history	2	11	41	0	7	8	69	5.8%
Tourism & recreation	3	6	5	6	6	15	42	3.5%
Quality of life	7		37		29	8	81	6.8%
Miscellaneous			26			17	43	3.6%
Total	31	429	393	72	62	213	1.200	
Percentage of total	3%	36%	33%	6%	5%	18%		100%

FIGURE 4.11; BASED ON PROVINCE OF BRABANT (2006), TRANSLATED FROM DUTCH

Provincial multiannual budget 2007 – 2013 (€ mln.) Overijssel								
Theme	European Union	National government	Provincial government	Water boards	Municipalities	Third parties	Total	Percentage of total
Environment, landscape, cult. his	10	178	76	56	2	13	336	42.4%
Agriculture	10	40	22	7	0	2	82	10.4%
Economic vitality	12	3	25	7		15	62	7.8%
Water & Soil	0	13	42	15	147	0	217	27.4%
Quality of life	0	0	27	21	7	14	63	7.9%
Process costs	0	5	21	7	1	0	35	4.4%
Total	32	239	213	114	150	45	792	
Percentage of total	4%	30%	27%	19%	14%	6%		100%

FIGURE 4.12; BASED ON PROVINCE OF OVERIJSSSEL (2006), TRANSLATED FROM DUTCH

There are clear differences between both the themes money is spent on and the origin of the funds. Brabant put a heavy emphasis on environment. It spent close to 70% of its budget on environment and landscape. In Overijssel, only 42% was spent on this theme; and more money was invested in water and economic vitality. It seems that Brabant was more successful in attracting money from third parties. This might have been a result of involving third parties intensively in the process. It is noteworthy Overijssel managed to convince it's municipalities to invest almost three times as much as the municipalities in Brabant; especially considering the comparative size of the two provinces.

The overall investment in Brabant seems bigger; but if we calculate investments per capita we find that in Overijssel 720€/per capita was invested versus 480€/capita in Brabant. One could argue that the investments per square kilometer are more interesting. This paints a more equal picture; In Brabant, 245,000€ was invested per square kilometer, versus 230,000€ in Overijssel. We will see how these investments were perceived by our interview and survey respondents in the next chapter.

4.7 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we tried to answer the first sub-question of this paper:

Q1: What steering mechanisms were used by the Province of Overijssel and the Province of Brabant in the ILG policy network?

- Where on the government-governance ruler can the steering mechanisms be placed?

We can conclude that Boonstra et al. (2012) and Pleijte et al., (2010) were not mistaken when they observed that the way the province of Overijssel and the province of Brabant organized the ILG policy program is very different. We can subscribe to their conclusion that the major differences are the selection process of actors included in the area committees (with Brabant opting for wide inclusion and Overijssel opting for only including public actors) and the philosophy behind the steering mechanisms. The Province of Brabant prioritized bottom-up processes to foster, amongst others, representation and creativity where the Province of Overijssel believed such processes would be too time-consuming, opting for a top-down structure with little regard for representation (Provincie Overijssel, 2006) (Provincie Brabant, 2008). Our review of policy documents showed a score of -0,75 for Overijssel versus a score of -0,255 for Brabant.

This score, at first glance, does not seem overwhelming. The scale Vreke et al. (2009) use runs from -1 to 1. When we look at the context of the ILG program, however, it is impossible to score higher than a 0 in many cases because of build-in limitations in the nationally defined policy framework. Therefore, the realistic scale in this context runs from -1 to 0. This makes the differences between both provinces significantly more remarkable.

- Was the primary aim of these steering mechanisms to use deterrence as a control mechanism, or goodwill?

Both provinces used a mixture of goodwill and deterrence as steering mechanisms. In both provinces, evaluation methods were used to ensure that money was well spent, for example, and the provincial governments had the right to subtract subsidies when rules were not followed. In both provinces the provincial governments aimed to maintain good relations with the municipalities. The use of deterrence seems to have been used more frequently in Overijssel then it has been in Brabant, however. Overijssel put a heavy emphasis on formalizing agreements and took a leading role in the writing of area plans and within the area committees. In Brabant, these processes were much less rigidly controlled and more power was transferred to the partners.

It will be interesting to see what effect this deviation in the use of steering mechanisms had on the inter-organizational trust in the policy system in both provinces. We will analyze the results of our survey and interview research in the next chapter to find this out.

5. ANALYZING RELATIONS IN THE ILG POLICY PROCESS

In this part of the research we will discuss the results of the survey and the interviews with a range of people working at organizations that were partners of the provincial governments of Brabant and Overijssel during the ILG policy process. To make this section easier to read, you can find the majority of figures in Appendix II.

5.1 RELATION WITH THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

This research focuses on the way the steering mechanisms influenced relations between provinces and their partners in the rural area. Since the provincial government is dependent on its partners and vice versa, a good relation based on mutual trust is valuable.

First off, we have asked our survey and interview respondents how they graded the cooperation with the provincial government during the ILG process. In Brabant, the respondents were slightly more positive about the cooperation with their provincial government, with an average grade of 7.4 against a 7.1 in Overijssel, as shown in figure 5.1.

How would you grade the cooperation with the provincial government during the ILG process?				
Province of organization	N	Mean	Std. deviation	Std. Error Mean
Overijssel	17	7,12	0,99	0,24
Brabant	12	7,42	0,79	0,23

FIGURE 5.1: GRADING THE COOPERATION WITH THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

During the interviews, there were mixed feelings about the provincial government in Overijssel, while in Brabant all respondents were generally positive. One respondent from Overijssel was especially harsh in his qualification of the provincial government, dubbing it *"a technocratic institution with civil servants that distrust the municipalities"*. Other respondents in Overijssel were positive; one, for example, stated that he appreciated the role of the province as sparring partner. Survey respondents that were asked if they were in general positive or negative about the cooperation with the provincial government were generally positive, regardless their province (figure 5.2). Next to satisfaction with the relation with the government, we have measured trust in the policy networks in both provinces, specifically the trust partners have in their provincial government. To measure "trust" we have used the conceptualization of Klijn et al. (2010), who came up with a five point scale to measure trust between two actors. In Appendix VII we have shown the way we have operationalized this five point scale in our survey.

Province of organization		Trust average	Agreement trust	Benefit of the doubt	Reliability	Absence of opportunistic behavior	Goodwill trust
Overijssel	Mean	2,38	2,71	2,21	2,68	1,71	2,66
	N	17	17	17	17	17	16
	SD	0,40	0,53	0,83	0,68	0,66	0,47
Brabant	Mean	2,70	2,87	2,67	3,04	2,12	2,79
	N	12	12	12	11	12	12
	SD	0,37	0,48	0,68	0,72	0,53	0,54

FIGURE 5.3: MEASURING MEAN TRUST SCORES

Figure 5.3 shows that on average, Brabant scores better on every item on the scale; even though none of these differences are significant (see 5.4). Overall, the difference in trust is significant using a p-value of <0.05, with a score of 0,037 using an independent t-test. There thus seems to be a difference in trust between the two provinces that cannot be explained by random variance.

Variable	Trust average	Agreement trust	Benefit of the doubt	Reliability	Absence of opportunistic behavior	Goodwill trust
P-value	0,037**	0,389	0,126	0,184	0,080	0,487
** = significant at 0,05 level						

FIGURE 5.4: P-VALUES OF INDEPENDENT T-TESTS FOR THE MEANS OF TRUST VARIABLES BETWEEN PROVINCES

How can this difference in trust in the provincial government be explained, then? Obviously; the numbers presented above are insufficient to state that indeed, more *governance* oriented steering mechanisms cause a higher level of trust. We only researched two provinces – both of which were administrated a different “treatment” (steering mechanisms) – and therefore it is not prudent to extrapolate these results on the overall population (in this case, of Dutch provinces). To review what factors contribute to a trust relationship between a province and its partners we have reviewed the steering mechanisms in both provinces, as well as other sources of trust derived from the theory at hand, more into depth during semi-structured interviews.

5.2 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Our review of the theory distinguished the culture of organizations, and especially their stance towards cooperation, as possible influencer of relations between actors. Therefore, we have constructed a scale on which the cultural reliability of an organization can be measured.

The outcomes of this scale show that on average, the organizations in Brabant score slightly higher. This means that they seem to value reliability in cooperation a little higher than their counterparts from Overijssel. The differences are, however, not significant statistically. The outcomes do not seem to correlate with trust in the provincial government, with general satisfaction in the outcomes or the cooperation with the province. It therefore does not seem to be of much value to this research. This does not mean culture within organizations is not an influencer of inter-organizational trust; but in the context of this research the variable seems of little added value.

During our interviews, we asked our respondents about the organizational culture of their organization. The vast majority of respondents stated their organization was very much externally focused. These results might be influenced by the fact we interviewed members of *aanjaagteams* and *reconstructiecommissies* whose jobs are probably more externally focused than the average civil servant. The only exception was a municipality in Overijssel; that claimed to be more internally focused, displaying little interest in cooperation with neighbouring municipalities, for example.

Average character (cultural reliability of organization)			
Province of organization	Mean	N	SD
Overijssel	2,21	16	0,50
Brabant	2,42	10	0,80

FIGURE 5.5: MEASURING AVERAGE CHARACTER

5.3 HISTORY

The importance of a positive relationship in the past has been stretched by several authors. Therefore, we have added it to our research. Both survey research (figure 5.6) and the interviews show little differences between the provinces. In general, all respondents were positive about their relation with the provincial government in the past. During the interviews, respondents from both provinces indicated that the relations became more intensive during the ILG period and that they have become less intensive after it ended. Not all respondents worked at the organizations long enough to elaborate on this subject; and the ones who did elaborate did not seem to find it to have had much effect on their current view of the provincial government. The respondents from the municipalities of Nuenen en Laarbeek remarked, however, that their long-standing relations with the provincial government made it significantly easier to get things done. “When you know your way in Den Bosch, a lot more is possible,” one respondent remarked.

5.4 ACTORS

The province of Overijssel and the province of Brabant made distinctively different choices with regard to actor involvement, as can be read in our comparison of the two provinces. What did their partners think of this? Figure 5.7 shows that between our survey respondents from Brabant, there is widespread, and even unanimous, support for the decisions made by the provincial government. In Overijssel, however, there is less uniformity in the opinion of respondents on this subject. Quite a number of respondents go against the decisions of the provincial government, in that they would have preferred a larger role for civil organizations.

The interviews conducted in Overijssel gave us a slightly different perspective. Five out of six interview respondents did support the decision not to include civil organizations in the area committees. The reason they supported this was the fear that including them would hamper the efficiency of these committees. An argument in favor of involving non-governmental organizations mentioned by respondents in both Brabant and Overijssel was the additional support for policy plans it could bring.

We asked our survey respondents to give their opinion on both these arguments (figure 5.8). In both provinces, respondents agreed with the notion that inclusion would lead to more support for policy plans. With regard to the counterargument that it would hamper efficiency, a clear difference between the provinces is visible. In Brabant, all respondents disagree with the notion. Even though they have experienced working together with civil organizations in committees, none of the respondents felt this hampered efficiency. In Overijssel, more than half of the respondents followed the reasoning that including civil organizations would have hampered efficiency of the process.

One respondent from Overijssel remarked that the decision of not including non-governmental organizations was not the main problem; rather it was the lack of communication about this decision. *"The non-governmental partners received the memo that they were not going to be included in the area committees, and that was it. No explanation, nothing. It was that lack of communication that caused a lot of bad blood."*

Concluding; it seems that with regard to actor selection, the mindsets of the province of Brabant and its partners is rather coherent, whereas in Overijssel there is disagreement about the subject among partners and between partners and the provincial government

5.5 RULES & STEERING

There were many differences between the both provinces with regard to rules; some differences more subtle than others. We asked our respondents about their opinion on the way of cooperating in their province; "aanjaagteams" and "bestuurlijke gebiedsoverleggen" in Overijssel and "reconstructiecommissies" in Brabant. Next to that, we asked them to answer questions about the power distribution in said committees, about their satisfaction with the area their organization belonged to and about their opinion on the way agreements were made official during the process.

AANJAAGTEAMS/RECONSTRUCTIEGEBIEDEN

Both in Brabant and in Overijssel, respondents were happy with the way the policy network was structured. This was echoed during the interviews; in Overijssel, where most area committees have stopped, the regular cooperation with neighboring municipalities, water boards and the province was described as one of the most important benefits of the ILG period. In areas where the cooperation was continued, the provincial government refused to participate. A number of respondents were disappointed by this decision, one especially, stating that *"We don't ask for the Province to give us another bag of money, but it would be great if they could at least have a seat in our regular meetings, listen to our ideas and give us feedback"*.

In Brabant the majority of area committees continued to exist. They were widely regarded as an efficient way of org

Working with aanjaagteams / reconstructiegebieden worked well			
Province	Brabant	Overijssel	Total
Disagree	1	1	2
Neutral	2	1	3
Agree	5	6	11
Completely agree	4	9	13
Total	12	17	29

FIGURE 5.9: SATISFACTION WITH WAY OF ORGANIZING COOPERATION

the ILG policy process, the decision-making power of such committees has declined, however, which decreased efficiency. This led a number of respondents to call for a change in the mission and goal of the area committees; from a decision-making body towards a cooperation in which information and best practices can be shared.

POWER DISTRIBUTION IN AREA COMMITTEES

Much of the decision making in the ILG process, both in Brabant and in Overijssel, was done in the area committees. They were in both provinces a key player in the writing of the area plans. It is difficult to find out through policy documents only what the power balance in these committees was like; how much power did the provincial government seize? In order to determine the perception of the partners of the province on this, we asked our respondents whether they believed the provincial government was too influential in the area committees.

As Figure 5.10 shows, the respondents from Overijssel in majority supported the statements that the province had too much influence on both the area committee and (the writing of) the area plan. In the interviews, this was also often stated. It is remarkable that most of the respondents did not mind the fact the provincial government was in charge of the chairmanship of the area committees in the early stages of the ILG program, though. The respondents were more interested in the quality of the chairman than they were in his or her color, and some of the provincial chairmen were considered especially competent. .

In Brabant, on the other hand, the majority of respondents did not believe the province had been too powerful. As an interview respondent from Brabant stated: *"The area committees were dominated by the municipalities, to such an extent that every municipality could make its own plan; it hampered the integrity of the program."* This statement was backed by another respondent from this province. *"They allowed us all to make a plan for our municipality; they bought a roll of clear tape and glued these plans together and there was your area plan.."*

Correlations		Provincial influence on area plans	Provincial influence in area committees
Pearson Correlation	Trust (average)	-,608**	-,583**
Sig. (2-tailed)		,001	,001
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)			

FIGURE 5.11: CORRELATION OF PERCEIVED INFLUENCE AND TRUST

Interesting to see, the way power distribution is perceived –both within area committees and in the writing of the area plans – seems an important predictor of trust. There is a strong correlation between trust, as measured earlier in this chapter, and the perceived power distribution. Actors that believe the provincial government is too powerful in the area committees and in the making of area plans tend to distrust their provincial government more than actors who don't. Figure 5.25 shows this relation can be partially explained by differences between the provinces; but can even be distinguished if we look within provinces. Within Overijssel there is even a significant correlation at the 0.05 level; in Brabant (partly due to the low N) there is no significant correlation, but the scatterplot does indicate a relation. This shows statistical support for our hypothesis that the use of *government*-oriented steering mechanisms decreases trust.

CONTRACTING

Especially in Overijssel much of the ILG program was decided upon outside of the scope of area committees, in bilateral contracts between municipalities and provincial government. Contracts exist in many forms and the perceived strictness of a contract is one of its defining features. Where the contracts deemed proportional?

Figure 5.12 shows that the respondents were satisfied with the way contracts clarified what was expected from their organization. Both in the survey and during the interviews, no respondent perceived the use of

The use of contracts made clear what was expected from our organization			
Province	Brabant	Overijssel	Total
Neutral	1	2	3
Agree	9	13	22
Completely Agree	1	2	3
Total	12	17	29

FIGURE 5.12: OPINION ON EXTENT CONTRACTS CAUSED CLARITY

contracts as a sign of distrust. Instead, many respondents were satisfied with the way they made clear what was expected of municipalities to receive certain benefits. A number of respondents from Overijssel complained that, especially during the early stages of the ILG, the contracts put a heavy burden on the municipal staffing because a lot of paperwork was needed to satisfy the provincial government. This situation reportedly improved, however, during the course of the program.

AREAS

We asked our respondents whether they were satisfied with the area they were placed in. Figure 5.13 shows that in both provinces, quite a number of actors were dissatisfied with this. In Overijssel, this especially manifested itself in Twente, where all interview respondents would have preferred Twente to have been a single area. One respondent from Twente even went as far as coining the splitting of Twente in two areas a sign of distrust. *"In Zwolle, they are afraid of Twente becoming too powerful. That's why they split us up."* In general and in both provinces often municipalities at the borders of areas were dissatisfied because the difference in areas caused problems in cooperation with neighboring municipalities. The lack of communication and cooperation between different areas was in both provinces mentioned as a negative aspect of working with area committees.

I was satisfied with the borders of the area my organization was active in			
Province	Brabant	Overijssel	Total
Disagree	5	4	9
Neutral	2	5	7
Agree	4	5	9
Completely agree	0	3	3
Total	11	17	28

FIGURE 5.13: SATISFACTION WITH AREA

EVALUATION

Contracts have little meaning if the agreements made in them are not carried out. Evaluation was a legal obligation for the provincial government, who had to hand in a mid-term evaluation in 2010. How were the mechanisms that were used to check up on the execution of projects perceived?

Figure 5.14 shows that the differences between the two provinces are not very large in this regard. It is noteworthy that two respondents in Overijssel perceived the way of evaluating progress as distrust from the provincial government. Still, the majority did not perceive it this way. During the interviews, the bureaucratic workload evaluation entailed was loathed, especially in Overijssel. Respondents indicated this improved during the process and that later, it was reduced to more manageable proportions. In both provinces interview respondents reported that the provincial government put a too heavy emphasis on concrete achievements (square meters of revitalized land, for example) and paid to little attention on general success of projects. In both provinces, respondents found this method harmful because it limited them in their creativity. This view was widely shared by survey respondents in both provinces. Results are reported in figure 5.15.

5.6 DESIGN

Provinces were free to design steering mechanisms. It was their decision to what extent partners were involved in this process. In the analysis of the steering mechanisms we tried to discover what efforts were made to involve partners. In this section we will investigate how the partners perceived this design process. We asked our respondents to what extent they felt included in the design process and how serious their position was taken by the provincial government in drawing up the actual policy framework. The survey results, shown in figure 5.16, show us that in Overijssel a larger portion of the respondents felt unable to influence the design of steering mechanisms, even though there was a lot of disagreement among respondents. In Brabant, most respondents felt there were sufficient opportunities to influence the design.

The interview respondents were more in agreement; in Overijssel all municipalities reported that they were not involved in the design of steering mechanisms, or only on very general headlines. Not all respondents found this to be a problem, however: some stated this was best, since finding consensus on what steering mechanisms would be best would likely have been a slow and inefficient process. Others were annoyed by this lack of involvement, one respondent even coining it a clear message of distrust from the provincial government. In Brabant, safe for one, all respondents felt sufficiently consulted in the design phase. The one respondent that did not agree admitted the presence of a

delegation representing the municipalities at the “Cork summit” where the design was concluded, but found that this delegation was not taken seriously and held little real power during these talks.

5.7 FINANCIAL & NON-FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Perceived competences of the other are, according to theory, an important source of trust. If the other is not perceived competent, there will be little trust in the others capability of fulfilling its promises. We operationalized competences of the provincial government as both financial competences (do they have the money to back their promises up?) and non-financial competences (is their support in the form of personnel of added value?). In the previous chapter we have found that in comparison, the financial investments in Overijssel were significantly higher per capita; while comparable per square kilometer. We will see if this shows in the results.

Figure 5.17 shows that both with regard to finances and with regard to the support of provincial staffing, respondents in both provinces were generally positive about the competences of the provincial government. Especially with regard to finances, this was supported by most interview respondents. *“The provincial government had money to burn during the ILG-period”*, one respondent from Brabant remarked. *“It is easy to please people when you get to play Santa Claus with provincial funding”*, another respondent from Brabant added. In Overijssel too, most respondents remarked that the large funds available were a significant contributor to the success of the ILG policy program. One respondent, however, found the provincial back-office to be too cautious when it came to spending. *“It was as if they did not trust the municipalities to do useful things with the money.. It was only through political courage that the process became, in the end, a success.”* It is clear, however, that in both provinces our respondents believed their provincial government had sufficient funds to support the ILG process.

With regard to the support of provincial staff, the interview respondents were not in agreement. In Brabant, almost all respondents found the support of the provincial government staff to be very helpful. They perceived the provincial government as an organization that was easily accessible and the staffing, especially the front-office, as people that want to help you and are willing to work with you to solve problems. The back-office was sometimes mentioned as being more rigid.

This distinction was, however, more often and more specifically mentioned by our interview respondents in Overijssel. Most of them regarded the provincial back-office as extremely rigid, while they had positive experiences with front-office staffing. The communication between departments and between front-office and back-office was mentioned as one of the key problems in the relation with the provincial government. Another mayor negative influencer of the program according to a number of interview respondents was the rapid change in provincial staffing because of reorganizations. The respondent from Steenwijkerland reported that they had over eight provincial contact persons in the first ILG-year. *“The changes in staffing severely hampered the process because agreements had to be renewed over and over again and made it impossible to build a trust relationship”*, remarked a respondent from Overijssel.

In Brabant, one respondent also found reorganization in Brabant to have equally troublesome effects. This was not echoed by our other interview respondents, however. We have therefore included the variable in our survey. In figure 5.18 the results are summarized. These results show that especially in Overijssel, the changes in staffing were perceived as having severe negative effects on the process.

In Brabant, roughly half of the respondents agreed with this, while the other half did not believe this hampered the process. In Brabant, *streekmanagers* (Area managers) were appointed, to ensure stability in the relation between partners and the provincial government. By the vast majority of respondents from Brabant, the area managers were indeed of added value for the ILG process. During interviews, the process named “the Arena”, in which partners could pitch their problem or project before a group of provincial employees from all different relevant departments to get quick feedback about the possibilities and impossibilities of their plans was also mentioned as a useful addition in the relation to the provincial government.

Interesting is the fact that many interview respondents from Overijssel emphasized the importance of political lines between aldermen and members of the provincial cabinet. Without exception respondents found this to be important; and they experienced that the political colour of their alderman was of high

importance for the success of these political communication lines. In Brabant, the respondents were significantly less enthusiastic about the use of their aldermen in getting around conflicts; they viewed it as a matter of last resort if no agreement was possible with the responsible civil servants at the province. They also reported that when political lines were used, political colour of the alderman did not influence the chances of success.

If we look at the correlation of the satisfaction with the support from the provincial staff with other variables, it becomes clear that this is indeed an important variable. Respondents that indicate they found the support of provincial civil servants of added value feel taken more seriously, indicate that they find the province more trustworthy and generally grade the cooperation with the provincial government higher.

5.8 POLICY SUCCESS

Policy success is one of the factors that is likely to contribute to the relations between actors in a policy network. It is a tricky variable, however, in that it could have been influenced by inter-organizational trust as much as it influenced it. We asked our survey respondents to grade the policy program on a scale of 0 – 10.




FIGURE 5.19: POLICY SUCCESSES GRADED FROM 1 – 10 IN BOTH PROVINCES

The differences in satisfaction with the ILG process were small; with an average grade of 7,4 for the province of Brabant and an average grade of 7,2 for the province of Overijssel. This difference is not statistically significant.

In both provinces, this general satisfaction with the ILG policy process as a whole was echoed during the interviews. A reason for this enthusiasm that was coined by multiple respondents in both provinces was the large investments – for a large part financed with money from higher governments, therefore not putting a strain on municipal budgets - that were made in the rural area during this time frame in comparison to before and afterwards.

One of the key goals of the ILG decentralization was to foster creativity and involvement by “bringing the policy to the rural area”. This should not only be beneficial for policy outcome; it should also bring about a rise in intensiveness of cooperation between actors in the rural area. Was this goal achieved?

The survey results indicate it was. In both provinces, respondents were satisfied about the cooperation between different actors in the areas that were formed, and in both areas respondents found that the ILG process had indeed intensified that cooperation (figure 5.21). All interview respondents seemed to agree with this. In Overijssel, many of them expressed their regret that the structures of the ILG process were torn down after it ended. In general, respondents looked back positively at the ILG period as a whole. Because of this comparable general satisfaction in both provinces, there is little we can say about the effects of policy success in general.

An important discovery we did during our interview sessions in Brabant is that a lot of respondents perceived a lack of integrality in the programs in their province. Unfortunately, it was impossible to include these findings in the survey of Overijssel civil servants, but we did include it in the Brabant edition. The results are shown in figure 5.20, and indicate that this view is indeed shared by quite a number of respondents from Brabant. Because of this, we will further review this aspect of the ILG policy program in the next chapter, where we will also make a comparison with Overijssel.

5.9 FLEXIBILITY

During any policy process situations will occur that are either not captured in previous agreements, or that require a divergence from them. In any of such situations the provincial government has a decision to make: either enforce the rules, or be flexible and allow the other not to follow them. To what extent did the provincial governments behave as flexible partners, according to our respondents?

The survey results show that the respondents from Brabant were slightly more positive about the flexibility of their provincial government, even though the difference is small. During the interviews, the differences between Brabant and Overijssel were much more distinct. Whereas most respondents in Brabant painted a picture of their province as a very flexible partner that was always willing to help and think with you; in Overijssel a number of respondents were extremely critical of their province in this regard. Especially the back-office was perceived as bureaucratic, nit-picking and especially strict when the UBS was involved. *"The UBS was cast in concrete"*, remarked a respondent from Overijssel. This opinion was echoed by the survey respondents, even though there was disagreement among them, as can be seen in figure 5.23.

In Brabant, agreements were often flexible in nature and easy to edit even after they were made. Because of this it was possible for municipalities to find fitting solutions for the problems in their communities. Especially the IDOP (Integraal Dorpsontwikkelingsplan) program was hailed as a success because of this flexibility. In Overijssel, on the other hand, the kulturhusen scheme that strived to solve similar problems in small communities was deemed rather rigid by some respondents. Others, however, noted that some creativity from the part of municipal civil servants was required if agreements had to be changed, but that it was nonetheless possible.

In both provinces most respondents found that the provincial government was willing to change agreements after they were made if this was necessary. From the interviews we can however conclude that this process seemed to have been easier in Brabant than it was in Overijssel, where most respondents added that changing agreements usually took quite a lot of time and effort.

5.10 CONFLICTS

When there is disagreement about the content of agreements, or when one of the partners is not as flexible as the other would like, there is a risk of conflict. We asked our survey respondents whether they were often in a relation of conflict with the provincial government. Figure 5.24 shows the results. The respondents from Overijssel reported this slightly more often. During interviews, most respondents reported there had been conflicts during the ILG period; but all of them were satisfied with the way these were solved, even though sometimes this took longer than they would have preferred.

Some interview respondents from Brabant reported conflicts as well. They were all satisfied with the way these were handled. *"Even when we disagreed, there was healthy respect between us and the provincial government"*, one respondent from this province reported.

5.11 CONCLUSION

In this chapter we analyzed the results of the interviews we conducted and of the survey that was filled in by our respondents. We compared our findings per subject. In the next chapter, we will try to make clear what the most important findings were and we will come up with recommendations for the two provinces.

6. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

In this final chapter we will draw conclusions based on the analysis of our data, shed light on the more remarkable findings of our research and finally come up with a number of recommendations for the provincial governments to improve their steering methods in the rural area in the future. By doing so, we hope to answer the research question and sub-questions we formulated in the introduction of this paper.

RQ: What influenced the relations between the provincial governments and their partners in the ILG policy networks and to what extent does the choice for government or governance oriented steering mechanisms effect this?

Q1: What steering mechanisms were used by the Province of Overijssel and the Province of Brabant in the ILG policy network?

Our first sub-question was answered on the basis of a review of policy papers and two expert interviews. We concluded that, as was predicted by a number of sources, Overijssel and Brabant chose distinctively different steering mechanisms for the ILG process. The steering mechanisms of Overijssel approach the *government* philosophy of steering more closely, whereas the steering mechanisms of Brabant seem more *governance* focused. Knowing this, we researched the effects these steering methods had on the inter-organizational trust in the ILG policy process.

Q2: What factors contributed to the inter-organizational trust the ILG policy process in the two provinces?

Q3: What factors could explain any differences in inter-organizational trust between provinces?

When we compare both provinces, we see many similarities and some notable differences. Overall, in both provinces respondents were satisfied with the results of the ILG process and with the relation with the provincial government. In both provinces, respondents were satisfied with the way the ILG managed to intensify and propel cooperation between different actors in the rural area. This cooperation was, both in the survey and during the interviews, mentioned as one of the important plusses of the ILG policy program.

Still, we observe a statistically significant difference with regard to trust in the provincial government between Overijssel and Brabant in favor of the latter province. This could very well be related with the way these provinces decided to organize and steer in the policy networks in their province. The municipalities in Brabant were much more satisfied with the level of involvement of their province in area committees and in the design of area plans, whereas respondents from Overijssel significantly more often found their province to use its powers too much. It seems that that trust grows when partners in the rural area are given more responsibilities and power in deciding upon the development of their region. This same difference was clearly visible with regard to the process of designing the steering mechanisms; in Brabant, partners felt more involved and taken more seriously in this process and in general.

The province of Brabant was described by interview respondents as a pleasant organization to work with, as a valued partner in the rural area that is willing to work with you, as a source of input and expertise. The province of Overijssel, on the other hand, was described more as a principal or leader in the policy networks: which was appreciated by some, but not so much by others. The relation was subsequently much less often described as an equal one; the provincial government was perceived as an actor that clearly was taking the lead – both by respondents that appreciated the way in which they did so and by respondents who were more critical.

These results are quite in line with the literature; in which it is expected that more governance-oriented steering mechanisms will have a positive effect on the trust relationship between provincial government and municipalities. The expected downsides of steering through trust; a larger chance of defection from agreement of partners and a possible loss of efficiency were not experiences in Brabant, however. Perhaps this was a result of the self-reported dominant role of municipalities in the area committees of Brabant; perhaps they managed to structure the process and convince other partners to

adhere to agreements. Other explanations for the lack of defection that was observed (the opposite of which was predicted on the basis of classical economic theory, which regard actors as rational entities looking for profit maximization) could perhaps be explained by the different dynamics in public-public relationship. In this context, first, relations are long-lasting, durable and difficult (or impossible) to withdraw from, and therefore probably of higher importance to the actors. Second, public organizations find that they have an exemplary function in society with regard to adhering to agreements, so our results show (see appendix II, figure 6.1).

Another interesting finding that can perhaps be contributed to the focus of steering mechanisms is the differences in financial contributions to the ILG of the different parties. In Brabant, where third parties were involved on a decision-making level, 18% of the budget was contributed by third parties. In comparison, this contribution was 6% in Overijssel where third parties were only involved in the execution of plans. Water boards and municipalities, the key players in the area committees in Overijssel, contributed significantly more in Overijssel (19% and 14% respectively versus 6% and 5% in Brabant, see figures 4.11 and 4.12). When we add up the contributions from all partners except national and provincial governments, these make up 32% of the budget in Brabant and 43% in Overijssel. Accruing money from "lower level parties" was one of the main objectives of the ILG program. In that respect, the province of Overijssel seems to have performed better.

These results could indicate, using some imagination, that water boards and municipalities felt less included in the process in Brabant as a result of the inclusion of third parties. This is not something that showed in the results of interviews or surveys. The inclusion of third parties was something all respondents were satisfied about. In Overijssel, many respondents would in fact have liked more involvement of third parties such as environmental organizations and agricultural organizations. The decision not to include them and the way this was communicated with them caused "bad blood", according to a respondent. This could perhaps explain the low financial contribution of third parties in Overijssel.

Both the interviews and the survey review showed clearly that personal relations were of importance for the relation between the provincial governments and their partners. Even though many interview respondents in Overijssel remarked that front-office employees did their work excellently, the changes in provincial staffing were often mentioned as something that distorted the process and hampered relations between actors and the province on more than one occasion.

The survey review showed that personal relations were of importance in the relation between province and its partners; but the interviews showed even more so. Especially in Overijssel, the relation with front-office employees was often emphasized as being critical to the success of the program. A lot of changes in provincial staffing due to reorganization hampered the relations between actors and province on more than one occasion. This was reported throughout the province, by multiple actors.

The most important negative point mentioned by respondents in Brabant, both in the survey and during interviews, is the lack of integrality of the program. This seems to be caused by the choice of the province to give a lot of power to municipalities and non-governmental organizations in the area committees and in the design of the area plans. Each municipal government got what it wanted; which resulted in very fragmented area plans.

A final point of concern for many respondents, both in Brabant and in Overijssel, was the focus of both provinces on achievements in the evaluation process. Many respondents remarked that they would have liked a focus on general success of projects instead. How this could be worked out is, however, a question that is difficult to answer.

6.1 INTEGRALITY IN BRABANT AND OVERIJSSSEL

A number of respondents mentioned the lack of integrality as a major flaw in the ILG program of the province of Brabant. The water board of Salland, active in a number of areas in Overijssel, mentioned during the interview that it was positively surprised by the integrality of the program in this province and that it considered the willingness of all partners to think as an area rather than a collection of municipalities was one of the strong points of the ILG in Overijssel. This statement contrasts sharply with the statements of a number of respondents from Brabant, who claim there was little to no integrality in the area plans in Brabant.

When we briefly review policy plans (see appendix VI) from both provinces, we can conclude that indeed, the plans in Overijssel seem more integral. Special areas assigned for agricultural or environmental development are often concentrated in one spot in the area plans of Overijssel, whereas these areas seem to appear in almost every municipal plan we reviewed in Brabant (safe for one). This gives a rather fragmented feeling to the plans in Brabant.

This fragmentation is countered, to an extent, by alone standing projects that do cross municipal borders. These projects are quite rare, however (the majority of responding municipalities did not participate in a single cross-border project), and were often an addition to area plans rather than an integral part of it. We conclude that the lacking integrality of plans in Brabant is indeed a missed opportunity. Then again, a civil servant working at a municipality in Overijssel pointed out during an excursion to see ILG projects in reality that the way “Groene en Blauwe Diensten” were used differed greatly between municipalities in Overijssel as well, creating visible municipal borders on certain occasions.

6.2 DISCUSSION

Even though we structured and carried out this research to the best of our abilities, there are certain limitations to this research that might hamper the extent to which its results can be extrapolated to other provinces in the Netherlands and other policy networks in general. We will sum up the limitations of this research in this section, and come up with recommendations for further research.

The first obvious limitation to this research is that it only encompasses two provinces. It was impossible for us, given the limitations to time and resources, This means we only investigate one province that used vertical steering mechanisms and one that used horizontal measures of steering. This makes it impossible to prove a relationship between the use of steering mechanisms and inter-organizational trust. By altering our research design and zooming in on the dynamics in policy networks, we have tried to adapt to this limitation.

A second limitation is the differences between the way respondents for both survey and interviews were found in the two provinces. In Overijssel, we had access to e-mail addresses of members of *aanjaagteams*. In Brabant, we did not. Therefore, we were forced to use the internet and personal connections to find appropriate respondents. With regard to interview respondents, I believe the quality and position of our respondents was similar to those in Overijssel. When looking at figures 3.1 and 3.2, it becomes apparent that the majority of respondents is from the Eindhoven region. It is very well possible this had some effect on the outcomes of the research.

For further research, it would be valuable to find out how the findings in this paper correspond with the reality in other Dutch provinces. A more superficial research, without the semi-structured interviews but purely based on survey research and quantitative analysis could shed further light on the question whether inter-organizational trust is indeed determined by the choice of steering mechanisms and could give a more precise statistical answer to the question what factors contribute to inter-organizational trust. For such a research, cooperation of all provinces would be needed to ensure a similar level and background of respondents throughout the country.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, we come up with recommendations for the provincial governments of Brabant and Overijssel to improve their methods of steering in the rural area, to answer our final sub-question:

Q4: How could the provinces improve the trust relationship with their partners in the rural area?

The ILG has ended, but the challenge to maintain a vital rural area where people can live, work and leisure remains. We have structured our recommendation per province.

PROVINCE OF OVERIJSSSEL

All-in-all, the majority of respondents of both survey and interviews were satisfied with the way the ILG process panned out. They all reported a bumpy start, but were happy with the big investments in the rural area and were of the opinion that the ILG process was a very positive one for the rural parts of Overijssel.

What became apparent during the interviews conducted in Overijssel, however, was that communication was perceived by many as the Achilles heel of the ILG process. This view was especially broadcasted by the municipalities of Enschede and Steenwijkerland, and by the water board of Groot Salland. This caused multiple problems, I will shortly describe here.

First, it caused friction between front-office and back-office employees; sometimes with far-reaching consequences for partners. One respondent reported several examples in which front-office employees made promises they had to take back under pressure of their back-office. This unreliable and unpredictable behavior from the part of the province annoyed partners to a great extent. According to respondents from municipalities, as well as from the provincial government, it was not always clear what part of the provincial organization was responsible for certain tasks. This created friction internally, and caused confusing situations for partners. This was also recognized by a report of the Rekenkamer Oost-Nederland (2010), who coined it one of the weak points of the way the ILG was structured in Overijssel.

The problem was worsened by the lack of consistency with regard to contact persons of areas and municipalities. A respondent reported eight different contact persons in a year; less shocking numbers were mentioned by other respondents, but they agreed that this was harmful for the process, mainly because knowledge of agreements was barely transferred from old to new contact person. Therefore **we recommend the province of Overijssel to define responsibilities between front- and back-office more sharply and to safeguard the transfer of knowledge in case of personnel changes.**

Another thing that was often mentioned during the interviews we conducted in the province of Overijssel was the disappointment of municipalities about the policy of non-involvement the province has taken after the end of the ILG program. This caused valuable structures to fall apart; and even where the committees were maintained by municipalities and other partners the province refused to sit at the table. This caused frustration with partners, and **we recommend the province of Overijssel to at least participate where area cooperations exist, without necessarily investing extra money.**

In certain areas, cooperation in the field of rural development has simply come to a halt after the end of the ILG program. This is a pity, according to respondents from such areas, because it hampers the quality of rural development. *"If we continue like this, all the progress we made between 2007 and 2013 will have been in vain, and we will need another ILG-like program in fifteen years"*, one respondent remarked. Next to this, our research has shown that the benefits of cooperation go further than the rural area: they help relations between actors in other fields as well. Therefore, **we recommend the province of Overijssel to stimulate cooperation in areas where this has stopped.**

Finally, both the review of Rekenkamer Oost-Nederland (2010) and a number of interview respondents stated that the way the province tried to involve non-governmental organizations is in need of improvement. According to the water board Groot Salland, they were barely informed of the decisions made in the design phase of the ILG process. Also, they were not kept in the loop during the process, something that definitely caused bad blood. **Therefore, we recommend the province of Overijssel to improve its communication with non-governmental actors.** The higher investments by third parties in the province of Brabant also shows the potential of involvement of non-governmental actors to boost investments. Therefore, **we recommend the province of Overijssel to overthink its exclusion policy with regard to non-governmental actors.**

PROVINCE OF BRABANT

We briefly went into the integrality question earlier in this chapter. The different policy documents show that it seems that integrality of the program was higher on the agenda in Overijssel than it was in Brabant. **Therefore, we recommend the province of Brabant to put more emphasis in integrality of area plans.**

Like we have seen in Overijssel, in Brabant a number of area committees, such as "de Wijde Biesbosch" dissolved after the end of the ILG program. Our respondent from Staatsbosbeheer, active in a number of areas, noticed this had quite a negative effect on the field of rural development in these

areas. Therefore, **we recommend the province of Brabant to stimulate cooperation in areas where this has stopped.**

In the province of Brabant, most area committees do still function to a certain degree. Most of their competences were removed after the end of the ILG process, but the committees seem to have adapted insufficiently to their new role. The interview respondents appreciated the continuing presence of the provincial government in the committees, but would prefer the committees to transform into sources of inspiration and discussion, rather than having meetings in which all participants simply present their municipal plans. **Therefore, we recommend the province of Brabant to alter the goal of the area committees to stimulating information sharing, cooperation and mutual inspiration, rather than discussing municipal policy plans.**

What also became apparent during the interviews is that the success of the ILG program differed greatly between municipalities. One municipality, for example, managed to realize little to no projects in the last eight years. They indicated they would have liked the province to have taken a more lenient stance in certain cases, so that they as well would have been able to realize projects for their inhabitants. **Therefore, we recommend the province of Brabant to pay attention to municipalities that are lagging behind with regard to project realization, and extend a hand of help in a more early stage of the process.**

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

In general, the tradeoff between control and trust is clearly visible in the outcomes of our research. We believe that a trust relationship is especially valuable in the field of rural development; where partners are bound to work together to achieve common goals. During the interviews we conducted in both provinces, there was a noticeable difference in the stance versus the province between respondents from Overijssel and the respondents from Brabant; in favor of the latter province. Both the survey results as the analysis of the interviews we conducted point in the same direction when we look for a cause: the power the provincial government seized in the process, or allowed the municipalities and other partners. **Therefore, we recommend provinces to take a more horizontal approach to steering in the policy area of rural development, to maintain positive, trust-based relations with different partners.**

This final recommendation seems conclusive. However, if we have learned one thing during our quest for trust in the ILG, it was that trust is a concept that is multidimensional and difficult to grasp. Horizontal steering mechanisms only work if partners are trustworthy and willing to commit; and there is no guarantee that this will be the case in any province. It is the difficult task of provincial governments to find a balance between trusting and controlling - to make sure the relation with partners stays good, while being able to make sure the necessary work is done.

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APPENDIX I: DETERMINING STEERING MECHANISMS

	Hierarchical government	Public cooperation	Interactive steering	Steering communities	in Self-steering
Actors					
Actors participating	Government	Government and institutionalized civil society	Government, civil society, regional actors	Individuals	Civil society
Setting of participation	Government bureaucracy	Formal policy network	Policy network with working groups and workshops	Communities with process managers	Open network
Rules					
Decision on rules	Hierarchy	Informal negotiation	Consensus	Co-formulation	Through doing
Method of deciding	Vision, structure, hierarchy	Formal negotiation	Exchange on the basis of consensus	Excluding	Ad hoc choices
Method of enforcing	Controlling	Managing	Discussion	Exempting	Freedom
Content					
Number of discourses	One	A few	A lot	One	Zero
Steering					
Type of interventions	Appoint	Allow	Cooperate	Convince	Plead
Influence/Power					
Spread of material resources	Concentrated	Some spread, with monopolies	High spread	High spread	Very high spread
Spread of immaterial resources	Relatively concentrated	Some spread, with monopolies	High spread	High spread	Very high spread

APPENDIX II: GRAPHS

Figure 5.2 (L) & 5.6 (R)







Figure 5.7







Figure 5.8 (top), Figure 5.10 (bottom)





Figure 5.14




Figure 5.15




Figure 5.16




Figure 5.17




Figure 5.18




Figure 5.20




Figure 5.21




Figure 5.22




Figure 5.23




Figure 5.24




Figure 5.25: Scatterplots of correlation trust and perceived influence of province on area plans and in area committees





Figure 6.1



APPENDIX III: QUESTIONNAIRE

Deel 1: Tevredenheid gebruik sturingselementen

1. Al met al kijkt men binnen mijn organisatie met een positief gevoel terug op het ILG

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

2. Al met al kijkt men binnen mijn organisatie met een positief gevoel terug op de samenwerking met de provincie binnen het ILG

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

3. Al met al kijkt men binnen mijn organisatie met een positief gevoel terug op de samenwerking met andere partners binnen het ILG

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

4. Ook vóór de start van het ILG werd er binnen ons gebied goed samengewerkt

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

5. Gedurende de looptijd van het ILG hebben was het contact met de medewerkers van de Provincie goed

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

6. De provincie had de benodigde middelen in huis om het ILG op een goede manier te regisseren.

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

7. De ondersteuning van medewerkers van de provincie was een meerwaarde gedurende het ILG-proces

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

8. Het werken met [OV: aanjaagteams] [UT: Gebiedsbureaus] is een goede manier van het vormgeven van ambtelijke ondersteuning

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

9. Er was voldoende ambtelijke ondersteuning vanuit de provincie

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

10. Het was van toegevoegde waarde (OV: geweest) maatschappelijke organisaties bij het opstellen van de gebiedsprogramma's te betrekken

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

11. Het was van toegevoegde waarde (OV: geweest) maatschappelijke organisaties deel te laten uitmaken van de gebiedscommissies

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

12. Het was goed (OV: geweest) voor het draagvlak van het ILG bij de bevolking OV: als/UT: dat maatschappelijke organisaties (OV: hadden kunnen/UT: konden) aanschuiven bij gebiedsoverleggen

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

13. Het was goed voor de efficiëntie (UT: geweest) om slechts overheidsinstanties mee te laten schrijven aan het gebiedsprogramma

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

14. Het was goed voor de efficiëntie (UT: geweest) om slechts overheidsinstanties lid te laten worden van de gebiedscommissies

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

15. Er had meer inbreng van maatschappelijke organisaties moeten zijn in het besluitvormingsproces

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

16. Er waren vóór begin van het programma (2007) voldoende mogelijkheden voor mijn organisatie om mee te beslissen over de manier waarop de ILG in Brabant/Overijssel tot uitvoering zou worden gebracht:

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

17. De Provincie heeft de mening van mijn organisatie over de manier waarop het ILG georganiseerd zou moeten worden serieus genomen.

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

18. Mijn organisatie heeft voldoende invloed gehad bij het formuleren van de ILG-doelen

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

19. OV: Het inzetten van convenanten verduidelijkte de verwachtingen die de provincie van mijn organisatie had en liet weinig ruimte voor misverstanden

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

20. OV: Dat de provincie gekozen heeft voor het inzetten van convenanten duidt erop dat zij haar partners niet helemaal vertrouwd .

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

21. UT: Het was van toegevoegde waarde geweest om alle prestaties die van mijn organisatie werden verwacht in een convenant met de provincie vast te leggen, zodat duidelijker werd wat er van mijn organisatie werd verwacht.

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

22. Er is goed nagedacht over de grenzen van de verschillende (OV: ILG/UT: AVP)-gebieden.

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

23. Ik had graag andere grenzen gezien van het ILG/AVP-gebied waar mijn organisatie toe behoort.

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

24. Gedurende de looptijd van het ILG probeerde de provincie vooral haar eigen doelen te behalen, ook als dat ten koste ging van de doelen van haar partners

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

25. De provincie had een te grote vinger in de pap in de gebiedscommissie

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

26. De provincie had haar partners vrijer moeten laten in de keuze voor instrumenten

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

27. De manier waarop de voortgang van mijn organisatie bij het uitvoeren van ILG-projecten in de gaten werd gehouden was fair.

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

28. De manier waarop de voortgang van mijn organisatie bij het uitvoeren van ILG-projecten in de gaten werd gehouden duidde erop dat de provincie haar partners niet helemaal vertrouwd

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

29. De provincie is een flexibele partner

1-5 Helemaal oneens – Helemaal eens

Deel 2: Vertrouwen

Table 3. Measurement of Trust

Measurement	Item
1. Agreement trust	The parties in this project generally live up to the agreements made with each other.
2. Benefit of the doubt	The parties in this project give one another the benefit of the doubt.
3. Reliability	The parties in this project keep in mind the intentions of the other parties.
4. Absence of opportunistic behavior	Parties do not use the contributions of other actors for their own advantage.
5. Goodwill trust	Parties in this project can assume that the intentions of the other parties are good in principle.

Stellingen:

- 1. Mijn organisatie heeft gedurende de looptijd van het ILG geen conflicten gehad met de provincie over de uitvoering van projecten**
- 2. De provincie is een partner die zijn afspraken nakomt**
- 3. De provincie is een partner waarop mijn organisatie kan vertrouwen**
- 4. De provincie houdt rekening met de wensen van mijn organisatie**
- 5. De provincie neemt de mening van mijn organisatie serieus**
- 6. De provincie probeert vaak haar partners voor haar karretje te spannen om haar beleidsdoelen te behalen**
- 7. De provincie streeft over het algemeen dezelfde doelen na als mijn organisatie in het landelijk gebied**
- 8. De provincie heeft het beste voor met het landelijk gebied**

APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

Vragenlijst

Introductie, voorstellen mezelf en het onderzoek.

- Wat was gedurende de looptijd van het ILG (2007 – 2012) uw functie binnen (organisatie)?
- Wat was uw functie binnen het ILG netwerk?

1) Algemeen

In het volgende gedeelte zullen we een aantal algemene zaken bespreken die te maken hebben met het ILG en de manier waarop dit binnen de provincie Overijssel georganiseerd is. Daarna zullen we een aantal zaken apart bespreken. Ik zal steeds kort introduceren waar het volgende gedeelte van de vragenlijst zich op toespitst.

- Is het samenwerken met externe partners belangrijk voor uw organisatie?
 - Zo ja: kunt u voorbeelden geven van succesvolle en minder succesvolle samenwerkingen met partners in andere beleidsgebieden door uw organisatie?
 - Maakt uw organisatie veel gebruik van samenwerking met andere organisaties?
 - In hoeverre streven de provincie en uw organisatie dezelfde doelen na met betrekking tot de ontwikkeling van het landelijk gebied?
 - In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende statements?
 - 1) Mijn organisatie zal altijd proberen gemaakte afspraken met andere partijen na te komen, ongeacht de consequenties hiervan voor de organisatie.

1-5 schaal Helemaal eens – Helemaal oneens
 - 2) In samenwerking met anderen zal mijn organisatie altijd de belangen van diegenen/hetgene die/dat wij vertegenwoordigen voorop stellen, ook als dit de belangen van partners eventueel kan schaden.

1-5 schaal Helemaal eens – Helemaal oneens
- Doorvragen 1)
- 1): Waarom?

Voorbeeld:
 - Voorbeeldfunctie overheid
 - Professionaliteit
 -
- Mochten er conflicterende belangen zijn voor uw organisatie en de provincie, in hoeverre zou u de belangen van de provincie meewegen in het komen tot een oplossing?

Doorvragen:

- Ja, die wegen we mee:

Apart bevragen eventuele redenen:

- Afhankelijkheid (angst voor sancties)
 - Goede relatie
 - Professionaliteit / overheid geeft goede voorbeeld
 - Wat gij niet wilt dat u geschiedt, doe dat ook een ander niet (anderen houden zich vaak aan de afspraak, dus wij ook)
- Wat zijn gedurende het ILG-proces uw ervaringen geweest met medewerkers van de provincie? (maak zo nodig duidelijk dat ILG-inhoudelijke ervaringen bedoeld worden, en geef aan dat er verschillende dimensies zijn: provincie-gemeente, binnen BGO, binnen aanjaagteams)
 - Kunt u een aantal voorbeelden noemen van positieve, danwel negatieve ervaringen met medewerkers van de provincie gedurende het ILG proces?
 - Evt.: Waarom zijn deze ervaringen specifiek belangrijk geweest?
 - Zijn deze ervaringen van invloed geweest op uw vertrouwen in de provincie als samenwerkingspartner in het ILG proces?
 - Wat zijn, mits van toepassing, uw ervaringen met samenwerken met de provincie vóór het ILG proces?

Doorvragen:

- Positief of negatief? Waarom?
- Zijn deze ervaringen van invloed geweest op uw vertrouwen in de provincie als samenwerkingspartner in het ILG proces?
 - Met wat voor organisaties werkt u zoal geregeld samen?
 - Wat zijn in het algemeen de ervaringen van uw organisatie met het samenwerken met deze partners?

Doorvragen:

- Positief of negatief? Waarom?
 - Kunt u hier voorbeelden van geven?
- Wat is uw algemene opvatting over de manier waarop de provincie de ILG heeft ingericht?

Doorvragen:

- Positief of negatief? Waarom?

2) Selectie van partners

Vanaf hier gaan we verder over specifieke onderdelen van de beslissingen die de provincie heeft genomen in het proces om het ILG-proces gestalte te geven. Het eerste onderdeel is hierbij de selectie van partners. De provincie Overijssel had de keuze om te komen tot een selectie van partners. Ze waren hierbij vrij om niet overheidsgeleide actoren toe te laten, maar hebben hier niet voor gekozen. Zij hebben alleen overheden toegelaten in de BGO's; gemeenten en waterschappen.

- Zijn er, naar uw idee, voldoende partners betrokken *bij het komen tot een ontwerp* van het ILG in Overijssel?
- Zijn er, naar uw idee, voldoende partners betrokken in de BGO's?
- Had u graag gezien dat er meer maatschappelijke organisaties en andere niet-overheidsinstellingen plaats hadden genomen in de BGO's?

Doorvragen:

- Nee: Waarom niet?/ Ja: waarom?

Voorbeeld:

- Bent u van mening dat het betrekken van (meer) maatschappelijke partners de effectiviteit van het besluitvormingsproces zou verlagen?
- Denkt u dat juist gemeenten en waterschappen de aangewezen partijen zijn om ervoor te zorgen dat álle burgers vertegenwoordigd zijn in de BGO (argument: de hardste schreeuwers worden vaak alleen gehoord)

Doorvragen:

- Ja: Om welke redenen had u dit graag gewild?

Voorbeeld:

- Bent u van mening dat het betrekken van (meer) maatschappelijke partners de effectiviteit en kwaliteit van het beleid had vergroot?
 - Bent u van mening dat middels het betrekken van maatschappelijke partners burgers makkelijker en directer betrokken hadden kunnen worden bij het besluitvormingsproces?
 - Denkt u dat het betrekken van partners de ambtelijke druk op uw organisatie had kunnen verminderen?
- Had u, als u de keuze had gehad, gekozen voor méér of minder betrokkenheid van maatschappelijke organisaties in het besluitvormingsproces? Waarom?

3) Betrekken van de geselecteerde ILG-actoren bij de besluitvorming omtrent het ontwerp van de ILG en de sturingsprocessen die hierbij werden ingezet

Aan het begin van het ILG proces, hebben de provincies het ILG-netwerk binnen hun provincie kunnen ontwerpen. Er was gedurende dit besluitvormingsproces de mogelijkheid om partners te betrekken middels bijvoorbeeld klankbordbijeenkomsten. De volgende vragen hebben op dit proces betrekking.

- Wat is uw algemene opvatting over de manier waarop het wettelijk kader van het ILG in de provincie Overijssel is opgesteld (dus niet over de functionering van het mechanisme an sich)?
 - Bent u van mening dat uw organisatie voldoende is betrokken bij het opstellen van het kader?
- Doorvragen
- Ja: Op welke manier is uw organisatie betrokken?

Voorbeeld:

- Klankborddiscussies
- Inspraakvergaderingen

- Nee: Vind u dat uw organisatie meer betrokken had moeten worden in dit proces? Zo ja, op welke manier?
 - Klankborddiscussies
 - Inspraakvergaderingen
 - Besluitvorming omtrent kaders in BGO-verband
- Als uw organisatie betrokken is, heeft u dan het idee dat de inbreng van uw organisatie serieus is genomen door de provincie?

4) Manier van contractering

Afspraken tussen gemeenten en provincies zijn vastgelegd in convenanten en beschikkingen. Ik ben benieuwd naar het tot stand komen van deze contracten en uw mening over de keuzes die de provincie gemaakt heeft op het gebied van contractering. Het volgende gedeelte zal dan ook hierop betrekking hebben.

- De afspraken tussen uw organisatie en de provincie zijn vastgelegd in een convenant. Wat is uw mening over deze vorm van het vastleggen van doelen en afspraken?
- Hoe hebt u het proces van opstellen van deze convenanten ervaren? Is er in dit proces volgens u (voldoende) rekening gehouden met eventuele bezwaren, opmerkingen of suggesties vanuit uw organisatie?
- Sommige Nederlandse provincies hebben het besluit genomen om de convenanten die afgesloten zijn met BGO's niet door te vertalen in beschikkingen per gemeente. Wat vindt u van een dergelijke constructie?
- Heeft u de doorvertaling van het convenant dat met de BGO's is afgesproken naar een beschikking effect gehad op de samenwerking en uitwisseling tussen partners?
 - Zo ja: was dit een belemmering? Op welke manier? (creativiteit, efficiency, etc.)
- Beschouwt u de doelen en afspraken die in het convenant tussen provincie en organisatie gemaakt zijn als bindende afspraken, of eerder als richtlijnen?
- In hoeverre denkt u dat uw organisatie bereid zou zijn geweest om méér te leveren dan voorgeschreven in het contract, zonder dat hier iets tegenover stond, mocht dit aan de orde zijn geweest?

Voorbeeld:

 - Zijn er projecten die wellicht wel waren opgestart als voor een minder rigide vorm van het vastleggen van afspraken was gekozen?

5) Ontwerp BGO

Één van de rijksdoelen, gesteld in het nationale ILG-plan, was dat de ILG het gebiedsgerichte werken moest promoten. De provincie Overijssel heeft dit vertaald naar het werken via BGO's en aanjaagteams. De BGO had een voorzitter, ondersteund door personeel van de provincie. Het volgende gedeelte van de vragenlijst richt zich op de mate van zelfstandigheid die de BGO's hebben gekregen.

- In hoeverre beschouwt u de BGO's als zelfstandige organen? (in tegenstelling tot door de provincie gestuurde organen)
- Als uw organisatie zelf een ontwerp had neer mogen leggen voor de BGO's, zouden deze er dan hetzelfde hebben uitgezien?

Voorbeeld:

- Hoe had uw organisatie het voorzitterschap van de BGO ingekleed?

- Hoe had uw organisatie de aanjaagteams vormgegeven?
 - Hoe had uw organisatie de ambtelijke ondersteuning van de BGO vormgegeven?
- Vanaf de start van het ILG is er gewerkt met gedeputeerden als BGO-voorzitters. Begin 2008 zijn deze vervangen door neutrale voorzitters. Wat is uw mening over deze beslissing?
- In hoeverre bent u van mening dat de voorzitter vanaf dit moment een onafhankelijke rol speelde?
- Bent u achteraf gezien tevreden met de manier waarop de BGO's zijn ingericht en met de competenties die de BGO's hebben gekregen?

6) Het proces

Natuurlijk is het ontwerp van het ILG belangrijk, maar het proces is dat eveneens. Ik ben benieuwd naar uw ervaringen gedurende de looptijd van het ILG (2007 – 2013). Het volgende gedeelte zal hierover gaan.

- Wat is uw mening over de kwaliteit van de samenwerking in de BGO's?
- Wat vindt u van de samenwerking binnen de aanjaagteams?
- Wat vindt u van de ondersteuning die de provincie uw organisatie heeft geboden?
- Wat vindt u van de ondersteuning die de provincie de BGO's heeft geboden?
(denk aan formulering, geen opsomming!)
- In hoeverre bent u van mening dat het ILG proces de samenwerking tussen gemeenten en waterschappen in uw BGO heeft geïntensiveerd?
- In hoeverre hebt u bekend met voorbeelden waarbij binnen BGO's verbanden gelegd zijn voor samenwerking in andere beleidsterreinen?
- Is uw organisatie, gedurende de looptijd van het ILG, de afspraken die gemaakt zijn met de provincie nagekomen?
- Als er onduidelijkheid is of de provincie haar verplichtingen nakomt aan uw organisatie, zou u de provincie dan het voordeel van de twijfel geven?
 - Doorvragen: Waarom?

7) Doelformulering

- In hoeverre bent u tevreden over de manier waarop de ILG-doelen van deze provincie zijn geformuleerd?
- In hoeverre bent u van mening dat uw organisatie voldoende mogelijkheden had eigen doelen te verwezelijken binnen het ILG programma?

8) Sturing

- Wat is uw mening over de evaluatiecriteria die gehanteerd zijn door de provincie?

Extra Verduidelijking:

- De keuze was er tussen het evalueren op het behalen van doelen (bijvoorbeeld: verbetering fietsinfrastructuur) of prestaties (bijvoorbeeld: aanleg 30 km fietspad). Bent u tevreden met de keuze die de provincie hierin gemaakt heeft? (evalueren op prestaties)
- De provincie heeft initieel aangegeven te willen evalueren op doelbereiking, niet op de gebruikte instrumenten en methoden (dus niet op *prestaties*). Uiteindelijk is er toch voor gekozen op basis van instrumenten en methoden (*prestaties*) te evalueren en subsidie toe te kennen. Wat is uw mening over deze verandering in strategie?
- Is het voorgekomen dat uw organisatie van mening was dat het wellicht verstandig was om te kiezen voor andere *prestaties* om te komen tot het in de convenanten en beschikkingen gestelde *doelen*?

Doorvragen:

- Ja: Wat is uw mening over de manier waarop de provincie met dergelijke suggesties is omgesprongen?
- Nee: Had u het idee dat het mogelijk was om met de provincie te overleggen over het inzetten van andere methoden of instrumenten om tot de te behalen doelen te komen?

9) Flexibiliteit en conflictoplossing

Gedurende het proces kan het zo zijn dat blijkt dat bepaalde zaken niet werken, of dat er toch misrekeningen zijn gemaakt zijn in de ontwerpfasen. Hier kan op verschillende manieren mee worden omgegaan. Het volgende gedeelte gaat over de flexibiliteit gedurende het proces.

- In hoeverre had u het idee dat er na het begin van de ILG nog te tornen viel aan de afspraken over prestaties gemaakt tussen gemeenten en provincies in convenanten en beschikkingen?
- In hoeverre ziet u de provincie als een flexibele partner?
- Zijn er, gedurende de looptijd van het ILG zaken aan de orde geweest waarbij er onenigheid was tussen uw organisatie en de provincie?
- Hoe is deze situatie afgehandeld?

APPENDIX V: RESPONDENTS OVERVIEW

Interviews	
<i>Brabant</i>	<i>Overijssel</i>
Gemeente Reusel-de Mierden	Gemeente Enschede
Gemeente Nuenen, Gerwen & Nederwetten	Gemeente Haaksbergen
Gemeente Geldrop-Mierlo	Gemeente Borne
Staatsbosbeheer De Baronie	Gemeente Ommen-Hardenberg
Gemeente Laarbeek	Gemeente Steenwijkerland
	Waterschap Groot-Salland

Other sources (extra interviews, phone calls)	
<i>Brabant</i>	<i>Overijssel</i>
Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven (interview)	Provincie Overijssel (interview)
Provincie Brabant (phone call)	Natuur & Milieu Overijssel (phone call)

	Surveys	
Nr.	Brabant	Overijssel
1	Streekontwikkeling Boven-Dommel	Gem. Hardenberg
2	Grontmij Eindhoven	Gem. Olst-Wijhe
3	Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven	Gem. Hellendoorn
4	Gemeente Gemert-Bakel	Waterschap Vechtstromen
5	Gemeente Heeze-Leende	Gem. Hof van Twente
6	Gemeente Cranendonck	Gem. Zwolle
7	Gemeente Bladel	Gem. Almelo
8	Gemeente Geldrop-Mierlo	Waterschap Groot Salland
9	Gemeente Nuenen	Gem. Enschede
10	Gemeente Laarbeek	Gem. Deventer
11	Staatsbosbeheer De Baronie	Gem. Wierden
12	Gemeente Eindhoven	Gem. Zwartwaterland
13		Gem. Dalfsen
14		Gem. Steenwijkerland
15		Gem. Hengelo
16		Gem. Haaksbergen
17		Gem. Borne

APPENDIX VI: SOURCES OF "COMPARING INTEGRALITY"

Province of Overijssel	Province of Brabant
<i>Provinciaal meerjarenplan Zuidwest-Twente (2006)</i>	<i>Responsnota ontwerpplan Buitengebied Gemeente Laarbeek (2010)</i>
<i>Provinciaal meerjarenplan Noordoost Overijssel (2006)</i>	<i>Bestemmingsplan Buitengebied Gemeente Nuenen, Gerwen & Nederwetten (2010)</i>
<i>Provinciaal meerjarenplan Salland (2006)</i>	<i>Bestemmingsplan Buitengebied Gemeente Geldrop-Mierlo (2010)</i>
<i>Provinciaal meerjarenplan Noordoost-Twente (2006)</i>	<i>Jaarverslag Reconstructiecommissie Reusel (2007)</i>
<i>Pmjp-atlas Overijssel (2013)</i>	<i>Ruimtelijke Agenda Gemeente Heeze-Leende</i>
	<i>Gebiedsproces "Reuseldal", versie 2.0 (2014)</i>
	<i>Reconstructieplan De Peel (ontwerp collectieve herziening) (2011)</i>

APPENDIX VII: OPERATIONALIZATION OF TRUST

Measurement	Item	SPSS Variable	Questions	Question weight	Subweight
1. Agreement Trust	Parties generally live up to agreements made with each other.				0,2
	Absense of conflicts	Conflicts	"Mijn organisatie heeft gedurende de looptijd van het ILG weinig conflicten gehad met de provincie over de uitvoering van projecten **"	0,5	
	Perceived provincial agreement trust	Provincial_trust	"Ik denk dat de provincie vertrouwen heeft dat mijn organisatie haar afspraken met de provincie na zal komen"	0,5	
2. Benefit of the doubt.	The parties give one another the benefit of the doubt.				0,2
	Flexibility	Flexibility_province_general	"De provincie is een flexibele partner"	0,5	
	Deviating from contracts	Flexibility_contracts_ILG	"Gedurende de looptijd van het ILG stond de provincie open voor ideeën vanuit mijn organisatie die afwijken van wat in het convenant of het gebiedsprogramma was overeengekomen **"	0,5	
3. Reliability	The parties in the project keep in mind the intentions of other parties				0,2
	The provincial government keeps my organizations wishes in mind	Opinions_takenintoaccount	"De provincie houdt in het algemeen rekening met de wensen van mijn organisatie"	0,5	
	The provincial government takes my organizations wishes seriously	Opinions_takenseriously	"De provincie neemt in het algemeen de mening van mijn organisatie serieus "	0,5	
4. Absence of opportunistic behavior	Parties do not use contributions of others for their own advantage				0,2
	Opportunistic behavior of the responding organization	Egoism_policynetwork	"Mijn organisatie heeft binnen het ILG haar uiterste best gedaan zo veel mogelijk middelen te vergaren voor de realisatie van haar eigen doelen"	0,5 (reversed)	
	Perceived opportunistic behavior of the provincial government	Goal_priotization_province	"Gedurende de looptijd van het ILG probeerde de provincie vooral haar eigen doelen te behalen, ook als dat ten koste ging van de doelen van haar partners "	0,5 (reversed)	
5. Goodwill trust	Parties can assume that the intentions of the other parties are good in principle				0,2
	Perceived goodwill of the provincial government	Good_will_province	"De provincie heeft het beste voor met het landelijk gebied "	0,5	
	Goal harmony	Goal_harmony	"De provincie streeft in het algemeen dezelfde doelen na als mijn organisatie in het landelijk gebied "	0,5	
					Total: 1

APPENDIX VIII: SCALE OF "ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS"

Org.	Province	Selfishness	Trustworthiness1	Trustworthiness2	Total avg.
1	1	1	3		2,0
2	1	2	3	3	2,7
3	1	0	4	2	2,0
4	1	0	4		2,0
5	1	1	2	2	1,7
6	1	1	3		2,0
7	1	1	4	4	3,0
8	1				n/a
9	1	2	3	1	2,0
10	1	0	3	2	1,7
11	1	1	3	3	2,3
12	1	0	4	2	2,0
13	1	0	2	2	1,3
14	1	1	3	3	2,3
15	1	1	3	3	2,3
16	1	3	3		3,0
17	1	3	3		3,0
18	0	2	2	2	2,0
19	0	4	4	4	4,0
20	0	3	3	2	2,7
21	0	0	2	1	1,0
22	0	1	2	2	1,7
23	0	2	3	4	3,0
24	0	0	4	3	2,3
25	0	2	4	2	2,7
26	0	2	3		2,5
27	0				n/a
28	0	0			n/a
29	0	1	3	3	2,3